Internet-Draft Composite ML-DSA Code Points for TLS November 2026
Beck, et al. Expires 23 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Transport Layer Security
Internet-Draft:
draft-beck-tls-hybrid-codepoints-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
B. Beck
OpenSSL
D. O'Brien
Apple Inc.
C. A. Wood
Cloudflare

TLS 1.3 Code Points for Composite ML-DSA Signature Algorithms

Abstract

This document allocates TLS SignatureScheme code points for the Composite ML-DSA signature algorithms that [RFC10073] short-lists for implementation, and specifies the parameters an implementation needs to use them interoperably in TLS 1.3.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://bob-beck.github.io/draft-beck-hybrid-codepoints/draft-beck-tls-hybrid-codepoints.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-beck-tls-hybrid-codepoints/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer Security Working Group mailing list (mailto:tls@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/bob-beck/draft-beck-hybrid-codepoints.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2027.

▲

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

[RFC10073] defines Composite ML-DSA signature algorithms, each pairing ML-DSA [FIPS204] with a traditional signature algorithm, and allocates an object identifier for each so that they can be used in X.509 certificates. Section 10.4 of that document short-lists six of them for implementation.

TLS 1.3 [RFC9846] negotiates signature algorithms using values from the TLS SignatureScheme registry, which has none for Composite ML-DSA. This document allocates one code point for each of those six algorithms, and specifies the parameters that the code point alone does not determine.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

"Composite ML-DSA" refers to the signature scheme of [RFC10073].

3. Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3

3.1. SignatureScheme Values

This document adds the following values to the TLS SignatureScheme namespace defined in Section 4.3.3 of [RFC9846], for use in the "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions.

enum {
    mldsa44_ed25519_sha512          (TBD1),
    mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256  (TBD2),
    mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_sha512      (TBD3),
    mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512  (TBD4),
    mldsa65_ed25519_sha512          (TBD5),
    mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512  (TBD6)
} SignatureScheme;

Each value corresponds to exactly one algorithm of [RFC10073]. Table 1 identifies each by the object identifier that appears in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of a certificate carrying a key for that algorithm. The names transliterate the Composite ML-DSA algorithm names, using the curve names of the TLS NamedGroup registry where these differ. Names carry no TLS-level processing semantics.

Table 1: Mapping to Composite ML-DSA Algorithms
Description Algorithm Identifier
mldsa44_ed25519_sha512 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.39
mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.40
mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_sha512 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.41
mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.45
mldsa65_ed25519_sha512 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.48
mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.49

3.2. Signing and Verification

TLS treats Composite ML-DSA as a single opaque signature algorithm, as it does Ed25519. The composite construction, its component algorithms, and its pre-hash are fixed by the negotiated scheme and specified in [RFC10073].

When a scheme defined in this document is negotiated, the CertificateVerify signature is computed over the signing input of Section 4.5.2 of [RFC9846] using Composite-ML-DSA.Sign, and verified using Composite-ML-DSA.Verify (Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC10073]).

The context (ctx) parameter MUST be the empty string. The ctx parameter of [RFC10073] is not the context string of Section 4.5.2 of [RFC9846].

3.3. Restrictions

The schemes defined in this document MUST NOT be used with TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or any earlier version. An endpoint that receives one of these schemes in the ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify message of a connection that negotiated TLS 1.2 or earlier MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. Offering them in a "signature_algorithms" extension is not an error; a TLS 1.2 peer ignores values it does not recognize.

These schemes apply equally to DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147].

4. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC10073] apply. TLS authentication requires existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack; Section 9.2 of [RFC10073] discusses the unforgeability properties of Composite ML-DSA.

5. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to add the following entries to the TLS SignatureScheme registry, according to the procedures of Section 16 of [RFC9847]. The Reference for every entry is this document.

Table 2: TLS SignatureScheme Registry Additions
Value Description Recommended
TBD1 mldsa44_ed25519_sha512 N
TBD2 mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 N
TBD3 mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_sha512 N
TBD4 mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512 N
TBD5 mldsa65_ed25519_sha512 N
TBD6 mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512 N

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9846]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.
[RFC9847]
Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS", RFC 9847, DOI 10.17487/RFC9847, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9847>.
[RFC10073]
Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Pala, M., Klaußner, J., and S. Fluhrer, "Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for Use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 10073, DOI 10.17487/RFC10073, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10073>.

6.2. Informative References

[FIPS204]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 204, , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.
[RFC5246]
Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.
[RFC9147]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>.

Acknowledgments

TODO acknowledge.

Authors' Addresses

Bob Beck
OpenSSL
Devon O'Brien
Apple Inc.
Christopher A. Wood
Cloudflare