| Internet-Draft | PQC Profile for DNP3 SAv5 | November 2026 |
| Liu, et al. | Expires 22 May 2027 | [Page] |
This document specifies a post-quantum cryptographic profile for DNP3 Secure Authentication version 5 (SAv5). It defines an ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA authentication exchange, HKDF-SHA-256 session keys, canonical DNP3 application protocol data unit (APDU) encoding, transport segmentation, and HMAC-SHA-256 protection of application messages.¶
This Internet-Draft is a proposal for Standards Track publication. The APDU uses DNP3 application control, authentication function codes, response internal indications, and a length-delimited post-quantum authentication object. The object variation and any externally allocated algorithm identifiers require coordination with the responsible DNP3 standards authority. A local experimental selector is specified only for explicitly configured laboratory use; this document does not assign an IEEE or IEC identifier.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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DNP3 provides supervisory control and data acquisition communication. Secure Authentication version 5 adds application authentication. This document defines a post-quantum authentication exchange and a precise binary carrier for ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA, and authenticated application messages.¶
The application and link syntax follows DNP3 [IEEE1815]. This draft defines the additional post-quantum payload and its processing. It does not amend IEEE 1815 or IEC 62351-5 [IEC62351-5]. Standards coordination and remaining technical review items are described in Section 15 and Section 16.¶
The key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, NOT RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals.¶
In this document, Master is the initiating DNP3 endpoint and Outstation is the responding endpoint. The octet-string operator || denotes concatenation. Unless stated otherwise, lengths are in octets and integers use the encoding explicitly named for the field.¶
The profile specifies authentication APDUs, a post-quantum authentication object, cryptographic transcripts, session activation, and authenticated application-message delivery. It retains the DNP3 user and authorization model. The 32-bit profile user field below is an identity index within this object; it MUST NOT be substituted into a standard SAv5 field with a different width or meaning.¶
The Group 120 variation selector 240 (0xF0) is specified only as a configurable local laboratory value. This document does not assert that it is a reserved or available standards allocation. A standards deployment requires an object variation and any algorithm identifiers assigned by the responsible DNP3 authority. Existing Group 120 variations MUST NOT be reinterpreted to contain these fields.¶
The network adversary can observe, inject, modify, delay, reorder, and replay traffic and can retain recorded traffic for later analysis. The adversary can submit malformed public keys, KEM ciphertexts, signatures, frame fields, and counters. The profile aims to provide post-quantum endpoint authentication, a fresh shared secret, integrity of authenticated DNP3 frames, and replay detection.¶
The profile does not protect a compromised Master, Outstation, PKI, trust anchor, or signing service. It does not address denial of service, physical access, traffic analysis, safety authorization, cryptographic side channels, or availability of an external PKI. It provides no confidentiality for the DNP3 payload; HMAC authenticates data but does not encrypt it.¶
The profile identifier for this draft is dnp3-sa-v5-pqc-00. It is a local configuration name and is not a DNP3, IANA, IEEE, or IEC registration.¶
| Function | Algorithm | Profile value |
|---|---|---|
| Key encapsulation | ML-KEM | ML-KEM-768 |
| Endpoint signatures | ML-DSA | ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, or ML-DSA-87 |
| Key derivation | HKDF | HKDF-SHA-256 |
| Application authentication | HMAC | HMAC-SHA-256, leftmost 16 octets |
| Random challenges | CSPRNG | 32-octet nonces |
Implementations MUST implement ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-65, HKDF-SHA-256, and HMAC-SHA-256 as the common interoperability baseline. ML-DSA-44 and ML-DSA-87 MAY additionally be supported. ML-KEM and ML-DSA use the algorithm definitions in FIPS 203 and FIPS 204 [FIPS203][FIPS204]. This requirement does not assert cryptographic-module validation.¶
ML-KEM-768 public keys are 1184 octets, ciphertexts are 1088 octets, and shared secrets are 32 octets. The ML-DSA parameter set is selected by authenticated local trust configuration; both peers MUST agree on it and MUST reject a signature or key encoded for a different parameter set. The profile does not negotiate the ML-DSA level on the wire. Suite support alone does not authorize a peer or override the configured suite.¶
Each endpoint MUST have an active ML-DSA signing identity and a configured trust path or equivalent authenticated trust relationship. The choice of PKI provider and signing API is an implementation detail and is not part of the wire protocol.¶
The Master and Outstation MUST bind the DNP3 user number, the expected peer role, and the ML-DSA public key to the locally configured endpoint identity. A user number alone MUST NOT select an arbitrary public key. The verifier MUST validate the peer's certificate or configured key binding, validity, revocation status where available, and authorization for the requested DNP3 role before accepting a signature.¶
Implementations MUST support an authenticated local binding of user number, peer identity, role, ML-DSA parameter set, and exact FIPS 204 public-key octets. The binding MUST be provisioned and updated through an authorized configuration channel; an authentication record MUST NOT create or replace it. A separately specified certificate mechanism MAY additionally supply the same authenticated binding.¶
Signatures use ML-DSA, rather than HashML-DSA, with the exact ASCII context string dnp3-sa-v5-pqc and the role-specific transcript below. An implementation MUST use the exact transcript bytes and context; it MUST NOT add a trailing zero to the context, prehash the message through an implementation-specific API, or treat a different serialization as equivalent.¶
The exchange consists of three encoded authentication records. Their type values are scoped to the object defined in Section 8. The Master selects a configured ML-DSA suite and a peer identity authorized for the profile user and Outstation role. The Outstation applies the corresponding Master identity policy.¶
TR = ASCII("DNP3-SA-v5-PQC") || 0x00 || LE32(user) ||
CN || SN || PK_M || CT
S_input = ASCII("DNP3-SA-v5-SERVER") || 0x00 || TR
M_input = ASCII("DNP3-SA-v5-CLIENT") || 0x00 || TR
confirm = HMAC-SHA-256(K,
ASCII("DNP3-SA-v5-CONFIRM") || 0x00 || SHA-256(TR))¶
Both signatures use the ML-DSA context dnp3-sa-v5-pqc. The user, suite, and transaction identifier MUST match the pending exchange. Receivers MUST require the expected record type and MUST NOT accept a duplicate confirmation to reinitialize session counters. Only one pending exchange per configured user/peer is permitted; its lifetime MUST be bounded to at most 30 seconds. A restart or timeout discards pending state and starts a fresh CN and KEM key pair.¶
The Outstation becomes ready after AUTH_CONFIRM validation. The Master retains a provisional session after sending AUTH_CONFIRM and obtains confirmation of the Outstation's possession of K from the first valid authenticated response. A failed KEM operation, signature, credential, or confirmation MUST leave application delivery disabled. ML-KEM implicit rejection can produce an unrelated secret for an altered ciphertext; the confirmation check MUST detect this case rather than relying solely on a decapsulation exception.¶
Before sending the first operational command, the Master MUST obtain that confirmation using an authenticated READ or another explicitly configured non-actuating request. It MUST NOT use a control operation or DIRECT_OPERATE_NO_ACK as the confirmation probe. The response MUST pass the session, direction, counter, MAC, and application-response checks. A timeout leaves the Master unconfirmed and requires a fresh authentication exchange.¶
Session state includes the authenticated user and peer bindings, suite, transaction-id, SID, key, and separate send and receive counters. An endpoint MUST NOT restore a key after restart without its complete replay state; this profile instead requires a fresh exchange after state loss. A duplicate AUTH_CONFIRM MUST NOT reactivate an expired session or reset counters. Credential invalidation and locally configured session expiry MUST disable further application delivery under that session.¶
All multi-octet integers in this section are unsigned little-endian unless an application object explicitly specifies a signed value. An application fragment begins with one control octet, followed by its function octet. This profile requires FIR=1, FIN=1, CON=0, UNS=0; the low four bits carry the application sequence. AUTHENTICATE_REQ uses function 0x20. AUTHENTICATE_RESP uses function 0x83 and MUST include the two-octet IIN field immediately after the function. The response uses the corresponding request application sequence modulo 16. A standalone Master AUTH_CONFIRM uses the next request sequence. Application fragments in this profile are at most 8192 octets.¶
Request = AppControl(1) || 0x20 || Object
Response = AppControl(1) || 0x83 || IIN(2) || Object
Object = 0x78 || variation(1) || 0x5B || 0x01 ||
LE16(body_length) || Body
Body = ASCII("DPQ1") || type(1) || suite(1) ||
LE16(0) || LE32(user) || transaction-id(16) || Payload¶
The variation field carries the value agreed for this profile by the responsible DNP3 authority; that allocation is pending. The value 0xF0 is restricted to explicitly configured local laboratory use and is not an assigned or reserved value. Peers MUST be configured for the same selector and MUST reject an unexpected selector. Qualifier 0x5B denotes a one-octet object count with a two-octet size prefix for each free-format object. This profile requires exactly one object; the count is 0x01. The size counts Body alone, including its 28-octet common header. No bytes may follow the object. The two reserved octets MUST be zero. The profile magic and suite MUST be checked before cryptographic processing.¶
| Type | Function | Payload, in order | Payload octets |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 AUTH_CHALLENGE | 0x20 | CN; PK_M | 32 + 1184 |
| 2 AUTH_REPLY | 0x83 | SN; CT; signature | 32 + 1088 + Lsig |
| 3 AUTH_CONFIRM | 0x20 | signature; confirm | Lsig + 32 |
| 4 AUTH_DATA | 0x20 or 0x83 | SID; direction; q; length; inner APDU; tag | 55 + inner length |
Suite values are decimal 44, 65, and 87 (hexadecimal 2C, 41, and 57) for ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87. Lsig is respectively 2420, 3309, or 4627 octets. These are signature lengths, distinct from signing-key lengths. The selected suite MUST equal local trust configuration; this field does not authorize algorithm negotiation. Truncation, extra bytes, an unknown type, a different suite, nonzero reserved bits, or a function inconsistent with the type/direction MUST abort processing.¶
For AUTH_DATA, SID is SHA-256(TR) (32 octets), direction is one octet (0 for Master to Outstation, 1 for Outstation to Master), q is LE32, and length is LE16 and counts only the inner APDU. The tag is 16 octets. Direction 0 uses 0x20; direction 1 uses 0x83. The outer IIN is transport metadata and MUST NOT drive authenticated control decisions; such decisions use the protected inner response IIN only.¶
The application example encodes a READ of G30V1 with qualifier 0x01 and equal 16-bit start/stop indices. A G30V1 response includes IIN, flags, and a signed 32-bit value. The control example uses G41V1 with a signed 32-bit output value and status; DIRECT_OPERATE_NO_ACK produces no application response. WRITE and other object mappings require a separately specified application object schema and are rejected by this example.¶
READ G30V1 index 3: c0 01 1e 01 01 03 00 03 00 Response, IIN=0, flags=ONLINE, value=-2: c0 81 00 00 1e 01 01 03 00 03 00 01 fe ff ff ff¶
The complete APDU is segmented into at most 249-octet pieces. Each piece has a one-octet DNP3 transport header: FIN is bit 7, FIR is bit 6, and bits 0..5 are the transport sequence. FIR is set only on the first piece and FIN only on the last. Sequence increases modulo 64, including within a large post-quantum record. Application sequence and transport sequence are separate counters.¶
Each link frame starts with 05 64, length, link control, destination LE16, and source LE16, followed by a two-octet header CRC. Length is 5 plus the number of transport-header and user-data octets and is at most 255. CRC-16/DNP covers the complete first eight header octets, including the sync and length bytes. Its reflected polynomial is 0xA6BC, initial register 0x0000, and final XOR 0xFFFF; CRC bytes are transmitted little-endian. Every block of at most 16 user-data octets has its own CRC. CRC bytes are excluded from Length. The check value for ASCII "123456789" is 0xEA82.¶
A receiver validates lengths and all CRCs before transport reassembly. It MUST bound a reassembly to 8192 APDU octets and 33 transport segments, require consistent source, destination, and link-control fields, reject missing, duplicate, or reordered segments, and require the correct FIR/FIN placement. It MUST bound incomplete reassembly to at most 30 seconds. The receiver MUST enforce that deadline even when no further segment arrives. A failed or incomplete transfer is discarded. A retry uses a fresh exchange, or a fresh authenticated data counter under an active session; received data MUST NOT be delivered twice. Link CRCs detect transmission errors and provide no cryptographic authentication.¶
For key confirmation and subsequent authenticated application data, both endpoints derive a 32-octet key K from their local ML-KEM shared secret SS and the exact transcript TR. Define:¶
salt = SHA-256(ASCII("DNP3-SA-v5-salt") || TR[0..47])¶
K = HKDF-Expand(HKDF-Extract(salt, SS), info, 32)¶
where info = ASCII("DNP3-SA-v5-PQC-session") || SHA-256(TR). HKDF is instantiated with SHA-256 as defined in [RFC5869]. The substring TR[0..47] is the first 48 octets of the exact transcript, starting with the domain label. Implementations MUST use the same byte sequence and MUST NOT apply text normalization or field re-encoding before hashing.¶
The key is used only for the authenticated session associated with this exchange. Implementations MUST erase the ML-KEM private key and temporary shared secret as soon as they are no longer required. A new authentication exchange MUST derive a new session key.¶
The profile authenticates the exact inner application APDU, before transport segmentation and link CRC insertion. Authenticating the APDU avoids a circular dependence between a carried tag and link-frame CRCs, and permits a single post-quantum object to span multiple link frames.¶
SID = SHA-256(TR)
tag = HMAC-SHA-256(K,
ASCII("DNP3-SA-v5-APDU-MAC") || 0x00 || direction ||
SID || LE32(q) || inner-APDU)[0:16]¶
The direction is a single binary octet 0 or 1. Each direction starts q at 1 and increments it for every new message. Receivers maintain separate highest accepted counters, reject q=0, duplicates and lower counters, check SID, user, transaction-id, and direction, and compare tags in constant time before updating counters or delivering data. No counter may wrap; a fresh exchange is required before reuse. Reordered data is rejected by this strictly increasing-counter profile. A failed tag MUST NOT advance a receive counter.¶
The inner response includes its IIN and application object data, so they are authenticated. The outer APDU control and IIN are framing metadata; an implementation MUST NOT interpret them as authenticated application results. Local authorization and object validation remain necessary after successful MAC verification.¶
Authentication or cryptographic failure MUST leave the session inactive. An implementation MUST fail closed on an invalid ML-KEM length, malformed ciphertext, mismatched signature algorithm, invalid signature, unknown peer identity, expired or revoked credential, transcript mismatch, failed tag, or replayed sequence value.¶
An implementation supporting classical and post-quantum profiles MUST NOT silently fall back to a classical profile after a post-quantum authentication or key-establishment failure. Any permitted fallback MUST be an explicit local policy decision, visibly reported to the operator, and bound to a separately selected profile. An attacker-controlled message MUST NOT cause fallback.¶
Detailed cryptographic errors MAY be recorded locally, but responses to unauthenticated peers SHOULD avoid distinguishing KEM, signature, trust, and tag failures. Logs MUST NOT include private keys, KEM secrets, session keys, bearer tokens, or unredacted secret-bearing records.¶
Implementations MUST implement the common suite, exact record and transcript encodings, peer binding checks, key confirmation, bounded reassembly, replay processing, and failure rules in this document. A new exchange MUST be completed before counter exhaustion or reuse after loss of session state.¶
This document makes no request of IANA. DNP3 object variations and algorithm identifiers are not allocated by IANA. The message type and suite values in this document are scoped to the proposed authentication object; they do not allocate or redefine identifiers in an existing IEEE, IEC, or DNP3 registry. The local profile name is not a registered identifier.¶
The Group 120 object variation and any external algorithm identifiers require agreement with the responsible DNP3 standards authority. The value 240 (0xF0) has no allocation asserted by this document and MUST remain restricted to explicitly configured laboratory use until an appropriate assignment is agreed.¶
Before Proposed Standard publication, this draft needs to record the agreed object mapping, assigned identifiers, relationship to the SAv5 user and key-management procedures, and migration from the laboratory selector. If coordination requires a different object group, qualifier, or payload encoding, the draft and its test vectors must be revised together. Existing SAv5 objects MUST NOT be silently reinterpreted.¶
This section records unresolved specification and review work for this Standards Track proposal. It does not relax the requirements above. The issues are to be resolved or otherwise explicitly addressed before Proposed Standard publication.¶
The profile depends on the security of ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA, HKDF-SHA-256, and HMAC-SHA-256 and on correct identity and role authorization. It uses a post-quantum KEM secret alone and makes no hybrid-combiner security claim. HMAC authenticates the inner application message; payload confidentiality requires a separate reviewed encryption mechanism.¶
Receivers MUST reject messages outside the configured suite, identity, user, transaction, session, or direction and MUST NOT activate a session on a signature alone. Key confirmation detects disagreement caused by an invalid KEM ciphertext. Fresh nonces and KEM keys are required on every restarted exchange; pending exchanges MUST be time bounded and duplicate confirmations MUST NOT reset counters.¶
Length checks, reassembly bounds, finite timeouts, and credential validation precede application delivery. Operators SHOULD test credential rollover, missing messages, endpoint restart, resource limits, and explicit failure handling before operational use. The experimental object selector requires coordination with the responsible DNP3 standards authority.¶