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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations-01" category="info" consensus="true" submissionType="IRTF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="ML-KEM Security">ML-KEM Security Considerations</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations-01"/>
    <author fullname="Scott Fluhrer">
      <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      <address>
        <email>sfluhrer@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Quynh Dang">
      <organization abbrev="NIST">National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
      <address>
        <email>Quynh.Dang@nist.gov</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="J." surname="Preuß Mattsson" fullname="John Preuß Mattsson">
      <organization>Ericsson</organization>
      <address>
        <email>john.mattsson@ericsson.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Kevin Milner">
      <organization>Individual</organization>
      <address>
        <email>kamilner@kamilner.ca</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Daniel Shiu">
      <organization>Arqit Quantum Inc</organization>
      <address>
        <email>daniel.shiu@arqit.uk</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
    <area>IRTF</area>
    <workgroup>Crypto Forum</workgroup>
    <keyword>ML-KEM</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 115?>

<t>NIST standardized ML-KEM as FIPS 203 in August 2024.  This document discusses
how to use ML-KEM within protocols - that is, what problem it solves,
and what you need to do to use it securely.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://sfluhrer.github.io/ml-kem-security-considerations/draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Crypto Forum Research Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:cfrg@irtf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/sfluhrer/ml-kem-security-considerations"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 121?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>A Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) is a large and reliable Quantum Computer that can break protocols which rely on the
traditional RSA, DH, or ECDH methods of securely exchanging keys.  Even
though it is not believed that, at the time of this writing, there exists a CRQC,
there still remains the possibility that an adversary may record the protocol
exchange, and then later (when they have access to a CRQC) go ahead and read
the traffic.</t>
      <t>Because of this threat, NIST has published FIPS 203 <xref target="FIPS203"/>, which standardizes a method for allowing two systems to securely exchange keying material and which is not vulnerable to a CRQC.
This method is based on module lattices, and is called ML-KEM.</t>
      <t>ML-KEM is a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), which can be used to generate a shared secret key between two parties.
A KEM is a public key mechanism where one side (Alice) can generate a public/private key pair, and send the public key to the other side (Bob).
Bob then can use it to generate both a ciphertext and a shared secret key.
Bob then sends the ciphertext to Alice, who uses her private key to generate the shared secret key.
The idea is that someone in the middle, listening into the exchanged public keys and ciphertexts will not be able to recover the shared secret key that Alice and Bob learn.
Hence, Alice and Bob can use their shared secret key to establish secure symmetric communication.
For ML-KEM, this shared secret is always 32 bytes, and is indistinguishable from random by an adversary (that is, it could be used directly as a symmetric key).</t>
      <t>One common misunderstanding of the term KEM is the expectation that Bob freely chooses the
shared secret, and encrypts that when sending to Alice.
While there do exist KEMs where this is true, this is not true for ML-KEM.
In ML-KEM, randomness from both sides is used to contribute to the
shared secret. That is, ML-KEM internally generates the shared secret in a
way that Bob cannot select the value. Now, Bob can generate a number of
ciphertext/shared secret pairs, and select the shared secret that he prefers,
but he cannot freely choose it or make the secrets across two different ML-KEM exchanges be
equal.</t>
      <t>A KEM (such as ML-KEM) sounds like it may be a drop-in replacement for
Diffie-Hellman (and in some scenarios, it can be).
However this is not always the case. In Diffie-Hellman, the parties
exchange two public keys, whereas in a KEM, the ciphertext is necessarily a
function of Alice's public key, and thus can only be useful with that
specific public key. Additionally, a KEM differs from Diffie-Hellman which is
asynchronous and non-interactive. In particular, for an 'ephemeral-ephemeral'
key establishment, an encapsulator cannot pre-emptively initiate a key
establishment, but requires an encapsulation key. Nor can participants compute
parts of the key establishment in parallel as is the case with
Diffie-Hellman. As long as the application can handle larger public keys and
ciphertexts, a KEM is a drop-in replacement for 'ephemeral-ephemeral' key
exchange in protocols like TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/>, SSH <xref target="RFC4253"/>, Wireguard <xref target="WIRE"/>, and EDHOC <xref target="RFC9528"/> as well as
'static-ephemeral' key exchange in protocols like ECIES/HPKE <xref target="RFC9180"/>,
that is, in cases where Alice has a long term public key, and Bob can use that long term public key to establish communication.
A KEM is not a drop-in replacement in applications such as the Diffie-Hellman
ratchet in Signal <xref target="SIGNAL"/>, implicit 'ephemeral-static' DH authentication
in Noise <xref target="NOISE"/>, WireGuard <xref target="WIRE"/>, and EDHOC <xref target="RFC9528"/>, and
'static-static' configurations in CMS <xref target="RFC6278"/> and Group OSCORE
<xref target="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm"/>, where both sides have long-term public
keys.</t>
      <t>ML-KEM can also be used to perform public key encryption, that is, where a sender encrypts a message with a public key, and only the holder of the private key can decrypt the message.
To use ML-KEM for this task, it is recommended that you use it within the Hybrid Public Key Encryption framework <xref target="RFC9180"/> to perform the operations.
You can use <xref target="I-D.draft-ietf-hpke-pq"/>, which defines three ML-KEM parameter sets that have been proposed for HPKE.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="using-ml-kem">
      <name>Using ML-KEM</name>
      <t>To use ML-KEM, there are three steps involved:</t>
      <section anchor="ml-kem-key-generation">
        <name>ML-KEM Key Generation</name>
        <t>The first step for Alice is to generate a public and private keypair.</t>
        <t>In FIPS 203, the key generation function is <tt>ML-KEM.KeyGen()</tt> (see section 7.1 of
<xref target="FIPS203"/>).  It internally calls the random number generator for a seed and
produces both a public key (known as an encapsulation key in FIPS 203) and a
private key (known as a decapsulation key). The seed can be securely stored,
but must be treated with the same safeguards as the private key.
The seed format allows fast
reconstruction of the expanded key pair format, and elides the need for
format checks of the expanded key formats.
Other intermediate data besides the matrix A_hat must be securely deleted.
A_hat may be saved for repeated Decapsulation operation(s) with the same decapsulation key.</t>
        <t>The public key can be freely published (and Bob will need it for his part of
the process); this step may be performed simply by transmitting the key to
Bob.  However, the private key (in either format) must be kept secret.</t>
        <t>It is essential that the public key is generated correctly when the initial
key generation is performed. Lattice public keys consist of a lattice and a secret
hidden by an error term; if additional error can be introduced into the
public key generation stage, then the success of decapsulation can reveal
enough of the secret that successive queries determine the private
key. Notably, this means a public key can be 'poisoned' such that a future
adversary can recover the private key even though it will appear correct in
normal usage.</t>
        <t>To try to prevent such errors before a keypair is used, FIPS requires that an
approved implementation perform a Pair-wise Consistency Test (PCT) on each
freshly generated keypair: the implementation performs an encapsulation
followed by a decapsulation against the new keypair, and verifies that
both sides derive the same shared secret.  The purpose of the test is to
catch key generation errors that would result in a non-functional or
weakened keypair - whether from a software bug, a hardware fault, or
deliberate fault injection - before the keypair is exported or used for
any real exchange.  The PCT will reliably detect a keypair that is
non-functional, but it cannot rule out the more subtle 'poisoned' keys
described above, which decapsulate honestly generated ciphertexts
correctly while still leaking information through decapsulation failures
on adversarially chosen ciphertexts.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ml-kem-encapsulation">
        <name>ML-KEM Encapsulation</name>
        <t>The second step is for Bob to generate a ciphertext and a shared secret key.</t>
        <t>To perform this step, Bob would first run the Encapsulation Key Check on
Alice's public key as outlined at the beginning of section 7.2 of
<xref target="FIPS203"/>.  If that test passes, then Bob would perform what FIPS 203
terms as ML-KEM.Encaps() (see section 7.2 of <xref target="FIPS203"/>).  This step takes
the validated public key, internally calls the random number generator for a
seed, and produces both a ciphertext and a 32-byte shared secret
key.
Intermediate data other than the ciphertext, shared secret key and the matrix A_hat (and the "matrix data" internal to ML-KEM, which can be deduced from the public key) must be securely deleted.
The matrix A_hat may be saved and reused for later encapsulation operations with the same encapsulation key.</t>
        <t>The ciphertext can be transmitted back to Alice; if the exchange is
successful, the 32-byte shared secret key will be the key shared with Alice.</t>
        <t>It may be that some libraries combine the validation and the encapsulation
step; implementations should determine whether the library they are using does. For static
public keys, the Encapsulation Key Check only needs to be performed once.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ml-kem-decapsulation">
        <name>ML-KEM Decapsulation</name>
        <t>The third and final step is for Alice to take the ciphertext and generate the
shared secret key.</t>
        <t>To perform this step, Alice would first run the input validation steps at
the beginning of section 7.3 of <xref target="FIPS203"/>: a ciphertext type check on
Bob's ciphertext, and a decapsulation key type check and decapsulation key
hash check on her own private key.  If those tests pass, then Alice would
perform what FIPS 203 terms as <tt>ML-KEM.Decaps()</tt> (see section 7.3 of
<xref target="FIPS203"/>).  This step takes the
ciphertext from Bob and the private key that was previously generated by
Alice, and produces a 32-byte shared secret key. It also repeats some or all of the
encapsulation process to ensure that the ciphertext was created strictly
according to the specification, with invalid ciphertexts generating an unrelated 32 byte value that gives no information.
Although not necessary for the correctness of the key establishment,
this step should not be skipped as a maliciously generated ciphertext could
induce decapsulation failures that can allow an attacker to deduce the private key with a sufficient number of exchanges.
Intermediate data other than the shared secret key and the matrix A_hat must be securely deleted.
The matrix A_hat may be saved for later Decapsulation operations with the same decapsulation key.</t>
        <t>If the exchange is successful, the 32-byte key generated on both sides will
be the same.</t>
        <t>It may be that some libraries combine the validation and the decapsulation
step; implementations should determine whether the library they are using does.
For a static private key, the decapsulation key type and hash checks only need
to be performed once; the ciphertext type check is required for every incoming
ciphertext.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ml-kem-parameter-sets">
        <name>ML-KEM Parameter Sets</name>
        <t>FIPS 203 specifies three parameter sets; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and
ML-KEM-1024.  It is assumed that Alice and Bob both know which parameter set
they use (either by negotiation or by having one selection fixed in the
protocol).</t>
        <t><xref target="par-sets"/> shows the sizes of the cryptographic material of ML-KEM for each parameter set, as well as their relative cryptographic strength:</t>
        <table anchor="par-sets">
          <name>pk = public key, sk = private key, expanded form, ct = ciphertext, ss = shared key, all lengths in bytes</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left"> </th>
              <th align="right">pk size</th>
              <th align="right">sk size</th>
              <th align="right">ct size</th>
              <th align="center">ss size</th>
              <th align="center">as strong as</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ML-KEM-512</td>
              <td align="right">800</td>
              <td align="right">1632</td>
              <td align="right">768</td>
              <td align="center">32</td>
              <td align="center">AES-128</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ML-KEM-768</td>
              <td align="right">1184</td>
              <td align="right">2400</td>
              <td align="right">1088</td>
              <td align="center">32</td>
              <td align="center">AES-192</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ML-KEM-1024</td>
              <td align="right">1568</td>
              <td align="right">3168</td>
              <td align="right">1568</td>
              <td align="center">32</td>
              <td align="center">AES-256</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t><xref target="par-perf"/> shows an example of ML-KEM performance of each parameter set on one specific platform:</t>
        <table anchor="par-perf">
          <name>Single-core performance in operations per second (higher is better) on AMD Ryzen 7 7700</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left"> </th>
              <th align="right">key generation</th>
              <th align="right">encapsulation</th>
              <th align="right">decapsulation</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ML-KEM-512</td>
              <td align="right">244000</td>
              <td align="right">153000</td>
              <td align="right">202000</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ML-KEM-768</td>
              <td align="right">142000</td>
              <td align="right">103000</td>
              <td align="right">134000</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ML-KEM-1024</td>
              <td align="right">109000</td>
              <td align="right">77000</td>
              <td align="right">99000</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Data sourced from <xref target="EBACS"/></t>
        <t>As can be seen from <xref target="par-sets"/> and <xref target="par-perf"/>, ML-KEM has significantly
larger public keys and ciphertexts than ECDH but very good performance.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ml-kem-security-considerations">
      <name>ML-KEM Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This section pertains specifically to ML-KEM, and may not be true of KEMs in
general.</t>
      <t>The fundamental security property of ML-KEM is that someone listening to the exchanges
(and thus obtains both the public key and the ciphertext) cannot reconstruct
the shared secret key, and this is true even if the adversary has access to a
CRQC. ML-KEM is IND-CCA2 secure; that is, it remains secure even if an
adversary is able to submit arbitrary ciphertexts against a fixed public key and observe the resulting
shared key. Submitting invalid ciphertexts to <tt>ML-KEM.Decaps()</tt> does not help
the attacker obtain information about the decryption key of the PKE-Decrypt
function inside the ML-KEM.Decaps(). Substituting the public key Alice sends
Bob by another public key chosen by the attacker will not help the attacker
get any information about Alice's private key, it would just make Alice and
Bob not have a same shared secret key. However, if it is possible to
substitute the stored copy of the public key on both sides (Alice's copy,
which is bound into her decapsulation key, and Bob's copy, which he
encapsulates against), an attacker can introduce a malicious public key
where the same private key can be used for decapsulation, but the
probability of decryption failure is marginally higher.  This is the same
'poisoning' attack described in the Key Generation section above, but
performed against the stored public key after generation rather than
during generation itself; the consequence is the same in either case.  As decryption failures can leak information about the
secret decapsulation key, it is important that Alice keeps a secure copy
of the public key as part of her secret key. For practical purposes, IND-CCA2 means
that ML-KEM is secure to use with static public keys.</t>
      <t>ML-KEM requires that a source of random bits with security strength greater than or
equal to the security strength of the ML-KEM parameter set be used when generating
the keypair and ciphertext in ML-KEM.KeyGen() and ML-KEM.Encaps() respectively.
The cryptographic library that implements ML-KEM may access this source of randomness
internally. A fresh string of bytes must be used for every sampling of random bytes
in key generation and encapsulation. The random bytes should be generated securely.</t>
      <t>During ML-KEM encapsulation, encapsulation randomness <tt>m</tt> drawn from a random bit
generator is encrypted (see Algorithms 17 and 20 in <xref target="FIPS203"/>); Alice (the decapsulator),
who holds the decapsulation key, recovers <tt>m</tt> exactly during decapsulation (see Algorithm
18 in <xref target="FIPS203"/>). Consequently, any information <tt>m</tt> carries about the generator's other
outputs is also exposed to the decapsulator.</t>
      <t>The disclosure of the output(s) of an insecure random number generator (RNG) can be
used in an attack to compromise the state of the insecure RNG itself, as demonstrated
for TLS in <xref target="DUALECTLS"/>. The <tt>m</tt> value in ML-KEM is an additional place where RNG
output is disclosed to an active attacker. Because the <tt>m</tt> value in ML-KEM is randomly
generated and transmitted to the client, it is important to follow the RBG guidance
in <xref target="FIPS203"/>. Implementers MAY choose to implement mechanisms from <xref target="RFC8937"/> for
additional protection across sessions.</t>
      <t>Alice must keep her private key secret (both private and secure from
modification).  A copy of the public key and its hash are
included in the private key and must be protected from modification.</t>
      <t>If the ciphertext that Alice receives from Bob is tampered with (either by
small modification or by replacing it with an entirely different ciphertext),
the shared secret key that Alice derives will be uncorrelated with the shared
secret key that Bob obtains.  An attacker will not be able to determine any
information about the correct shared secret key or Alice's private key, even
if the attacker obtains Alice's modified shared secret key which is the
output of the <tt>ML-KEM.Decaps()</tt> function taking the modified ciphertext as input.</t>
      <t>It is secure to reuse a public key multiple times.  That is, instead of Alice
generating a fresh public and private keypair for each exchange, Alice may
generate a public key once, and then publish that public key, and use it for
multiple incoming ciphertexts, generating multiple shared secret keys.  While
this is safe, it is recommended that if the protocol already has Alice send Bob her unauthenticated public key, they should generate a fresh keypair each time
(and zeroize the private key immediately after ML-KEM.Decaps()) to obtain Perfect Forward
Secrecy. Generally key generation of ML-KEM is very fast (see
<xref target="par-perf"/>). Hence, if Alice generates a fresh ML-KEM key each time, then even if Alice's system is subverted (either by a hacker or
a legal warrant), the previous communications remain secure (because Alice no
longer has the information needed to recover the shared secret keys).</t>
      <t>Alice and Bob must perform the input validation steps in <xref target="FIPS203"/>: Bob
must perform the Encapsulation Key Check on Alice's public key, and Alice
must perform the ciphertext type check on Bob's ciphertext and the
decapsulation key type and hash checks on her own private key.  The
cryptographic libraries that Alice and Bob use may automatically perform such
checks; they should each verify that is the case.</t>
      <t>The shared secret key for all three parameter sets, ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768
and ML-KEM-1024 is 32 bytes which are indistinguishable from 32-byte
pseudorandom byte-strings of 128, 192 and 256 bits of strengths
respectively. As such, the 32-byte string is suitable for both directly as a symmetric key
(for use by a symmetric cipher such as AES or a MAC), and also as input into
a Key Derivation Function.  This is in contrast to a Diffie-Hellman (or ECDH)
operation, where the output is distinguishable from random.</t>
      <t>If the adversary has control over the ML-KEM private key, it has been shown that the adversary can cause a ‘misbinding’ between the shared key and either the ciphertext or the public key.
That is, by generating an impossible private key (a key that cannot occur with the standard ML-KEM key generation process), the adversary can create public keys for which different ciphertexts or public keys may result in the same shared secret (these security notions are called MAL-BIND-K-CT and MAL-BIND-K-PK in the cryptographical literature <xref target="CDM23"/> <xref target="KEMMY24"/>).
This is not a threat to normal uses of ML-KEM as a key exchange or a public key encryption method.
If ML-KEM is used as an authentication method where the shared key is used for authentication (and adversary control of the private key is possible), it may be advisable if the protocol also authenticates the public key and ciphertext as well.</t>
      <section anchor="issues-that-are-likely-not-a-concern">
        <name>Issues that are likely not a concern</name>
        <t>This section contains issues that you may have heard of, but are quite unlikely to be a concern in your use case.
This is here to discuss them, and show why they are not practical issues.
Readers who have not encountered these issues can safely skip this section.</t>
        <section anchor="decapsulation-failure">
          <name>Decapsulation failure</name>
          <t>With ML-KEM, there is a tiny probability of decapsulation failure.
That is, even if Alice and Bob perform their roles honestly and the public key and ciphertext are transmitted correctly, there is a tiny probability that Alice and Bob will not derive the same shared key.
However, even though that is a theoretical possibility, practically speaking this will never happen.
For all three parameter sets, the probability is so low that most likely an actual decapsulation failure because of this will never be seen for any ML-KEM exchange anywhere (not only for your protocol, but over all protocols that use ML-KEM).
Hence, the advice we give is to ignore the possibility.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ml-kem-public-key-expansion-not-being-constant-time">
          <name>ML-KEM public key expansion not being constant time</name>
          <t>During the ML-KEM key generation and the encapsulation process, the public seed is expanded, and this involves rejection sampling of XOF (extendable-output function) output to achieve coefficient values that are uniformly distributed.
This means that a straight-forward implementation will perform a variable number of XOF calls to generate this output to find values that are in range.
Converting this into a constant time operation is expensive enough that it is rarely done.
One consequence of this is that public key expansion is not constant time and this timing sidechannel can be used to provide information about the seed (and the expanded key, which is a function of the seed) in cases where they are not publicly known.
On the other hand, this public seed is in the public key, which is almost always publicly known, and so this timing variation does not leak any information about any secret data.
One exception is in some methods that implement Password Authenticated Key Exchange with ML-KEM, where the public key may be encrypted with the password.
In this rather narrow use case, this variable timing needs to be taken into account.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="FIPS203" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203">
          <front>
            <title>Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="NIST" value="FIPS 203"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC4253">
          <front>
            <title>The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="T. Ylonen" initials="T." surname="Ylonen"/>
            <author fullname="C. Lonvick" initials="C." role="editor" surname="Lonvick"/>
            <date month="January" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services over an insecure network.</t>
              <t>This document describes the SSH transport layer protocol, which typically runs on top of TCP/IP. The protocol can be used as a basis for a number of secure network services. It provides strong encryption, server authentication, and integrity protection. It may also provide compression.</t>
              <t>Key exchange method, public key algorithm, symmetric encryption algorithm, message authentication algorithm, and hash algorithm are all negotiated.</t>
              <t>This document also describes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method and the minimal set of algorithms that are needed to implement the SSH transport layer protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4253"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4253"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6278">
          <front>
            <title>Use of Static-Static Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement in Cryptographic Message Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="J. Herzog" initials="J." surname="Herzog"/>
            <author fullname="R. Khazan" initials="R." surname="Khazan"/>
            <date month="June" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how to use the 'static-static Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme (i.e., Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman where both participants use static Diffie-Hellman values) with the Cryptographic Message Syntax. In this form of key agreement, the Diffie-Hellman values of both the sender and receiver are long-term values contained in certificates. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6278"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6278"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8446">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9180">
          <front>
            <title>Hybrid Public Key Encryption</title>
            <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
            <author fullname="K. Bhargavan" initials="K." surname="Bhargavan"/>
            <author fullname="B. Lipp" initials="B." surname="Lipp"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wood" initials="C." surname="Wood"/>
            <date month="February" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a scheme for hybrid public key encryption (HPKE). This scheme provides a variant of public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key. It also includes three authenticated variants, including one that authenticates possession of a pre-shared key and two optional ones that authenticate possession of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) private key. HPKE works for any combination of an asymmetric KEM, key derivation function (KDF), and authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) encryption function. Some authenticated variants may not be supported by all KEMs. We provide instantiations of the scheme using widely used and efficient primitives, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF), and SHA2.</t>
              <t>This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9180"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9180"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9528">
          <front>
            <title>Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)</title>
            <author fullname="G. Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"/>
            <author fullname="J. Preuß Mattsson" initials="J." surname="Preuß Mattsson"/>
            <author fullname="F. Palombini" initials="F." surname="Palombini"/>
            <date month="March" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys. EDHOC provides mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. EDHOC is intended for usage in constrained scenarios, and a main use case is to establish an Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) security context. By reusing CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) for cryptography, Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) for encoding, and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for transport, the additional code size can be kept very low.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9528"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9528"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8937">
          <front>
            <title>Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols</title>
            <author fullname="C. Cremers" initials="C." surname="Cremers"/>
            <author fullname="L. Garratt" initials="L." surname="Garratt"/>
            <author fullname="S. Smyshlyaev" initials="S." surname="Smyshlyaev"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sullivan" initials="N." surname="Sullivan"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wood" initials="C." surname="Wood"/>
            <date month="October" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Randomness is a crucial ingredient for Transport Layer Security (TLS) and related security protocols. Weak or predictable "cryptographically secure" pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. An initial entropy source that seeds a CSPRNG might be weak or broken as well, which can also lead to critical and systemic security problems. This document describes a way for security protocol implementations to augment their CSPRNGs using long-term private keys. This improves randomness from broken or otherwise subverted CSPRNGs.</t>
              <t>This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8937"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8937"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm">
          <front>
            <title>Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE)</title>
            <author fullname="Marco Tiloca" initials="M." surname="Tiloca">
              <organization>RISE AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Göran Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander">
              <organization>Ericsson AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Francesca Palombini" initials="F." surname="Palombini">
              <organization>Ericsson AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="John Preuß Mattsson" initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson">
              <organization>Ericsson AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Rikard Höglund" initials="R." surname="Höglund">
              <organization>RISE AB</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="23" month="December" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines the security protocol Group Object Security for
   Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE), providing end-to-end
   security of messages exchanged with the Constrained Application
   Protocol (CoAP) between members of a group, e.g., sent over IP
   multicast.  In particular, the described protocol defines how OSCORE
   is used in a group communication setting to provide source
   authentication for CoAP group requests, sent by a client to multiple
   servers, and for protection of the corresponding CoAP responses.
   Group OSCORE also defines a pairwise mode where each member of the
   group can efficiently derive a symmetric pairwise key with each other
   member of the group for pairwise OSCORE communication.  Group OSCORE
   can be used between endpoints communicating with CoAP or CoAP-
   mappable HTTP.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-28"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-ietf-hpke-pq">
          <front>
            <title>Post-Quantum and Post-Quantum/Traditional Hybrid Algorithms for HPKE</title>
            <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Deirdre Connolly" initials="D." surname="Connolly">
              <organization>Selkie Cryptography</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="6" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Updating key exchange and public-key encryption protocols to resist
   attack by quantum computers is a high priority given the possibility
   of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks.  Hybrid Public Key
   Encryption (HPKE) is a widely-used public key encryption scheme based
   on combining a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), a Key Derivation
   Function (KDF), and an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
   (AEAD) scheme.  In this document, we define KEM algorithms for HPKE
   based on both post-quantum KEMs and hybrid constructions of post-
   quantum KEMs with traditional KEMs, as well as a KDF based on SHA-3
   that is suitable for use with these KEMs.  When used with these
   algorithms, HPKE is resilient with respect to attacks by a quantum
   computer.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-hpke-pq-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CDM23" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1933.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Keeping Up with the KEMs: Stronger Security Notions for KEMs and automated analysis of KEM-based protocols</title>
            <author initials="C." surname="Cremers" fullname="Cas Cremers">
              <organization>CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Dax" fullname="Alexander Dax">
              <organization>CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author initials="N." surname="Medinger" fullname="Niklas Medinger">
              <organization>CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KEMMY24" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/523.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Unbindable Kemmy Schmidt: ML-KEM is neither MAL-BIND-K-CT nor MAL-BIND-K-PK</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Schmieg" fullname="Sophie Schmieg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SIGNAL" target="https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/">
          <front>
            <title>The Double Ratchet Algorithm</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2011" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIRE" target="https://www.wireguard.com/">
          <front>
            <title>WireGuard</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="NOISE" target="http://www.noiseprotocol.org/">
          <front>
            <title>Noise Protocol Framework</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EBACS" target="https://bench.cr.yp.to/results-kem/amd64-hertz.html">
          <front>
            <title>eBACS: ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Systems</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DUALECTLS" target="&lt;https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-checkoway.pdf&gt;">
          <front>
            <title>On the Practical Exploitability of Dual EC in TLS Implementations</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2014"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 426?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The authors would like to thank Rebecca Guthrie and Thom Wiggers for their valuable comments and feedback.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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