Internet-Draft x402-federation-zkp November 2026
Hopley Expires 21 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Independent Submission
Internet-Draft:
draft-hopley-x402-federation-zkp-01
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
C. Hopley
AlgoVoi

Cross-Issuer ZKP Federation for Post-Quantum Agentic Payment Credentials

Abstract

This document defines a protocol for composing independently-issued post-quantum ZKP credentials from different issuers into a single federation token, without requiring a shared trust root between issuers.

Each credential is a Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206) or ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) signed Bulletproofs range proof asserting that an agent's trust score meets a threshold. A federation validator independently verifies each credential against its issuer's public key, then computes a composite commitment binding all verified proofs.

The resulting federation token is signed by the validator alone. No issuer needs to know about the others. This solves the cross-issuer attestation composition problem in agentic payment networks.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

1.1. The Cross-Issuer Composition Problem

Agentic payment networks are converging on a multi-issuer credential landscape. An agent may hold credentials from:

  • A payment-security evaluation service (e.g. ATB)

  • A KYC/AML identity provider

  • A domain-specific competency attestor

A gateway that requires proof of compliance with N issuers faces a composition problem: how does it accept a single credential that proves all N conditions are met, without requiring:

  • A shared trust root among the N issuers

  • The issuers to coordinate with each other

  • The agent to reveal its raw scores to the gateway

The naive solution — accept N separate credentials and verify each — works but has two drawbacks:

  1. The gateway must manage N HTTP header slots and N cache entries.

  2. Time-of-check / time-of-use windows differ per credential: if credential A is re-used from cache while credential B is fresh, they may represent different points in time.

This document specifies a federation composition protocol that:

  • Binds all N credentials to a single composite commitment

  • Produces a single short-lived token that the gateway can verify with one HMAC check

  • Requires no coordination among issuers

  • Preserves ZKP privacy (scores remain hidden)

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174].

Issuer: An entity that signs PQC credentials (ATB hub, identity provider, etc.). Each issuer has an independent Falcon-1024 or ML-DSA-65 key pair. Issuers have no knowledge of each other.

Federation Validator: An entity that holds the public keys of N trusted issuers and composes their credentials into a single federation token. The validator may be the payment gateway itself, or a separate service trusted by the gateway.

Federation Token: A short-lived HMAC-SHA256-signed token produced by the federation validator, containing the composite commitment and issuer list.

Composite Commitment: A SHA-256 hash binding the Pedersen commitments from all N input credentials together with a per-composition nonce.

2. Protocol Overview

Agent                  Validator              Gateway
  |                       |                      |
  |-- [cred_A, cred_B] -->|                      |
  |                       | verify cred_A vs pk_A|
  |                       | verify cred_B vs pk_B|
  |                       | compose_commitments()|
  |                       | issue_fed_token()    |
  |<--- federation_token--|                      |
  |                                              |
  |--- Bearer <fed_token> ---------------------->|
  |                                              | HMAC-verify
  |                                              | spend_cap check
  |<-------------- 200 OK ----------------------|

The agent presents two or more PQC credentials (each from an independent issuer) to the federation validator. The validator verifies each, composes the commitments, and returns a federation token. The agent then uses this token on the gateway.

The gateway only needs to: 1. Verify the HMAC on the federation token. 2. Verify expiry. 3. Check spend cap.

No Falcon-1024 verification happens on the gateway hot path.

3. Credential Requirements

Each credential presented to the federation validator MUST conform to [CREDENTIALBINDING] §2 (ATB Phase 2, atb_cert_version = "2").

Specifically: - alg MUST be "Falcon-1024" or "ML-DSA-65". - commitment_b64 MUST decode to exactly 32 bytes (compressed Ristretto255). - proof_b64 MUST decode to 200–900 bytes (64-bit Bulletproofs range proof). - bench_issuer MUST be a DID present in the validator's issuer_pks registry. - The credential MUST not be expired.

The validator MUST independently verify each credential's Falcon-1024 signature before proceeding to composition.

4. Issuer Key Registry

The federation validator maintains a mapping:

issuer_pks: { DID → Falcon-1024 public key (base64 standard) }

Each issuer's public key is obtained from their /.well-known/atb-keys.json endpoint:

{
  "keys": [
    {
      "kid": "<hex>",
      "alg": "Falcon-1024",
      "public_key_pqclean_b64": "<base64>"
    }
  ]
}

The validator MUST NOT accept credentials from issuers not in its registry. This is the sole trust boundary: the validator trusts specific issuer keys, but issuers do not need to trust each other.

5. Composition Algorithm

5.1. Input

  • credentials: ordered list of N verified PQC credential envelopes.

  • issuer_pks: registry mapping issuer DID → PK.

  • validator_secret: HMAC key held by the validator (>= 256 bits).

5.2. Composite Commitment

For each credential i, extract the Pedersen commitment:

comm_i = base64decode(credentials[i].payload.commitment_b64)  (32 bytes)

Sample a per-composition nonce:

nonce = CSPRNG(32 bytes)

Compute the composite commitment:

fed_commitment = SHA-256(DOMAIN || comm_0 || comm_1 || … || comm_{N-1} || nonce)

where:

DOMAIN = b"AlgoVoi-FederationToken-v1"    (26 bytes, UTF-8)

The domain label provides separation from other SHA-256 uses. The nonce ensures the composite commitment is unique per composition event, preventing an adversary from reusing a subset of credentials with different partners to produce a matching composite.

5.3. Expiry

The federation token's expires_at MUST be set to:

expires_at = min(credentials[i].payload.expires_at for i in 0..N)

This ensures the federation token never outlives any of its input credentials.

5.4. Issuance

The validator constructs the following payload:

{
  "version": "1",
  "fed_commitment": "<hex(fed_commitment)>",
  "fed_nonce":      "<hex(nonce)>",
  "issuers": [
    { "did": "<issuer_0_did>", "kid": "<issuer_0_kid>", "alg": "Falcon-1024" },
    { "did": "<issuer_1_did>", "kid": "<issuer_1_kid>", "alg": "Falcon-1024" }
  ],
  "threshold_met": true,
  "issued_at":    "<ISO8601-UTC>",
  "expires_at":   "<ISO8601-UTC>"
}

Applies JCS canonicalization [RFC8785] to produce canonical_payload.

Computes the HMAC tag:

sig = HMAC-SHA256(validator_secret, DOMAIN || canonical_payload)

Assembles the federation token envelope:

{
  "alg":     "HMAC-SHA256",
  "kid":     "<hex(SHA-256(validator_secret))[:16]>",
  "type":    "federation_token",
  "payload": { ... },
  "sig":     "<base64url(sig)>"
}

Base64url-encodes the envelope JSON as the federation token string.

6. Federation Token Verification (Gateway)

The gateway receiving Authorization: Bearer <fed_token> (after the initial session exchange):

  1. Base64url-decode and JSON-parse the envelope.

  2. Verify type = "federation_token" and alg = "HMAC-SHA256".

  3. Apply JCS canonicalization to payload.

  4. Compute expected = HMAC-SHA256(validator_secret, DOMAIN || canonical).

  5. Compare expected to the decoded sig using a constant-time comparison.

  6. Verify expires_at has not elapsed.

  7. If valid: extract fed_commitment, issuers, and enforce spend_cap.

The gateway does NOT re-verify Falcon-1024 signatures on the hot path. That work was done once by the federation validator.

7. Security Properties

7.1. No Shared Trust Root

Issuers A and B have independent key pairs. The validator's only relationship to each issuer is possession of their public keys. Issuers do not need to communicate with each other or with the validator beyond publishing their public keys.

7.2. Credential Independence

Each credential in the composition is independently verifiable by any party holding the issuer's public key. The composite token does not obscure this: the issuers field in the token payload lists all issuers and their kids, allowing retrospective audit.

7.3. Commitment Binding

The composite commitment fed_commitment binds the federation token to the exact set of Pedersen commitments from the input credentials. An adversary who replaces one credential with a different one will produce a different fed_commitment and the HMAC will not verify.

The per-composition nonce prevents a partial-credential-set replay: an adversary cannot use commitment_A from one composition event and commitment_B from another to produce a valid composite.

7.4. Score Privacy

The ZKP range proof in each input credential asserts score >= threshold without revealing the exact score. The composite commitment is derived from Pedersen commitment bytes, not from scores. The gateway learns only that threshold_met = true.

7.5. Quantum Resistance

All per-credential signing uses Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206) or ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204). The composite token uses HMAC-SHA256, which is quantum- resistant under the birthday-bound model (Grover's algorithm reduces effective security from 256 to 128 bits — still adequate).

7.6. Validator Key Compromise

If the validator's HMAC key is compromised, an adversary can forge federation tokens. Operators SHOULD rotate the validator key regularly and revoke outstanding tokens on rotation by advancing the token's kid.

8. Deployment Considerations

8.1. Single-Instance vs Distributed Validators

An HMAC-based federation token is verifiable by any instance holding the validator secret. In multi-instance deployments the secret MUST be shared across instances (e.g. via a secrets manager), not per-instance.

8.2. Minimum Credential Count

Operators SHOULD configure min_credentials >= 2 to require cross-issuer evidence. A value of 1 provides single-issuer mode — useful for testing but does not demonstrate cross-issuer composition.

8.3. Same-Issuer Credentials

The protocol permits two credentials from the same issuer. The composite commitment is still computed correctly and the HMAC verifies. However, the "no shared trust root" property holds trivially in this case. Operators that require distinct issuers SHOULD enforce issuer-DID uniqueness in the validator configuration.

8.4. ZKP Service Integration

Full Bulletproofs range proof verification (step 10 of [CREDENTIALBINDING] §4) requires calling the ATB ZKP service. The federation validator package performs structural validation of proof fields without the Rust service. Operators requiring cryptographic range proof verification SHOULD configure ATB_ZKP_ENABLED=true and the ATB_ZKP_URL environment variable.

9. Relation to Existing Work

The composition pattern in this document is novel in the agentic payments context. It draws on:

10. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[FIPS206]
NIST, "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures — FN-DSA (Falcon)", NIST FIPS 206 , .
[FIPS204]
NIST, "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)", NIST FIPS 204 , .
[RFC8785]
"JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", .
[SHA256]
NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-4 , n.d..

11.2. Informative References

[CREDENTIALBINDING]
"Post-Quantum Credential Binding for x402 Agentic Payment Authorization", n.d..
[ATB]
Hopley, C., "AlgoVoi Agent Trust Bench: Adversarial Evaluation, Post-Quantum Credential Binding, and Cross-Issuer Federation for Agentic Payment Safety", IACR ePrint 2026/109852 , , <https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/109852>.
[BULLETPROOFS]
al., B. B. et., "Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and More", IEEE S&P 2018 , .
[RISTRETTO]
"The ristretto255 and decaf448 Groups", n.d., <https://ristretto.group/>.
[x402]
"The x402 Payment Protocol", n.d., <https://x402.org/spec>.

Author's Address

C. Hopley
AlgoVoi