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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-gondwana-email-big-files-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Linked Attachments">Linked Attachments in Email Messages</title>

    <author initials="B." surname="Gondwana" fullname="Bron Gondwana">
      <organization>Fastmail</organization>
      <address>
        <email>brong@fastmailteam.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="A." surname="Melnikov" fullname="Alexey Melnikov">
      <organization>Isode Limited</organization>
      <address>
        <email>alexey.melnikov@isode.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>

    
    
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 78?>

<t>Message size limits mean that large files are sent by email as links
to a web server rather than as attachments.  A link loses the
properties that make an attachment useful: it can stop working, the
file behind it can change, it can't be scanned in transit, and it may
need a separate login.</t>

<t>This document defines the "Content-External" header field, which lets
receiving systems fetch, verify and keep a linked file, and then treat
it like any other attachment.  The field is on a body part with a
fallback link, which aware clients hide.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 91?>

<section anchor="intro"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>Most SMTP systems limit the size of messages that can be sent, which
can be as low as 10 megabytes.  Moreover, limits vary depending on the
recipient's system.  End users want to send files to each other, and
the files they create keep getting bigger.</t>

<t>The usual workaround is to upload the file to a web server and send a
link.  Many clients and services do this, each in their own way.</t>

<t>An attached file has properties that a link lacks:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>A copy lasts as long as the message.</t>
  <t>It can't be changed after sending.</t>
  <t>Systems that handle the message can scan it.</t>
  <t>Anyone who has the message has the file.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A link can stop working, the file behind it can change, it can't be
scanned in transit, and it may need a separate login.</t>

<t>This document defines the "Content-External" header field
(<xref target="header"/>), which gives the URL, size and digest of a file and, if
the file is encrypted, its key.  Receiving servers fetch, verify and
scan the file when the message arrives (<xref target="receiving"/>), and keep it as
long as the message (<xref target="lifetime"/>), which restores those properties.
The field is on a body part with an ordinary link to the file, which
clients that support this document hide (<xref target="fallback"/>).</t>

<t>This document replaces <xref target="BIG-FILES-00"/>; see <xref target="changes"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="conventions-and-definitions"><name>Conventions and Definitions</name>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

<t>This document uses the terms MUA, MDA and message store from
<xref target="MAIL-ARCH"/>, and:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>sender:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The sending MUA, or a service acting for it.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>linked attachment:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A file described by a Content-External header field.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>attachment server:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The HTTP <xref target="HTTP"/> server that holds a linked attachment.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>receiving server:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Any system on the recipient's side that inspects message content,
such as an MDA, a content filter or a message store.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="header"><name>Content-External Header Field</name>

<t>The generic syntax of the Content-External header field is the same
as that of the Content-Type header field (<xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="MIME"/>), so
the same generic parser can be used.  The media type is that of the
linked attachment.  If a different media type is returned when the
linked attachment is retrieved, the value in the header field
overrides it.</t>

<t>The Content-External header field appears in the header section of
the body part that is used to display the message to a user of an MUA
that doesn't support this document (<xref target="fallback"/>).  Such body parts
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have either the "text/plain" or the "text/html" media type.  A
body part <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> have more than one Content-External header field.
A Content-External header field in any other body part, or in a body
part that has more than one, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.</t>

<t>A linked attachment is treated as if an attached file had been placed
where its body part is in the MIME structure.</t>

<t>The body part's Content-ID (<xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="MIME"/>), if any, identifies
the linked attachment (<xref target="cid-urls"/>).</t>

<section anchor="params"><name>Parameters</name>

<t>Parameter names are case-insensitive.  <xref target="MIME-PARAM"/> encoding can be
used in parameter values, for long values and for non-ASCII names; it
is decoded before the rules below apply.  Other parameters are
parameters of the media type.</t>

<t>Each parameter below can appear at most once.  A receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore a
Content-External header field in which one appears more than once, a
<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> parameter is missing, or a value is invalid.</t>

<dl>
  <dt>URL:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>.  An absolute "https" URI <xref target="URI"/> used to access the linked
attachment (<xref target="fetching"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>SIZE:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>.  The size of the data in octets, after any decryption.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>DIGEST-&lt;digest-name&gt;:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>.  A digest of the data, after any decryption.  The digest
name is from the IANA "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields"
registry <xref target="DIGEST-FIELDS"/>, and its value is base64 <xref target="BASE64"/>.
"DIGEST-SHA-256" <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present; others <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be.  Deprecated
algorithms <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used.  Receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support SHA-256.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>STORED-DIGEST-&lt;digest-name&gt;:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>.  A digest of the data as stored at the URL, before
decryption, with names and values as for "DIGEST-".  It lets a
recipient check the downloaded data before decrypting it.  It is only
useful with "KEY".</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>NAME:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>.  The recommended file name of the linked attachment.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>DESCRIPTION:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>.  A description of the linked attachment, as for
Content-Description (<xref section="8" sectionFormat="of" target="MIME"/>).</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>LANGUAGE:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>.  The language of the linked attachment, as for
Content-Language <xref target="CONTENT-LANG"/>.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>CREATION-DATE, MODIFICATION-DATE, READ-DATE:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>.  As for Content-Disposition <xref target="CONTENT-DISP"/>.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>KEY:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>.  The algorithm, key and nonce used to encrypt the stored
data (<xref target="key-format"/>).  If absent, the data is not encrypted.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>EXPIRATION:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>.  The date-time <xref target="MAIL"/> after which the existence of the
linked attachment is not guaranteed, as for message/external-body
(<xref section="5.2.3" sectionFormat="of" target="MEDIA-TYPES"/>).</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="key-format"><name>Key Format</name>

<t>A key is an algorithm name, the key, and the nonce, separated by
colons.  The key and nonce are base64url <xref target="BASE64"/> without padding:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="abnf"><![CDATA[
key-value       = aead-name ":" key-material ":" nonce
aead-name       = "AEAD_" 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" )
                  ; name from the AEAD Registry
key-material    = b64url
nonce           = b64url
b64url          = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" )
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The algorithm is named in the IANA AEAD Registry (<xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="AEAD"/>).  The stored file is the algorithm's ciphertext output, with
empty associated data.  The nonce has the length the algorithm
requires, 12 octets for "AEAD_AES_128_GCM".  Receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support
"AEAD_AES_128_GCM".
Senders <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use it unless they know every recipient supports
another.</t>

<t>The sender <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use a new random key for each file.  A file larger than
the algorithm's P_MAX, about 64 GiB for "AEAD_AES_128_GCM", can't be
encrypted this way.</t>

<t>A receiver can't verify the file until it has all of it, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use any of
the plaintext before then.  A receiver that doesn't support the
algorithm treats the linked attachment as unavailable.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="abnf"><name>Formal Syntax</name>

<t>This uses ABNF <xref target="ABNF"/>.  "type", "subtype", "attribute", "token" and
"value" are from <xref target="MIME"/>; FWS, quoted-string and date-time are from
<xref target="MAIL"/>.</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="abnf"><![CDATA[
content-external = "Content-External:" [FWS] type "/" subtype
                   *([FWS] ";" [FWS] ce-parameter) [FWS] CRLF

ce-parameter    = url-param / size-param / digest-param /
                  stored-digest-param / name-param /
                  description-param / language-param /
                  date-param / key-param / expiration-param /
                  other-param ; other media type parameters

url-param       = "URL" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                  ; absolute "https" URI
size-param      = "SIZE" [FWS] "=" [FWS] 1*DIGIT
digest-param    = "DIGEST-" token [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                  ; base64
stored-digest-param = "STORED-DIGEST-" token [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                  ; base64
name-param      = "NAME" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
description-param = "DESCRIPTION" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
language-param  = "LANGUAGE" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                  ; Content-Language value
date-param      = ( "CREATION-DATE" / "MODIFICATION-DATE" /
                    "READ-DATE" ) [FWS] "=" [FWS] quoted-string
                  ; date-time
key-param       = "KEY" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                  ; key-value
expiration-param = "EXPIRATION" [FWS] "=" [FWS] quoted-string
                  ; date-time
other-param     = attribute [FWS] "=" [FWS] value

]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>A URL can't contain whitespace, so whitespace in the value of "URL" is
removed before it is used.  This lets a long URL be folded.  Senders
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> fold a long URL this way rather than split it with
<xref target="MIME-PARAM"/> continuations, which some receivers don't handle.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="example-header"><name>Example</name>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
Content-External: video/mp4; name="site-survey.mp4"; size=734003200;
    description="Drone survey of the north site";
    modification-date="Mon, 16 Nov 2026 17:42:10 +0000";
    url="https://files.example.com/la/
         Hq3Ld9YtW2xKq8vZp0aN5uFbE7cJr1sM";
    digest-sha-256="X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=";
    key="AEAD_AES_128_GCM:9Mzuq2AvtfQJxwuIzYB4Gg:Xq3mC8vT0bLw5RzH";
    expiration="Thu, 17 Dec 2026 09:15:00 +0000"
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="fallback"><name>Fallback Body Part</name>

<t>The body part with a Content-External header field contains a link from
which the file can be downloaded with a web browser, with its file name
and size.  It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be text/html <xref target="HTML"/>, with "Content-Disposition:
inline", where an attached file would go.  A sender
that knows every recipient's MUA supports this document, for example
because they all use the same service, <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> leave the body part empty.</t>

<t>The download link is usually not the "URL" parameter, which gives the
stored, possibly encrypted, data.  So that the attachment server can
decrypt the file, the download link <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include the key in the
format of <xref target="key-format"/>, for example as a query parameter.  The
attachment server chooses the rest of the URL.  See <xref target="security"/>.</t>

<t>In a text/html body part, the link <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be inside a "div" element with
class "content-external", so that an MUA that shows several body parts
as one can hide it.</t>

<t>MUAs that support this document <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> hide body parts with a
Content-External header field, and show the linked attachment instead.
They <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> hide one unless they offer the user a way to download
the file.  The file can be fetched and verified (<xref target="fetching"/>) on
arrival or when the user opens it.</t>

<t>The example uses the line wrapping of <xref target="WRAP"/>:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="b1"

--b1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8

Here is the survey video.

--b1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-External: video/mp4; name="site-survey.mp4"; ...

<div class="content-external">
<a href="https://dl.example/pR7wQxV3mTz9KcLe2Hd8Fy?k=AEAD_AES_128_\
  GCM:9Mzuq2AvtfQJxwuIzYB4Gg:Xq3mC8vT0bLw5RzH">site-survey.mp4</a>
(700 MiB)
</div>
--b1--
]]></artwork></figure>

<aside>
  <t>Open issue: Six years ago, some MUAs showed a second text/html body
part as an attachment rather than inline, so the user only saw the
link after opening it.  Is this still the case?</t>
</aside>

<section anchor="cid-urls"><name>CID URLs</name>

<t>A "cid" URL <xref target="CID"/> that refers to the Content-ID of a body part with a
Content-External header field refers to the linked attachment.  For
example, if that body part has "Content-ID:
<eref target="mailto:a2.20261117T091500Z@mail.example.com">a2.20261117T091500Z@mail.example.com</eref>":</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="html"><![CDATA[
<img src="cid:a2.20261117T091500Z@mail.example.com"
     alt="Site plan">
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>An MUA resolves such a URL only to a verified copy of the file
(<xref target="fetching"/>).  An MUA that would have to fetch the file from the
attachment server to display it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat it as remote content,
under the same policy as remote images (<xref target="privacy"/>).</t>

<t>MUAs that don't support this document resolve these URLs to the
fallback body part, and will show, for example, a broken image.
Senders <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> use them unless they know that the recipients' MUAs
support this document.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="sending"><name>Sending</name>

<section anchor="publishing"><name>Publishing the File</name>

<t>The sender stores the file on an attachment server, and chooses its
URL and key.  Unless the file is meant to be public, the sender <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
encrypt it (<xref target="key-format"/>).</t>

<t>The "URL" and the download link <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be guessable, unless the file
is already public.  Each <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> contain at least 128 random bits, as a
capability URL <xref target="CAPABILITY-URLS"/>.</t>

<t>The attachment server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> serve GET requests for the "URL" without
authentication, cookies or other state, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> always return the same
content for it.  It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep the file until "EXPIRATION", if given, and
for at least several days in any case.  Its download pages <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> send
"Referrer-Policy: no-referrer" <xref target="REFERRER-POLICY"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="composing"><name>Composing</name>

<t>The MUA adds a body part with a Content-External header field for each
linked attachment (<xref target="fallback"/>).  The DKIM <xref target="DKIM"/> body hash covers
these fields.</t>

<t>A linked attachment can be kept in a draft, and is published once.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="forwarding"><name>Forwarding and Replying</name>

<t>An MUA that forwards a message with linked attachments, or replies and
keeps them, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> publish its own copy of each file (<xref target="publishing"/>)
and give the new message body parts with Content-External header
fields that point to that copy.  The Content-ID and the parameters
other than "URL", "KEY", "STORED-DIGEST-" and "EXPIRATION" stay the
same.
This keeps the file from depending on the original attachment server
(<xref target="security"/>).</t>

<t>A message forwarded as a message/rfc822 body part keeps its linked
attachments inside it, as it would attached files.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="receiving"><name>Receiving</name>

<section anchor="fetching"><name>Fetching and Verifying</name>

<t>A receiving server or MUA fetches a linked attachment with a GET
request to its "URL".  The client:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> send cookies, credentials or anything else that identifies
the recipient;</t>
  <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the server's certificate (<xref section="4.3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="HTTP"/>);</t>
  <t><bcp14>MAY</bcp14> follow redirects, only to "https" URIs, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> limit how many;</t>
  <t>treats any final status code other than 2xx as failure, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> retry
after a 429 (Too Many Requests) <xref target="RATE-LIMIT"/>, a 5xx or a network
error; and</t>
  <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> stop reading once the content is longer than "SIZE" plus the
length of the algorithm's tag, if there is a "KEY".</t>
</list></t>

<t>A client that retries <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> back off.  After a response with a
Retry-After header field (<xref section="10.2.3" sectionFormat="of" target="HTTP"/>), it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> send
another request to that host before the time given.  Otherwise it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
wait at least a minute before the first retry, at least double the wait
after each further failure, and add random jitter.  The back-off
applies to the host, not just the URL, so that a receiving server
fetching many files from one attachment server slows down for all of
them.  A client <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> give up after a day or so, and treat the linked
attachment as unavailable.</t>

<t>The client then checks each "STORED-DIGEST-" whose algorithm it
supports, decrypts the file if there is a "KEY", and checks "SIZE" and
each "DIGEST-" whose algorithm it supports.  If no "DIGEST-" is
supported, or any check fails, the linked attachment is unavailable,
and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be shown as a verified attachment.</t>

<t>A receiving server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> decline to fetch a file, for example because it
is too large.  The MUA or the user can then fetch it.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="scanning"><name>Content Scanning</name>

<t>A receiving server <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> fetch and scan each linked attachment that it
would have scanned if the file had been attached, and apply the
same policy to the result.  If fetching during the SMTP transaction
would take too long, it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> scan after accepting the message and before
delivering it.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="storage"><name>Storage and Access</name>

<t>A message store <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> fetch each linked attachment on delivery, if it
wasn't fetched during scanning, and store it with the message.</t>

<t>It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> let the user's MUAs fetch the stored file the same way as an
attached file, so the MUA needn't contact the attachment server.  It
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> require the user to authenticate, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> let a user fetch
the file unless the user can read a message that refers to it.  This
applies to any lookup by digest, and to any proxy for remote content
that the message store offers.</t>

<aside>
  <t>Open issue: This is specific to each access protocol.  In JMAP
<xref target="JMAP-MAIL"/>, the EmailBodyPart for the fallback body part could
give the linked attachment's blobId, type, name and size, so it
appears among the Email's attachments like an attached file.  In
IMAP, BODYSTRUCTURE shows the fallback body part, so an MUA would
need a new FETCH data item to get the file.  These might be separate
documents, along with a way for an MUA to get proxied remote images.</t>
</aside>

<t>An MUA whose message store doesn't do this <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> fetch the file itself,
when the user opens it or in the background on arrival, but <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>
fetch it just because the message was displayed, except for an image
that the user's remote image policy allows (<xref target="cid-urls"/>).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="lifetime"><name>Lifetime</name>

<t>A message store <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep a linked attachment as long as any message
that refers to it, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> remove it once no message does, as it
would an attached file, so that it doesn't keep data the user has
deleted.  It can keep one copy for many messages, found by digest.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="alternatives"><name>Requirements and Alternatives Not Taken</name>

<t>The design meets these requirements:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>MUAs that don't support this document can show links to the files.</t>
  <t>A message can have many linked attachments.</t>
  <t>Linked attachments can be kept in drafts, forwarded and replied to.</t>
  <t>Receiving systems can restore the properties in <xref target="intro"/>.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The message/external-body media type <xref target="MEDIA-TYPES"/> also refers to
external content, but many MUAs show it as an attachment with no link,
and it has no digest or key.</t>

<t><xref target="BIG-FILES-00"/> asked whether the field should also be allowed in the
header section of a message.  This document doesn't allow it, so that
the field always has a fallback.  The field's name starts with
"Content-" because only such fields have a defined meaning in body
parts, and gateways may discard others (<xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="MEDIA-TYPES"/>).</t>

<t>The ExternalPart of <xref target="MIMI-CONTENT"/> has much the same information for
instant messaging.  This document uses the same encryption, AEAD
algorithms from the AEAD Registry, and the same option of a digest of
the stored file.  It also requires a digest of the plaintext, so that
copies under different keys match.  It names digest algorithms from the
HTTP Digest registry rather than the Named Information registry; both
have SHA-256.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<section anchor="iana-header"><name>Message Header Field</name>

<t>IANA is asked to add this entry to the "Permanent Message Header Field
Names" registry <xref target="REG-PROC"/>:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Header field name:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Content-External</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Applicable protocol:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>mail</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Status:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>standard</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Author/change controller:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>IETF</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Specification document(s):</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>this document</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-params"><name>Content-External Parameters</name>

<t>IANA is asked to create a "Content-External Parameters" registry, with
the Specification Required policy.  Each entry has a name, a
description and a reference.  The initial entries are:</t>

<texttable>
      <ttcol align='left'>Name</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Description</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>
      <c>URL</c>
      <c>URL of the data</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>SIZE</c>
      <c>Size of the data in octets</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>DIGEST-*</c>
      <c>Digest of the data</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>STORED-DIGEST-*</c>
      <c>Digest of the stored data</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>NAME</c>
      <c>Recommended file name</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>DESCRIPTION</c>
      <c>Description of the data</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>LANGUAGE</c>
      <c>Language of the data</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>CREATION-DATE</c>
      <c>Creation date of the file</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>MODIFICATION-DATE</c>
      <c>Modification date of the file</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>READ-DATE</c>
      <c>Last read date of the file</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>KEY</c>
      <c>Encryption algorithm, key and nonce</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
      <c>EXPIRATION</c>
      <c>Date after which the data may be gone</c>
      <c><xref target="params"/></c>
</texttable>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="security"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t><strong>Access.</strong>  Anyone with the message can fetch the file, as with an
attachment.  But URLs leak more easily, through browser history, logs
or Referer header fields, so encryption keeps a leaked "URL" alone from
revealing the file.  The download link includes the key, so it is as
sensitive as the message, and the attachment server sees the key when
it is used.  An attachment server could instead put the key in the
fragment and decrypt in the browser.</t>

<t><strong>Guessable URLs.</strong>  Even if the file is encrypted, a guessable URL
reveals that it exists and its size.</t>

<t><strong>Changed content.</strong>  Whoever controls the URL can change the file
without changing the message, and the digest detects this.  The digest
is required even with "KEY", because every recipient has the key, and
so does the attachment server once the download link is used, so any
of them can make a ciphertext that decrypts correctly.</t>

<t><strong>Request forgery.</strong>  Receiving servers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> fetch from addresses
that aren't publicly routable, such as loopback, link-local or private
addresses, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check again after each redirect.</t>

<t><strong>Resource use.</strong>  Receiving servers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> limit the number and total
size of linked attachments they fetch per message.</t>

<t><strong>Denial of service.</strong>  Someone who receives a message with linked
attachments can resend it, or just its Content-External header fields,
to millions of recipients, each of whose servers then fetches the file
from the original attachment server.  The same works with a "URL" that
points at any large file on any server.  Forwarding MUAs that publish
their own copies (<xref target="forwarding"/>) avoid this for ordinary forwarding.
Receiving servers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> fetch a URL only once, and reuse the result
for every message that names the same URL and digest, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> limit
how fast they fetch from any one host.  Attachment servers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> limit how
often they serve a file, and receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> back off when they do
(<xref target="fetching"/>).</t>

<t><strong>Misleading links.</strong>  The fallback link might not match the header
field.  An MUA that hides them and shows the verified file avoids
this.</t>

<t><strong>Scanning.</strong>  The key is in the message, so systems that handle the
message can decrypt the file.  Encryption protects it only from the
attachment server, unless the download link is used, and from anyone
with the URL alone.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="privacy"><name>Privacy Considerations</name>

<t>The attachment server sees each fetch.  If an MUA fetches the file
from it when the user views the message or opens the file, the
sender learns when and from where, as with a remote image, and
per-recipient URLs show who.  An image shown through a "cid" URL
(<xref target="cid-urls"/>) is then a "web bug" (<xref section="9.7.3" sectionFormat="of" target="E2E-GUIDANCE"/>).
If the message store fetches it on arrival and MUAs get it from there
(<xref target="storage"/>), the attachment server learns only that the message was
delivered, and not the recipient's address.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">



<reference anchor="DKIM">
  <front>
    <title>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures</title>
    <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker"/>
    <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Hansen"/>
    <author fullname="M. Kucherawy" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Kucherawy"/>
    <date month="September" year="2011"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) permits a person, role, or organization that owns the signing domain to claim some responsibility for a message by associating the domain with the message. This can be an author's organization, an operational relay, or one of their agents. DKIM separates the question of the identity of the Signer of the message from the purported author of the message. Assertion of responsibility is validated through a cryptographic signature and by querying the Signer's domain directly to retrieve the appropriate public key. Message transit from author to recipient is through relays that typically make no substantive change to the message content and thus preserve the DKIM signature.</t>
      <t>This memo obsoletes RFC 4871 and RFC 5672. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="76"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6376"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6376"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RATE-LIMIT">
  <front>
    <title>Additional HTTP Status Codes</title>
    <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
    <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
    <date month="April" year="2012"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies additional HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status codes for a variety of common situations. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6585"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6585"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="MEDIA-TYPES">
  <front>
    <title>Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types</title>
    <author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed"/>
    <author fullname="N. Borenstein" initials="N." surname="Borenstein"/>
    <date month="November" year="1996"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This second document defines the general structure of the MIME media typing system and defines an initial set of media types. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2046"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2046"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="CID">
  <front>
    <title>Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource Locators</title>
    <author fullname="E. Levinson" initials="E." surname="Levinson"/>
    <date month="August" year="1998"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Uniform Resource Locator (URL) schemes, "cid:" and "mid:" allow references to messages and the body parts of messages. For example, within a single multipart message, one HTML body part might include embedded references to other parts of the same message. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2392"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2392"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="ABNF">
  <front>
    <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
    <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker"/>
    <author fullname="P. Overell" initials="P." surname="Overell"/>
    <date month="January" year="2008"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="MIME">
  <front>
    <title>Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies</title>
    <author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed"/>
    <author fullname="N. Borenstein" initials="N." surname="Borenstein"/>
    <date month="November" year="1996"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This initial document specifies the various headers used to describe the structure of MIME messages. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2045"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2045"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="MIME-PARAM">
  <front>
    <title>MIME Parameter Value and Encoded Word Extensions: Character Sets, Languages, and Continuations</title>
    <author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed"/>
    <author fullname="K. Moore" initials="K." surname="Moore"/>
    <date month="November" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This memo defines extensions to the RFC 2045 media type and RFC 2183 disposition parameter value mechanisms. This memo also defines an extension to the encoded words defined in RFC 2047 to allow the specification of the language to be used for display as well as the character set. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2231"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2231"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="CONTENT-DISP">
  <front>
    <title>Communicating Presentation Information in Internet Messages: The Content-Disposition Header Field</title>
    <author fullname="R. Troost" initials="R." surname="Troost"/>
    <author fullname="S. Dorner" initials="S." surname="Dorner"/>
    <author fullname="K. Moore" initials="K." role="editor" surname="Moore"/>
    <date month="August" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This memo provides a mechanism whereby messages conforming to the MIME specifications [RFC 2045, RFC 2046, RFC 2047, RFC 2048, RFC 2049] can convey presentational information. It specifies the "Content- Disposition" header field, which is optional and valid for any MIME entity ("message" or "body part"). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2183"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2183"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="CONTENT-LANG">
  <front>
    <title>Content Language Headers</title>
    <author fullname="H. Alvestrand" initials="H." surname="Alvestrand"/>
    <date month="May" year="2002"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines a "Content-language:" header, for use in cases where one desires to indicate the language of something that has RFC 822-like headers, like MIME body parts or Web documents, and an "Accept-Language:" header for use in cases where one wishes to indicate one's preferences with regard to language. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3282"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3282"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="URI">
  <front>
    <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
    <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
    <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
    <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
    <date month="January" year="2005"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="BASE64">
  <front>
    <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
    <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
    <date month="October" year="2006"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="MAIL">
  <front>
    <title>Internet Message Format</title>
    <author fullname="P. Resnick" initials="P." role="editor" surname="Resnick"/>
    <date month="October" year="2008"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies the Internet Message Format (IMF), a syntax for text messages that are sent between computer users, within the framework of "electronic mail" messages. This specification is a revision of Request For Comments (RFC) 2822, which itself superseded Request For Comments (RFC) 822, "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages", updating it to reflect current practice and incorporating incremental changes that were specified in other RFCs. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5322"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5322"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="REG-PROC">
  <front>
    <title>Registration Procedures for Message Header Fields</title>
    <author fullname="G. Klyne" initials="G." surname="Klyne"/>
    <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
    <author fullname="J. Mogul" initials="J." surname="Mogul"/>
    <date month="September" year="2004"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification defines registration procedures for the message header fields used by Internet mail, HTTP, Netnews and other applications. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="90"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3864"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3864"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="HTTP">
  <front>
    <title>HTTP Semantics</title>
    <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
    <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
    <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
    <date month="June" year="2022"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
      <t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="AEAD">
  <front>
    <title>An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption</title>
    <author fullname="D. McGrew" initials="D." surname="McGrew"/>
    <date month="January" year="2008"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines algorithms for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), and defines a uniform interface and a registry for such algorithms. The interface and registry can be used as an application-independent set of cryptoalgorithm suites. This approach provides advantages in efficiency and security, and promotes the reuse of crypto implementations. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5116"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5116"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="DIGEST-FIELDS">
  <front>
    <title>Digest Fields</title>
    <author fullname="R. Polli" initials="R." surname="Polli"/>
    <author fullname="L. Pardue" initials="L." surname="Pardue"/>
    <date month="February" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines HTTP fields that support integrity digests. The Content-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP message content. The Repr-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP representations. Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest can be used to indicate a sender's interest and preferences for receiving the respective Integrity fields.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 3230 and the Digest and Want-Digest HTTP fields.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9530"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9530"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="HTML" target="https://html.spec.whatwg.org/">
  <front>
    <title>HTML Living Standard</title>
    <author >
      <organization>WHATWG</organization>
    </author>
    <date />
  </front>
</reference>


<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>




    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">



<reference anchor="WRAP">
  <front>
    <title>Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs</title>
    <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>
    <author fullname="E. Auerswald" initials="E." surname="Auerswald"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <author fullname="Q. Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu"/>
    <date month="June" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines two strategies for handling long lines in width-bounded text content. One strategy, called the "single backslash" strategy, is based on the historical use of a single backslash ('\') character to indicate where line-folding has occurred, with the continuation occurring with the first character that is not a space character (' ') on the next line. The second strategy, called the "double backslash" strategy, extends the first strategy by adding a second backslash character to identify where the continuation begins and is thereby able to handle cases not supported by the first strategy. Both strategies use a self-describing header enabling automated reconstitution of the original content.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8792"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8792"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="E2E-GUIDANCE">
  <front>
    <title>Guidance on End-to-End Email Security</title>
    <author fullname="D. K. Gillmor" initials="D. K." role="editor" surname="Gillmor"/>
    <author fullname="A. Melnikov" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Melnikov"/>
    <author fullname="B. Hoeneisen" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Hoeneisen"/>
    <date month="August" year="2025"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>End-to-end cryptographic protections for email messages can provide useful security. However, the standards for providing cryptographic protection are extremely flexible. That flexibility can trap users and cause surprising failures. This document offers guidance for Mail User Agent (MUA) implementers to help mitigate those risks and to make end-to-end email simple and secure for the end user. It provides a useful set of vocabulary as well as recommendations to avoid common failures. It also identifies a number of currently unsolved usability and interoperability problems.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9787"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9787"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="MAIL-ARCH">
  <front>
    <title>Internet Mail Architecture</title>
    <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." surname="Crocker"/>
    <date month="July" year="2009"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Over its thirty-five-year history, Internet Mail has changed significantly in scale and complexity, as it has become a global infrastructure service. These changes have been evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, reflecting a strong desire to preserve both its installed base and its usefulness. To collaborate productively on this large and complex system, all participants need to work from a common view of it and use a common language to describe its components and the interactions among them. But the many differences in perspective currently make it difficult to know exactly what another participant means. To serve as the necessary common frame of reference, this document describes the enhanced Internet Mail architecture, reflecting the current service. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5598"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5598"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="JMAP-MAIL">
  <front>
    <title>The JSON Meta Application Protocol (JMAP) for Mail</title>
    <author fullname="N. Jenkins" initials="N." surname="Jenkins"/>
    <author fullname="C. Newman" initials="C." surname="Newman"/>
    <date month="August" year="2019"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies a data model for synchronising email data with a server using the JSON Meta Application Protocol (JMAP). Clients can use this to efficiently search, access, organise, and send messages, and to get push notifications for fast resynchronisation when new messages are delivered or a change is made in another client.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8621"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8621"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="BIG-FILES-00">
   <front>
      <title>Referencing big external files in email messages</title>
      <author fullname="Bron Gondwana" initials="B." surname="Gondwana">
         <organization>FastMail</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Alexey Melnikov" initials="A." surname="Melnikov">
         <organization>Isode Limited</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="6" month="November" year="2023"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document specifies a way to reference big attachments in email
   messages without including them inline.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-melnikov-email-big-files-00"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="MIMI-CONTENT">
   <front>
      <title>More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) message content</title>
      <author fullname="Rohan Mahy" initials="R." surname="Mahy">
         <organization>Rohan Mahy Consulting Services</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes content semantics common in Instant Messaging
   (IM) systems and describes a profile suitable for instant messaging
   interoperability of messages end-to-end encrypted inside the MLS
   (Message Layer Security) Protocol.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mimi-content-10"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="REFERRER-POLICY" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/referrer-policy/">
  <front>
    <title>Referrer Policy</title>
    <author initials="J." surname="Eisinger" fullname="Jochen Eisinger">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="E." surname="Stark" fullname="Emily Stark">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2017" month="January" day="26"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="W3C" value="Candidate Recommendation"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="CAPABILITY-URLS" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/capability-urls/">
  <front>
    <title>Good Practices for Capability URLs</title>
    <author initials="J." surname="Tennison" fullname="Jeni Tennison">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2014" month="February" day="18"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="W3C" value="First Public Working Draft"/>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>


<?line 651?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="changes-from-draft-gondwana-email-big-files-00"><name>Changes from draft-gondwana-email-big-files-00</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Used FWS instead of CFWS in the Content-External syntax, and allowed
FWS around "=" in parameters.</t>
  <t>Let an MUA hide the fallback body part before verifying the file, if
it offers a way to download it.</t>
  <t>Recommended folding a long URL at whitespace rather than with
RFC 2231 continuations.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section numbered="false" anchor="changes"><name>Changes from draft-melnikov-email-big-files-00</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Allowed only one Content-External header field per body part, and
used the body part's Content-ID to refer to the linked attachment.</t>
  <t>Added "KEY", "STORED-DIGEST-", "DESCRIPTION", "LANGUAGE" and the
Content-Disposition date parameters.</t>
  <t>Made "SIZE" and "DIGEST-SHA-256" required, and required "https"
URLs.</t>
  <t>Removed "PERMISSION": a linked attachment can't change.</t>
  <t>Added the "content-external" HTML class.</t>
  <t>Added requirements for attachment servers, receiving servers and
message stores.</t>
  <t>Wrote the Security and Privacy Considerations.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

<t>Thanks to the participants in the discussion of large file attachments
at the IETF meeting where this design was sketched out.</t>

</section>


  </back>

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