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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-li-lamps-ca-key-provenance-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="CA Key Provenance Evidence">Key Provenance Evidence for Certification Authority Keys</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-li-lamps-ca-key-provenance-01"/>
    <author fullname="Leonard Li">
      <organization/>
      <address>
        <email>cuno3u@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <keyword>PKIX</keyword>
    <keyword>certification authority</keyword>
    <keyword>key attestation</keyword>
    <keyword>key ceremony</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 243?>

<t>Many cryptographic modules can sign a statement that they generated a
given key, using an attestation key that the module vendor certifies.
This document defines Key Provenance Evidence (KPE), which applies
this to the keys of certification authorities (CAs).  A KPE file
carries the public key of a CA together with the statements that
modules signed about it.  Anyone can then verify a chain of signatures
from the vendor's trust anchor to the public key in a CA certificate,
and so confirm that the private key was generated inside a module.
The signed statements stay in the formats that module vendors already
use, which are listed in a new IANA registry.  Modules that are
already deployed need no changes.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 257?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>A certification authority (CA) is expected to generate its key pairs
inside a cryptographic module and to keep the private keys there.
Today, the assurance that this happened for a particular CA key comes
from procedural controls: a key generation script, witnessing of the
key ceremony, logs, and an auditor's report (see, for example,
Section 6.1.1.1 of <xref target="CABF-BR"/>).  These controls describe the
process.  They do not let anyone check that the public key in a given
certificate belongs to a private key that the module generated.</t>
      <t>In October 2026, the P-384 private keys of eight subordinate CAs were
found to be integers smaller than 256 <xref target="EMUDHRA-REPORT"/>.  According
to the CA's incident report, the keys had been generated correctly in
a module and were to be transferred to modules of another vendor.  A
host-side script wrapped and unwrapped each key, read the private
value back into host memory, and created a new key object from it.
For these keys, the script truncated the value to its leading byte.
The certificates, including cross-certificates from another CA, were
issued for the re-created keys: keys that were in the module but had
not been generated by it.  The report notes that the ceremony did not
compare the certified public key with the key originally generated,
and that such a check would have detected the problem.</t>
      <t>Eight RSA keys from the same ceremony went through the same steps.
Their values were not changed, but the CA revoked their certificates
because the key material had been in host memory and the CA could not
show that this complied with its policy.  For these keys, the
certified public keys were the ones that the module had generated.
What went wrong is that the private keys left the module.</t>
      <t>In both cases, the CAs that certified the keys had no way to check
what had happened to them, whatever checks the operator made.  The
modules themselves can close this gap.  Many cryptographic modules
can sign a statement about a key that they hold, which says that the
key was generated inside a module and not brought in from outside.
Some modules also state whether the key can ever leave the module.
The module signs this statement with an attestation key, and the
module vendor certifies the attestation key under a trust anchor that
the vendor publishes.  The result is a chain of signatures from the
vendor's trust anchor to the public key of the CA, as shown in
<xref target="fig-chain"/>.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-chain">
        <name>The Chain of Signatures That KPE Verifies</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
  Vendor Trust Anchor
        |
        |  certifies, directly or through intermediate keys
        v
  attestation key, held inside the module
        |
        |  signs
        v
  +----------------------------------------------+
  | public key K                                 |
  | "the private key of K was generated inside   |
  |  a module"                                   |
  +----------------------------------------------+
        |
        |  K is the public key in
        v
  CA certificate or certification request
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>This document is built around that chain.  It defines Key Provenance
Evidence (KPE), which consists of:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>a file that carries the SubjectPublicKeyInfo <xref target="RFC5280"/> of a CA
key together with the signed statements about it (<xref target="file"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the facts that a Verifier takes from a signed statement
(<xref target="facts"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the requirements that the chain has to meet (<xref target="binding"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the procedure to verify the chain (<xref target="verification"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>KPE does not define what a module signs.  Module vendors already
offer key attestation mechanisms, each with its own encoding, and the
signed statement stays in the vendor's format.  Each format is
identified by an entry in an IANA registry (<xref target="iana-formats"/>), as the
attestation statement formats of Web Authentication are <xref target="RFC8809"/>.
Modules that are already deployed therefore need no changes.  A CA
adds one step to its key ceremony: it obtains the signed statement
from the module.</t>
      <t>KPE works with any public key algorithm that has a
SubjectPublicKeyInfo encoding, including RSA, ECDSA and ML-DSA.</t>
      <section anchor="non-goals">
        <name>Non-Goals</name>
        <t>This document does not:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>attest the quality of the module's random bit generator, or the
entropy of any key;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>show how many copies of the private key exist or which modules hold
them.  Exportability (<xref target="facts"/>) can show only that the key cannot
leave modules.  The rest is covered by policy and audit (for
example, <xref target="CABF-BR"/>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>specify when a KPE file is required.  That is left to the policies
of CAs and root programs.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="relationship-to-other-work">
        <name>Relationship to Other Work</name>
        <t>This document depends on no other attestation specification.
<xref target="app-carriers"/> shows how the statements of a KPE file can be
carried in a certification request as described in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation"/>, and how a KPE file can be carried
in a Conceptual Message Wrapper <xref target="RFC9999"/>.  The evidence format for
hardware security modules that <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-pkix-key-attestation"/>
defines could be registered as an Evidence Format (<xref target="format-specs"/>)
once it is published (<xref target="app-rats"/>).  The roles in this document map
onto the RATS architecture <xref target="RFC9334"/>: the Module is the Attester,
the Module Vendor is the Endorser, and the party that checks a KPE
file is the Verifier.</t>
        <t>The PKI Consortium maintains a list of modules and services that
support key attestation, together with instructions for verifying the
evidence of some of them <xref target="PKIC-RKA"/>.  It is concerned with keys of
subscribers, such as code signing keys, and leaves the choice of the
properties to be checked to the module vendor and the verifier.  The
properties that it names as typical, that the key was generated in
the module and cannot be exported, correspond to Origin and
Exportability (<xref target="facts"/>).  This document applies the same approach
to CA keys and adds a file format, a registry of Evidence Formats, and
the requirements that an Evidence Format has to meet.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<dl>
        <dt>Cryptographic Module (Module):</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A hardware security module or similar device that generates and
stores private keys and performs operations with them inside a
protected boundary, for example a module validated under
<xref target="FIPS140-3"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Module Vendor:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The entity that manufactures a Module and operates the public key
infrastructure used to certify the Module's attestation keys.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Vendor Trust Anchor:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A trust anchor, published by a Module Vendor, to which the
attestation keys of the vendor's Modules chain.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Module Evidence:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Data about a key held by a Module: content that the Module signed
with an attestation key that chains to a Vendor Trust Anchor,
together with any further data that the Evidence Format needs to
verify it, such as certificates.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Evidence Format:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A specification of one kind of Module Evidence and of how to verify
it, identified by an object identifier and listed in the registry
defined in <xref target="iana-formats"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Subject Key:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The public key whose provenance a KPE file shows.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Assembler:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The party that creates a KPE file.  Usually the CA operator.  The
Assembler is not trusted by the Verifier.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Verifier:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A party that checks a KPE file, for example a CA about to issue a
certificate for the Subject Key, a root program, an auditor, or a
relying party.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="facts">
      <name>Provenance Facts</name>
      <t>Verifying a piece of Module Evidence under its Evidence Format yields
the following Provenance Facts.  An Evidence Format specification
defines how each fact is derived (<xref target="format-specs"/>).  If a fact cannot
be derived, its value is "unknown".</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Attested Key:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The public key that the Module Evidence is about.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Origin:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>One of "generated", "not-generated" or "unknown".  "generated"
means that a Module created the private key from the output of its
own random bit generator, and that no party outside the Module
supplied the private key, a seed, or any other value from which the
private key can be computed (<xref target="sec-inputs"/>).  That Module is either
the Module that produced the evidence, or a Module from which the
key was cloned or restored by a mechanism that the Evidence Format
specification identifies as preserving this fact.  A mechanism
preserves this fact only if no party outside a Module can create or
change the Origin that the receiving Module records, for example
because the transfer is protected by keys that can be used only
inside Modules.  "not-generated" means that the Module that produced
the evidence reports that the private key entered it from outside,
for example by import, unwrapping or derivation, and not by a
mechanism that preserves "generated".  This does not show that no
other Module generated the key.  Origin describes how the key came
into existence or into the Module.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Exportability:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>One of "not-exportable", "exportable" or "unknown".
"not-exportable" means that no function of a Module has made the
private key, or any value from which it can be computed, available
outside Modules since the key was created in or brought into a
Module, and that nobody, including the operator of the Module, can
cause this later, for example by changing an attribute of the key,
the configuration of a Module or its firmware.  Functions that
transfer the key between Modules, for example for backup or cloning,
are excluded if the Evidence Format specification identifies them as
keeping the key inside Modules.  A function keeps the key inside
Modules only if no party outside a Module can obtain the key from
what the function transfers, every Module that can receive the key
is subject to the same restrictions, and no party outside a Module
can create or change the Exportability that the receiving Module
records.  "exportable" means that the Module Evidence shows that a
function of a Module could have made the key available outside
Modules in another way, or still can, for example because the key is
or was marked as extractable.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Module Description:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Information about two Modules, which can be the same Module.  The
Producing Module is the Module that produced the evidence, as it was
when it produced the evidence.  The Generating Module is the Module
that generated the key, as it was when it generated the key.  For
each of them, the Module Description can give the Module Vendor, the
Module model, the firmware version, the Module serial number, and
identifiers of validation certificates for the Module, such as a
<xref target="FIPS140-3"/> certificate number.  A value describes the Generating
Module only if the Evidence Format specification says so.  Otherwise
it describes the Producing Module.  Values that the Module Evidence
does not give are "unknown".</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Trust Path:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The certification path from the key that signed the Module Evidence
to a Vendor Trust Anchor, including the identity of that anchor.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="binding">
      <name>Cryptographic Binding</name>
      <t>A Verifier checks the chain in <xref target="fig-chain"/> from the certificate
upwards, in three steps.  Every Evidence Format <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> support all
three, and the Verification Procedure (<xref target="verification"/>) performs all
three.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Certificate to KPE file:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The SubjectPublicKeyInfo in the certificate or certification request
is byte-for-byte identical to subjectKey.  This check needs no
cryptography, because the Verifier holds both values.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>KPE file to Module Evidence:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The Module Evidence contains a signature over some signed content,
made with an attestation key that is held inside the Module.  The
signed content <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the Attested Key, either as the
complete public key or as a hash of it.  The included key, or the
data that is hashed, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> determine the public key algorithm, all
of its parameters, and the key value.  The hash function <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
provide at least 128 bits of security against second preimages, and
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide at least 384 bits, as SHA-384 and SHA-512 do
<xref target="FIPS180-4"/>.  <xref target="app-hash"/> explains these values.  The Verifier
compares the Attested Key with subjectKey as described in
<xref target="verification"/>.
</t>
          <t>The signed content <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also establish the Origin of the private
key corresponding to the Attested Key, either through a value in
the signed content or because the Module produces signed content of
this kind only for keys with one Origin.  Where the Evidence Format
supports Exportability, the same applies to it.  The origin or the
attributes of a public key object are not sufficient, because a
public key can be placed in a Module without its private key.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Module Evidence to Vendor Trust Anchor:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The attestation key is certified by a chain of signatures, the
Trust Path, that ends at a Vendor Trust Anchor.  The Evidence
Format specification defines how the Trust Path is validated
(<xref target="format-specs"/>).  If the Trust Path consists of X.509
certificates, the Verifier validates it as described in Section 6
of <xref target="RFC5280"/>, except where the Evidence Format specification
states a different rule.
</t>
          <t>It is not enough that the Trust Path ends at a Vendor Trust Anchor.
The Verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also check that the Trust Path identifies the
attestation key as a key that the Module Vendor has designated for
signing Module Evidence of this Evidence Format, for example
through an extended key usage in its certificate (<xref target="sec-roles"/>).
The Module Vendor asserts that such a key can be used only inside a
Module, and that a Module uses it only to sign content that the
Module itself constructs.  The Verifier cannot check this assertion
and relies on the Module Vendor for it.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>The signed content <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have only one interpretation under the
Evidence Format specification, including when it contains values that
the operator of the Module chose, such as a key label
(<xref target="sec-content"/>).</t>
      <t>Every signature that the Verifier relies on, that is, the signature
over the signed content and each signature in the Trust Path, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
use an algorithm and a key size that provide a security strength of
at least 112 bits, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide at least 128 bits (see, for
example, <xref target="SP800-57"/>).  The hash function of such a signature <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
be collision resistant.  A Verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept a signature that
uses MD5 or SHA-1.  This is stricter than the requirement for the
hash of the Attested Key, because signed content can contain values
that the operator of the Module chose (<xref target="sec-content"/>).  The
self-signature of a trust anchor is not relied on and is outside this
requirement.</t>
      <t>A Verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> take every Provenance Fact from content covered by a
signature that it has verified: either the signed content of the
Module Evidence or a certificate in the Trust Path.  Everything else
in a KPE file can be written or changed by whoever assembles the
file.  This includes subjectKey, format, and any data in the Module
Evidence that no verified signature covers.  The Verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
use any of it as the source of a Provenance Fact.</t>
      <t>Assume that Modules and the Module Vendor behave as the Evidence
Format specification states.  Then a KPE file that passes
verification for a given SubjectPublicKeyInfo can exist only if one
of the following happened:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>a Module generated the corresponding private key, and that Module,
or a Module that received the key through a mechanism that
preserves Origin (<xref target="facts"/>), signed evidence for that key;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>someone forged a signature of the attestation key or of a key in
the Trust Path, or found two different contents with the same hash
under the hash function of such a signature;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the Attested Key is included as a hash, and someone found a
different public key with the same hash.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>If the Verifier also requires Exportability "not-exportable", the
first case further means that no function of a Module has made the
private key available outside Modules, or can do so (<xref target="facts"/>).</t>
      <t>So, beyond the correct behavior of Modules and the Module Vendor, the
security of KPE rests on the unforgeability of the signatures that
the Verifier checks, on the collision resistance of their hash
functions, and on the second-preimage resistance of the hash that
identifies the Attested Key.</t>
      <t>The assumption of correct behavior carries real weight.  It includes
that an attestation key signs nothing except content that the Module
constructed, that the operator of a Module cannot extract its
attestation key, that a Module records a key as generated only if the
key meets the definition in <xref target="facts"/>, and that a key leaves a Module
only through the functions that the Evidence Format specification
lists.  <xref target="format-specs"/> requires each Evidence Format specification
to state how these properties are met.  <xref target="sec-operator"/> and
<xref target="sec-roles"/> describe what follows when they are not.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="file">
      <name>Key Provenance Evidence File</name>
      <section anchor="structure">
        <name>Structure</name>
        <t>A KPE file is the DER <xref target="X.690"/> encoding of the following ASN.1
<xref target="X.680"/> structure.  The complete ASN.1 module is in
<xref target="asn1-module"/>.</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
KeyProvenanceEvidence ::= SEQUENCE {
  version     KPEVersion,
  subjectKey  SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
  statements  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ProvenanceStatement }

KPEVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }

ProvenanceStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
  format      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  evidence    OCTET STRING }
]]></sourcecode>
        <dl>
          <dt>version:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be v1 for files that conform to this document.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>subjectKey:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the Subject Key, in the same DER
encoding that appears in certificates and certification requests
<xref target="RFC2986"/> for the key.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>statements:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>One or more pieces of Module Evidence about the Subject Key.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>format:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The object identifier of the Evidence Format of this statement, as
registered in <xref target="iana-formats"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>evidence:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The Module Evidence, encoded as its Evidence Format specifies.  The
encoding can be a container that host software assembles.  The
Assembler <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry signed content in the exact encoding over
which the signature was computed.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>A KPE file has no signature of its own.  The Verifier uses version
and format only to decode the file and to select an Evidence Format,
and uses subjectKey only to compare it with the certificate and with
the Attested Key (<xref target="verification"/>).  It takes the Provenance Facts
from signed content only (<xref target="binding"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="textual-encoding">
        <name>Textual Encoding</name>
        <t>A KPE file <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be represented in the textual encoding of <xref target="RFC7468"/>
with the label "KEY PROVENANCE EVIDENCE":</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
-----BEGIN KEY PROVENANCE EVIDENCE-----
(base64 encoding of the DER-encoded KeyProvenanceEvidence)
-----END KEY PROVENANCE EVIDENCE-----
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="media-type">
        <name>Media Type</name>
        <t>The media type "application/key-provenance-evidence"
(<xref target="iana-media-type"/>) identifies a KPE file in its DER encoding.  It
is not used for the textual encoding.  The file extension for the DER
encoding is ".kpe".</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="assembling-a-kpe-file">
        <name>Assembling a KPE File</name>
        <t>To produce a KPE file for a CA key, the CA operator:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>generates the key pair inside a Module;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>obtains Module Evidence for the key, as described by the Evidence
Format specification.  The CA operator <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> do this during the
key generation ceremony, before the public key is used in any
certification request or certificate, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> record the
evidence in the ceremony log;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>sets subjectKey to the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the key;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>places the Module Evidence in statements.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Statements <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be added to an existing KPE file later.  For example,
the operator might add evidence from a backup Module, or evidence in a
newer Evidence Format.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="format-specs">
      <name>Evidence Format Specifications</name>
      <t>An Evidence Format specification <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be publicly available and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
contain:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>the object identifier of the Evidence Format;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the encoding of the Module Evidence carried in the evidence field,
including any container that host software assembles;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>which part of the Module Evidence is the signed content, how to
verify the signature over it, and which signature algorithms are
allowed (<xref target="binding"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>how to parse the signed content so that it has only one
interpretation (<xref target="binding"/>).  This includes how values that the
operator of the Module chose, such as key labels, are delimited,
and which signed value tells the Verifier which version or layout
of the signed content it has;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>how to build the Trust Path and how to validate it at the time of
verification: which signatures are verified, which algorithms are
allowed, and how validity periods and revocation status are
checked, or a statement that the mechanism has none.  This item
also says where the Vendor Trust Anchors are published;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>how the Verifier recognizes from the Trust Path that the Module
Vendor has designated the attestation key for signing Module
Evidence of this Evidence Format (<xref target="binding"/>), for example by an
extended key usage, a policy identifier, or the position of its
certificate under a specific vendor CA.  The specification states
what the Module Vendor asserts about keys with this designation:
that they can be used only inside a Module, and that a Module uses
them only to sign content that the Module itself constructs.  It
also states what else the attestation key and the other keys in
the Trust Path sign, and why none of that can be accepted as
Module Evidence of this Evidence Format;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>which signatures and which Trust Path are required when the Module
Evidence carries more than one, for example a chain from the
Module Vendor and a chain from a service provider that hosts the
Module;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>how to derive each of the Provenance Facts in <xref target="facts"/> from
signed content.  This includes whether the Attested Key is included
as the complete public key or as a hash, which hash function is
used, how the Attested Key is compared with a
SubjectPublicKeyInfo, and how the signed content shows that the
Origin, and the Exportability if supported, are those of the
private key corresponding to the Attested Key;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>how the Module determines Origin.  For example, a Module might use
a key attribute that it sets at generation and does not allow to
change, such as CKA_LOCAL in <xref target="PKCS11"/>.  The specification lists
the ways of creating a key that result in "generated", and states
whether any of them accepts a seed or another secret value from
outside the Module;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>whether the Evidence Format supports Exportability, and if so, how
the Module determines it.  The specification lists every function
by which a Module can let a private key, or a value from which it
can be computed, leave it, including wrapping, backup, cloning,
splitting into shares, and vendor-specific functions.  For each
function it states whether the function keeps the key inside
Modules (<xref target="facts"/>) and why, to which Modules it can transfer the
key, and whether it can be enabled later for an existing key.  For
example, a Module that implements <xref target="PKCS11"/> might use the
attribute CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, which the Module sets and which is
true only if the key has never been extractable, together with a
statement about the backup and cloning functions of the Module,
which that attribute does not necessarily control;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>under which conditions the Module produces the Module Evidence;
whether it can be produced for a key some time after the key was
generated; and whether Origin and Exportability are preserved when
the key is backed up, cloned or otherwise transferred to another
Module.  If either is preserved, the specification states by which
mechanism, why the mechanism meets the conditions in <xref target="facts"/>, and
which Modules can be the source of such a transfer;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>which Module models and firmware versions produce the Module
Evidence, and how the Verifier establishes from signed data that
the Producing Module is one of them and is a production unit, not
a development unit, an emulator, or a unit in a test mode;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>whether code that the operator can load into the Module can
affect key generation, key attributes, the functions by which keys
leave the Module, or the content of the Module Evidence, and if
so, how the Module Evidence shows that the Module allows or
contains such code.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>The derivation of Origin <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sound.  It yields "generated" only
if, for Modules that behave as the specification states, the signed
content could not have been produced for a key that does not meet the
definition of "generated" in <xref target="facts"/>.  The same applies to
"not-exportable" and the derivation of Exportability.  Where this
depends on something that the Module Evidence does not show, such as
how a wrapping key was created or whether a backup function can be
enabled, the derivation yields "unknown".</t>
      <t>An Evidence Format specification <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> state which values of the
Module Description describe the Generating Module (<xref target="facts"/>).  If
the Module records the firmware version that was in use when the key
was generated, the Module Evidence <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include it.</t>
      <t>An Evidence Format specification <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide test vectors and
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> reference a verifier implementation that is publicly available.</t>
      <ul empty="true">
        <li>
          <t>Editor's note: Existing vendor key attestation mechanisms are
candidates for registration.  <xref target="app-vendors"/> summarizes what their
public documentation shows.  Whether each of them supports deriving
the Provenance Facts, including Exportability, and meets the
requirements of <xref target="binding"/>, for each key algorithm of interest, has
not been confirmed with the vendors yet.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="verification">
      <name>Verification Procedure</name>
      <t>Inputs:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>a KPE file;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the SubjectPublicKeyInfo S of the certificate or certification
request being checked;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the Verifier's policy: the Evidence Formats that the Verifier
accepts; for each of them, the Vendor Trust Anchors that it accepts;
the rules that decide whether a Module Description is acceptable;
and whether it requires Exportability "not-exportable".</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The Verifier performs the following steps:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Decode the KPE file.  If it is not the DER encoding of one
KeyProvenanceEvidence value with no data after it, or version is
not v1, the verification fails.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If subjectKey is not byte-for-byte identical to S, the verification
fails.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>For each ProvenanceStatement:
          </t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>If the Verifier does not implement the Evidence Format
identified by format, or its policy does not accept that
Evidence Format, skip the statement.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Parse the Module Evidence, verify the signature over the signed
content, and validate the Trust Path as of the time of
verification, all as the Evidence Format specification
describes.  This includes checking that the
attestation key and the other keys in the Trust Path have the
roles that the specification requires, and that every signature
meets the requirements of <xref target="binding"/>.  Derive the Provenance
Facts from signed content only.  If any of this
fails, or if the Module Evidence deviates from the form that
the specification defines, for example by a repeated element or
by unexpected data, skip the statement.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The statement is satisfying if all of the following hold:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>the Attested Key is the same public key as subjectKey.  If the
signed content includes the complete public key, the
comparison <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be made on the decoded public key, that is,
the algorithm, its parameters, and the key value, and not on
an encoding.  If it includes a hash, the Verifier computes the
hash from subjectKey as the Evidence Format specification
describes and compares the two values.  If either key cannot
be decoded unambiguously, the statement is not satisfying;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Origin is "generated";</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>if the Verifier's policy requires it, Exportability is
"not-exportable";</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>the Trust Path ends at a Vendor Trust Anchor that the Verifier
accepts for this Evidence Format;</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>the Module Description is acceptable under the Verifier's
policy.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If at least one statement is satisfying, the verification succeeds.
Otherwise it fails.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>On success, the Verifier's result is the Provenance Facts of a
satisfying statement.  A Verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat "unknown" as
satisfying any condition in step 3.3.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="use">
      <name>Use in Certificate Issuance and Disclosure</name>
      <t>Where a policy requires a KPE file, the following applies:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A CA that issues a certificate to another CA, including a
cross-certificate, verifies a KPE file for the Subject Key before
issuance, using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the certification
request or the to-be-signed certificate as S.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A CA operator makes the KPE file for each of its CA keys, including
those of root CAs, available to root programs and other parties
that the policy names.  For example, the operator might publish it
alongside the key ceremony report.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A KPE file can be produced for a key that is already in service if
the Evidence Format supports producing Module Evidence for existing
keys.  This allows existing CA keys to be checked retroactively.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A key that a Module did not generate, for example a key generated
outside any Module and then imported, cannot obtain a KPE file that
passes verification.  A policy that introduces KPE can therefore apply
it to keys generated after a given date.</t>
      <t>A Verifier gets the same result no matter who delivers the file or how
it is delivered.  A KPE file can therefore be sent with a certification
request, published in a repository, or exchanged by any other means.
<xref target="app-carriers"/> describes how its content can be carried in
structures that other specifications define.</t>
      <t>A KPE file is about a key, not about a certificate.  It applies to
every certificate for the Subject Key, including cross-certificates,
for as long as any of them is in use.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="what-is-and-is-not-shown">
        <name>What Is and Is Not Shown</name>
        <t>A successful verification shows that the private key for the Subject
Key was generated inside a Module.  It shows what happened to the key
afterwards only if the Verifier requires Exportability
"not-exportable": then no function of a Module has made the key
available outside Modules, or can do so.  It does not show how many
copies of the key exist inside Modules, or where they are.  It also
does not show that the Module's random bit generator worked
correctly.  A key generated by a Module with a failed random bit
generator passes verification.  Such a failure is likely to affect
every key and every signature produced by that Module, and is out of
scope for this document.</t>
        <t>KPE detects the substitution of a key that the Module did not
generate, whether or not the substituted key is weak.  With
Exportability "not-exportable", it also detects a key that a Module
generated but let leave, for example by wrapping it under a key that
host software holds (<xref target="example"/>).</t>
        <t>A successful verification also does not show who operated the Module
that generated the key.  Anyone who has a Module of an accepted model
can obtain valid Module Evidence for the keys that this Module
generates.  A policy that requires the key to come from a particular
Module, for example one listed in the audited inventory of the CA,
has to compare the serial number in the Module Description with that
record.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="vendor-trust">
        <name>Trust in Module Vendors</name>
        <t>The facts shown by KPE are only as reliable as the Module Vendor's
attestation keys and the Module firmware.  If an attestation key or a
Vendor Trust Anchor is compromised, false Module Evidence can be
produced.  The same is true if a firmware version reports Origin or
Exportability incorrectly, or if a later firmware version lets a key
that earlier evidence reported as "not-exportable" leave the Module.
Verifier policies <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> let the Verifier stop accepting a Vendor
Trust Anchor, an Evidence Format, specific Module models or firmware
versions, and individual Modules identified by their serial numbers
(<xref target="sec-operator"/>).  This document does not defend against a
Module or a Module Vendor that is malicious.</t>
        <t>The registration of an Evidence Format (<xref target="iana-formats"/>) shows that
a specification exists and covers the items in <xref target="format-specs"/>.  It
does not show that the mechanism is secure.  A Verifier decides for
itself which Evidence Formats it accepts.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-operator">
        <name>The Operator as Adversary</name>
        <t>In the cases that KPE is meant to detect, the false statement about a
key comes from the CA operator, by mistake or on purpose.  The CA
operator has physical possession of the Module, administers it,
controls the host software, and chooses every value that the Module's
interface lets a user choose.  The verification procedure trusts none
of this.  It trusts only what the Module signs.  KPE therefore
depends on the Module protecting its attestation key and its record
of each key's Origin and Exportability against its own operator.</t>
        <t>If the operator of a Module extracts its attestation key, the
operator can produce Module Evidence for any public key, with any
Origin or Exportability, and that evidence verifies under the Vendor
Trust Anchor.
The resistance of the Module to physical and logical attacks by the
party that holds it, as assessed for example in a validation under
<xref target="FIPS140-3"/>, is therefore part of the security of KPE.  A Verifier
policy can require such a validation through the Module Description.</t>
        <t>Evidence forged in this way carries the identity of the Module whose
attestation key was extracted.  This is why a Verifier should be able
to stop accepting an individual Module (<xref target="vendor-trust"/>), in
particular where the vendor mechanism has no revocation
(<xref target="sec-time"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-roles">
        <name>Attestation Keys and Other Keys Under the Same Trust Anchor</name>
        <t>A chain of signatures to a Vendor Trust Anchor shows that the vendor,
or a device of the vendor, certified a key.  It does not show what
that key is for.  A vendor can use one trust anchor for several
product lines, for development units and emulators, and for keys with
other purposes, such as keys of smart cards or keys that sign time
stamps or logs.  Some Modules also let the operator choose which key
signs evidence.  That key can be one that the operator imported, or
one that can also sign arbitrary data, and the Module can certify it
with a key that chains to the Vendor Trust Anchor.</t>
        <t>If a Verifier accepted a signature from any key that chains to the
trust anchor, the operator could obtain false Module Evidence without
breaking any algorithm, for example by writing the content of the
evidence and having a general-purpose signing key sign it.  For this
reason <xref target="binding"/> requires the Verifier to establish that the Module
Vendor designated the attestation key for this purpose, and
<xref target="format-specs"/> requires each Evidence Format specification to say
how.  This check does not remove the need to trust the Module Vendor.
It limits that trust to the keys about which the vendor makes its
assertion, and excludes every other key under the same trust anchor.
The same care applies to every other key in the Trust Path: a
certificate is accepted at a given position only if its key is
allowed to sign what follows it.</t>
        <t>A service provider that hosts Modules can add its own signature or
its own certificate chain to the Module Evidence.  Such a chain shows
that the provider vouches for the Module.  It does not replace the
Trust Path to the Vendor Trust Anchor.  A Verifier that accepted the
provider's chain alone would be trusting the provider, not the Module
Vendor.</t>
        <t>For the same reason, a Verifier accepts a Vendor Trust Anchor only
for the Evidence Formats for which it is meant (<xref target="verification"/>).
Content that is harmless under the rules of one Evidence Format can
have a different meaning under the rules of another.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-content">
        <name>Operator-Chosen Values in Signed Content</name>
        <t>Signed content often contains values that the operator of the Module
chose: key labels, identifiers, usage policies, or a challenge
supplied with the request.  The Module signs them together with the
facts that matter.  This allows two attacks that need no access to
any key.</t>
        <t>The first attack uses an ambiguous encoding.  If a chosen value can
be read as part of the surrounding structure, for example a label
that contains markup in a text-based format, the operator can make
the Module sign content that a tolerant parser reads as evidence
about a different key or with different Provenance Facts.  <xref target="binding"/>
therefore requires that signed content has only one interpretation,
and <xref target="verification"/> requires the Verifier to reject Module Evidence
that deviates from the defined form.  Searching the signed content
for a field name is not a safe way to parse it.</t>
        <t>The second attack uses hash collisions.  If the signature is computed
with a hash function that is not collision resistant, the operator
may be able to prepare two contents with the same hash that differ in
the key or in a Provenance Fact, have the Module sign the harmless
one, and attach the signature to the other.  Chosen-prefix collisions
of this kind are practical for MD5 and SHA-1 <xref target="SHAMBLES"/>.
<xref target="binding"/> therefore requires collision-resistant hash functions in
signatures.  The hash that identifies the Attested Key is a different
matter (<xref target="app-hash"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-inputs">
        <name>Key Generation Inputs</name>
        <t>A key that a Module computes from a seed or another secret value
supplied from outside does not have Origin "generated" (<xref target="facts"/>),
even if the Module's interface calls the operation key generation.
Standard interfaces keep the two apart.  For example, <xref target="PKCS11"/> does
not allow the seed of an ML-DSA key to be supplied when the key is
generated, and it marks keys that are created from supplied values,
unwrapped or derived as not locally generated.  Vendor-specific
functions do not necessarily follow the same rule.  This is why
<xref target="format-specs"/> requires an Evidence Format specification to list
the ways of creating a key that result in "generated".</t>
        <t>The operator still chooses the public inputs of key generation: the
algorithm, the key size, and parameters such as an RSA public
exponent or an elliptic curve.  Origin "generated" does not show that
these were chosen well.  A key that a Module generated over a weak
group selected by the operator is a weak key.  These choices are
visible in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo.  A Verifier therefore applies
its own requirements for algorithms, key sizes and parameters to S,
as it would without KPE.  For elliptic curve keys, <xref target="RFC5480"/>
already requires that the curve is identified by name.</t>
        <t>Some Modules can run code that the operator loads into the protected
boundary.  Depending on the product, such code might influence how
keys are generated, which attributes they get, or what the Module
signs.  <xref target="format-specs"/> requires an Evidence Format specification to
cover this.  If such code can affect the Origin or the Exportability
that the Module reports, and the Module Evidence does not show
whether it was present, the derivation of that fact yields "unknown".</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="unauthenticated-container">
        <name>Unauthenticated Container</name>
        <t>Anyone can create or modify a KPE file.  This is safe because a
Verifier accepts a file only if one statement contains Module Evidence
that verifies under an accepted Vendor Trust Anchor and whose Attested
Key equals subjectKey, and only if subjectKey equals the certificate's
SubjectPublicKeyInfo (<xref target="verification"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="key-comparison">
        <name>Key Comparison</name>
        <t>Vendor formats can encode public keys differently from a
SubjectPublicKeyInfo.  For example, an elliptic curve point can be
compressed or uncompressed.  For this reason, step 3.3 compares
decoded public keys, or a hash computed as the Evidence Format
specifies.  Step 2 compares encodings byte for byte, because the CA
operator supplies both the KPE file and the SubjectPublicKeyInfo to
be certified, and a byte comparison leaves no room for ambiguity.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-transfer">
        <name>Backup and Cloning</name>
        <t>CA keys are routinely backed up or cloned to other Modules.  Some
Modules record Origin only in the Module that generated the key.  In
that case, the Module Evidence has to be obtained from the generating
Module, or obtained before the key is cloned.  The CA operator should
plan for this in the key ceremony.</t>
        <t>Keys also move between Modules by wrapping and unwrapping.  With
standard interfaces, a key that enters a Module in this way is not
marked as locally generated (<xref target="sec-inputs"/>).  Keys that move between
Modules of different vendors usually move in this way.  Module
Evidence with Origin "generated" for such a key can then come only
from the Module that generated it, or from a Module that received the
key from it by a mechanism that preserves Origin.  If none of these
Modules supports an Evidence Format that the Verifier accepts, the key
cannot obtain such evidence, even if every step of the transfer was
carried out correctly.  Vendor-specific mechanisms for cloning, backup
and restore are different.  They carry the attributes of the key with
it, and the receiving Module records the Origin that the transfer
conveys.  Such a mechanism preserves
Origin only under the condition stated in <xref target="facts"/>.  In particular,
if the operator can choose or learn the key that protects the
transfer, the operator can construct a transfer that conveys any
Origin.</t>
        <t>Wrapping also affects Exportability.  A key wrapped under a key that
the operator can choose or learn has been available outside Modules,
because the operator can unwrap it outside any Module.  With standard
interfaces, such a key cannot be reported as "not-exportable": in
<xref target="PKCS11"/>, a key can be wrapped only if its CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute
is true, and a key that has ever had this attribute set to true has
CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE false.  Vendor-specific backup and cloning
functions often do not depend on these attributes, which is why
<xref target="format-specs"/> requires an Evidence Format specification to list
them.  A CA operator whose keys have to meet a policy that requires
"not-exportable" has to choose, before generating a key, a backup and
cloning method that keeps the key inside Modules.</t>
        <t>When Origin is preserved across transfers, "generated" in evidence
from the receiving Module means that some Module among the possible
sources generated the key.  The assurance is that of the weakest
Module that can be a source.  That Module might be an older model,
run an earlier firmware version, or be configured differently.
Unless the Module Evidence describes the Generating Module, a
Verifier that accepts such an Evidence Format accepts every source
that the Evidence Format specification names (<xref target="format-specs"/>).
Likewise, "not-exportable" is only as strong as the weakest Module to
which the key can be transferred.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-replay">
        <name>Replay</name>
        <t>Module Evidence records how a key came into existence and, through
Exportability, whether the key can ever leave Modules.  Neither
changes over time.  Presenting the same evidence again for the same
key conveys facts that are still true.  Evidence for one key cannot be
presented for another key (<xref target="binding"/>).  KPE therefore needs no nonce
or other freshness mechanism.  KPE does not show that a key is still
held by a Module today.  A Verifier that needs to know that has to use
a different mechanism.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-time">
        <name>Verification Over Time</name>
        <t>A Verifier validates the Trust Path as of the time of verification.
Module Evidence whose Trust Path has since expired or been revoked
fails verification, even if the path was valid when the Module
produced the evidence.  In that case the CA operator can obtain new
Module Evidence for the key, if the Evidence Format supports producing
evidence for existing keys (<xref target="format-specs"/>) and the Module Vendor
provides a Trust Path that is valid at that time, for example by
issuing a new certificate for the attestation key.  If the vendor
does not, the key no longer passes verification.  This approach
avoids having to establish, years later, when a piece of evidence was
produced.</t>
        <t>Not every vendor mechanism has validity periods or revocation, and an
Evidence Format specification states which checks apply
(<xref target="format-specs"/>).  Where a mechanism has neither, a Trust Path
stops being acceptable only when the Verifier's policy stops
accepting it (<xref target="vendor-trust"/>).</t>
        <t>The Producing Module and the Generating Module (<xref target="facts"/>) can
differ, for example after cloning, and a Module's firmware can be
updated after the Module generated the key.  A Verifier policy that
distrusts a firmware version because of a fault in key generation
needs the firmware version of the Generating Module.  A policy that
distrusts a firmware version because of a fault in producing evidence
needs that of the Producing Module.  When the Module Evidence does
not describe the Generating Module, a policy of the first kind fails.
It does not fall back to the firmware version of the Producing
Module.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="disclosure-of-module-information">
        <name>Disclosure of Module Information</name>
        <t>A KPE file reveals the Module Vendor, the model, the firmware version
and possibly the serial number of the Module that produced the
evidence, and possibly of the Module that generated the key.  This
information helps an attacker choose an attack against a specific
firmware version.  CA operators and policy authors should weigh this
when deciding where KPE files are published.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="asn1-module-identifier">
        <name>ASN.1 Module Identifier</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to assign an object identifier for the ASN.1 module
in <xref target="asn1-module"/> in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier"
registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), with the description
"id-mod-key-provenance-2026" and a reference to this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="iana-formats">
        <name>Key Provenance Evidence Formats Registry</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to create a registry titled "Key Provenance Evidence
Formats".  Each entry has the following fields:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Object Identifier:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The identifier of the Evidence Format.  It <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be allocated from any
object identifier arc that the registrant controls.  It identifies
Module Evidence that is carried in an OCTET STRING, as in the
evidence field (<xref target="file"/>).  An object identifier that another
specification uses with a different meaning, or for a value of a
different ASN.1 type, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be registered.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A short descriptive name.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Specification:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A reference to the publicly available Evidence Format specification.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The entity that can change the specification, normally the Module
Vendor.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The registration policy is Specification Required <xref target="RFC8126"/>.  The
designated experts should check that:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the specification is publicly available and stable;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the specification covers every item listed in <xref target="format-specs"/>,
in particular which content is signed and how each Provenance Fact
is derived from it;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the encoding, the meaning of the Object Identifier, and the
verification rules are described in enough detail that independent
implementations can interoperate;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the Object Identifier is not already registered and is not used
elsewhere with a different meaning or type.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The experts are not asked to evaluate the security of the mechanism
or of any product (<xref target="vendor-trust"/>).</t>
        <t>A third party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> register an Evidence Format that a Module Vendor has
deployed and publicly documented, if the experts find that the vendor
documentation covers the items in <xref target="format-specs"/>.  In that case the
Module Vendor is recorded as the Change Controller.</t>
        <t>The registry is initially empty.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="iana-media-type">
        <name>Media Type Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following media type in the "Media
Types" registry, in accordance with <xref target="RFC6838"/>.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Type name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>application</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Subtype name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>key-provenance-evidence</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Required parameters:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>N/A</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Optional parameters:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>N/A</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Encoding considerations:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>binary</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Security considerations:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>See the Security Considerations section of this document.  A KPE
file contains no active content.  It has no signature of its own,
and a recipient relies on it only through the verification
procedure in <xref target="verification"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>N/A</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Published specification:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>This document</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Applications that use this media type:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Software of certification authorities, root programs and auditors
that produces, publishes or verifies Key Provenance Evidence.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>N/A</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Additional information:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A.  Magic number(s): N/A.
File extension(s): .kpe.  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>See the Authors' Addresses section of this document.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Intended usage:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>COMMON</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>N/A</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Author:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>See the Authors' Addresses section of this document.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Change controller:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>IETF</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Provisional registration?  (standards tree only):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>No</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5912">
          <front>
            <title>New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="June" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5912"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5912"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7468">
          <front>
            <title>Textual Encodings of PKIX, PKCS, and CMS Structures</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Leonard" initials="S." surname="Leonard"/>
            <date month="April" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes and discusses the textual encodings of the Public-Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX), Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), and Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The textual encodings are well-known, are implemented by several applications and libraries, and are widely deployed. This document articulates the de facto rules by which existing implementations operate and defines them so that future implementations can interoperate.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7468"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7468"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8126">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t>
              <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t>
              <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X.680">
          <front>
            <title>Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ITU-T</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.680"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X.690">
          <front>
            <title>Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ITU-T</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.690"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2986">
          <front>
            <title>PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nystrom" initials="M." surname="Nystrom"/>
            <author fullname="B. Kaliski" initials="B." surname="Kaliski"/>
            <date month="November" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo represents a republication of PKCS #10 v1.7 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change control is retained within the PKCS process. The body of this document, except for the security considerations section, is taken directly from the PKCS #9 v2.0 or the PKCS #10 v1.7 document. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5480">
          <front>
            <title>Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information</title>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
            <author fullname="D. Brown" initials="D." surname="Brown"/>
            <author fullname="K. Yiu" initials="K." surname="Yiu"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Polk" initials="T." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="March" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public Key Information field in certificates that support Elliptic Curve Cryptography. This document updates Sections 2.3.5 and 5, and the ASN.1 module of "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5480"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5480"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6838">
          <front>
            <title>Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures</title>
            <author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed"/>
            <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/>
            <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
            <date month="January" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines procedures for the specification and registration of media types for use in HTTP, MIME, and other Internet protocols. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="13"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6838"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6838"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8809">
          <front>
            <title>Registries for Web Authentication (WebAuthn)</title>
            <author fullname="J. Hodges" initials="J." surname="Hodges"/>
            <author fullname="G. Mandyam" initials="G." surname="Mandyam"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="August" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines IANA registries for W3C Web Authentication (WebAuthn) attestation statement format identifiers and extension identifiers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8809"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8809"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9334">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
            <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="W. Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan"/>
            <date month="January" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9334"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9334"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9999">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW)</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="T. Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The conceptual messages introduced by the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture (RFC 9334) are protocol-agnostic data units that are conveyed between RATS roles during RATS interactions. Conceptual messages describe the meaning and function of such data units within RATS data flows without specifying a wire format, encoding, transport mechanism, or processing details. The initial set of conceptual messages is defined in Section 8 of RFC 9334 and includes Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, Reference Values, and Appraisal Policies.</t>
              <t>This document introduces the Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) that provides a common structure to encapsulate these messages. It defines a dedicated Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) tag, corresponding JSON Web Token (JWT) and CBOR Web Token (CWT) claims, and an X.509 extension.</t>
              <t>Together, these mechanisms allow CMWs to be used in CBOR-based protocols, web APIs using JWTs and CWTs, and PKIX artifacts such as X.509 certificates. Additionally, this document defines media types and CoAP Content-Formats that may be used to identify CMWs when transported over protocols such as HTTP, MIME, and CoAP.</t>
              <t>The goal is to improve the interoperability and flexibility of remote attestation protocols. Introducing a shared message format such as CMW enables consistent support for different attestation message types, enables the evolution of message serialization formats without breaking compatibility, and avoids the need to redefine how messages are handled within each protocol.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9999"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9999"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation">
          <front>
            <title>Use of Remote Attestation with Certification Signing Requests</title>
            <author fullname="Mike Ounsworth" initials="M." surname="Ounsworth">
              <organization>Cryptic Forest Software</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>Siemens</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Monty Wiseman" initials="M." surname="Wiseman">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ned Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith">
         </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Certification Authorities (CAs) issuing certificates to Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) end entities may require a certificate signing
   request (CSR) to include additional verifiable information to confirm
   policy compliance.  For example, a CA may require an end entity to
   demonstrate that the private key corresponding to a CSR's public key
   is secured by a hardware security module (HSM), is not exportable,
   etc.  The process of generating, transmitting, and verifying
   additional information required by the CA is called remote
   attestation.  While work is currently underway to standardize various
   aspects of remote attestation, a variety of proprietary mechanisms
   have been in use for years, particularly regarding protection of
   private keys.

   This specification defines ASN.1 structures which may carry
   attestation data for PKCS#10 and Certificate Request Message Format
   (CRMF) messages.  Both standardized and proprietary attestation
   formats are supported by this specification.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-33"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-pkix-key-attestation">
          <front>
            <title>Evidence Encoding for Hardware Security Modules</title>
            <author fullname="Jean-Pierre Fiset" initials="J." surname="Fiset">
              <organization>Crypto4A Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mike Ounsworth" initials="M." surname="Ounsworth">
              <organization>Cryptic Forest Software</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>University of the Bundeswehr Munich</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Monty Wiseman" initials="M." surname="Wiseman">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Ned Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith">
         </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies a vendor-agnostic format for Evidence
   produced and verified within a PKIX context.  The Evidence produced
   this way includes claims collected about a cryptographic module, such
   as a Hardware Security Module (HSM), and elements found within it
   such as cryptographic keys.

   One scenario envisaged is that the state information about the
   cryptographic module can be securely presented to a remote operator
   or auditor in a vendor-agnostic verifiable format.  A more complex
   scenario would be to submit this Evidence to a Certification
   Authority to aid in determining whether the storage properties of
   this key meet the requirements of a given certificate profile.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-pkix-key-attestation-08"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CABF-BR" target="https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/">
          <front>
            <title>Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates</title>
            <author>
              <organization>CA/Browser Forum</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="04"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Version" value="2.3.1"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PKIC-RKA" target="https://pkic.org/wg/cm/remote-key-attestation/">
          <front>
            <title>Remote Key Attestation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>PKI Consortium</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Cryptographic Module Working Group</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FIPS140-3" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2019" month="March" day="22"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="140-3"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FIPS180-4" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="August" day="04"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="180-4"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SP800-57" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 - General</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2020" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PKCS11" target="https://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-spec/v3.2/pkcs11-spec-v3.2.html">
          <front>
            <title>PKCS #11 Specification Version 3.2</title>
            <author>
              <organization>OASIS</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="June" day="03"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="OASIS Standard" value="pkcs11-spec-v3.2-os"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EMUDHRA-REPORT" target="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083449#c82">
          <front>
            <title>Full Incident Report</title>
            <author>
              <organization>eMudhra</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="10"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Mozilla Bugzilla, Bug 2083449, eMudhra: Private key compromise of Intermediate Certificates, Comment 82</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8554">
          <front>
            <title>Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="D. McGrew" initials="D." surname="McGrew"/>
            <author fullname="M. Curcio" initials="M." surname="Curcio"/>
            <author fullname="S. Fluhrer" initials="S." surname="Fluhrer"/>
            <date month="April" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This note describes a digital-signature system based on cryptographic hash functions, following the seminal work in this area of Lamport, Diffie, Winternitz, and Merkle, as adapted by Leighton and Micali in 1995. It specifies a one-time signature scheme and a general signature scheme. These systems provide asymmetric authentication without using large integer mathematics and can achieve a high security level. They are suitable for compact implementations, are relatively simple to implement, and are naturally resistant to side-channel attacks. Unlike many other signature systems, hash-based signatures would still be secure even if it proves feasible for an attacker to build a quantum computer.</t>
              <t>This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF. This has been reviewed by many researchers, both in the research group and outside of it. The Acknowledgements section lists many of them.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8554"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8554"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SHATTERED" target="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_19">
          <front>
            <title>The First Collision for Full SHA-1</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Stevens" fullname="Marc Stevens">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="E." surname="Bursztein" fullname="Elie Bursztein">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Karpman" fullname="Pierre Karpman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Albertini" fullname="Ange Albertini">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Markov" fullname="Yarik Markov">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2017"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_19"/>
          <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2017, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10401, pp. 570-596</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SHAMBLES" target="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/leurent">
          <front>
            <title>SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust</title>
            <author initials="G." surname="Leurent" fullname="Gaetan Leurent">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Peyrin" fullname="Thomas Peyrin">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2020"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>29th USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 1839-1856</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KELSEY-SCHNEIER" target="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11426639_28">
          <front>
            <title>Second Preimages on n-bit Hash Functions for Much Less than 2^n Work</title>
            <author initials="J." surname="Kelsey" fullname="John Kelsey">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Schneier" fullname="Bruce Schneier">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2005"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/11426639_28"/>
          <refcontent>Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3494, pp. 474-490</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LUNA-CONFIRM" target="https://thalesdocs.com/gphsm/luna/7/docs/network/Content/admin_partition/confirm/confirm_hsm.htm">
          <front>
            <title>Verifying HSM Authenticity or Key Attestation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Thales</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LUNA-GETPKC" target="https://thalesdocs.com/gphsm/luna/7/docs/network/Content/Utilities/cmu/cmu_getpkc.htm">
          <front>
            <title>cmu getpkc</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Thales</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LUNA-PKCV" target="https://github.com/ThalesGroup/luna-pkc-validator">
          <front>
            <title>luna-pkc-validator</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Thales</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Reference validator source code</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="NSHIELD-KAF" target="https://nshielddocs.entrust.com/app-notes/key-attestation-format.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Key Attestation Format</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Entrust</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="June" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>nShield Application Note</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="NSHIELD-WARRANTS" target="https://nshielddocs.entrust.com/app-notes/nshield-warrants.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>nShield Warrants</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Entrust</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="June" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>nShield Application Note</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MARVELL-ATTEST" target="https://www.marvell.com/products/security-solutions/nitrox-hs-adapters/software-key-attestation.html">
          <front>
            <title>LiquidSecurity HSM - Software Key Attestation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Marvell</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GCP-ATTEST" target="https://docs.cloud.google.com/kms/docs/attest-key">
          <front>
            <title>Verify attestations</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Google Cloud</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Cloud Key Management Service documentation</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GCP-EKCV" target="https://docs.cloud.google.com/kms/docs/verifying-imported-key">
          <front>
            <title>Verify an imported key version</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Google Cloud</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Cloud Key Management Service documentation</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AZURE-ATTEST" target="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/managed-hsm/key-attestation">
          <front>
            <title>Validate Azure Key Vault Managed HSM keys with key attestation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Microsoft</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="January" day="30"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SECUROSYS-ATTEST" target="https://docs.securosys.com/primus-hsm/Concepts/attestation">
          <front>
            <title>Primus HSM - Attestation and Audit (Device, User, Key)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Securosys</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SECUROSYS-AN" target="https://dlarea.securosys.com/document/PrimusHSM_AuditAndAttestation_AN-E01.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Primus HSM Audit &amp; Attestation: Usage with Qualified Trust Service Providers</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Securosys</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Application Note AN-E01, Edition 1 (v1.0.2)</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="YUBIHSM-CONCEPTS" target="https://docs.yubico.com/hardware/yubihsm-2/hsm-2-user-guide/hsm2-intro-core-concepts.html">
          <front>
            <title>YubiHSM 2 Core Concepts</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Yubico</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
          <refcontent>YubiHSM 2 User Guide</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="YUBIHSM-OVERVIEW" target="https://docs.yubico.com/hardware/yubihsm-2/hsm-2-user-guide/hsm2-intro-overview.html">
          <front>
            <title>YubiHSM 2 Product Overview</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Yubico</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
          <refcontent>YubiHSM 2 User Guide</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="YUBIHSM-PY" target="https://developers.yubico.com/python-yubihsm/API_Documentation/autoapi/yubihsm/objects/index.html">
          <front>
            <title>python-yubihsm API Documentation: yubihsm.objects</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Yubico</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="YUBICO-OID" target="https://docs.yubico.com/hardware/oid/oid-product-arc.html">
          <front>
            <title>YubiHSM OIDs</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Yubico</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="C4A-ATTEST" target="https://support.crypto4a.com/cs-api/contents/download/69273639fea931658071becf">
          <front>
            <title>Attestation using the QASM</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Crypto4A</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Document C4A-302-0043</refcontent>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 1300?>

<section anchor="asn1-module">
      <name>ASN.1 Module</name>
      <t>This module imports SubjectPublicKeyInfo from the PKIX1Explicit-2009
module in <xref target="RFC5912"/>.</t>
      <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
KeyProvenanceEvidence-2026
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-key-provenance-2026(TBD1) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

EXPORTS ALL;

IMPORTS
  SubjectPublicKeyInfo
    FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
        id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ;

KeyProvenanceEvidence ::= SEQUENCE {
  version     KPEVersion,
  subjectKey  SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
  statements  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ProvenanceStatement }

KPEVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }

ProvenanceStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
  format      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  evidence    OCTET STRING }

END
]]></sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section anchor="app-carriers">
      <name>Carrying Provenance Statements in Other Structures</name>
      <t>This appendix is informative.  It describes two ways to carry the
content of a KPE file in structures that other specifications define
(<xref target="use"/>).</t>
      <section anchor="app-csr">
        <name>Certification Requests</name>
        <t><xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation"/> defines how a certification
request carries an AttestationBundle.  An AttestationBundle contains
one or more AttestationStatement values.  Each AttestationStatement
consists of an object identifier, type, which identifies the format
of the statement, and a value, stmt, whose ASN.1 type that format
defines.  That document registers no statement formats.  It leaves
the object identifier to the specification of each format, and it
asks a format that is not defined in ASN.1 to define an ASN.1 wrapper
for it, for example an OCTET STRING.  This description follows
version 33 of that document, which had not been published as an RFC
when this appendix was written.</t>
        <t>A ProvenanceStatement (<xref target="file"/>) has the same two fields as an
AttestationStatement: format corresponds to type, and evidence
corresponds to stmt.  The only possible difference is the ASN.1 type
of stmt.  For an Evidence Format, that type is OCTET STRING, because
the object identifier of an Evidence Format identifies Module
Evidence that is carried in an OCTET STRING (<xref target="iana-formats"/>).  A
ProvenanceStatement and an AttestationStatement with such an object
identifier therefore have the same DER encoding, and a statement can
be copied between a KPE file and an AttestationBundle without
change.</t>
        <t>When statements are carried in a certification request in this way:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the request contains no subjectKey.  The Verifier uses the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the request as S and performs steps 3 and 4
of <xref target="verification"/>, with S in place of subjectKey, on the
statements whose type is an Evidence Format that it accepts;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the Module Evidence in each statement already contains everything
that its Evidence Format needs for verification, except the Vendor
Trust Anchor.  The certs field of the AttestationBundle is not used
for it;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>no nonce or other freshness mechanism is needed (<xref target="sec-replay"/>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a CA that receives such a request can assemble a KPE file from the
statements, with the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the request as
subjectKey, and keep or publish it (<xref target="use"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="app-cmw">
        <name>Conceptual Message Wrapper</name>
        <t>A Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) <xref target="RFC9999"/> carries a message
together with an identifier of its type.  In a CMW record, that
identifier is a media type or a CoAP Content-Format.  A KPE file can
be the value of a CMW record whose type is
"application/key-provenance-evidence" (<xref target="media-type"/>).  A record can
also contain an indicator of the kind of message that it carries.
For a KPE file, the fitting value is "evidence", together with
"endorsements" when the Module Evidence includes certificates of the
Module Vendor.</t>
        <t><xref target="RFC9999"/> defines how a CMW is carried in other structures, among
them an X.509 extension that can appear in certification requests.
For a certification request, the form in <xref target="app-csr"/> is more direct,
because it needs no second wrapper.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="example">
      <name>Example: Detecting a Substituted Key</name>
      <t>This appendix is informative.</t>
      <t>During a key ceremony, a CA operator generates key pair K1 inside a
Module.  A later step in the ceremony goes wrong and produces a
different key pair, K2, for example by re-creating K1 from key
material that host software read back and altered.  The certification
request submitted to the issuing CA contains the public key of K2.</t>
      <t>The Module produces Module Evidence with Origin "generated" only for
K1.  In a KPE file whose subjectKey is the public key of K2, no
statement can be satisfying (<xref target="verification"/>):</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>a statement that does not verify is skipped;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a statement that verifies and whose Attested Key is not K2, for
example the evidence for K1, does not match subjectKey;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a statement that verifies and whose Attested Key is K2 has Origin
"not-generated" or "unknown".</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Verification therefore fails, and the issuing CA detects the problem
before issuing the certificate.  The detection does not depend on K2
being weak, and does not depend on knowing why K2 was produced.</t>
      <t>A different failure re-creates K1 itself from key material that host
software read, for example after wrapping K1 under a key that the
host holds.  The certification request then contains the public key
of K1, and the evidence for K1 is satisfying under a policy that does
not consider Exportability.  A policy that requires Exportability
"not-exportable" detects this case as well, because a Module that let
K1 be wrapped under such a key does not report "not-exportable" for
it (<xref target="facts"/>).</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="app-hash">
      <name>Rationale for the Hash Strength Requirements</name>
      <t>This appendix is informative.</t>
      <t>Some deployed vendor mechanisms include the Attested Key in the
signed content only as a hash, and at least one of them uses SHA-1
(<xref target="app-nshield"/>).  <xref target="binding"/> requires at least 128 bits of
security against second preimages, which SHA-1 provides, and
recommends at least 384 bits.  This appendix explains both values.</t>
      <t>KPE relies on the second-preimage resistance of this hash, not on its
collision resistance.  The Module chooses the Attested Key, because
the Module generates it.  An attacker who wants a KPE file for a public
key of its own choosing therefore has to find a public key whose hash
equals the hash of a key that a Module generated.  That is a
second-preimage problem.  For an n-bit hash function, the generic
cost is about 2^n hash computations.</t>
      <t>The collision attacks on SHA-1 <xref target="SHATTERED"/> <xref target="SHAMBLES"/> do not
apply.  They produce two inputs with the same hash, but the attacker
has to choose both inputs, or at least their prefixes.  Here one of
the two inputs is a public key that the Module generated from its own
random bits.  Importing a key of the attacker's choice into a Module
does not help either, because evidence for an imported key reports
Origin "not-generated".</t>
      <t>Two generic effects reduce the cost of a second preimage.  Neither
changes this conclusion:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The attack in <xref target="KELSEY-SCHNEIER"/> finds second preimages faster
than 2^n for long target messages.  Its advantage grows with the
length of the target.  Public keys are short, so the attack gives
no meaningful advantage here.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>An attacker that can get evidence for many keys, for example by
having a Module generate T keys, can aim at any one of them.  This
reduces the work by a factor of T.  For SHA-1 and T = 2^40, about
2^120 hash computations remain.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The recommended value of 384 bits leaves a margin for this reduction,
for the long lifetime of CA keys, and for generic quantum attacks,
which reduce second-preimage resistance to about half of its bit
length.</t>
      <t>Evidence Formats that include the complete public key in the signed
content do not depend on a hash function for this binding.</t>
      <t>The argument in this appendix applies only to the hash that
identifies the Attested Key.  The signatures of the Module Evidence
and the Trust Path are computed over content that can contain values
chosen by the operator of the Module, and a party that chooses part
of the input can use a collision (<xref target="sec-content"/>).  This is why
<xref target="binding"/> allows SHA-1 for identifying the Attested Key but not in
signatures.</t>
      <t>The argument also assumes that the operator cannot choose a long part
of the public key that is hashed.  When domain parameters are
identified by name, the parts that the operator selects, such as a
curve name or an RSA public exponent, are short, and the Verifier
checks them against its own requirements (<xref target="sec-inputs"/>).  Domain
parameters that are specified explicitly are long values chosen by
the operator.  The argument does not cover keys with such parameters.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="app-vendors">
      <name>Existing Vendor Mechanisms</name>
      <t>This appendix is informative.  It summarizes Module Vendor
documentation and reference implementations, supplemented by official
cloud-provider documentation, as read in November 2026.  It relates
these mechanisms to the Provenance Facts in <xref target="facts"/>.  It is not an
evaluation of any product and registers none of these mechanisms.
"Not confirmed" means that the sources cited do not settle the
question; it does not mean that a product lacks the capability.</t>
      <table anchor="tab-vendors-key">
        <name>Vendor Mechanisms: Attested Key and Origin</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Mechanism</th>
            <th align="left">Attested Key in signed content</th>
            <th align="left">Origin</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Thales Luna PKC</td>
            <td align="left">SubjectPublicKeyInfo in the PKC certificate</td>
            <td align="left">PKC issuance restricted to keys created in a Module</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Entrust nShield key attestation</td>
            <td align="left">SHA-1 nCore key hash</td>
            <td align="left">key generation certificate</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Marvell LiquidSecurity</td>
            <td align="left">RSA public-key attributes; Cloud HSM also documents a SHA-256 public-key digest</td>
            <td align="left">OBJ_ATTR_LOCAL attribute</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Securosys Primus</td>
            <td align="left">SubjectPublicKeyInfo in signed XML</td>
            <td align="left">creation attribute and key attributes</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Yubico YubiHSM 2</td>
            <td align="left">SubjectPublicKeyInfo in the attestation certificate</td>
            <td align="left">Origin extension</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Crypto4A QASM</td>
            <td align="left">SubjectPublicKeyInfo or its SHA-256 digest</td>
            <td align="left">claim that the key is hardware generated</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <table anchor="tab-vendors-module">
        <name>Vendor Mechanisms: Module Description and Trust Path</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Mechanism</th>
            <th align="left">Module Description</th>
            <th align="left">Trust Path</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Thales Luna PKC</td>
            <td align="left">serial number; firmware version when present</td>
            <td align="left">certificate chain to the Thales SafeNet root</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Entrust nShield key attestation</td>
            <td align="left">serial numbers; hardware approval fields</td>
            <td align="left">KML, KLF2, and a warrant to KWARN-1</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Marvell LiquidSecurity</td>
            <td align="left">model and firmware fields not confirmed</td>
            <td align="left">Marvell chain; hosted services also provide a provider chain</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Securosys Primus</td>
            <td align="left">device identity in the chain; model and firmware in separate device-state evidence</td>
            <td align="left">attestation key, device key, Securosys root</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Yubico YubiHSM 2</td>
            <td align="left">firmware version, serial number, FIPS extensions</td>
            <td align="left">default attestation key chains to a Yubico root</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Crypto4A QASM</td>
            <td align="left">UUID, serial number, firmware version, FIPS-mode claim</td>
            <td align="left">one or more signatures; default keys chain to a Crypto4A root</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>The tables describe available fields, not fields guaranteed to occur
in every attestation.  An Evidence Format specification would still
need to identify the supported versions, required signed fields,
their interpretation, and the applicable Trust Path.</t>
      <section anchor="app-luna">
        <name>Thales Luna</name>
        <t>A Luna HSM restricts Public Key Confirmation (PKC) issuance to private
keys generated in a Luna Module and confined to Luna HSM protection
<xref target="LUNA-CONFIRM"/>.  The cmu getpkc documentation describes retrieval
for existing non-extractable RSA and ECC keys <xref target="LUNA-GETPKC"/>.
Applications can retrieve the PKC through CKA_PKC or CKA_PKC_ECC and
the supporting certificates through CA_GetTokenCertificates.  The
cmu procedure is not supported with Functionality Modules enabled.</t>
        <t>The PKCS #7 bundle contains the PKC and its certificate chain.  The
documented RSA path is PKC, DAC, HOC, MIC, then the Thales SafeNet root;
the ECC path uses a separate ECC MIC <xref target="LUNA-CONFIRM"/>.  Thales's
reference validator <xref target="LUNA-PKCV"/> compares the encoded public key in
the leaf PKC certificate with the public key in a certification
request.  The Attested Key is therefore available as the
certificate's SubjectPublicKeyInfo, rather than only as a fingerprint.
The validator also reads the serial-number extension
1.3.6.1.4.1.12383.2.1 and, when present, the firmware-version
extension 1.3.6.1.4.1.12383.2.3.</t>
        <t>The validator verifies each signature in the chain.  Where a
certificate carries an extended key usage, the validator compares it
with the value expected at that position in the chain; it does not
reject a certificate that lacks the extension.  In the test chains
published with the validator, every certificate carries a critical
extended key usage, and the value differs at each level.  An Evidence
Format specification that uses these values to recognize the
attestation key would have to require them.  The validator does not
check validity periods or revocation.  The certificates below the
roots in those test chains are signed with SHA-384 <xref target="LUNA-PKCV"/>.</t>
        <t>The sources reviewed do not fully specify the model mapping or PKC
behavior after cloning between Modules.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="app-nshield">
        <name>Entrust nShield</name>
        <t>Entrust's key attestation format note, dated June 2, 2026, describes a
JSON bundle assembled by host software from Module-signed artifacts
<xref target="NSHIELD-KAF"/>.  The key generation certificate contains the nCore
public-key hash, generation parameters, and generation-time access
control list (ACL), signed by KML.  The documented nCore hash is
SHA-1.  The complete public key, including domain parameters, is
carried separately in pubkeydata; its binding is checked by computing
the nCore hash and comparing it with the signed hash.</t>
        <t>A module state certificate binds KML to KLF2.  A vendor warrant binds
KLF2 to the vendor's trust root.  The documented ModuleInformation
warrant uses ECDSA P-521 with SHA-512 and root key KWARN-1, and carries
electronic and physical serial numbers and optional hardware approval
fields <xref target="NSHIELD-WARRANTS"/>.  Those fields describe approval properties,
not necessarily a FIPS validation certificate number.  The warrant
note separately documents a legacy FieldUpgradeModuleInformation
form using DSA; the warrant type must therefore be identified rather
than assuming that every historical warrant uses the same algorithm.
The warrant note also defines a certificate type for smart cards
under the same root, and the ModuleInformation payload that it
documents has no validity period <xref target="NSHIELD-WARRANTS"/>.  The reference
verification code in the format note accepts ECDSA with SHA-512 and
DSA with SHA-256 as signature mechanisms of KML <xref target="NSHIELD-KAF"/>.</t>
        <t>The generation certificate is stored with the key.  A module state
certificate can be regenerated if the original Module is available
and has not been reinitialized.  The bundle mechanism supports
asymmetric keys.  The cited format note does not confirm a firmware
version field <xref target="NSHIELD-KAF"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="app-marvell">
        <name>Marvell LiquidSecurity</name>
        <t>Marvell describes the attestation as an optional part of the
response to a command, such as key generation, that is signed by the
HSM <xref target="MARVELL-ATTEST"/>.  The signed data consists of type-length-value
key attributes and, unless the request excludes it, the response
header.  Its RSA example includes the modulus (0x0120) and public
exponent (0x0122), as well as OBJ_ATTR_LOCAL (0x0163), which is true
for keys created on the HSM and false for imported keys.  In that
example, the attributes of the private key also include the modulus,
the public exponent and OBJ_ATTR_LOCAL, so the Attested Key and the
Origin can be read from the same object.  The format supports
different attribute sets, so an Evidence Format specification must
identify which signed attributes establish the Attested Key and
Origin.</t>
        <t>The documented layout uses a 256-byte RSA signature.  The page does
not name the hash function of that signature; the output of its
verification script reports raw padding for firmware 2.x and PKCS #1
padding for firmware 3.x.  Marvell distinguishes format version 1
before firmware 3.2 from format version 2 starting with firmware 3.2;
it also provides separate instructions for legacy 2.x firmware.  The
page does not say which signed field, if any, distinguishes these
versions.  A format version is not itself an attested firmware
version.</t>
        <t>Signed model and firmware fields were not confirmed in the sources
reviewed.  The documentation does not say whether an attestation can
be obtained later for an existing key.  It also describes a park
operation that returns the encrypted key together with its
attributes, and does not say how Origin is handled when such an
object is restored.</t>
        <t>Google's Cloud HSM documentation describes both Marvell and Google
certificate chains and confirms the meaning of LOCAL <xref target="GCP-ATTEST"/>.
For asymmetric keys, Google defines the extended key check value
(EKCV) as the SHA-256 digest of the DER-encoded public key
<xref target="GCP-EKCV"/>.  Marvell describes the EKCV as derived with a
SHA-256-based HKDF extract <xref target="MARVELL-ATTEST"/>.  An Evidence Format
specification therefore has to define the computation exactly.  The
ordinary key check value, three bytes of a SHA-1 digest of the
modulus, is far too short for the binding specified in <xref target="binding"/>.</t>
        <t>Azure Managed HSM likewise supplies the attestation blob and
certificates, and documents validation through both Marvell and
Microsoft certificate chains <xref target="AZURE-ATTEST"/>.  These hosted-service
paths should be distinguished from the underlying vendor mechanism.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="app-securosys">
        <name>Securosys Primus</name>
        <t>Securosys documents key attestation from firmware 2.8 and device
attestation from firmware 2.10 <xref target="SECUROSYS-ATTEST"/>.  Its Audit and
Attestation application note <xref target="SECUROSYS-AN"/> describes signed XML
with a detached signature and a separate certificate chain.  The
attestation key is certified by a device key, which chains to a
Securosys root.  The verification example in the note checks the
signature of the attestation file with SHA-256.</t>
        <t>The signed public_key element (Sections 4.4 and 5.3 of the note)
contains a base64 encoding of the DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo, which can
be compared with the public key in a certification request.  The
example in Section 8.1.1 includes a private_key creation attribute
set to generated, creation and attestation times, algorithm
information, and attributes including sensitive, always_sensitive,
extractable, and never_extractable.  This supplies both a public-key
binding and documented generation-related attributes; the note does
not fully specify their interpretation for every import or cloning
operation.</t>
        <t>Device-state attestation separately reports information including the
model, software version, and operating mode.  Section 6 describes
linking key and device evidence through their common device key.
These device-state fields should not be assumed to occur in the key
attestation XML itself.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="app-yubihsm">
        <name>Yubico YubiHSM 2</name>
        <t>A YubiHSM 2 produces an X.509 attestation certificate whose
SubjectPublicKeyInfo contains the attested public key <xref target="YUBIHSM-PY"/>
          <xref target="YUBICO-OID"/>.  The default attestation key and its certificate are
preloaded under object ID 0 and chain through a Yubico intermediate
to a Yubico root <xref target="YUBIHSM-CONCEPTS"/>.  Custom attestation keys are
also supported; their certificates do not acquire a Yubico trust path
merely by being used for attestation <xref target="YUBICO-OID"/>.</t>
        <t>The signature uses RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 with SHA-256 or ECDSA with
SHA-256.  The certificate validity dates are copied from the
attesting key's certificate.  Extensions report firmware version,
serial number, Origin, domains, capabilities, object ID, and label
<xref target="YUBICO-OID"/>.  On FIPS devices with firmware 2.4.1 or later, an
extension reports whether attestation occurred in FIPS-approved mode.
A separate vendor-coded extension identifies a FIPS validation;
these are distinct claims <xref target="YUBIHSM-OVERVIEW"/>.</t>
        <t>Origin is a read-only object property.  Its bits distinguish
generated (0x01), imported (0x02), and imported_wrapped (0x10).
Wrapped imports combine the last bit with the original origin,
yielding 0x11 or 0x12 <xref target="YUBIHSM-CONCEPTS"/>.  An Evidence Format
specification would need to state how these values map to Origin,
including the conditions for preserving generated origin through
wrapped transfer.  The sources reviewed do not confirm attestation
availability for every imported-key origin value.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="app-qasm">
        <name>Crypto4A QASM</name>
        <t>Crypto4A's document "Attestation using the QASM" <xref target="C4A-ATTEST"/>
specifies ASN.1 claims with one or more signatures and optional X.509
certificates.  The Module checks claims before signing
them.  Attestation keys cannot also have the general signing
capability.</t>
        <t>Key claims include key-spki (SubjectPublicKeyInfo), key-spki-sha256
(its SHA-256 digest), key-is-hardware-generated (the local bit),
key-is-confined, and key-never-extracted.  Object UUIDs identify claim
subjects.  Module claims cover UUID, serial number, firmware version,
certified-production status, attestation time, and FIPS mode.</t>
        <t>The private-key-is-on-hsm verification template treats
key-is-hardware-generated as optional.  Successful template
verification therefore does not establish Origin generated without
that claim bound to the relevant key.</t>
        <t>The default key is QASM_AA_ECC; examples also select ECC and HSS
signatures <xref target="RFC8554"/>.  Dual signatures are not mandatory.  Default
certificates chain through C4A_SCA to C4A_RCA; custom chains are
supported.  Verification checks the attestation extended key usage
1.3.6.1.4.1.39901.4.1.1, signatures, and certificate paths to accepted
roots.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="app-rats">
      <name>IETF RATS Evidence Format for Hardware Security Modules</name>
      <t>This appendix is informative.</t>
      <t><xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-pkix-key-attestation"/> is a working group draft that
defines a vendor-neutral evidence format for hardware security
modules.  It is not a deployed vendor mechanism.  This appendix
follows version 08 of that draft, which can still change.</t>
      <t>The key claim spki carries the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of the key.  The
claims local, extractable, sensitive and never-extractable correspond
to the <xref target="PKCS11"/> attributes of the same names, such as CKA_LOCAL.  A
further claim, device-bound, asserts when it is true that the key was
generated on the device, has never been exported from it in any form,
and cannot be exported in the future, including by backup, cloning or
interfaces available only to the vendor.  Platform claims give, among
other values, the hardware model, the serial number, the firmware
version, and whether the device is operating in FIPS mode.</t>
      <t>The certificate of the attestation key has to contain an extended key
usage, id-kp-attestationKey, that the draft defines for signing
evidence, and a Verifier has to check for it.  This is a designation
of the kind that <xref target="binding"/> requires.  The draft also allows the
attestation key to chain to a trust anchor of the device operator
instead of the vendor, and allows a signer to be identified without a
certificate.  Evidence of that kind has no Trust Path to a Vendor
Trust Anchor and does not pass the verification procedure of this
document.</t>
      <t>An Evidence Format specification for this format would still have to
state which claims and which form of signer identification it
requires, and how local, never-extractable and device-bound relate to
the definitions of "generated" and "not-exportable" in <xref target="facts"/>, in
particular after a key has been transferred between Modules.  A
device-bound key cannot be transferred to another Module at all, so
that claim is stricter than "not-exportable".</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>TODO</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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