SCITT L. Lemonnier Internet-Draft iSoluce Intended status: Informational 17 November 2026 Expires: 21 May 2027 Decision Provenance for SCITT: binding software releases and agent actions to the decisions behind them draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance-03 Abstract Build attestations, bills of materials and Signed Statements in a Transparency Service record what was built and by whom. Authorization receipts for agent actions can establish who approved an exact action; the statement profiles for agent actions record a human approval as the producer's claim. The release and agent action examples in this document use the Decision Provenance Standard to supply a separately verifiable decision record and an attachment for the approved action. The cited records and receipts supply evidence about the build, the action or its authorization, according to their respective profiles. This document describes how a decision record and its action-binding attachment, as the extension proposals of the Decision Provenance Standard define them, sit under a release statement, a build attestation or an agent action record by typed digest references; how a verifier checks them offline, including the approver's signature where one is carried; and how the witness checkpoints of the anchoring extension are registered in a Transparency Service. For a relying party reviewing one occurrence, it specifies which authenticated inputs to compare and how to report missing evidence about presentation, authority and the observed effect. A software release decision and an agent action capsule are the worked examples; the model has no feature specific to either. This document is independent of the Decision Provenance Standard, is not part of it, does not change it, and is not endorsed by its Steward. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Relation to the Decision Provenance Standard . . . . . . 4 1.2. Versions and commit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. What the decision layer adds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Where it attaches in the software supply chain . . . . . . . 7 5. Artifact types for typed digest references . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. decision_record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. action_binding_attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. What a verified reference shows . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.4. Carrying the references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.1. Reviewing one occurrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.2. Interoperability of the joins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. Checkpoints in a Transparency Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. Worked examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.1. A software release decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.2. An agent action capsule citing a decision . . . . . . . . 15 8.3. A signed approval composed with an execution receipt . . 16 9. Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10. Open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 11. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Changes since -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Changes since -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Appendix: the worked examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 1. Introduction The SCITT use cases [I-D.ietf-scitt-software-use-cases] and the formats a software supply chain already carries, build provenance [SLSA], attestations [IN-TOTO] and bills of materials [SPDX], answer the question "what is this artifact, and how was it built". Registered as Signed Statements in a Transparency Service [RFC9943], with Receipts [RFC9942], they become evidence anyone can check later. In the release example here, a separate decision record supplies the rationale and stated authority. Its attachment lets the verifier compare the approved specification with authenticated evidence about the artifact shipped. The agent action profiles cited here carry evidence about different stages of an action. A capsule records an action's disposition [I-D.mih-scitt-agent-action-capsule]; an AgentInteractionRecord its inputs and outcomes [I-D.emirdag-scitt-ai-agent-execution]; a receipt its risk class and verdict, and may record a permission, a refusal or a deferral as well as an execution outcome [I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt]. A producer's approval flag or approver label records the producer's claim. A verifier needs the person's signature and the applicable trust policy to authenticate the approval described here. Where a profile carries the reasoning behind the action at all, it stays private or is reduced to a hash: the capsule's reason digest, the AgentInteractionRecord's reasoning hash; the receipt commits to the action parameters and, optionally, to the policy, and carries no rationale. Authorization receipts such as [I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts] do establish who approved an exact action, with a signature; they carry no record of the decision, its alternatives or its reasons. What this document adds is that record and its composition with those receipts and statements; the signed approval itself is not new. The Decision Provenance Standard [DPS-CORE] records the decision: what was decided, under which charter, which options were considered and with what rationale, and the affirmative human act that closed the record. Its action binding extension [DPS-ACTION-BINDING], a proposal in the Standard's repository, records the stages from a proposed action specification to its execution: what the attachment states the reviewer was shown, what was approved, signed where a Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 signature is carried, what was requested, re-checked and executed, compared through the digest constructions and stage checks the extension specifies. Its anchoring extension [DPS-ANCHORING], also a proposal, gives those records evidence that their bytes existed by a given point, and witness checkpoints, including, since its SCITT source, a witness-signed checkpoint registered in a Transparency Service with its Receipt. A deploy pipeline and an AI agent are two executors of decisions; the Standard does not distinguish them. Decision provenance serves accountability and later review. A relying party may need to identify who approved an action, distinguish that approval from the authority to act, inspect the reasons and the alternatives that were recorded, and follow a later correction. Each verification result in this document says which of these questions it answers and which stay with evidence outside it. This document is an applicability statement: it defines no new format, and it does three things. It uses two artifact types, declared in the Standard's repository, so that a build attestation, a release statement or an agent action record may cite, by typed digest reference [I-D.mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding], the decision record and the action-binding attachment it executes. It describes how a verifier holding both checks the approval and the binding offline. And it describes the registration of the anchoring extension's checkpoints in a Transparency Service, by reference to the anchoring extension at a fixed commit. Two worked examples: a software release decision, and an agent action capsule citing a decision. Nothing in the architecture [RFC9943], in Signed Statements or in Receipts changes: the decision layer is cited by digest from a statement a service already registers, and its checkpoints are registered as any statement is. 1.1. Relation to the Decision Provenance Standard This document is an independent, downstream description. It is not part of the Decision Provenance Standard, does not change it, and is not endorsed by its Steward. The name is used only to identify the Standard and its extensions, which are the source: where this document and the repository differ, the repository governs, and any change a reader asks for in a format described here is made in the repository first, as a pull request. The extensions are proposals in the repository; they are not part of the Standard itself. Only the version cited here, at that commit, governs this revision; a later change in the repository does not change this document, and a revision of this document names the commit it is written against. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 "Decision Provenance Standard" is a trademark of Etsion Brands Ltd., used here to identify the Standard, with attribution: The Decision Provenance Standard, Yohay Etsion, 2026, CC-BY 4.0, https://decisionprovenancestandard.org. 1.2. Versions and commit This document is written against the extensions as they stand on the repository's main branch at commit 1f7dd40d7ad30783013228ca4e060ef15c29a2bc (10 November 2026): anchoring 0.2.0, signatures 0.2.0, portable verification 0.3.0 and action binding 0.3.0, each a proposal written against Core v1.3 rev. 11 and the reference files 5.2.0. The names of Section 5 are those the extensions index declares at the same commit [DPS-NAMES], with the digest contexts stated in the terms of the Canonical Payload Binding since that index's revision of 27 October. Since 28 October the anchoring extension reads a Receipt whose protected header carries alg -8 (EdDSA), with a finding that [RFC9864] deprecates it in favour of -19; a statement stays pinned to -19. Each extension states its version in every document it defines; this document names them so that a reader can check the same tree. 2. Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Decision record, action-binding attachment, stage, checkpoint, witness, trust policy and verification report are used as the Standard and its extensions define them. Signed Statement, Transparency Service and Receipt are used as [RFC9943] and [RFC9942] define them. Build attestation, provenance predicate and bill of materials are used as [IN-TOTO], [SLSA] and [SPDX] define them. 3. What the decision layer adds A verifier holding an action record (a release statement, a build attestation, a capsule) and the decision record and attachment it cites can establish, offline: Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * where the approver's signature is carried, that the approver signed the outcome stage with a key the verifier's own trust policy maps to a named person, in the role person of that policy; the authority reference that points into the deployer's charter stays the issuer's statement unless the verifier checks it against an independent source, such as the permission system; * that the specification the attachment says was shown to the approver, the one approved, the one that was requested, re-checked and executed, are one and the same, by equal digests, or exactly where they differ; for a release, that specification names the artifact digest, the bill of materials digest, the migrations and the rollback; * the options considered and the rationale as the record states them, with the time the rationale was recorded relative to the decision; * and, through the anchoring extension, evidence about when those bytes existed, each source with what it does and does not show: an RFC 3161 token [RFC3161] gives a time from an authority the verifier trusts; a SCITT Receipt states no time, only that the service registered the statement into its log; an OpenTimestamps proof shows only that the bytes existed before a block was mined. It cannot establish that the decision was right, that the action was, or what the reviewer actually saw or read: the check shows what the attachment says was shown; the verification reports of the extensions say so in every result, and this document inherits those limits. What each signature covers, and what a verifier may conclude from it, is not the same for every member of the records: * the approved specification (operation, target, parameters, policy version): the person's person_approval signs the specification's digest and the view's digest; the conclusion is that the holder of a key the verifier's own trust policy maps to this person approved the commitment to these specification and view bytes; * the decision record (options, rationale, charter, accountable owner): its seal is a digest; a person_affirmation over the record's covered digest, where one is carried, makes the rationale a statement signed with a key that policy maps to the person; without it the rationale is the issuer's record, and an approval signs the record's identifier and a stage, not the record's content; Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * the stages and their times: the issuer's seal over the attachment, where one is carried; the issuer's statement either way; * the authority reference: the issuer's statement, until checked against an independent source. The worked examples say which of these each carries. 4. Where it attaches in the software supply chain Nothing here replaces a build attestation, a provenance predicate or a bill of materials; they say what was built, and they say it well. The decision layer sits beside them and is linked to them in both directions by digests: * The action specification the approver sees, carried in full in the attachment, names the artifact by its digest, the bill of materials by its digest, and the build by its identifier. A verifier that holds the SLSA provenance or the SBOM recomputes those digests and reads whether the release that was approved is the artifact that was built. * A release statement registered in a Transparency Service, or the build attestation itself where its format allows additional references, cites the decision record and the attachment by the typed digest references of Section 5. The Receipt over that statement then covers the references, that is the two digests, beside the artifact's; the decision documents themselves travel beside the statement or are obtained from the issuer. * A Transparency Service that registers the anchoring extension's witness checkpoints (Section 7) gives each checkpoint over one issuer's chain of release decisions a Receipt from the same service the artifacts use. A Receipt shows the statement's inclusion; the anchoring extension does not yet check that the log only grew, so this is not evidence of an append-only history of decisions. The stages an action-binding attachment records map onto a release pipeline without change: the proposal is the release candidate as the assistant or the pipeline drafted it; the review is the release manager's reading of it; the outcome is the approval under the release charter, signed by the release manager where a signature is carried; the request is the deploy job; the re-check is the permission or policy gate just before deployment; the attempt and the result are the deployment and what the target reported. A change of the artifact digest between the approval and the attempt fails the binding, by construction. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 5. Artifact types for typed digest references The Canonical Payload Binding [I-D.mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding] defines a typed digest reference, {type, purpose, digest_alg, digest}, and leaves artifact types to the consuming profile: an artifact type is identified by a stable specification, whose declaration binds the exact type token to a digest context (its pre- image, its canonicalization named by its CPB identifier, the hash function, the digest_alg token and the output representation), and the consuming profile names the declarations it accepts (CPB -05 section 8.1, -06 section 9). An entry's identity is the {type, digest_alg, digest} triple. This document uses two, both declared in the Standard's repository under its own namespace, org.decisionprovenancestandard [DPS-NAMES]. The repository declares each name, what it identifies and which digest context it uses in those terms: the decision record is cited by its seal, taken over the covered bytes that portable verification defines; the attachment by the SHA-256 of its bytes, as the action binding extension defines them. This document does not restate the rules and only says how the references are carried. A name never changes meaning; a different digest rule would get a new name. 5.1. decision_record * type: org.decisionprovenancestandard.decision_record * digest: as [DPS-NAMES] declares it for this name, by reference to portable verification [DPS-PV]; the same value as the entry's seal_hash. 5.2. action_binding_attachment * type: org.decisionprovenancestandard.action_binding_attachment * digest: as [DPS-NAMES] declares it for this name: the plain SHA-256 of the attachment's bytes, computed as the action binding report computes its attachment_digest; not the sealed digest of the signatures extension [DPS-SIGNATURES]. 5.3. What a verified reference shows A reference that verifies shows only that the cited bytes have the digest it carries. It does not show that they are a decision record or an attachment, which one they are, or anything they state: that is for the document's own check, which reports it. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 5.4. Carrying the references In a capsule, the references are carried in references[] as the capsule profile allows, in the style of [I-D.rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance-binding]; in an AgentInteractionRecord, in external_refs; for a receipt whose object is closed (Section 3 of [I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt]), this document describes a separate Signed Statement carrying typed references to the receipt and to the decision record, subject to the Transparency Service's registration policy, while leaving the receipt and the bytes of any existing envelope carrying it unchanged; Section 8.4 of [I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt] discusses separate signed artifacts for the claims listed in its Section 8.1, but does not define this composition; the reference's type is the identifier the receipts carry in their spec member, "noa.receipt/0.1", and its digest is the profile's own value, "sha256:" followed by the lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 of the receipt's canonical form with only chain.hash and sig.value omitted, which for a valid receipt equals its chain.hash, kept in that prefixed representation by the declaration; the reference binds that canonical receipt content, does not itself authenticate the receipt's signature, which is the profile's own check, and binds neither the serialized file, nor a COSE statement carrying the receipt, nor its Transparency Receipt; in a release statement, in the cpb-refs protected header of CPB -06 section 9.3, marked critical where the consuming profile requires the references to be understood, or in the statement's own payload. A capsule's Producer Envelope, a COSE_Sign1 over the raw capsule identifier with exactly alg, content type and kid in its protected header, is unchanged by the references, which live in the capsule's payload. Nothing in the citing profile's protected header or verification changes. The cited artifacts travel beside the citing record, in a portable verification export and a signatures attachment, or are obtained from the issuer. 6. Verification A verifier that holds the citing record, the decision record, the attachment and its own trust policy: 1. resolves each typed digest reference as CPB describes, and stops at Failed for a digest that does not match; 2. runs the action binding reference check on the attachment with the record, which reports the stages' consistency, the issuer signature where there is one, the time, and the pairing of the report with its documents; Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 3. runs the signatures check on the approver's signature over the outcome stage, where one is carried beside; 4. compares what the citing record commits to about the action, its operation or tool, its target, the digest of its arguments or of its recorded input, and the execution occurrence, with the approved specification the attachment carries, member by member as each composition defines, and reports each agreement on its own: a reference that resolves to a valid record and attachment approving a different action fails here and nowhere earlier, since resolving a reference is not accepting its content ([I-D.mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding] says so of its references); [INTEROP] carries that case for each composition; 5. where it holds the artifact, the build attestation or the bill of materials, recomputes the digests the approved specification names and reports each agreement on its own; 6. reads the result dimension by dimension; it MUST NOT merge them into one pass or fail, and it MUST NOT report more than those checks find. A relying party may still decide, under its own policy, whether the results it reads are enough for its purpose; the report itself keeps them apart. A separate policy decision may consume the individual findings and name the rule used for its overall conclusion. The reference checks, their cases and their vectors are in the test directories of the corresponding extensions. The action binding text pinned in [DPS-ACTION-BINDING] clarifies how a checker citing an attachment interprets its report. Report separately what the checker verified on the supplied pieces, the bounds supported by time evidence, and the issuer's claims. A checker that operates on an attachment can cite a finding about it without making a finding about every other part of the decision record. The clarification records the result of an interoperability question and leaves the report format and checks as they were [DPS-CHECKER-CLARIFICATION]. A check first identifies the bytes and the property being verified. For example, if an application declares core deterministic CBOR but hashes bytes produced with the length-first ordering in [RFC8949], a verifier holding the value can re-encode it under the declared rule and detect the mismatch. Where the selected encoding specification admits more than one treatment, as in the NaN cases in Section 11, consistent verdicts require a stated choice or acceptance criteria that allow those treatments. Where a required input is unavailable, the affected comparison remains unestablished. The authenticated fields and the rule mapping them to the claim determine what a successful check establishes. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 6.1. Reviewing one occurrence Consider one organisation that later supplies evidence of a particular release or agent action to a reviewer who does not take the agent's or operator's word for what happened. The evidence can stay with the organisation until the review. This reading uses the existing records in their native formats. No identifier shared across organisations, central evidence store or new receipt format is needed. The reviewer chooses the sources it accepts for each fact before accepting the packet. 1. Resolve the decision and attachment as above. Recover the exact specification and presentation bytes in their declared digest contexts. Verify the person's signed commitment to both. Compare all effect-bearing terms, including operation, target, units, parameters, and any bounds, with what the view communicates. A view that hides the target cannot support a finding that the target was presented. A signed view digest identifies a representation. To report an actual presentation, the reviewer also needs evidence from a presentation path it trusts, binding that representation to this approval ceremony. User presence and user verification give narrower findings. Records of questions, responses or a confirmation step can document the review procedure. Understanding is outside the verifier's observations. 2. Resolve the authority effective for that person, operation and time using a source the reviewer accepts for delegation or entitlement. Resolve the policy identifier in the approved specification to immutable content, recompute the commitment and retain the dependencies that determine the effective rules. A mutable name alone leaves the policy comparison undetermined. If an execution uses a later policy, preserve both versions and verify that the originally approved bounds still hold under the rules actually applied. Later withdrawal can block use. A later expansion cannot enlarge the earlier grant. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 3. For a standing approval the signed object specifies the programme and its limits. Verify that this occurrence falls within those limits. Report separately the human approval of the programme and the executor's application of it to this occurrence. Under either mode inspect the re-check for this particular attempt, including a retry. Establish the live authority, revocation, expiry and remaining allowance at that boundary. For a consumable limit the stated unit matters: an attempt, an accepted request and a completed effect can have different counts. Checking the last available unit requires evidence of a reservation or equivalent serialisation covering competing uses. After an ambiguous outcome, reconcile the first occurrence before treating a retry as a new effect. 4. Verify the executor's account of the request and the target's evidence of the result using each format's own rules. Join the approved and attempted specification to the actual inputs and to an occurrence value authenticated on the observation side, such as the idempotency key in the recorded request. Compare the observed result with the effect claimed, including the target and amount where applicable. A receipt for dispatch or acceptance alone leaves completion open. Two attestations of the same occurrence need an authenticated join and issuers competent to observe the respective facts. A copied trace identifier or an unprotected back-reference cannot supply that join. 5. State the source of each observation and whether the reviewer trusts it for that fact independently of the operator. For a claim that approval preceded execution, use a causal dependency enforced by a trusted execution boundary, or independently supported time bounds that establish that order. A timestamp over the completed packet supplies only an upper bound on the existence of those bytes. Report each verified claim, each contradiction and each unavailable item separately, including the outstanding assumptions. Localised identifiers or disclosed commitments can be sufficient for this review. A reviewer can therefore authenticate the approval even if the execution evidence conflicts with it. Conversely an independently confirmed effect may have no verifiable personal approval. An operator controlling both presentation and execution can produce internally consistent records for either story. In that setting, independent observation of the particular disputed fact determines how far the reviewer can go. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 6.2. Interoperability of the joins A composition identifies, for each comparison, the native field on each side, the exact bytes and encoding covered, the observation each value represents, and the part authenticated by the signer. The refund in Section 8.3 illustrates the distinction. In the four-draft case of Section 11, the execution evidence's request_digest (key 12) covers tool arguments. The person's signature covers a specification that contains those arguments together with other terms. The dispute packet's action_hash is a third commitment. A verifier extracts the parameters from the verified specification, applies the construction of each receiving profile, then compares the results. Comparing the signed specification digest directly with the arguments digest would reject the valid case. The case uses keys in sorted order so the two argument serialisations give the same bytes. That fixture establishes no general equivalence of those serialisations. Two drafts even use similar names for commitments to different things. In Section 5.3 of [I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record] (-03), decision.requestDigest includes the action, argumentsDigest, resourceId and resourceKind in the canonical object. In Section 6.7 of [I-D.thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence] (-02), request_digest commits to the argument bytes. A composition verifies each native digest, compares the arguments under an agreed byte construction and checks the action and resource through their own authenticated fields. Simply equating the two request digests would reject a matching request. The occurrence and outcome require another comparison. In the AER-1 composition the request identifier occurs inside the recorded input and the result cites the output hash. In the execution-evidence composition the attempt cites the allow outcome's record hash and the result cites the tool-result record hash and response digest. Each combination can convey evidence about a refund. A reader must know which value commits to an occurrence, which to shared parameters, and which to a result. Equal parameters alone also fit two different refunds. When the receipt records 150.00 EUR against an approval for 120.00 EUR, its own checks and the approval check can both succeed while the action comparison fails. The existing fixtures demonstrate specific combinations. They do not establish interchangeability of producers or a single encoding for all actions. The variant with a real passkey in [INTEROP] (interop/one-chain-real, negative R1) illustrates why local verdicts alone also fail. The chain is rebuilt for 150.00 EUR with the passkey assertion for 120.00 EUR. The verdict record can still be released, the dispute packet verifies and the joins reported by that fixture hold. The person- signature check detects a challenge mismatch. With the signature Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 removed (R7), the verdict can again be released and the packet verified while personal approval remains unsupported. These results concern the published fixtures and the readers used in that experiment. The AIR/DPS tests give a more specific example (Section 11). In the published N7 case, changing the global AIR input from the approved 120 EUR specification is detected by join J2. In the synthetic C01 follow-up, that global input digest still names the approved specification, but the digest of the selected tool call's arguments commits to 150 EUR. The AIR and DPS checks and all six joins still pass. Before deciding whether the approved refund was performed, the reviewer must establish which call corresponds to the refund and compare its authenticated arguments with the signed specification under the composition's stated mapping. C06 is a control: J6 detects that the AIR's reported principal differs from the approver identified by the DPS signature under the test trust policy. That identity comparison follows the roles chosen in this example. The four-draft refund example also shows how to verify the result of an audit. With 120 EUR approved and 150 EUR in the execution evidence, the rule executed-as-approved:v1 derives not_as_approved. A Wright verdict reporting that result can be released because the verifier derives the same result from the cited inputs. A verdict claiming executed_as_approved from those inputs is refused on recomputation. [I-D.wright-verdict-record] already supplies the rule identifier, evidence references and result. An effect beyond what the execution evidence observes remains a separate question. 7. Checkpoints in a Transparency Service A witness's checkpoint over a chain of decision records is a signed statement whose payload is the checkpoint's signed bytes under the anchoring extension's shared rule, with its Receipt, as the anchoring extension defines under "A transparency service as a checkpoint source" at commit 1f7dd40d7ad30783013228ca4e060ef15c29a2bc. This document adds no rule; it names what a Transparency Service operator and a verifier need: * the statement's protected header [RFC9052]: alg -19, kid the witness key's reference, CWT claims [RFC9597] iss the key's holder and sub the chain; * the leaf: the statement's bytes as registered, under the [RFC9162] leaf hash; a Transparent Statement is carried with its receipts taken out. A service that defines its entry otherwise, for example as the digest of the statement's Sig_structure, issues Receipts the extension does not verify, and says so (Section 9); Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * what a Receipt shows: that the service signed a root of its log under which the statement is included; the tree size and the leaf index a receipt states are not covered by its signature. When a claim depends on a particular tree size or leaf index, the verifier needs evidence that authenticates the claimed value. A separately signed head binds its size if that size is signed. Establishing the index also requires linking the index to the entry and authenticated tree under the chosen proof rules. The inclusion Receipt alone leaves consistency unchecked in this version, and the extension reads no registration time from it; * a verifier examining history compares retained checkpoints and verifies the applicable consistency proof between authenticated heads. It can detect a truncated history relative to a head it already trusts or conflicting views it obtains. A single internally consistent prefix cannot reveal a withheld suffix or an unseen fork. A second log that registers the same bytes observes their registration, not their truth; * the registration policy is the operator's [RFC9943]. A verifier never relies on it: it accepts only statements from the witness keys and chains its own trust policy lists for that service. A service may mirror that list in its policy. 8. Worked examples 8.1. A software release decision The appendix carries a decision record for shipping release 2.3.1 of a claims-intake service, and the action-binding attachment of its deploy pipeline: the release assistant's proposal, the release manager's review and approval under the release charter, the orchestrator's request, the permission re-check, the deployer's attempt and the observed result. The approved specification names the build, the artifact digest, the bill of materials digest, the migration and the rollback. The record states three options and why the first was chosen. The action binding reference check verifies the stage dimensions; the example carries no signature, so the issuer signature and the time are not checked. 8.2. An agent action capsule citing a decision The same record and attachment, cited from an Agent Action Capsule by two typed digest references in references[]. The capsule reference library parses the capsule strictly and verifies it; a verifier of the Standard resolves both references to the documents it holds. Nothing in the capsule's protected header or verification changed. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 8.3. A signed approval composed with an execution receipt The release example carries no signature, on purpose: it is the lower level of evidence. [INTEROP] (interop/aer1-decision) carries the full path for a refund of 120.00 EUR: the support lead's person_approval over the specification's digest, verified against the verifier's trust policy; the attachment sealed by the merchant; the agent runtime's call to the payment gateway, which issues a receipt of [I-D.zambo-aer1] (schema 0.4) whose recorded input carries the attachment's request identifier and exactly the approved parameters, under the receipt's own digest; the attempt citing the receipt's identifier and its output digest; and the report, dimension by dimension. Decision record DR-2026-1104 (seal 3615cd70...), specification e5052c21..., receipt d9f0200e-793e-4fec-a4ae- 0687e0d92cac with output_hash sha256:3ca5904b...; ten failing cases, among them the gateway recording 150.00 EUR against 120.00 EUR approved, where the receipt verifies, the approval verifies, and the join of step 4 fails. 9. Related work The SCITT working group holds, in October 2026, some fifty individual drafts that record something about an agent's action, its authorization or the decision behind it. Most record the action, its authorization by a policy, or a named person's authorization of one action; this document records the decision of a person, with what was considered and why, and binds it to the action. Where each stands relative to it, as its author reads them: * The composition model [I-D.mih-sato-agent-accountability-composition] joins four records of one action by a shared subject digest: who authorized it (WHO), was it permitted (CAN), what outcome the agent system recorded and what is known to have crossed the effect boundary (WHAT), did the runtime enforce it (AUDIT). Its WHO slot is a named person's signature covering the digest of the exact action bytes, with validity, one-time or reusable semantics, fail-closed behaviour and a verifier that keeps signature, digest, freshness and verified-versus-accepted apart; any record form meeting those requirements conforms. The action-binding attachment of the Standard is a candidate for that slot. The decision record is not: it sits in the layer the composition model places above itself, whether this authorization was the right one, with the options considered and the reasons, and it is cited from the composition by digest. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * The EMILIA authorization receipts [I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts], the first-instance WHO profile of the composition model, record a named principal's device-bound signature over the canonical bytes of one action, with a nonce, a validity window, one-time consumption and quorum rules, verifiable offline; companion documents bind what the approver was shown [I-D.schrock-ep-presentation-binding] and the observed effect [I-D.schrock-ep-outcome-binding], and declare bounded execution programs [I-D.schrock-ep-bounded-execution-program]. They answer who authorized this exact action, and answer it thoroughly; they carry no record of the decision, its alternatives or its rationale, and the stages of the action binding extension (shown, approved, requested, re-checked, executed) are one record where EMILIA composes several. A decision record can cite an EMILIA receipt as its approval evidence, and an EMILIA receipt can cite the decision it executes. * The checkpointed local log [I-D.mih-scitt-checkpointed-local-log] gives a producer's records order, completeness and contemporaneity through signed checkpoints registered with a Transparency Service, and says what that does not prove; the anchoring extension does the same for chains of decision records, with a verifier-held list of witnesses. The two are orthogonal to the decision layer and to each other, and a checkpoint of either can be registered where the other is. * The Pre-Execution Authorization Record, or Permit [I-D.munoz-scitt-permit-profile], records a policy engine's allow, deny or challenge before dispatch, bound to the canonical bytes of the authorized request, with a Closure Record after dispatch and an authority lineage between Permits. The subject is a workload identity; the reason is a code. A Permit may reference a human- authority artifact by URI and digest; the decision record and attachment of this document can be cited the same way, so that the Permit records what the policy allowed and the attachment records what the person approved. * The Seal receipts and action records [I-D.chueayen-attestation-receipts] record an enforcement point's ALLOWED or BLOCKED decision on a proposed tool call, bound to the digest of its arguments, with refusals as first-class records. Its section 8 states the properties an approval needs for an action record to be read as evidence that a person approved a specific action, binding to exact values, single use, expiry, policy version, independence, a designated approver, a view rendered from the canonical action, and leaves the approval record to a later revision. The signed outcome stage of the action Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 binding extension, with the signatures extension's person approval over it, meets those properties except the digest of the designating policy and a short validity, which can sit under the person's signature through the specification the approval signs, as the Standard's Steward read it; whether that meets section 8 is its author's reading (Section 10); [INTEROP] carries a worked example of its section 8.3 in that form, verified by both sides, with the failing cases. * The Operating Model Protocol [I-D.veridom-omp-core] records, at the moment of a routing state, whether the named accountable officer can be bound to a valid delegation instrument: the SHA-256 of the instrument's canonical form (instrument_hash, section 4.4.4 of that document), a root of authority that the law or a professional register establishes, how the instrument was selected relative to the decision (instrument_selection_mode, section 4.4.1) and the hash of an authority registry's state at decision time; a binding that cannot be made is sealed as AUTHORITY_UNBOUND, a result in its own right, with the reasons it failed; its domain profiles include financial regulation and insurance. It records the authority of the person, not their approval of exact bytes; this document records the second. Its authors read the -00 of this document and the question of a reference from the attachment's authority member to an instrument by that hash, and answered that the hash gives non-modification of the document named and nothing about timing; that a reference added once a decision record exists is, in their vocabulary, post_hoc_attached, which their document says MUST raise a review flag and SHOULD NOT be treated as fully bound; that a bound record needs the registry snapshot, which a deployer's charter cannot give; and that, by section 8.1 of their document, the instrument stays the deploying organisation's to produce. What that leaves of the open question is argued in Section 10. * Signed permissions and action receipts [I-D.izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts] let a principal sign a permission with machine-checkable limits and an agent sign a receipt for each action, verifiable offline; the standing approval of the action binding extension, a person's approval of bounds with a count and a period, is the nearest construction here. * The briefing-and-binding envelope [I-D.morrison-binding-moment-envelope] is the delivery contract by which an agent surfaces a decision to its principal, who commits, declines, amends or rejects; it names by digest what the principal was shown and defines no signature over the resolution. The review stage of the action binding extension names the same thing, and the signatures extension gives it the signature. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * Execution and audit records [I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record], [I-D.zambo-aer1], [I-D.sirkkavaara-vaara-receipt] and the AgentInteractionRecord record what ran, what it touched and what came out, with recomputable digests and offline verifiers; the decision record sits above them and is cited from them. The approval-binding contract published beside the audit record's corpus binds one approval to one use by identifier, key, principal, event, phase, bytes, validity and the policy served; the action binding extension binds an approval to the bytes of a specification and the digest of a policy, and the two readings differ on who may use an approval and on when a policy was served (the table is in the repository). * The AUDIT architecture [I-D.kuehlewind-audit-architecture] defines Action Records at the boundary where an action took effect and Authorization Transition Records for changes of permission, including step-up approvals, without a signed record of the approval itself; the AIMS best practices [I-D.ietf-wimse-aims] require that a local confirmation in a user interface not count as authorization on its own and that audit records be tamper-evident, and define no signed decision record. The outcome stage with the person's signature is the record both leave to be defined. * On the regulatory side, [I-D.dawkins-scitt-ai-article50] gives transparency receipts for Article 50 of the EU AI Act, including the exemption for content a person reviewed; a decision record can be the evidence of that review. [I-D.kamimura-scitt-vcp] applies SCITT to the audit trail of algorithmic trading decisions under MiFID II. * For time, [I-D.fassbender-scitt-time-anchor] specifies the verification of an OpenTimestamps proof against a chain the verifier holds; the anchoring extension uses the same proofs for the same purpose, with the same statement of what they show. * The PALA-1 audit log [I-D.sparysh-pala-audit] is a header-chained wire format whose chain verifies without keys and without bodies, with a SCITT bridge: the chain head expressed as a Signed Statement whose payload commits to the head and, in its third construction, to a derived root over every record so far, so that two statements of one chain connect by a prefix-consistency proof without the chain. It records what a device produced; the decision record is cited from such evidence, not carried in it, and the author's verification record is built on readings from the text alone, which this document's repository joined. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * The P10 underdetermination profile [I-D.nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination] binds, in a Transparent Statement, an adjudication that the evidence closed at a point did not decide a claim: two witness worlds of a model class committed before the first admission, compatible with the same closed evidence set and giving the claim different values, with the verifier and its limitations committed as well. It establishes underdetermination relative to the declared profile and does not identify the actual world. It reads the -00 of this document as decision provenance rather than evidential underdetermination, which is right: a decision record states what a person considered and decided, a P10 statement that a claim was left undecided by the evidence at a point, and a decision taken under such a claim can name the adjudication statement among its inputs. The repository's case interop/plan-checkpoint shows the shape: a plan approved as a whole, a check in the middle of it that leaves a claim undecided, a second decision record naming the exact state of the run and an adjudication in the form of that profile's section 9 (built there, synthetic, and said to be), and the steps after the checkpoint citing that decision. * Three other drafts are discussed with this one for adoption at IETF 127. Each records a different moment of an action. [I-D.thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence] profiles SCITT for a hash-chained record of every call an agent makes. The decision on a call may be confirm: policy required confirmation from a Principal or an operator, and a later receipt records the outcome. Its -02 records that a confirmation was required and whether it was granted; it has no member for who gave it. Where the confirmation is one that policy required a person for, the signed approval of the action-binding attachment can be the record of that person's act. Not every confirmation needs a person: an operator may meet it, as one of that draft's authors pointed out. [I-D.wright-verdict-record] defines a verdict record: a result on a claim, bound to its issuer, with the evidence it relies on cited by digest and the rule by which the result can be re-derived. A verdict can cite an attachment by the digest of its exact bytes; the check of the approval stays the Standard's own. [I-D.xg-payment-dispute-profile] defines a signed dispute receipt for agent-initiated payments. Its -02, of 16 November 2026, cites this document and adds constructions for hashes that its -01 named, after a reading of -01 by this document's author. The repository's case interop/one-chain runs one refund through the four formats, none of them changed (Section 11). It was built on the -02 of the first two drafts and on the -01 of the third. Since commit 0f9ade4 its checker reads the third's -02 and verifies that draft's Appendix A vector; the registered packet is unchanged. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * [I-D.mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings] defines a protected-header parameter of a COSE Hash Envelope that identifies the deterministic encoding of the bytes that were hashed, for a verifier that holds the value and not those bytes. The two artifact types of Section 5 settle the same point by declaration: each name fixes the bytes its digest is taken over. This document does not use that parameter. The author of this document wrote a checker from that draft's text (Section 11). * Outside these drafts, W3C PROV [PROV-O] describes where something came from: entities, activities and agents, and relations such as used, wasGeneratedBy, wasAssociatedWith and actedOnBehalfOf. It has no canonical bytes to digest, no signature semantics, no verifier and no content for a decision, its options, rationale and authority: anyone can state that a person approved something, and nothing binds the statement. The two do not compete. Once verified, a decision record, its action-binding attachment and a person's approval can be read as PROV, which [DECISION-PROV] does with a JSON-LD context, an exporter and queries, under a vocabulary of its own and without changing a member of the records. * A thread on the SCITT list, opened on 15 November 2026 [RECEIPT-SIZE], observes that in a receipt of inclusion of [RFC9942] (RFC9162_SHA256) the signature covers the Merkle root, while the tree size and the leaf index are carried in the unprotected header. The same inclusion path can give the same root under more than one tree size. Several participants reproduced it on their own logs and implementations; the author reproduced it on receipts of his own service. A receipt read alone shows that the statement is in the tree whose root the service signed. It does not establish the statement's position or the size of the log; a relying party that needs either takes it from signed data, for example a signed tree head that binds a tree size to the same root. A position claim also needs evidence binding the occurrence to its index or a proof that uniquely determines that index under authenticated inputs. The same was then reported on that thread for receipts of consistency. An erratum to Section 5.2.1 of [RFC9942] was announced on that thread, to be filed after the SCITT session of 18 November 2026, and one to Section 5.3.1 with it or shortly after. On 17 November 2026 the RFC Editor's errata search listed no erratum for [RFC9942]. A reply on the thread pointed to the MMR profile [I-D.bryce-cose-receipts-mmr-profile]. Its published -03 states no tree size in a receipt of inclusion; its editor's copy, which no published revision carries yet, makes the newer tree size of a receipt of consistency a required protected header parameter. The -01 of this document said that a Receipt shows that the service Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 signed the statement into its log "at a tree size"; Section 7 now says that the service signed a root of its log under which the statement is included. What the author's service and repository did about it is in Section 11. 10. Open questions This revision is a base for discussion. The questions its author would like the working group's reading on: * Whether a decision record should itself be registered as a Signed Statement, with the decision identifier as its subject, rather than only cited by digest from the statements that execute it. The anchoring extension registers checkpoints over chains of records, not the records; registering a record would be a new rule, made in the repository. * Whether the capsule profile will name, among the artifact-type declarations it accepts, the two names of Section 5, so that its library resolves the references itself; today they resolve on the verifier's side of the Standard. The question was put to the capsule profile's author on 29 October 2026. * The mandate at the instant of the decision. The attachment's authority reference points into the deployer's charter, which is the issuer's statement. The authors of the Operating Model Protocol, asked whether a reference from that member to one of their delegation instruments by its hash would change this, answered that it would not on its own (Section 9) and asked this document to argue whether their Invariant 3 closes the gap or formalises its shape. The argument of this revision is that it does half of each. On timing: the authority member sits in the outcome stage; where the issuer seals the attachment the seal covers it, and where the anchoring extension is used an independent timestamp over the issuer's or the approver's signature bounds when those bytes existed; an instrument hash carried there was selected no later than that bound, and one added once the record exists gives other bytes, another seal and, where those are anchored, a later bound. What the record cannot show is that the instrument existed before the decision rather than being written with it: the registry snapshot shows that, a charter has none, and the same anchoring applied to the instrument itself before the decision would show it too, which nothing in this document does today. On the party: the instrument is issued by the organisation whose authority is in question, so the claim becomes testable and its absence a sealed result, AUTHORITY_UNBOUND, which this layer would carry rather than silence; it is not independently grounded, and this document Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 grounds no other fact the issuer states either. The ground, where there is one, is a root outside the deployer; for an insurance intermediary in France the public register grounds the firm's standing to distribute, not the officer's mandate inside the firm, and which root a profile names is the remaining question. [INTEROP] (interop/omp-authority, 13 November 2026) carries a worked case, written from the text of [I-D.veridom-omp-core] with vectors of this document's author, since those authors had published none: thirteen failing cases, among them the four forms that the -01 of this document named (an instrument revoked, outside its mandate scope, with a mismatched hash, attached after the fact). Its records are a reading of that text, with stand-ins where the text leaves a choice; they are not OMP-conformant records. * The digest of the policy that designates the approver, and a short validity on a single approval, which the Seal draft asks to find in an approval record. The Standard's Steward answered (issue 93 of the repository) that both can already sit under the person's signature through the specification the approval signs: the policy version written as the SHA-256 of the policy's bytes, and, where a deployer needs a deadline for each approval, a member of the specification it declares material; the executor's recheck before each attempt is where an approval that is too old can be refused, on the enforcement point's clock. Nothing in the extensions changes. [INTEROP] carries the Seal section 8.3 example in that form, with the cases proposed on that issue: a policy digest that does not match the policy held, a policy not held, an attempt after the policy's limit, and relabelling. Whether that form meets section 8 of the Seal draft is its author's reading. A standing approval keeps its period in its bounds; the difference is intended. * Which definitions of the log entry the anchoring extension should accept when it reads a Receipt. Today it verifies only an entry that is the [RFC9162] leaf hash over the registered statement's bytes; a Transparency Service whose verifiable data structure defines its entry otherwise issues Receipts the extension reports as not verified. Whether the extension should follow the Receipt's declared structure instead, and how a verifier learns it, is the question (it was raised on issue 89 of the repository). * Which media type or CoAP Content-Format, if any, a checkpoint payload should carry when registered, and whether the vendor tree is the right place (Section 13). Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * Whether a Transparency Service should recognise witness checkpoints in its registration policy by their witness keys, as a verifier does in its trust policy, or treat them as any statement from any issuer. 11. Implementation Status Note to the RFC Editor: this section is to be removed before publication as an RFC. It records implementations known to the author at the time of writing, following [RFC7942]; listing one implies no endorsement, and the author has verified only the ones he ran. Chronology, for the record: the action binding and portable verification proposals were documented in the Standard's repository on 29 September 2026 (issue 21, by its Steward, naming their author); their first versions, with schemas and reference checks, were merged on 5 and 3 October; anchoring and signatures followed on 15 and 16 October. This document composes those existing mechanisms with SCITT. The dates give the chronology of these contributions, not a claim over neighbouring work, which has its own history and scope. The items below establish different things: syntax and digest agreement, verification by another author's library, the consistency of a composition across formats, the behaviour of a Transparency Service, and operation in a deployment; a verifier written by the author from another draft's text checks that draft independently of its reference code and is not a second independent implementation of this document's composition. * The reference checks of the Decision Provenance Standard's extensions (repository above, Apache-2.0 for schemas and tests): action binding 0.3.0, signatures 0.2.0, anchoring 0.2.0 and portable verification 0.3.0, each with a runner, cases by mutation (over four hundred for anchoring, over four hundred for signatures, over three hundred for action binding) and published vectors, reviewed by the Standard's Steward before each merge. They produce the reports this document's verification section reads. Maturity: proposal; test fixtures and the author's own deployments. * [INTEROP], the author's working repository, Apache-2.0, with continuous integration for the public cases, including: the two worked examples of this document; seven interoperability cases with the Agent Action Capsule reference library 0.12.0 (typed references that resolve, an altered digest, an unsigned attachment, an attachment that resolves and then fails its own check, a re-encoded record; the capsule registered at the library's Transparency Service with its COSE Receipt; a Producer Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 Envelope the library verifies and a CPB-bound Signed Statement carrying the references in the cpb-refs protected header, with its negative forms); the Seal section 8.3 example with its failing cases; one agent pass carried three ways, the action binding extension's standing approvals of exact lists and exact approvals of each comment with their signatures, the Seal action records of what the enforcement point allowed and blocked, and a capsule for each action, with the joins across the three and ten failing cases, one of which only the policy signed through the specification catches; a decision record and a receipt of [I-D.zambo-aer1] joined both ways at that draft's author's request, the attempt citing the receipt's identifier and output hash and the receipt's recorded input carrying the request identifier and the approved values, with the receipt's execution context naming the record reported as the producer's assertion, and ten failing cases; a receipt of [I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt], taken from its published conformance vectors, cited with the decision record and the attachment by a separate Signed Statement, its own signature verified as a separate result, with the negative forms its author described; a plan approved as a whole and executed as steps, one exact approval of a plan of three steps whose specification carries the hash of its executable steps, three capsules chained in run order, and a run manifest between them that lists, for each step, the capsule that executed it, the outputs it recorded and the state of the run's context before and after it, each capsule citing the state it read, with ten joins (membership, completeness, order, arguments resolved from an earlier step's committed outputs, the growth of the context) and fourteen failing cases; the same plan stopped after its first step on a claim the evidence left undecided, with a second decision record whose specification names the exact state of the run and an adjudication in the form of [I-D.nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination] section 9 (synthetic, and said to be), five joins more and eight failing cases; and verifiers written from the text of four neighbouring drafts and run on their published vectors, the Seal receipts (67 of 67), the OpenTimestamps verification of [I-D.fassbender-scitt-time-anchor] (its four vectors, against a header set the verifier checks for proof of work and linkage from a checkpoint it holds), AER-1 [I-D.zambo-aer1] (119 of 119 across its kit's seven suites) and the agent audit record [I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record] (184 of 184 members of its corpus at release 0.31.0, read against its -03, every anchor of its retained records validated offline against the tree heads and block headers the corpus pins and the dating reported in full; 141 of 141 at release 0.28.0, the run posted on the corpus's issue tracker at its author's request; and the OpenTimestamps proof of a live run recorded in that corpus replayed to a Bitcoin block Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 against headers from two explorers), each with the places where the author's text and kit were found to differ, reported to them; for the audit record, both earlier observations are taken into its -03, and three more were reported after the -03 rerun; and, from the same package, its approval-binding contract, whose eleven checks ask of one approval and one use what the action binding asks of a specification and its stages: a verifier written from the contract's text agrees with its 23 cases on decision and reason, and a table in the repository maps the eleven checks onto the extension's rules and cases, five met, three with a note, one partial (the validity window of a single approval), two with no analogue in the Standard (the principal who may use an approval; the window in which a policy was served), as the input to the shared profile that corpus's author proposed; and the SCITT-bridge Signed Statement of [I-D.sparysh-pala-audit] in its third construction, read and reproduced byte for byte from its task's text and the standards it names, at the author's invitation and within the boundary he set: both statements, the derived roots, the prefix-consistency proof from the statements' roots alone, the seven tamper expectations and the version rule, with the ambiguities logged. * [DECISION-PROV], the author's reading of the records as W3C PROV, version 0.1.0 (code Apache-2.0, context and vocabulary CC-BY 4.0), written against record schema 5.2.0, action binding 0.3.0 and signatures 0.2.0: a JSON-LD 1.1 context, an exporter and three SPARQL queries. On a worked example whose person approval the Standard's reference check verified, the queries find the stage chain from proposal to result, and for every attempt a verified approval of the attempted digest attributed to a person; a negative control with the attribution dropped finds no one. The graph proves nothing by itself: it repeats what the reference checks reported. * The author's deployment, a runtime for insurance brokers: an action with external effect runs only after an approval that names the person and carries the digest of the exact payload shown, checked again before the effect, with a receipt kept for every effect; that approval is recorded, and since November 2026 one given on the author's signing page is also signed with his passkey and registered on his Transparency Service, the first on 12 November 2026. A program that repeats is certified once, with bounds, a period, a count of executions and a revocation, as its code defines. An exporter writes approval and effect records in the form the action binding extension describes; one such export is the first interop case above. Its history, in the author's SmartOffice runtime (a private repository): schemas and examples committed in December 2025 describe a hierarchical execution Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 envelope, the enclosing context and its operation records; workflows of January 2026 preserve that context across model calls, carry the authorization at the parent, distinguishing an approval of one instance (human_approved) from a preauthorised, registry-compiled process (preapproved, naming the use case and its version), refuse any other mode in the executor, and collect a result per step; the grammar of June 2026 requires an authority of one of those two modes for a runtime transition; from May 2026 the proposal shown to the person carries a hash of the plan's executable steps, the reply carries it back, and the resumed run refuses a plan whose hash changed before it is marked approved; guided actions of June 2026 allow that transition only with an approval identifier and that hash; prepared and revisable programs of October 2026 are approved on their exact content and executed through a preview token carrying the payload's digest, checked again before the effect. These are the background of the extension's approval and standing approval and of the compositions above; that runtime implements neither the capsule profile nor the extensions' anchoring or portable verification, and none of it is public: the private documents are the author's declared implementation context. The signing page does implement the signatures extension: the person_approval it produces (WebAuthn, ES256) is verified by the reference check of that extension before it is registered. The items below are new in the -02. They report work done between 6 and 16 November 2026, part of it at the IETF 127 Hackathon of 14 and 15 November. Unless an item says otherwise, the files are in [INTEROP] at commit e444fff and its continuous integration replays them. Each item says what was run, by whom, and what it does not show. * One action through four drafts (interop/one-chain). One refund of 120.00 EUR is run through the four drafts of the IETF 127 adoption discussion: the execution receipts of [I-D.thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence] (-02), the decision record, the attachment and the signed approval of this document, the verdict record of [I-D.wright-verdict-record] (-02), and the dispute packet of [I-D.xg-payment-dispute-profile] (built on its -01, with the constructions its author gave on 8 November 2026; read against its -02 since 16 November 2026). No format is changed. Each record is checked by a verifier written from the text of its own draft; the decision layer is checked by the Standard's reference checks. Twelve joins across the four compare values that the records already carry. The chain is run twice, once executed as approved and once with 150.00 EUR executed for 120.00 EUR approved. Twenty-two failing cases fail where expected. Everything in this case is synthetic. One outside run Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 is published: Darren Wright's reference checker replays the case as it stood on 11 November 2026 (commit f0d766a), and 48 verdict records agree on state, steps and re-run result. That is an outside run of the composed case. The checks of the decision layer in it are the Standard's reference implementation, not an independent one. A second dispute packet for the same refund follows the letter of that draft's -02 as this author reads it: a receipt of exactly eleven members, and the Signed Statement of its Section 6. It is registered on the author's Transparency Service (interop/one-chain/goshi-02-letter, commit e444fff). It is one reading, not a claim of conformance. * The same chain with a real approval (interop/one-chain-real). One thing is real here: the person. On 6 November 2026 the author signed the person_approval of that chain, over its exact bytes, with his own passkey (WebAuthn, ES256). The reference check of the Standard's signatures extension verifies the assertion under a pinned trust policy: signature, subject, key state and identity are verified, and user presence and user verification are reported as set. Eight failing cases fail where expected; five of them are seen by that check alone. The rest of the chain is synthetic. The time of signing is the signer's statement. * The same statements on two logs (interop/one-chain/registration). The four Signed Statements of that case are registered on two Transparency Services run by two operators. The first, https://ts.isoluce.net, is operated by the author; its entry is the [RFC9162] leaf hash over the statement's bytes, as in Section 7. The second, https://witness.agentactioncapsule.org, is operated by Steven Mih. He registered the four statements, unchanged, on 14 November 2026 and sent the four receipts, which are published with his agreement. Each operator checked the receipts of the other. The four receipts of the second log verify with a script in the repository, written from [RFC9162]: inclusion proof, root, signature under the key that service publishes, and two negative controls for each receipt. The second operator reports that the four receipts of ts.isoluce.net verify on his side with a script of his own; that script and its output are not published. What this shows: two logs, under two operators and two keys, each state that the same bytes were registered. Limits: the two operators are co-champions of the same hackathon project. No signed tree head of the second log was checked. The same statement has a different leaf on each log, because the entry of the second log is the SHA-256 of the statement's Sig_structure; a receipt cannot be checked without knowing the rule of the service that issued it. The author's service has no witness that the author does not operate. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * An outside reading of those statements. Mikhail Sergeev read the five Signed Statements of that folder, the four current ones and an earlier dispute packet, with two scripts built on the CBOR code of a pull request to the working group's examples repository, and with none of this repository's code. He reported no difference (issue 7 of the repository): file digests and entry identifiers, the COSE structure and its re-encoding to the same bytes, the Ed25519 signature under the issuer key, and the payloads of the four current statements. The limits are his: the COSE layer of five files only, the repository's README read first, no receipt checked, and not a verifier of this document. He states his ties: the author replayed two comparisons of his own project, and he is co-author of a check in the repository. His run of the repository's test script also found one stale committed log, corrected since. * A checker for [I-D.mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings], written from the text of its -00 alone (interop/cose- deterministic); no code of that draft's authors was read or run. On 16 vectors of the author's own, each gives its expected verdict. On the 33 vectors of that draft's authors, all 8 emission cases and all 25 content-binding outcomes agree. The authors report that their two reference implementations agree with 14 of the 16 vectors and differ on two cases that the -00 text leaves open; the author did not run their code. On the 41 vectors the authors prepared for their -01, the result is 41 of 41: first from the authors' description on 14 November 2026, then, on 15 November, from the -01 text in the authors' repository, identical to the -01 now published on the Datatracker. That result holds with an encoder that rejects a non-trivial NaN. The CBOR text that the -01 cites also allows another encoder behaviour, and with it 5 of the 41 vectors differ; this was reported to the authors. * A test of what a receipt of the MMR profile binds, written from the text of [I-D.bryce-cose-receipts-mmr-profile] -03 alone, on a synthetic log (interop/mmr-profile). In a receipt of inclusion the index is bound, except when the path is empty: 60 of 60 such receipts verify at every index. A receipt of inclusion states no log size. For a receipt of consistency, another newer tree size is accepted in 10 of 18 cases by the strictest of the three verifiers tried. Every point is already resolved in the authors' editor's copy (commit f1320c0d63 of 10 October 2026), which no published revision carries yet. These results describe the published -03, not the profile as its authors now write it. No production MMR log was checked, and no code of the authors. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * Receipts that sign their tree size and leaf index (interop/ receipt-size). Since 15 November 2026, every receipt of https://ts.isoluce.net repeats its tree size and its leaf index in the protected header, under two private-use labels that are not listed in crit, so that the signature covers them; the earlier form stays available on request. The folder holds one receipt of each kind for the same statement, and an offline check. Of 8,255 edited pairs of tree size and leaf index, a plain [RFC9942] receipt read alone is accepted for the issued pair and for 31 others. Read with the service's signed tree head, or carrying the two signed labels, it is accepted for the issued pair only. The labels are this service's own; this document does not propose them. The check shows nothing about append-only behaviour, equivocation or registration time. * The Agent evidence conformance matrix [EVIDENCE-MATRIX], maintained by Sankalp Gilda and first run for the same hackathon, has a row for this work (row 4, as read on 17 November 2026). The matrix compares its own reader with this repository's two verifiers written from the text of [I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record] and of its approval-binding contract, on the corpus at release 0.36.3: 217 of 217 members agree on verdict, and 37 of 37 approval-binding cases agree on decision and reason. One cell of the row marks this repository's own records as unsupported: the matrix's tools have no reader for them. Four more cells, merged on 17 November 2026, record the chain, the passkey approval, the second log and the receipt that signs its size; they run this repository's own verifiers, through an adapter its author wrote. The author ran a follow-up to the AIR/DPS case on 17 November 2026 using AIR -01, the AIR reader and test harness at commit e444fffb5a6488e9898061bc02c3c52ebdbf97b8 and DPS reference checks at 007f8c99ec910564bac1c508b76c8ce8391fa11e. A positive control and six synthetic variations exercised the existing checks. Five variations passed the harness and illustrate correspondences beyond the checks exercised. In C06 only J6 changed from pass to fail. The harness aggregates schema, chain, trust, signature, binding and join checks. The additional fixtures and results are internal to this follow-up. The public e444fff tree contains the original AIR/DPS case and N7. The run concerns that test harness and its reference readers. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 12. Security Considerations An organisation can disclose evidence for the particular interaction under review to an authorized reviewer. A rule that needs a withheld piece leaves the dependent finding open until the reviewer can obtain and check that piece. Restrict an interaction identifier to the context needed to resolve the evidence. Storing a digest preserves a comparison to bytes the reviewer later obtains. A digest of a small set of guessable inputs can itself disclose information about the content. Where the approver's signature is carried, the signature authenticates the approval commitment. Binding it to an actual execution requires separate evidence of that execution; an authority reference stays the issuer's statement unless checked against an independent source; it does not establish the truth of the decision's inputs, nor that the artifact a specification names is safe: that stays with the build attestations and the reviews they record. A relying party that needs a signed approval requires one in its own configuration and does not accept an unsigned attachment: anyone holding a signed attachment can remove its signature and present it as unsigned, and only a seal beside it shows that. Keys and sources of trust come from the verifier's own trust policy, never from the artifacts. Every stage time in an attachment is the issuer's: a consistent set of them shows what the issuer recorded, not that the approval preceded the effect, since the issuer can date every stage as it likes. What bounds the order from outside is an independent timestamp over the approval signature's value, which the anchoring extension carries, and what the execution side observed itself, such as a request identifier under a receipt's own commitment (Section 11). A Receipt states no time; an OpenTimestamps proof shows only that bytes existed before a block was mined; an RFC 3161 token can additionally provide a civil-time bound under the timestamp authority selected by the verifier. A decision record and its attachment carry personal data, the names of the accountable owner, the approver and the attestor, and the rationale of a decision; only their digests are registered in a Transparency Service, and the documents themselves travel under the issuer's control, to the parties that hold the citing statement; this document defines no selective disclosure of their members. A member by which an execution receipt names a decision record, when it sits outside what the receipt's own digest or signature covers, is the producer's assertion and shows nothing by itself; a verifier reports it as such. The binding runs the other way: the decision layer's attempt and result cite values the receipt commits to, its identifier and its output digest, and where the executor sends the request identifier as the target's idempotency key, that key is under the receipt's own commitment as part of the recorded input. The same holds for a Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 human-approval flag in a receipt: it is the producer's claim, and only an approval of that exact specification, signed, under the decision layer, makes it more. The anchoring extension's security considerations apply. 13. IANA Considerations This document registers no media type in this revision; the content type stays optional in the anchoring extension. 14. References 14.1. Normative References [DPS-ACTION-BINDING] Lemonnier, L., "Action binding extension 0.3.0 of the Decision Provenance Standard", October 2026, . [DPS-ANCHORING] Lemonnier, L., "Anchoring extension 0.2.0 of the Decision Provenance Standard", October 2026, . [DPS-NAMES] Lemonnier, L., "Extensions of the Decision Provenance Standard, Names for typed references", October 2026, . [DPS-PV] Lemonnier, L., "Portable verification extension 0.3.0 of the Decision Provenance Standard", October 2026, . [DPS-SIGNATURES] Lemonnier, L., "Signatures extension 0.2.0 of the Decision Provenance Standard", October 2026, . Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 [I-D.mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding] Mih, S. and A. Sokolov, "Canonicalization Declaration for SCITT Signed Statements", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding-06, 25 October 2026, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022, . [RFC9942] Steele, O., Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., and C. Fournet, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts", RFC 9942, DOI 10.17487/RFC9942, June 2026, . [RFC9943] Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande, Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, June 2026, . 14.2. Informative References [DECISION-PROV] Lemonnier, L., "decision-prov: the records of the Decision Provenance Standard read as W3C PROV, version 0.1.0", October 2026, . [DPS-CHECKER-CLARIFICATION] Lemonnier, L., "Action binding: which report dimensions concern the attachment, for a checker that cites it (#106)", 10 November 2026, . Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 [DPS-CORE] Etsion, Y., "The Decision Provenance Standard, Core v1.3 (reading edition rev. 11)", 2026, . [EVIDENCE-MATRIX] Gilda, S., "Agent evidence conformance matrix", November 2026, . [I-D.bryce-cose-receipts-mmr-profile] Bryce, R. and J. Geater, "COSE Receipts for MMRs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bryce-cose-receipts-mmr- profile-03, 19 September 2026, . [I-D.chueayen-attestation-receipts] Chueayen, A., "Enforcement Attestation Receipts for AI Inference and Agent Action Decisions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-chueayen-attestation-receipts-05, 25 October 2026, . [I-D.dawkins-scitt-ai-article50] Dawkins, V. S., "A SCITT Profile for EU AI Act Article 50 Transparency Receipts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-dawkins-scitt-ai-article50-00, 25 May 2026, . [I-D.emirdag-scitt-ai-agent-execution] Emirdag, P. and D. Feichtinger, "AI Agent Execution Profile of SCITT", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-emirdag-scitt-ai-agent-execution-01, 12 October 2026, . [I-D.fassbender-scitt-time-anchor] Fassbender, J., "Umarise's Bitcoin-Anchored Temporal Proofs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- fassbender-scitt-time-anchor-08, 23 October 2026, . Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 34] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 [I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record] Gilda, S., "An Audit Record Format for AI Agent Authorization Decisions", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03, 29 October 2026, . [I-D.ietf-scitt-software-use-cases] Birkholz, H., Deshpande, Y., Brooks, D., Martin, B., and B. Knight, "Detailed Software Supply Chain Uses Cases for SCITT", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- scitt-software-use-cases-03, 18 April 2024, . [I-D.ietf-wimse-aims] Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B., Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- wimse-aims-01, 2 November 2026, . [I-D.izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts] Izmaylov, P., "Signed Permissions and Action Receipts for Automated Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts-02, 2 November 2026, . [I-D.kamimura-scitt-vcp] Tokachi, K., "A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Audit Trails in Algorithmic Trading: The VeritasChain Protocol (VCP)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-kamimura-scitt- vcp-05, 24 October 2026, . [I-D.kuehlewind-audit-architecture] Kühlewind, M. and H. Birkholz, "An Architecture for Auditing Agent Delegation and Interactions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-kuehlewind-audit- architecture-01, 7 September 2026, . Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 35] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 [I-D.mih-sato-agent-accountability-composition] Mih, S., Sato, Schrock, I., Bu, S., and A. Sokolov, "Agent Accountability: Composition and Conformance", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mih-sato-agent- accountability-composition-02, 2 November 2026, . [I-D.mih-scitt-agent-action-capsule] Mih, S., "An Agent Action Capsule Profile for SCITT", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mih-scitt-agent-action- capsule-05, 26 September 2026, . [I-D.mih-scitt-checkpointed-local-log] Mih, S., "The Checkpointed Local Log (CLL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mih-scitt-checkpointed- local-log-02, 14 October 2026, . [I-D.mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings] Mih, S. and A. Sokolov, "Deterministic Encodings for COSE", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mih- sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings-01, 17 November 2026, . [I-D.morrison-binding-moment-envelope] Morrison, B. and C. Whiteside, "The Briefing-and-Binding Envelope: A Delivery Contract for Agent-to-Principal Decision Moments with Dual-Veto Reconciliation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-binding-moment- envelope-04, 12 October 2026, . [I-D.munoz-scitt-permit-profile] Munoz, C., "A SCITT Profile for Pre-Execution AI Action Authorization Records", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-munoz-scitt-permit-profile-01, 19 July 2026, . [I-D.nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination] Nestorov, I., "P10 Underdetermination Profile: Adjudication Statements over SCITT", Work in Progress, Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 36] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 Internet-Draft, draft-nestorov-scitt-p10- underdetermination-03, 15 November 2026, . [I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt] Toraman, T., "A SCITT Profile for AI-Agent Action Receipts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-noa- scitt-ai-agent-receipt-01, 14 August 2026, . [I-D.rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance-binding] Karthik, R., "Binding Per-Action Authorization and Memory Provenance into Agent Action Capsules", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance- binding-00, 4 July 2026, . [I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts] Schrock, I., "Authorization Receipts for High-Risk Agent Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-schrock- ep-authorization-receipts-13, 12 September 2026, . [I-D.schrock-ep-bounded-execution-program] Schrock, I., "Bounded Execution Programs for Consequential Agent Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- schrock-ep-bounded-execution-program-00, 2 August 2026, . [I-D.schrock-ep-outcome-binding] Schrock, I., "Outcome Binding for Authorized Actions and Independently Observed Effects", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-schrock-ep-outcome-binding-00, 28 July 2026, . [I-D.schrock-ep-presentation-binding] Schrock, I., "Binding Deterministic Rendering and Display Attestations to Human-Authorization Receipts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-schrock-ep-presentation- binding-01, 12 September 2026, . Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 37] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 [I-D.sirkkavaara-vaara-receipt] Sirkkavaara, H., "The Vaara Receipt: A Recomputable Receipt Format for Decisions About Autonomous Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-sirkkavaara-vaara- receipt-15, 1 November 2026, . [I-D.sparysh-pala-audit] Sparysh, A. and O. Verteletskyi, "PALA-1: A Tamper-Evident Audit Record Format for Constrained and Disconnected Deployments", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- sparysh-pala-audit-02, 22 October 2026, . [I-D.thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence] Thaha, S. and S. Shamsudeen, "Agent Execution Evidence: A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Records of AI Agent Runs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-thaha-scitt-agent- execution-evidence-02, 1 November 2026, . [I-D.veridom-omp-core] Adebayo, T. and O. Apalowo, "Operating Model Protocol (OMP) Core: Invariant 3 -- Verifiable Delegation Binding", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-veridom-omp-core- 00, 13 May 2026, . [I-D.wright-verdict-record] Wright, D., "Verdict Records: Results on Claims that Cite Receipts as Evidence", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-wright-verdict-record-02, 2 November 2026, . [I-D.xg-payment-dispute-profile] Goshi, X., "Card-Scheme Dispute Evidence Profile of Signed Decision Receipts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-xg-payment-dispute-profile-02, 16 November 2026, . [I-D.zambo-aer1] Zambo, B., "AER-1: A Portable Execution Receipt for AI Agent Tool Calls", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 38] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 draft-zambo-aer1-26, 22 October 2026, . [IN-TOTO] "in-toto Attestation Framework", n.d., . [INTEROP] Lemonnier, L., "dps-scitt-decision-layer: worked examples, interop cases and independent verifiers (this document's working repository)", October 2026, . [PROV-O] Lebo, T., Sahoo, S., and D. McGuinness, "PROV-O: The PROV Ontology", W3C REC-prov-o-20130430, 30 April 2013, . [RECEIPT-SIZE] Kudsi, B., "RFC 9942 inclusion receipts: tree-size is not authenticated by the signed root (message to the SCITT mailing list, and the thread that follows)", 15 November 2026, . [RFC3161] Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, DOI 10.17487/RFC3161, August 2001, . [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, . [RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020, . [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, . [RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162, December 2021, . Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 39] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 [RFC9597] Looker, T. and M.B. Jones, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims in COSE Headers", RFC 9597, DOI 10.17487/RFC9597, June 2024, . [RFC9864] Jones, M.B. and O. Steele, "Fully-Specified Algorithms for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9864, DOI 10.17487/RFC9864, October 2025, . [SLSA] "SLSA: Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts, provenance predicate", n.d., . [SPDX] "SPDX Specification", n.d., . Changes since -02 * Clarified verification for one organisation presenting evidence of one occurrence. Added the evidence needed for a presentation, effective authority, policy by content, bounded standing approval and observed result. * Specified the inputs and scope of comparisons across the existing refund compositions. Distinguished encoding mismatches, choices allowed by the encoding specification, unavailable evidence and correspondences defined by a composition. Added the AIR/DPS global-input versus tool-call comparison and clarified what the result of a recomputed audit verdict establishes. * Updated the downstream DPS references to the 10 November snapshot. Clarified the distinction between a signed size and an established index. No new artifact type or IANA allocation. Changes since -01 Note to the RFC Editor: this section is to be removed before publication as an RFC. * Implementation status: a second dispute packet built to the letter of the -02 of the payment dispute profile, registered on 16 November 2026. Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 40] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 * Implementation Status: eight items added, for work done between 6 and 16 November 2026: one action through the four drafts of the adoption discussion, the same chain with a real passkey approval, the same statements on two logs, an outside reading of them, a checker for the COSE deterministic encodings draft, a test of the MMR profile, receipts that sign their tree size and leaf index, and a row in a conformance matrix. * Related work: three entries added: the three other drafts of the adoption discussion; the COSE deterministic encodings draft; and the SCITT list thread of 15 November 2026 on the tree size and leaf index of [RFC9942] receipts, with the errata announced there and the MMR profile. * Related work: two entries corrected to follow the current revision of the drafts they describe. * Checkpoints in a Transparency Service: the sentence on what a Receipt shows is corrected. The service signed a root of its log under which the statement is included; the tree size and the leaf index a receipt states are not covered by its signature. * Implementation Status, the author's deployment: approvals given on the author's signing page are now signed with his passkey and registered on his Transparency Service. * Open questions: the sentence that planned a worked case with the Operating Model Protocol for the -02 now points to that case in the repository. * Open questions and IANA Considerations: two sentences that announced later work are removed. * Acknowledgments extended; seven informative references added. * No change to the artifact types, to the verification steps or to any requirement; in the registration of checkpoints, only the sentence named above changes. The extensions are still read at commit 007f8c9. Acknowledgments Yohay Etsion, Founding Steward of the Decision Provenance Standard, for discussion. Steven Mih, for reading the demonstration and the two declarations and sending the corrections the -01 carries; Tora Toraman, for the correction on what the receipt profile commits to, and for stating the receipt's digest and signature constructions; Anya Chueayen, for the exchange on the approval record of section 8 Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 41] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 of the Seal draft. Brennan Zambo, for confirming the readings of the AER-1 conformance kit and asking for the composed example. Sankalp Gilda, for the answers on the audit record's corpus that let its anchors be validated offline; Iman Schrock, for reading the WHO table against the composition draft's -02 candidate and the two corrections that followed; Andrii Sparysh, for stating the bridge task and its boundary; Ivan Nestorov, whose draft's adjudication shape the checkpoint case borrows, and whose own words for what it does not show the case keeps; Tolulope Adebayo, for reading the -00 against Invariant 3 and stating what a reference by instrument hash carries and what it does not. The authors of the capsule, payload binding, AI agent execution and action receipt drafts, whose care in stating what their records do not prove made the junction clear. For the work the -02 reports: Darren Wright, whose reference checker replays the composed case, and whose run found a failing case whose published files did not hold the altered bytes; Xavier Goshi, for the constructions his profile uses; Shameer Thaha, for the correction on what a confirmation establishes; Mikhail Sergeev, for an outside reading of the registered statements and for the stale log his run found. Appendix: the worked examples The files are kept with this document's source (https://github.com/ Laurent-Lemonnier/dps-scitt-decision-layer, examples/release- decision/ and demo/); the digests below let a reader check them. * Decision record DR-2026-0412 (record schema of the reference files 5.2.0, state closed): "Ship claims-intake 2.3.1 to production on 2026-10-23", three options considered, the first chosen; affirmed by the release manager on 2026-10-23T14:20:00Z. seal_hash: 34ba302a668e9200017a1083a92e88773dab1ca620faeaac8cd8bb7747596ba5. * Action-binding attachment (0.3.0, unsigned in this example): seven stages, proposal by the release assistant, review and approval by the release manager under the release charter, without signature in this example, request, re-check, attempt, observed result; one specification, digest 19ade2a46319ac6622333cd6731ac400ed11daa7d6955b5daa5864da91c2b711, carried in full, naming build 2.3.1+git.5d1c9f0, the artifact digest, the SBOM digest, migration 0042 and the rollback. Attachment digest: 5086c7674db770c6d01592ba697722a2fb468c16d1d5ab9226a7b5217c4bc1a8. * The action binding reference check on the attachment with the record: specification digests, record statements, action binding, stage order, authorisation re-check, observed results and Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 42] Internet-Draft SCITT Decision Provenance November 2026 rationale provenance verified; execution state attempted, result succeeded; issuer signature and time not checked, as the attachment is unsigned. * A capsule (format 4, action_type decide, disposition accept by a human, effect confirmed) citing both by typed digest references in references[] with citation_purpose ran_under and acted_on: capsule_id 76481fc3bf5016ae51d7be821557f4bd7e40a0c0898ac7d8a6f425fbc135ab9d (the -00 quoted 8ffac39f..., before the effect's response digest was made the JSON digest of the observed response, as the capsule profile requires, and the effect type given a producer prefix); the capsule library (0.12.0) parses it strictly and its Class 1 verification passes with two informational findings (an effect type and a domain outside the seeded values); a verifier of the Standard resolves both references to the documents it holds. The two references as the capsule carries them, wrapped as [RFC8792] describes: NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 [ { "type": "org.decisionprovenancestandard.decision_record", "digest_alg": "SHA-256", "digest": "34ba302a668e9200017a1083a92e88773dab1ca620faeaac8cd8\ bb7747596ba5", "citation_purpose": "ran_under" }, { "type": "org.decisionprovenancestandard.action_binding_attachment", "digest_alg": "SHA-256", "digest": "5086c7674db770c6d01592ba697722a2fb468c16d1d5ab9226a7\ b5217c4bc1a8", "citation_purpose": "acted_on" } ] Author's Address Laurent Lemonnier iSoluce France Email: laurent@isoluce.net Lemonnier Expires 21 May 2027 [Page 43]