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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-liu-cadi-03" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" xml:lang="en" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="CADI">Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-liu-cadi-03"/>
    <author initials="C. P." surname="Liu" fullname="Chunchi Peter Liu">
      <organization>Huawei</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>liuchunchi@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="Y." surname="Fu" fullname="Yufan Fu">
      <organization>Huawei</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>fuyufan2@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
    <keyword>CADI</keyword>
    <keyword>PQC</keyword>
    <keyword>CBOM</keyword>
    <keyword>YANG</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 98?>

<t>This document compiles existing Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory (CADI) methods and analyzes potential gaps. It also defines a YANG data model that augments the base network inventory model with the cryptographic assets of each network element. The data model is aligned with the Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM) defined in CycloneDX.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 102?>

<section anchor="intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory (CADI) refers to a set of tools and guidelines that assist in identifying, collecting, normalizing, correlating, and continuously maintaining all cryptography-related assets, including configurations, dependencies, and usage contexts within a given organization, system, or product scope. It requires both technical tools and management approaches.</t>
      <t>Many Post-Quantum transition roadmaps have highlighted the importance of identifying legacy cryptographic assets inside of an organization as a crucial preparatory part. For example:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The G7 statement on "Advancing a Coordinated Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in the Financial Sector" <xref target="G7"/> mentions there should exist six key PQ-migration activities:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Awareness and Preparation, <strong>Discovery and Inventory</strong>, Risk Assessment and Planning, Migration Execution, Migration Testing, Validation and Monitoring. The exact six stages are also published in NCCoE analysis on "Six Key Phases of the PQC Migration Journey" <xref target="NCCOEFAQ"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The United States Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on "Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography" <xref target="OMBM2302"/> requires:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>All federal agencies to "<strong>Submit cryptographic system inventory By May 4, 2023 and annually thereafter</strong>". This important date is also mentioned in CISA directive "Strategy for Migrating to Automated Post-Quantum Cryptography Discovery and Inventory Tools"<xref target="CISAACDI"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Although the exact PQ-migration roadmap in each different nations varies, the fact that cryptographic asset discovery and inventory is a key prerequisite for Chief Information Security Officers to asses a migration budget and draft a migration plan does not change.</t>
      <t>This document analyzes existing CADI methods and potential gaps. It also defines a YANG data model that extends the network inventory with cryptographic assets.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="term">
      <name>Conventions and Terminology</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<t>The following terms are defined in <xref target="RFC7950"/> and are not redefined here: augment, data model, and data node. The terms "network element" and "component" are used as defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang"/>. The meanings of the symbols in the YANG tree diagrams are defined in <xref target="RFC8340"/>.</t>
      <t>This document also uses the following terms:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>CADI (Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory) -- A set of tools and guidelines designed to automate the identification, collection, normalization, correlation, and lifecycle management of an organization's cryptographic assets.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>CBOM (Cryptography Bill of Materials) -- A machine-readable inventory of cryptographic assets, their properties, and their dependencies, defined as part of CycloneDX <xref target="CycloneDX"/>. In a CBOM, a cryptographic asset is a component of type "cryptographic-asset" described by "cryptoProperties".</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Cryptographic Asset -- A digital or physical element within a device or service-such as an algorithm, module, configuration, credential, secret, or communication protocol-that protects the confidentiality and integrity of secure data transmission or storage.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Cryptographic System -- An active software or hardware implementation of one or more cryptographic algorithms that provide one or more of the following services: (1) creation and exchange of encryption keys; (2) encrypted connections; or (3) creation and validation of digital signatures. (according to <xref target="OMBM2302"/>)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQC) -- A fault-tolerant quantum system capable of solving the underlying hardness assumption problems of widely used public-key cryptography in polynomial time, such as RSA and ECC.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ps">
      <name>Problem Statement and Challenges</name>
      <t>Apart from the milestones and requirements discussed above, there are also a few challenges to identify cryptographic assets:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Legacy ICT systems were not engineered to treat cryptographic primitives as distinct, trackable assets. Instead, cryptographic implementations are deeply integrated, highly distributed, and hidden across heterogeneous layers of the technology stack.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Taking inventory manually would take enormous amount of effort, yet there may still be statistical omissions that leave security exposures.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Methods like Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) only take effect on new devices to self-announce its cryptographic assets, but it cannot help identify legacy devices and systems.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Legacy devices and systems often behave like blackboxes, many does not allow installing additional programs or tools on them.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>As a result, the ideal CADI tool should meet the following requirements:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><strong>Automated</strong> scanning and inventory taking</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Agnostic</strong> to target object's system designs and architectures</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Integrate</strong> the result to existing network management and operations systems for unified presentation</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The requirements for automation, architectural agnosticism, and network management integration suggest a protocol-driven approach, potentially placing this within the scope of the IETF. However, this remains open for discussion.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="discovery">
      <name>Discovery and Identification</name>
      <t>There are many ways of doing discovering and identification. We catagorize them into two: active identification and passive identification.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><strong>Active Identification</strong>: The case where devices and services modifies its development and/or management process, actively self-announcing their cryptographic assets. Methods falls into this category includes:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>CBOM Declaration</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Static Code Scanning</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Binary / Image Scanning</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CI/CD Integration</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Passive Identification</strong>: The case where devices and services will stay as-is and cannot self-announce their cryptographic assets. These devices will require additional external tools to assist the identification. Methods falls into this category includes:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Simulated Handshakes</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configuration Extraction</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Traffic Pattern Analysis</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Process Identification</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <section anchor="active-identification">
        <name>Active Identification</name>
        <section anchor="cryptographic-bill-of-materials-cbom-and-auxiliary-methods">
          <name>Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) and Auxiliary Methods</name>
          <t>CBOM-based identification is to empower cryptographic asset owners or vendors to explicitly declare cryptographic usage within their products, components, or services. Usually CBOM declaration is achieved through static code scanning and/or CI/CD integration, so we keep them in the same section.</t>
          <t>Scanning Methods:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><strong>Static Code Scanning</strong>:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>SCA (Software Composition Analysis): Scan manifest files (like <tt>package.json</tt>, <tt>requirements.txt</tt>, or <tt>pom.xml</tt>) from the codebase to create CBOMS, usually for analyzing third-party libraries dependency.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>SAST (Static Application Security Testing): Builds a Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with parsed syntax and data flow of the target source code. It then uses AST to track call chain to end crypto library, track variables (data flow) from source to destination, do reference matching, etc.
                  </t>
                  <ul spacing="normal">
                    <li>
                      <t>SCA and SAST is used by IBM CBOMKit-Hyperion.</t>
                    </li>
                  </ul>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Binary / Image Scanning</strong>:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Scan for algorithmic constants, signatures; Extract from OS trust stores and runtime configurations... The process details are omitted in this document due to complexity.
                  </t>
                  <ul spacing="normal">
                    <li>
                      <t>Binary / Image Scanning is used by IBM CBOMKit-Theia and CycloneDX Cdxgen.</t>
                    </li>
                  </ul>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Tools and Modelling:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><strong>IBM CBOMkit</strong>, Static code level scanning (Hyperion) and Artifact level scanning (Theia) <xref target="IBMCBOM"/>: uses <tt>implements</tt> and <tt>uses</tt> relationship to create dependency diagram.
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t><tt>implements</tt>: Describes the list of protocols or algorithms this module implements.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>uses</tt>: Describes what modules are used by this service.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>For example, Application Nginx <tt>uses</tt> Library <tt>libssl.so</tt> that <tt>uses</tt> Protocol TLS v1.3/v1.2 that <tt>uses</tt> <tt>libcrypto.so</tt> that <tt>implements</tt> Algorithm MD5, SHA256, AES-128-GCM.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>CycloneDX Cdxgen</strong>, Artifact level scanning <xref target="CDXGEN"/>: uses <tt>dependsOn</tt> and <tt>provides</tt> relationship to create dependency diagram.
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t><tt>dependsOn</tt>: Describes other modules or services this module depends on.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t><tt>provides</tt>: Describes all capabilities this module provides.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>For example, Application Nginx <tt>dependsOn</tt> Library <tt>libssl.so</tt> , which <tt>provides</tt> TLS 1.2.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>After scanning, the result will be recorded as a CBOM object.</t>
          <t>CBOM data specification: A standardized cryptographic asset object includes cryptographic algorithms, digital certificates, protocols, private keys, public keys, cryptographic keys, ciphertext information, digital signatures, digests (the output values of hash functions), initialization vectors (input parameters for encryption algorithms), seeds, salts, shared secrets, authentication tags, passwords, credentials, and tokens. CycloneDX 1.7 <xref target="CycloneDX"/> groups them into four asset types: algorithm, certificate, protocol, and related cryptographic material. <xref target="fig-cbom"/> shows an example.</t>
          <figure anchor="fig-cbom">
            <name>Example CBOM (CycloneDX 1.7)</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
"components": [
 {
  "name": "google.com",
  "type": "cryptographic-asset",
  "bom-ref": "crypto/certificate/google.com@sha256:1e15e0fbd3ce9...",
  "cryptoProperties": {
    "assetType": "certificate",
    "certificateProperties": {
      "subjectName": "CN = www.google.com",
      "issuerName": "CN = GTS CA 1C3, O = Google Trust Services",
      "notValidBefore": "2016-11-21T08:00:00Z",
      "notValidAfter": "2017-11-22T07:59:59Z",
      "certificateFormat": "X.509",
      "certificateFileExtension": "crt",
      "relatedCryptographicAssets": [
        { "type": "algorithm", "ref": "crypto/algorithm/sha512-rsa" },
        { "type": "publicKey", "ref": "crypto/key/rsa-2048" }
      ]
    }
  }
 }
]
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t>Gaps: Obviously, this does not help with identifying the mass legacy devices, components or services.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="passive-identification">
        <name>Passive Identification</name>
        <section anchor="simulated-handshakes">
          <name>Simulated Handshakes</name>
          <t>Simulated handshake is a network-probing technique where a discovery tool acts as a client and intentionally initiates cryptographic protocol negotiations (e.g., TLS, SSH, IPsec) with enterprise network endpoints without completing the full data session. During the negotiation process, the discovery tool determines the specific cryptographic protocol versions, negotiation mechanisms, and ciphersuites supported by the endpoint. This is also known as <em>Active Probing</em>.</t>
          <t>Steps of simulated handshake include:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t><strong>Port Scan:</strong> The tool scans for typical ports for specific secure communication protocols (443 for HTTPS, 22 for SSH, etc)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Probing:</strong> The tool generates a RFC-compliant connection initialization packet, including all currently standardized ciphersuites, and examine the response.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Response Extraction:</strong> The target object respond with supported ciphersuites, following its own internal priority rules.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>Parsing:</strong> The tool intercepts this raw response and decodes it as cryptographic assets.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>This works for most secure protocols that includes negotiation:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>IPSEC</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>TLS</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>SSH</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Pros and Cons/Gaps:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Strengths:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>This kind of method does not require complex engineering refactoring. Since it is agnostic to the design of the target, it works best for the case where the manager operates vast heterogeneous devices from different vendors, versions and locations, hence telecommunications case.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>This probing is one-time, thus it will not create unhandleable amount of probing packets.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The limitation of this method is that
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Some masking mechanism will stop the probing (firewalls, load balancers, port-concealing protocols like Single Packet Authorization that enforce a default drop for unexpected packets), leaving a hidden security posture inside of the system.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Network management cannot know local application components that rests internally in the device and are not exposed over a socket.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Tools:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Cisco Mercury project <xref target="MERCURY"/> provides an open source packet capture and analysis tool. It can read network packets, identify metadata of interest, and write out the metadata (including cryptographic-related) in JSON format.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="traffic-pattern-analysis">
          <name>Traffic Pattern Analysis</name>
          <t>Unlike simulated handshakes that actively query an endpoint, Traffic Pattern Analysis listens passively to live network traffic at strategic aggregation points. It infers cryptographic asset usage from protocol metadata, statistical characteristics, and behaviors without decrypting the underlying data payload.</t>
          <t>Methods of Traffic Pattern Analysis includes:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Listen to unencrypted negotiations like <tt>clientHello</tt>/<tt>serverHello</tt>, Server Name Indication (SNI), response of an unencrypted server digital certificate request, etc.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Listen to handshake fingerprints and compare them to existing patterns, as protocol implementations and behaviors are often rigid.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Listen to packet length and arrival time, do statistical pattern recognition.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Pros and Cons/Gaps:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Strengths:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Similar to Simulated Handshakes, this kind of method is not intrusive and is agnostic to the design of the target.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The limitation of this method is that
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Negotiation information like <tt>clientHello</tt> <xref target="RFC9849"/> and SNI are tending to be encrypted.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Protocols tend to have constant size packets <xref target="RFC9347"/>.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Alternative routing: network requests/responses could exit through a different routing path.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="process-identification">
          <name>Process Identification</name>
          <t>Process Identification requires Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) installed to have cryptographic visibility inside of a system.</t>
          <t>Methods of Process Identification includes:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Kernel-Level System Call Auditing by deploying eBPF programs into the kernel space. These filters can capture kernel events to determine exactly which process (down to PID) have initiated an encrypted network communication.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Shared Library and Binary Hooking, by monitoring process load table to see if cryptographic dynamic libraries are loaded into the memory space.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Live Memory Scanning, by periodically scanning volatile memory for indication of creation of keys or signatures (as high-entropy memory segments), and then compare them with known patterns.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Pros and Cons/Gaps:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Strengths:
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Have deeper visibility for cryptographic assets within devices.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The limitation of this method is that
              </t>
              <ul spacing="normal">
                <li>
                  <t>Requires loading new software (at least EDR/RDR) to legacy devices.</t>
                </li>
                <li>
                  <t>Potential blind spots due to lower pattern coverage.</t>
                </li>
              </ul>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="configuration-extraction">
          <name>Configuration Extraction</name>
          <t>The Configuration Extraction is a bit similar to the source code scanning. This section focuses more on the runtime configurations. In different use cases, the configuration extraction methods differs significantly. This section is to be extended.</t>
          <t>Methods of Configuration Extraction includes:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>In network device management, NETCONF and YANG provide a standardized, model-driven management interface that enables programmable configuration and state validation. The network managing platform can define a YANG model and extract configurations from a device.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>In cloud-native development, general <tt>.yaml</tt> configuration files, <tt>.env</tt> environment variables files, Kubernetes secret manifest, etc, can be extracted by administrative scripts or through management interfaces (e.g., AWS CloudControl, Kubernetes API).</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="inventory">
      <name>Inventory</name>
      <section anchor="overview">
        <name>Overview</name>
        <t>The discovery methods in <xref target="discovery"/> produce information about cryptographic assets in different forms, e.g., CBOMs delivered by vendors or handshake results collected by scanners. To support migration planning, this information needs to be correlated with the network elements and components on which the assets are deployed, and exposed through a standard management interface.</t>
        <t>This section defines the "ietf-network-inventory-crypto" YANG module. It augments the base network inventory model <xref target="I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang"/> with a read-only cryptographic inventory of each network element. Like the base model, it is a network model: a network controller uses it to report the cryptographic assets of all network elements under its control, e.g., to an Operations Support System (OSS) or to a higher-level controller, via NETCONF <xref target="RFC6241"/> or RESTCONF <xref target="RFC8040"/>.</t>
        <t>The module complements CycloneDX CBOM <xref target="CycloneDX"/> rather than replacing it, as summarized in the table below. Asset types, properties, and relationships are aligned with CycloneDX 1.7, so that a vendor CBOM can be imported into a controller and controller data can be exported as a CBOM. This enables network-wide post-quantum cryptography (PQC) readiness assessment.</t>
        <table>
          <name>CBOM Documents and the Inventory Data Model</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left"> </th>
              <th align="left">CycloneDX CBOM</th>
              <th align="left">This Module</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Form</td>
              <td align="left">Document (JSON, XML)</td>
              <td align="left">Interface (NETCONF, RESTCONF)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Scope</td>
              <td align="left">One product or software version</td>
              <td align="left">All network elements managed by a controller</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Producer</td>
              <td align="left">Vendor or scanning tool</td>
              <td align="left">Network controller</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Typical use</td>
              <td align="left">Supply chain, audit</td>
              <td align="left">Operations, PQC readiness assessment</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Linked to</td>
              <td align="left">Software components</td>
              <td align="left">Network elements</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section anchor="model-structure">
        <name>Model Structure</name>
        <t>The module adds a "crypto-inventory" container to each network element, alongside the "components" list of the base model. All data nodes of the container are read-only, as the augmented "network-inventory" container is "config false". It contains two lists:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>"cbom-ref":</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>References to CBOMs that describe the network element or one of its components. Each entry contains the serial number and version of the CBOM, retrieval URIs, and a hash of the CBOM for integrity verification.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>"crypto-object":</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A structured list of the cryptographic assets of the network element, referred to as cryptographic objects in this module. An object can refer to the components that implement it, e.g., a Hardware Security Module (HSM) or a cryptographic library (<xref target="relationships"/>). This list is optional and is reported only if the server supports the "crypto-objects" feature. Otherwise, clients obtain the details from the CBOMs listed in "cbom-ref".</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <section anchor="cryptographic-objects">
          <name>Cryptographic Objects</name>
          <t>Each cryptographic object is identified by an "id" that is unique within the network element. The common attributes are:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>"uuid", "name", "alias", and "description": reused from the base model.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>"usage": the purposes for which the object is used, i.e., management plane, control plane, or data plane. CycloneDX has no equivalent; this network-specific context is needed to prioritize migration.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>"provided-by" and "depends-on": the relationships described in <xref target="relationships"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>"last-discovered": the time at which the object was last observed.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>In CycloneDX, each cryptographic asset has exactly one of four asset types. The type is therefore modeled as a YANG choice: the container that is present indicates the type and contains the type-specific properties:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>"algorithm": primitive (e.g., signature or kem), family, parameter set, elliptic curve, and quantum security level, where the value 0 indicates a quantum-vulnerable algorithm.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>"certificate": subject, issuer, and validity period.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>"related-material": material type (e.g., private key), size, expiration time, and protection mechanism.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>"protocol": protocol type, version, and cipher suites.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Only the CycloneDX properties needed for inventory and PQC readiness assessment are modeled. Further details remain available in the CBOMs referenced by "cbom-ref". Additional properties and types can be added by augmentation.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="naming">
          <name>Naming</name>
          <t>CycloneDX 1.7 introduces the Cryptography Registry <xref target="CDX-REGISTRY"/>. It defines algorithm families together with naming patterns, and elliptic curves in namespaces of the defining organizations. The Registry evolves independently of the CycloneDX specification. This module uses it as follows:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>"family" <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> contain a family name from the Registry, e.g., "AES", "ML-KEM", or "SM4".</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The "name" of an algorithm <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> follow the naming pattern of its family, e.g., "AES-128-GCM" or "ML-KEM-768".</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>"curve" <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> contain a Registry curve name in the form "&lt;namespace&gt;/&lt;curve&gt;", e.g., "nist/P-256". A curve can have aliases in other namespaces, e.g., "secg/secp256r1" and "x962/prime256v1" for "nist/P-256"; consumers need to treat aliases as the same curve.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>A hybrid scheme is reported as an algorithm whose "primitive" is "combiner" and whose "name" is the registered name of the hybrid, e.g., the TLS group name "X25519MLKEM768" <xref target="IANA-TLS"/>. No "family" is reported for it; it depends on its component algorithms (<xref target="relationships"/>).</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="relationships">
          <name>Relationships</name>
          <t>Two relationship types are defined, matching the two dependency types of CycloneDX:</t>
          <dl>
            <dt>"provided-by":</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>From a cryptographic object to the components that implement or provide it, e.g., from a TLS implementation to a cryptographic library or a main processing unit. CycloneDX expresses this as "dependencies[].provides", in the opposite direction.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>"depends-on":</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>From a cryptographic object to other cryptographic objects that it uses or is bound to. CycloneDX expresses this as "dependencies[].dependsOn" or "relatedCryptographicAssets". The meaning of the relationship is given by the type of the referenced object. For example, a certificate depends on an algorithm (its signature algorithm) and on a public key (its subject public key), a protocol depends on a certificate (its credential), and a combiner depends on its component algorithms.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <t>A relationship is recorded once, at the object that uses or holds the other object; reverse relationships are not recorded. The resulting graph is expected to be acyclic.</t>
          <t><xref target="fig-rel"/> shows the relationships of the example in <xref target="example"/>. Unlabeled arrows denote "depends-on", and the labeled arrow denotes "provided-by".</t>
          <figure anchor="fig-rel">
            <name>Example of Relationships</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
  +------------+  provided-by   +-------------+
  |   tls-1    +--------------->|    mpu-1    |
  | (protocol) |                | (component) |
  +--+------+--+                +-------------+
     |      |
     |      +----------------+
     v                       v
  +------------+     +----------------+
  |  dev-cert  |     | x25519mlkem768 |
  +-----+------+     +---+--------+---+
        |                |        |
        v                v        v
  +-------------+   +--------+  +------------+
  | ecdsa-p-256 |   | x25519 |  | ml-kem-768 |
  +-------------+   +--------+  +------------+
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="tree">
        <name>Tree Diagram</name>
        <t><xref target="fig-tree"/> shows the tree diagram of the "ietf-network-inventory-crypto" module.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-tree">
          <name>Tree Diagram of ietf-network-inventory-crypto</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
module: ietf-network-inventory-crypto

  augment /nwi:network-inventory/nwi:network-elements
            /nwi:network-element:
    +--ro crypto-inventory!
       +--ro cbom-ref* [serial-number]
       |  +--ro serial-number    cbom-serial-number
       |  +--ro version?         uint32
       |  +--ro uri*             inet:uri
       |  +--ro hash
       |  |  +--ro algorithm?   string
       |  |  +--ro value?       string
       |  +--ro component-ref?   leafref
       +--ro crypto-object* [id] {crypto-objects}?
          +--ro id                 string
          +--ro uuid?              yang:uuid
          +--ro name?              string
          +--ro alias?             string
          +--ro description?       string
          +--ro usage*             identityref
          +--ro provided-by*       leafref
          +--ro depends-on*        leafref
          +--ro last-discovered?   yang:date-and-time
          +--ro (type)
             +--:(algorithm)
             |  +--ro algorithm!
             |     +--ro primitive?                string
             |     +--ro family?                   algorithm-family
             |     +--ro parameter-set?            string
             |     +--ro curve?                    elliptic-curve
             |     +--ro quantum-security-level?   uint8
             +--:(certificate)
             |  +--ro certificate!
             |     +--ro subject?            string
             |     +--ro issuer?             string
             |     +--ro not-valid-before?   yang:date-and-time
             |     +--ro not-valid-after?    yang:date-and-time
             +--:(related-material)
             |  +--ro related-material!
             |     +--ro type?              string
             |     +--ro size?              uint32
             |     +--ro expiration-date?   yang:date-and-time
             |     +--ro secured-by?        string
             +--:(protocol)
                +--ro protocol!
                   +--ro type?           string
                   +--ro version?        string
                   +--ro cipher-suite*   string
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
      </section>
      <section anchor="module">
        <name>YANG Module</name>
        <t>This module imports types from <xref target="RFC9911"/> and <xref target="I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang"/>. It references <xref target="CycloneDX"/> and <xref target="CDX-REGISTRY"/>.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-module">
          <name>ietf-network-inventory-crypto YANG Module</name>
          <sourcecode type="yang"><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-network-inventory-crypto@2026-10-30.yang"
module ietf-network-inventory-crypto {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-network-inventory-crypto";
  prefix nwic;

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
    reference
      "RFC 9911: Common YANG Data Types";
  }
  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
    reference
      "RFC 9911: Common YANG Data Types";
  }
  import ietf-network-inventory {
    prefix nwi;
    reference
      "RFC YYYY: A Base YANG Data Model for Network Inventory";
  }

  organization
    "IETF Network Inventory YANG (ivy) Working Group";
  contact
    "WG Web:   <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ivy/>
     WG List:  <mailto:ivy@ietf.org>

     Editor:   Chunchi Peter Liu
               <mailto:liuchunchi@huawei.com>

     Editor:   Yufan Fu
               <mailto:fuyufan2@huawei.com>";
  description
    "This module augments the base network inventory model with
     a read-only cryptographic inventory of each network element.
     The inventory consists of references to Cryptography Bills
     of Materials (CBOMs) and, optionally, a structured list of
     cryptographic objects.  Types, properties, and relationships
     are aligned with CycloneDX 1.7 (ECMA-424).

     The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
     'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
     'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
     are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
     (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
     capitals, as shown here.

     Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified
     as authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

     Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
     without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
     to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License
     set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
     Relating to IETF Documents
     (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

     This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
     the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

  revision 2026-10-30 {
    description
      "Initial revision.";
    reference
      "RFC XXXX: Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory";
  }

  /*
   * Features
   */

  feature crypto-objects {
    description
      "Indicates that the server supports reporting a structured
       list of the cryptographic objects of each network element,
       in addition to references to CBOMs.";
  }

  /*
   * Identities
   */

  identity crypto-usage {
    description
      "Base identity for the purposes for which a cryptographic
       object is used on a network element.";
  }

  identity management-plane {
    base crypto-usage;
    description
      "Protection of management traffic, e.g., NETCONF over SSH.";
  }

  identity control-plane {
    base crypto-usage;
    description
      "Protection of control plane protocols, e.g., routing
       protocol authentication.";
  }

  identity data-plane {
    base crypto-usage;
    description
      "Protection of user traffic, e.g., IPsec or MACsec.";
  }

  identity device-identity {
    base crypto-usage;
    description
      "Identification and authentication of the device, e.g.,
       using an IDevID certificate.";
  }

  identity secure-boot {
    base crypto-usage;
    description
      "Verification of boot loaders and images during start-up.";
  }

  identity software-integrity {
    base crypto-usage;
    description
      "Verification of software images and patches.";
  }

  identity storage-protection {
    base crypto-usage;
    description
      "Protection of data at rest, e.g., configuration files or
       key stores.";
  }

  /*
   * Typedefs
   */

  typedef algorithm-family {
    type string;
    description
      "An algorithm family name registered in the CycloneDX
       Cryptography Registry, e.g., 'AES', 'ML-KEM', or 'SM4'.
       The value SHOULD match the Registry entry exactly.";
    reference
      "CycloneDX Cryptography Registry";
  }

  typedef elliptic-curve {
    type string {
      pattern '[a-z0-9]+/.+';
    }
    description
      "An elliptic curve name registered in the CycloneDX
       Cryptography Registry, in the form '<namespace>/<curve>',
       e.g., 'nist/P-256' or 'oscaa/SM2'.";
    reference
      "CycloneDX Cryptography Registry";
  }

  typedef cbom-serial-number {
    type string {
      pattern 'urn:uuid:[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-'
            + '[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}';
    }
    description
      "The serial number of a CycloneDX BOM, i.e., a UUID URN.";
    reference
      "ECMA-424: CycloneDX Bill of Materials Specification,
       serialNumber";
  }

  /*
   * Augmentation
   */

  augment "/nwi:network-inventory/nwi:network-elements"
        + "/nwi:network-element" {
    description
      "Adds the cryptographic inventory to network elements.";
    container crypto-inventory {
      presence
        "Indicates that the server reports the cryptographic
         inventory of this network element.";
      description
        "The cryptographic inventory of the network element.";
      list cbom-ref {
        key "serial-number";
        description
          "References to CBOMs that describe the network element
           or one of its components.";
        leaf serial-number {
          type cbom-serial-number;
          description
            "The serial number of the CBOM.";
        }
        leaf version {
          type uint32 {
            range "1..max";
          }
          description
            "The version of the CBOM.";
        }
        leaf-list uri {
          type inet:uri;
          description
            "Locations from which the CBOM can be retrieved.";
        }
        container hash {
          description
            "The hash of the CBOM, for integrity verification.";
          leaf algorithm {
            type string;
            description
              "The hash algorithm, using the CycloneDX hash
               algorithm names, e.g., 'SHA-256' or 'SHA3-384'.";
          }
          leaf value {
            type string {
              pattern '[0-9a-fA-F]+';
            }
            description
              "The hex-encoded hash value.";
          }
        }
        leaf component-ref {
          type leafref {
            path "../../../nwi:components/nwi:component"
               + "/nwi:component-id";
          }
          description
            "The component described by the CBOM.  If not present,
             the CBOM describes the whole network element.";
        }
      }
      list crypto-object {
        if-feature "crypto-objects";
        key "id";
        description
          "The cryptographic objects of the network element.";
        leaf id {
          type string;
          description
            "An identifier of the cryptographic object, unique
             within the network element.";
        }
        uses nwi:basic-common-entity-attributes {
          refine "name" {
            description
              "The name of the cryptographic object.  The name of
               an algorithm SHOULD follow the naming pattern of its
               family in the CycloneDX Cryptography Registry, e.g.,
               'AES-128-GCM'.";
          }
        }
        leaf-list usage {
          type identityref {
            base crypto-usage;
          }
          description
            "The purposes for which the cryptographic object is
             used.";
        }
        leaf-list provided-by {
          type leafref {
            path "../../../nwi:components/nwi:component"
               + "/nwi:component-id";
          }
          description
            "The hardware or software components that implement or
             provide the cryptographic object.";
        }
        leaf-list depends-on {
          type leafref {
            path "../../crypto-object/id";
          }
          description
            "Other cryptographic objects that this object uses or is
             bound to.  The meaning of the relationship is given by
             the type of the referenced object.";
        }
        leaf last-discovered {
          type yang:date-and-time;
          description
            "The time at which the cryptographic object was last
             observed.";
        }
        choice type {
          mandatory true;
          description
            "The type of the cryptographic object.  Exactly one type
             is reported for each object.";
          reference
            "ECMA-424: CycloneDX Bill of Materials Specification,
             cryptoProperties.assetType";
          container algorithm {
            presence
              "Indicates that the object is an algorithm.";
            description
              "A cryptographic algorithm, e.g., AES-128-GCM or
               ML-KEM-768.";
            leaf primitive {
              type string;
              description
                "The cryptographic primitive, using the CycloneDX
                 values, e.g., 'block-cipher', 'ae', 'signature',
                 'key-agree', 'kem', or 'combiner'.";
            }
            leaf family {
              type algorithm-family;
              description
                "The algorithm family.  Not present for combiners.";
            }
            leaf parameter-set {
              type string;
              description
                "The parameter set, e.g., '128' for AES-128 or '768'
                 for ML-KEM-768.";
            }
            leaf curve {
              type elliptic-curve;
              description
                "The elliptic curve, if any.";
            }
            leaf quantum-security-level {
              type uint8 {
                range "0..6";
              }
              description
                "The NIST security strength category against quantum
                 attacks.  The value 0 indicates that none of the
                 categories is met, i.e., the algorithm is
                 quantum-vulnerable.";
              reference
                "ECMA-424: CycloneDX Bill of Materials Specification,
                 algorithmProperties.nistQuantumSecurityLevel";
            }
          }
          container certificate {
            presence
              "Indicates that the object is a certificate.";
            description
              "A certificate, e.g., an X.509 device certificate.";
            leaf subject {
              type string;
              description
                "The subject name.";
            }
            leaf issuer {
              type string;
              description
                "The issuer name.";
            }
            leaf not-valid-before {
              type yang:date-and-time;
              description
                "The start of the validity period.";
            }
            leaf not-valid-after {
              type yang:date-and-time;
              description
                "The end of the validity period.";
            }
          }
          container related-material {
            presence
              "Indicates that the object is related cryptographic
               material.";
            description
              "Material related to algorithms, certificates, or
               protocols, e.g., a key, a password, or a token.";
            leaf type {
              type string;
              description
                "The type of the material, using the CycloneDX
                 values, e.g., 'private-key', 'public-key',
                 'secret-key', or 'password'.";
            }
            leaf size {
              type uint32;
              units "bits";
              description
                "The size of the material.";
            }
            leaf expiration-date {
              type yang:date-and-time;
              description
                "The time at which the material expires.";
            }
            leaf secured-by {
              type string;
              description
                "The mechanism protecting the material, using the
                 CycloneDX values, e.g., 'HSM', 'TPM', 'Software',
                 or 'None'.";
            }
          }
          container protocol {
            presence
              "Indicates that the object is a protocol.";
            description
              "A cryptographic protocol, e.g., TLS, SSH, or IKEv2.";
            leaf type {
              type string;
              description
                "The protocol, using the CycloneDX values, e.g.,
                 'tls', 'ssh', 'ipsec', 'ike', 'dtls', or 'quic'.";
            }
            leaf version {
              type string;
              description
                "The protocol version, e.g., '1.3'.";
            }
            leaf-list cipher-suite {
              type string;
              description
                "The cipher suites supported by the protocol, e.g.,
                 'TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384'.  The algorithms of the
                 cipher suites are reported using 'depends-on'.";
            }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
<CODE ENDS>
]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
      </section>
      <section anchor="operational-considerations">
        <name>Operational Considerations</name>
        <t>As with the base model, this module provides a read-only view of the cryptographic inventory known to the controller. How the controller obtains the information, e.g., by importing CBOMs or by the methods in <xref target="discovery"/>, is outside the scope of this document.</t>
        <t>The inventory needs to be updated when cryptographic assets change, e.g., after a software upgrade, a certificate renewal, or a configuration change. The "last-discovered" leaf allows consumers to detect stale entries.</t>
        <t>Network-wide inventories can be large. Clients can use protocol filtering mechanisms, e.g., subtree or XPath filtering in NETCONF, to retrieve only the data they need, such as the algorithms whose "quantum-security-level" is 0.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="open-issues">
        <name>Open Issues</name>
        <t>This section is to be removed before publication.</t>
        <t>The authors seek feedback from the WG on the following issues:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Content: whether the model includes the "crypto-object" list as an optional feature, as currently proposed, or is limited to CBOM references, leaving the content to the CBOMs.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Placement: whether cryptographic objects are modeled as a separate list of each network element, as currently proposed, or as a new class of components in the base model. The "parent" of a component denotes containment, whereas a cryptographic object is implemented by, used by, or bound to components.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="potentially-related-working-groups">
      <name>Potentially Related Working Groups</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>IVY -- <xref target="inventory"/> augments the base network inventory model <xref target="I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang"/> with cryptographic assets.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>SCITT -- extend SBOMs to adapt CBOMs.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>PQUIP -- as a migration guideline.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="tools-compilation">
      <name>Tools Compilation</name>
      <t>Due to limited time, compiling existing CADI tools remains open and will be done in next version.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no further security considerations.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>TBD</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7950">
          <front>
            <title>The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language</title>
            <author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Bjorklund"/>
            <date month="August" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>YANG is a data modeling language used to model configuration data, state data, Remote Procedure Calls, and notifications for network management protocols. This document describes the syntax and semantics of version 1.1 of the YANG language. YANG version 1.1 is a maintenance release of the YANG language, addressing ambiguities and defects in the original specification. There are a small number of backward incompatibilities from YANG version 1. This document also specifies the YANG mappings to the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7950"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7950"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9911">
          <front>
            <title>Common YANG Data Types</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schönwälder" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Schönwälder"/>
            <date month="December" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a collection of common data types to be used with the YANG data modeling language. It includes several new type definitions and obsoletes RFC 6991.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9911"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9911"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang">
          <front>
            <title>A Base YANG Data Model for Network Inventory</title>
            <author fullname="Chaode Yu" initials="C." surname="Yu">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sergio Belotti" initials="S." surname="Belotti">
              <organization>Nokia</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jean-Francois Bouquier" initials="J." surname="Bouquier">
              <organization>Vodafone</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Fabio Peruzzini" initials="F." surname="Peruzzini">
              <organization>FiberCop</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Phil Bedard" initials="P." surname="Bedard">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="29" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a base YANG data model for reporting network
   inventory.  The scope of this base model is set to be application-
   and technology-agnostic.  The base data model can be augmented with
   application- and technology-specific details.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-ivy-network-inventory-yang-20"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CycloneDX" target="https://ecma-international.org/publications-and-standards/standards/ecma-424/">
          <front>
            <title>ECMA-424: CycloneDX Bill of Materials Specification, 2nd Edition</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Ecma International</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CDX-REGISTRY" target="https://cyclonedx.org/registry/cryptography/">
          <front>
            <title>CycloneDX Cryptography Registry</title>
            <author>
              <organization>OWASP CycloneDX</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6241">
          <front>
            <title>Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Enns" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Enns"/>
            <author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Bjorklund"/>
            <author fullname="J. Schoenwaelder" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Schoenwaelder"/>
            <author fullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Bierman"/>
            <date month="June" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) defined in this document provides mechanisms to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. It uses an Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based data encoding for the configuration data as well as the protocol messages. The NETCONF protocol operations are realized as remote procedure calls (RPCs). This document obsoletes RFC 4741. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6241"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6241"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7951">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG</title>
            <author fullname="L. Lhotka" initials="L." surname="Lhotka"/>
            <date month="August" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines encoding rules for representing configuration data, state data, parameters of Remote Procedure Call (RPC) operations or actions, and notifications defined using YANG as JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) text.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7951"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7951"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8040">
          <front>
            <title>RESTCONF Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." surname="Bierman"/>
            <author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." surname="Bjorklund"/>
            <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>
            <date month="January" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes an HTTP-based protocol that provides a programmatic interface for accessing data defined in YANG, using the datastore concepts defined in the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8040"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8040"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8340">
          <front>
            <title>YANG Tree Diagrams</title>
            <author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." surname="Bjorklund"/>
            <author fullname="L. Berger" initials="L." role="editor" surname="Berger"/>
            <date month="March" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document captures the current syntax used in YANG module tree diagrams. The purpose of this document is to provide a single location for this definition. This syntax may be updated from time to time based on the evolution of the YANG language.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="215"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8340"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8340"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8792">
          <front>
            <title>Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>
            <author fullname="E. Auerswald" initials="E." surname="Auerswald"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <author fullname="Q. Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines two strategies for handling long lines in width-bounded text content. One strategy, called the "single backslash" strategy, is based on the historical use of a single backslash ('\') character to indicate where line-folding has occurred, with the continuation occurring with the first character that is not a space character (' ') on the next line. The second strategy, called the "double backslash" strategy, extends the first strategy by adding a second backslash character to identify where the continuation begins and is thereby able to handle cases not supported by the first strategy. Both strategies use a self-describing header enabling automated reconstitution of the original content.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8792"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8792"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9347">
          <front>
            <title>Aggregation and Fragmentation Mode for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Its Use for IP Traffic Flow Security (IP-TFS)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Hopps" initials="C." surname="Hopps"/>
            <date month="January" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for aggregation and fragmentation of IP packets when they are being encapsulated in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). This new payload type can be used for various purposes, such as decreasing encapsulation overhead for small IP packets; however, the focus in this document is to enhance IP Traffic Flow Security (IP-TFS) by adding Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) to encrypted IP-encapsulated traffic. TFC is provided by obscuring the size and frequency of IP traffic using a fixed-size, constant-send-rate IPsec tunnel. The solution allows for congestion control, as well as nonconstant send-rate usage.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9347"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9347"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9849">
          <front>
            <title>TLS Encrypted Client Hello</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <author fullname="K. Oku" initials="K." surname="Oku"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sullivan" initials="N." surname="Sullivan"/>
            <author fullname="C. A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Wood"/>
            <date month="March" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS) for encrypting a message under a server public key.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9849"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9849"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA-TLS" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters">
          <front>
            <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="G7" target="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/G7-CEG-Quantum-Roadmap.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Advancing a Coordinated Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in the Financial Sector</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="January"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CISAACDI" target="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/Strategy-for-Migrating-to-Automated-PQC-Discovery-and-Inventory-Tools.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Strategy for Migrating to Automated Post-Quantum Cryptography Discovery and Inventory Tools</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="NCCOEFAQ" target="https://pages.nist.gov/nccoe-migration-post-quantum-cryptography/FAQ/index.html">
          <front>
            <title>Frequently Asked Questions about Post-Quantum Cryptography</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="June"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OMBM2302" target="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/M-23-02-M-Memo-on-Migrating-to-Post-Quantum-Cryptography.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="NIST-SP-1800-38B" target="https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/pqc-migration-nist-sp-1800-38b-preliminary-draft.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography Quantum Readiness- Cryptographic Discovery</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="December"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MERCURY" target="https://github.com/cisco/mercury/">
          <front>
            <title>Mercury - network metadata capture and analysis.</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IBMCBOM" target="https://github.com/IBM/CBOM">
          <front>
            <title>CBOM</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CDXGEN" target="https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen">
          <front>
            <title>CycloneDX Generator</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 936?>

<section anchor="example">
      <name>Example</name>
      <t><xref target="fig-example"/> shows an instance of the module in JSON encoding <xref target="RFC7951"/>. Network element "ne-1" is described by a vendor CBOM listed in "cbom-ref". It runs a TLS 1.3 implementation that is used on the management plane and provided by component "mpu-1". The TLS implementation depends on a device certificate, on the hybrid key exchange X25519MLKEM768, and on AES-256-GCM. The key exchange includes ML-KEM-768 (quantum security level 3), but the device certificate still relies on ECDSA with P-256, which is quantum-vulnerable (level 0).</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-example">
        <name>Example of Cryptographic Inventory</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

{
  "ietf-network-inventory:network-inventory": {
    "network-elements": {
      "network-element": [
        {
          "ne-id": "ne-1",
          "components": {
            "component": [
              {
                "component-id": "mpu-1",
                "class": "iana-hardware:module"
              }
            ]
          },
          "ietf-network-inventory-crypto:crypto-inventory": {
            "cbom-ref": [
              {
                "serial-number": "urn:uuid:3e671687-395b-41f5-a30f-\
                   a58921a69b79",
                "version": 1,
                "uri": ["https://vendor.example.com/ne-1.cdx.json"]
              }
            ],
            "crypto-object": [
              {
                "id": "tls-1",
                "name": "TLSv1.3",
                "usage": ["management-plane"],
                "provided-by": ["mpu-1"],
                "depends-on": ["dev-cert", "x25519mlkem768",
                               "aes-256-gcm"],
                "protocol": {
                  "type": "tls",
                  "version": "1.3",
                  "cipher-suite": ["TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"]
                }
              },
              {
                "id": "x25519mlkem768",
                "name": "X25519MLKEM768",
                "depends-on": ["x25519", "ml-kem-768"],
                "algorithm": {
                  "primitive": "combiner"
                }
              },
              {
                "id": "x25519",
                "name": "x25519",
                "algorithm": {
                  "primitive": "key-agree",
                  "family": "ECDH",
                  "curve": "other/Curve25519",
                  "quantum-security-level": 0
                }
              },
              {
                "id": "ml-kem-768",
                "name": "ML-KEM-768",
                "algorithm": {
                  "primitive": "kem",
                  "family": "ML-KEM",
                  "parameter-set": "768",
                  "quantum-security-level": 3
                }
              },
              {
                "id": "aes-256-gcm",
                "name": "AES-256-GCM",
                "algorithm": {
                  "primitive": "ae",
                  "family": "AES",
                  "parameter-set": "256",
                  "quantum-security-level": 5
                }
              },
              {
                "id": "dev-cert",
                "name": "ne-1 device certificate",
                "usage": ["device-identity", "management-plane"],
                "depends-on": ["ecdsa-p-256"],
                "certificate": {
                  "subject": "CN=ne-1.example.com",
                  "issuer": "CN=Example CA",
                  "not-valid-after": "2028-01-01T00:00:00Z"
                }
              },
              {
                "id": "ecdsa-p-256",
                "name": "ECDSA-P-256",
                "algorithm": {
                  "primitive": "signature",
                  "family": "ECDSA",
                  "curve": "nist/P-256",
                  "quantum-security-level": 0
                }
              }
            ]
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
    </section>
  </back>
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