<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.43 (Ruby 3.4.12) -->
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters-01" category="bcp" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.35.0 -->
  <front>
    <title>Acceptance of DNSSEC Parameters in EPP</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters-01"/>
    <author fullname="Joe Abley">
      <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
      <address>
        <email>jabley@cloudflare.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>
    <area>Operations and Management</area>
    <workgroup>Registration Protocols Extensions</workgroup>
    <keyword>dnssec</keyword>
    <keyword>epp</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 46?>

<t>The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) is used to submit DNSSEC
parameters for domain names to domain name registries. Registries
and registrars often restrict the values they accept, and those
restrictions vary from registry to registry. The resulting uncertainty
makes it difficult for DNS operators to adopt new algorithms.  This
document recommends that registries and registrars base their
acceptance policies on the IANA registries for DNSSEC algorithms
and digest types.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://ableyjoe.github.io/draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters/draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Registration Protocols Extensions Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:regext@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/regext/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/regext/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ableyjoe/draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 57?>

<section anchor="intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) are described in <xref target="RFC9364"/>. The
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) <xref target="RFC5730"/> is used by
registrars to manage domain names in domain registries, and
<xref target="RFC5910"/> specifies how DNSSEC parameters are conveyed in EPP.</t>
      <t>For a signed zone to have a secure delegation, DS data must be
submitted to the parent registry, usually by a registrar using EPP.
That data identifies the algorithm used to sign the zone and the
digest type used to construct the DS record. When the algorithm
changes, new DS data must be submitted.</t>
      <t>Guidance on suitable algorithms changes over time. Advances in
cryptanalysis weaken existing algorithms, and new algorithms are
being developed, for example to resist cryptanalysis by quantum
computers. Each new algorithm or digest type specified for DNSSEC is
assigned a new codepoint, and following current guidance is only
possible if registries and registrars accept those codepoints.</t>
      <t>Registries and registrars often constrain the values they accept
using allowlists. What those allowlists contain, whether they are
published and how they are maintained varies, and this inconsistency
makes new algorithms difficult to deploy.</t>
      <t>The inconsistency is felt most by DNS operators. The algorithm used
for a zone is generally chosen by the DNS operator that signs it,
which may or may not be the registrar, and that choice is typically
made once for many zones in many top-level domains, before any EPP
transaction takes place. A DNS operator that cannot predict whether
a registry will accept a new algorithm risks leaving zones stuck
partway through an algorithm rollover, unable to retire the old
algorithm because DS data for the new one was rejected. Where DS
data is provisioned automatically, there may be nobody in a position
to notice the rejection.</t>
      <t>Faced with this uncertainty, a DNS operator can use only algorithms
that every relevant registry is known to accept, limiting registrants
to what the most conservative registry allows. Alternatively, it can
sign only zones whose registries have known policies, or not sign
zones at all. DNSSEC deployment faces many obstacles, most of which
are outside the scope of this document. Unpredictable registry policy
is one of them, and removing it is a modest but real reduction in the
friction associated with deploying DNSSEC.</t>
      <t>The IANA registries <xref target="DNSKEY-IANA"/> and <xref target="DS-IANA"/> already record
which values are suitable for use with DNSSEC, and are updated as
guidance changes <xref target="RFC9904"/>. If registries base their acceptance
policies on those IANA registries, DNS operators can know in advance
which algorithms will be accepted, and newly assigned algorithms
become usable across registries at approximately the same time.</t>
      <t>This document recommends a consistent and liberal policy, based on
those IANA registries, for the DNSSEC parameters that registries and
registrars accept in EPP.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>This document assumes familiarity with DNS and domain name registration
terminology as defined in <xref target="RFC9499"/>.</t>
      <t>In this document, "registry" refers to a domain name registry as
described in <xref target="RFC9499"/>. Registries maintained by IANA are always
referred to as "IANA registries".</t>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="dnssec-parameters-in-epp">
      <name>DNSSEC Parameters in EPP</name>
      <t>This document is concerned only with which <tt>&lt;secDNS:alg&gt;</tt> and
<tt>&lt;secDNS:digestType&gt;</tt> values registries and registrars accept in the
DS data interface. The key data interface described in
<xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5910"/> is out of scope. This document does not
change the contents of the IANA registries or the requirement levels
they record.</t>
      <t><xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5910"/> defines two child elements of the
<tt>&lt;secDNS:dsData&gt;</tt> element that are relevant to this document:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>&lt;secDNS:alg&gt;</tt> contains the algorithm number of the DNSKEY
referenced by the DS record, as described in
<xref section="5.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC4034"/>; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>&lt;secDNS:digestType&gt;</tt> contains the algorithm used to construct
the digest, as described in <xref section="5.1.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC4034"/>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Values for these elements are drawn from the IANA registries
<xref target="DNSKEY-IANA"/> and <xref target="DS-IANA"/> respectively. Following
<xref target="RFC9904"/>, those IANA registries are the canonical source of
requirement levels for each value, and those requirement levels are
expected to change over time.</t>
      <t>This document refers to the following columns in <xref target="DNSKEY-IANA"/>:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>"Zone Signing", which indicates whether an algorithm may appear
in DNSKEY, RRSIG and DS records;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>"Use for DNSSEC Signing", which gives the requirement level for
using an algorithm to sign zones; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>"Use for DNSSEC Validation", which gives the requirement level for
using an algorithm in DNSSEC validators.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>This document refers to the following columns in <xref target="DS-IANA"/>:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>"Use for DNSSEC Delegation", which gives the requirement level for
using a digest type in DS records published by authoritative
servers; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>"Use for DNSSEC Validation", which gives the requirement level for
using a digest type in DNSSEC validators.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The "Implement for" columns in those IANA registries describe
requirements for software implementations rather than for the
operation of a zone, and are not used by this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="recommendations">
      <name>Recommendations for Registries and Registrars</name>
      <section anchor="default">
        <name>Default Policy</name>
        <t>Registries and registrars <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> accept any value of the
<tt>&lt;secDNS:alg&gt;</tt> and <tt>&lt;secDNS:digestType&gt;</tt> elements that is not
excluded by <xref target="deny"/>, and <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> reject values on any other
basis. For a registrar, this applies to values received from
registrants and DNS operators through whatever interface the
registrar provides.</t>
        <t>In particular, registries and registrars <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> reject a value
solely because they do not themselves implement the corresponding
algorithm. A validator that does not support the algorithm or digest
type specified in a DS record disregards that record
(<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC4035"/>, <xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6840"/>), so
accepting such values cannot cause validation failures for the zone
concerned. Similarly, registries and registrars that check the
length of the <tt>&lt;secDNS:digest&gt;</tt> element <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> do so only for digest
types whose digest length they know.</t>
        <t>A registrar <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> apply restrictions beyond those applied by the
registry for the domain name concerned. A registrar is not expected
to accept a value that the registry would reject, and can instead
report the registry's rejection to its customer.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="deny">
        <name>Values to Deny</name>
        <t>Registries and registrars <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reject a <tt>&lt;secDNS:alg&gt;</tt> value unless
its "Zone Signing" column in <xref target="DNSKEY-IANA"/> is "Y" and its "Use for
DNSSEC Validation" column is not "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>". This admits the values
reserved for private algorithms.</t>
        <t>Registries and registrars <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reject a <tt>&lt;secDNS:digestType&gt;</tt> value
unless its "Use for DNSSEC Validation" column in <xref target="DS-IANA"/> contains
a requirement level other than "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", or the value is reserved
for private use.</t>
        <t>These rules exclude values that are unassigned, cannot appear in DS
records, or are no longer expected to be validated. DS data
containing such values provides no security benefit and could
suggest that a zone is protected when it is not, and rejecting them
also catches errors in submitted data. The rules apply to the current
contents of the IANA registries, which are expected to change over
time, not to a fixed snapshot of them.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="existing">
        <name>Existing DS Data</name>
        <t>The contents of the IANA registries change over time, so DS data
that was accepted in the past may later include values that
<xref target="deny"/> would exclude.</t>
        <t>Registries and registrars <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reject a request to remove DS
data on the grounds that it contains values that would be denied
under <xref target="deny"/>.</t>
        <t>Registries and registrars <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> reject an otherwise acceptable
request on the grounds that DS data already associated with the
domain name contains values that would be denied under <xref target="deny"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="current">
        <name>Keeping Current</name>
        <t>Registries and registrars <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reflect changes to <xref target="DNSKEY-IANA"/>
and <xref target="DS-IANA"/> in their acceptance policy within 30 days of those
changes being published.</t>
        <t>An example script which generates an allowlist directly from the
IANA registries can be found in <xref target="generator"/>. An operator could
use automatically-generated allowlists to react to changes and
trigger internal processes to update configuration deployed in
production.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="publication">
        <name>Publication</name>
        <t>Registries and registrars <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> publish their policy for accepting
<tt>&lt;secDNS:alg&gt;</tt> and <tt>&lt;secDNS:digestType&gt;</tt> values at a stable and
publicly accessible location, so that registrants and DNS operators
can make informed choices. The published policy <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> state whether
it follows this document and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> describe any respect in which it
does not. For registries that publish a DNSSEC Practice Statement
<xref target="RFC6841"/>, that document is a suitable location.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="operational">
      <name>Operational Considerations</name>
      <t>Registry and registrar systems that process DS data, including
systems that generate zone data or publish registration data, may
encounter algorithm and digest type values they have not seen
before. Such systems need to handle unfamiliar values without
failure, for example by treating them as opaque numbers. A failure in
a registry's own systems caused by an unfamiliar value could affect
many delegations, not only the one concerned, and is a more
significant risk than any effect on validation.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="unsupported-algorithms-and-digest-types">
        <name>Unsupported Algorithms and Digest Types</name>
        <t>The recommendations in <xref target="recommendations"/> cause registries and
registrars to accept algorithm and digest type values that they, and
some validators, may not implement.</t>
        <t>A validator that does not support the algorithm specified in a DS
record, or that does not support its digest type, disregards that
record (<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC4035"/>, <xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6840"/>). If
no remaining DS record for a delegation uses a supported algorithm
and digest type, the validator treats the child zone as unsigned.
Accepting such values therefore cannot cause a validator to treat a
correctly signed zone as bogus. The worst outcome is that the zone
is unsigned from the point of view of validators that lack support.
This is no worse than if the DS data had been rejected.</t>
        <t>Registrants and DNS operators who submit DS data using only algorithms
that are not yet widely supported should understand that their zones
are unlikely to be successfully validated. This also applies to
private algorithm values (253 and 254) in <xref target="DNSKEY-IANA"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="weak-algorithms-and-digest-types">
        <name>Weak Algorithms and Digest Types</name>
        <t>A validator may accept any valid chain of trust from the parent to
the child, regardless of what other algorithms are present
(<xref section="5.11" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6840"/>). The security of a signed delegation is
therefore limited by the weakest algorithm and digest type in its DS
data that validators still accept. Publishing DS data that uses a
weak algorithm or digest type alongside DS data that uses a strong
one does not preserve the strength of the stronger combination.</t>
        <t>The values denied in <xref target="deny"/> add no assurance. Values that are
deprecated for signing or delegation but are still validated represent
a greater risk. This document does not recommend rejecting them,
since doing so would interfere with DNS operators and registrants
who have not yet completed an algorithm rollover.  The risk of using
a weak algorithm or digest type falls mainly on the zone concerned
and the zones beneath it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="unauthorised-changes">
        <name>Unauthorised Changes</name>
        <t>An attacker who can submit DS data for a domain name, for example by
compromising a registrant's account at a registrar, could submit DS
data containing arbitrary values. Accepting a wider range of values
does not materially change the impact of such an attack. An attacker
with that access could already remove the DS data or change the
delegation itself.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="algorithm-agility">
        <name>Algorithm Agility</name>
        <t>Policies that are too restrictive, or that are not kept current
(<xref target="current"/>), can prevent DNS operators and registrants from moving
away from algorithms that are becoming weaker or from adopting new
ones, such as those designed to resist cryptanalysis by quantum
computers. This prolongs exposure to the weaknesses that algorithm
agility is meant to address. The recommendations in this document
are intended to remove that obstacle while still allowing registries
and registrars to exclude values that offer no security benefit.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="DNSKEY-IANA" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Security Algorithm Numbers</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DS-IANA" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types">
          <front>
            <title>Digest Algorithms</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9364">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <date month="February" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the DNS Security Extensions (commonly called "DNSSEC") that are specified in RFCs 4033, 4034, and 4035, as well as a handful of others. One purpose is to introduce all of the RFCs in one place so that the reader can understand the many aspects of DNSSEC. This document does not update any of those RFCs. A second purpose is to state that using DNSSEC for origin authentication of DNS data is the best current practice. A third purpose is to provide a single reference for other documents that want to refer to DNSSEC.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="237"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9364"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9364"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5730">
          <front>
            <title>Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)</title>
            <author fullname="S. Hollenbeck" initials="S." surname="Hollenbeck"/>
            <date month="August" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes an application-layer client-server protocol for the provisioning and management of objects stored in a shared central repository. Specified in XML, the protocol defines generic object management operations and an extensible framework that maps protocol operations to objects. This document includes a protocol specification, an object mapping template, and an XML media type registration. This document obsoletes RFC 4930. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="69"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5730"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5730"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5910">
          <front>
            <title>Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)</title>
            <author fullname="J. Gould" initials="J." surname="Gould"/>
            <author fullname="S. Hollenbeck" initials="S." surname="Hollenbeck"/>
            <date month="May" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) extension mapping for the provisioning and management of Domain Name System security (DNSSEC) extensions for domain names stored in a shared central repository. Specified in XML, this mapping extends the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required for the provisioning of DNS security extensions. This document obsoletes RFC 4310. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5910"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5910"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9499">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Terminology</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <author fullname="K. Fujiwara" initials="K." surname="Fujiwara"/>
            <date month="March" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Domain Name System (DNS) is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFC 2308 by clarifying the definitions of "forwarder" and "QNAME". It obsoletes RFC 8499 by adding multiple terms and clarifications. Comprehensive lists of changed and new definitions can be found in Appendices A and B.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="219"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9499"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9499"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4034">
          <front>
            <title>Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions</title>
            <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
            <date month="March" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of resource records and protocol modifications that provide source authentication for the DNS. This document defines the public key (DNSKEY), delegation signer (DS), resource record digital signature (RRSIG), and authenticated denial of existence (NSEC) resource records. The purpose and format of each resource record is described in detail, and an example of each resource record is given.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4034"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4034"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9904">
          <front>
            <title>DNSSEC Cryptographic Algorithm Recommendation Update Process</title>
            <author fullname="W. Hardaker" initials="W." surname="Hardaker"/>
            <author fullname="W. Kumari" initials="W." surname="Kumari"/>
            <date month="November" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The DNSSEC protocol makes use of various cryptographic algorithms to provide authentication of DNS data and proof of nonexistence. To ensure interoperability between DNS resolvers and DNS authoritative servers, it is necessary to specify both a set of algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidelines to ensure that there is at least one algorithm that all implementations support. This document replaces and obsoletes RFC 8624 and moves the canonical source of algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance for DNSSEC from RFC 8624 to the IANA DNSSEC algorithm registries. This is done to allow the list of requirements to be more easily updated and referenced. Extensions to these registries can be made in future RFCs. This document also updates RFC 9157 and incorporates the revised IANA DNSSEC considerations from that RFC.</t>
              <t>This document does not change the recommendation status (MUST, MAY, RECOMMENDED, etc.) of the algorithms listed in RFC 8624; that is the work of future documents.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9904"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9904"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4035">
          <front>
            <title>Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions</title>
            <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
            <date month="March" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of new resource records and protocol modifications that add data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS. This document describes the DNSSEC protocol modifications. This document defines the concept of a signed zone, along with the requirements for serving and resolving by using DNSSEC. These techniques allow a security-aware resolver to authenticate both DNS resource records and authoritative DNS error indications.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4035"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4035"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6840">
          <front>
            <title>Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)</title>
            <author fullname="S. Weiler" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Weiler"/>
            <author fullname="D. Blacka" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Blacka"/>
            <date month="February" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is a collection of technical clarifications to the DNS Security (DNSSEC) document set. It is meant to serve as a resource to implementors as well as a collection of DNSSEC errata that existed at the time of writing.</t>
              <t>This document updates the core DNSSEC documents (RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035) as well as the NSEC3 specification (RFC 5155). It also defines NSEC3 and SHA-2 (RFC 4509 and RFC 5702) as core parts of the DNSSEC specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6840"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6840"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6841">
          <front>
            <title>A Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements</title>
            <author fullname="F. Ljunggren" initials="F." surname="Ljunggren"/>
            <author fullname="AM. Eklund Lowinder" initials="AM." surname="Eklund Lowinder"/>
            <author fullname="T. Okubo" initials="T." surname="Okubo"/>
            <date month="January" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document presents a framework to assist writers of DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements, such as domain managers and zone operators on both the top level and secondary level, who are managing and operating a DNS zone with Security Extensions implemented.</t>
              <t>In particular, the framework provides a comprehensive list of topics that should be considered for inclusion into a DNSSEC Policy definition and Practice Statement. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6841"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6841"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 361?>

<section anchor="generator">
      <name>Example Allowlist Generator</name>
      <t>The following short script, written in Python 3 using only its
standard library, retrieves <xref target="DNSKEY-IANA"/> and <xref target="DS-IANA"/> in XML
form and prints allowlists for <tt>&lt;secDNS:alg&gt;</tt> and <tt>&lt;secDNS:digestType&gt;</tt>
constructed according to <xref target="deny"/>, together with the date on which
each IANA registry was last updated. It illustrates how a registry
or registrar might generate an allowlist automatically and compare
it with the one it has deployed, for example in order to follow
<xref target="current"/>.</t>
      <sourcecode type="python" markers="true" name="secdns-allowlist.py"><![CDATA[
#!/usr/bin/env python3
#
# Print allowlists for the EPP <secDNS:alg> and <secDNS:digestType>
# elements, derived from the current contents of the IANA
# registries as described in Section 4.2 of
# draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters.

import json
import urllib.request
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET

IANA = "https://www.iana.org/assignments/"
NS = {"i": "http://www.iana.org/assignments"}


def col(record, tag):
    return record.findtext("i:" + tag, "", NS).strip()


def alg_ok(r):
    # "Zone Signing" is "Y" and "Use for DNSSEC Validation" is
    # not "MUST NOT"; this admits the private algorithms
    return col(r, "signing") == "Y" and \
        col(r, "usevalid") != "MUST NOT"


def digest_ok(r):
    # "Use for DNSSEC Validation" contains a requirement level
    # other than "MUST NOT", or the value is for private use
    return col(r, "usevalid") not in ("", "MUST NOT") or \
        "private use" in col(r, "description").lower()


def allowlist(name, number, ok):
    url = IANA + name + "/" + name + ".xml"
    with urllib.request.urlopen(url) as f:
        root = ET.parse(f).getroot()
    # the table we want is the first sub-registry, "<name>-1"
    path = "i:registry[@id='" + name + "-1']/i:record"
    allow = []
    for r in root.iterfind(path, NS):
        if ok(r):
            lo, _, hi = col(r, number).partition("-")
            allow += range(int(lo), int(hi or lo) + 1)
    return {"updated": root.findtext("i:updated", "", NS),
            "allow": sorted(allow)}


print(json.dumps({
    "secDNS:alg":
        allowlist("dns-sec-alg-numbers", "number", alg_ok),
    "secDNS:digestType":
        allowlist("ds-rr-types", "value", digest_ok),
}, indent=2))
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>At the time of writing, the program produced the following output,
reformatted here for brevity:</t>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "secDNS:alg": {
    "updated": "2026-08-10",
    "allow": [5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 253, 254]
  },
  "secDNS:digestType": {
    "updated": "2026-01-13",
    "allow": [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 253, 254]
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>Bas Westerbaan provided post-quantum energy. Scott Hollenbeck and
Gavin Brown provided welcome encouragement. Mark Andrews provided
suggestions which made the text clearer.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
