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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance-03" category="info" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="SCITT Decision Provenance">Decision Provenance for SCITT: binding software releases and agent actions to the decisions behind them</title>

    <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier">
      <organization>iSoluce</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>France</country>
        </postal>
        <email>laurent@isoluce.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>SCITT</workgroup>
    <keyword>SCITT</keyword> <keyword>provenance</keyword> <keyword>decision</keyword> <keyword>human approval</keyword> <keyword>software release</keyword> <keyword>action binding</keyword> <keyword>transparency service</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 155?>

<t>Build attestations, bills of materials and Signed Statements in a Transparency Service record what was built and by whom. Authorization receipts for agent actions can establish who approved an exact action; the statement profiles for agent actions record a human approval as the producer's claim. The release and agent action examples in this document use the Decision Provenance Standard to supply a separately verifiable decision record and an attachment for the approved action. The cited records and receipts supply evidence about the build, the action or its authorization, according to their respective profiles. This document describes how a decision record and its action-binding attachment, as the extension proposals of the Decision Provenance Standard define them, sit under a release statement, a build attestation or an agent action record by typed digest references; how a verifier checks them offline, including the approver's signature where one is carried; and how the witness checkpoints of the anchoring extension are registered in a Transparency Service. For a relying party reviewing one occurrence, it specifies which authenticated inputs to compare and how to report missing evidence about presentation, authority and the observed effect. A software release decision and an agent action capsule are the worked examples; the model has no feature specific to either. This document is independent of the Decision Provenance Standard, is not part of it, does not change it, and is not endorsed by its Steward.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 159?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>The SCITT use cases <xref target="I-D.ietf-scitt-software-use-cases"/> and the formats a software supply chain already carries, build provenance <xref target="SLSA"/>, attestations <xref target="IN-TOTO"/> and bills of materials <xref target="SPDX"/>, answer the question "what is this artifact, and how was it built". Registered as Signed Statements in a Transparency Service <xref target="RFC9943"/>, with Receipts <xref target="RFC9942"/>, they become evidence anyone can check later. In the release example here, a separate decision record supplies the rationale and stated authority. Its attachment lets the verifier compare the approved specification with authenticated evidence about the artifact shipped.</t>

<t>The agent action profiles cited here carry evidence about different stages of an action. A capsule records an action's disposition <xref target="I-D.mih-scitt-agent-action-capsule"/>; an AgentInteractionRecord its inputs and outcomes <xref target="I-D.emirdag-scitt-ai-agent-execution"/>; a receipt its risk class and verdict, and may record a permission, a refusal or a deferral as well as an execution outcome <xref target="I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt"/>. A producer's approval flag or approver label records the producer's claim. A verifier needs the person's signature and the applicable trust policy to authenticate the approval described here. Where a profile carries the reasoning behind the action at all, it stays private or is reduced to a hash: the capsule's reason digest, the AgentInteractionRecord's reasoning hash; the receipt commits to the action parameters and, optionally, to the policy, and carries no rationale. Authorization receipts such as <xref target="I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts"/> do establish who approved an exact action, with a signature; they carry no record of the decision, its alternatives or its reasons. What this document adds is that record and its composition with those receipts and statements; the signed approval itself is not new.</t>

<t>The Decision Provenance Standard <xref target="DPS-CORE"/> records the decision: what was decided, under which charter, which options were considered and with what rationale, and the affirmative human act that closed the record. Its action binding extension <xref target="DPS-ACTION-BINDING"/>, a proposal in the Standard's repository, records the stages from a proposed action specification to its execution: what the attachment states the reviewer was shown, what was approved, signed where a signature is carried, what was requested, re-checked and executed, compared through the digest constructions and stage checks the extension specifies. Its anchoring extension <xref target="DPS-ANCHORING"/>, also a proposal, gives those records evidence that their bytes existed by a given point, and witness checkpoints, including, since its SCITT source, a witness-signed checkpoint registered in a Transparency Service with its Receipt. A deploy pipeline and an AI agent are two executors of decisions; the Standard does not distinguish them.</t>

<t>Decision provenance serves accountability and later review. A relying party may need to identify who approved an action, distinguish that approval from the authority to act, inspect the reasons and the alternatives that were recorded, and follow a later correction. Each verification result in this document says which of these questions it answers and which stay with evidence outside it.</t>

<t>This document is an applicability statement: it defines no new format, and it does three things. It uses two artifact types, declared in the Standard's repository, so that a build attestation, a release statement or an agent action record may cite, by typed digest reference <xref target="I-D.mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding"/>, the decision record and the action-binding attachment it executes. It describes how a verifier holding both checks the approval and the binding offline. And it describes the registration of the anchoring extension's checkpoints in a Transparency Service, by reference to the anchoring extension at a fixed commit. Two worked examples: a software release decision, and an agent action capsule citing a decision. Nothing in the architecture <xref target="RFC9943"/>, in Signed Statements or in Receipts changes: the decision layer is cited by digest from a statement a service already registers, and its checkpoints are registered as any statement is.</t>

<section anchor="relation-to-the-decision-provenance-standard"><name>Relation to the Decision Provenance Standard</name>

<t>This document is an independent, downstream description. It is not part of the Decision Provenance Standard, does not change it, and is not endorsed by its Steward. The name is used only to identify the Standard and its extensions, which are the source: where this document and the repository differ, the repository governs, and any change a reader asks for in a format described here is made in the repository first, as a pull request. The extensions are proposals in the repository; they are not part of the Standard itself. Only the version cited here, at that commit, governs this revision; a later change in the repository does not change this document, and a revision of this document names the commit it is written against.</t>

<t>"Decision Provenance Standard" is a trademark of Etsion Brands Ltd., used here to identify the Standard, with attribution: The Decision Provenance Standard, Yohay Etsion, 2026, CC-BY 4.0, https://decisionprovenancestandard.org.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="versions-and-commit"><name>Versions and commit</name>

<t>This document is written against the extensions as they stand on the repository's main branch at commit 1f7dd40d7ad30783013228ca4e060ef15c29a2bc (10 November 2026): anchoring 0.2.0, signatures 0.2.0, portable verification 0.3.0 and action binding 0.3.0, each a proposal written against Core v1.3 rev. 11 and the reference files 5.2.0. The names of <xref target="artifact-types"/> are those the extensions index declares at the same commit <xref target="DPS-NAMES"/>, with the digest contexts stated in the terms of the Canonical Payload Binding since that index's revision of 27 October. Since 28 October the anchoring extension reads a Receipt whose protected header carries alg -8 (EdDSA), with a finding that <xref target="RFC9864"/> deprecates it in favour of -19; a statement stays pinned to -19. Each extension states its version in every document it defines; this document names them so that a reader can check the same tree.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="conventions-and-definitions"><name>Conventions and Definitions</name>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

<t>Decision record, action-binding attachment, stage, checkpoint, witness, trust policy and verification report are used as the Standard and its extensions define them. Signed Statement, Transparency Service and Receipt are used as <xref target="RFC9943"/> and <xref target="RFC9942"/> define them. Build attestation, provenance predicate and bill of materials are used as <xref target="IN-TOTO"/>, <xref target="SLSA"/> and <xref target="SPDX"/> define them.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="what-the-decision-layer-adds"><name>What the decision layer adds</name>

<t>A verifier holding an action record (a release statement, a build attestation, a capsule) and the decision record and attachment it cites can establish, offline:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>where the approver's signature is carried, that the approver signed the outcome stage with a key the verifier's own trust policy maps to a named person, in the role <spanx style="verb">person</spanx> of that policy; the authority reference that points into the deployer's charter stays the issuer's statement unless the verifier checks it against an independent source, such as the permission system;</t>
  <t>that the specification the attachment says was shown to the approver, the one approved, the one that was requested, re-checked and executed, are one and the same, by equal digests, or exactly where they differ; for a release, that specification names the artifact digest, the bill of materials digest, the migrations and the rollback;</t>
  <t>the options considered and the rationale as the record states them, with the time the rationale was recorded relative to the decision;</t>
  <t>and, through the anchoring extension, evidence about when those bytes existed, each source with what it does and does not show: an RFC 3161 token <xref target="RFC3161"/> gives a time from an authority the verifier trusts; a SCITT Receipt states no time, only that the service registered the statement into its log; an OpenTimestamps proof shows only that the bytes existed before a block was mined.</t>
</list></t>

<t>It cannot establish that the decision was right, that the action was, or what the reviewer actually saw or read: the check shows what the attachment says was shown; the verification reports of the extensions say so in every result, and this document inherits those limits.</t>

<t>What each signature covers, and what a verifier may conclude from it, is not the same for every member of the records:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>the approved specification (operation, target, parameters, policy version): the person's <spanx style="verb">person_approval</spanx> signs the specification's digest and the view's digest; the conclusion is that the holder of a key the verifier's own trust policy maps to this person approved the commitment to these specification and view bytes;</t>
  <t>the decision record (options, rationale, charter, accountable owner): its seal is a digest; a <spanx style="verb">person_affirmation</spanx> over the record's covered digest, where one is carried, makes the rationale a statement signed with a key that policy maps to the person; without it the rationale is the issuer's record, and an approval signs the record's identifier and a stage, not the record's content;</t>
  <t>the stages and their times: the issuer's seal over the attachment, where one is carried; the issuer's statement either way;</t>
  <t>the authority reference: the issuer's statement, until checked against an independent source.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The worked examples say which of these each carries.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="where-it-attaches-in-the-software-supply-chain"><name>Where it attaches in the software supply chain</name>

<t>Nothing here replaces a build attestation, a provenance predicate or a bill of materials; they say what was built, and they say it well. The decision layer sits beside them and is linked to them in both directions by digests:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The action specification the approver sees, carried in full in the attachment, names the artifact by its digest, the bill of materials by its digest, and the build by its identifier. A verifier that holds the SLSA provenance or the SBOM recomputes those digests and reads whether the release that was approved is the artifact that was built.</t>
  <t>A release statement registered in a Transparency Service, or the build attestation itself where its format allows additional references, cites the decision record and the attachment by the typed digest references of <xref target="artifact-types"/>. The Receipt over that statement then covers the references, that is the two digests, beside the artifact's; the decision documents themselves travel beside the statement or are obtained from the issuer.</t>
  <t>A Transparency Service that registers the anchoring extension's witness checkpoints (<xref target="checkpoints"/>) gives each checkpoint over one issuer's chain of release decisions a Receipt from the same service the artifacts use. A Receipt shows the statement's inclusion; the anchoring extension does not yet check that the log only grew, so this is not evidence of an append-only history of decisions.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The stages an action-binding attachment records map onto a release pipeline without change: the proposal is the release candidate as the assistant or the pipeline drafted it; the review is the release manager's reading of it; the outcome is the approval under the release charter, signed by the release manager where a signature is carried; the request is the deploy job; the re-check is the permission or policy gate just before deployment; the attempt and the result are the deployment and what the target reported. A change of the artifact digest between the approval and the attempt fails the binding, by construction.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="artifact-types"><name>Artifact types for typed digest references</name>

<t>The Canonical Payload Binding <xref target="I-D.mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding"/> defines a typed digest reference, {type, purpose, digest_alg, digest}, and leaves artifact types to the consuming profile: an artifact type is identified by a stable specification, whose declaration binds the exact type token to a digest context (its pre-image, its canonicalization named by its CPB identifier, the hash function, the digest_alg token and the output representation), and the consuming profile names the declarations it accepts (CPB -05 section 8.1, -06 section 9). An entry's identity is the {type, digest_alg, digest} triple. This document uses two, both declared in the Standard's repository under its own namespace, <spanx style="verb">org.decisionprovenancestandard</spanx> <xref target="DPS-NAMES"/>. The repository declares each name, what it identifies and which digest context it uses in those terms: the decision record is cited by its seal, taken over the covered bytes that portable verification defines; the attachment by the SHA-256 of its bytes, as the action binding extension defines them. This document does not restate the rules and only says how the references are carried. A name never changes meaning; a different digest rule would get a new name.</t>

<section anchor="decisionrecord"><name>decision_record</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>type: org.decisionprovenancestandard.decision_record</t>
  <t>digest: as <xref target="DPS-NAMES"/> declares it for this name, by reference to portable verification <xref target="DPS-PV"/>; the same value as the entry's seal_hash.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="actionbindingattachment"><name>action_binding_attachment</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>type: org.decisionprovenancestandard.action_binding_attachment</t>
  <t>digest: as <xref target="DPS-NAMES"/> declares it for this name: the plain SHA-256 of the attachment's bytes, computed as the action binding report computes its attachment_digest; not the sealed digest of the signatures extension <xref target="DPS-SIGNATURES"/>.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="what-a-verified-reference-shows"><name>What a verified reference shows</name>

<t>A reference that verifies shows only that the cited bytes have the digest it carries. It does not show that they are a decision record or an attachment, which one they are, or anything they state: that is for the document's own check, which reports it.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="carrying-the-references"><name>Carrying the references</name>

<t>In a capsule, the references are carried in references[] as the capsule profile allows, in the style of <xref target="I-D.rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance-binding"/>; in an AgentInteractionRecord, in external_refs; for a receipt whose object is closed (Section 3 of <xref target="I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt"/>), this document describes a separate Signed Statement carrying typed references to the receipt and to the decision record, subject to the Transparency Service's registration policy, while leaving the receipt and the bytes of any existing envelope carrying it unchanged; Section 8.4 of <xref target="I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt"/> discusses separate signed artifacts for the claims listed in its Section 8.1, but does not define this composition; the reference's type is the identifier the receipts carry in their spec member, "noa.receipt/0.1", and its digest is the profile's own value, "sha256:" followed by the lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 of the receipt's canonical form with only chain.hash and sig.value omitted, which for a valid receipt equals its chain.hash, kept in that prefixed representation by the declaration; the reference binds that canonical receipt content, does not itself authenticate the receipt's signature, which is the profile's own check, and binds neither the serialized file, nor a COSE statement carrying the receipt, nor its Transparency Receipt; in a release statement, in the cpb-refs protected header of CPB -06 section 9.3, marked critical where the consuming profile requires the references to be understood, or in the statement's own payload. A capsule's Producer Envelope, a COSE_Sign1 over the raw capsule identifier with exactly alg, content type and kid in its protected header, is unchanged by the references, which live in the capsule's payload. Nothing in the citing profile's protected header or verification changes. The cited artifacts travel beside the citing record, in a portable verification export and a signatures attachment, or are obtained from the issuer.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="verification"><name>Verification</name>

<t>A verifier that holds the citing record, the decision record, the attachment and its own trust policy:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>resolves each typed digest reference as CPB describes, and stops at Failed for a digest that does not match;</t>
  <t>runs the action binding reference check on the attachment with the record, which reports the stages' consistency, the issuer signature where there is one, the time, and the pairing of the report with its documents;</t>
  <t>runs the signatures check on the approver's signature over the outcome stage, where one is carried beside;</t>
  <t>compares what the citing record commits to about the action, its operation or tool, its target, the digest of its arguments or of its recorded input, and the execution occurrence, with the approved specification the attachment carries, member by member as each composition defines, and reports each agreement on its own: a reference that resolves to a valid record and attachment approving a different action fails here and nowhere earlier, since resolving a reference is not accepting its content (<xref target="I-D.mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding"/> says so of its references); <xref target="INTEROP"/> carries that case for each composition;</t>
  <t>where it holds the artifact, the build attestation or the bill of materials, recomputes the digests the approved specification names and reports each agreement on its own;</t>
  <t>reads the result dimension by dimension; it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> merge them into one pass or fail, and it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report more than those checks find. A relying party may still decide, under its own policy, whether the results it reads are enough for its purpose; the report itself keeps them apart. A separate policy decision may consume the individual findings and name the rule used for its overall conclusion.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The reference checks, their cases and their vectors are in the test directories of the corresponding extensions. The action binding text pinned in <xref target="DPS-ACTION-BINDING"/> clarifies how a checker citing an attachment interprets its report. Report separately what the checker verified on the supplied pieces, the bounds supported by time evidence, and the issuer's claims. A checker that operates on an attachment can cite a finding about it without making a finding about every other part of the decision record. The clarification records the result of an interoperability question and leaves the report format and checks as they were <xref target="DPS-CHECKER-CLARIFICATION"/>.</t>

<t>A check first identifies the bytes and the property being verified. For example, if an application declares core deterministic CBOR but hashes bytes produced with the length-first ordering in <xref target="RFC8949"/>, a verifier holding the value can re-encode it under the declared rule and detect the mismatch. Where the selected encoding specification admits more than one treatment, as in the NaN cases in <xref target="implementation-status"/>, consistent verdicts require a stated choice or acceptance criteria that allow those treatments. Where a required input is unavailable, the affected comparison remains unestablished. The authenticated fields and the rule mapping them to the claim determine what a successful check establishes.</t>

<section anchor="one-occurrence"><name>Reviewing one occurrence</name>

<t>Consider one organisation that later supplies evidence of a particular release or agent action to a reviewer who does not take the agent's or operator's word for what happened. The evidence can stay with the organisation until the review. This reading uses the existing records in their native formats. No identifier shared across organisations, central evidence store or new receipt format is needed. The reviewer chooses the sources it accepts for each fact before accepting the packet.</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Resolve the decision and attachment as above. Recover the exact specification and presentation bytes in their declared digest contexts. Verify the person's signed commitment to both. Compare all effect-bearing terms, including operation, target, units, parameters, and any bounds, with what the view communicates. A view that hides the target cannot support a finding that the target was presented. A signed view digest identifies a representation. To report an actual presentation, the reviewer also needs evidence from a presentation path it trusts, binding that representation to this approval ceremony. User presence and user verification give narrower findings. Records of questions, responses or a confirmation step can document the review procedure. Understanding is outside the verifier's observations.</t>
  <t>Resolve the authority effective for that person, operation and time using a source the reviewer accepts for delegation or entitlement. Resolve the policy identifier in the approved specification to immutable content, recompute the commitment and retain the dependencies that determine the effective rules. A mutable name alone leaves the policy comparison undetermined. If an execution uses a later policy, preserve both versions and verify that the originally approved bounds still hold under the rules actually applied. Later withdrawal can block use. A later expansion cannot enlarge the earlier grant.</t>
  <t>For a standing approval the signed object specifies the programme and its limits. Verify that this occurrence falls within those limits. Report separately the human approval of the programme and the executor's application of it to this occurrence. Under either mode inspect the re-check for this particular attempt, including a retry. Establish the live authority, revocation, expiry and remaining allowance at that boundary. For a consumable limit the stated unit matters: an attempt, an accepted request and a completed effect can have different counts. Checking the last available unit requires evidence of a reservation or equivalent serialisation covering competing uses. After an ambiguous outcome, reconcile the first occurrence before treating a retry as a new effect.</t>
  <t>Verify the executor's account of the request and the target's evidence of the result using each format's own rules. Join the approved and attempted specification to the actual inputs and to an occurrence value authenticated on the observation side, such as the idempotency key in the recorded request. Compare the observed result with the effect claimed, including the target and amount where applicable. A receipt for dispatch or acceptance alone leaves completion open. Two attestations of the same occurrence need an authenticated join and issuers competent to observe the respective facts. A copied trace identifier or an unprotected back-reference cannot supply that join.</t>
  <t>State the source of each observation and whether the reviewer trusts it for that fact independently of the operator. For a claim that approval preceded execution, use a causal dependency enforced by a trusted execution boundary, or independently supported time bounds that establish that order. A timestamp over the completed packet supplies only an upper bound on the existence of those bytes. Report each verified claim, each contradiction and each unavailable item separately, including the outstanding assumptions. Localised identifiers or disclosed commitments can be sufficient for this review.</t>
</list></t>

<t>A reviewer can therefore authenticate the approval even if the execution evidence conflicts with it. Conversely an independently confirmed effect may have no verifiable personal approval. An operator controlling both presentation and execution can produce internally consistent records for either story. In that setting, independent observation of the particular disputed fact determines how far the reviewer can go.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="joins"><name>Interoperability of the joins</name>

<t>A composition identifies, for each comparison, the native field on each side, the exact bytes and encoding covered, the observation each value represents, and the part authenticated by the signer. The refund in <xref target="signed-example"/> illustrates the distinction. In the four-draft case of <xref target="implementation-status"/>, the execution evidence's request_digest (key 12) covers tool arguments. The person's signature covers a specification that contains those arguments together with other terms. The dispute packet's action_hash is a third commitment. A verifier extracts the parameters from the verified specification, applies the construction of each receiving profile, then compares the results. Comparing the signed specification digest directly with the arguments digest would reject the valid case. The case uses keys in sorted order so the two argument serialisations give the same bytes. That fixture establishes no general equivalence of those serialisations.</t>

<t>Two drafts even use similar names for commitments to different things. In Section 5.3 of <xref target="I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record"/> (-03), decision.requestDigest includes the action, argumentsDigest, resourceId and resourceKind in the canonical object. In Section 6.7 of <xref target="I-D.thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence"/> (-02), request_digest commits to the argument bytes. A composition verifies each native digest, compares the arguments under an agreed byte construction and checks the action and resource through their own authenticated fields. Simply equating the two request digests would reject a matching request.</t>

<t>The occurrence and outcome require another comparison. In the AER-1 composition the request identifier occurs inside the recorded input and the result cites the output hash. In the execution-evidence composition the attempt cites the allow outcome's record hash and the result cites the tool-result record hash and response digest. Each combination can convey evidence about a refund. A reader must know which value commits to an occurrence, which to shared parameters, and which to a result. Equal parameters alone also fit two different refunds. When the receipt records 150.00 EUR against an approval for 120.00 EUR, its own checks and the approval check can both succeed while the action comparison fails. The existing fixtures demonstrate specific combinations. They do not establish interchangeability of producers or a single encoding for all actions.</t>

<t>The variant with a real passkey in <xref target="INTEROP"/> (interop/one-chain-real, negative R1) illustrates why local verdicts alone also fail. The chain is rebuilt for 150.00 EUR with the passkey assertion for 120.00 EUR. The verdict record can still be released, the dispute packet verifies and the joins reported by that fixture hold. The person-signature check detects a challenge mismatch. With the signature removed (R7), the verdict can again be released and the packet verified while personal approval remains unsupported. These results concern the published fixtures and the readers used in that experiment.</t>

<t>The AIR/DPS tests give a more specific example (<xref target="implementation-status"/>). In the published N7 case, changing the global AIR input from the approved 120 EUR specification is detected by join J2. In the synthetic C01 follow-up, that global input digest still names the approved specification, but the digest of the selected tool call's arguments commits to 150 EUR. The AIR and DPS checks and all six joins still pass. Before deciding whether the approved refund was performed, the reviewer must establish which call corresponds to the refund and compare its authenticated arguments with the signed specification under the composition's stated mapping. C06 is a control: J6 detects that the AIR's reported principal differs from the approver identified by the DPS signature under the test trust policy. That identity comparison follows the roles chosen in this example.</t>

<t>The four-draft refund example also shows how to verify the result of an audit. With 120 EUR approved and 150 EUR in the execution evidence, the rule <spanx style="verb">executed-as-approved:v1</spanx> derives <spanx style="verb">not_as_approved</spanx>. A Wright verdict reporting that result can be <spanx style="verb">released</spanx> because the verifier derives the same result from the cited inputs. A verdict claiming <spanx style="verb">executed_as_approved</spanx> from those inputs is <spanx style="verb">refused</spanx> on recomputation. <xref target="I-D.wright-verdict-record"/> already supplies the rule identifier, evidence references and result. An effect beyond what the execution evidence observes remains a separate question.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="checkpoints"><name>Checkpoints in a Transparency Service</name>

<t>A witness's checkpoint over a chain of decision records is a signed statement whose payload is the checkpoint's signed bytes under the anchoring extension's shared rule, with its Receipt, as the anchoring extension defines under "A transparency service as a checkpoint source" at commit 1f7dd40d7ad30783013228ca4e060ef15c29a2bc. This document adds no rule; it names what a Transparency Service operator and a verifier need:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>the statement's protected header <xref target="RFC9052"/>: alg -19, kid the witness key's reference, CWT claims <xref target="RFC9597"/> iss the key's holder and sub the chain;</t>
  <t>the leaf: the statement's bytes as registered, under the <xref target="RFC9162"/> leaf hash; a Transparent Statement is carried with its receipts taken out. A service that defines its entry otherwise, for example as the digest of the statement's Sig_structure, issues Receipts the extension does not verify, and says so (<xref target="related"/>);</t>
  <t>what a Receipt shows: that the service signed a root of its log under which the statement is included; the tree size and the leaf index a receipt states are not covered by its signature. When a claim depends on a particular tree size or leaf index, the verifier needs evidence that authenticates the claimed value. A separately signed head binds its size if that size is signed. Establishing the index also requires linking the index to the entry and authenticated tree under the chosen proof rules. The inclusion Receipt alone leaves consistency unchecked in this version, and the extension reads no registration time from it;</t>
  <t>a verifier examining history compares retained checkpoints and verifies the applicable consistency proof between authenticated heads. It can detect a truncated history relative to a head it already trusts or conflicting views it obtains. A single internally consistent prefix cannot reveal a withheld suffix or an unseen fork. A second log that registers the same bytes observes their registration, not their truth;</t>
  <t>the registration policy is the operator's <xref target="RFC9943"/>. A verifier never relies on it: it accepts only statements from the witness keys and chains its own trust policy lists for that service. A service may mirror that list in its policy.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="worked-examples"><name>Worked examples</name>

<section anchor="a-software-release-decision"><name>A software release decision</name>

<t>The appendix carries a decision record for shipping release 2.3.1 of a claims-intake service, and the action-binding attachment of its deploy pipeline: the release assistant's proposal, the release manager's review and approval under the release charter, the orchestrator's request, the permission re-check, the deployer's attempt and the observed result. The approved specification names the build, the artifact digest, the bill of materials digest, the migration and the rollback. The record states three options and why the first was chosen. The action binding reference check verifies the stage dimensions; the example carries no signature, so the issuer signature and the time are not checked.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="an-agent-action-capsule-citing-a-decision"><name>An agent action capsule citing a decision</name>

<t>The same record and attachment, cited from an Agent Action Capsule by two typed digest references in references[]. The capsule reference library parses the capsule strictly and verifies it; a verifier of the Standard resolves both references to the documents it holds. Nothing in the capsule's protected header or verification changed.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="signed-example"><name>A signed approval composed with an execution receipt</name>

<t>The release example carries no signature, on purpose: it is the lower level of evidence. <xref target="INTEROP"/> (interop/aer1-decision) carries the full path for a refund of 120.00 EUR: the support lead's <spanx style="verb">person_approval</spanx> over the specification's digest, verified against the verifier's trust policy; the attachment sealed by the merchant; the agent runtime's call to the payment gateway, which issues a receipt of <xref target="I-D.zambo-aer1"/> (schema 0.4) whose recorded input carries the attachment's request identifier and exactly the approved parameters, under the receipt's own digest; the attempt citing the receipt's identifier and its output digest; and the report, dimension by dimension. Decision record DR-2026-1104 (seal 3615cd70...), specification e5052c21..., receipt d9f0200e-793e-4fec-a4ae-0687e0d92cac with output_hash sha256:3ca5904b...; ten failing cases, among them the gateway recording 150.00 EUR against 120.00 EUR approved, where the receipt verifies, the approval verifies, and the join of step 4 fails.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="related"><name>Related work</name>

<t>The SCITT working group holds, in October 2026, some fifty individual drafts that record something about an agent's action, its authorization or the decision behind it. Most record the action, its authorization by a policy, or a named person's authorization of one action; this document records the decision of a person, with what was considered and why, and binds it to the action. Where each stands relative to it, as its author reads them:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The composition model <xref target="I-D.mih-sato-agent-accountability-composition"/> joins four records of one action by a shared subject digest: who authorized it (WHO), was it permitted (CAN), what outcome the agent system recorded and what is known to have crossed the effect boundary (WHAT), did the runtime enforce it (AUDIT). Its WHO slot is a named person's signature covering the digest of the exact action bytes, with validity, one-time or reusable semantics, fail-closed behaviour and a verifier that keeps signature, digest, freshness and verified-versus-accepted apart; any record form meeting those requirements conforms. The action-binding attachment of the Standard is a candidate for that slot. The decision record is not: it sits in the layer the composition model places above itself, whether this authorization was the right one, with the options considered and the reasons, and it is cited from the composition by digest.</t>
  <t>The EMILIA authorization receipts <xref target="I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts"/>, the first-instance WHO profile of the composition model, record a named principal's device-bound signature over the canonical bytes of one action, with a nonce, a validity window, one-time consumption and quorum rules, verifiable offline; companion documents bind what the approver was shown <xref target="I-D.schrock-ep-presentation-binding"/> and the observed effect <xref target="I-D.schrock-ep-outcome-binding"/>, and declare bounded execution programs <xref target="I-D.schrock-ep-bounded-execution-program"/>. They answer who authorized this exact action, and answer it thoroughly; they carry no record of the decision, its alternatives or its rationale, and the stages of the action binding extension (shown, approved, requested, re-checked, executed) are one record where EMILIA composes several. A decision record can cite an EMILIA receipt as its approval evidence, and an EMILIA receipt can cite the decision it executes.</t>
  <t>The checkpointed local log <xref target="I-D.mih-scitt-checkpointed-local-log"/> gives a producer's records order, completeness and contemporaneity through signed checkpoints registered with a Transparency Service, and says what that does not prove; the anchoring extension does the same for chains of decision records, with a verifier-held list of witnesses. The two are orthogonal to the decision layer and to each other, and a checkpoint of either can be registered where the other is.</t>
  <t>The Pre-Execution Authorization Record, or Permit <xref target="I-D.munoz-scitt-permit-profile"/>, records a policy engine's allow, deny or challenge before dispatch, bound to the canonical bytes of the authorized request, with a Closure Record after dispatch and an authority lineage between Permits. The subject is a workload identity; the reason is a code. A Permit may reference a human-authority artifact by URI and digest; the decision record and attachment of this document can be cited the same way, so that the Permit records what the policy allowed and the attachment records what the person approved.</t>
  <t>The Seal receipts and action records <xref target="I-D.chueayen-attestation-receipts"/> record an enforcement point's ALLOWED or BLOCKED decision on a proposed tool call, bound to the digest of its arguments, with refusals as first-class records. Its section 8 states the properties an approval needs for an action record to be read as evidence that a person approved a specific action, binding to exact values, single use, expiry, policy version, independence, a designated approver, a view rendered from the canonical action, and leaves the approval record to a later revision. The signed outcome stage of the action binding extension, with the signatures extension's person approval over it, meets those properties except the digest of the designating policy and a short validity, which can sit under the person's signature through the specification the approval signs, as the Standard's Steward read it; whether that meets section 8 is its author's reading (<xref target="open-questions"/>); <xref target="INTEROP"/> carries a worked example of its section 8.3 in that form, verified by both sides, with the failing cases.</t>
  <t>The Operating Model Protocol <xref target="I-D.veridom-omp-core"/> records, at the moment of a routing state, whether the named accountable officer can be bound to a valid delegation instrument: the SHA-256 of the instrument's canonical form (<spanx style="verb">instrument_hash</spanx>, section 4.4.4 of that document), a root of authority that the law or a professional register establishes, how the instrument was selected relative to the decision (<spanx style="verb">instrument_selection_mode</spanx>, section 4.4.1) and the hash of an authority registry's state at decision time; a binding that cannot be made is sealed as <spanx style="verb">AUTHORITY_UNBOUND</spanx>, a result in its own right, with the reasons it failed; its domain profiles include financial regulation and insurance. It records the authority of the person, not their approval of exact bytes; this document records the second. Its authors read the -00 of this document and the question of a reference from the attachment's authority member to an instrument by that hash, and answered that the hash gives non-modification of the document named and nothing about timing; that a reference added once a decision record exists is, in their vocabulary, <spanx style="verb">post_hoc_attached</spanx>, which their document says <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> raise a review flag and <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be treated as fully bound; that a bound record needs the registry snapshot, which a deployer's charter cannot give; and that, by section 8.1 of their document, the instrument stays the deploying organisation's to produce. What that leaves of the open question is argued in <xref target="open-questions"/>.</t>
  <t>Signed permissions and action receipts <xref target="I-D.izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts"/> let a principal sign a permission with machine-checkable limits and an agent sign a receipt for each action, verifiable offline; the standing approval of the action binding extension, a person's approval of bounds with a count and a period, is the nearest construction here.</t>
  <t>The briefing-and-binding envelope <xref target="I-D.morrison-binding-moment-envelope"/> is the delivery contract by which an agent surfaces a decision to its principal, who commits, declines, amends or rejects; it names by digest what the principal was shown and defines no signature over the resolution. The review stage of the action binding extension names the same thing, and the signatures extension gives it the signature.</t>
  <t>Execution and audit records <xref target="I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record"/>, <xref target="I-D.zambo-aer1"/>, <xref target="I-D.sirkkavaara-vaara-receipt"/> and the AgentInteractionRecord record what ran, what it touched and what came out, with recomputable digests and offline verifiers; the decision record sits above them and is cited from them. The approval-binding contract published beside the audit record's corpus binds one approval to one use by identifier, key, principal, event, phase, bytes, validity and the policy served; the action binding extension binds an approval to the bytes of a specification and the digest of a policy, and the two readings differ on who may use an approval and on when a policy was served (the table is in the repository).</t>
  <t>The AUDIT architecture <xref target="I-D.kuehlewind-audit-architecture"/> defines Action Records at the boundary where an action took effect and Authorization Transition Records for changes of permission, including step-up approvals, without a signed record of the approval itself; the AIMS best practices <xref target="I-D.ietf-wimse-aims"/> require that a local confirmation in a user interface not count as authorization on its own and that audit records be tamper-evident, and define no signed decision record. The outcome stage with the person's signature is the record both leave to be defined.</t>
  <t>On the regulatory side, <xref target="I-D.dawkins-scitt-ai-article50"/> gives transparency receipts for Article 50 of the EU AI Act, including the exemption for content a person reviewed; a decision record can be the evidence of that review. <xref target="I-D.kamimura-scitt-vcp"/> applies SCITT to the audit trail of algorithmic trading decisions under MiFID II.</t>
  <t>For time, <xref target="I-D.fassbender-scitt-time-anchor"/> specifies the verification of an OpenTimestamps proof against a chain the verifier holds; the anchoring extension uses the same proofs for the same purpose, with the same statement of what they show.</t>
  <t>The PALA-1 audit log <xref target="I-D.sparysh-pala-audit"/> is a header-chained wire format whose chain verifies without keys and without bodies, with a SCITT bridge: the chain head expressed as a Signed Statement whose payload commits to the head and, in its third construction, to a derived root over every record so far, so that two statements of one chain connect by a prefix-consistency proof without the chain. It records what a device produced; the decision record is cited from such evidence, not carried in it, and the author's verification record is built on readings from the text alone, which this document's repository joined.</t>
  <t>The P10 underdetermination profile <xref target="I-D.nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination"/> binds, in a Transparent Statement, an adjudication that the evidence closed at a point did not decide a claim: two witness worlds of a model class committed before the first admission, compatible with the same closed evidence set and giving the claim different values, with the verifier and its limitations committed as well. It establishes underdetermination relative to the declared profile and does not identify the actual world. It reads the -00 of this document as decision provenance rather than evidential underdetermination, which is right: a decision record states what a person considered and decided, a P10 statement that a claim was left undecided by the evidence at a point, and a decision taken under such a claim can name the adjudication statement among its inputs. The repository's case <spanx style="verb">interop/plan-checkpoint</spanx> shows the shape: a plan approved as a whole, a check in the middle of it that leaves a claim undecided, a second decision record naming the exact state of the run and an adjudication in the form of that profile's section 9 (built there, synthetic, and said to be), and the steps after the checkpoint citing that decision.</t>
  <t>Three other drafts are discussed with this one for adoption at IETF 127. Each records a different moment of an action. <xref target="I-D.thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence"/> profiles SCITT for a hash-chained record of every call an agent makes. The decision on a call may be <spanx style="verb">confirm</spanx>: policy required confirmation from a Principal or an operator, and a later receipt records the outcome. Its -02 records that a confirmation was required and whether it was granted; it has no member for who gave it. Where the confirmation is one that policy required a person for, the signed approval of the action-binding attachment can be the record of that person's act. Not every confirmation needs a person: an operator may meet it, as one of that draft's authors pointed out. <xref target="I-D.wright-verdict-record"/> defines a verdict record: a result on a claim, bound to its issuer, with the evidence it relies on cited by digest and the rule by which the result can be re-derived. A verdict can cite an attachment by the digest of its exact bytes; the check of the approval stays the Standard's own. <xref target="I-D.xg-payment-dispute-profile"/> defines a signed dispute receipt for agent-initiated payments. Its -02, of 16 November 2026, cites this document and adds constructions for hashes that its -01 named, after a reading of -01 by this document's author. The repository's case <spanx style="verb">interop/one-chain</spanx> runs one refund through the four formats, none of them changed (<xref target="implementation-status"/>). It was built on the -02 of the first two drafts and on the -01 of the third. Since commit 0f9ade4 its checker reads the third's -02 and verifies that draft's Appendix A vector; the registered packet is unchanged.</t>
  <t><xref target="I-D.mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings"/> defines a protected-header parameter of a COSE Hash Envelope that identifies the deterministic encoding of the bytes that were hashed, for a verifier that holds the value and not those bytes. The two artifact types of <xref target="artifact-types"/> settle the same point by declaration: each name fixes the bytes its digest is taken over. This document does not use that parameter. The author of this document wrote a checker from that draft's text (<xref target="implementation-status"/>).</t>
  <t>Outside these drafts, W3C PROV <xref target="PROV-O"/> describes where something came from: entities, activities and agents, and relations such as used, wasGeneratedBy, wasAssociatedWith and actedOnBehalfOf. It has no canonical bytes to digest, no signature semantics, no verifier and no content for a decision, its options, rationale and authority: anyone can state that a person approved something, and nothing binds the statement. The two do not compete. Once verified, a decision record, its action-binding attachment and a person's approval can be read as PROV, which <xref target="DECISION-PROV"/> does with a JSON-LD context, an exporter and queries, under a vocabulary of its own and without changing a member of the records.</t>
  <t>A thread on the SCITT list, opened on 15 November 2026 <xref target="RECEIPT-SIZE"/>, observes that in a receipt of inclusion of <xref target="RFC9942"/> (RFC9162_SHA256) the signature covers the Merkle root, while the tree size and the leaf index are carried in the unprotected header. The same inclusion path can give the same root under more than one tree size. Several participants reproduced it on their own logs and implementations; the author reproduced it on receipts of his own service. A receipt read alone shows that the statement is in the tree whose root the service signed. It does not establish the statement's position or the size of the log; a relying party that needs either takes it from signed data, for example a signed tree head that binds a tree size to the same root. A position claim also needs evidence binding the occurrence to its index or a proof that uniquely determines that index under authenticated inputs. The same was then reported on that thread for receipts of consistency. An erratum to Section 5.2.1 of <xref target="RFC9942"/> was announced on that thread, to be filed after the SCITT session of 18 November 2026, and one to Section 5.3.1 with it or shortly after. On 17 November 2026 the RFC Editor's errata search listed no erratum for <xref target="RFC9942"/>. A reply on the thread pointed to the MMR profile <xref target="I-D.bryce-cose-receipts-mmr-profile"/>. Its published -03 states no tree size in a receipt of inclusion; its editor's copy, which no published revision carries yet, makes the newer tree size of a receipt of consistency a required protected header parameter. The -01 of this document said that a Receipt shows that the service signed the statement into its log "at a tree size"; <xref target="checkpoints"/> now says that the service signed a root of its log under which the statement is included. What the author's service and repository did about it is in <xref target="implementation-status"/>.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="open-questions"><name>Open questions</name>

<t>This revision is a base for discussion. The questions its author would like the working group's reading on:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Whether a decision record should itself be registered as a Signed Statement, with the decision identifier as its subject, rather than only cited by digest from the statements that execute it. The anchoring extension registers checkpoints over chains of records, not the records; registering a record would be a new rule, made in the repository.</t>
  <t>Whether the capsule profile will name, among the artifact-type declarations it accepts, the two names of <xref target="artifact-types"/>, so that its library resolves the references itself; today they resolve on the verifier's side of the Standard. The question was put to the capsule profile's author on 29 October 2026.</t>
  <t>The mandate at the instant of the decision. The attachment's authority reference points into the deployer's charter, which is the issuer's statement. The authors of the Operating Model Protocol, asked whether a reference from that member to one of their delegation instruments by its hash would change this, answered that it would not on its own (<xref target="related"/>) and asked this document to argue whether their Invariant 3 closes the gap or formalises its shape. The argument of this revision is that it does half of each. On timing: the authority member sits in the outcome stage; where the issuer seals the attachment the seal covers it, and where the anchoring extension is used an independent timestamp over the issuer's or the approver's signature bounds when those bytes existed; an instrument hash carried there was selected no later than that bound, and one added once the record exists gives other bytes, another seal and, where those are anchored, a later bound. What the record cannot show is that the instrument existed before the decision rather than being written with it: the registry snapshot shows that, a charter has none, and the same anchoring applied to the instrument itself before the decision would show it too, which nothing in this document does today. On the party: the instrument is issued by the organisation whose authority is in question, so the claim becomes testable and its absence a sealed result, <spanx style="verb">AUTHORITY_UNBOUND</spanx>, which this layer would carry rather than silence; it is not independently grounded, and this document grounds no other fact the issuer states either. The ground, where there is one, is a root outside the deployer; for an insurance intermediary in France the public register grounds the firm's standing to distribute, not the officer's mandate inside the firm, and which root a profile names is the remaining question. <xref target="INTEROP"/> (<spanx style="verb">interop/omp-authority</spanx>, 13 November 2026) carries a worked case, written from the text of <xref target="I-D.veridom-omp-core"/> with vectors of this document's author, since those authors had published none: thirteen failing cases, among them the four forms that the -01 of this document named (an instrument revoked, outside its mandate scope, with a mismatched hash, attached after the fact). Its records are a reading of that text, with stand-ins where the text leaves a choice; they are not OMP-conformant records.</t>
  <t>The digest of the policy that designates the approver, and a short validity on a single approval, which the Seal draft asks to find in an approval record. The Standard's Steward answered (issue 93 of the repository) that both can already sit under the person's signature through the specification the approval signs: the policy version written as the SHA-256 of the policy's bytes, and, where a deployer needs a deadline for each approval, a member of the specification it declares material; the executor's recheck before each attempt is where an approval that is too old can be refused, on the enforcement point's clock. Nothing in the extensions changes. <xref target="INTEROP"/> carries the Seal section 8.3 example in that form, with the cases proposed on that issue: a policy digest that does not match the policy held, a policy not held, an attempt after the policy's limit, and relabelling. Whether that form meets section 8 of the Seal draft is its author's reading. A standing approval keeps its period in its bounds; the difference is intended.</t>
  <t>Which definitions of the log entry the anchoring extension should accept when it reads a Receipt. Today it verifies only an entry that is the <xref target="RFC9162"/> leaf hash over the registered statement's bytes; a Transparency Service whose verifiable data structure defines its entry otherwise issues Receipts the extension reports as not verified. Whether the extension should follow the Receipt's declared structure instead, and how a verifier learns it, is the question (it was raised on issue 89 of the repository).</t>
  <t>Which media type or CoAP Content-Format, if any, a checkpoint payload should carry when registered, and whether the vendor tree is the right place (<xref target="iana-considerations"/>).</t>
  <t>Whether a Transparency Service should recognise witness checkpoints in its registration policy by their witness keys, as a verifier does in its trust policy, or treat them as any statement from any issuer.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="implementation-status"><name>Implementation Status</name>

<t>Note to the RFC Editor: this section is to be removed before publication as an RFC. It records implementations known to the author at the time of writing, following <xref target="RFC7942"/>; listing one implies no endorsement, and the author has verified only the ones he ran.</t>

<t>Chronology, for the record: the action binding and portable verification proposals were documented in the Standard's repository on 29 September 2026 (issue 21, by its Steward, naming their author); their first versions, with schemas and reference checks, were merged on 5 and 3 October; anchoring and signatures followed on 15 and 16 October. This document composes those existing mechanisms with SCITT. The dates give the chronology of these contributions, not a claim over neighbouring work, which has its own history and scope. The items below establish different things: syntax and digest agreement, verification by another author's library, the consistency of a composition across formats, the behaviour of a Transparency Service, and operation in a deployment; a verifier written by the author from another draft's text checks that draft independently of its reference code and is not a second independent implementation of this document's composition.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The reference checks of the Decision Provenance Standard's extensions (repository above, Apache-2.0 for schemas and tests): action binding 0.3.0, signatures 0.2.0, anchoring 0.2.0 and portable verification 0.3.0, each with a runner, cases by mutation (over four hundred for anchoring, over four hundred for signatures, over three hundred for action binding) and published vectors, reviewed by the Standard's Steward before each merge. They produce the reports this document's verification section reads. Maturity: proposal; test fixtures and the author's own deployments.</t>
  <t><xref target="INTEROP"/>, the author's working repository, Apache-2.0, with continuous integration for the public cases, including: the two worked examples of this document; seven interoperability cases with the Agent Action Capsule reference library 0.12.0 (typed references that resolve, an altered digest, an unsigned attachment, an attachment that resolves and then fails its own check, a re-encoded record; the capsule registered at the library's Transparency Service with its COSE Receipt; a Producer Envelope the library verifies and a CPB-bound Signed Statement carrying the references in the cpb-refs protected header, with its negative forms); the Seal section 8.3 example with its failing cases; one agent pass carried three ways, the action binding extension's standing approvals of exact lists and exact approvals of each comment with their signatures, the Seal action records of what the enforcement point allowed and blocked, and a capsule for each action, with the joins across the three and ten failing cases, one of which only the policy signed through the specification catches; a decision record and a receipt of <xref target="I-D.zambo-aer1"/> joined both ways at that draft's author's request, the attempt citing the receipt's identifier and output hash and the receipt's recorded input carrying the request identifier and the approved values, with the receipt's execution context naming the record reported as the producer's assertion, and ten failing cases; a receipt of <xref target="I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt"/>, taken from its published conformance vectors, cited with the decision record and the attachment by a separate Signed Statement, its own signature verified as a separate result, with the negative forms its author described; a plan approved as a whole and executed as steps, one exact approval of a plan of three steps whose specification carries the hash of its executable steps, three capsules chained in run order, and a run manifest between them that lists, for each step, the capsule that executed it, the outputs it recorded and the state of the run's context before and after it, each capsule citing the state it read, with ten joins (membership, completeness, order, arguments resolved from an earlier step's committed outputs, the growth of the context) and fourteen failing cases; the same plan stopped after its first step on a claim the evidence left undecided, with a second decision record whose specification names the exact state of the run and an adjudication in the form of <xref target="I-D.nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination"/> section 9 (synthetic, and said to be), five joins more and eight failing cases; and verifiers written from the text of four neighbouring drafts and run on their published vectors, the Seal receipts (67 of 67), the OpenTimestamps verification of <xref target="I-D.fassbender-scitt-time-anchor"/> (its four vectors, against a header set the verifier checks for proof of work and linkage from a checkpoint it holds), AER-1 <xref target="I-D.zambo-aer1"/> (119 of 119 across its kit's seven suites) and the agent audit record <xref target="I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record"/> (184 of 184 members of its corpus at release 0.31.0, read against its -03, every anchor of its retained records validated offline against the tree heads and block headers the corpus pins and the dating reported in full; 141 of 141 at release 0.28.0, the run posted on the corpus's issue tracker at its author's request; and the OpenTimestamps proof of a live run recorded in that corpus replayed to a Bitcoin block against headers from two explorers), each with the places where the author's text and kit were found to differ, reported to them; for the audit record, both earlier observations are taken into its -03, and three more were reported after the -03 rerun; and, from the same package, its approval-binding contract, whose eleven checks ask of one approval and one use what the action binding asks of a specification and its stages: a verifier written from the contract's text agrees with its 23 cases on decision and reason, and a table in the repository maps the eleven checks onto the extension's rules and cases, five met, three with a note, one partial (the validity window of a single approval), two with no analogue in the Standard (the principal who may use an approval; the window in which a policy was served), as the input to the shared profile that corpus's author proposed; and the SCITT-bridge Signed Statement of <xref target="I-D.sparysh-pala-audit"/> in its third construction, read and reproduced byte for byte from its task's text and the standards it names, at the author's invitation and within the boundary he set: both statements, the derived roots, the prefix-consistency proof from the statements' roots alone, the seven tamper expectations and the version rule, with the ambiguities logged.</t>
  <t><xref target="DECISION-PROV"/>, the author's reading of the records as W3C PROV, version 0.1.0 (code Apache-2.0, context and vocabulary CC-BY 4.0), written against record schema 5.2.0, action binding 0.3.0 and signatures 0.2.0: a JSON-LD 1.1 context, an exporter and three SPARQL queries. On a worked example whose person approval the Standard's reference check verified, the queries find the stage chain from proposal to result, and for every attempt a verified approval of the attempted digest attributed to a person; a negative control with the attribution dropped finds no one. The graph proves nothing by itself: it repeats what the reference checks reported.</t>
  <t>The author's deployment, a runtime for insurance brokers: an action with external effect runs only after an approval that names the person and carries the digest of the exact payload shown, checked again before the effect, with a receipt kept for every effect; that approval is recorded, and since November 2026 one given on the author's signing page is also signed with his passkey and registered on his Transparency Service, the first on 12 November 2026. A program that repeats is certified once, with bounds, a period, a count of executions and a revocation, as its code defines. An exporter writes approval and effect records in the form the action binding extension describes; one such export is the first interop case above. Its history, in the author's SmartOffice runtime (a private repository): schemas and examples committed in December 2025 describe a hierarchical execution envelope, the enclosing context and its operation records; workflows of January 2026 preserve that context across model calls, carry the authorization at the parent, distinguishing an approval of one instance (<spanx style="verb">human_approved</spanx>) from a preauthorised, registry-compiled process (<spanx style="verb">preapproved</spanx>, naming the use case and its version), refuse any other mode in the executor, and collect a result per step; the grammar of June 2026 requires an authority of one of those two modes for a runtime transition; from May 2026 the proposal shown to the person carries a hash of the plan's executable steps, the reply carries it back, and the resumed run refuses a plan whose hash changed before it is marked approved; guided actions of June 2026 allow that transition only with an approval identifier and that hash; prepared and revisable programs of October 2026 are approved on their exact content and executed through a preview token carrying the payload's digest, checked again before the effect. These are the background of the extension's approval and standing approval and of the compositions above; that runtime implements neither the capsule profile nor the extensions' anchoring or portable verification, and none of it is public: the private documents are the author's declared implementation context. The signing page does implement the signatures extension: the <spanx style="verb">person_approval</spanx> it produces (WebAuthn, ES256) is verified by the reference check of that extension before it is registered.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The items below are new in the -02. They report work done between 6 and 16 November 2026, part of it at the IETF 127 Hackathon of 14 and 15 November. Unless an item says otherwise, the files are in <xref target="INTEROP"/> at commit e444fff and its continuous integration replays them. Each item says what was run, by whom, and what it does not show.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>One action through four drafts (<spanx style="verb">interop/one-chain</spanx>). One refund of 120.00 EUR is run through the four drafts of the IETF 127 adoption discussion: the execution receipts of <xref target="I-D.thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence"/> (-02), the decision record, the attachment and the signed approval of this document, the verdict record of <xref target="I-D.wright-verdict-record"/> (-02), and the dispute packet of <xref target="I-D.xg-payment-dispute-profile"/> (built on its -01, with the constructions its author gave on 8 November 2026; read against its -02 since 16 November 2026). No format is changed. Each record is checked by a verifier written from the text of its own draft; the decision layer is checked by the Standard's reference checks. Twelve joins across the four compare values that the records already carry. The chain is run twice, once executed as approved and once with 150.00 EUR executed for 120.00 EUR approved. Twenty-two failing cases fail where expected. Everything in this case is synthetic. One outside run is published: Darren Wright's reference checker replays the case as it stood on 11 November 2026 (commit f0d766a), and 48 verdict records agree on state, steps and re-run result. That is an outside run of the composed case. The checks of the decision layer in it are the Standard's reference implementation, not an independent one. A second dispute packet for the same refund follows the letter of that draft's -02 as this author reads it: a receipt of exactly eleven members, and the Signed Statement of its Section 6. It is registered on the author's Transparency Service (<spanx style="verb">interop/one-chain/goshi-02-letter</spanx>, commit e444fff). It is one reading, not a claim of conformance.</t>
  <t>The same chain with a real approval (<spanx style="verb">interop/one-chain-real</spanx>). One thing is real here: the person. On 6 November 2026 the author signed the <spanx style="verb">person_approval</spanx> of that chain, over its exact bytes, with his own passkey (WebAuthn, ES256). The reference check of the Standard's signatures extension verifies the assertion under a pinned trust policy: signature, subject, key state and identity are verified, and user presence and user verification are reported as set. Eight failing cases fail where expected; five of them are seen by that check alone. The rest of the chain is synthetic. The time of signing is the signer's statement.</t>
  <t>The same statements on two logs (<spanx style="verb">interop/one-chain/registration</spanx>). The four Signed Statements of that case are registered on two Transparency Services run by two operators. The first, https://ts.isoluce.net, is operated by the author; its entry is the <xref target="RFC9162"/> leaf hash over the statement's bytes, as in <xref target="checkpoints"/>. The second, https://witness.agentactioncapsule.org, is operated by Steven Mih. He registered the four statements, unchanged, on 14 November 2026 and sent the four receipts, which are published with his agreement. Each operator checked the receipts of the other. The four receipts of the second log verify with a script in the repository, written from <xref target="RFC9162"/>: inclusion proof, root, signature under the key that service publishes, and two negative controls for each receipt. The second operator reports that the four receipts of ts.isoluce.net verify on his side with a script of his own; that script and its output are not published. What this shows: two logs, under two operators and two keys, each state that the same bytes were registered. Limits: the two operators are co-champions of the same hackathon project. No signed tree head of the second log was checked. The same statement has a different leaf on each log, because the entry of the second log is the SHA-256 of the statement's Sig_structure; a receipt cannot be checked without knowing the rule of the service that issued it. The author's service has no witness that the author does not operate.</t>
  <t>An outside reading of those statements. Mikhail Sergeev read the five Signed Statements of that folder, the four current ones and an earlier dispute packet, with two scripts built on the CBOR code of a pull request to the working group's examples repository, and with none of this repository's code. He reported no difference (issue 7 of the repository): file digests and entry identifiers, the COSE structure and its re-encoding to the same bytes, the Ed25519 signature under the issuer key, and the payloads of the four current statements. The limits are his: the COSE layer of five files only, the repository's README read first, no receipt checked, and not a verifier of this document. He states his ties: the author replayed two comparisons of his own project, and he is co-author of a check in the repository. His run of the repository's test script also found one stale committed log, corrected since.</t>
  <t>A checker for <xref target="I-D.mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings"/>, written from the text of its -00 alone (<spanx style="verb">interop/cose-deterministic</spanx>); no code of that draft's authors was read or run. On 16 vectors of the author's own, each gives its expected verdict. On the 33 vectors of that draft's authors, all 8 emission cases and all 25 content-binding outcomes agree. The authors report that their two reference implementations agree with 14 of the 16 vectors and differ on two cases that the -00 text leaves open; the author did not run their code. On the 41 vectors the authors prepared for their -01, the result is 41 of 41: first from the authors' description on 14 November 2026, then, on 15 November, from the -01 text in the authors' repository, identical to the -01 now published on the Datatracker. That result holds with an encoder that rejects a non-trivial NaN. The CBOR text that the -01 cites also allows another encoder behaviour, and with it 5 of the 41 vectors differ; this was reported to the authors.</t>
  <t>A test of what a receipt of the MMR profile binds, written from the text of <xref target="I-D.bryce-cose-receipts-mmr-profile"/> -03 alone, on a synthetic log (<spanx style="verb">interop/mmr-profile</spanx>). In a receipt of inclusion the index is bound, except when the path is empty: 60 of 60 such receipts verify at every index. A receipt of inclusion states no log size. For a receipt of consistency, another newer tree size is accepted in 10 of 18 cases by the strictest of the three verifiers tried. Every point is already resolved in the authors' editor's copy (commit f1320c0d63 of 10 October 2026), which no published revision carries yet. These results describe the published -03, not the profile as its authors now write it. No production MMR log was checked, and no code of the authors.</t>
  <t>Receipts that sign their tree size and leaf index (<spanx style="verb">interop/receipt-size</spanx>). Since 15 November 2026, every receipt of https://ts.isoluce.net repeats its tree size and its leaf index in the protected header, under two private-use labels that are not listed in <spanx style="verb">crit</spanx>, so that the signature covers them; the earlier form stays available on request. The folder holds one receipt of each kind for the same statement, and an offline check. Of 8,255 edited pairs of tree size and leaf index, a plain <xref target="RFC9942"/> receipt read alone is accepted for the issued pair and for 31 others. Read with the service's signed tree head, or carrying the two signed labels, it is accepted for the issued pair only. The labels are this service's own; this document does not propose them. The check shows nothing about append-only behaviour, equivocation or registration time.</t>
  <t>The Agent evidence conformance matrix <xref target="EVIDENCE-MATRIX"/>, maintained by Sankalp Gilda and first run for the same hackathon, has a row for this work (row 4, as read on 17 November 2026). The matrix compares its own reader with this repository's two verifiers written from the text of <xref target="I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record"/> and of its approval-binding contract, on the corpus at release 0.36.3: 217 of 217 members agree on verdict, and 37 of 37 approval-binding cases agree on decision and reason. One cell of the row marks this repository's own records as unsupported: the matrix's tools have no reader for them. Four more cells, merged on 17 November 2026, record the chain, the passkey approval, the second log and the receipt that signs its size; they run this repository's own verifiers, through an adapter its author wrote.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The author ran a follow-up to the AIR/DPS case on 17 November 2026 using AIR -01, the AIR reader and test harness at commit e444fffb5a6488e9898061bc02c3c52ebdbf97b8 and DPS reference checks at 007f8c99ec910564bac1c508b76c8ce8391fa11e. A positive control and six synthetic variations exercised the existing checks. Five variations passed the harness and illustrate correspondences beyond the checks exercised. In C06 only J6 changed from pass to fail. The harness aggregates schema, chain, trust, signature, binding and join checks. The additional fixtures and results are internal to this follow-up. The public e444fff tree contains the original AIR/DPS case and N7. The run concerns that test harness and its reference readers.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>An organisation can disclose evidence for the particular interaction under review to an authorized reviewer. A rule that needs a withheld piece leaves the dependent finding open until the reviewer can obtain and check that piece. Restrict an interaction identifier to the context needed to resolve the evidence. Storing a digest preserves a comparison to bytes the reviewer later obtains. A digest of a small set of guessable inputs can itself disclose information about the content.</t>

<t>Where the approver's signature is carried, the signature authenticates the approval commitment. Binding it to an actual execution requires separate evidence of that execution; an authority reference stays the issuer's statement unless checked against an independent source; it does not establish the truth of the decision's inputs, nor that the artifact a specification names is safe: that stays with the build attestations and the reviews they record. A relying party that needs a signed approval requires one in its own configuration and does not accept an unsigned attachment: anyone holding a signed attachment can remove its signature and present it as unsigned, and only a seal beside it shows that. Keys and sources of trust come from the verifier's own trust policy, never from the artifacts. Every stage time in an attachment is the issuer's: a consistent set of them shows what the issuer recorded, not that the approval preceded the effect, since the issuer can date every stage as it likes. What bounds the order from outside is an independent timestamp over the approval signature's value, which the anchoring extension carries, and what the execution side observed itself, such as a request identifier under a receipt's own commitment (Section 11). A Receipt states no time; an OpenTimestamps proof shows only that bytes existed before a block was mined; an RFC 3161 token can additionally provide a civil-time bound under the timestamp authority selected by the verifier. A decision record and its attachment carry personal data, the names of the accountable owner, the approver and the attestor, and the rationale of a decision; only their digests are registered in a Transparency Service, and the documents themselves travel under the issuer's control, to the parties that hold the citing statement; this document defines no selective disclosure of their members. A member by which an execution receipt names a decision record, when it sits outside what the receipt's own digest or signature covers, is the producer's assertion and shows nothing by itself; a verifier reports it as such. The binding runs the other way: the decision layer's attempt and result cite values the receipt commits to, its identifier and its output digest, and where the executor sends the request identifier as the target's idempotency key, that key is under the receipt's own commitment as part of the recorded input. The same holds for a human-approval flag in a receipt: it is the producer's claim, and only an approval of that exact specification, signed, under the decision layer, makes it more. The anchoring extension's security considerations apply.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>This document registers no media type in this revision; the content type stays optional in the anchoring extension.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9052">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
    <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
    <date month="August" year="2022"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
      <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9942">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts</title>
    <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
    <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
    <date month="June" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts prove properties of a Verifiable Data Structure (VDS) to a verifier. VDSs and associated Proof Types enable security properties, such as minimal disclosure, transparency, and non-equivocation. Transparency helps maintain trust over time and has been applied to certificates, end-to-end encrypted messaging systems, and supply chain security. This specification enables concise transparency-oriented systems by building on Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and COSE. The extensibility of the approach is demonstrated by providing CBOR encodings for Merkle inclusion and consistency proofs.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9942"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9943">
  <front>
    <title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
    <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
    <author fullname="Y. Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande"/>
    <author fullname="S. Lasker" initials="S." surname="Lasker"/>
    <date month="June" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Traceability in supply chains is a growing security concern. While Verifiable Data Structures (VDSs) have addressed specific issues, such as equivocation over digital certificates, they lack a universal architecture for all supply chains. This document defines such an architecture for single-issuer signed statement transparency. It ensures extensibility and interoperability between different transparency services as well as compliance with various auditing procedures and regulatory requirements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9943"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9943"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding">
   <front>
      <title>Canonicalization Declaration for SCITT Signed Statements</title>
      <author fullname="Steven Mih" initials="S." surname="Mih">
         <organization>Action State Group, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Anton Sokolov" initials="A." surname="Sokolov">
         <organization>Tyche Institute</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="25" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Independently written systems that anchor records to a SCITT
   Transparency Service repeatedly need the same construction: a
   canonical form of structured content, a content-addressed identifier
   derived from that form, binding to a SCITT Signed Statement and
   Receipt, and references that cite external artifacts by digest.  This
   document, referred to as CPB, specifies that construction as
   declarations rather than as a payload format.  A payload profile
   declares its canonicalization algorithm and exclusion set and thereby
   obtains a reproducible derived identifier.  A CPB Signed Statement
   carries either the complete statement content as specified by RFC
   9943 or a digest of content held elsewhere using the COSE Hash
   Envelope of RFC 9995.  CPB also defines an abstract typed digest
   reference information model and one optional protected-header
   encoding, cpb-refs; a payload profile may instead define its own
   reference serialization.  An IANA registry assigns the
   canonicalization algorithm identifiers that these declarations name.
   CPB does not define payload content formats, establish or require a
   universal artifact-type registry, or require either typed-reference
   carrier.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mih-sokolov-scitt-payload-binding-06"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="DPS-SIGNATURES" target="https://github.com/decision-provenance-standard/standard/tree/1f7dd40d7ad30783013228ca4e060ef15c29a2bc/extensions/signatures">
  <front>
    <title>Signatures extension 0.2.0 of the Decision Provenance Standard</title>
    <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="October"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="DPS-PV" target="https://github.com/decision-provenance-standard/standard/tree/1f7dd40d7ad30783013228ca4e060ef15c29a2bc/extensions/portable-verification">
  <front>
    <title>Portable verification extension 0.3.0 of the Decision Provenance Standard</title>
    <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="October"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="DPS-NAMES" target="https://github.com/decision-provenance-standard/standard/blob/1f7dd40d7ad30783013228ca4e060ef15c29a2bc/extensions/README.md#names-for-typed-references">
  <front>
    <title>Extensions of the Decision Provenance Standard, Names for typed references</title>
    <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="October"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="DPS-ANCHORING" target="https://github.com/decision-provenance-standard/standard/tree/1f7dd40d7ad30783013228ca4e060ef15c29a2bc/extensions/anchoring">
  <front>
    <title>Anchoring extension 0.2.0 of the Decision Provenance Standard</title>
    <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="October"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="DPS-ACTION-BINDING" target="https://github.com/decision-provenance-standard/standard/tree/1f7dd40d7ad30783013228ca4e060ef15c29a2bc/extensions/action-binding">
  <front>
    <title>Action binding extension 0.3.0 of the Decision Provenance Standard</title>
    <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="October"/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">

<reference anchor="DPS-CHECKER-CLARIFICATION" target="https://github.com/decision-provenance-standard/standard/pull/108">
  <front>
    <title>Action binding: which report dimensions concern the attachment, for a checker that cites it (#106)</title>
    <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="10"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="DPS-CORE" target="https://decisionprovenancestandard.org">
  <front>
    <title>The Decision Provenance Standard, Core v1.3 (reading edition rev. 11)</title>
    <author initials="Y." surname="Etsion" fullname="Yohay Etsion">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026"/>
  </front>
</reference>



<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-scitt-software-use-cases">
   <front>
      <title>Detailed Software Supply Chain Uses Cases for SCITT</title>
      <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
         <organization>Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Yogesh Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande">
         <organization>ARM</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Dick Brooks (Business Cyber Guardian)" initials="D." surname="Brooks">
         <organization>REA</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Bob Martin" initials="B." surname="Martin">
         <organization>MITRE</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Brian Knight" initials="B." surname="Knight">
         <organization>Microsoft</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="18" month="April" year="2024"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document includes a collection of representative Software Supply
   Chain Use Cases.  These use cases aim to identify software supply
   chain problems that the industry faces today and act as a guideline
   for developing a comprehensive security architecture and solutions
   for these scenarios.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-scitt-software-use-cases-03"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.mih-scitt-agent-action-capsule">
   <front>
      <title>An Agent Action Capsule Profile for SCITT</title>
      <author fullname="Steven Mih" initials="S." surname="Mih">
         <organization>Action State Group, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="26" month="September" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines a SCITT statement profile for recording what an
   AI agent did: the Agent Action Capsule.  A Capsule is a digest-
   committed record of one agent action carrying its verdict-level
   disposition (executed, blocked, denied, errored, timed out), the
   deterministic constraints that were evaluated, the effect that was
   committed together with a confirmed-effect binding that distinguishes
   a dispatched attempt from an observed result, and an honest human-in-
   the-loop flag.  Capsules are identified independently of signing and
   MAY be authenticated by one or more COSE_Sign1 Producer Envelopes.
   Its Capsule ID can separately be made transparent by registration in
   a SCITT Transparency Service [I-D.ietf-scitt-scrapi].  A Capsule is
   recorded on every verdict, including refusals: a blocked or denied
   Capsule is the auditor-grade evidence that a gate worked.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mih-scitt-agent-action-capsule-05"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance-binding">
   <front>
      <title>Binding Per-Action Authorization and Memory Provenance into Agent Action Capsules</title>
      <author fullname="KARTHIK RAMPALLI" initials="R." surname="Karthik">
         <organization>Glyphzero, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="4" month="July" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   The Agent Action Capsule (AAC) profile (draft-mih-scitt-agent-action-
   capsule) records what an autonomous agent actually did -- executed,
   blocked, denied, errored, or timed out -- with a structural binding
   that prevents an attempt from being presented as a completion.  AAC
   deliberately does not define the authority that permitted an action;
   it carries that authority as an opaque reference.  Two companion
   profiles supply what that reference can point to: a per-action
   authorization profile (draft-rampalli-aiagent-authz-hmac) records
   that an action was permitted (the &quot;may&quot;), and a memory-provenance
   profile (draft-rampalli-aiagent-memory-provenance) records the source
   and trust state of the belief on which the agent acted (the &quot;why-
   believed&quot;).

   This document specifies how the latter two are bound into an AAC
   Capsule.  It defines (a) what the AAC &quot;disposition.authority&quot;
   reference MAY resolve to, (b) a namespaced, payload-only extension
   carrying an authorization-token reference, a memory chain root, and a
   quarantine attestation, and (c) an OPTIONAL divergence-class value,
   drawn from the per-action profile, that explains a non-executing AAC
   verdict.  The binding uses only mechanisms AAC already provides --
   the opaque authority reference and the payload-extension namespacing
   convention -- and changes neither AAC&#x27;s closed protected-header claim
   set nor its Class 1 verification.  The result is a single verifiable
   record that answers &quot;may,&quot; &quot;did,&quot; and &quot;why-believed&quot; together.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance-binding-00"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.emirdag-scitt-ai-agent-execution">
   <front>
      <title>AI Agent Execution Profile of SCITT</title>
      <author fullname="Pinar Emirdag" initials="P." surname="Emirdag">
         <organization>Veridic Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Daniel Feichtinger" initials="D." surname="Feichtinger">
         <organization>Veridic Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="12" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines a SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency,
   and Trust) profile for creating independently verifiable, tamper-
   evident records of autonomous AI agent actions.  The profile defines
   the AgentInteractionRecord (AIR) as the COSE_Sign1 signed statement
   payload for material agent actions; maps SCITT roles to the agent
   execution context, with the Agent Operator as Issuer and an
   independent Evidence Custodian as Transparency Service; specifies
   Registration Policy requirements including hash chain integrity,
   temporal ordering, and sequence completeness; defines a redaction
   receipt mechanism for privacy-preserving evidence custody; and
   provides compliance mappings to EU AI Act Articles 12 and 19, DORA,
   NIST AI RMF, MAS AI Risk Management Guidelines, PCI DSS, and MiFID
   II.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-emirdag-scitt-ai-agent-execution-01"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt">
   <front>
      <title>A SCITT Profile for AI-Agent Action Receipts</title>
      <author fullname="Tora Toraman" initials="T." surname="Toraman">
         <organization>NordenSoft</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="14" month="August" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document profiles the IETF SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity,
   Transparency, and Trust) architecture for AI-agent action receipts:
   tamper-evident, signed, offline-verifiable records of what an
   autonomous agent was recorded as doing at the governed boundary,
   under which recorded principal class, with what recorded verdict, and
   -- where the issuer records one -- under which policy identity.  Each
   receipt is a signed record over a canonical JSON payload, hash-
   chained so that each record commits to its predecessor, and presented
   either bare -- the payload with its own native signature -- or
   enveloped in a COSE_Sign1.  This revision specifies how such a
   receipt is carried as a SCITT Signed Statement, with the protected
   claims a Transparency Service requires, so that a receipt can be
   registered.  Registration obtains a Transparency Service&#x27;s signed
   proof that the statement was registered in its log -- a property a
   self-signed chain cannot provide alone.  It does not, by itself, give
   an offline holder non-equivocation: that requires consistency proofs
   and monitoring of the log, which this profile does not specify.  The
   profile makes a deliberately narrow, checkable claim: this is an
   issuer-authenticated, signature-verifiable, tamper-evident record of
   the action, the recorded principal class, the recorded verdict, and
   any policy identity the receipt carries.  It explicitly does not
   claim that the agent was correct, safe, or wise, that the recorded
   inputs were true or complete, that a named approver authorized this
   exact action before it ran, that a downstream controller succeeded,
   or that any physical effect occurred.  This revision separates those
   last three as distinct claims with independent failure behaviour,
   states the boundary of a shared action digest, and keeps a
   deterministic offline policy-replay capability out of scope.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-noa-scitt-ai-agent-receipt-01"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.munoz-scitt-permit-profile">
   <front>
      <title>A SCITT Profile for Pre-Execution AI Action Authorization Records</title>
      <author fullname="Christian Munoz" initials="C." surname="Munoz">
         <organization>Keel API, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="19" month="July" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document specifies a SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity,
   Transparency, and Trust) profile for pre-execution authorization
   records of AI agent actions.  The profile defines a Signed Statement
   type, the &quot;Pre-Execution Authorization Record&quot; (also called a
   Permit), that records a policy-evaluated decision to allow, deny, or
   challenge an AI agent action before that action is dispatched to a
   model provider, tool, or service.  The profile cryptographically
   binds the authorization decision to the canonical bytes of the
   request that is authorized.  When the paired Closure Record carries a
   dispatch digest, a Verifier can compare the authorized-request digest
   against the recorded dispatched-request digest; on the managed
   dispatch path the reference implementation additionally enforces this
   equality before the request is sent.

   This revision also introduces authorization-lineage vocabulary.  It
   defines how a Verifier can determine whether the authority conveyed
   by a child Permit is equal to or narrower than the authority conveyed
   by its parent (attenuation), given a signed or chain-committed
   Authority Representation and a declared Comparator Profile.  The
   Permit remains an evidence artifact; this profile specifies the
   evidence a Verifier needs to make that determination, not a
   delegation or policy protocol.

   The profile composes with adjacent profiles for human-authority
   binding, post-execution material-action evidence, and content-refusal
   events, referenced rather than replicated.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-munoz-scitt-permit-profile-01"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.chueayen-attestation-receipts">
   <front>
      <title>Enforcement Attestation Receipts for AI Inference and Agent Action Decisions</title>
      <author fullname="Anya Chueayen" initials="A." surname="Chueayen">
         <organization>Aqta Technologies Limited</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="25" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document specifies two compact JSON records, signed with Ed25519
   and verifiable offline under a pinned public key.  The first is an
   attestation receipt for an AI inference decision, binding an outcome
   to a request hash.  The second, added in this revision, is an action
   record: the decision an enforcement point takes before an agent&#x27;s
   proposed tool call or other state-changing action runs, whether that
   decision is to allow or to refuse.  An action record is signed by the
   enforcement point, never by the agent, and binds the decision to a
   hash of the exact canonical arguments proposed.  The document also
   describes how a human approval can be bound to exact action values
   with single use and expiry, how either record could be carried as a
   COSE_Sign1 Signed Statement and registered with a SCITT Transparency
   Service, and where the current format does not yet do so.  Both
   formats are intended for settings where an operator-controlled log is
   not, on its own, sufficient evidence of the decision.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-chueayen-attestation-receipts-05"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.veridom-omp-core">
   <front>
      <title>Operating Model Protocol (OMP) Core: Invariant 3 -- Verifiable Delegation Binding</title>
      <author fullname="Tolulope Adebayo" initials="T." surname="Adebayo">
         <organization>Veridom Ltd</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Oluropo Apalowo" initials="O." surname="Apalowo">
         <organization>Veridom Ltd</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="13" month="May" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document obsoletes draft-veridom-omp-00.  The Operating Model
   Protocol (OMP) defines a deterministic routing and tamper-evident
   evidence architecture for consequential AI decisions.  This document
   specifies OMP Core, which adds Invariant 3: Verifiable Delegation
   Binding.  Every ASSISTED or ESCALATED routing state must bind the
   Named Accountable Officer to a verifiable DelegationInstrument at the
   time of decision.  When valid binding cannot be established, the
   system records AUTHORITY_UNBOUND -- a sealed, positive evidentiary
   state.  This update is additive and backward-compatible with OMP Core
   version 00.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-veridom-omp-core-00"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts">
   <front>
      <title>Signed Permissions and Action Receipts for Automated Agents</title>
      <author fullname="Pavel Izmaylov" initials="P." surname="Izmaylov">
         </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document specifies records with which a third party can
   establish, later and without network access, what an automated agent,
   such as an artificial intelligence (AI) agent, was permitted to do
   and what it recorded doing.  The person for whom the agent acts, the
   principal, signs a permission with a passkey; the permission carries
   limits that a verifier can check mechanically.  The agent signs a
   receipt for each action with Ed25519 and the Module-Lattice-Based
   Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-87).  Receipts are chained and
   entered in a log whose signed tree heads are time-stamped.  A
   verifier reports, separately, whether the records are sound and
   whether each recorded action stayed within its permission.  The
   content of each record is specified independently of its encoding;
   one encoding, JSON Web Signature (JWS) over canonical JavaScript
   Object Notation (JSON), is defined.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts-02"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.morrison-binding-moment-envelope">
   <front>
      <title>The Briefing-and-Binding Envelope: A Delivery Contract for Agent-to-Principal Decision Moments with Dual-Veto Reconciliation</title>
      <author fullname="Blake Morrison" initials="B." surname="Morrison">
         <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Christopher Whiteside" initials="C." surname="Whiteside">
         <organization>Independent</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="12" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This memo specifies the briefing-and-binding envelope: a delivery
   contract for the wire-level structure by which an artificial-
   intelligence agent surfaces a consequential decision to the human
   principal it acts for, and by which the principal commits, declines,
   amends, or rejects that decision.  The envelope carries eight named
   slots (a synopsis, findings, recommendations, an offer of detail, a
   question stem, a set of options each marked with its own reasoning, a
   single recommended option, and a pair of escape hatches) and is
   emitted as a structured field of a Model Context Protocol tool
   result.  The envelope is renderer-agnostic, so the briefing an agent
   delivers and the binding a principal commits back have one machine-
   checkable shape across every consuming surface.  The memo also
   specifies a dual-veto handshake: one escape hatch lets the principal
   revise the answer space while accepting the question; the other lets
   the principal reject the question itself and reopen deliberation.
   Either party may veto.  The memo defines a content digest over the
   envelope, canonicalized under JCS and hashed with SHA-256, so that a
   resolution names the exact envelope it resolves and an external
   receipt can reference that envelope by digest.  The memo is
   Informational.  No new transport is introduced; the envelope composes
   with the handle namespace of draft-morrison-identity-pronouns and the
   MCP tool surface of draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-binding-moment-envelope-04"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record">
   <front>
      <title>An Audit Record Format for AI Agent Authorization Decisions</title>
      <author fullname="Sankalp Gilda" initials="S." surname="Gilda">
         </author>
      <date day="29" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines a record format for AI agent authorization
   decisions and the effects that followed them.  The format is one in-
   toto predicate type, signed inside a DSSE envelope.  A record carries
   the decision and the observed effect with a derived agreement between
   them, whether the decision point could evaluate the request and how
   fresh each input it relied on was, and a canonicalization contract
   under which a party that trusts neither the agent nor its operator
   recomputes the record&#x27;s consistency from its bytes.  The document
   also defines what a party that retains a record keeps beside it, so
   that the record can later be dated from anchors that party does not
   control.  The format carries the seven minimum audit fields of the
   WIMSE AI Identity Management System framework, and it is offered as a
   data model for the audit records the proposed AUDIT working group
   would specify.  It defines no policy.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.sirkkavaara-vaara-receipt">
   <front>
      <title>The Vaara Receipt: A Recomputable Receipt Format for Decisions About Autonomous Actions</title>
      <author fullname="Henri Sirkkavaara" initials="H." surname="Sirkkavaara">
         <organization>Vaara</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document specifies vaara.receipt/v1, a signed and independently
   recomputable record that binds a decision about an autonomous action
   to the evidence the decision was made on, and optionally to one or
   more external timestamp anchors.  The format is canonicalized with
   the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) so that a third party can
   recompute its digests, and, for a receipt signed with a public-key
   algorithm, verify its signature, without access to the issuer.  A
   decision and the execution receipt that answers it form one
   recomputable pair through the envelope&#x27;s back link.

   The receipt&#x27;s trust is root-agnostic: the same record is verifiable
   with or without a hardware trusted execution environment and is re-
   expressible as an IETF RATS Entity Attestation Result.  Downstream
   specifications (a payment rail, a compliance regime, a framework
   integration) define profiles that pin to a version of this document
   and add only their own evidence schema; they do not redefine the
   envelope.  The format described here is deployed, and its receipts
   are independently recomputable from public conformance vectors that
   ship with standalone checkers importing no issuer code.  The minimal
   profile is the engine decision: one receipt per decision an engine
   records on its own audit trail, bound to the trail record it decided,
   with no external rail.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sirkkavaara-vaara-receipt-15"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.zambo-aer1">
   <front>
      <title>AER-1: A Portable Execution Receipt for AI Agent Tool Calls</title>
      <author fullname="Brennan Zambo" initials="B." surname="Zambo">
         <organization>Zambo</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="22" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document specifies AER-1, a small vocabulary for recording one
   AI agent tool call as a portable, independently checkable execution
   receipt.  A receipt identifies the execution, records when it
   happened, preserves the canonical bytes used for the output
   commitment, names the tool and caller scope, carries a provenance
   class, and resolves at a stable public URL.  The format separates
   what the system observed from claims about the outside world, and it
   separates provenance (who ran or reported the action) from the record
   itself.  A reference implementation is deployed, and its receipts are
   publicly verifiable without an account or token.  The specification
   covers workflow receipts, which bind an ordered sequence of step
   receipts to a single goal with a Merkle root over the step sequence,
   and hash-chained job timelines for tamper-evident sequencing of
   executions.  This revision closes honesty and precision gaps: it adds
   the workflow-receipt truncation limit (new Section 8.4), normatively
   specifies the external anchor format and its verification procedure
   (rewritten Section 10, new Section 10.1), fixes a RECOMMENDED/MUST
   contradiction in Section 8.1, makes the Section 6 verification step
   testable, and documents replay, low-entropy, empty-record, and size-
   limit considerations.  It changes no receipt field, digest
   construction, or existing verification rule.  The -13 revision fixes
   a malformed sentence in the Abstract, three incorrect section cross-
   references, stale Table of Contents page numbers, a skipped footer
   page number, misaligned table rows, and chain version-string updates,
   and records two reported interoperability examples in Implementation
   Status; it changes no receipt field, digest construction, or
   verification rule.  The -14 revision adds tamper-evident metadata
   binding (new Section 3.1; conditional metadata_hash for schema 0.4
   and later), disambiguates the anchor receipt_id (Table 4), corrects
   the self-anchoring witnessing claim (Section 10), makes the
   Section 8.3 display rule a SHOULD with a byte-testable MUST, narrows
   the provenance attestation wording (Section 5), states the binding
   non-transfer rule normatively (new Section 10.2), pins
   anchored_digest to bare hex (Table 4), corrects the vector corpus
   counts, and adds normative disclosure of missing issuer
   authentication.  It changes no existing receipt field, digest
   construction, or verification rule for schema 0.3 and earlier.  The
   -15 revision narrows the Implementation Status wording for the
   reported interoperability examples at the implementer&#x27;s request; it
   changes no receipt field, digest construction, or verification rule.
   The -16 revision documents the live workflow tools API (new Sections
   8.5, 8.6, 8.7): the workflow_close tool, workflow metadata in step
   receipts, and the workflow view API.  It changes no receipt field,
   digest construction, or existing verification rule.  The -17 revision
   documents the recommended execution_context member (new Section 3.2):
   an optional, non-core structure for recording source and version
   context such as the model name and version behind a tool call and the
   identity of the source system acted upon.  It changes no existing
   receipt field, digest construction, or verification rule.  The -18
   revision repairs the reference apparatus (normative references to RFC
   3339, RFC 8259, RFC 4122, and RFC 4648, and the previously missing
   RFC 7942 entry), pins two parser edge cases (duplicate JSON member
   names and leap-second timestamps are rejected), names the Unicode
   normalization behavior in Section 4 with a computed vector pair,
   adopts the unknown-versus-not-applicable convention for optional
   members, adds optional members for readback outcomes, per-field
   provenance, negative records, reversal state, method descriptors, and
   payment references, completes the execution_context member set (model
   and environment digests), adds the optional input_hash commitment
   (Section 3.3), permits SCITT and RFC 3161 anchors under Section 10,
   states the clock-trust and equivocation limits in Section 13, and
   rewrites Section 15 to position the specification against adjacent
   work.  It changes no receipt field, digest construction, or
   verification outcome for any receipt well-formed under the -17 rules.
   The -19 revision aligns the workflow tool and workflow view
   descriptions in Sections 8.5 and 8.7 with the normative Merkle
   construction in Section 8.1: both descriptions named step output
   hashes as the root&#x27;s leaf input where Section 8.1 specifies step
   receipt identifiers.  An implementer report identified the
   divergence.  It changes no construction, receipt field, digest, or
   verification outcome.  The -20 revision adopts three findings
   reported by an independent implementer who built a conformance
   verifier from the -19 text alone.  It requires the published byte
   layout of a recorded input to state the member ordering rule it
   applies when the input is a JSON object (Section 3.3), and it bars
   control characters from provenance class labels, with rejection
   required (Section 5).  The conformance kit&#x27;s quickstart core tier
   also gains the provenance-label and schema-version metadata checks as
   a stated rule.  It changes no receipt field or digest construction; a
   receipt well-formed under the -19 rules verifies identically, except
   that an input commitment whose published layout states no ordering
   rule is no longer reported as confirmed.  The -21 revision states the
   receipt-id binding rule normatively (Section 6), describes the id-
   substitution case in Security Considerations (Section 13), and
   credits the independent control test that produced the finding
   (Section 18).  It changes no receipt field, digest construction, or
   existing verification rule.  The -22 revision pins the legacy (schema
   0.3) member forms that satisfy the core requirements and requires
   verifiers to report a legacy acceptance explicitly rather than as a
   plain pass (Section 6), requires the canonical base64 spelling of
   canonical_bytes and the rejection of non-canonical spellings
   (Sections 3 and 4), states that the receipt object is the document
   and that no presentation envelope is part of the format (Section 3),
   enumerates the id verdict a verifier reports beside the structural
   verdict, binds the states to verifier behavior, and states the
   resolution order between the two layers (Section 6), requires the
   reason to be printed next to the rule for every check that does not
   pass (Section 6), and records an independent production validator in
   the Implementation Status.  It changes no receipt field or digest
   construction; one verification outcome changes, for a receipt whose
   canonical_bytes spelling is not canonical, which earlier revisions
   did not address.  The -23 revision states the per-anchor outcome
   report normatively (Section 6): a verifier&#x27;s report carries each
   anchor&#x27;s outcome in machine-visible form, and an anchor the verifier
   did not evaluate is reported as &quot;not checked&quot;, never as an evaluated
   outcome, so that state cannot be conflated with an anchor that was
   evaluated and could not be resolved.  It changes no receipt field,
   digest construction, or existing verification rule.

Implementation Status

   This section records the implementation status of the AER-1
   vocabulary at the time of this revision, following [RFC7942].  It
   will be removed before publication as an RFC.

   Reference implementation.  Zambo (https://zambo.dev), operated by the
   document author, is a deployed implementation of Sections 3 through
   10.  Tool calls made over HTTPS as JSON-RPC to https://zambo.dev/api/
   mcp receive a public receipt page at https://zambo.dev/run/&lt;id&gt;,
   retrievable without an account, wallet, or token.  A machine-readable
   verifier is exposed as described in Section 6.  Receipts are anchored
   to public Nostr relays with an envelope binding the receipt
   identifier, the output hash, and the evidence hash (envelope &quot;zambo-
   receipt-anchor/1&quot;).

   Workflow receipts (Section 8) are deployed in the reference
   implementation.  Multi-step sessions receive a workflow receipt at
   https://zambo.dev/workflow/&lt;workflow_id&gt; binding the ordered step
   receipts with a Merkle root, and step receipt pages link to the
   parent workflow (&quot;Part of workflow&quot;) while workflow pages link to
   each step receipt.

   Since 2026-10-22, the reference implementation closes workflows under
   the seq-output-v1 construction and declares merkle_version on every
   new workflow receipt; workflow receipts issued before that date carry
   no merkle_version member and remain verifiable under receipt-id-v0
   exactly as issued.  This revision defines both constructions and the
   selector.  The conformance corpus described below now carries seq-
   output-v1 vectors as well, including multi-step closes, the odd-level
   duplication case, a single-step close, and mixed-version cases in
   which a single verifier checks closes under both constructions, each
   keyed on the close&#x27;s declared merkle_version.

   Conformance kit.  An open conformance suite for this vocabulary is
   maintained at https://gitlab.com/rambozambodotdev/zambo.  It ships
   seven bundled kit runners (Rust, Go, TypeScript, Python, Java, C#,
   and Swift), each verified against the full vector corpus, which at
   this revision stands at 124 vectors (127 checks per runner) across
   the receipt-level, Merkle (Section 8.1), timeline (Section 7),
   hardened chain (Section 7.1), chain commitment (Section 7.3),
   Unicode, id-binding, and anchor-report suites.  The kit repository
   publishes the corpus&#x27;s current vector count, check count, and
   evaluated-set corpus digest alongside the corpus itself; that
   published record states the corpus&#x27;s current counts, and if the
   corpus grows beyond the counts stated here, the published record
   governs.  The -22 revision adds vectors pinning the canonical base64
   spelling (Section 4), the nil-UUID rejection as a standalone case,
   the legacy schema 0.3 production shape (Section 6), the bare
   presentation form (Section 3), a current-schema (0.4) real receipt
   beside the two bundled 0.3 fixtures, and one vector per id_verdict
   state (Section 6).  The -23 revision adds the anchor-report vectors
   pinning the per-anchor outcome report of Section 6, implemented in
   the kit runners (kit v1.5.6) and in the reference verifier
   (aer1-verify 0.2.13) ahead of this text.  Each runner is zero-
   dependency within its language toolchain.  Running the Python suite
   takes two steps and no dependencies beyond git and a Python 3
   interpreter:

   git clone https://gitlab.com/rambozambodotdev/zambo.git python3 aer1-
   implementations/python/conformance.py
   Since the -23 revision, each conformance run also emits the evaluated
   vector set: one line per vector carrying its id and content digest,
   with a corpus digest over the set, so a claimed pass can be checked
   as a set difference against the full corpus.  The cross-runner parity
   gate mints a receipt of each of its runs (schema 0.4; the committed
   payload carries the evaluated vector ids, the corpus digest, and the
   verdict, pass or fail) and pins it in the kit repository as parity-
   gate-receipt.json; the gate verifies that receipt with the kit
   conformance check and with aer1-verify, id bound, before it reports
   success.

   An implementation is conformant when it produces byte-identical
   verdicts to the reference runners across the full vector corpus.  The
   corpus includes attack vectors for tampered provenance labels, schema
   version downgrades, and legacy (pre-0.4) receipts; conformance
   requires the Section 6 metadata checks to fail the first two and to
   report the third with a legacy notice rather than a failure.  The kit
   is versioned; the v1.5.7 release is the frozen reference for the
   corpus described above.

   Independent verification.  The Section 6 verification procedure has
   been exercised against live receipts by independent third parties:

   *  On 2026-09-16, an independent agent (&quot;Merv&quot;, on the Clawstr
      network) verified a live receipt (id 0ec81343-cc1f-
      4c25-9c33-d76b5582406d) in three checks: the SHA-256 of the
      decoded canonical bytes matched the output commitment, the
      upstream evidence hash matched, and the anchor event carried a
      valid signature retrievable on independent relays.  The same party
      reported that the anchor envelope did not then bind the evidence
      hash; the reference implementation has since shipped the binding
      envelope described above.

   *  On 2026-09-16, an independent agent (&quot;nilo_agent&quot;, on Nostr) ran
      adversarial verification challenges against live receipts,
      including a witness round and a strong-form Bitcoin-anchored
      challenge (anchor block 967351, receipt 88094e26), each answered
      with bytes the challenger could check independently.

   *  On 2026-09-25 and 2026-09-26, an independent agent (&quot;Devan&quot;, on
      Nostr) published timestamped probe receipts (v1 and v2) exercising
      independent verification of agent work in the same receipt model.

   Independent validators.  An independent implementation exposes the
   Section 6 procedure as a public service:

   *  WhiteMagic Labs (Lucas Bailey) operates a production validator for
      this specification at https://api.whitemagic.dev/aer1/verify,
      publicly accessible without a key, with the same procedure also
      exposed as an MCP tool (verify_aer1_receipt).  On 2026-10-17 the
      operator exercised the validator against the reference
      implementation and the conformance corpus.  The two
      implementations initially disagreed on cases in both directions (a
      decoding boundary in the validator; an id-binding reading and a
      nil-UUID acceptance in the reference tooling), each disagreement
      was resolved against the draft text the same day, and the
      implementations now agree across the exercised case matrix.  The
      validator reports comparison outcomes in the shared states of
      Section 6 and attaches its provenance caution as advisory metadata
      beside the verdict, the arrangement the provenance note in
      Section 6 describes.

   Seven bundled kit runners for Sections 3 through 6 are maintained in
   the conformance kit repository (Rust, Go, TypeScript, Python, Java,
   C#, and Swift), each verified against the full vector corpus
   described above (124 vectors, 127 checks per runner).  These runners
   are the kit&#x27;s own test runners, not independent implementations.
   Independent third-party implementations, built from the draft text
   alone without access to kit internals, include ARION&#x27;s Node.js and
   Java verifiers and ColonistOne&#x27;s Perl verifier, each conformant
   against the same corpus.  Since revision 12, contributors have
   reported two scoped interoperability exercises.  On 2026-10-08,
   Tanilo and the AER-1 author published a cross-repository worked
   example linking an AER-1 receipt to a live Tanilo receipt by
   canonical hash, with the AER-1 commitment check and the Tanilo
   signature check run separately, each under its own rules.  Also on
   2026-10-08, the independent builder FlyThink published a four-case
   fixture binding AER-1 execution receipts to physical completion
   claims; all four cases replay cleanly, including the case where a
   valid AER-1 receipt coexists with invalid physical-evidence binding
   (see Section 10.2).  Reports of additional implementations or
   independent verification results are solicited; implementers are
   encouraged to validate against the open conformance kit described
   above and to report their results.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-zambo-aer1-26"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.kuehlewind-audit-architecture">
   <front>
      <title>An Architecture for Auditing Agent Delegation and Interactions</title>
      <author fullname="Mirja Kühlewind" initials="M." surname="Kühlewind">
         <organization>Ericsson</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
         <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="7" month="September" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes an architecture for auditing of agent-driven
   interactions on the Internet.  Autonomous and semi-autonomous
   software agents, including those based on artificial intelligence,
   increasingly act on behalf of users, organizations, and services.
   Existing auditing mechanisms often capture isolated system events but
   do not consistently represent delegation relationships, user intent,
   or evolving authorization.  In agent-driven systems, auditability
   requires linking intent, delegation, authorization, and execution.
   The proposed architecture enables this through distributed audit
   record generation, propagation of audit context, optional
   attestation, and additional logging for transparency.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-wimse-aims">
   <front>
      <title>AI Identity Management System</title>
      <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
         <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Jeff Lombardo" initials="J." surname="Lombardo">
         <organization>AWS</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
         <organization>Zscaler</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
         <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Nick Steele" initials="N." surname="Steele">
         <organization>OpenAI</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
         <organization>Okta</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document proposes best practices for authentication and
   authorization of AI agent interactions.  It leverages existing
   standards such as the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments
   (WIMSE) architecture and OAuth 2.0 family of specifications.  Rather
   than defining new protocols, this document describes how existing and
   widely deployed standards can be applied or extended to establish
   agent authentication and authorization.  By doing so, it aims to
   provide a framework within which to use existing standards, identify
   gaps and guide future standardization efforts for agent
   authentication and authorization.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.dawkins-scitt-ai-article50">
   <front>
      <title>A SCITT Profile for EU AI Act Article 50 Transparency Receipts</title>
      <author fullname="Veronica S. Dawkins" initials="V. S." surname="Dawkins">
         <organization>LedgerProof Foundation</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="25" month="May" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines a Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and
   Trust (SCITT) profile for machine-readable cryptographic
   transparency receipts addressing all four sub-obligations of
   Article 50 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (the &quot;EU AI Act&quot;):
   interactive AI system disclosure (50(1)), machine-readable marking
   of synthetic media (50(2)), emotion recognition notification
   (50(3), referenced for completeness), and AI-generated text
   disclosure with human editorial review exemption (50(4)).

   The profile defines three SCITT statement content types
   (&quot;ai/article-50/v1&quot;, &quot;ai/human-review/v1&quot;, and
   &quot;ai/chatbot-session/v1&quot;) and specifies validation, verification,
   and chain-of-custody semantics suitable for presentation to
   European Union supervisory authorities, national competent
   authorities, and judicial proceedings.

   The profile is substrate-agnostic but presumes a SCITT Transparency
   Service backed by a publicly verifiable append-only log. A reference
   implementation using the Bitcoin blockchain as the SCITT log
   substrate, via RFC 6962 Merkle aggregation anchored in OP_RETURN
   transactions, is described in companion document
   draft-dawkins-scitt-lpr-00.


	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-dawkins-scitt-ai-article50-00"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.kamimura-scitt-vcp">
   <front>
      <title>A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Audit Trails in Algorithmic Trading: The VeritasChain Protocol (VCP)</title>
      <author fullname="TOKACHI KAMIMURA" initials="K." surname="Tokachi">
         <organization>VeritasChain Standards Organization</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="24" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines a profile of the SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity,
   Transparency, and Trust) architecture for creating tamper-evident
   audit trails of AI-driven algorithmic trading decisions and
   executions.  The VeritasChain Protocol (VCP) applies the SCITT
   framework to address the specific requirements of financial markets,
   including high-precision timestamps, considerations arising from
   recordkeeping regimes such as the EU AI Act and MiFID II, and a
   crypto-shredding mechanism intended to support erasure obligations
   such as those under the GDPR.  This profile specifies how VCP events
   are encoded as SCITT Signed Statements, registered with Transparency
   Services, and verified using COSE Receipts.  It further defines SCITT
   conformance profiles for interoperability and an ERASURE event type
   that records crypto-shredding operations as append-only audit events.
   The profile makes trading records auditable and attributable after
   the fact; it does not prevent or block any trading activity, and it
   does not warrant the correctness of any recorded decision.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp-05"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.fassbender-scitt-time-anchor">
   <front>
      <title>Umarise&#x27;s Bitcoin-Anchored Temporal Proofs</title>
      <author fullname="Jonna Fassbender" initials="J." surname="Fassbender">
         <organization>Umarise</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="23" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes the mechanism Umarise uses for temporal
   anchoring of digital artifacts: cryptographic hashes are committed to
   the Bitcoin blockchain via the OpenTimestamps protocol.  The
   resulting proof is independently verifiable by any party with access
   to independently validated Bitcoin chain data, without contacting
   Umarise or any other anchoring service.  The document is published so
   that other parties can produce and verify such proofs.  The SCITT
   Architecture is used as the primary integration example; no changes
   to it are required.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-fassbender-scitt-time-anchor-08"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.mih-sato-agent-accountability-composition">
   <front>
      <title>Agent Accountability: Composition and Conformance</title>
      <author fullname="Steven Mih" initials="S." surname="Mih">
         <organization>Action State Group, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Tom Sato" initials="" surname="Sato">
         <organization>MyAuberge K.K.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Iman Schrock" initials="I." surname="Schrock">
         <organization>EMILIA Protocol, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Songbo Bu" initials="S." surname="Bu">
         <organization>Independent</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Anton Sokolov" initials="A." surname="Sokolov">
         <organization>Tyche Institute</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Autonomous and semi-autonomous software agents increasingly take
   consequential actions across administrative and trust domains.
   Holding such an action accountable — to a regulator, auditor, or
   counterparty who does not trust the operator — requires answering
   several questions, each answerable by an independently-verifiable
   profile: whether the agent was permitted to act (CAN), which
   accountable human authorized the specific action (WHO), what outcome
   the agent system recorded and what is known to have crossed the
   effect boundary (WHAT), and whether the runtime enforced correctly
   (AUDIT).

   This document specifies, in Informational terms, how such profiles
   compose — by a shared action-digest, each verifying independently —
   and defines a shared conformance-vector suite against which any
   profile may be tested.  It complements existing audit-architecture
   and record-format work rather than replacing it, reusing existing
   signing, transport, and transparency mechanisms.  Its focus is an
   assurance tier those documents leave open: most agent records today
   are self-attested by an interested party; this document makes
   reachable and testable an anchored, third-party-verifiable tier, in
   which a record is registered to a transparency service (SCITT) so a
   party who trusts neither the agent nor the operator can verify it.
   Self-attestation remains a valid baseline; convergence on the
   disinterested tier — by any conforming profile — is the goal, not a
   single mandated format.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mih-sato-agent-accountability-composition-02"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.mih-scitt-checkpointed-local-log">
   <front>
      <title>The Checkpointed Local Log (CLL)</title>
      <author fullname="Steven Mih" initials="S." surname="Mih">
         <organization>Action State Group</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="14" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Many systems emit individually signed records — receipts,
   attestations, statements — and store them locally.  Each record
   verifies on its own, but the collection proves nothing: records can
   be deleted, reordered, or created after the fact without detection.
   This document specifies the Checkpointed Local Log (CLL): a producer-
   operated append-only log that is a Merkle Mountain Range as defined
   by the COSE Receipts profile for Merkle Mountain Ranges, together
   with a small signed checkpoint that commits to the log&#x27;s entire
   history.  A checkpoint carries the content of that profile&#x27;s Receipt
   of consistency — the accumulator and the consistency proof — inside a
   SCITT Signed Statement, so it can be registered with one or more
   independent Transparency Services without any change to them.  A CLL
   upgrades a set of point receipts into a stream with provable order,
   contemporaneity, and completeness, and states precisely what it does
   not establish.  It defines no new proof format, no change to SCITT
   Registration or Receipts, and no payload semantics.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mih-scitt-checkpointed-local-log-02"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts">
   <front>
      <title>Authorization Receipts for High-Risk Agent Actions</title>
      <author fullname="Iman Schrock" initials="I." surname="Schrock">
         <organization>EMILIA Protocol, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="12" month="September" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines the EMILIA Protocol (EP) authorization receipt,
   an evidence artifact binding an enrolled approver key to one
   canonical action before execution.  An approver-held key signs an
   Authorization Context containing the action hash, policy reference,
   shared authorization instance, per-signoff nonce, audience, and
   validity window.  A Trust Receipt carries the signed contexts,
   terminal consumption record, and Merkle inclusion material so a
   relying party can verify the recorded event offline under
   independently selected log, directory, policy, and approver trust
   inputs.

   The receipt establishes only the guarantees of the selected
   verification profile.  The mapping from an enrolled approver
   identifier to a natural person is asserted by the directory
   authority.  Offline verification does not establish current
   revocation status, global non-replay, comprehension, legality,
   safety, or execution.  Replay prevention requires an online atomic
   consumption store at the executor.  The state-machine invariants are
   machine-checked under the assumptions stated in this document.

   This revision defines the closed EP-AUTHORIZATION-BUNDLE-v1 pre-
   execution profile and its verification algorithm.  The bundle carries
   the Action Object, signed Authorization Contexts, signoffs, key
   proofs, and presentation evidence; it deliberately carries no
   terminal consumption or execution claim.  An optional, profile-
   identified authorization binding can commit the human evidence to an
   independently verified native authorization artifact without
   replacing that artifact or making this receipt format depend on its
   transport or trust model.

   A receipt is evidence, not authorization.  This document does not
   treat a local user interaction as an authorization decision.  It
   defines one evidence artifact that an authorization architecture can
   use in a human-confirmation flow: the signed Authorization Context is
   action-bound confirmation evidence an authorization server MAY
   validate and bind to the grant it issues.  The resulting Trust
   Receipt records terminal consumption and remains evidence; neither
   object makes the authorization decision.  That decision remains with
   the authorization server.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-schrock-ep-authorization-receipts-13"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.schrock-ep-presentation-binding">
   <front>
      <title>Binding Deterministic Rendering and Display Attestations to Human-Authorization Receipts</title>
      <author fullname="Iman Schrock" initials="I." surname="Schrock">
         <organization>EMILIA Protocol, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="12" month="September" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   A human-authorization receipt proves an enrolled key produced a user-
   verified signature over a digest that commits to an exact action.  It
   does not prove the signing surface DISPLAYED that action honestly.
   If a signing interface shows a benign summary while committing a
   different action, the resulting receipt is laundered authority:
   cryptographically valid and semantically false, which is worse than
   no receipt at all.  This is the presentation attack, and it is the
   deepest unsolved problem in authorization evidence, because a
   signature cannot attest to pixels.  This document narrows the gap
   with two additive, offline-checkable pieces that touch no existing
   receipt format: a DETERMINISTIC RENDERER, a pure function from the
   canonical action to a byte-identical human-readable rendering, so a
   verifier RE-DERIVES the rendering from the signed bytes and rejects a
   claimed rendering that does not match; and a DISPLAY ATTESTATION, a
   signed claim by the signing client binding the rendering it showed to
   the action it committed.  Neither eliminates the presentation attack
   (nothing purely digital can), but together they let a verifier check
   the claimed rendering against the signed action under relying-party-
   selected client trust inputs.  They make the residual risk explicit
   rather than hidden.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-schrock-ep-presentation-binding-01"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.schrock-ep-outcome-binding">
   <front>
      <title>Outcome Binding for Authorized Actions and Independently Observed Effects</title>
      <author fullname="Iman Schrock" initials="I." surname="Schrock">
         <organization>EMILIA Protocol, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="28" month="July" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Authorization proves what action was permitted; it does not prove
   what happened after execution.  An executor-signed result improves
   attribution but remains a claim by the party that acted.  This
   document specifies a source-routed Outcome Binding profile.  Signed
   predicted effects identify the source role and source class required
   to evaluate each predicate.  Executors, systems of record, and
   independent observers sign closed observation objects bound to the
   same authorization, action digest, Canonical Action Identifier,
   consumption nonce, operation, facility, and observation window.  A
   deterministic verifier separates evidence availability from
   comparison: missing or unauthenticated required sources yield an
   indeterminate lifecycle state; authentic observations yield the
   closed comparison result in_bounds, divergent, or incomparable.  The
   profile improves consequence reconciliation without claiming physical
   truth, sensor correctness, or legal finality.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-schrock-ep-outcome-binding-00"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.schrock-ep-bounded-execution-program">
   <front>
      <title>Bounded Execution Programs for Consequential Agent Actions</title>
      <author fullname="Iman Schrock" initials="I." surname="Schrock">
         <organization>EMILIA Protocol, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="2" month="August" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   An authorization for one action does not by itself authorize an open-
   ended agent plan.  This document defines an Experimental profile for
   a signed, finite, versioned directed acyclic graph of consequential
   action occurrences.  The program binds a total retained-history
   ceiling.  Each node binds an exact action or a pinned action-matching
   profile, an action- specific Trust Program, outcome-specific
   dependencies, an occurrence ceiling, and fixed charges against
   aggregate attempt budgets.

   A conforming program-aware admission store evaluates reachability and
   budgets in the same linearizable transaction domain as the ordinary
   one-time execution right.  It uses store-owned authorizer trust
   roots, clock, authenticated profile-match verification, and current
   program status; seals a deterministic execution-program resource into
   the AdmissionSnapshot; and fences the program&#x27;s independent
   authorization digest against ordinary-path admission.  The profile
   does not establish that natural-language intent was understood, that
   a plan is safe or lawful, that provider or effect evidence is true,
   or that every mutation path was mediated.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-schrock-ep-bounded-execution-program-00"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination">
   <front>
      <title>P10 Underdetermination Profile: Adjudication Statements over SCITT</title>
      <author fullname="Ivan Nestorov" initials="I." surname="Nestorov">
         <organization>VolMax Studio Lab d.o.o.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   P10 defines a third-party-verifiable binding for
   NotDemonstrated(reason=underdetermined).  A conforming P10
   Adjudication Statement carries two canonical witness worlds that are
   compatible with the same closed evidence set and produce different
   values for the same frozen claim.  The witness result is checked
   against committed profile semantics and bound into a SCITT
   Transparent Statement containing an in-toto Statement v1 predicate.
   The result establishes underdetermination only relative to the
   declared profile and does not identify the actual world or establish
   either claim value as true.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination-03"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.sparysh-pala-audit">
   <front>
      <title>PALA-1: A Tamper-Evident Audit Record Format for Constrained and Disconnected Deployments</title>
      <author fullname="Andrii Sparysh" initials="A." surname="Sparysh">
         <organization>Assault Consulting</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Oleksandr Verteletskyi" initials="O." surname="Verteletskyi">
         <organization>Assault Consulting</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="22" month="October" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes PALA-1 -- version 1 of the Portable Append-
   only Log for Audit -- a compact binary record format for tamper-
   evident audit trails produced by AI inference runtimes and robotic
   control systems.  It is designed for a class of deployment defined by
   three constraints that hold together: the hardware is computationally
   modest and its cycles are reserved for the workload and the power
   budget rather than for the audit trail; no external witness is
   reachable, whether because policy forbids outbound contact or because
   the platform operates beyond connectivity, so a witness is
   unavailable by rule or by physics rather than by circumstance; and
   the right to verify the trail is separated from the right to read
   what it records.

   Records form an append-only hash chain.  Integrity verification
   requires no key material of any kind, inspects no record bodies, and
   costs one hash per record rather than one signature.  The format
   distinguishes three separately answerable questions -- internal
   consistency, completeness against an external anchor, and existence
   at a point in time against an external witness -- and states which of
   the three a given trail actually supports rather than implying all
   three.

   The format is frozen at version 1.0 and is described here as it is.
   This document presents an existing wire format; it does not revise
   one.  Where a deployment does permit an external witness, a chain
   head may be published to a transparency service such as that of the
   Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust architecture (SCITT,
   RFC 9943); that path is described but is not part of the hashing
   contract.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sparysh-pala-audit-02"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence">
   <front>
      <title>Agent Execution Evidence: A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Records of AI Agent Runs</title>
      <author fullname="Shameer Thaha" initials="S." surname="Thaha">
         <organization>Individual Contributor</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Shaibi Shamsudeen" initials="S." surname="Shamsudeen">
         <organization>Individual Contributor</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   AI agents act through calls to models, tools and other agents.
   Identity work establishes who an agent is and what it may do, but
   leaves execution-evidence formats and assurance criteria out of
   scope.  This document profiles the Supply Chain Integrity,
   Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) architecture for Signed Statements
   that bind an agent&#x27;s registered identity, declared capabilities,
   risk-based assessment and supervised operational status to a hash-
   chained record of every call the agent makes.  It also defines
   admission records produced where a call is received, and the linking
   of records for requests that pass between agents of different
   operators.  It specifies Registration Policy, offline verification
   and Bundle requirements.  It does not define an accreditation scheme,
   a universal risk classification, an identifier scheme or a policy
   language.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence-02"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.wright-verdict-record">
   <front>
      <title>Verdict Records: Results on Claims that Cite Receipts as Evidence</title>
      <author fullname="Darren Wright" initials="D." surname="Wright">
         <organization>Sencor AI S.L.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines a verdict record: a statement, bound to its
   issuer, of a result reached on a claim, together with the evidence
   the result relies on and the rule by which the result can be re-
   derived.  Evidence is cited by digest and can be a receipt or record
   in any format, such as a SCITT Receipt or an Agent Action Capsule.
   The document defines how a checker checks a verdict record and what
   such a check does and does not show.  It defines no receipt format
   and changes none.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wright-verdict-record-02"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.xg-payment-dispute-profile">
   <front>
      <title>Card-Scheme Dispute Evidence Profile of Signed Decision Receipts</title>
      <author fullname="Xavier Goshi" initials="X." surname="Goshi">
         <organization>ActaSeal</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="16" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   In an agent-initiated payment dispute, the payer, the merchant, the
   payment service provider and the agent operator each keep their own
   record of the same decision, and none of those records can be
   verified by the other parties.  This document states that problem and
   defines a signed dispute receipt, registrable as the payload of a
   SCITT Signed Statement, that binds the decision to card-scheme
   dispute-evidence categories, to the agent&#x27;s delegated scope, to the
   settlement that actually occurred, and to an evidentiary-custody
   record, so that parties with opposed interests can verify the same
   evidence offline.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-xg-payment-dispute-profile-02"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings">
   <front>
      <title>Deterministic Encodings for COSE</title>
      <author fullname="Steven Mih" initials="S." surname="Mih">
         <organization>Action State Group, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Anton Sokolov" initials="A." surname="Sokolov">
         <organization>Tyche Institute</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="17" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   A COSE Hash Envelope signs the digest of a preimage, not the preimage
   itself.  When the preimage is the encoding of a structured value,
   such as a CBOR data item, and a verifier holds that value but not the
   bytes that were hashed, the verifier has to encode the value again,
   and the digest matches only if it applies the same deterministic
   encoding as the producer.  RFC 8949 describes more than one such
   encoding for the same content type, and the preimage content type
   does not identify which one was applied.  This document defines a
   COSE Hash Envelope protected-header parameter that identifies the
   encoding, and one value for CBOR content, the text string &quot;dtrm&quot;,
   which states that the Core Deterministic Encoding Requirements of RFC
   8949 were applied.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings-01"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="I-D.bryce-cose-receipts-mmr-profile">
   <front>
      <title>COSE Receipts for MMRs</title>
      <author fullname="Robin Bryce" initials="R." surname="Bryce">
         </author>
      <author fullname="Jon Geater" initials="J." surname="Geater">
         </author>
      <date day="19" month="September" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines a new verifiable data structure type for COSE
   Receipts [I-D.ietf-cose-merkle-tree-proofs] specifically for use with
   ledgers based on post-order traversal binary Merkle trees and which
   are designed for high throughput, ease of replication and
   compatibility with commodity cloud storage.

   Post-order traversal binary Merkle trees, also known as history
   trees, are more commonly known as Merkle Mountain Ranges.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-bryce-cose-receipts-mmr-profile-03"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="RECEIPT-SIZE" target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/scitt/sKNL7T_CRu1YX-_rLPRYnyRcixg/">
  <front>
    <title>RFC 9942 inclusion receipts: tree-size is not authenticated by the signed root (message to the SCITT mailing list, and the thread that follows)</title>
    <author initials="B." surname="Kudsi" fullname="Bassem Kudsi">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="EVIDENCE-MATRIX" target="https://github.com/probityai/agent-evidence-matrix/blob/main/MATRIX.md">
  <front>
    <title>Agent evidence conformance matrix</title>
    <author initials="S." surname="Gilda" fullname="Sankalp Gilda">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November"/>
  </front>
</reference>


<reference anchor="RFC7942">
  <front>
    <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
    <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <date month="July" year="2016"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
      <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8949">
  <front>
    <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
    <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
    <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
    <date month="December" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9864">
  <front>
    <title>Fully-Specified Algorithms for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)</title>
    <author fullname="M.B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones"/>
    <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
    <date month="October" year="2025"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This specification refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that fully specify the cryptographic operations to be performed, including any curve, key derivation function (KDF), and hash functions, as being "fully specified". It refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that require additional information beyond the algorithm identifier to determine the cryptographic operations to be performed as being "polymorphic". This specification creates fully-specified algorithm identifiers for registered JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) polymorphic algorithm identifiers, enabling applications to use only fully-specified algorithm identifiers. It deprecates those polymorphic algorithm identifiers.</t>
      <t>This specification updates RFCs 7518, 8037, and 9053. It deprecates polymorphic algorithms defined by RFCs 8037 and 9053 and provides fully-specified replacements for them. It adds to the instructions to designated experts in RFCs 7518 and 9053.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9864"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9864"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="INTEROP" target="https://github.com/Laurent-Lemonnier/dps-scitt-decision-layer">
  <front>
    <title>dps-scitt-decision-layer: worked examples, interop cases and independent verifiers (this document's working repository)</title>
    <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="October"/>
  </front>
</reference>


<reference anchor="RFC3161">
  <front>
    <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)</title>
    <author fullname="C. Adams" initials="C." surname="Adams"/>
    <author fullname="P. Cain" initials="P." surname="Cain"/>
    <author fullname="D. Pinkas" initials="D." surname="Pinkas"/>
    <author fullname="R. Zuccherato" initials="R." surname="Zuccherato"/>
    <date month="August" year="2001"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes the format of a request sent to a Time Stamping Authority (TSA) and of the response that is returned. It also establishes several security-relevant requirements for TSA operation, with regards to processing requests to generate responses. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3161"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3161"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9162">
  <front>
    <title>Certificate Transparency Version 2.0</title>
    <author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"/>
    <author fullname="E. Messeri" initials="E." surname="Messeri"/>
    <author fullname="R. Stradling" initials="R." surname="Stradling"/>
    <date month="December" year="2021"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency (CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs.</t>
      <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6962. It also specifies a new TLS extension that is used to send various CT log artifacts.</t>
      <t>Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9162"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9162"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8792">
  <front>
    <title>Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs</title>
    <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>
    <author fullname="E. Auerswald" initials="E." surname="Auerswald"/>
    <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
    <author fullname="Q. Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu"/>
    <date month="June" year="2020"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines two strategies for handling long lines in width-bounded text content. One strategy, called the "single backslash" strategy, is based on the historical use of a single backslash ('\') character to indicate where line-folding has occurred, with the continuation occurring with the first character that is not a space character (' ') on the next line. The second strategy, called the "double backslash" strategy, extends the first strategy by adding a second backslash character to identify where the continuation begins and is thereby able to handle cases not supported by the first strategy. Both strategies use a self-describing header enabling automated reconstitution of the original content.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8792"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8792"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9597">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims in COSE Headers</title>
    <author fullname="T. Looker" initials="T." surname="Looker"/>
    <author fullname="M.B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones"/>
    <date month="June" year="2024"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes how to include CBOR Web Token (CWT) claims in the header parameters of any CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) structure. This functionality helps to facilitate applications that wish to make use of CWT claims in encrypted COSE structures and/or COSE structures featuring detached signatures, while having some of those claims be available before decryption and/or without inspecting the detached payload. Another use case is using CWT claims with payloads that are not CWT Claims Sets, including payloads that are not CBOR at all.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9597"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9597"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="PROV-O" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-prov-o-20130430/">
  <front>
    <title>PROV-O: The PROV Ontology</title>
    <author initials="T." surname="Lebo" fullname="Timothy Lebo">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Sahoo" fullname="Satya Sahoo">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="D." surname="McGuinness" fullname="Deborah McGuinness">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2013" month="April" day="30"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="W3C" value="REC-prov-o-20130430"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="DECISION-PROV" target="https://github.com/Laurent-Lemonnier/decision-prov">
  <front>
    <title>decision-prov: the records of the Decision Provenance Standard read as W3C PROV, version 0.1.0</title>
    <author initials="L." surname="Lemonnier" fullname="Laurent Lemonnier">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="October"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="SLSA" target="https://slsa.dev/spec/">
  <front>
    <title>SLSA: Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts, provenance predicate</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="IN-TOTO" target="https://github.com/in-toto/attestation">
  <front>
    <title>in-toto Attestation Framework</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="SPDX" target="https://spdx.dev/specifications/">
  <front>
    <title>SPDX Specification</title>
    <author >
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

</references>


<?line 393?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="changes-since-02"><name>Changes since -02</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Clarified verification for one organisation presenting evidence of one occurrence. Added the evidence needed for a presentation, effective authority, policy by content, bounded standing approval and observed result.</t>
  <t>Specified the inputs and scope of comparisons across the existing refund compositions. Distinguished encoding mismatches, choices allowed by the encoding specification, unavailable evidence and correspondences defined by a composition. Added the AIR/DPS global-input versus tool-call comparison and clarified what the result of a recomputed audit verdict establishes.</t>
  <t>Updated the downstream DPS references to the 10 November snapshot. Clarified the distinction between a signed size and an established index. No new artifact type or IANA allocation.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section numbered="false" anchor="changes-since-01"><name>Changes since -01</name>

<t>Note to the RFC Editor: this section is to be removed before publication as an RFC.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Implementation status: a second dispute packet built to the letter of the -02 of the payment dispute profile, registered on 16 November 2026.</t>
  <t>Implementation Status: eight items added, for work done between 6 and 16 November 2026: one action through the four drafts of the adoption discussion, the same chain with a real passkey approval, the same statements on two logs, an outside reading of them, a checker for the COSE deterministic encodings draft, a test of the MMR profile, receipts that sign their tree size and leaf index, and a row in a conformance matrix.</t>
  <t>Related work: three entries added: the three other drafts of the adoption discussion; the COSE deterministic encodings draft; and the SCITT list thread of 15 November 2026 on the tree size and leaf index of <xref target="RFC9942"/> receipts, with the errata announced there and the MMR profile.</t>
  <t>Related work: two entries corrected to follow the current revision of the drafts they describe.</t>
  <t>Checkpoints in a Transparency Service: the sentence on what a Receipt shows is corrected. The service signed a root of its log under which the statement is included; the tree size and the leaf index a receipt states are not covered by its signature.</t>
  <t>Implementation Status, the author's deployment: approvals given on the author's signing page are now signed with his passkey and registered on his Transparency Service.</t>
  <t>Open questions: the sentence that planned a worked case with the Operating Model Protocol for the -02 now points to that case in the repository.</t>
  <t>Open questions and IANA Considerations: two sentences that announced later work are removed.</t>
  <t>Acknowledgments extended; seven informative references added.</t>
  <t>No change to the artifact types, to the verification steps or to any requirement; in the registration of checkpoints, only the sentence named above changes. The extensions are still read at commit 007f8c9.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

<t>Yohay Etsion, Founding Steward of the Decision Provenance Standard, for discussion. Steven Mih, for reading the demonstration and the two declarations and sending the corrections the -01 carries; Tora Toraman, for the correction on what the receipt profile commits to, and for stating the receipt's digest and signature constructions; Anya Chueayen, for the exchange on the approval record of section 8 of the Seal draft. Brennan Zambo, for confirming the readings of the AER-1 conformance kit and asking for the composed example. Sankalp Gilda, for the answers on the audit record's corpus that let its anchors be validated offline; Iman Schrock, for reading the WHO table against the composition draft's -02 candidate and the two corrections that followed; Andrii Sparysh, for stating the bridge task and its boundary; Ivan Nestorov, whose draft's adjudication shape the checkpoint case borrows, and whose own words for what it does not show the case keeps; Tolulope Adebayo, for reading the -00 against Invariant 3 and stating what a reference by instrument hash carries and what it does not. The authors of the capsule, payload binding, AI agent execution and action receipt drafts, whose care in stating what their records do not prove made the junction clear.</t>

<t>For the work the -02 reports: Darren Wright, whose reference checker replays the composed case, and whose run found a failing case whose published files did not hold the altered bytes; Xavier Goshi, for the constructions his profile uses; Shameer Thaha, for the correction on what a confirmation establishes; Mikhail Sergeev, for an outside reading of the registered statements and for the stale log his run found.</t>

</section>
<section numbered="false" anchor="appendix-the-worked-examples"><name>Appendix: the worked examples</name>

<t>The files are kept with this document's source (https://github.com/Laurent-Lemonnier/dps-scitt-decision-layer, examples/release-decision/ and demo/); the digests below let a reader check them.</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Decision record DR-2026-0412 (record schema of the reference files 5.2.0, state closed): "Ship claims-intake 2.3.1 to production on 2026-10-23", three options considered, the first chosen; affirmed by the release manager on 2026-10-23T14:20:00Z. seal_hash: <spanx style="verb">34ba302a668e9200017a1083a92e88773dab1ca620faeaac8cd8bb7747596ba5</spanx>.</t>
  <t>Action-binding attachment (0.3.0, unsigned in this example): seven stages, proposal by the release assistant, review and approval by the release manager under the release charter, without signature in this example, request, re-check, attempt, observed result; one specification, digest <spanx style="verb">19ade2a46319ac6622333cd6731ac400ed11daa7d6955b5daa5864da91c2b711</spanx>, carried in full, naming build 2.3.1+git.5d1c9f0, the artifact digest, the SBOM digest, migration 0042 and the rollback. Attachment digest: <spanx style="verb">5086c7674db770c6d01592ba697722a2fb468c16d1d5ab9226a7b5217c4bc1a8</spanx>.</t>
  <t>The action binding reference check on the attachment with the record: specification digests, record statements, action binding, stage order, authorisation re-check, observed results and rationale provenance verified; execution state attempted, result succeeded; issuer signature and time not checked, as the attachment is unsigned.</t>
  <t>A capsule (format 4, action_type decide, disposition accept by a human, effect confirmed) citing both by typed digest references in references[] with citation_purpose ran_under and acted_on: capsule_id <spanx style="verb">76481fc3bf5016ae51d7be821557f4bd7e40a0c0898ac7d8a6f425fbc135ab9d</spanx> (the -00 quoted <spanx style="verb">8ffac39f...</spanx>, before the effect's response digest was made the JSON digest of the observed response, as the capsule profile requires, and the effect type given a producer prefix); the capsule library (0.12.0) parses it strictly and its Class 1 verification passes with two informational findings (an effect type and a domain outside the seeded values); a verifier of the Standard resolves both references to the documents it holds.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The two references as the capsule carries them, wrapped as <xref target="RFC8792"/> describes:</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

[
 {
  "type": "org.decisionprovenancestandard.decision_record",
  "digest_alg": "SHA-256",
  "digest": "34ba302a668e9200017a1083a92e88773dab1ca620faeaac8cd8\
bb7747596ba5",
  "citation_purpose": "ran_under"
 },
 {
  "type": "org.decisionprovenancestandard.action_binding_attachment",
  "digest_alg": "SHA-256",
  "digest": "5086c7674db770c6d01592ba697722a2fb468c16d1d5ab9226a7\
b5217c4bc1a8",
  "citation_purpose": "acted_on"
 }
]
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>


  </back>

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