Internet-Draft EAGF Delegation Semantics November 2026
Luna Expires 21 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-luna-eagf-agent-delegation-semantics-02
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
D. Luna
Alygn (Intention Alliance Inc.)

Semantic Governance Requirements for AI Agent Delegation and Handoff

Abstract

AI agents increasingly decide and act on behalf of organizations and delegate work to other agents. Identity, authentication, authorization and runtime control mechanisms establish who is acting and what is permitted, but they do not by themselves preserve the organizational meaning of a delegation: the bounded authority, purpose, material context, and the distinction between a recommendation, a decision, an action and its outcome. This document states requirements, derived from the Enterprise Agent Governance Framework (EAGF), that such semantics be preserved across tool calls, delegations and agent-to-agent handoffs. It defines no new protocol.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Project site: https://alygn.us. Contact: taniaalygn@gmail.com. EAGF is openly published under open licences, and anyone may implement it; Alygn (Intention Alliance Inc.) is the copyright holder and steward of the EAGF text. This Internet-Draft is contributed under BCP 78 / BCP 79.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Organizations are moving from using AI as a content-generation tool to delegating work to systems that can plan, call tools, query internal systems, coordinate with other agents and produce effects on business state. Controls that operate only at identity, authentication, authorization or runtime-policy layers leave a semantic gap: they can establish which credential is in use and which permission was granted, but they do not necessarily preserve who the agent is for the organization, who is accountable for it, under what purpose-bounded Authority it acts, whether a Recommendation was adopted as an organizational Decision, whether an Action actually occurred, or what Outcome followed.

That gap appears in practice when infrastructure permissions become implicit business authority; when an AI recommendation is treated as a Decision without an adoption rule; when tool invocation, Action and Outcome are collapsed; when Trust or Authority is propagated between agents without contextual justification; when constraints and purpose are lost during agent-to-agent handoffs; or when an agent's self-report is treated as proof that an Action occurred.

The Enterprise Agent Governance Framework (EAGF) [EAGF-SPEC] is a vendor-, model-, protocol- and runtime-independent semantic architecture for governed organizational autonomy. It separates concepts that systems often collapse (Claim, Evidence, Assessment, Authority, Decision, Action, Outcome, Trust, Confidence) and states invariants that MUST NOT be collapsed. This document extracts the subset of those requirements that apply specifically to tool calls, delegations and agent-to-agent handoffs, so that protocol and control-plane designers can preserve organizational meaning across boundaries.

This document is complementary to, and does not replace:

EAGF does not define a vocabulary of oversight acts. Where such a vocabulary is used, for example [I-D.ehstand-oversight-acts], the act type is recorded in the oversight record that a Decision reference resolves to.

Those mechanisms can carry or check the semantics below: a delegation receipt or attenuated token can carry the bounded Authority scope of REQ-1, an action-time envelope can carry the Decision reference of REQ-2, and an audit task model can consume the Evidence kinds of REQ-5. None of them, by itself, establishes that an organizational Decision existed or that an Action produced a given Outcome.

EAGF supplies organizational semantics those mechanisms can carry. It defines no wire format, no credential type and no Guardian verdict.

1.2. Non-Goals

This document does not: define a new agent protocol; replace IAM, PAM, SIEM, policy engines or runtime security; replace the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001 or NIST AI RMF; define a maturity score or universal trust score; or claim that EAGF is an international standard. EAGF is an open candidate specification with an explicit external-validation program.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Terminology

The following terms are used as in the EAGF specification overview. They are organizational semantics, not protocol identifiers.

Agent:
A digital participant that can observe, generate Claims, consume Evidence, reason, produce Assessments, operate under Authority, take or support Decisions, execute Actions and produce Outcomes.
Subject:
The human, agent or organizational unit whose identity, authority and accountability are governed.
Authority:
The bounded, purpose-scoped right to decide or act on behalf of the organization. Distinct from Trust and from infrastructure permission.
Delegation (DELEGATES_TO):
A relationship that passes a bounded subset of Authority, purpose and constraints to another Subject. It does not imply unlimited Authority transfer.
Recommendation:
An agent output that proposes a course of action. It is not an organizational Decision.
Decision:
An organizational commitment adopted by an authorized Subject under an adoption rule.
Adverse Determination:
A Decision that is adverse to a party in a specific case, including screen-out, rejection, or closing a case against that party. An Adverse Determination is a Decision; silence or lack of objection is not.
Validity Window:
The interval, if any, during which a Decision or grant of Authority may authorize Actions. An Action whose commitment time falls outside that window is not authorized by that Decision alone.
Revocation:
An integrity-protected event that withdraws a Decision or grant of Authority from a stated time forward. Revocation does not rewrite the historical Decision record (see REQ-8).
Supersession:
A later Decision or oversight act (for example a release) that becomes the authorizing act for a specific Action in place of an earlier Decision. The Action references the superseding record; that record SHOULD reference the earlier Decision.
Action:
An intervention that actually occurred. Its occurrence and its legitimacy (authorization) are separate facts. An unauthorized Action is still an Action and MUST be recorded as such.
Outcome:
A change in reality and its consequences. Distinct from Action and from Observation.
Evidence:
Contextual, traceable material that supports or challenges a Claim or Judgment. Supporting Evidence does not make a Claim true.
Context Qualification:
The rules deciding which context is material and MUST survive a handoff when its loss would change interpretation, authorization or risk.
Operational Evidence:
Authentic evidence produced by a real system in operation (as opposed to design-time artefacts alone).
Trust:
A contextual justification of what the organization can rely on. Trust is not transitive and is not Authority.
Confidence:
A qualified statement about a Judgment. It is not a probability by default and is not Trust.
Cumulative Action Bound:
A limit, declared in or referenced by a Delegation's Authority scope, on how many Actions or what aggregate effect may be taken under that Delegation before a new Decision or renewed scope is required. Distinct from a chain-depth bound on further Delegations.

4. Invariants

The following high-value invariants are restated from EAGF for the delegation and handoff setting. Implementations that claim alignment with this document MUST NOT collapse these distinctions. Identifiers in parentheses refer to the high-value invariant list in the EAGF specification overview [EAGF-SPEC]; the corresponding normative conformance rules are listed in Appendix A.

5. Requirements for Delegation and Handoff

The following requirements apply whenever an Agent issues a tool call, delegates work to another Subject, or performs an agent-to-agent handoff. They are semantic obligations; they MAY be carried as attributes on existing protocol messages, traces or control-plane hooks. Exact field names are out of scope.

5.1. REQ-1: Bounded Authority Scope

A Delegation or handoff MUST carry (or unambiguously reference) a bounded Authority scope that is a subset of the delegator's Authority and Purpose. The scope MUST include at least: purpose, limits (what is excluded), and the identity of the delegator. Unlimited or implicit Authority transfer MUST NOT occur as a side effect of a Delegation.

The bounded Authority scope of a Delegation MUST also make available any limit that applies to how many Actions, or what aggregate effect, may be taken under that Delegation before a new Decision or a renewed scope is required. Where the operating profile claims a volume, count, spend, rate or similar bound and the Delegation omits it, a verifier MUST NOT treat the Delegation as authorizing an unbounded series of Actions. A chain-depth bound alone (see Security Considerations) does not satisfy this requirement.

5.2. REQ-2: Decision Reference

Where an Action is taken on behalf of the organization, the Action MUST reference the organizational Decision that authorized it, or an explicit rule that no Decision was required. An Agent Recommendation alone MUST NOT satisfy this requirement.

Absence of objection (silence) MUST NOT be treated as a Decision.

A Decision that closes a specific case is an event, distinct from the standing policy that governed it. A Decision Record is an integrity-protected record of one such Decision that identifies at least: the accountable role that made it, the case or matter it applies to, the time it was made, and the scope of Action it authorizes. The policy that governed the Decision SHOULD be referenced separately.

Where the Decision is an Adverse Determination (see Section 3), a Decision Record MUST exist, and the Action MUST reference that record by a content-binding reference as required for Decision references generally (see the Decision-reference stability text below). A reference to the governing policy alone MUST NOT satisfy this requirement for an Adverse Determination. For other Decisions, a Decision Record SHOULD exist and the Action SHOULD reference it in the same way.

Where Authority or a Decision is time-bounded or may be withdrawn, the authorizing record MUST make the following facts available to a verifier that can resolve the Decision reference (see the Decision-reference stability and resolution text in this section): (1) the end of the validity window, if any; (2) whether and when the Authority or Decision was revoked; and (3) when a later act (for example a release) supersedes an earlier Decision for a specific Action, which later record the Action is to reference. Absence of these facts, when the operating profile claims time bounds or revocation, MUST NOT be treated as continuing validity.

A Decision reference MUST allow an independent implementation to identify the exact Decision that authorized the Action, even if the system that originally held the Decision changes, is migrated or is no longer available. A content digest of the preserved Decision record, or another authenticated reference with equivalent properties, satisfies this requirement; a mutable pointer alone (for example a URL or database row identifier) does not.

The Decision record referenced under this requirement SHOULD keep three facts distinct: on whose account the Action is taken, what was observed or presented to the approver, and who approved. These facts MUST NOT be inferred from one another.

A Decision reference MUST resolve: a reader with access to the referenced record MUST be able to determine which Decision it identifies, which Subject adopted it, and the scope it covers. A reference that cannot be resolved to such a record does not satisfy this requirement.

Note (non-normative): approval of a broader task or mission is not, by itself, the Decision for a later Action taken under it. A Decision reference identifies the specific decision event, with a separate reference to the policy that governed it. The kind of oversight act (for example approval, override or release) is a property of the referenced record, not of the reference; stating it in both places creates a second place where the act could be described differently (see [I-D.ehstand-oversight-acts]).

Example (non-normative): a Decision to pay a supplier is adopted by one Subject, and a different Subject later releases the payment after a hold. The payment Action references the release, because the release is the act that authorized that Action at that time. The release record in turn references the underlying Decision. A verifier following the reference therefore finds both acts, who performed each, and over what scope, without the Action record restating either.

5.3. REQ-3: Material Context Preservation

Material Context (Context whose loss would change interpretation, authorization or risk) MUST survive a Delegation or handoff under Context Qualification rules. Context transfer MUST NOT be assumed automatic. Non-material Context SHOULD be minimized for privacy (see Section 8).

Note (non-normative): Material Context required under this requirement, and any justification that accompanies a Decision, MAY be carried with the Decision record, in a capability certificate (for example a zcap- or UCAN-style certificate), or with a delegation or token-exchange request. This document does not prefer a carriage; profiles choose the carrier that fits their protocol.

Note (non-normative): the end of a validity window, a revocation event, and a superseding release are Material Context under this requirement when they affect whether an Action is authorized. Profiles MAY carry them in the Decision record, in a linked revocation or release record, or with the Action; they SHOULD NOT leave the executing party dependent on a cached copy that omits a later revocation or supersession.

5.4. REQ-4: Outcome Reference

Records of Action SHOULD allow later linkage to observed Outcomes without collapsing Action and Outcome into one record. Systems MUST NOT treat successful tool invocation as proof of the business Outcome.

5.5. REQ-5: Evidence Kind

Evidence cited to support Claims about Delegation, Decision, Action or Outcome MUST distinguish at least: Agent self-report, platform/runtime record, and externally verifiable evidence. Self-report MUST NOT be treated as sufficient proof of Action for high-risk settings.

5.6. REQ-6: Accountable Owner

Every Agent Subject that receives Authority through Delegation MUST have an identifiable accountable owner for the organization. Accountability relationships MUST NOT be inferred solely from causality or from who performed the Action.

5.7. REQ-7: No Automatic Trust or Confidence Transfer

Trust and Confidence MUST NOT be transferred automatically across a Delegation or handoff. Any reliance on another Subject's Trust or Confidence MUST be re-justified in the receiving context.

5.8. REQ-8: Historical Integrity

New Evidence that appears after a Decision MUST NOT rewrite the historical record of what Evidence and Context were available at Decision time. Learning updates future cognition; it does not alter the audit trail of past Decisions. Historical Integrity is satisfied by an append-only, content-bound evidence record that a third party can verify (for example a transparency log of hash-chained receipts with externally witnessed heads). A parent-byte or hop-linkage property of a token chain MAY support other requirements; it MUST NOT by itself be treated as satisfying REQ-8. Historical integrity does not imply continuing validity: a Decision that was valid when it was made can be revoked, expire or lose its approver's standing before a later Action relies on it (see Section 7, Paragraph 6).

5.9. Informative Mapping to Control Planes

Implementers of ACS-style hooks MAY attach optional semantic fields corresponding to REQ-1 through REQ-4 (for example authority_scope, decision_ref, outcome_ref, evidence.kind). AACP Agent Certification Credentials and Proof-of-Control verifiable evidence MAY be treated as Evidence under REQ-5; they are not Authority under REQ-1. Exact schema is left to those projects.

6. Conformance Considerations

EAGF distinguishes Design Conformance (architecture and artefacts show the required distinctions) from Operational Conformance (a real system produces authentic Operational Evidence). These are evidence scopes, not maturity levels. Conformance results are evidence-based Judgments (PASS / FAIL / NOT DEMONSTRATED / NOT APPLICABLE), not percentage scores.

An Operational Conformance claim SHOULD be assessed by an assessor independent of the implementer. An implementer MUST NOT assess its own customers and present the result as independent.

The normative rule catalogue (68 rules across 16 domains and 7 profiles) and the assessment instrument (68 items) are maintained in the EAGF conformance work products (WO-013, WO-014). This Internet-Draft states only the delegation and handoff requirements above; it does not reproduce the full catalogue.

An assessment that cannot establish authority status at time of use for a sampled Action SHOULD record the related requirement as NOT DEMONSTRATED for that Action rather than PASS.

When an assessment samples an Action that the profile claims is time-bounded or revocable, and the resolved Decision or Authority record does not make the validity end, revocation time, or superseding release (as applicable) available, the related requirement SHOULD be recorded as NOT DEMONSTRATED for that Action rather than PASS.

Appendix A maps each requirement in this document to the conformance rules that test it.

7. Security Considerations

Authority escalation through Delegation chains: if REQ-1 is not enforced, a chain of Delegations can accumulate into broader Authority than any single delegator intended. Implementations SHOULD bound chain depth and re-validate scope at each hop.

Unbounded cumulative Actions under one Delegation: if REQ-1 only bounds purpose and excluded scopes, and not Action volume or aggregate effect, an Agent can exhaust the intended mandate through many individually in-scope Actions. Implementations SHOULD declare and enforce cumulative bounds (count, spend, rate or equivalent) and SHOULD record when a bound is reached so a later Action cannot silently continue under the same Delegation.

Context stripping: if REQ-3 is not enforced, a handoff can drop purpose, limits or risk signals and produce Actions that look authorized under the remaining credentials. Material Context MUST be treated as security-relevant.

Forged or unverified self-reports: if REQ-5 is not enforced, an Agent can assert that an Action occurred or was authorized. Self-report MUST be distinguishable from platform and external Evidence.

Replay of Decision references: Decision references used for REQ-2 MUST be bound to scope and time so that a past Decision cannot authorize a later, different Action.

Status at time of use: a verifier that only checks that a Delegation, Authority scope or Decision was valid when it was issued can accept an Action that relies on Authority that has since been revoked, has expired, or whose approver no longer holds the standing required to approve it. Implementations that rely on REQ-1 or REQ-2 SHOULD be able to establish the status of the relevant Authority and Decision at the time the Action is taken, not only at issuance. Where status at time of use cannot be established, the Action record SHOULD say so explicitly rather than imply that status was checked. This document does not define a status mechanism; status lists, short-lived credentials, online checks and transparency receipts are possible carriers.

Collapsing Recommendation into Decision (HV-18) creates unauthorized organizational commitments. Adoption rules are a security control, not only a governance nicety.

8. Privacy Considerations

Material Context under REQ-3 SHOULD be minimized to what is necessary for interpretation, authorization and risk. Evidence cited under REQ-5 may contain personal or confidential data; Evidence handling MUST respect applicable confidentiality and retention rules. Publishing Operational Evidence packages for assessment SHOULD use redaction or scoped disclosure rather than wholesale log dumps.

9. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

10.2. Informative References

[EAGF-SPEC]
Alygn (Intention Alliance Inc.), "Enterprise Agent Governance Framework (EAGF), Specification Overview v0.9", , <https://alygn.us>.
[I-D.asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain]
"Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain/>.
[I-D.chen-oauth-agent-intent-token]
"The Intent Token - A Credential for Delegated User Intent", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-chen-oauth-agent-intent-token-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-oauth-agent-intent-token/>.
[I-D.ehstand-oversight-acts]
"Terminology for Human Oversight Acts in Automated and Agentic Systems", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ehstand-oversight-acts-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ehstand-oversight-acts/>.
[I-D.etcheverry-action-ref]
"Action Reference: A Deterministic Identifier for Agent Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-etcheverry-action-ref-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-etcheverry-action-ref/>.
[I-D.gilda-audit-agent-audit-record]
"An Audit Record Format for AI Agent Authorization Decisions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record/>.
[I-D.hulea-wimse-agent-mandate]
"Verifiable Mandates for Agents Acting Across Administrative Domains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hulea-wimse-agent-mandate-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hulea-wimse-agent-mandate/>.
[I-D.ietf-wimse-aims]
Kasselman, P., "AI Identity Management System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01>.
[I-D.izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts]
"Signed Permissions and Action Receipts for Automated Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts/>.
[I-D.kuehlewind-audit-architecture]
"An Architecture for Auditing Agent Delegation and Interactions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture/>.
[I-D.levi-agent-certification]
Levi, N. and O. Yeger, "Autonomous Agent Certification Protocol (AACP)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-levi-agent-certification-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-levi-agent-certification/>.
[I-D.liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work]
"OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work/>.
[I-D.mccormack-ztip]
"The Zero Trust Intelligence Protocol (ZTIP): Governed, Independently Verified AI Agent Transactions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mccormack-ztip-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mccormack-ztip/>.
[I-D.mcguinness-oauth-mission]
"Mission-Bound Authorization for OAuth 2.0", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcguinness-oauth-mission/>.
[I-D.milan-agent-decision-commitment]
"Agent Decision Commitments for Payments", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-milan-agent-decision-commitment-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-milan-agent-decision-commitment/>.
[I-D.morrison-ot-command-authority]
"Authorised and Attributable Agent Authority for Operational-Technology Control Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-ot-command-authority-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-ot-command-authority/>.
[I-D.nelson-agent-delegation-receipts]
"Agent Delegation Receipts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nelson-agent-delegation-receipts-15, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nelson-agent-delegation-receipts/>.
[I-D.sergeev-audit-task-requirements]
"Task-Relative Evidence Requirements for Agent Auditing", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-sergeev-audit-task-requirements-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sergeev-audit-task-requirements/>.
[I-D.sirkkavaara-vaara-receipt]
"The Vaara Receipt: A Recomputable Receipt Format for Decisions About Autonomous Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-sirkkavaara-vaara-receipt-15, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sirkkavaara-vaara-receipt/>.
[I-D.watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope]
"High-Assurance Agent Control Envelope", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope/>.
[I-D.zambo-aer1]
"AER-1: A Portable Execution Receipt for AI Agent Tool Calls", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-zambo-aer1-26, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zambo-aer1/>.

Appendix A. Mapping to EAGF Conformance Rules (Informative)

This appendix maps the requirements of this document to rule identifiers in the EAGF conformance model (WO-013: 68 rules in 16 domains). The rule text is maintained with the EAGF specification [EAGF-SPEC]; it is not reproduced here.

Table 1
Requirement EAGF conformance rules
REQ-1 Bounded Authority Scope ECA-CONF-MUL-001, ECA-CONF-AGT-002, ECA-CONF-TRU-001, ECA-CONF-CTX-004
REQ-2 Decision Reference ECA-CONF-DEC-002, ECA-CONF-DEC-003, ECA-CONF-AGT-001, ECA-CONF-RSN-004
REQ-3 Material Context Preservation ECA-CONF-CTX-001, ECA-CONF-CTX-002, ECA-CONF-MUL-002
REQ-4 Outcome Reference ECA-CONF-DEC-001, ECA-CONF-DEC-005, ECA-CONF-AGT-003, ECA-CONF-REA-001
REQ-5 Evidence Kind ECA-CONF-EVD-004, ECA-CONF-AGT-003, ECA-CONF-EVD-002
REQ-6 Accountable Owner ECA-CONF-MUL-005, ECA-CONF-AGT-004
REQ-7 No Automatic Trust or Confidence Transfer ECA-CONF-MUL-003, ECA-CONF-MUL-004, ECA-CONF-TRU-002, ECA-CONF-ASM-006
REQ-8 Historical Integrity ECA-CONF-HIS-002, ECA-CONF-LRN-001, ECA-CONF-TRU-004, ECA-CONF-ASM-004
Unauthorized Action recorded (HV-11) ECA-CONF-DEC-004

Appendix B. Changes since -01

This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Appendix C. Acknowledgments

This document draws on the EAGF architecture developed under Alygn (Intention Alliance Inc.). Operational contact for the project: taniaalygn@gmail.com.

Author's Address

David Luna
Alygn (Intention Alliance Inc.)
Austin, TX
United States of America