Independent Submission S. Das Internet-Draft Independent Intended status: Informational 18 November 2026 Expires: 22 May 2027 AI Safety and Custody Security: Execution Finality at the Signing, Delegation and Withdrawal Boundaries of Cryptocurrency Systems draft-das-crypto-execution-finality-00 Abstract A cryptographically valid signature can authorize a transaction that the organization never intended. The hard problem in digital-asset custody is therefore not only protecting keys. It is stopping compromised workflows, delegated code, misleading transaction displays, stolen credentials, and legitimate automation (including AI agents) from turning broad technical capability into unrestricted transfers. This document proposes defender-controlled, consequence-specific authorization at three boundaries: signing, wallet execution, and withdrawal release. The defender reconstructs the operation that would actually take effect from the transaction bytes and account state, holds it in a non-effective state, evaluates it against independent policy and a protected exposure ledger, and releases only a bounded, act-bound, single-use authority at a mandatory enforcement point. The document specifies placement by chain type, requirements, a state machine with crash and reorganization handling, EIP-7702 delegation controls, a catalogue of edge cases and twenty-four threat scenarios, and an acceptance-test method with a reference simulator. It states the limits plainly: an off-chain gate cannot stop a leaked key that submits directly to a permissionless network, and it fails if the enforcement layer is bypassed or compromised. No deployment, measured latency, or real-world prevention is claimed. Status of This Document This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. This is an individual, independent-submission Internet-Draft. It is a technical proposal and has not been adopted by any IETF working group. Basis of disclosure: this document is based on the Mothership application PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and publicly disclosed (published as WO 2026/150382 A2) on 16 July 2026. The full filing can be read by searching "Sangam Das" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE, by Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 searching PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615), or at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/ . The filing text, not this draft, is authoritative for the patent disclosure. Incident descriptions are drawn from public third-party reports and are treated as reported accounts, not as independently reconstructed chain forensics. Any mention of products, standards, or organizations is for technical context only. It is not an endorsement, validation, or statement of infringement, and no third- party adoption is implied. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. How to Read This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Incident Evidence and Factual Separation . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Reported Exchange Theft, October 2026 . . . . . . . . . . 7 Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 3.2. Reported Exchange Theft, February 2025 . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Reported Outage-Themed Phishing, November 2026 . . . . . 8 3.4. What the Evidence Supports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Problem Statement: A Signature Is Not Consequence Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. Why Conventional Controls Can Leave a Gap . . . . . . . . 9 5. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1. Protected Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. Attacker Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.3. Trust Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.4. Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. Three Control Planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2. The Attacker Does Not Implement Candidate Acts . . . . . 14 7. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. Finality Sink Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.1. Placement Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.2. Placement by Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.3. Placement by Chain Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9. Conceptual Data Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. State Machine and Crash Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 11. Exposure Ledger and Bounded Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11.1. Reserve, Commit, Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11.2. Ledger Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12. EIP-7702 Delegation Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12.1. Mechanics Relevant to Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 12.2. Defensive Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 13. Signing-Surface Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 14. Custody Models and Operational Trade-Offs . . . . . . . . . . 25 15. Independence and Shared-Failure Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 27 16. AI Agents, MCP, and Delegated Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 17. Cross-Chain, Bridge, Stablecoin, and Allowance Hazards . . . 29 18. Edge Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 18.1. Chain and Settlement Edge Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 18.2. Asset and Token Edge Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 18.3. System and Operations Edge Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 19. Threat Scenario Catalogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 19.1. T1: Leaked Hot-Wallet Key and Delegation to an Attacker Sweeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 19.2. T2: Parallel Multi-Chain Drain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 19.3. T3: Compromised Signing Interface Misleading Multisig Signers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 19.4. T4: Induced Delegation to Malicious or Mutable Code . . 35 19.5. T5: Speculative Authorization Batch Over a Nonce Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 19.6. T6: Split Withdrawals Below Per-Transaction Limits . . . 36 19.7. T7: Allowance and Permit Drain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 19.8. T8: Hidden Effects Through Multicall, Delegatecall, and Hooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 19.9. T9: Bridge Release and Finality Mismatch . . . . . . . . 37 19.10. T10: Upgrade-Admin Takeover Replacing the Policy Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 19.11. T11: Insider or Policy Administrator Approves Theft . . 38 19.12. T12: Compromised Validator or Signer Fabricates Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 19.13. T13: Break-Glass and Emergency Signer Abuse . . . . . . 39 19.14. T14: Prompt-Injected AI Agent Requests a Withdrawal . . 39 19.15. T15: Phishing to Cloud Account to Treasury Instruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 19.16. T16: Address Poisoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 19.17. T17: Valuation and Oracle Manipulation of Caps . . . . . 41 19.18. T18: Retry or Reorganization Spending the Same Budget Twice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 19.19. T19: Validator Denial of Service to Force Fail-Open . . 42 19.20. T20: Supply-Chain Compromise of the Signer or Validator Build . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 19.21. T21: Social Engineering of Recovery, Rotation, or Help Desk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 19.22. T22: Stale Policy Bundle Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 19.23. T23: Cross-Chain Replay of a Broad Authorization . . . . 43 19.24. T24: Customer Account Takeover Withdrawing to a New Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 20. Simulation and Evaluation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 20.1. Three Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 20.2. Rules for Real Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 20.3. Simulator Scenarios and Threat Mapping . . . . . . . . . 45 21. Latency and Throughput Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 22. Deployment Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 23. Operations: Revocation, Recovery, and Monitoring . . . . . . 48 24. Falsifiable Acceptance Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 25. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 26. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 27. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 28. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 29. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 29.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 29.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Appendix A. Reference Simulator and Results . . . . . . . . . . 52 A.1. How the Arms Are Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 A.2. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 A.3. Extending the Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Appendix B. Frequently Asked Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 B.1. Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 B.2. The incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 B.3. Design questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 B.4. Operations and limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 B.5. Patents and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Appendix C. Basis of Disclosure and Patent Notice . . . . . . . 59 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 1. Introduction Digital-asset custody has strong cryptographic building blocks: hardware security modules, multi-party computation, multisignature wallets, smart-contract wallets, transaction simulation, allowlists, rate limits, and chain monitoring. Large losses still occur when a signature that verifies correctly authorizes a consequence nobody approved. A multisignature threshold can be met while signers read an altered display. An HSM can correctly sign a request produced by compromised middleware. A delegated account can run code whose powers are far broader than its owner understood. A hot wallet can be emptied within minutes, faster than any human response. Two public incidents motivate the problem, and this document keeps them separate (Section 3). The February 2025 theft from a major exchange involved tampering with a multisignature signing interface. The October 2026 reported theft from a major exchange's hot wallets involved leaked signing capability and, on at least one chain, an EIP-7702 delegation [EIP-7702]. Neither incident is reconstructed here, and this document does not claim the proposed architecture would have prevented either. The architecture here asks one additional question at the last enforceable boundary: given the exact bytes, account state, destination, value, code, and remaining exposure budget, may this specific operation take effect now? It complements multisig, MPC, HSMs, contract audits, risk engines, and monitoring. It replaces none of them. 1.1. Scope The document covers: signing services and HSM or MPC policy layers; programmable wallets and smart accounts on EVM-compatible chains; centralized-exchange withdrawal release; bridge and treasury-upgrade paths; and AI agents or automation that prepare or request such operations. It addresses non-programmable chains only at the signing and release boundary, where on-chain policy is unavailable. 1.2. Non-Goals * Preventing phishing, key theft, or malware infection on user or staff devices. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 * Overruling a public blockchain: a validly signed transaction submitted directly to the network executes according to the chain's rules. * Replacing smart-contract auditing, formal verification, or consensus security. * Attributing any incident to any actor. 1.3. How to Read This Document Sections 3 to 5 give the evidence, the problem, and the threat model. Sections 6 to 11 give the architecture, requirements, data objects, state machine, and exposure accounting. Sections 12 to 18 cover EIP- 7702, signing hazards, custody models, independence, agents, bridges, and edge cases. Section 19 is the threat-scenario catalogue. Section 20 and Appendix A give the evaluation method and the reference simulator results. Appendix B collects objections. 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The names below describe architectural roles in this proposal. They are not established protocol or standard terms. Protected Consequence An effect whose unauthorized occurrence is unacceptable: a transfer, an allowance or permit, a code-delegation change, a withdrawal, a contract upgrade, a bridge release, a key or credential issuance, or a signature that releases any of these. Candidate Act The defender-side representation of the operation that would actually take effect, reconstructed from transaction bytes, calldata, account state, code hashes, delegate paths, and asset semantics, not from a request's description or a user-interface rendering. Non-Effective State A staging state in which the Candidate Act has produced no protected effect. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Protected Validator A defender-controlled component, isolated from the transaction builder, that evaluates policy for a Candidate Act. Finality Sink The enforcement point that refuses to sign, execute, or release a Protected Consequence unless valid, current, act-bound authority is verified. It can be a protected signer, a wallet or contract rule, or an exchange withdrawal-release service. Bounded Authority Authorization limited to one Candidate Act or one narrow capability, by asset, amount, beneficiary, chain, target, code hash, time, and security epoch, consumable a bounded number of times. Exposure Ledger A protected shared record of committed and reserved value, supporting atomic reserve, commit, and release across parallel signers, agents, and chains. Receipt Authenticated evidence that binds a phase and its observed result to a Candidate Act, used for reconciliation and for deciding later authority. Mandatory A control is Mandatory for an effect if no route reaches that effect without passing it. Everything in this document depends on this property. 3. Incident Evidence and Factual Separation 3.1. Reported Exchange Theft, October 2026 Public reports describe a large theft from a major exchange's hot wallets on 29 October 2026, on the order of USD 6.3 billion across several chains, including an Ethereum address labelled "Binance 14" on a block explorer. Reports describe an EIP-7702 delegation installing attacker-chosen code on that address, with the transfers submitted by a different address. Reports also say the delegation explains only part of the total: withdrawals on chains without account delegation, and ordinary signed transfers from another Ethereum wallet, were also reported, and several analyses point to how signing capability was obtained as the root cause rather than to the delegation feature [INCIDENT-REPORTS]. Some analyses describe about fifty delegation authorizations of which one matched the live account nonce. At least one source labels its nonce-range Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 explanation as its own inference, so this document treats it as a test case, not as established fact. All figures and mechanisms in this section are third-party accounts requiring independent on-chain and primary-source confirmation. 3.2. Reported Exchange Theft, February 2025 The February 2025 loss, reported at about USD 1.5 billion, is a separate case. A Japanese Financial Services Agency research paper discusses tampering with a multisignature wallet's web interface and misleading signer presentation [FSA-BYBIT]. EIP-7702 is not established as the mechanism of that theft, and the two incidents MUST NOT be conflated. 3.3. Reported Outage-Themed Phishing, November 2026 Following a Microsoft 365 service disruption on 12 November 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported a campaign on 13 November 2026 impersonating service-health notices, claiming held mail would be deleted within 24 hours unless a link was followed, and assessed it as consistent with credential phishing [MSFT-PHISH]. Public evidence does not establish credential capture, account takeover, or any downstream cryptocurrency loss. This document uses the campaign only as a plausible entry-stage pattern (Section 19.15). 3.4. What the Evidence Supports +===============+=====================+=============================+ | Evidence | Supported reading | Caution | +===============+=====================+=============================+ | Exchange | Valid signing | Third-party reports; | | theft, Oct | capability plus | delegation does not | | 2026 | delegation to | explain all losses; | | | attacker code on at | root cause of key or | | | least one chain | signature compromise | | | | not established here | +---------------+---------------------+-----------------------------+ | Exchange | Compromised signing | Separate event; not | | theft, Feb | presentation in a | an EIP-7702 case | | 2025 | multisig workflow | | +---------------+---------------------+-----------------------------+ | Outage-themed | High-volume | No established | | phishing, Nov | credential-phishing | account compromise | | 2026 | lure | or custody impact | +---------------+---------------------+-----------------------------+ | This proposal | Candidate Act plus | Proposed; not shown | | | independent | to prevent any | Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 | | consequence gate | incident | +---------------+---------------------+-----------------------------+ Table 1: Evidence, supported reading, and caution These events support a defensible question: how can a custody system tell technically valid signing or execution apart from authorization of the actual destination, value, code path, and effect? They do not prove the proposal was present, absent, novel, effective, or sufficient. 4. Problem Statement: A Signature Is Not Consequence Authority A signature proves that a signing capability was used under specified rules. It does not prove the organization intended the real downstream effect. Define the invariant: No Protected Consequence occurs unless the reconstructed effective operation satisfies a fresh, independently evaluated policy and the final effectuation boundary enforces that decision. The invariant is conditional on complete mediation. If a private key or an existing on-chain allowance permits a direct, unmediated transfer, an external validator cannot stop it afterwards. 4.1. Why Conventional Controls Can Leave a Gap Modern custody already uses transaction policy engines, MPC approvals, allowlists, rate limits, time delays, code simulation, and monitoring, and these block many attacks. The claim here is narrower than "conventional controls fail". It is that three structural gaps can remain even when each control is correctly implemented. Semantic gap Controls verify who or what is signing, not necessarily what the final operation does. Multisig counts signatures over bytes signers may have seen misrepresented. An HSM signs a digest it is given. Simulation predicts behavior, but hidden state changes, upgradeable proxies, time-dependent logic, and multi-step composition can defeat it. Allowances and delegations grant future power without moving funds at signing time. Irreversibility gap Settlement on public chains is final within minutes. Monitoring and alerting detect, but a loss that completes in about twenty minutes is faster than most response processes. Detection is necessary and is not prevention. Evidence after the effect cannot undo it. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Mediation gap A control protects only the routes that pass through it. A leaked raw key, an alternate signer, an emergency credential, a batch job, a direct RPC submission, a second chain, or a previously issued permit can reach the effect without passing the gate. Per- chain controls miss global intent. Per-transaction caps miss aggregation. The table below states, for common controls, what each establishes and what can remain open. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 +=================+====================+============================+ | Control | What it | Residual gap | | | establishes | | +=================+====================+============================+ | MFA, IAM, | Identity or | Not exact asset, | | conditional | permitted | destination, or code | | access | service access | intent | +-----------------+--------------------+----------------------------+ | Multisig | Threshold of | Signers can approve | | | signatures | misrepresented bytes | +-----------------+--------------------+----------------------------+ | HSM / MPC | Key protection, | Compromised request | | | distributed | construction; policy often | | | signing | limited to simple fields | +-----------------+--------------------+----------------------------+ | Allowlists, | Known | Approvals, delegations, | | per-transaction | destination, | and aggregation can bypass | | caps | bounded single | | | | transfer | | +-----------------+--------------------+----------------------------+ | Transaction | Predicted call | Hidden state, mutable | | simulation | behavior | code, ordering, and | | | | composition | +-----------------+--------------------+----------------------------+ | Monitoring, | Detection and | Late relative to | | alerts | investigation | irreversible settlement | +-----------------+--------------------+----------------------------+ | Smart-contract | Review of code | Upgrades, delegation to | | audit | at a point in | other code, deployment- | | | time | time substitution | +-----------------+--------------------+----------------------------+ | Finality gate | Exact protected | Fails if bypassed, | | (proposed) | effect | corrupted, or the key | | | authorized | submits directly to the | | | | chain | +-----------------+--------------------+----------------------------+ Table 2: Conventional controls and residual gaps AI agents enlarge the surface by composing tools, iterating after failure, and operating at volume. The same finality problem exists without AI. 5. Threat Model Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 5.1. Protected Assets Funds and tokens under custody; allowances and permits that confer future spending; delegations and account code; signing keys and key shares; policy and governance state; upgrade authority; bridge release authority; withdrawal queues; and the evidence and ledgers that record exposure. 5.2. Attacker Capabilities The attacker MAY: * compromise the transaction builder, dashboard, signer front end, or an AI agent, and control what operators and signers see; * hold stolen service credentials, staff credentials, or one of several approver credentials; * request many signatures, including speculative ones over nonce or parameter ranges; * send requests in parallel across workers, agents, and chains; * exploit retries, timeouts, reorganizations, and replacement transactions; * replay old approvals, old policy bundles, or old receipts; * induce a signer to authorize delegation to attacker-chosen or mutable code; * attempt denial of service against the validator to create pressure to fail open; * claim in natural language, or through a compromised agent, that an operation is approved. 5.3. Trust Assumptions The protection in this document holds only if all of the following hold for the covered effects: the Finality Sink is Mandatory; the Protected Validator and policy authority are not controlled by the attacker; signing keys are non-exportable or the on-chain rule is itself mandatory; and the attacker does not simultaneously control the validator, the sink, the policy authority, and the audit and reconciliation channels. Section 25 lists what happens when these fail. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 5.4. Out of Scope Consensus attacks; compromise of a chain's client software; legal seizure; and attacks that need no signature (for example, direct exploitation of a vulnerable contract that holds funds) are out of scope except where they bear on the sink's placement. 6. Architecture The attacker never has to take part. The defender builds the Candidate Act from what actually arrives at a defender-controlled boundary. Request / workflow / AI tool / operator command | v Reconstruct actual operation: target, value, chain, calldata, code hash, beneficiary, allowance and delegation effects | v Hold as Candidate Act (NON-EFFECTIVE) | v Protected Validator: independent policy, fresh state, epoch, revocation, exposure ledger reservation | +----+--------------------+ | | deny / hold / issue Bounded Authority reconcile (act-bound, single use) | | v v NO EFFECT Finality Sink verifies authority + exact bytes (fail closed) at signer / wallet rule / withdrawal release | v Bounded effect + Receipt Figure 1: Defender-side control sequence (schematic, not an observed incident trace) Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 6.1. Three Control Planes A. Pre-signing control The gate sits inside the protected signing service, MPC policy quorum, or an HSM-adjacent authorization service, not in a web dashboard. It inspects the exact bytes or canonical semantics being signed, never an untrusted UI rendering, and the signer MUST be unable to sign protected effects through another path. Signing is itself a consequential release of authority, because a signed transaction can be broadcast later or through another relay. B. On-chain smart-wallet control Where assets sit in a programmable account, the rule is enforced in the actual contract execution path: destination allowlists, asset and value limits, session constraints, delegate-code allowlists, timelocks or vetoes. An off-chain decision alone is not enough if a valid key can invoke an unrestricted transfer directly. C. Exchange-controlled release control For centralized withdrawals, enforcement sits at the last internal release boundary: the custody transaction builder, signing authority, and broadcast control bind the approved withdrawal request to the exact destination, asset, chain, and amount. Post- broadcast reconciliation is required, but post-event monitoring is not preventive authorization. No single location fits every chain or wallet design. Several gates may be needed. The decisive property is that every protected effect path is mediated. 6.2. The Attacker Does Not Implement Candidate Acts A hostile builder, agent, or stolen credential simply sends ordinary requests. The defender reconstructs the Candidate Act. The attacker cannot avoid the gate by refusing to use it, provided the effect cannot be reached through an unmediated path. 7. Requirements R1. Bytes-derived reconstruction. The gate MUST derive the Candidate Act from the transaction bytes, calldata, account state, code hashes, delegate paths, and asset semantics. It MUST NOT rely on a memo, API endpoint name, or user-interface text. It MUST account for indirect effects: approvals, permits, delegatecall, multicall, hooks, and downstream recipients. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 R2. Complete mediation. Deployments MUST enumerate every route to each Protected Consequence (raw key, alternate signer, emergency signer, direct RPC, private relay, batch job, upgrade admin, bridge executor, previously issued allowance, second chain) and MUST either gate each route or record it as residual risk. A claim of non- bypassability MUST NOT be made without that inventory. R3. Independent policy authority. Policy MUST be held by an authority the transaction builder cannot modify. Policy updates MUST be authenticated, quorum-approved where feasible, versioned with a monotonic epoch, and protected against rollback (Section 19.22). R4. Bounded authority. Authority MUST specify asset, maximum value, cumulative exposure, beneficiary set, chain identifier, target contract, calldata constraints, delegate-code hash, source wallet, expiry, nonce, security epoch, and execution environment. Unspecified fields MUST NOT become wildcards. R5. Act binding and single use. Authority MUST be bound to one Candidate Act or one narrow capability and MUST be consumed at most the permitted number of times, by the intended sink only. It MUST NOT behave as a transferable bearer token. R6. Atomic exposure accounting. The Exposure Ledger MUST reserve value atomically before signing, across all parallel signers, agents, and chains, and MUST hold the reservation through uncertain outcomes (Section 11). R7. Delegation and approval are consequences. Granting a delegation, an allowance, a permit, a session key, or an upgrade right MUST be gated as its own Candidate Act, because it confers future power without moving funds at signing time. R8. Refuse unapproved authorizations. A protected signer MUST NOT produce delegation authorizations, typed-data permits, or similar future-power signatures except for an approved Candidate Act. It MUST NOT sign speculative batches over nonce or parameter ranges. R9. Anti-replay. Authorizations, receipts, and policy bundles MUST carry freshness (nonce, counter, or epoch) and sink-local consumption state. Old approvals and older policy epochs MUST be rejected. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 R10. TOCTOU closure. The decision MUST be bound to an integrity-protected digest of the final operation, the target state version, and the policy epoch, and MUST be rechecked at the sink immediately before or atomically with the effect. R11. Reconciliation, not blind retry. After a timeout, crash, replacement, drop, or reorganization, the system MUST enter HOLD and RECONCILE against authoritative chain state. It MUST NOT sign again with fresh authority until the original outcome is established or explicitly compensated. R12. Fail closed, tiered. If required authority is absent, stale, or unverifiable, the gate MUST prevent high-risk effects. Routine low-risk transfers MAY proceed on a local fast path using signed policy and protected local counters, so that an outage does not itself create pressure to disable the control. R13. Independence. The Protected Validator, policy authority, and signer MUST NOT share an administrator, credential store, or deploy pipeline whose compromise defeats all three. Shared-failure analysis is REQUIRED (Section 15). R14. Governed emergency paths. Break-glass and emergency-signer paths MUST require dual control, carry a small bounded budget and timelock, and be logged to an independent record. R15. Evidence before effect. For consequential acts, authorization evidence SHOULD exist before or atomically with the effect. Receipts MUST be authenticated and bound to the act. R16. Honest limits. Implementations MUST state which effects are covered, which routes are not mediated, and what happens if the sink, validator, or key custody is compromised. 8. Finality Sink Placement Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 8.1. Placement Rule Place the sink in the lowest practical trusted component that exclusively controls the effect, and make every equivalent path converge on it. A check higher in the stack is supplementary if an alternate API, batch job, privileged account, or direct signer can reach the same effect. 8.2. Placement by Consequence +=============+============================+=======================+ | Consequence | Effective gate | Critical bypass to | | | | close | +=============+============================+=======================+ | Hot-wallet | Protected signer plus | Raw key or | | transfer | wallet contract rule | unrestricted RPC | | | | signer | +-------------+----------------------------+-----------------------+ | EIP-7702 | Protected signer refusing | Direct signature | | delegation | unapproved authorizations; | offline; malicious or | | | delegated-code policy | mutable delegate code | +-------------+----------------------------+-----------------------+ | Token | Allowance cap and spender | Previously issued | | approval or | review at signer or wallet | permit; | | permit | | setApprovalForAll | +-------------+----------------------------+-----------------------+ | Exchange | Custody release, sign, and | Privileged batch job | | withdrawal | broadcast control | or emergency key | +-------------+----------------------------+-----------------------+ | Bridge mint | Bridge verifier or release | Alternative bridge | | or release | contract; dual-side proof | executor | +-------------+----------------------------+-----------------------+ | Treasury or | Governance timelock and | Unmediated admin | | contract | upgrade executor with | upgrade | | upgrade | independent veto | | +-------------+----------------------------+-----------------------+ | Key or | HSM or MPC policy before | Alternate signer; | | share | share release | exportable key | | release | | | +-------------+----------------------------+-----------------------+ | Policy | Quorum-signed policy with | Builder-side policy | | update | anti-rollback epoch | edit; replay of old | | | | bundle | +-------------+----------------------------+-----------------------+ Table 3: Effective gate and critical bypass to close Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 8.3. Placement by Chain Capability On-chain policy exists only where the chain's account model supports it. Elsewhere the gate must be at the signer or withdrawal-release layer, and the protection ends at that boundary. +===============+=================+=================+===============+ | Account model | On-chain rule | Where the gate | Main limit | | | possible? | must sit | | +===============+=================+=================+===============+ | EVM | Not by default; | Protected | A leaked key | | externally | possible after | signer; | can sign and | | owned account | delegation to a | delegation | submit | | (EOA) | policy module | approval | directly | +---------------+-----------------+-----------------+---------------+ | EVM smart | Yes (modules, | Contract rule | Upgrade | | account or | session keys, | plus signer | authority and | | ERC-4337 | validators) | | module bugs | | wallet | | | | +---------------+-----------------+-----------------+---------------+ | EOA delegated | Yes, inside the | Signer | Delegate code | | under | delegated code | approving | quality; re- | | EIP-7702 | | delegate hash; | delegation by | | | | delegate | key holder | | | | policy | | +---------------+-----------------+-----------------+---------------+ | UTXO chains | Limited by | HSM or MPC | Script-level | | (for example | script | policy and | covenants | | Bitcoin) | | release layer | limited | +---------------+-----------------+-----------------+---------------+ | Other | Chain-specific | Signer and | Varies by | | account-based | | release layer | chain | | non-EVM | | | features | | chains | | | | +---------------+-----------------+-----------------+---------------+ | Centralized | Not applicable | Withdrawal | Insider and | | exchange | | release and | privileged | | internal | | custody signer | job paths | | ledger | | | | +---------------+-----------------+-----------------+---------------+ Table 4: Where enforcement can live, by account model Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 9. Conceptual Data Objects This section lists what each object needs. It defines no wire format. A future revision or a chain-specific profile could specify canonical serialization (for example JSON canonicalization [RFC8785]), signature suites, and encodings. The field names are illustrative. Candidate Act descriptor act_id; chain_id; transaction type; resolved target and effective callee chain (including delegatecall targets); value; asset and token contract; calldata digest and decoded function; beneficiary set; code hash of each executed or delegated contract; account state version (nonce, balance); delegation designator state for the source account; requested time; originating workload identity. Authority Envelope Reference to the descriptor digest; issuer identity; policy epoch; maximum value and cumulative budget; beneficiary set; allowed code hashes; validity window (not-before, not-after); maximum consumption count; sink identity; nonce or counter; reservation identifier; issuer authenticator. Reservation Reservation id; act id; amount; ledger scope (wallet, global, or asset); state (RESERVED, COMMITTED, RELEASED); expiry; reconciliation owner. Receipt act_id; envelope reference; observed phase and result (for example SIGNED_NOT_BROADCAST, BROADCAST_PENDING, CONFIRMED, REVERTED, REPLACED, DROPPED, REORGED); transaction hash and nonce; confirmation depth; sink identity; sink-local counter; timestamp; authenticator. A Receipt MAY be required before a later phase of a multi-step operation. Much of this can be built from existing primitives: threshold signatures [RFC9591], remote attestation [RFC9334], and typed-data signing [EIP-712]. The document does not claim novelty for those primitives individually. Its subject is the integrated invariants in Section 7. 10. State Machine and Crash Discipline The state machine separates intent, validation, signing, broadcast, and confirmed effect. A wallet or exchange MUST NOT infer actual effects from a memo or endpoint name. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 +=========================+==============+=========================+ | State |Meaning | Allowed next states and | | | | rule | +=========================+==============+=========================+ | PROPOSED |Request | STAGED_NON_EFFECTIVE, | | |received; no | DENIED | | |staging yet | | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ | STAGED_NON_EFFECTIVE |Candidate Act | VALIDATED, DENIED; | | |reconstructed;| expires | | |no effect | | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ | VALIDATED |Policy passed;| SIGNING_RESERVED, | | |budget not yet| DENIED | | |reserved | | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ | SIGNING_RESERVED |Exposure | SIGNED_NOT_BROADCAST, | | |reserved | or release on explicit | | |atomically; | abort | | |authority | | | |issued | | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ | SIGNED_NOT_BROADCAST |Signature | BROADCAST_PENDING; | | |produced; | signature is itself a | | |transaction | consequential release | | |not yet public| | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ | BROADCAST_PENDING |Submitted; | CONFIRMED, REVERTED, | | |outcome | REPLACED, DROPPED, | | |unknown | RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ | CONFIRMED |Included at | Terminal; authority | | |required depth| consumed; reservation | | |for this chain| committed | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ | REVERTED |Included but | Terminal; reservation | | |failed; fee | released after | | |and nonce | reconciliation | | |effects remain| | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ | RECONCILIATION_REQUIRED |Outcome | CONFIRMED, REVERTED, or | | |uncertain | bounded manual | | |(timeout, | resolution; no new | | |reorg, crash) | authority meanwhile | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ | DENIED |Policy failed | Terminal; no effect | | |or authority | | | |absent, stale,| | Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 | |or mismatched | | +-------------------------+--------------+-------------------------+ Table 5: Candidate Act states A successful broadcast is not proof of confirmed settlement, and a receipt is not proof of finality under reorganization. Confirmation depth MUST follow the chain's consensus assumptions. A transaction that reverts can still cost fees and consume a nonce. Each transition has a defined authority, expiry, and idempotency rule. Consumption of authority and reservation MUST be durably recorded before the signature is released, and INDETERMINATE outcomes MUST be resolved by querying authoritative state, never by issuing fresh authority. 11. Exposure Ledger and Bounded Authority 11.1. Reserve, Commit, Release A per-transaction limit does not stop an agent from splitting a large theft into many small transfers. The system keeps a protected cumulative ledger and reserves exposure atomically before any signature. Reservation states are RESERVED, COMMITTED, and RELEASED. A reservation MUST be held through uncertain broadcast outcomes. Releasing it early lets a retry spend the same budget twice (Section 19.18). Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 +=============+==============================+=====================+ | Predicate | Example policy | Failure response | +=============+==============================+=====================+ | Asset | One stablecoin only | Deny other tokens | +-------------+------------------------------+---------------------+ | Beneficiary | Allowlisted treasury account | Hold new address | +-------------+------------------------------+---------------------+ | Per | At most 100 units | Deny 101 | | operation | | | +-------------+------------------------------+---------------------+ | Rolling | At most 300 units per hour | Deny aggregate | | window | | excess | +-------------+------------------------------+---------------------+ | Global cap | At most 400 units across all | Deny aggregate | | | chains | excess on any chain | +-------------+------------------------------+---------------------+ | Delegate | Pinned code hash | Hold code change | +-------------+------------------------------+---------------------+ | Time | Five-minute expiry | Require new | | | | authority | +-------------+------------------------------+---------------------+ Table 6: Example synthetic predicates and failure responses 11.2. Ledger Scope * Multiple agents MUST share one ledger. Agent A reserving 400 and Agent B reserving another 400 against a 500 limit MUST NOT both succeed. * The ledger MUST be chain-agnostic where policy intent is global. Per-chain ledgers allow a split across chains to exceed the global cap (Section 19.2). * Valuation of non-stable assets for USD-denominated caps MUST use a protected price source with bounds, or caps SHOULD be expressed in asset units (Section 19.17). * Rolling windows MUST use a protected monotonic clock source, with defined behavior at window boundaries, daylight-saving transitions, and clock skew. 12. EIP-7702 Delegation Controls Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 12.1. Mechanics Relevant to Defense EIP-7702 [EIP-7702] lets an externally owned account designate executable code through a signed authorization tuple containing a chain identifier, a delegation target address, and a nonce. A transaction carrying an authorization list installs a delegation designator on the account, so the account's own address then runs the delegated code. The delegation persists until replaced, and pointing it to the zero address clears it. The specification warns that poorly designed delegate contracts can allow near-complete control of the account, and it identifies replay protection and binding of value, gas, target, and calldata as security considerations. Points that matter for defenders: * The authorization is a signature. Anyone can submit it, so the submitting address need not be the account owner, and an attacker who can obtain a valid signature can have it relayed from elsewhere. * An authorization may carry chain identifier zero, which the specification allows to apply on any chain. That widens the effect of one signature. * The authorization nonce must match the account's live nonce. A signer that produces authorizations for a range of nonces gives an attacker several chances for one to match. * Delegated code runs in the account's own context and storage. Re- delegation to different code can collide with storage left by earlier code. * Checks that assume an account has no code, or that assume the transaction origin equals the caller, may behave differently for delegated accounts. * Delegation and later execution are separate phases. A protected design must assess both. 12.2. Defensive Design 1. Treat authorization to delegate as a high-risk Candidate Act distinct from any later transfer. 2. The protected signer MUST NOT sign an EIP-7702 authorization unless the descriptor matches an approved delegation act (R8). It MUST NOT sign speculative nonce ranges. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 3. Resolve the actual delegation address from the bytes and verify its code hash, upgradeability, chain scope (including chain identifier zero), nonce, initialization call, account state, intended permissions, and revocation path. 4. Reject delegation to unknown or mutable code. Where a proxy is unavoidable, pin the implementation hash, govern upgrade rights, and monitor. 5. After delegation, enforce per-effect limits inside the delegated implementation or through a mandatory upstream signer. Do not assume the delegation signature enforces downstream spend limits. 6. Pre-authorize a tested revocation path: an authorization that points the account back to the zero address, plus key rotation and sweep procedures (Section 23). 7. Monitor accounts for unexpected delegation designators and alert on any change. The on-chain network cannot consult an off-chain Finality Sink unless the delegated contract is explicitly written to require cryptographic proof or to enforce its own policy. If an attacker already holds the private key and can sign and submit an authorization directly, an off-chain policy cannot prevent it (Section 19.1). 13. Signing-Surface Hazards Misleading presentation A compromised front end can show a familiar destination and description while the bytes change a wallet implementation or grant privileged execution. A second copy of the same compromised front end is not a defense. Use independently sourced payload decoding, known-contract registries, a protected hardware display where feasible, and signer-enforced transaction hashes. Signers should approve a canonical rendering derived from the exact payload, and the protected signer should refuse if the code hash, call target, storage effects, or transfer envelope differ from policy. Blind signing Signing an opaque hash or typed data without decoding it is a consequence-blind act. Clear signing, structured typed data [EIP-712], and signer-side decoding reduce the risk. Typed-data permits can grant spending authority without a transaction. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Allowances and permits An ERC-20 approval or a signed permit can authorize later spending without a fresh owner signature. A policy that checks only immediate outflow misses the authority transfer. Approvals and setApprovalForAll-style grants are Protected Consequences (R7). Address poisoning and lookalike destinations Attackers seed histories with lookalike addresses so an operator copies the wrong one. Beneficiary binding MUST use full-address allowlists and MUST NOT rely on prefix and suffix matching or history. Name resolution A human-readable name can resolve to a different address later. Policy MUST bind the resolved address at decision time and recheck at the sink. Multisignature workflow A multisig satisfies a threshold over bytes. It does not by itself verify the economic effect of an arbitrary contract call. Do not assume a generic hardware wallet or multisig verifies the effect. 14. Custody Models and Operational Trade-Offs Hot wallets favor availability and automated throughput. Cold wallets favor key isolation and deliberate authorization. Both can suffer semantic authorization failures if a signer approves malicious bytes, and the right control placement differs. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 +===============+==========================+=======================+ | Architecture | Primary enforcement | Operational concern | +===============+==========================+=======================+ | Hot-wallet | Signer and withdrawal | Latency, throughput, | | exchange | release; rolling budgets | batching; blast | | | | radius if key leaks | +---------------+--------------------------+-----------------------+ | Cold multisig | Trusted payload | Semantic display | | | rendering and contract | integrity; slow | | | policy | response | +---------------+--------------------------+-----------------------+ | MPC custody | Quorum policy and share | Collusion and shared | | | release | policy failures; | | | | policy expressiveness | +---------------+--------------------------+-----------------------+ | HSM-backed | Policy engine adjacent | HSM signs what the | | signer | to the HSM | builder sends unless | | | | it decodes | +---------------+--------------------------+-----------------------+ | Smart-account | On-chain policy module | Upgrade authority and | | treasury | | delegate security | +---------------+--------------------------+-----------------------+ | EOA with | Wallet signer only | Cannot stop | | direct key | | externally submitted | | | | valid signatures | +---------------+--------------------------+-----------------------+ Table 7: Primary enforcement and operational concern by custody architecture For hot wallets, combine protected signer policies, rolling exposure budgets, per-beneficiary controls, code and delegate checks, withdrawal queues, and emergency circuit breakers. For cold wallets, use trusted transaction rendering, separated approvals, independent payload reconstruction, delayed high-risk upgrades, and verified on- chain settlement receipts. A policy that freezes every routine withdrawal becomes operationally unacceptable and invites bypass. Tiered controls are RECOMMENDED: low-risk known-destination transfers receive deterministic fast checks; new beneficiaries, contract upgrades, delegation changes, and high-value transfers receive stricter verification and possibly timelocks. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Large hot-wallet fleets deserve extra caution. If many wallets share one key-derivation root, one signing service, or one deploy pipeline, a single compromise reaches all of them at once. Spreading risk across independent signers and capping per-wallet balances limits blast radius. 15. Independence and Shared-Failure Analysis Independence is an architectural property. A second process with the same administrator, credentials, and deploy pipeline is not independent. The policy evaluator SHOULD receive independently attested context, while the signer or wallet enforces the resulting narrowly scoped decision. Consider separate key domains, protected policy storage, quorum-based policy updates, attested signer binaries, anti-rollback versioning, independent code-hash verification, and key release only after validation. Do not let an administrator of the transaction builder modify both policy and signing logic. Independence fails if the attacker compromises a common kernel, a shared CI/CD system, a hypervisor, a root cloud account, or a wallet upgrade authority. Deployments MUST therefore document shared- failure analysis explicitly and MUST NOT claim absolute non- bypassability. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 +====================+================================+ | Shared element | Question to answer | +====================+================================+ | Administrator or | Can one account change policy, | | identity provider | validator, and signer? | +--------------------+--------------------------------+ | CI/CD and build | Can one pipeline ship altered | | signing | signer or validator binaries? | +--------------------+--------------------------------+ | Cloud root account | Can one control plane read | | or hypervisor | keys or edit policy state? | +--------------------+--------------------------------+ | Key hierarchy | Do policy keys and signing | | | keys share a root? | +--------------------+--------------------------------+ | Upgrade authority | Can one party replace the on- | | | chain policy module? | +--------------------+--------------------------------+ | Monitoring and | Can the same attacker silence | | audit | all evidence channels? | +--------------------+--------------------------------+ Table 8: Common-mode failure checklist 16. AI Agents, MCP, and Delegated Tools A custody assistant may legitimately read balances, prepare transactions, and query risk limits. It MUST NOT inherit authority to finalize withdrawals. Tool discoverability, successful authentication, and valid arguments do not constitute transfer authority. Permission to prepare an operation is not permission to finalize it. * For MCP or other tool chains, put the gate at the real wallet signing or withdrawal effect boundary, not only at the agent framework's dispatcher. If the agent can call the underlying signing or exchange API directly with the same credentials, a dispatcher-only check is bypassed. * The agent can stage an operation. A protected service reconstructs the effective transfer and checks policy independently. Tool output MUST NOT be treated as proof of a committed effect. * Multiple agents share the same Exposure Ledger. Failures produce HOLD and RECONCILE, not blind retry. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 * Composition: an agent may chain individually permitted tools into a harmful outcome (read balances, build a transfer, request a signature, broadcast). The final signing or release is the Candidate Act, and tool-by-tool permission is not enough. * Prompt injection can change what an agent requests. The sink MUST NOT accept model text, an agent's claim of approval, or an unsigned tool result as authorization. * Delegation from one agent to another MUST attenuate. A child agent MUST NOT inherit the parent's full signing or release authority. 17. Cross-Chain, Bridge, Stablecoin, and Allowance Hazards An apparent transfer can be implemented as a token transfer, approval, permit, delegated call, bridge lock, mint, swap, or multicall. The final effect can differ from the visible top-level function, so policy must account for transitive effects and stateful approvals. +==============+======================+==========================+ | Operation | Hidden consequence | Proposed gate | +==============+======================+==========================+ | approve or | Future third-party | Allowance cap and | | permit | spend | spender review | +--------------+----------------------+--------------------------+ | delegatecall | Code executes in the | Pinned code and storage- | | | wallet's context | effect policy | +--------------+----------------------+--------------------------+ | bridge lock | Cross-chain mint or | Dual-side proof, limits, | | or release | release | and finality depth | +--------------+----------------------+--------------------------+ | swap or | Variable execution | Slippage, destination, | | intent | route and price | and token bounds | +--------------+----------------------+--------------------------+ | multicall | Composition of | Evaluate full-call | | | effects | semantics, not the first | | | | call | +--------------+----------------------+--------------------------+ | token hooks | Reentrant or side- | Treat hooks as part of | | or callbacks | effecting transfers | the Candidate Act | +--------------+----------------------+--------------------------+ Table 9: Operations with hidden downstream consequences Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Bridge transfers need matching source-chain lock and destination- chain release evidence, with reorganization and finality assumptions stated. Stablecoin issuers may offer pause or freeze functions, but availability and legal authorization vary. A sink MUST NOT assume every token can be frozen or clawed back after settlement. 18. Edge Cases These cases test whether an implementation holds its invariants at the boundaries. Each states the hazard and the required handling. 18.1. Chain and Settlement Edge Cases EC1. Reorganization after confirmation A transaction seen as confirmed is removed or reordered. Keep exposure reserved until the chain-appropriate finality depth. Do not consume authority or release the reservation on a shallow confirmation. Re-run reconciliation after any reorganization signal. EC2. Replacement transaction (same nonce) A fee-bumped or cancel transaction replaces the original. Track transaction identity per nonce. If a replacement confirms, the original is REPLACED and its reservation resolves against the replacement's actual effect, which may differ from the original Candidate Act. Treat a replacement as a new Candidate Act when its bytes differ. EC3. Dropped transaction A pending transaction vanishes from the mempool. Do not assume failure. Query nonce and receipt state, then decide. Keep the reservation until the nonce is known to be consumed elsewhere or the transaction cannot still confirm. EC4. Nonce gaps and stuck queues An earlier stuck transaction blocks later ones. Resolving it by cancelling or replacing is itself a consequential act and passes the gate. EC5. Fee spikes and failed execution A reverted transaction still burns fees and consumes the nonce. Reservation accounting MUST include fee exposure and MUST NOT treat a revert as zero effect. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 EC6. Private relays and alternate broadcast A signed transaction can be sent through any relay, including private ones, at any later time. The signature is the consequential release, so the gate sits before signing, and signed-but-unbroadcast transactions are tracked with expiry (for example by validity windows or by nonce invalidation). EC7. Layer-2 sequencer outage and forced inclusion When a sequencer is down, users may force inclusion through the base layer, with different timing and ordering. Reconciliation MUST understand each route's finality and MUST NOT assume a single path to settlement. EC8. Hard forks and chain splits A fork can make one transaction valid on two chains. Chain identifiers bind a signature to one chain, except an authorization using chain identifier zero, which applies broadly. Policy SHOULD reject chain-identifier-zero authorizations unless explicitly approved. EC9. Bridge finality mismatch A destination chain mints before the source chain is final. Require source-finality depth before authorizing the destination effect, and cap per-window bridge exposure. 18.2. Asset and Token Edge Cases EC10. Fee-on-transfer, rebasing, and elastic-supply tokens The amount received or held differs from the amount in calldata. Bind caps to the effective balance change observed in simulation and verify after settlement, not only to the argument. EC11. Upgradeable and blacklistable tokens Token logic can change, or a token can freeze the destination. Pin token implementation hashes for covered assets, and treat issuer-side freezes as external events, not as protection. EC12. Hooks and reentrancy A token or recipient executes code during transfer. Include callee code and hooks in reconstruction, and set gas and call- depth limits so a hook cannot trigger an unreviewed second effect. EC13. Dust and many-small-transfer attacks Many tiny transfers evade per-transfer thresholds or flood the validator. Aggregate by identity, destination, and window, and apply admission control. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 EC14. Valuation and volatility A USD cap on a volatile asset can be exceeded by price movement or oracle manipulation. Prefer unit caps for volatile assets, or use bounded, protected price sources with deviation limits. EC15. Multi-asset multicall One call moves several assets. The cap is applied per asset and in aggregate, using the effective effects from simulation plus a post-state check where the substrate allows. 18.3. System and Operations Edge Cases EC16. Validator timeout, split brain, duplicate act identifiers Two validator replicas decide the same act differently or a client retries with the same act_id. Authority is issued by a single linearizable source per ledger scope, and the sink rejects a second consumption of one act_id. EC17. Crash between consumption and confirmation The sink records consumption, then fails before the signature or broadcast confirmation. On restart the act is INDETERMINATE. Resolve by querying authoritative state. Do not re-issue authority. EC18. Policy rollback and downgrade An older, validly signed policy is replayed to raise caps. Enforce monotonic policy epochs at the validator and sink. A downgrade requires an explicit, quorum-approved, logged procedure. EC19. Key rotation mid-flight Authority issued under an old key or epoch arrives after rotation. Authority carries the epoch, and a sink rejects authority from a retired epoch. Pending acts are re-evaluated under the new epoch, not silently honored. EC20. Clock skew, daylight-saving, and window boundaries Rolling windows and expiries depend on time. Use a protected monotonic source, define behavior at boundaries, tolerate bounded skew in one direction only (never extending a window), and test around transitions. EC21. Break-glass during an incident Emergency paths are needed and are an attack surface. Require dual control, a small budget, a timelock where safe, and independent logging, and test them regularly. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 EC22. Validator outage under load An outage creates pressure to disable the gate. Keep a routine local fast path with signed policy and protected local counters, hold high-risk effects, rate-limit, and define an authorized degraded mode in advance. EC23. Insider with policy-administration rights A single administrator approves theft. Separate governance from signing, require quorum for policy changes, and log changes to an independent record. Test common-mode compromise. EC24. Legacy wallets that cannot host a module Where an old wallet cannot enforce on-chain policy, move funds to a wallet that can, or place a mandatory protected signer in front, and record the residual risk until migration finishes. EC25. Legal or regulatory holds A court or regulator may require freezing or release. These are separately authorized acts and MUST pass the same gate with their own authority and evidence, not a side door. 19. Threat Scenario Catalogue Each scenario states the attack, why conventional controls can miss it, the proposed mitigation, the residual risk, and the test. Scenarios are illustrative and synthetic. Where a scenario resembles a reported incident, that is for motivation only, and no claim is made about the actual incident trace. Scenario identifiers T1 to T24 are referenced by the simulator in Appendix A where one exists (S01 to S14). 19.1. T1: Leaked Hot-Wallet Key and Delegation to an Attacker Sweeper Attack An attacker holds signing capability for a hot wallet, signs an EIP-7702 authorization delegating the account to a sweeper contract, has it relayed from another address, then drains assets in minutes. Why conventional controls miss it The signature is valid. Transfer-focused policy does not see a delegation as a transfer. If the key signs offline and submits directly, no off-chain gate is consulted. Monitoring sees it after settlement. Mitigation Keys non-exportable, so signing happens only inside the protected signer, which refuses unapproved delegation authorizations (R8). Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 For EVM wallets, move custody to smart accounts or delegated policy modules whose limits the key cannot bypass. Cap per-wallet balances to bound blast radius. Residual risk If the raw key is exfiltrated and the account stays an unrestricted EOA, the off-chain layer cannot stop direct submission (S14). Only the on-chain mandatory rule or key non- exportability helps. Test S05, S07, S14; add a test that the signer refuses a delegation authorization with a valid but unapproved target. 19.2. T2: Parallel Multi-Chain Drain Attack Withdrawals are launched on several chains at once, each below its own cap, so the sum exceeds the organization's intent. Why conventional controls miss it Per-chain counters do not see the global total. Chains without smart-account features cannot enforce on-chain rules at all. Mitigation A single chain-agnostic Exposure Ledger and a global cap. For non-programmable chains the gate is at the signer and release layer. Residual risk Ledger availability and integrity become critical. Compromise of the ledger voids the cap. Test S08. 19.3. T3: Compromised Signing Interface Misleading Multisig Signers Attack A compromised interface shows signers a familiar destination while the signed bytes change a wallet implementation or call. A valid threshold approves. Why conventional controls miss it The threshold is satisfied by legitimate signers over what they were shown. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Mitigation Independent decoding of the bytes, a canonical rendering from a separate trusted source, protected hardware display where feasible, signer-enforced digests, and refusal when code hash, target, or storage effects differ from policy (R1). Residual risk If the decoder or the trusted display shares the compromised path, it fails. Test S05 (substitution of target while displaying an approved one). 19.4. T4: Induced Delegation to Malicious or Mutable Code Attack A phishing or compromised workflow persuades an owner to sign a valid delegation to attacker-controlled code, or to a proxy whose implementation changes after approval. Why conventional controls miss it The signature is genuine. Address allowlists check the address, not the code behind it. Mitigation Pin the code hash. Reject unknown or mutable delegates. Govern upgrade rights. Enforce per-call limits inside the delegate or through a mandatory signer. Residual risk A trusted, audited delegate with its own bug. Test S05, S06. 19.5. T5: Speculative Authorization Batch Over a Nonce Range Attack A compromised builder asks the signer for many delegation authorizations covering a range of account nonces, so that at least one matches the live nonce when submitted. Why conventional controls miss it Each request is an individually valid, well-formed signing request. Request counts may be low. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Mitigation The signer refuses any delegation authorization without an approved act (R8), and refuses multi-nonce batches. Alert on repeated requests for future-power signatures. Residual risk None if the signer is Mandatory. Total if the key signs elsewhere. Test S07. This scenario is a test case; the reported nonce-range explanation for the October 2026 incident is unconfirmed. 19.6. T6: Split Withdrawals Below Per-Transaction Limits Attack One large theft is cut into many small transfers across workers, each under the per-transaction cap. Why conventional controls miss it A signer enforcing only a per-transaction cap approves all of them. Mitigation Protected cumulative ledger, atomic reservation, beneficiary allowlist. Residual risk Slow, below-threshold drains to an allowlisted beneficiary that has itself been compromised. Test S01, S02, S03. 19.7. T7: Allowance and Permit Drain Attack A signer is induced to grant a large allowance or sign a permit to an attacker spender, who later pulls funds without a new signature. Why conventional controls miss it No funds move at signing time, so transfer policy passes it. Mitigation Treat approvals and permits as Protected Consequences (R7): cap, spender allowlist, expiry. Review and revoke existing allowances. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Residual risk Allowances issued before the gate existed remain exploitable until revoked. Test S12. 19.8. T8: Hidden Effects Through Multicall, Delegatecall, and Hooks Attack The top-level call looks benign while a nested call, a delegatecall into attacker code, or a token hook moves value or changes state. Why conventional controls miss it Policy reads the first function name or a simulation that does not follow hidden dependencies. Mitigation Reconstruct full call semantics and callee code hashes, treat hooks as part of the act, and apply post-state checks where available. Residual risk Simulation that diverges from execution because of state or ordering changes. Test Add a vector with nested transfer and delegatecall into an unpinned contract. 19.9. T9: Bridge Release and Finality Mismatch Attack A destination-chain release is triggered by a source-chain event that is later reorganized, or an alternative bridge executor bypasses the verifier. Why conventional controls miss it The release is valid against the evidence available at the time. Mitigation Dual-side proof, finality-depth requirements, per-window bridge caps, and a single mandatory release executor. Residual risk Consensus failure on either chain. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Test Reorganization vectors for EC1 and EC9. 19.10. T10: Upgrade-Admin Takeover Replacing the Policy Module Attack The attacker obtains upgrade authority and replaces the on-chain policy module or proxy implementation. Why conventional controls miss it The upgrade is authorized by the very authority the policy trusts. Mitigation Timelock, independent veto, quorum approvals, code-hash verification, and monitoring of upgrade events. Residual risk Compromise of every party in the quorum. Test Attempt an unapproved upgrade and measure time to detect and veto. 19.11. T11: Insider or Policy Administrator Approves Theft Attack A single administrator edits policy to allow an attacker beneficiary and then requests transfers. Why conventional controls miss it The change is made with legitimate rights. Mitigation Quorum-signed policy, separation of governance from signing, mandatory waiting period for new beneficiaries, independent logging. Residual risk Collusion across the quorum. Test Common-mode compromise test (EC23). 19.12. T12: Compromised Validator or Signer Fabricates Approval Attack An attacker controls the Protected Validator or the sink and issues authority for any act. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Why conventional controls miss it Not applicable: this defeats the proposal. Mitigation Attestation, constrained keys, quorum, separation, independent audit. These reduce likelihood, not eliminate it. Residual risk High. The architecture can fail here, and the document says so. Test Negative control: report the failure honestly. 19.13. T13: Break-Glass and Emergency Signer Abuse Attack Stolen help-desk or operator credentials invoke the emergency signer for an urgent transfer to a new address. Why conventional controls miss it Emergency paths are designed to bypass normal controls. Mitigation Dual control, small budget, timelock, independent logging, and regular drills (R14). Residual risk Two credentials compromised at once. Test S13. 19.14. T14: Prompt-Injected AI Agent Requests a Withdrawal Attack Content the agent reads instructs it to widen a transfer or change a beneficiary, and the agent submits a request with valid credentials. Why conventional controls miss it The request is authenticated and well-formed. Mitigation The sink takes authority only from protected policy, never from model text or tool output. Agent-to-agent delegation attenuates. Preparation is separate from finalization. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Residual risk Policy that is itself too broad. Test Inject instructions into the agent's input and confirm no effect without act-bound authority. 19.15. T15: Phishing to Cloud Account to Treasury Instruction Attack A phished staff credential reaches a cloud suite used for treasury approvals. The attacker sets mail-forwarding rules, grants application consent, or alters a treasury instruction that a custody workflow then acts on. This is a hypothetical chain; public evidence does not show it occurred in any observed campaign. Why conventional controls miss it Phishing-resistant authentication and conditional access may already stop several steps. Where one is bypassed, a valid session does not show that a new forwarding recipient, consent, or beneficiary is authorized. Mitigation Out-of-band confirmation of beneficiary changes, a mandatory waiting period for new beneficiaries, custody release bound to an independently stored instruction (not a mailbox), and the same gate at each separate consequence. Residual risk The gate cannot prevent the click or the password entry. It begins when the compromised identity attempts a consequence in defender-controlled systems. Test Walk the chain with a synthetic identity and verify each consequence is separately gated. 19.16. T16: Address Poisoning Attack Lookalike addresses are seeded into history so an operator copies the wrong beneficiary. Why conventional controls miss it The destination looks familiar to humans and may pass prefix or suffix checks. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Mitigation Full-address allowlists, no reliance on history, waiting period for new addresses. Residual risk An operator adding the wrong address to the allowlist itself. Test Lookalike vectors against the allowlist. 19.17. T17: Valuation and Oracle Manipulation of Caps Attack A USD-denominated cap on a volatile or thin asset is exceeded by manipulating the price source or by market movement. Why conventional controls miss it The cap is satisfied numerically. Mitigation Unit caps for volatile assets, bounded protected price sources, deviation limits, and a separate cap on count of operations. Residual risk Source compromise. Test Price-shock vectors against the cap logic. 19.18. T18: Retry or Reorganization Spending the Same Budget Twice Attack A transfer is broadcast, confirmation is delayed, an agent retries, and the original later confirms as well. Or a reorganization removes a confirmed transfer and the budget has already been released. Why conventional controls miss it Systems that release budget on timeout sign a second transaction with fresh authority. Mitigation Hold the reservation through uncertainty, track act id, transaction id and nonce, reconcile by chain state, and deny retries with new authority until resolved. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Residual risk Unbounded INDETERMINATE exposure if reconciliation is slow. Report maximum unresolved exposure. Test S04. 19.19. T19: Validator Denial of Service to Force Fail-Open Attack The attacker floods or disables the validator so the business disables the control to restore throughput. Why conventional controls miss it Fail-open policy engines release when unavailable. Mitigation Fail closed for high-risk effects, a local fast path for routine ones, admission control, capacity planning, and a defined degraded mode that does not silently open. Residual risk Availability loss for non-routine operations during an attack. Test S10. 19.20. T20: Supply-Chain Compromise of the Signer or Validator Build Attack A malicious update ships through the build pipeline and weakens validation or leaks keys. Why conventional controls miss it The update arrives through a trusted channel. Mitigation Measured or attested images, reproducible builds, separate signing authority for releases, quorum for updates, anti-rollback. Residual risk Compromise of the release authority. Test Attempt to install an unsigned or older version and confirm rejection. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 19.21. T21: Social Engineering of Recovery, Rotation, or Help Desk Attack An attacker persuades support to reset credentials, rotate a key to one they control, or enroll a new signer. Why conventional controls miss it The process is legitimate and the requester appears legitimate. Mitigation Treat signer enrollment and key rotation as Protected Consequences with quorum, waiting periods, and out-of-band confirmation. Residual risk Quorum members socially engineered together. Test Tabletop and red-team enrollment attempts. 19.22. T22: Stale Policy Bundle Replay Attack An older, validly signed policy with higher limits is replayed to the validator or sink. Why conventional controls miss it The signature on the old bundle is valid. Mitigation Monotonic policy epochs enforced at validator and sink, with rollback only through a logged quorum procedure. Residual risk Epoch store compromise. Test S11. 19.23. T23: Cross-Chain Replay of a Broad Authorization Attack One signed authorization using chain identifier zero, or one signature reused across forks, is submitted on every chain where the account exists. Why conventional controls miss it One signature appears to apply to one intent. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 43] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Mitigation Bind chain identifier in every authority, reject chain-identifier- zero authorizations unless explicitly approved, and track per- chain nonce state. Residual risk Chains with different replay semantics. Test Submit an approved single-chain authorization on a second chain and expect rejection. 19.24. T24: Customer Account Takeover Withdrawing to a New Address Attack A taken-over customer account requests withdrawal of the whole balance to a new address. Why conventional controls miss it The session and second factor may be the attacker's. Mitigation New-address waiting period, per-customer rolling limits enforced at the release boundary, out-of-band confirmation, and the same effect-bound check used for treasury flows. Residual risk Customer friction trade-offs. Test Synthetic takeover with whole-balance withdrawal to a new address. 20. Simulation and Evaluation Method This section describes how to evaluate the architecture and how to read the reference simulator in Appendix A. Expected outcomes are test hypotheses. The simulator is a model of policy logic and accounting. It is not a chain, wallet, or exchange, and its results are not evidence of real-world prevention. 20.1. Three Configurations Every experiment MUST run in three configurations, to avoid a weak baseline: * Arm A: an ordinary signer with coarse identity and access control. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 44] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 * Arm B: strengthened conventional custody controls (MPC or HSM policy, allowlists, per-transaction and rolling caps, timelocks, simulation, monitoring). * Arm C: Arm B plus the independent, effect-bound enforcement described here. The security benefit is the difference between Arm C and Arm B, not between Arm C and Arm A. 20.2. Rules for Real Experiments * Use synthetic assets on local test chains or public testnets. Never use live production funds. * Pre-register expected pass and fail conditions before testing. * Collect transaction hashes, policy versions, attestation evidence, signed bytes, decoded calldata, code hashes, destination and amount, reservation state, validator decision, latency distribution, and chain receipt. * Include negative controls in which the mechanism is bypassed or compromised, and report the failures. * Record whether the unauthorized effect actually occurred, not only whether a policy engine returned DENY. A successful result demonstrates a property under a defined threat model. It does not establish universal protection, legal compliance, novelty, or prevention of any historical breach. 20.3. Simulator Scenarios and Threat Mapping +===========+==============================+==============+ | Simulator | Scenario | Threat | +===========+==============================+==============+ | S01 | Split withdrawal, | T6 | | | unauthorized beneficiary | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S02 | Split withdrawal, authorized | T6 | | | beneficiary, aggregate cap | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S03 | Concurrent race on rolling | T6, T2 | | | cap (stale counter) | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S04 | Retry during uncertain | T18 | | | settlement | | Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 45] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S05 | Delegation target | T3, T4, T1 | | | substitution | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S06 | Mutable-proxy delegate | T4 | | | changed after approval | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S07 | Builder requests 50 | T5, T1 | | | delegation authorizations | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S08 | Four-chain parallel drain | T2 | | | versus global cap | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S09 | Replay of one approval three | T22, general | | | times | replay | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S10 | Validator outage, mixed | T19 | | | workload | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S11 | Stale policy bundle replayed | T22 | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S12 | approve or permit to | T7 | | | attacker spender | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S13 | Break-glass abuse with one | T13 | | | stolen credential | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ | S14 | Raw key leaked, direct chain | T1 (limit) | | | submission | | +-----------+------------------------------+--------------+ Table 10: Reference simulator scenarios mapped to catalogue threats Threats T8 to T12, T14 to T17, T20, T21, T23, and T24 need chain- level or organizational tests that the model does not cover. They are listed with a test in Section 19. 21. Latency and Throughput Engineering Do not put heavyweight approval in every token-generation step or blockchain polling loop. Enforce at high-consequence signing and effectuation transitions. Precompute trusted policy, maintain local protected counters, and use deterministic cryptographic verification for low-risk operations. The goal is not zero overhead. It is a measured trade-off that does not push operators to disable the control. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 46] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 +======================+=========================+==================+ | Workload | Approach | Measurement | +======================+=========================+==================+ | Routine withdrawal | Local signed policy | p99 gate latency | | to known beneficiary | and counter | | +----------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | New beneficiary | Enhanced review and | Time to safe | | | delay | release | +----------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Contract upgrade or | Multi-party approval | Unmediated | | delegation change | and timelock | upgrade attempts | +----------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Mass agent requests | Atomic global budget | Overspend under | | | | concurrency | +----------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ | Validator outage | Hold high-risk | Availability and | | | effects; fast path | recovery time | | | for routine | | +----------------------+-------------------------+------------------+ Table 11: Workload tiers and measurements Suggested metrics: p50, p95, and p99 gate latency; approvals per second; maximum reservation contention; false-hold rate; validator outage behavior; queue recovery time; reorganization reconciliation lag; and the percentage of protected effects reachable without mediation. No measured latency is reported in this document, and the simulator does not measure it. 22. Deployment Roadmap 1. Inventory and consequence mapping: enumerate every wallet, key, signer, contract, upgrade path, batch executor, RPC route, allowance, bridge, emergency credential, and administrator that can produce a protected financial effect. Build a path-to-effect graph and mark each unmediated route. 2. Enforce bounded authority: choose enforceable signer and on-chain boundaries, bind the canonical operation, beneficiary, chain, amount, delegate code, time, and epoch, and stand up the shared Exposure Ledger and non-replayable authorization. 3. Observe-only mode: run the validator beside production, compare its decisions with actual outcomes, tune policy, and measure false holds. Do not enforce yet. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 47] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 4. Enforce by consequence class: begin with delegation and approvals, new beneficiaries, and upgrades, then high-value transfers, then routine flows, each with a rollback path. 5. Independence and resilience: separate policy administration from construction and custody, test fail-closed behavior, emergency recovery, signer replacement, upgrades, and reorganization handling. 6. Test and measure: run the synthetic scenarios, compare against strengthened conventional controls, publish measured latency and failure results, and refine coverage before wide rollout. Compatibility: some designs work through a protected signer or an on- chain module. Others need wallet or contract changes and cannot be retrofitted transparently. 23. Operations: Revocation, Recovery, and Monitoring Detection and revocation of a bad delegation Monitor accounts for delegation designators and alert on change. Keep a rehearsed procedure that signs an authorization pointing the account back to the zero address, rotates the key, and sweeps funds to a safe wallet. Public reports of the October 2026 incident describe a delegation remaining unrevoked for more than two hours, which illustrates why this procedure should be prepared in advance. Circuit breakers Automatic halts on anomalies: unexpected delegation, spend above rolling thresholds, repeated denied attempts, validator disagreement. Breakers MUST fail toward holding high-risk effects. Incident freeze A quorum-approved action that freezes relevant envelopes, revokes pending authority, and prevents queued operations from draining under stale approvals. Key rotation and recovery Rotation and signer enrollment are Protected Consequences with quorum, waiting periods, and out-of-band confirmation (T21). Pending acts are re-evaluated under the new epoch. Allowance hygiene Periodically list and revoke unneeded allowances and delegations, and cap new ones. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 48] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Independent evidence Decisions, receipts, and policy changes are written to a record the builder cannot alter. Evidence supports investigation, accountability, and supervisory review, and does not by itself determine legal liability. 24. Falsifiable Acceptance Criteria +========================+=================================+ | Metric | Acceptance criterion | +========================+=================================+ | Unauthorized transfers | Zero in protected, tested paths | +------------------------+---------------------------------+ | Aggregate overspend | Zero above the atomic budget, | | | including under concurrency | +------------------------+---------------------------------+ | Replay | At most one effective act per | | | bound nonce | +------------------------+---------------------------------+ | Delegate substitution | 100 percent of test | | | substitutions rejected | +------------------------+---------------------------------+ | Unapproved delegation | Zero | | authorizations signed | | +------------------------+---------------------------------+ | Bypass coverage | All enumerated protected paths | | | mediated | +------------------------+---------------------------------+ | False denials on a | Reported empirically against a | | legitimate mix | stated target | +------------------------+---------------------------------+ | p99 latency | Reported empirically, not | | | presumed | +------------------------+---------------------------------+ | Compromised root key | Explicit limitation disclosed | | or upgrade admin | | +------------------------+---------------------------------+ Table 12: Pre-registered acceptance criteria for real experiments The strongest falsification tests are: demonstrate a protected high- value transfer through an unmediated route, or a budget breach under concurrent requests. Either one shows the claim does not hold for that deployment. 25. Limitations Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 49] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 * A public blockchain executes valid transactions according to its rules. An off-chain Finality Sink cannot overrule the chain. Non-bypassability requires a mandatory protected signing path, contract-enforced policy, or an equivalent actual constraint on authority. * Existing keys, allowances, upgrades, and bridges can defeat the invariant. A leaked key that submits directly to an unrestricted account defeats it entirely (S14). * The enforcement layer is a high-value target. If the validator, sink, signing key, policy authority, upgrade admin, or underlying device is compromised, protection may fail. * Smart-contract bugs, consensus failures, and compromised trusted components stay in scope for defense in depth. * Per-chain capability differs, and some chains offer no on-chain policy at all. * Cross-organization workflows need explicit trust-model design that this document does not provide. * Incident descriptions are third-party accounts. The simulator is a model, and its results do not demonstrate real-world effectiveness. 26. Security Considerations This entire document concerns security. Further points: * Replay: authority, receipts, and policy bundles carry freshness and sink-local consumption state. * Confused deputy: authority is bound to the act so a trusted service cannot be induced to spend authority issued for another act. * Availability: a fail-closed gate creates a dependency. Provide capacity, failover, rate limiting, a routine fast path, and an authorized degraded mode. * Revocation timing: propagation delay leaves a window in which revoked authority may be accepted. Use short validity and revocation epochs. * False assurance: a DENY from a policy engine is not evidence that no effect occurred. Observe actual effects. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 50] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 * Residual routes: any unmediated route, including a second chain or a previously issued permit, defeats protection for that effect, and the deployment must say so. * Key handling: non-exportable keys and attested signers reduce the chance that signing capability leaves the protected boundary. They do not remove the need for monitoring and incident response. 27. Privacy Considerations Candidate Act descriptors, ledgers, and Receipts can reveal balances, counterparties, and operational patterns. Operators SHOULD minimize retained detail, protect these records, apply retention limits consistent with applicable law, and avoid publishing wallet addresses or limits in ways that help attackers. 28. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. 29. References 29.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . 29.2. Informative References [EIP-712] Ethereum Improvement Proposals, "EIP-712: Typed structured data hashing and signing", 2017, . [EIP-7702] Ethereum Improvement Proposals, "EIP-7702: Set Code for EOAs", 2024, . [FSA-BYBIT] Financial Services Agency, Japan, "Research paper discussing the February 2025 multisignature wallet interface incident", Verify against the original publication, 2025, . Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 51] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 [INCIDENT-REPORTS] Various security firms and industry bodies, "Public analyses and fact cards on the 29 October 2026 exchange hot-wallet theft (multiple authors)", Third-party accounts; verify on-chain and against primary sources, October 2026. [MSFT-PHISH] Microsoft Threat Intelligence, "Notice on phishing campaign exploiting the 12 November 2026 service disruption", Verify against the original publication, November 2026. [RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020, . [RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January 2023, . [RFC9591] Connolly, D., Komlo, C., Goldberg, I., and C. A. Wood, "The Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold (FROST) Protocol for Two-Round Schnorr Signatures", RFC 9591, DOI 10.17487/RFC9591, June 2024, . Appendix A. Reference Simulator and Results The reference simulator is a short Python program, finality_sim.py, distributed with this draft. It is deterministic, uses synthetic units, and contacts no chain, wallet, HSM, or exchange. It runs with "python3 finality_sim.py" and exits non-zero if an acceptance assertion fails. "python3 finality_sim.py --json" prints machine- readable results. A.1. How the Arms Are Defined Results follow from these definitions, so the table checks that the designed logic and accounting behave as specified. It is a regression and acceptance harness. It does not show that real attackers would be stopped. Arm A Ordinary signer. Signs anything the possibly compromised builder sends. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 52] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Arm B Strengthened conventional controls. Beneficiary allowlist; per- transaction cap of 100; atomic rolling cap of 300 per chain; signer decodes transfer fields; delegation approved on the displayed description; fail-open on policy-service outage; accepts any validly signed policy bundle; no handling of approvals or delegation authorizations; releases budget on timeout; per-chain counters only. In S03 the rolling counter is read before any worker writes it, modelling a stale read. Arm C Arm B plus: reconstruction from bytes with code-hash pinning; atomic reservation across chains held through uncertain outcomes; one-time act-bound authority; refusal of unapproved delegation authorizations; monotonic policy epochs; approvals and permits treated as consequences; fail-closed for high-risk effects with a local fast path for routine ones; break-glass under dual control and a small budget. Several Arm B weaknesses (per-chain counters, fail-open, no epoch check, release on timeout) are modelling assumptions. Deployments that already close them would see smaller differences. This is why Section 20.1 requires a strengthened baseline in real experiments. A.2. Results +=====+===========================+===========+======+======+======+ | ID | Scenario | Metric | A | B | C | +=====+===========================+===========+======+======+======+ | S01 | Split withdrawal, | units | 900 | 0 | 0 | | | unauthorized beneficiary | released | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S02 | Split withdrawal, | units | 600 | 0 | 0 | | | authorized beneficiary | above cap | | | | | | (overspend vs 300 cap) | | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S03 | Concurrent race on | units | 150 | 150 | 0 | | | rolling cap (stale | above cap | | | | | | counter) | | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S04 | Retry during uncertain | duplicate | 270 | 90 | 0 | | | settlement | units | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S05 | Delegation target | takeover | 1 | 1 | 0 | | | substitution (display H1, | (1/0) | | | | | | bytes H2) | | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S06 | Mutable-proxy delegate | takeover | 1 | 1 | 0 | Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 53] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 | | changed after approval | (1/0) | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S07 | Builder requests 50 | takeover | 1 | 1 | 0 | | | delegation authorizations | (1/0) | | | | | | (nonce range) | | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S08 | Four-chain parallel drain | units | 1760 | 680 | 0 | | | vs global cap | above cap | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S09 | Replay of one approval | replayed | 270 | 180 | 0 | | | three times | units | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S10 | Validator outage, mixed | units | 500 | 500 | 0 | | | workload | released | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S11 | Stale signed policy | units | 700 | 700 | 0 | | | bundle replayed (epoch 3 | above cap | | | | | | vs 5) | | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S12 | approve()/permit to | exposure | 1000 | 1000 | 0 | | | attacker spender | granted | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S13 | Break-glass abuse with | units | 500 | 500 | 0 | | | one stolen credential | released | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ | S14 | Raw signing key leaked, | units | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | | | direct chain submission | released | | | | +-----+---------------------------+-----------+------+------+------+ Table 13: Reference simulator output (synthetic units; model, not a chain) Reading the table: the metric column states what is counted (units released, units above the cap, duplicate units, a takeover flag, or exposure granted). Lower is better. In S03 and S08 the result in Arm B comes from the stale counter and per-chain ledgers described above, which Arm C removes by reserving atomically against one shared ledger. In S08 Arm C still releases 360 units, which is below the 400 global cap, so "units above cap" is zero. Additional checks: in S10, Arm C blocked 0 legitimate units, because the routine transfers ran on the local fast path while the five high- risk transfers were held. In a separate mix of 100 in-policy transfers, Arm C produced 0 false denials. For S14, a mandatory on- chain module with the same limits (modelled as 300 minus a 30-unit margin) would cap the loss at 270 units, against 1000 when only an off-chain gate exists. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 54] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 S14 is a documented limit. When a leaked key submits directly to an unrestricted account, all three arms lose the full balance. This result is intended: the document states that an off-chain gate cannot stop it. A.3. Extending the Simulator To move from a model to evidence, replace each scenario function with a harness against a local test chain (for example a forked development node) and a real signer, record the items listed in Section 20.2, and keep the acceptance assertions unchanged. Add vectors for the threats the model does not cover (T8 to T12, T14 to T17, T20, T21, T23, T24). Appendix B. Frequently Asked Questions The answers describe proposed design patterns and conditions for enforceability. They are not deployed or empirically validated results. B.1. Basics Q1. Does this replace multisig, MPC, or HSMs? No. Multisig distributes signing authority, MPC and HSMs protect keys, and the proposed gate adds consequence-specific constraints. They can all be required together. Q2. Does a valid signature prove a safe transfer? No. It proves a cryptographic authorization condition, not that the organization intended the actual effect. Q3. Does the attacker have to implement Candidate Acts or use the gate? No. The defender constructs the Candidate Act from the effective requested operation. The attacker only sends ordinary requests, and cannot avoid the gate by refusing to use it if the effect has no other route. Q4. Can an off-chain validator stop a direct transaction from a leaked key? Not if a valid key can sign and submit unrestricted transactions outside the validator. Protection then needs a non-exportable key or a mandatory on-chain rule, such as a smart-account module. Q5. Does this eliminate key theft? No. It aims to limit what compromised credentials can effectuate, where the control is mandatory. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 55] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Q6. Does zero trust become obsolete? No. Identity and session controls remain essential and complement consequence authorization. B.2. The incidents Q7. Could this have prevented the reported October 2026 exchange theft? Not established. Prevention would depend on the actual attack path and on whether a mandatory signer or on-chain wallet policy mediated the delegated action. Reports also describe losses on chains without delegation, so no single mechanism explains the whole event. Q8. Could this have prevented the February 2025 theft? Not established. Independent payload reconstruction and signer controls might address some presentation-tampering failure modes, but retrospective prevention is unproven. Q9. Is EIP-7702 inherently malicious? No. It enables useful account functionality. Malicious or poorly governed delegation creates risk, and the specification itself warns about it. Q10. Is an EIP-7702 delegation a one-time approval? No. It changes the executable behavior of the account until replaced or cleared, subject to the delegate code. Q11. Why does the paper keep the Bybit and Binance cases separate? They are different events with different reported mechanisms. Conflating them would create a false technical claim. B.3. Design questions Q12. Where is the Finality Sink for a centralized exchange? At protected withdrawal signing and release, with controls against alternate signing or broadcast paths, and with reconciliation of post-broadcast receipts. Q13. What is the on-chain Finality Sink? A mandatory wallet or contract execution rule that rejects effects lacking valid policy-bound authority. Q14. Where should a code-upgrade gate sit? At the upgrade authority and execution contract, with independent approvals and a timelock or veto where appropriate. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 56] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Q15. Why bind the beneficiary, chain identifier, and code hash? A valid transfer to an unauthorized destination can be economically irreversible. Chain binding avoids cross-chain authorization confusion and unintended broad delegation. A familiar name or address label does not prove which executable implementation will run. Q16. Are proxies forbidden? No, but upgradeability changes the trust model and needs protected governance, pinned implementation hashes, and monitoring. Q17. Why track rolling budgets and reserve before signing? To stop many individually small transfers from exceeding aggregate exposure, and to stop parallel requests from each consuming the same unspent budget. Q18. Can token approvals cause future losses? Yes. An approval or permit can allow later spending without a fresh owner signature, so it is treated as a consequence. Q19. Does a transaction receipt prove final settlement? Not always. Confirmation and finality depend on the chain and on reorganization assumptions. Q20. What is an evidence-carrying receipt? A proposed authenticated record that binds a phase and its observed result to the act, used for reconciliation and later authority decisions. Q21. Can agents just use another RPC endpoint? If they hold unrestricted signing authority, yes. Mandatory control must sit at the signer or the on-chain execution path. Q22. What about bridge exploits? Apply separate source and destination effect gates, require finality depth, cap exposure per window, and reconcile cross-chain outcomes. There is no universal guarantee. Q23. Can a wallet interface be trusted? Not alone. Verify the exact bytes and semantics independently of potentially compromised presentation. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 57] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 B.4. Operations and limits Q24. What happens if the validator is unavailable? High-risk effects hold. Routine low-risk transfers can run on a local fast path with signed policy and protected local counters. The mode is defined in advance, and a failure does not silently open. Q25. Can a compromised policy administrator approve theft? Potentially. Separate governance from signing, require quorum for policy changes, and test common-mode compromise. Q26. Can a hot wallet use machine-speed checks? That is a design goal. Actual performance must be measured under concurrency and failure, and no figure is claimed. Q27. What if validation times out after a partial execution? Distinguish not-started, staged, committed, and uncertain outcomes. Do not sign again with fresh authority. Reconcile against chain state and keep the reservation until the outcome is known. Q28. Is the architecture compatible with existing wallets? Sometimes through a protected signer or an on-chain module. Other designs need wallet or contract changes and cannot be retrofitted transparently. Q29. How do I handle a delegation that is already installed and malicious? Use the prepared revocation path: an authorization pointing the account back to the zero address, key rotation, and a sweep to a safe wallet, while the circuit breaker holds other effects. Q30. What if the simulator shows Arm C winning every scenario? That follows from how the arms are defined. It tests that the designed logic works as specified. Real evidence needs the real- chain experiments in the evaluation method, with a strengthened Arm B. Q31. What is the strongest falsification test? Demonstrate a protected high-value transfer through an unmediated route, or a budget breach under concurrent requests. Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 58] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 B.5. Patents and references Q32. What should patent examiners or reviewers look for? Concrete technical distinctions: operation reconstruction, independent authority, mandatory enforcement, state binding, replay prevention, and measurable effects, evaluated against prior art. Q33. Is this proof of novelty or patentability? No. Prior-art analysis and claim-specific inventive-step assessment remain necessary. Q34. How should readers treat the patent and industry references? They identify the inventor-reported technical provenance. They do not establish implementation, endorsement, adoption, validity, or infringement by any organization. Readers should consult authoritative WIPO and patent-office records and verify all claims before reliance. Appendix C. Basis of Disclosure and Patent Notice This document is based on the Mothership application PCT/ IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and published as WO 2026/150382 A2 on 16 July 2026. The full filing can be read by searching "Sangam Das" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE, by searching PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615), or at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/ . The underlying invention is human-originated. Preparation of this draft, its summaries, and any mapping to third-party systems or incidents used AI assistance and may contain errors or omissions, so readers MUST verify against the original filings and primary sources. Nothing here implies endorsement, collaboration, licensing, or an allegation of infringement by any third party. The author is open to acquihire or strategic collaboration. License: CC BY-NC 4.0. The license does not grant patent rights. Acknowledgements The author thanks the security researchers and journalists whose public reporting made the incident discussion possible. Author's Address Sangam Kumar Das Independent Balasore Odisha India Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 59] Internet-Draft Crypto Execution Finality November 2026 Phone: +91-9861363532 Email: info@sangamdas.com Das Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 60]