| Internet-Draft | CADI | November 2026 |
| Liu & Fu | Expires 22 May 2027 | [Page] |
This document compiles existing Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory (CADI) methods and analyzes potential gaps. It also defines a YANG data model that augments the base network inventory model with the cryptographic assets of each network element. The data model is aligned with the Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM) defined in CycloneDX.¶
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory (CADI) refers to a set of tools and guidelines that assist in identifying, collecting, normalizing, correlating, and continuously maintaining all cryptography-related assets, including configurations, dependencies, and usage contexts within a given organization, system, or product scope. It requires both technical tools and management approaches.¶
Many Post-Quantum transition roadmaps have highlighted the importance of identifying legacy cryptographic assets inside of an organization as a crucial preparatory part. For example:¶
The G7 statement on "Advancing a Coordinated Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in the Financial Sector" [G7] mentions there should exist six key PQ-migration activities:¶
The United States Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on "Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography" [OMBM2302] requires:¶
Although the exact PQ-migration roadmap in each different nations varies, the fact that cryptographic asset discovery and inventory is a key prerequisite for Chief Information Security Officers to asses a migration budget and draft a migration plan does not change.¶
This document analyzes existing CADI methods and potential gaps. It also defines a YANG data model that extends the network inventory with cryptographic assets.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The following terms are defined in [RFC7950] and are not redefined here: augment, data model, and data node. The terms "network element" and "component" are used as defined in [I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang]. The meanings of the symbols in the YANG tree diagrams are defined in [RFC8340].¶
This document also uses the following terms:¶
CADI (Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory) -- A set of tools and guidelines designed to automate the identification, collection, normalization, correlation, and lifecycle management of an organization's cryptographic assets.¶
CBOM (Cryptography Bill of Materials) -- A machine-readable inventory of cryptographic assets, their properties, and their dependencies, defined as part of CycloneDX [CycloneDX]. In a CBOM, a cryptographic asset is a component of type "cryptographic-asset" described by "cryptoProperties".¶
Cryptographic Asset -- A digital or physical element within a device or service-such as an algorithm, module, configuration, credential, secret, or communication protocol-that protects the confidentiality and integrity of secure data transmission or storage.¶
Cryptographic System -- An active software or hardware implementation of one or more cryptographic algorithms that provide one or more of the following services: (1) creation and exchange of encryption keys; (2) encrypted connections; or (3) creation and validation of digital signatures. (according to [OMBM2302])¶
Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQC) -- A fault-tolerant quantum system capable of solving the underlying hardness assumption problems of widely used public-key cryptography in polynomial time, such as RSA and ECC.¶
Apart from the milestones and requirements discussed above, there are also a few challenges to identify cryptographic assets:¶
Legacy ICT systems were not engineered to treat cryptographic primitives as distinct, trackable assets. Instead, cryptographic implementations are deeply integrated, highly distributed, and hidden across heterogeneous layers of the technology stack.¶
Taking inventory manually would take enormous amount of effort, yet there may still be statistical omissions that leave security exposures.¶
Methods like Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) only take effect on new devices to self-announce its cryptographic assets, but it cannot help identify legacy devices and systems.¶
Legacy devices and systems often behave like blackboxes, many does not allow installing additional programs or tools on them.¶
As a result, the ideal CADI tool should meet the following requirements:¶
Automated scanning and inventory taking¶
Agnostic to target object's system designs and architectures¶
Integrate the result to existing network management and operations systems for unified presentation¶
The requirements for automation, architectural agnosticism, and network management integration suggest a protocol-driven approach, potentially placing this within the scope of the IETF. However, this remains open for discussion.¶
There are many ways of doing discovering and identification. We catagorize them into two: active identification and passive identification.¶
Active Identification: The case where devices and services modifies its development and/or management process, actively self-announcing their cryptographic assets. Methods falls into this category includes:¶
Passive Identification: The case where devices and services will stay as-is and cannot self-announce their cryptographic assets. These devices will require additional external tools to assist the identification. Methods falls into this category includes:¶
CBOM-based identification is to empower cryptographic asset owners or vendors to explicitly declare cryptographic usage within their products, components, or services. Usually CBOM declaration is achieved through static code scanning and/or CI/CD integration, so we keep them in the same section.¶
Scanning Methods:¶
Static Code Scanning:¶
SCA (Software Composition Analysis): Scan manifest files (like package.json, requirements.txt, or pom.xml) from the codebase to create CBOMS, usually for analyzing third-party libraries dependency.¶
SAST (Static Application Security Testing): Builds a Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with parsed syntax and data flow of the target source code. It then uses AST to track call chain to end crypto library, track variables (data flow) from source to destination, do reference matching, etc.¶
SCA and SAST is used by IBM CBOMKit-Hyperion.¶
Binary / Image Scanning:¶
Tools and Modelling:¶
IBM CBOMkit, Static code level scanning (Hyperion) and Artifact level scanning (Theia) [IBMCBOM]: uses implements and uses relationship to create dependency diagram.¶
implements: Describes the list of protocols or algorithms this module implements.¶
uses: Describes what modules are used by this service.¶
For example, Application Nginx uses Library libssl.so that uses Protocol TLS v1.3/v1.2 that uses libcrypto.so that implements Algorithm MD5, SHA256, AES-128-GCM.¶
CycloneDX Cdxgen, Artifact level scanning [CDXGEN]: uses dependsOn and provides relationship to create dependency diagram.¶
After scanning, the result will be recorded as a CBOM object.¶
CBOM data specification: A standardized cryptographic asset object includes cryptographic algorithms, digital certificates, protocols, private keys, public keys, cryptographic keys, ciphertext information, digital signatures, digests (the output values of hash functions), initialization vectors (input parameters for encryption algorithms), seeds, salts, shared secrets, authentication tags, passwords, credentials, and tokens. CycloneDX 1.7 [CycloneDX] groups them into four asset types: algorithm, certificate, protocol, and related cryptographic material. Figure 1 shows an example.¶
"components": [
{
"name": "google.com",
"type": "cryptographic-asset",
"bom-ref": "crypto/certificate/google.com@sha256:1e15e0fbd3ce9...",
"cryptoProperties": {
"assetType": "certificate",
"certificateProperties": {
"subjectName": "CN = www.google.com",
"issuerName": "CN = GTS CA 1C3, O = Google Trust Services",
"notValidBefore": "2016-11-21T08:00:00Z",
"notValidAfter": "2017-11-22T07:59:59Z",
"certificateFormat": "X.509",
"certificateFileExtension": "crt",
"relatedCryptographicAssets": [
{ "type": "algorithm", "ref": "crypto/algorithm/sha512-rsa" },
{ "type": "publicKey", "ref": "crypto/key/rsa-2048" }
]
}
}
}
]
Gaps: Obviously, this does not help with identifying the mass legacy devices, components or services.¶
Simulated handshake is a network-probing technique where a discovery tool acts as a client and intentionally initiates cryptographic protocol negotiations (e.g., TLS, SSH, IPsec) with enterprise network endpoints without completing the full data session. During the negotiation process, the discovery tool determines the specific cryptographic protocol versions, negotiation mechanisms, and ciphersuites supported by the endpoint. This is also known as Active Probing.¶
Steps of simulated handshake include:¶
Port Scan: The tool scans for typical ports for specific secure communication protocols (443 for HTTPS, 22 for SSH, etc)¶
Probing: The tool generates a RFC-compliant connection initialization packet, including all currently standardized ciphersuites, and examine the response.¶
Response Extraction: The target object respond with supported ciphersuites, following its own internal priority rules.¶
Parsing: The tool intercepts this raw response and decodes it as cryptographic assets.¶
This works for most secure protocols that includes negotiation:¶
Pros and Cons/Gaps:¶
Strengths:¶
This kind of method does not require complex engineering refactoring. Since it is agnostic to the design of the target, it works best for the case where the manager operates vast heterogeneous devices from different vendors, versions and locations, hence telecommunications case.¶
This probing is one-time, thus it will not create unhandleable amount of probing packets.¶
The limitation of this method is that¶
Some masking mechanism will stop the probing (firewalls, load balancers, port-concealing protocols like Single Packet Authorization that enforce a default drop for unexpected packets), leaving a hidden security posture inside of the system.¶
Network management cannot know local application components that rests internally in the device and are not exposed over a socket.¶
Tools:¶
Unlike simulated handshakes that actively query an endpoint, Traffic Pattern Analysis listens passively to live network traffic at strategic aggregation points. It infers cryptographic asset usage from protocol metadata, statistical characteristics, and behaviors without decrypting the underlying data payload.¶
Methods of Traffic Pattern Analysis includes:¶
Listen to unencrypted negotiations like clientHello/serverHello, Server Name Indication (SNI), response of an unencrypted server digital certificate request, etc.¶
Listen to handshake fingerprints and compare them to existing patterns, as protocol implementations and behaviors are often rigid.¶
Listen to packet length and arrival time, do statistical pattern recognition.¶
Pros and Cons/Gaps:¶
Process Identification requires Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) installed to have cryptographic visibility inside of a system.¶
Methods of Process Identification includes:¶
Kernel-Level System Call Auditing by deploying eBPF programs into the kernel space. These filters can capture kernel events to determine exactly which process (down to PID) have initiated an encrypted network communication.¶
Shared Library and Binary Hooking, by monitoring process load table to see if cryptographic dynamic libraries are loaded into the memory space.¶
Live Memory Scanning, by periodically scanning volatile memory for indication of creation of keys or signatures (as high-entropy memory segments), and then compare them with known patterns.¶
Pros and Cons/Gaps:¶
The Configuration Extraction is a bit similar to the source code scanning. This section focuses more on the runtime configurations. In different use cases, the configuration extraction methods differs significantly. This section is to be extended.¶
Methods of Configuration Extraction includes:¶
In network device management, NETCONF and YANG provide a standardized, model-driven management interface that enables programmable configuration and state validation. The network managing platform can define a YANG model and extract configurations from a device.¶
In cloud-native development, general .yaml configuration files, .env environment variables files, Kubernetes secret manifest, etc, can be extracted by administrative scripts or through management interfaces (e.g., AWS CloudControl, Kubernetes API).¶
The discovery methods in Section 4 produce information about cryptographic assets in different forms, e.g., CBOMs delivered by vendors or handshake results collected by scanners. To support migration planning, this information needs to be correlated with the network elements and components on which the assets are deployed, and exposed through a standard management interface.¶
This section defines the "ietf-network-inventory-crypto" YANG module. It augments the base network inventory model [I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang] with a read-only cryptographic inventory of each network element. Like the base model, it is a network model: a network controller uses it to report the cryptographic assets of all network elements under its control, e.g., to an Operations Support System (OSS) or to a higher-level controller, via NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040].¶
The module complements CycloneDX CBOM [CycloneDX] rather than replacing it, as summarized in the table below. Asset types, properties, and relationships are aligned with CycloneDX 1.7, so that a vendor CBOM can be imported into a controller and controller data can be exported as a CBOM. This enables network-wide post-quantum cryptography (PQC) readiness assessment.¶
| CycloneDX CBOM | This Module | |
|---|---|---|
| Form | Document (JSON, XML) | Interface (NETCONF, RESTCONF) |
| Scope | One product or software version | All network elements managed by a controller |
| Producer | Vendor or scanning tool | Network controller |
| Typical use | Supply chain, audit | Operations, PQC readiness assessment |
| Linked to | Software components | Network elements |
The module adds a "crypto-inventory" container to each network element, alongside the "components" list of the base model. All data nodes of the container are read-only, as the augmented "network-inventory" container is "config false". It contains two lists:¶
References to CBOMs that describe the network element or one of its components. Each entry contains the serial number and version of the CBOM, retrieval URIs, and a hash of the CBOM for integrity verification.¶
A structured list of the cryptographic assets of the network element, referred to as cryptographic objects in this module. An object can refer to the components that implement it, e.g., a Hardware Security Module (HSM) or a cryptographic library (Section 5.2.3). This list is optional and is reported only if the server supports the "crypto-objects" feature. Otherwise, clients obtain the details from the CBOMs listed in "cbom-ref".¶
Each cryptographic object is identified by an "id" that is unique within the network element. The common attributes are:¶
"uuid", "name", "alias", and "description": reused from the base model.¶
"usage": the purposes for which the object is used, i.e., management plane, control plane, or data plane. CycloneDX has no equivalent; this network-specific context is needed to prioritize migration.¶
"provided-by" and "depends-on": the relationships described in Section 5.2.3.¶
"last-discovered": the time at which the object was last observed.¶
In CycloneDX, each cryptographic asset has exactly one of four asset types. The type is therefore modeled as a YANG choice: the container that is present indicates the type and contains the type-specific properties:¶
"algorithm": primitive (e.g., signature or kem), family, parameter set, elliptic curve, and quantum security level, where the value 0 indicates a quantum-vulnerable algorithm.¶
"certificate": subject, issuer, and validity period.¶
"related-material": material type (e.g., private key), size, expiration time, and protection mechanism.¶
"protocol": protocol type, version, and cipher suites.¶
Only the CycloneDX properties needed for inventory and PQC readiness assessment are modeled. Further details remain available in the CBOMs referenced by "cbom-ref". Additional properties and types can be added by augmentation.¶
CycloneDX 1.7 introduces the Cryptography Registry [CDX-REGISTRY]. It defines algorithm families together with naming patterns, and elliptic curves in namespaces of the defining organizations. The Registry evolves independently of the CycloneDX specification. This module uses it as follows:¶
"family" SHOULD contain a family name from the Registry, e.g., "AES", "ML-KEM", or "SM4".¶
The "name" of an algorithm SHOULD follow the naming pattern of its family, e.g., "AES-128-GCM" or "ML-KEM-768".¶
"curve" SHOULD contain a Registry curve name in the form "<namespace>/<curve>", e.g., "nist/P-256". A curve can have aliases in other namespaces, e.g., "secg/secp256r1" and "x962/prime256v1" for "nist/P-256"; consumers need to treat aliases as the same curve.¶
A hybrid scheme is reported as an algorithm whose "primitive" is "combiner" and whose "name" is the registered name of the hybrid, e.g., the TLS group name "X25519MLKEM768" [IANA-TLS]. No "family" is reported for it; it depends on its component algorithms (Section 5.2.3).¶
Two relationship types are defined, matching the two dependency types of CycloneDX:¶
From a cryptographic object to the components that implement or provide it, e.g., from a TLS implementation to a cryptographic library or a main processing unit. CycloneDX expresses this as "dependencies[].provides", in the opposite direction.¶
From a cryptographic object to other cryptographic objects that it uses or is bound to. CycloneDX expresses this as "dependencies[].dependsOn" or "relatedCryptographicAssets". The meaning of the relationship is given by the type of the referenced object. For example, a certificate depends on an algorithm (its signature algorithm) and on a public key (its subject public key), a protocol depends on a certificate (its credential), and a combiner depends on its component algorithms.¶
A relationship is recorded once, at the object that uses or holds the other object; reverse relationships are not recorded. The resulting graph is expected to be acyclic.¶
Figure 2 shows the relationships of the example in Appendix A. Unlabeled arrows denote "depends-on", and the labeled arrow denotes "provided-by".¶
+------------+ provided-by +-------------+
| tls-1 +--------------->| mpu-1 |
| (protocol) | | (component) |
+--+------+--+ +-------------+
| |
| +----------------+
v v
+------------+ +----------------+
| dev-cert | | x25519mlkem768 |
+-----+------+ +---+--------+---+
| | |
v v v
+-------------+ +--------+ +------------+
| ecdsa-p-256 | | x25519 | | ml-kem-768 |
+-------------+ +--------+ +------------+
Figure 3 shows the tree diagram of the "ietf-network-inventory-crypto" module.¶
module: ietf-network-inventory-crypto
augment /nwi:network-inventory/nwi:network-elements
/nwi:network-element:
+--ro crypto-inventory!
+--ro cbom-ref* [serial-number]
| +--ro serial-number cbom-serial-number
| +--ro version? uint32
| +--ro uri* inet:uri
| +--ro hash
| | +--ro algorithm? string
| | +--ro value? string
| +--ro component-ref? leafref
+--ro crypto-object* [id] {crypto-objects}?
+--ro id string
+--ro uuid? yang:uuid
+--ro name? string
+--ro alias? string
+--ro description? string
+--ro usage* identityref
+--ro provided-by* leafref
+--ro depends-on* leafref
+--ro last-discovered? yang:date-and-time
+--ro (type)
+--:(algorithm)
| +--ro algorithm!
| +--ro primitive? string
| +--ro family? algorithm-family
| +--ro parameter-set? string
| +--ro curve? elliptic-curve
| +--ro quantum-security-level? uint8
+--:(certificate)
| +--ro certificate!
| +--ro subject? string
| +--ro issuer? string
| +--ro not-valid-before? yang:date-and-time
| +--ro not-valid-after? yang:date-and-time
+--:(related-material)
| +--ro related-material!
| +--ro type? string
| +--ro size? uint32
| +--ro expiration-date? yang:date-and-time
| +--ro secured-by? string
+--:(protocol)
+--ro protocol!
+--ro type? string
+--ro version? string
+--ro cipher-suite* string
This module imports types from [RFC9911] and [I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang]. It references [CycloneDX] and [CDX-REGISTRY].¶
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-network-inventory-crypto@2026-10-30.yang"
module ietf-network-inventory-crypto {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-network-inventory-crypto";
prefix nwic;
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 9911: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference
"RFC 9911: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-network-inventory {
prefix nwi;
reference
"RFC YYYY: A Base YANG Data Model for Network Inventory";
}
organization
"IETF Network Inventory YANG (ivy) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ivy/>
WG List: <mailto:ivy@ietf.org>
Editor: Chunchi Peter Liu
<mailto:liuchunchi@huawei.com>
Editor: Yufan Fu
<mailto:fuyufan2@huawei.com>";
description
"This module augments the base network inventory model with
a read-only cryptographic inventory of each network element.
The inventory consists of references to Cryptography Bills
of Materials (CBOMs) and, optionally, a structured list of
cryptographic objects. Types, properties, and relationships
are aligned with CycloneDX 1.7 (ECMA-424).
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2026-10-30 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory";
}
/*
* Features
*/
feature crypto-objects {
description
"Indicates that the server supports reporting a structured
list of the cryptographic objects of each network element,
in addition to references to CBOMs.";
}
/*
* Identities
*/
identity crypto-usage {
description
"Base identity for the purposes for which a cryptographic
object is used on a network element.";
}
identity management-plane {
base crypto-usage;
description
"Protection of management traffic, e.g., NETCONF over SSH.";
}
identity control-plane {
base crypto-usage;
description
"Protection of control plane protocols, e.g., routing
protocol authentication.";
}
identity data-plane {
base crypto-usage;
description
"Protection of user traffic, e.g., IPsec or MACsec.";
}
identity device-identity {
base crypto-usage;
description
"Identification and authentication of the device, e.g.,
using an IDevID certificate.";
}
identity secure-boot {
base crypto-usage;
description
"Verification of boot loaders and images during start-up.";
}
identity software-integrity {
base crypto-usage;
description
"Verification of software images and patches.";
}
identity storage-protection {
base crypto-usage;
description
"Protection of data at rest, e.g., configuration files or
key stores.";
}
/*
* Typedefs
*/
typedef algorithm-family {
type string;
description
"An algorithm family name registered in the CycloneDX
Cryptography Registry, e.g., 'AES', 'ML-KEM', or 'SM4'.
The value SHOULD match the Registry entry exactly.";
reference
"CycloneDX Cryptography Registry";
}
typedef elliptic-curve {
type string {
pattern '[a-z0-9]+/.+';
}
description
"An elliptic curve name registered in the CycloneDX
Cryptography Registry, in the form '<namespace>/<curve>',
e.g., 'nist/P-256' or 'oscaa/SM2'.";
reference
"CycloneDX Cryptography Registry";
}
typedef cbom-serial-number {
type string {
pattern 'urn:uuid:[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-'
+ '[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}';
}
description
"The serial number of a CycloneDX BOM, i.e., a UUID URN.";
reference
"ECMA-424: CycloneDX Bill of Materials Specification,
serialNumber";
}
/*
* Augmentation
*/
augment "/nwi:network-inventory/nwi:network-elements"
+ "/nwi:network-element" {
description
"Adds the cryptographic inventory to network elements.";
container crypto-inventory {
presence
"Indicates that the server reports the cryptographic
inventory of this network element.";
description
"The cryptographic inventory of the network element.";
list cbom-ref {
key "serial-number";
description
"References to CBOMs that describe the network element
or one of its components.";
leaf serial-number {
type cbom-serial-number;
description
"The serial number of the CBOM.";
}
leaf version {
type uint32 {
range "1..max";
}
description
"The version of the CBOM.";
}
leaf-list uri {
type inet:uri;
description
"Locations from which the CBOM can be retrieved.";
}
container hash {
description
"The hash of the CBOM, for integrity verification.";
leaf algorithm {
type string;
description
"The hash algorithm, using the CycloneDX hash
algorithm names, e.g., 'SHA-256' or 'SHA3-384'.";
}
leaf value {
type string {
pattern '[0-9a-fA-F]+';
}
description
"The hex-encoded hash value.";
}
}
leaf component-ref {
type leafref {
path "../../../nwi:components/nwi:component"
+ "/nwi:component-id";
}
description
"The component described by the CBOM. If not present,
the CBOM describes the whole network element.";
}
}
list crypto-object {
if-feature "crypto-objects";
key "id";
description
"The cryptographic objects of the network element.";
leaf id {
type string;
description
"An identifier of the cryptographic object, unique
within the network element.";
}
uses nwi:basic-common-entity-attributes {
refine "name" {
description
"The name of the cryptographic object. The name of
an algorithm SHOULD follow the naming pattern of its
family in the CycloneDX Cryptography Registry, e.g.,
'AES-128-GCM'.";
}
}
leaf-list usage {
type identityref {
base crypto-usage;
}
description
"The purposes for which the cryptographic object is
used.";
}
leaf-list provided-by {
type leafref {
path "../../../nwi:components/nwi:component"
+ "/nwi:component-id";
}
description
"The hardware or software components that implement or
provide the cryptographic object.";
}
leaf-list depends-on {
type leafref {
path "../../crypto-object/id";
}
description
"Other cryptographic objects that this object uses or is
bound to. The meaning of the relationship is given by
the type of the referenced object.";
}
leaf last-discovered {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The time at which the cryptographic object was last
observed.";
}
choice type {
mandatory true;
description
"The type of the cryptographic object. Exactly one type
is reported for each object.";
reference
"ECMA-424: CycloneDX Bill of Materials Specification,
cryptoProperties.assetType";
container algorithm {
presence
"Indicates that the object is an algorithm.";
description
"A cryptographic algorithm, e.g., AES-128-GCM or
ML-KEM-768.";
leaf primitive {
type string;
description
"The cryptographic primitive, using the CycloneDX
values, e.g., 'block-cipher', 'ae', 'signature',
'key-agree', 'kem', or 'combiner'.";
}
leaf family {
type algorithm-family;
description
"The algorithm family. Not present for combiners.";
}
leaf parameter-set {
type string;
description
"The parameter set, e.g., '128' for AES-128 or '768'
for ML-KEM-768.";
}
leaf curve {
type elliptic-curve;
description
"The elliptic curve, if any.";
}
leaf quantum-security-level {
type uint8 {
range "0..6";
}
description
"The NIST security strength category against quantum
attacks. The value 0 indicates that none of the
categories is met, i.e., the algorithm is
quantum-vulnerable.";
reference
"ECMA-424: CycloneDX Bill of Materials Specification,
algorithmProperties.nistQuantumSecurityLevel";
}
}
container certificate {
presence
"Indicates that the object is a certificate.";
description
"A certificate, e.g., an X.509 device certificate.";
leaf subject {
type string;
description
"The subject name.";
}
leaf issuer {
type string;
description
"The issuer name.";
}
leaf not-valid-before {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The start of the validity period.";
}
leaf not-valid-after {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The end of the validity period.";
}
}
container related-material {
presence
"Indicates that the object is related cryptographic
material.";
description
"Material related to algorithms, certificates, or
protocols, e.g., a key, a password, or a token.";
leaf type {
type string;
description
"The type of the material, using the CycloneDX
values, e.g., 'private-key', 'public-key',
'secret-key', or 'password'.";
}
leaf size {
type uint32;
units "bits";
description
"The size of the material.";
}
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The time at which the material expires.";
}
leaf secured-by {
type string;
description
"The mechanism protecting the material, using the
CycloneDX values, e.g., 'HSM', 'TPM', 'Software',
or 'None'.";
}
}
container protocol {
presence
"Indicates that the object is a protocol.";
description
"A cryptographic protocol, e.g., TLS, SSH, or IKEv2.";
leaf type {
type string;
description
"The protocol, using the CycloneDX values, e.g.,
'tls', 'ssh', 'ipsec', 'ike', 'dtls', or 'quic'.";
}
leaf version {
type string;
description
"The protocol version, e.g., '1.3'.";
}
leaf-list cipher-suite {
type string;
description
"The cipher suites supported by the protocol, e.g.,
'TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384'. The algorithms of the
cipher suites are reported using 'depends-on'.";
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
As with the base model, this module provides a read-only view of the cryptographic inventory known to the controller. How the controller obtains the information, e.g., by importing CBOMs or by the methods in Section 4, is outside the scope of this document.¶
The inventory needs to be updated when cryptographic assets change, e.g., after a software upgrade, a certificate renewal, or a configuration change. The "last-discovered" leaf allows consumers to detect stale entries.¶
Network-wide inventories can be large. Clients can use protocol filtering mechanisms, e.g., subtree or XPath filtering in NETCONF, to retrieve only the data they need, such as the algorithms whose "quantum-security-level" is 0.¶
This section is to be removed before publication.¶
The authors seek feedback from the WG on the following issues:¶
Content: whether the model includes the "crypto-object" list as an optional feature, as currently proposed, or is limited to CBOM references, leaving the content to the CBOMs.¶
Placement: whether cryptographic objects are modeled as a separate list of each network element, as currently proposed, or as a new class of components in the base model. The "parent" of a component denotes containment, whereas a cryptographic object is implemented by, used by, or bound to components.¶
Due to limited time, compiling existing CADI tools remains open and will be done in next version.¶
This document has no further security considerations.¶
Figure 5 shows an instance of the module in JSON encoding [RFC7951]. Network element "ne-1" is described by a vendor CBOM listed in "cbom-ref". It runs a TLS 1.3 implementation that is used on the management plane and provided by component "mpu-1". The TLS implementation depends on a device certificate, on the hybrid key exchange X25519MLKEM768, and on AES-256-GCM. The key exchange includes ML-KEM-768 (quantum security level 3), but the device certificate still relies on ECDSA with P-256, which is quantum-vulnerable (level 0).¶
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"ietf-network-inventory:network-inventory": {
"network-elements": {
"network-element": [
{
"ne-id": "ne-1",
"components": {
"component": [
{
"component-id": "mpu-1",
"class": "iana-hardware:module"
}
]
},
"ietf-network-inventory-crypto:crypto-inventory": {
"cbom-ref": [
{
"serial-number": "urn:uuid:3e671687-395b-41f5-a30f-\
a58921a69b79",
"version": 1,
"uri": ["https://vendor.example.com/ne-1.cdx.json"]
}
],
"crypto-object": [
{
"id": "tls-1",
"name": "TLSv1.3",
"usage": ["management-plane"],
"provided-by": ["mpu-1"],
"depends-on": ["dev-cert", "x25519mlkem768",
"aes-256-gcm"],
"protocol": {
"type": "tls",
"version": "1.3",
"cipher-suite": ["TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"]
}
},
{
"id": "x25519mlkem768",
"name": "X25519MLKEM768",
"depends-on": ["x25519", "ml-kem-768"],
"algorithm": {
"primitive": "combiner"
}
},
{
"id": "x25519",
"name": "x25519",
"algorithm": {
"primitive": "key-agree",
"family": "ECDH",
"curve": "other/Curve25519",
"quantum-security-level": 0
}
},
{
"id": "ml-kem-768",
"name": "ML-KEM-768",
"algorithm": {
"primitive": "kem",
"family": "ML-KEM",
"parameter-set": "768",
"quantum-security-level": 3
}
},
{
"id": "aes-256-gcm",
"name": "AES-256-GCM",
"algorithm": {
"primitive": "ae",
"family": "AES",
"parameter-set": "256",
"quantum-security-level": 5
}
},
{
"id": "dev-cert",
"name": "ne-1 device certificate",
"usage": ["device-identity", "management-plane"],
"depends-on": ["ecdsa-p-256"],
"certificate": {
"subject": "CN=ne-1.example.com",
"issuer": "CN=Example CA",
"not-valid-after": "2028-01-01T00:00:00Z"
}
},
{
"id": "ecdsa-p-256",
"name": "ECDSA-P-256",
"algorithm": {
"primitive": "signature",
"family": "ECDSA",
"curve": "nist/P-256",
"quantum-security-level": 0
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
}