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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-hopley-x402-federation-zkp-01" category="info" submissionType="independent">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="x402-federation-zkp">Cross-Issuer ZKP Federation for Post-Quantum Agentic Payment Credentials</title>

    <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="C. Hopley">
      <organization>AlgoVoi</organization>
      <address>
        <email>hello@algovoi.co.uk</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Independent Submission</workgroup>
    <keyword>zero-knowledge proof</keyword> <keyword>federation</keyword> <keyword>cross-issuer</keyword> <keyword>x402</keyword> <keyword>agentic payments</keyword> <keyword>Falcon-1024</keyword> <keyword>post-quantum</keyword> <keyword>credential composition</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 73?>

<t>This document defines a protocol for composing independently-issued
post-quantum ZKP credentials from different issuers into a single
federation token, without requiring a shared trust root between issuers.</t>

<t>Each credential is a Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206) or ML-DSA-65 (NIST
FIPS 204) signed Bulletproofs range proof asserting that an agent's
trust score meets a threshold. A federation validator independently
verifies each credential against its issuer's public key, then computes
a composite commitment binding all verified proofs.</t>

<t>The resulting federation token is signed by the validator alone. No
issuer needs to know about the others. This solves the cross-issuer
attestation composition problem in agentic payment networks.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 89?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<section anchor="the-cross-issuer-composition-problem"><name>The Cross-Issuer Composition Problem</name>

<t>Agentic payment networks are converging on a multi-issuer credential
landscape. An agent may hold credentials from:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A payment-security evaluation service (e.g. ATB)</t>
  <t>A KYC/AML identity provider</t>
  <t>A domain-specific competency attestor</t>
</list></t>

<t>A gateway that requires proof of compliance with N issuers faces a
composition problem: how does it accept a single credential that
proves all N conditions are met, without requiring:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A shared trust root among the N issuers</t>
  <t>The issuers to coordinate with each other</t>
  <t>The agent to reveal its raw scores to the gateway</t>
</list></t>

<t>The naive solution — accept N separate credentials and verify each —
works but has two drawbacks:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>The gateway must manage N HTTP header slots and N cache entries.</t>
  <t>Time-of-check / time-of-use windows differ per credential: if
credential A is re-used from cache while credential B is fresh,
they may represent different points in time.</t>
</list></t>

<t>This document specifies a federation composition protocol that:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Binds all N credentials to a single composite commitment</t>
  <t>Produces a single short-lived token that the gateway can verify
with one HMAC check</t>
  <t>Requires no coordination among issuers</t>
  <t>Preserves ZKP privacy (scores remain hidden)</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>

<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174].</t>

<t><strong>Issuer:</strong> An entity that signs PQC credentials (ATB hub, identity
provider, etc.). Each issuer has an independent Falcon-1024 or ML-DSA-65
key pair. Issuers have no knowledge of each other.</t>

<t><strong>Federation Validator:</strong> An entity that holds the public keys of N
trusted issuers and composes their credentials into a single federation
token. The validator may be the payment gateway itself, or a separate
service trusted by the gateway.</t>

<t><strong>Federation Token:</strong> A short-lived HMAC-SHA256-signed token produced by
the federation validator, containing the composite commitment and issuer
list.</t>

<t><strong>Composite Commitment:</strong> A SHA-256 hash binding the Pedersen commitments
from all N input credentials together with a per-composition nonce.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="protocol-overview"><name>Protocol Overview</name>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
Agent                  Validator              Gateway
  |                       |                      |
  |-- [cred_A, cred_B] -->|                      |
  |                       | verify cred_A vs pk_A|
  |                       | verify cred_B vs pk_B|
  |                       | compose_commitments()|
  |                       | issue_fed_token()    |
  |<--- federation_token--|                      |
  |                                              |
  |--- Bearer <fed_token> ---------------------->|
  |                                              | HMAC-verify
  |                                              | spend_cap check
  |<-------------- 200 OK ----------------------|
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The agent presents two or more PQC credentials (each from an independent
issuer) to the federation validator. The validator verifies each, composes
the commitments, and returns a federation token. The agent then uses this
token on the gateway.</t>

<t>The gateway only needs to:
1. Verify the HMAC on the federation token.
2. Verify expiry.
3. Check spend cap.</t>

<t>No Falcon-1024 verification happens on the gateway hot path.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="credential-requirements"><name>Credential Requirements</name>

<t>Each credential presented to the federation validator MUST conform to
<xref target="CREDENTIALBINDING"/> §2 (ATB Phase 2, <spanx style="verb">atb_cert_version = "2"</spanx>).</t>

<t>Specifically:
- <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> MUST be <spanx style="verb">"Falcon-1024"</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">"ML-DSA-65"</spanx>.
- <spanx style="verb">commitment_b64</spanx> MUST decode to exactly 32 bytes (compressed Ristretto255).
- <spanx style="verb">proof_b64</spanx> MUST decode to 200–900 bytes (64-bit Bulletproofs range proof).
- <spanx style="verb">bench_issuer</spanx> MUST be a DID present in the validator's <spanx style="verb">issuer_pks</spanx> registry.
- The credential MUST not be expired.</t>

<t>The validator MUST independently verify each credential's Falcon-1024
signature before proceeding to composition.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="issuer-key-registry"><name>Issuer Key Registry</name>

<t>The federation validator maintains a mapping:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
issuer_pks: { DID → Falcon-1024 public key (base64 standard) }
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>Each issuer's public key is obtained from their <spanx style="verb">/.well-known/atb-keys.json</spanx>
endpoint:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "keys": [
    {
      "kid": "<hex>",
      "alg": "Falcon-1024",
      "public_key_pqclean_b64": "<base64>"
    }
  ]
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The validator MUST NOT accept credentials from issuers not in its registry.
This is the sole trust boundary: the validator trusts specific issuer keys,
but issuers do not need to trust each other.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="composition-algorithm"><name>Composition Algorithm</name>

<section anchor="input"><name>Input</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><spanx style="verb">credentials</spanx>: ordered list of N verified PQC credential envelopes.</t>
  <t><spanx style="verb">issuer_pks</spanx>: registry mapping issuer DID → PK.</t>
  <t><spanx style="verb">validator_secret</spanx>: HMAC key held by the validator (&gt;= 256 bits).</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="composite-commitment"><name>Composite Commitment</name>

<t>For each credential <spanx style="verb">i</spanx>, extract the Pedersen commitment:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
comm_i = base64decode(credentials[i].payload.commitment_b64)  (32 bytes)
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>Sample a per-composition nonce:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
nonce = CSPRNG(32 bytes)
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>Compute the composite commitment:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
fed_commitment = SHA-256(DOMAIN || comm_0 || comm_1 || … || comm_{N-1} || nonce)
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>where:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
DOMAIN = b"AlgoVoi-FederationToken-v1"    (26 bytes, UTF-8)
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The domain label provides separation from other SHA-256 uses. The nonce
ensures the composite commitment is unique per composition event, preventing
an adversary from reusing a subset of credentials with different partners
to produce a matching composite.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="expiry"><name>Expiry</name>

<t>The federation token's <spanx style="verb">expires_at</spanx> MUST be set to:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
expires_at = min(credentials[i].payload.expires_at for i in 0..N)
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>This ensures the federation token never outlives any of its input credentials.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="issuance"><name>Issuance</name>

<t>The validator constructs the following payload:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "version": "1",
  "fed_commitment": "<hex(fed_commitment)>",
  "fed_nonce":      "<hex(nonce)>",
  "issuers": [
    { "did": "<issuer_0_did>", "kid": "<issuer_0_kid>", "alg": "Falcon-1024" },
    { "did": "<issuer_1_did>", "kid": "<issuer_1_kid>", "alg": "Falcon-1024" }
  ],
  "threshold_met": true,
  "issued_at":    "<ISO8601-UTC>",
  "expires_at":   "<ISO8601-UTC>"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>Applies JCS canonicalization <xref target="RFC8785"/> to produce <spanx style="verb">canonical_payload</spanx>.</t>

<t>Computes the HMAC tag:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
sig = HMAC-SHA256(validator_secret, DOMAIN || canonical_payload)
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>Assembles the federation token envelope:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "alg":     "HMAC-SHA256",
  "kid":     "<hex(SHA-256(validator_secret))[:16]>",
  "type":    "federation_token",
  "payload": { ... },
  "sig":     "<base64url(sig)>"
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>Base64url-encodes the envelope JSON as the federation token string.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="federation-token-verification-gateway"><name>Federation Token Verification (Gateway)</name>

<t>The gateway receiving <spanx style="verb">Authorization: Bearer &lt;fed_token&gt;</spanx> (after
the initial session exchange):</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Base64url-decode and JSON-parse the envelope.</t>
  <t>Verify <spanx style="verb">type = "federation_token"</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">alg = "HMAC-SHA256"</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Apply JCS canonicalization to <spanx style="verb">payload</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Compute <spanx style="verb">expected = HMAC-SHA256(validator_secret, DOMAIN || canonical)</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Compare <spanx style="verb">expected</spanx> to the decoded <spanx style="verb">sig</spanx> using a constant-time comparison.</t>
  <t>Verify <spanx style="verb">expires_at</spanx> has not elapsed.</t>
  <t>If valid: extract <spanx style="verb">fed_commitment</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">issuers</spanx>, and enforce <spanx style="verb">spend_cap</spanx>.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The gateway does NOT re-verify Falcon-1024 signatures on the hot path.
That work was done once by the federation validator.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-properties"><name>Security Properties</name>

<section anchor="no-shared-trust-root"><name>No Shared Trust Root</name>

<t>Issuers A and B have independent key pairs. The validator's only
relationship to each issuer is possession of their public keys. Issuers
do not need to communicate with each other or with the validator beyond
publishing their public keys.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="credential-independence"><name>Credential Independence</name>

<t>Each credential in the composition is independently verifiable by any
party holding the issuer's public key. The composite token does not
obscure this: the <spanx style="verb">issuers</spanx> field in the token payload lists all issuers
and their kids, allowing retrospective audit.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="commitment-binding"><name>Commitment Binding</name>

<t>The composite commitment <spanx style="verb">fed_commitment</spanx> binds the federation token to
the exact set of Pedersen commitments from the input credentials. An
adversary who replaces one credential with a different one will produce
a different <spanx style="verb">fed_commitment</spanx> and the HMAC will not verify.</t>

<t>The per-composition nonce prevents a partial-credential-set replay:
an adversary cannot use commitment_A from one composition event and
commitment_B from another to produce a valid composite.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="score-privacy"><name>Score Privacy</name>

<t>The ZKP range proof in each input credential asserts <spanx style="verb">score &gt;= threshold</spanx>
without revealing the exact score. The composite commitment is derived
from Pedersen commitment bytes, not from scores. The gateway learns only
that <spanx style="verb">threshold_met = true</spanx>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="quantum-resistance"><name>Quantum Resistance</name>

<t>All per-credential signing uses Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206) or ML-DSA-65
(NIST FIPS 204). The composite token uses HMAC-SHA256, which is quantum-
resistant under the birthday-bound model (Grover's algorithm reduces
effective security from 256 to 128 bits — still adequate).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="validator-key-compromise"><name>Validator Key Compromise</name>

<t>If the validator's HMAC key is compromised, an adversary can forge
federation tokens. Operators SHOULD rotate the validator key regularly
and revoke outstanding tokens on rotation by advancing the token's <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="deployment-considerations"><name>Deployment Considerations</name>

<section anchor="single-instance-vs-distributed-validators"><name>Single-Instance vs Distributed Validators</name>

<t>An HMAC-based federation token is verifiable by any instance holding
the validator secret. In multi-instance deployments the secret MUST
be shared across instances (e.g. via a secrets manager), not per-instance.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="minimum-credential-count"><name>Minimum Credential Count</name>

<t>Operators SHOULD configure <spanx style="verb">min_credentials &gt;= 2</spanx> to require cross-issuer
evidence. A value of 1 provides single-issuer mode — useful for testing
but does not demonstrate cross-issuer composition.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="same-issuer-credentials"><name>Same-Issuer Credentials</name>

<t>The protocol permits two credentials from the same issuer. The composite
commitment is still computed correctly and the HMAC verifies. However, the
"no shared trust root" property holds trivially in this case. Operators
that require distinct issuers SHOULD enforce issuer-DID uniqueness in the
validator configuration.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="zkp-service-integration"><name>ZKP Service Integration</name>

<t>Full Bulletproofs range proof verification (step 10 of <xref target="CREDENTIALBINDING"/>
§4) requires calling the ATB ZKP service. The federation validator package
performs structural validation of proof fields without the Rust service.
Operators requiring cryptographic range proof verification SHOULD configure
<spanx style="verb">ATB_ZKP_ENABLED=true</spanx> and the <spanx style="verb">ATB_ZKP_URL</spanx> environment variable.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="relation-to-existing-work"><name>Relation to Existing Work</name>

<t>The composition pattern in this document is novel in the agentic payments
context. It draws on:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><strong>BBS+ / selective disclosure</strong>: The commitment-binding approach is
inspired by Pedersen commitment composition in BBS+ credential
presentations, without requiring pairing-based cryptography.</t>
  <t><strong>OIDC Federation</strong>: The validator-as-translator pattern mirrors OIDC
federation, where a federation entity re-signs assertions about a
relying party's trustworthiness without requiring the OP to know
about the federation.</t>
  <t><strong>Verifiable Presentations (W3C VC)</strong>: The <spanx style="verb">issuers</spanx> list in the
federation token is analogous to a VP's credential provenance graph,
but simplified for the payment-session context.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">

<reference anchor="FIPS206" >
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures — FN-DSA (Falcon)</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="August"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS 206" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="FIPS204" >
  <front>
    <title>Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="August"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS 204" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8785" >
  <front>
    <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2020" month="June"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="SHA256" >
  <front>
    <title>Secure Hash Standard</title>
    <author >
      <organization>NIST</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="FIPS PUB 180-4" value=""/>
</reference>


    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">

<reference anchor="CREDENTIALBINDING" >
  <front>
    <title>Post-Quantum Credential Binding for x402 Agentic Payment Authorization</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="ATB" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/109852">
  <front>
    <title>AlgoVoi Agent Trust Bench: Adversarial Evaluation, Post-Quantum Credential Binding, and Cross-Issuer Federation for Agentic Payment Safety</title>
    <author initials="C." surname="Hopley" fullname="C. Hopley">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="June"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="IACR ePrint 2026/109852" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="BULLETPROOFS" >
  <front>
    <title>Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and More</title>
    <author initials="B. B. et" surname="al." fullname="B. Bünz et al.">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2018"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="IEEE S&amp;P 2018" value=""/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RISTRETTO" target="https://ristretto.group/">
  <front>
    <title>The ristretto255 and decaf448 Groups</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="x402" target="https://x402.org/spec">
  <front>
    <title>The x402 Payment Protocol</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>



  </back>

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