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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-gerber-oauth-refresh-one-time-proofs-00" category="exp" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="One-Time Refresh Proofs">OAuth 2.0 One-Time Refresh Proofs</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gerber-oauth-refresh-one-time-proofs-00"/>
    <author fullname="Maxwell Gerber">
      <organization>Twilio</organization>
      <address>
        <email>mgerber@twilio.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Web Authorization Protocol</workgroup>
    <abstract>
      <?line 40?>

<t>Refresh token rotation asks the authorization server to deliver a new secret to
the client in every refresh response, and then treats any later appearance of
the old secret as evidence of theft. When a response is lost, the legitimate
client's retry is indistinguishable from token theft, and the grant is revoked.</t>
      <t>This document defines an alternative for clients that are unable or unwilling
to implement DPoP. The client generates a key pair, registers the public key
when it redeems the authorization code, and thereafter accompanies each use of
a non-rotating refresh token with a signature over a strictly increasing
counter and a nonce. Everything the client needs in order to retry is something
the client itself generated, so a lost response can no longer desynchronize the
two parties. Replay of a captured request yields nothing, and concurrent use of
a copied key is detected in the same way that rotation detects reuse.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>Discussion Venues</name>
      <t>Discussion of this document takes place on the
    Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (oauth@ietf.org),
    which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/"/>.</t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
    <eref target="https://github.com/maxwellgerber/draft-gerber-oauth-refresh-one-time-proofs"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 56?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice (<xref section="4.14.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9700"/>)
requires that refresh tokens issued to public clients be either
sender-constrained or rotated on use. Sender-constraining in practice means
DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/> or mutual TLS <xref target="RFC8705"/>. Many clients implement neither, and
so rely on rotation.</t>
      <t>Rotation makes the token endpoint an exactly-once operation carried over a
transport that offers at-most-once delivery. The authorization server
invalidates the old refresh token when it issues the new one, but the new one
exists only in a response that may never arrive. A client that retries with the
token it still holds is presenting a superseded token, which is what reuse
detection is designed to treat as theft.</t>
      <t>Grace periods reduce the frequency of this failure but keep the underlying
design, in which the next secret travels from server to client in a response
that may not arrive.</t>
      <t>This document removes the server-to-client secret:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The refresh token does not rotate. It is a handle for the grant and is
useless without a proof.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The proof is a signature by a key the client generated. The private key never
crosses the wire, and where the platform allows it, never leaves a
non-extractable key store.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A counter in the signed content does the work rotation used to do. It
advances only when the client knows the previous value was consumed, so the
authorization server sees each value exactly once from an honest client and
can treat a conflicting second sighting as theft.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A nonce in the signed content lets the authorization server tell an honest
retry from a second party, and prevents a captured request from being used to
provoke revocation.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A lost response therefore cannot desynchronize the client and the authorization
server. This mechanism does not bind access tokens; <xref target="comparison"/> compares it
with DPoP.</t>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

<dl>
          <dt>Refresh key:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>an asymmetric key pair generated by the client for one grant.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Refresh proof:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>a signature made with the private refresh key over the refresh token, a
counter and a nonce.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Attempt:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>one (counter, nonce) pair. Retransmissions of an attempt carry the same pair.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Accepted attempt:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>an attempt for which the authorization server issued an access token.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Base64url:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the URL-safe encoding of <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC4648"/>, with trailing padding
omitted.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Protocol Overview</name>
      <t>The figure shows a code exchange followed by two refreshes, the second of which
loses its response.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-overview">
        <name>Code exchange, refresh, and recovery from a lost response</name>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
+--------+                                          +---------------+
|        |--(A) code, code_verifier, refresh_pub -->|               |
|        |<-(B) access_token, refresh_token --------|               |
|        |                                          |               |
|        |--(C) refresh_token, counter=1, nonce,    |               |
|        |      proof ----------------------------->|               |
|        |<-(D) access_token -----------------------|               |
|        |                                          |               |
| Client |--(E) refresh_token, counter=2, nonce',   | Authorization |
|        |      proof' ---------------------------->|    Server     |
|        |        X<-(F) access_token --------------|               |
|        |                                          |               |
|        |--(G) refresh_token, counter=2, nonce',   |               |
|        |      proof'' --------------------------->|               |
|        |<-(H) error: duplicate_request -----------|               |
|        |                                          |               |
|        |--(I) refresh_token, counter=3, nonce'',  |               |
|        |      proof''' -------------------------->|               |
|        |<-(J) access_token -----------------------|               |
+--------+                                          +---------------+
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>(A) The client generates a refresh key and sends the public key with an
otherwise ordinary authorization code token request.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>(B) The authorization server stores the public key with the grant and returns
an ordinary token response. The refresh token in it can be used only with a
proof.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>(C, D) The client signs the refresh token, counter 1 and a fresh nonce. The
authorization server verifies the signature, sees the next counter in
sequence, and issues an access token. The refresh token is unchanged.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>(E, F) The same again with counter 2, but the response is lost.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>(G, H) The client retransmits the same attempt. The authorization server
recognizes the (counter, nonce) pair as one it already accepted and says so.
No access token is issued and nothing is revoked.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>(I, J) The client now knows counter 2 was consumed, and proceeds with
counter 3.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Had the request at (E) been lost instead of the response at (F), the
retransmission at (G) would simply have been accepted.</t>
      <section anchor="comparison">
        <name>Comparison with Rotation and DPoP</name>
        <t>The table compares this mechanism with refresh token rotation as described in
<xref target="RFC9700"/> and with DPoP-bound refresh tokens that are not also rotated.
"Detected" means the grant is revoked at a later refresh; "prevented" means the
attacker obtains nothing.</t>
        <table anchor="tab-comparison">
          <name>Comparison with rotation and DPoP-bound refresh tokens</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Threat</th>
              <th align="left">Rotation</th>
              <th align="left">Refresh proofs</th>
              <th align="left">DPoP-bound</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Lost token response</td>
              <td align="left">User is logged out</td>
              <td align="left">No effect</td>
              <td align="left">No effect</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Replay of a captured refresh request</td>
              <td align="left">Detected</td>
              <td align="left">Prevented</td>
              <td align="left">Prevented</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Capture of the code exchange (request or response)</td>
              <td align="left">Attacker holds tokens</td>
              <td align="left">Refresh token unusable; access token as issued</td>
              <td align="left">Refresh token unusable; access token as issued</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Offline copy of client storage, extractable key</td>
              <td align="left">Detected</td>
              <td align="left">Detected</td>
              <td align="left">Not detected</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Offline copy of client storage, non-extractable key</td>
              <td align="left">Detected</td>
              <td align="left">Prevented</td>
              <td align="left">Prevented</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Attacker executing in the client</td>
              <td align="left">Detected</td>
              <td align="left">Detected</td>
              <td align="left">Not detected</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Disclosure of the authorization server's grant store</td>
              <td align="left">Depends on token storage</td>
              <td align="left">Nothing usable</td>
              <td align="left">Nothing usable</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/> already binds refresh tokens issued to public clients to the
DPoP key, and an authorization server that does so need not rotate them. A
client that implements DPoP has no need of this document.</t>
        <t>This document is for the client that does not. It requires one key generation
and one signature per refresh, over three concatenated strings. There is no
JWS, no <tt>htu</tt> or <tt>htm</tt> to canonicalize, no server-provided nonce, and no
involvement of resource servers. In exchange it does less: access tokens remain
bearer tokens. What it adds, relative to a DPoP-bound refresh token, is the
counter, and with it detection of a key that has been copied or is being used
by an attacker inside the client.</t>
        <t>Whether the counter would be better specified as an extension to DPoP is an
open question (<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="establishing">
      <name>Establishing the Refresh Key</name>
      <section anchor="token-request">
        <name>Token Request</name>
        <t>A client that wants a proof-bound refresh token generates a new ECDSA key pair
on the P-256 curve <xref target="FIPS186-5"/> and adds the following parameter to an
authorization code token request (<xref section="4.1.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>):</t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>refresh_pub</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> for this specification. The public refresh key, as the 65-octet
uncompressed elliptic curve point (<tt>0x04 || X || Y</tt>,
<xref target="SEC1"/>, Section 2.3.3), base64url encoded.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> generate a new key pair for each authorization and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use
the key for any other purpose. The client <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> generate the private key as
non-extractable where the platform supports it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-response">
        <name>Token Response</name>
        <t>The authorization server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject the request with <tt>invalid_request</tt> if
<tt>refresh_pub</tt> is not a valid P-256 public key.</t>
        <t>Otherwise, having validated the request as usual, the authorization server
stores the public key with the grant, sets the grant's last accepted counter to
zero, and returns an ordinary token response (<xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>). The
refresh token in that response is proof-bound: it can be used only as described
in <xref target="using"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="using">
      <name>Using the Refresh Token</name>
      <section anchor="refresh-request">
        <name>Refresh Request</name>
        <t>A refresh request for a proof-bound refresh token is a request as described in
<xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>, with three additional parameters:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>refresh_counter</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. A positive integer in base 10 with no leading zeros, sign or other
decoration. The first attempt for a grant uses 1.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>refresh_nonce</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. Between 16 and 64 characters from the base64url alphabet, generated
with at least 128 bits of entropy.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>refresh_proof</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The refresh proof described in <xref target="refresh-proof"/>.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="refresh-proof">
        <name>Refresh Proof</name>
        <t>The signing input is the ASCII octets of the following concatenation, where <tt>.</tt>
is a single period:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
refresh_token "." refresh_counter "." refresh_nonce
]]></artwork>
        <t>The proof is an ECDSA signature over the signing input using P-256 and SHA-256,
computed with the private refresh key and base64url encoded.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="as-processing">
        <name>Authorization Server Processing</name>
        <t>The authorization server processes a refresh request for a proof-bound refresh
token in this order.</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t><strong>Grant.</strong> If the refresh token is unknown, expired or revoked, respond with
<tt>invalid_grant</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Syntax.</strong> If any of the three parameters is absent or malformed, respond
with <tt>invalid_request</tt>. A request without a proof <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be honoured: a
proof-bound refresh token is never a bearer token.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Signature.</strong> Verify the proof against the stored public key. If
verification fails, respond with <tt>invalid_grant</tt>. The authorization server
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> revoke the grant on a failed verification: the refresh token is not
secret, so anyone who had seen it could otherwise force revocation.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Sequence.</strong> Let <tt>last</tt> be the grant's last accepted counter. As a single
atomic operation on the grant:  </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>If the counter equals <tt>last + 1</tt>, record the counter as <tt>last</tt>, retain the
(counter, nonce) pair, and issue an access token.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Otherwise, if the (counter, nonce) pair is one the authorization server
has retained, respond with the <tt>duplicate_request</tt> error
(<xref target="duplicate-request"/>). No token is issued and the grant is unchanged.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Otherwise, revoke the grant, including outstanding access tokens where
that is possible, and respond with <tt>invalid_grant</tt>.</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The third branch is the theft signal. A valid signature over a counter the
authorization server has already moved past, with a nonce it does not
recognize, can only have been made by a second holder of the private key.</t>
        <t>A successful response is as described in <xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>. It <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> contain a <tt>refresh_token</tt> parameter with a value different from the one
presented, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> omit the parameter.</t>
        <t>The authorization server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> retain the most recently accepted pair, and
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> retain accepted pairs for at least as long as a request could plausibly
remain in flight; a few minutes is suggested. A duplicate that arrives after
its pair has been discarded falls into the third branch and revokes the grant.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="duplicate-request">
        <name>The duplicate_request Error</name>
        <t>This document defines one new error code for the token endpoint:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>duplicate_request</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The request repeats an attempt that the authorization server has already
accepted. The client should consider that attempt consumed and proceed with
the next counter.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>It is returned with HTTP status 400 in the usual error response format
(<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>).</t>
        <t>An authorization server could instead answer a duplicate by issuing another
access token, saving a round trip. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> do so, because a duplicate is
exactly what a replayed capture looks like.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="client-behaviour">
      <name>Client Behaviour</name>
      <t>The properties described in this document depend on the following client
behaviour.</t>
      <section anchor="persist">
        <name>Persist Before Sending</name>
        <t>The client maintains, per grant, the counter of its last consumed attempt and
at most one pending attempt. Before sending a new attempt, the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
durably store the pending (counter, nonce) pair. The proof itself need not be
stored; ECDSA signatures are randomized, and a freshly computed proof over the
same pair is equally acceptable.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="retransmit">
        <name>Retransmit the Same Attempt</name>
        <t>While an attempt is pending, every refresh request the client sends for that
grant <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry that attempt's counter and nonce. The client treats the
following as a lost response and retransmits, with suitable backoff:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>a connection failure or timeout;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>any 5xx status;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a response that cannot be parsed, or that is successful in status but lacks
the required members;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>any error other than <tt>invalid_grant</tt>, <tt>invalid_client</tt> and
<tt>duplicate_request</tt>. This includes rate limiting and error responses
generated by intermediaries.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A client that gives up for the moment keeps the pending attempt and resumes
with it later, including after a restart.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="advance">
        <name>Advance Only on Knowledge</name>
        <t>The client records an attempt as consumed, and clears the pending attempt, only
when:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>it has received and stored a successful response, or</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>it has received <tt>duplicate_request</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>After <tt>duplicate_request</tt> the client has no access token to show for the
attempt, so it immediately begins a new attempt with the next counter and a new
nonce.</t>
        <t>On <tt>invalid_grant</tt> or <tt>invalid_client</tt> the client discards the grant. Nothing
else is terminal.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="one-at-a-time">
        <name>One Attempt at a Time</name>
        <t>The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ensure that at most one refresh is in progress per grant across
every thread, process, tab or window that shares the grant's storage. Two
contexts that each read the same counter and each mint a nonce will present the
authorization server with the theft signal described in <xref target="as-processing"/>, and
the grant will be revoked.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="captured-requests">
        <name>Captured Requests</name>
        <t>A refresh request contains the refresh token, a counter, a nonce and a
signature over all three. An attacker who captures one, for instance from the
logs of a TLS-terminating intermediary, can replay it and can do nothing else:
the authorization server answers a replay of an accepted attempt with
<tt>duplicate_request</tt>, and the attacker cannot produce a signature over any other
counter or nonce.</t>
        <t>The exception is an attacker who captures a request and also prevents it from
reaching the authorization server. That attacker can deliver the request itself
and will receive one access token. The client's retransmission then draws
<tt>duplicate_request</tt> and the client proceeds normally. This is not detected.
Preventing it would require binding the request to the transport.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="theft-detection">
        <name>Theft Detection and Its Limits</name>
        <t>Two parties holding the same key and the same counter will, sooner or later,
present the same counter with different nonces. The second to do so causes
revocation. This is the same property refresh token rotation provides and it
has the same weakness: an attacker who refreshes while the legitimate client is
idle is undetected until the client returns.</t>
        <t>If storage is copied while an attempt is pending, both parties hold the same
pending pair. One is accepted, the other receives <tt>duplicate_request</tt>, and each
then proceeds to the next counter with its own nonce. Detection therefore
arrives one refresh later than it otherwise would, and each party obtains one
further access token in the meantime.</t>
        <t>An attacker executing inside the client (cross-site scripting, say) can ask a
non-extractable key to sign. Non-extractability confines the attack to the
period of compromise; it does not prevent it.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6749">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FIPS186-5" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5">
          <front>
            <title>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="PUB 186-5"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SEC1" target="https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2009" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Version" value="2.0"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC8705">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes OAuth client authentication and certificate-bound access and refresh tokens using mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication with X.509 certificates. OAuth clients are provided a mechanism for authentication to the authorization server using mutual TLS, based on either self-signed certificates or public key infrastructure (PKI). OAuth authorization servers are provided a mechanism for binding access tokens to a client's mutual-TLS certificate, and OAuth protected resources are provided a method for ensuring that such an access token presented to it was issued to the client presenting the token.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8705"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8705"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9449">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access and refresh tokens.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9449"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9700">
          <front>
            <title>Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security</title>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="A. Labunets" initials="A." surname="Labunets"/>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <date month="January" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes best current security practice for OAuth 2.0. It updates and extends the threat model and security advice given in RFCs 6749, 6750, and 6819 to incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader application of OAuth 2.0. Further, it deprecates some modes of operation that are deemed less secure or even insecure.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="240"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9700"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9700"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 415?>

<section anchor="example">
      <name>Example</name>
      <t>One grant, from code exchange to a recovered lost response. The key and
signatures are real and verify against the public key shown. The responses are
illustrative. Line breaks inside values are for display only.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
# Code exchange: register the public key.

POST /token
  grant_type=authorization_code
  client_id=app
  code=i9aa_UbUHSIwX_3rnb_Jyw
  code_verifier=pKRFjmAIOwcsbHrG5UMLj0rVg0YtximebMTtZW2fcpo
  redirect_uri=https://app.example/cb
  refresh_pub=BPA5CdTORvBMgWTzXE9MB0X7U9Lxx0r95AE2VMwQCqg5Y2fl7O6UGJ
              D8DEaPm0ho46P6jztsQlcYxYhJ5Qqnuhc

200 {"access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
     "token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":600,
     "refresh_token":"oYmn5yIe5ez3y5hsJkajPTl1W3B7gjwIB7LbkLRohDk"}

# Refresh, counter 1. Signing input:
#   oYmn5yIe5ez3y5hsJkajPTl1W3B7gjwIB7LbkLRohDk.1.lZxgLFHMUrz3MvtZ14GF_w

POST /token
  grant_type=refresh_token
  client_id=app
  refresh_token=oYmn5yIe5ez3y5hsJkajPTl1W3B7gjwIB7LbkLRohDk
  refresh_counter=1
  refresh_nonce=lZxgLFHMUrz3MvtZ14GF_w
  refresh_proof=DD0KfNFW2roiDffShIj64XxAmJGrk32WkNMmp4dArullkLVMHCQZm1
                1dKIoRdoGkKOozR4yzpHNBblnivtEq3A

200 {"access_token":"P8NgAGKHqv7QUEw555LDbpUyY-RBObDR4YG-CL1wFEY",
     "token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":600}

# Refresh, counter 2. The AS accepts it; the response is lost.

POST /token
  grant_type=refresh_token
  client_id=app
  refresh_token=oYmn5yIe5ez3y5hsJkajPTl1W3B7gjwIB7LbkLRohDk
  refresh_counter=2
  refresh_nonce=M_RTesmwhOkhr4ArD5xGEQ
  refresh_proof=Nj29r5X6komZUrWQTz3KxdZt16eO51VygXTnf2BflkufMSUg8DvwBO
                M2QF25SzVSbqsZy7EbkokbpaujcDyQ9Q

(no response received)

# Retransmission: same counter and nonce. The client re-signs, so the
# proof octets differ.

POST /token
  grant_type=refresh_token
  client_id=app
  refresh_token=oYmn5yIe5ez3y5hsJkajPTl1W3B7gjwIB7LbkLRohDk
  refresh_counter=2
  refresh_nonce=M_RTesmwhOkhr4ArD5xGEQ
  refresh_proof=(a fresh signature over the same input)

400 {"error":"duplicate_request"}

# Counter 2 is known to be consumed. Next attempt.

POST /token
  grant_type=refresh_token
  client_id=app
  refresh_token=oYmn5yIe5ez3y5hsJkajPTl1W3B7gjwIB7LbkLRohDk
  refresh_counter=3
  refresh_nonce=HlbePMcpunkMH8Jp7eekDw
  refresh_proof=Xej7iclBC0hJm3AXa2QhPfGgTBOo7VzZ8hjA4uqMwKOW3nByYYiuIb
                b1_PvmkuR1aF516fNBaLy8YQxH0mZC8A

200 {"access_token":"zaG7uKGCJACz7SloYUnDlMr2vXe7Siq2NOQgqzn-ctA",
     "token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":600}
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-issues">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t><strong>Lost code exchange response.</strong> Not addressed. The client restarts the
authorization. An idempotent retry of the code exchange is possible.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Discovery.</strong> Nothing tells a client that the authorization server supports
this, or that the refresh token it received is proof-bound. A server that
ignores <tt>refresh_pub</tt> returns an ordinary bearer refresh token.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Algorithm agility.</strong> The encodings are specific to P-256. Is one algorithm
enough?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Retention window.</strong> <xref target="as-processing"/> suggests "a few minutes". Should
there be a normative minimum?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Other grants.</strong> Only the authorization code grant is covered.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Should this be a DPoP extension?</strong> A counter and nonce in a DPoP proof at
the token endpoint would give DPoP clients the same detection property.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Missing sections.</strong> Key storage guidance, denial of service, authorization
server consistency requirements, metadata and IANA registrations are not yet
written.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Names.</strong> All parameter names are placeholders.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
  </back>
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