iotops P. Liu, Ed. Internet-Draft R. Yang, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track Y. Zhang, Ed. Expires: 22 May 2027 X. Zhong, Ed. Pengcheng Laboratory Y. Gong, Ed. Schneider Electric 18 November 2026 Post-Quantum Cryptographic Protection Profile for OPC UA Secure Conversation draft-liu-iotops-pqc-uasc-01 Abstract This document specifies a post-quantum cryptographic protection profile for the OPC Unified Architecture Secure Conversation protocol (OPC UA UASC) carried over the opc.tcp transport. The profile uses ML-KEM-768 for SecureChannel key establishment, ML-DSA for asymmetric signatures, HKDF-SHA-256 for key derivation, and AES-256-GCM for symmetric message protection. It defines the profile identifiers, nonce encoding, key schedule, authenticated-encryption inputs, certificate and public-key binding requirements, token rollover behavior, and conformance requirements. This Internet-Draft is a proposal for Standards Track publication. Permanent OPC UA SecurityPolicy and algorithm identifiers require coordination with the OPC Foundation; the private identifiers documented here remain provisional. This document does not assign official OPC UA identifiers or claim conformance with an OPC Foundation specification. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Conventions and Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Scope and Relationship to OPC UA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Threat Model and Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Profile Identification and Algorithm Suites . . . . . . . . . 4 6. SecureChannel Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Key Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. OPN Signature Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. MSG and CLO Authenticated Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. Sequence Numbers, Replay, and SecurityToken Rollover . . . . 10 11. Certificates and Key Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12. Negotiation, Downgrade, and Failure Handling . . . . . . . . 11 13. Conformance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 15. OPC UA Identifier Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 16. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 17. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 18.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 18.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1. Introduction OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) is used in industrial automation and other operational technology environments. OPC UA Secure Conversation (UASC) provides application authentication, message integrity, confidentiality, and SecureChannel token management for transports such as opc.tcp. Existing deployments commonly rely on classical public-key algorithms in the application signature and Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 SecureChannel establishment path. A sufficiently capable quantum computer would threaten those algorithms and would also make recorded traffic vulnerable to retrospective decryption when long-term authentication or key-establishment keys are compromised. This document defines a concrete profile that can be implemented by UASC stacks while the OPC UA ecosystem evaluates post-quantum and hybrid migration options. The profile is deliberately narrow: it describes one ML-KEM parameter set, three ML-DSA parameter-set variants, one HKDF construction, and one AEAD construction. The narrow profile makes byte-level interoperability testing possible and exposes the protocol decisions that require review before standardization. This document proposes a Standards Track profile for community review. It describes a protocol mapping for OPC UA, but it does not replace OPC UA Part 4 or Part 6 and does not create a new official OPC UA SecurityPolicy. An implementation claiming support for this draft MUST treat the private identifiers as provisional. Identifier coordination and remaining technical review items are recorded in Section 15 and Section 16. 2. Conventions and Requirements Language The key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, NOT RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals. 3. Scope and Relationship to OPC UA This document specifies a cryptographic profile for the UASC OpenSecureChannel (OPN), Message (MSG), and CloseSecureChannel (CLO) message paths. It assumes the message framing, sequence headers, SecurityToken fields, endpoint discovery, session services, and application-layer semantics defined by OPC UA Part 4 and Part 6 [OPCUA-Part4][OPCUA-Part6]. The profile does not define a new transport, a new OPC UA service, a new user identity token, or a replacement for the OPC UA certificate profile. In particular, an implementation MUST continue to enforce the OPC UA ApplicationUri and certificate validation rules applicable to its deployment. The profile defines additional requirements for binding an ML-DSA verification key to the authenticated application identity. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 Formal allocation of a permanent OPC UA SecurityPolicy URI, inclusion in the OPC UA SecurityPolicy table, and changes to OPC UA conformance requirements are outside the authority of this document and require coordination with the OPC Foundation. 4. Threat Model and Design Goals The adversary is assumed to control or observe the network between UASC peers, inject, delete, replay, delay, reorder, and modify messages, and record traffic for later cryptanalysis. The adversary can submit malformed public keys, ciphertexts, signatures, certificates, and message headers. The adversary is not assumed to have extracted an endpoint's private ML-KEM or ML-DSA key, compromised the certificate trust anchor, or obtained an implementation's protected signing-service authorization token. The profile has the following goals: * Provide a post-quantum key-establishment path for the SecureChannel symmetric keys. * Authenticate OPN messages with a post-quantum signature and bind the signature key to the application certificate and configured peer identity. * Provide confidentiality and integrity for MSG and CLO traffic with an AEAD construction. * Preserve UASC SecurityToken rollover, chunking, and sequence- number processing. * Make algorithm identifiers, byte ordering, key labels, and authenticated data explicit enough for independent implementations. The profile does not claim protection against endpoint compromise, denial of service, traffic analysis, implementation side channels, weak random-number generators, or a compromised certificate authority. Those risks require deployment and implementation controls in addition to this profile. 5. Profile Identification and Algorithm Suites A peer selects this profile using the SecurityPolicy identifier advertised by the OPC UA endpoint. The following provisional identifiers are restricted to explicitly configured development deployments. This document does not register the urn:open62541-pqc namespace or assign permanent OPC UA identifiers: Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 +========================+===========+===============+============+ | SecurityPolicy | Signature | Key | Message | | identifier | algorithm | establishment | protection | +========================+===========+===============+============+ | urn:open62541- | ML-DSA-44 | ML-KEM-768 | AES- | | pqc:SecurityPolicy#ML- | | | 256-GCM | | KEM-768-ML-DSA-44-AES- | | | | | 256-GCM | | | | +------------------------+-----------+---------------+------------+ | urn:open62541- | ML-DSA-65 | ML-KEM-768 | AES- | | pqc:SecurityPolicy#ML- | | | 256-GCM | | KEM-768-ML-DSA-65-AES- | | | | | 256-GCM | | | | +------------------------+-----------+---------------+------------+ | urn:open62541- | ML-DSA-87 | ML-KEM-768 | AES- | | pqc:SecurityPolicy#ML- | | | 256-GCM | | KEM-768-ML-DSA-87-AES- | | | | | 256-GCM | | | | +------------------------+-----------+---------------+------------+ Table 1 All three variants use the same key-establishment, key-derivation, nonce, and AEAD rules. Only the ML-DSA parameter set and the resulting signature and public-key lengths differ. An endpoint MUST select exactly one variant for a SecureChannel. A peer MUST reject an endpoint that changes the variant after the SecureChannel has been opened. The mandatory-to-implement suite is ML-KEM-768 with ML-DSA-65, HKDF- SHA-256, and AES-256-GCM. Implementations MAY additionally support ML-DSA-44 and ML-DSA-87. Support for a suite does not authorize its use for a peer: endpoint selection and authenticated local policy MUST agree on the suite, the application identity, and the verification key. A mismatch MUST fail without silent fallback. The provisional algorithm identifiers for this draft are: * urn:open62541-pqc:ML-DSA-44, urn:open62541-pqc:ML-DSA-65, or urn:open62541-pqc:ML-DSA-87 for OPN signatures. * urn:open62541-pqc:OPN-SignedOnly for the OPN asymmetric-encryption operation. * urn:open62541-pqc:AES-256-GCM-Tag for the symmetric authentication tag operation. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 * urn:open62541-pqc:AES-256-GCM for symmetric encryption and decryption. These identifiers have no IANA or OPC Foundation allocation asserted by this draft. Permanent identifiers and their publication authority remain to be agreed as described in Section 15. An identifier change MUST NOT silently change the associated algorithm, signature input, key derivation, or wire encoding. 6. SecureChannel Key Establishment The profile maps ML-KEM to the two SecureChannel nonces exchanged in the OPN request and response. The client generates an ML-KEM-768 key pair and sends the public key as the client SecureChannel nonce. The server encapsulates to that public key and sends the resulting ciphertext as the server SecureChannel nonce. The peer MUST verify the exact lengths before invoking the KEM operation. +============================+========================+========+ | Value | Encoding | Length | +============================+========================+========+ | Client SecureChannel nonce | ML-KEM-768 public key, | 1184 | | | opaque octets | octets | +----------------------------+------------------------+--------+ | Server SecureChannel nonce | ML-KEM-768 ciphertext, | 1088 | | | opaque octets | octets | +----------------------------+------------------------+--------+ | ML-KEM shared secret | ML-KEM output, kept | 32 | | | internal | octets | +----------------------------+------------------------+--------+ Table 2 For a client-generated public key PK, a server computes (CT, SS) = Encaps(PK). The client computes SS = Decaps(SK, CT). A KEM failure, a length mismatch, or a decapsulation failure MUST abort the SecureChannel without exposing a distinguishable oracle to an unauthenticated peer. The client and server nonce values are also the key-establishment transcript inputs. They MUST be used exactly as received, including all leading or trailing zero octets. Implementations MUST NOT parse, normalize, compress, or concatenate them using a text encoding. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 The KEM operation is performed within the OPN exchange already defined by UASC. No additional UASC message type is introduced. A peer that does not understand the profile will not be able to interpret the nonce lengths or profile identifier and MUST fail closed during endpoint or SecureChannel negotiation. 7. Key Schedule The profile derives one client-to-server and one server-to-client key and initialization vector from the ML-KEM shared secret. Let CN be the client nonce, SN be the server nonce, and SS be the 32-octet ML- KEM shared secret. First compute: salt = SHA-256(CN || SN) where || denotes octet-string concatenation and the client value precedes the server value regardless of which peer performs the computation. Then, for each direction, apply HKDF-SHA-256 [RFC5869] with: * HKDF-Extract salt: salt. * HKDF-Extract input keying material: SS. * HKDF-Expand info for client-to-server: the ASCII octets of open62541-private-PQC-UASC-v1/c2s. * HKDF-Expand info for server-to-client: the ASCII octets of open62541-private-PQC-UASC-v1/s2c. * HKDF-Expand length: 44 octets. For a direction-specific output OKM, the first 32 octets are the AES- 256-GCM key and the final 12 octets are the base initialization vector: key = OKM[0..31] base-iv = OKM[32..43] The client uses the c2s material for locally generated MSG and CLO chunks and the s2c material for received chunks. The server uses the inverse mapping. Direction labels are part of the transcript domain separation and MUST be compared as exact ASCII octets. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 The HKDF labels above are exact ASCII protocol constants for this draft, with no trailing zero octet. A revision that changes a label or the key schedule MUST use a distinct profile identifier and specify the resulting compatibility and migration rules. 8. OPN Signature Processing OPN messages use the UASC asymmetric signing input defined by OPC UA Part 6. The profile replaces the classical signature algorithm with the selected ML-DSA parameter set. The signer and verifier MUST use the exact serialized UASC signing input, without adding a profile- specific text prefix or changing the OPC UA byte order. Signatures use ML-DSA as specified in FIPS 204 [FIPS204] with an empty context string. HashML-DSA, an implementation-specific prehash, and a nonempty context are not interchangeable with this operation. The public-key and signature lengths for ML-DSA-44, ML- DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87 are respectively 1312 and 2420, 1952 and 3309, and 2592 and 4627 octets. This profile defines OPN as signed-only. The asymmetric-encryption operation is therefore a no-op for the OPN payload, while the ML-DSA signature authenticates the OPN signing input. OPN confidentiality is not provided by this profile; confidentiality begins with the symmetric MSG and CLO path after the SecureChannel keys have been derived. Implementations and user interfaces MUST NOT describe this signed-only OPN behavior as full OPN encryption. The ML-DSA public key used for verification MUST be bound to the authenticated application identity. At minimum, the verifier MUST check: * the peer certificate chain and validity period according to the deployment trust policy; * the OPC UA ApplicationUri and certificate URI SAN binding; * the configured ML-DSA public-key binding for the peer; and * the selected ML-DSA parameter set and exact public-key length. A successful X.509 path check alone MUST NOT authorize an unrelated ML-DSA public key. Conversely, a matching ML-DSA key pin MUST NOT replace certificate validity, application identity, or authorization checks. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 9. MSG and CLO Authenticated Encryption MSG and CLO chunks use AES-256-GCM [RFC5116] with a 32-octet direction key, a 12-octet nonce, a 16-octet authentication tag, and no padding introduced by this profile. The UASC message and symmetric security headers are left in cleartext as required for routing and token selection. The sequence header and payload are included in the encrypted portion. The additional authenticated data (AAD) is the first 16 octets of the chunk: the three-octet MessageType, one-octet ChunkType, four-octet MessageSize, four-octet SecureChannelId, and four-octet SecurityToken identifier, in that order. Each integer uses the UASC little-endian encoding. MessageSize counts the complete chunk, including the headers, ciphertext, and 16-octet tag. The AAD MUST be taken from the exact transmitted or received octets. In particular, SecureChannelId MUST NOT be omitted. The plaintext is the eight-octet SequenceHeader (SequenceNumber followed by RequestId, each a little-endian UInt32) followed by the chunk body. No additional counter is serialized. Let Q be that SequenceNumber and S = Q - 1. The sequence and receiver prediction rules are defined in Section 10. Let IV be the direction-specific base IV and T the SecurityToken identifier from this chunk. The profile constructs the 12-octet GCM nonce as follows: N[0..11] = IV N[0..3] = N[0..3] XOR LE32(T) N[4..7] = N[4..7] XOR LE32(S) N[8..11] remains unchanged. Here LE32 is the four-octet little-endian encoding and XOR is bytewise. The subtraction in S = Q - 1 is ordinary integer subtraction, not modular arithmetic. For example, an all-zero base IV, token 0x01020304, and Q = 2 produce nonce 040302010100000000000000 in hexadecimal. The sender and receiver MUST use this exact nonce calculation for each protected chunk. The ciphertext and tag are serialized as the ciphertext followed immediately by the 16-octet GCM tag. A receiver MUST verify the tag before releasing any decrypted octets to the UASC message decoder or application. Authentication failure, an invalid token, an invalid sequence transition, or a nonce reuse condition MUST terminate the affected SecureChannel. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 10. Sequence Numbers, Replay, and SecurityToken Rollover The initial signed OPN in each direction uses SequenceNumber 0. Every subsequent OPN, MSG, or CLO chunk in that direction increments the SequenceNumber by one. The counter is maintained for the SecureChannel, independently of the RequestId, and MUST NOT be reset on token renewal. This profile requires a new SecureChannel before sequence-number wraparound; it does not use a legacy rollover window. A receiver initializes its last accepted sequence L from the successfully verified initial OPN. Before decrypting an MSG or CLO chunk, it predicts Q = L + 1 and uses S = L to compute the nonce. It then verifies the AEAD tag and checks that the decrypted SequenceNumber equals the predicted Q. Only after both checks succeed may it update L and release the chunk. A subsequent signed OPN also MUST carry L + 1 and pass signature verification before advancing L. A duplicate, gap, out-of-order chunk, or exhausted sequence space MUST terminate the affected SecureChannel. During SecurityToken rollover, a peer MAY receive a message protected under the previous token while the new token is already locally installed, as permitted by UASC. The receiver MUST select the SecurityToken identifier from the chunk's cleartext symmetric security header when selecting the direction key and computing the nonce. It MUST NOT blindly use only the newest locally stored token. Each token MUST identify the direction keys and base IVs derived for its corresponding authenticated OPN exchange. Every renewal MUST use a fresh client ML-KEM key pair and fresh server encapsulation. Previous-token keys MAY be retained only for the validity overlap allowed by UASC and MUST be removed when that token expires. An unknown or expired token MUST be rejected before application delivery. Token identifiers and sequence numbers are finite fields. An implementation MUST ensure that the same direction key and base IV are never used with a repeated effective nonce. Before exhaustion or wraparound of the sequence space, the implementation MUST establish a new SecureChannel and fresh ML-KEM shared secret. A SecurityToken rollover alone is insufficient if it can reuse the same key, IV, token identifier, and sequence tuple. Chunking does not change the AEAD construction. Each chunk is independently authenticated with its own AAD and effective sequence counter. The UASC message reassembly layer MUST deliver a complete message only after every chunk has passed authentication and sequence validation. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 11. Certificates and Key Binding Deployments MUST use certificates and trust processing compatible with OPC UA Part 6 and the applicable X.509 profile [RFC5280]. The certificate's ApplicationUri and key usage constraints remain authoritative for OPC UA application identity. Implementations MUST support an authenticated, out-of-band binding containing the expected ApplicationUri, peer role, selected ML-DSA parameter set, and exact FIPS 204 public-key octets. The binding MUST be provisioned through an authorized configuration channel, checked together with the X.509 identity, and replaced only through an authorized credential update. A key received in an OPN message or an unverified discovery response MUST NOT create or replace this binding. A separately specified certificate-based binding MAY be supported in addition to this baseline. Its extension syntax, validation, and authorization rules must be defined by that specification; this document does not invent an extension identifier. A key mismatch, expired or revoked binding, or failure of the required certificate checks MUST fail authentication. If authentication depends on a PKI service response, a failed, unavailable, malformed, expired, revoked, or unauthorized response MUST be treated as a failed authentication decision. Private keys, signing-service credentials, and certificate-status tokens MUST be protected as operational secrets. Logging MUST NOT disclose private keys, KEM secret keys, shared secrets, bearer tokens, or complete unredacted certificates when those values are not required for diagnosis. 12. Negotiation, Downgrade, and Failure Handling A client MUST verify that the selected endpoint advertises the requested provisional SecurityPolicy identifier and the required SignAndEncrypt security mode before opening a SecureChannel. A server MUST reject an OPN request whose profile identifier, nonce length, ML-DSA algorithm, or key length is inconsistent with the configured endpoint. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 An implementation supporting both classical and post-quantum policies MUST apply an explicit local policy for algorithm selection. It MUST NOT silently fall back from this profile to a classical policy after a cryptographic failure, an unsupported nonce length, a signature failure, or a certificate-binding failure. Any fallback, if permitted by deployment policy, MUST require a separate endpoint selection or an explicit authenticated configuration decision. Malformed, truncated, overlong, or unexpected nonce fields MUST cause the OPN exchange to fail. KEM, ML-DSA, HKDF, AES-GCM, certificate, and token-processing errors MUST be reported as a generic secure- channel failure to an unauthenticated peer. Detailed diagnostics MAY be logged locally but MUST be access controlled and MUST avoid secret material. 13. Conformance Requirements A conforming implementation: 1. MUST implement exact ML-KEM-768 public-key, ciphertext, and shared-secret lengths. 2. MUST implement ML-DSA-65, MAY additionally implement ML-DSA-44 and ML-DSA-87, and MUST reject parameter-set mismatches. 3. MUST implement the byte-exact nonce, AAD, HKDF, and AES-GCM rules in this document. 4. MUST use a cryptographically secure random generator for ML-KEM key generation and other profile nonces. 5. MUST perform constant-time or library-provided verification operations where required by the selected cryptographic library. 6. MUST reject modified ciphertext, invalid tags, duplicate sequence numbers, invalid tokens, incorrect certificate or ML-DSA key bindings, parameter-set mismatches, and malformed KEM values. Implementations MUST use the algorithm and parameter definitions in NIST FIPS 203 and FIPS 204 [FIPS203][FIPS204]. This requirement does not assert that a particular implementation has obtained cryptographic-module validation. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 14. IANA Considerations This document makes no request of IANA at this stage. In particular, it does not register a URN namespace or assign an OPC UA SecurityPolicy or algorithm identifier. OPC UA identifier coordination is described in Section 15. If an IANA-managed namespace is selected during review, the corresponding registration request must be added to this section before publication. 15. OPC UA Identifier Coordination Permanent SecurityPolicy and algorithm identifiers, their ownership, and the relationship to OPC UA conformance requirements require agreement with the OPC Foundation. The private identifiers in Section 5 specify provisional profile selection; they MUST NOT be advertised as officially allocated identifiers. Before publication as a Proposed Standard, this draft needs to document the agreed permanent identifiers or an explicitly accepted identifier scheme, the applicable OPC UA specification changes, and a migration rule from the private identifiers. Peers MUST select the same exact profile identifier. A peer MUST NOT infer compatibility by rewriting or aliasing an unfamiliar identifier. 16. Open Issues This section records unresolved specification and review work. It does not relax the protocol requirements above. The issues are to be resolved or otherwise explicitly addressed before Proposed Standard publication. * Complete OPC Foundation coordination for identifiers, the signed- only OPN mapping, and the relationship to OPC UA SecurityPolicy conformance. * Validate the S = Q - 1 nonce calculation and receive prediction rule for the initial OPN, first MSG, renewal, previous-token overlap, multi-chunk messages, and counter exhaustion. Publish byte-level vectors for these cases. * Specify and review the complete OPN request and response signature transcripts, including any request-signature binding required by the selected OPC UA mapping, together with key confirmation, replay resistance, and downgrade handling. Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 * Review the mandatory suite, AES-GCM key-usage and failed- verification limits, resource bounds, and certificate and ML-DSA identity bindings. Publish canonical vectors covering key establishment, signature inputs, key derivation, AAD, plaintext, ciphertext, and authentication tags for the mandatory suite. 17. Security Considerations This document defines a post-quantum cryptographic profile, but the security of a deployment depends on the complete UASC implementation and its operational environment. Security review needs to consider the protocol and its deployment using the guidance in [RFC3552]. ML- KEM-768 and ML-DSA are assumed to provide the security properties documented by their standard specifications. This document does not make an independent security claim about those algorithms or about any particular cryptographic library. The profile currently uses pure ML-KEM and ML-DSA. It does not combine a classical key-establishment secret with the ML-KEM secret. Deployments that require protection if either a classical or post- quantum assumption fails need a separately specified hybrid construction; they MUST NOT infer hybrid security from this profile. OPN is signed-only in this profile. OPN metadata and the OPN payload are therefore not confidential. An observer can learn the existence, timing, and size of the OPN exchange. Deployments requiring OPN confidentiality need a separately reviewed profile that defines and tests an asymmetric encryption or hybrid protection operation. AES-GCM security depends on nonce uniqueness under each key. The token and sequence masking rules are intended to prevent nonce reuse across protected chunks, but an implementation bug in sequence handling, token rollover, concurrent send paths, or counter wraparound can invalidate this property. Implementations MUST serialize or otherwise coordinate counter allocation, MUST test rollover and restart behavior, and MUST establish fresh keys before counter exhaustion. Certificate trust, ML-DSA key binding, and downgrade protection are part of the authenticated security boundary. Accepting a valid X.509 certificate with an unrelated ML-DSA key, accepting a key solely because it is pinned, or silently selecting a weaker classical policy can defeat the intended authentication or post-quantum property. External signing and certificate-status services create availability and authorization dependencies. Deployments using such services SHOULD bound request time and isolate failures to limit denial-of- service exposure. Service authorization tokens MUST be protected, Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 the service endpoint MUST be authenticated and authorized according to local policy, and a failed required authentication check MUST fail closed. Industrial control systems have safety and availability requirements that are not addressed by this profile. Operators SHOULD test failure behavior, certificate renewal, key rollover, endpoint recovery, and resource exhaustion in an isolated environment before enabling the profile on a production control network. 18. References 18.1. Normative References [FIPS203] NIST, N., "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard", FIPS 203, August 2024, . [FIPS204] NIST, N., "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 204, August 2024, . [OPCUA-Part4] OPC Foundation, O., "OPC Unified Architecture Specification, Part 4: Services", 2023, . [OPCUA-Part6] OPC Foundation, O., "OPC Unified Architecture Specification, Part 6: Mappings", 2023, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, . [RFC5116] McGrew, D. and D. Viega, "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008, . [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., and R. Housley, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008, . Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 [RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017, . 18.2. Informative References [RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July 2003, . Authors' Addresses Penghui Liu (editor) Pengcheng Laboratory No.2 Xingke 1 Street Shenzhen 518055 China Email: liuph@pcl.ac.cn Rongwei Yang (editor) Pengcheng Laboratory No.2 Xingke 1 Street Shenzhen 518055 China Email: yangrw@pcl.ac.cn Yu Zhang (editor) Pengcheng Laboratory No.2 Xingke 1 Street Shenzhen 518055 China Email: zhangy08@pcl.ac.cn Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft PQC Protection Profile for OPC UA UASC November 2026 Xiaoxiong Zhong (editor) Pengcheng Laboratory No.2 Xingke 1 Street Shenzhen 518055 China Email: zhongxx@pcl.ac.cn Yanjie Gong (editor) Schneider Electric Building A, No. 6 Wangjing East Road, Chaoyang District Beijing 100102 China Email: garrett.gong@se.com Liu, et al. Expires 22 May 2027 [Page 17]