| Internet-Draft | EAGF Delegation Semantics | November 2026 |
| Luna | Expires 21 May 2027 | [Page] |
AI agents increasingly decide and act on behalf of organizations and delegate work to other agents. Identity, authentication, authorization and runtime control mechanisms establish who is acting and what is permitted, but they do not by themselves preserve the organizational meaning of a delegation: the bounded authority, purpose, material context, and the distinction between a recommendation, a decision, an action and its outcome. This document states requirements, derived from the Enterprise Agent Governance Framework (EAGF), that such semantics be preserved across tool calls, delegations and agent-to-agent handoffs. It defines no new protocol.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
Project site: https://alygn.us. Contact: taniaalygn@gmail.com. EAGF is openly published under open licences, and anyone may implement it; Alygn (Intention Alliance Inc.) is the copyright holder and steward of the EAGF text. This Internet-Draft is contributed under BCP 78 / BCP 79.¶
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Organizations are moving from using AI as a content-generation tool to delegating work to systems that can plan, call tools, query internal systems, coordinate with other agents and produce effects on business state. Controls that operate only at identity, authentication, authorization or runtime-policy layers leave a semantic gap: they can establish which credential is in use and which permission was granted, but they do not necessarily preserve who the agent is for the organization, who is accountable for it, under what purpose-bounded Authority it acts, whether a Recommendation was adopted as an organizational Decision, whether an Action actually occurred, or what Outcome followed.¶
That gap appears in practice when infrastructure permissions become implicit business authority; when an AI recommendation is treated as a Decision without an adoption rule; when tool invocation, Action and Outcome are collapsed; when Trust or Authority is propagated between agents without contextual justification; when constraints and purpose are lost during agent-to-agent handoffs; or when an agent's self-report is treated as proof that an Action occurred.¶
The Enterprise Agent Governance Framework (EAGF) [EAGF-SPEC] is a vendor-, model-, protocol- and runtime-independent semantic architecture for governed organizational autonomy. It separates concepts that systems often collapse (Claim, Evidence, Assessment, Authority, Decision, Action, Outcome, Trust, Confidence) and states invariants that MUST NOT be collapsed. This document extracts the subset of those requirements that apply specifically to tool calls, delegations and agent-to-agent handoffs, so that protocol and control-plane designers can preserve organizational meaning across boundaries.¶
This document is complementary to, and does not replace:¶
EAGF does not define a vocabulary of oversight acts. Where such a vocabulary is used, for example [I-D.ehstand-oversight-acts], the act type is recorded in the oversight record that a Decision reference resolves to.¶
Those mechanisms can carry or check the semantics below: a delegation receipt or attenuated token can carry the bounded Authority scope of REQ-1, an action-time envelope can carry the Decision reference of REQ-2, and an audit task model can consume the Evidence kinds of REQ-5. None of them, by itself, establishes that an organizational Decision existed or that an Action produced a given Outcome.¶
EAGF supplies organizational semantics those mechanisms can carry. It defines no wire format, no credential type and no Guardian verdict.¶
This document does not: define a new agent protocol; replace IAM, PAM, SIEM, policy engines or runtime security; replace the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001 or NIST AI RMF; define a maturity score or universal trust score; or claim that EAGF is an international standard. EAGF is an open candidate specification with an explicit external-validation program.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The following terms are used as in the EAGF specification overview. They are organizational semantics, not protocol identifiers.¶
The following high-value invariants are restated from EAGF for the delegation and handoff setting. Implementations that claim alignment with this document MUST NOT collapse these distinctions. Identifiers in parentheses refer to the high-value invariant list in the EAGF specification overview [EAGF-SPEC]; the corresponding normative conformance rules are listed in Appendix A.¶
The following requirements apply whenever an Agent issues a tool call, delegates work to another Subject, or performs an agent-to-agent handoff. They are semantic obligations; they MAY be carried as attributes on existing protocol messages, traces or control-plane hooks. Exact field names are out of scope.¶
Where an Action is taken on behalf of the organization, the Action MUST reference the organizational Decision that authorized it, or an explicit rule that no Decision was required. An Agent Recommendation alone MUST NOT satisfy this requirement.¶
Absence of objection (silence) MUST NOT be treated as a Decision.¶
A Decision that closes a specific case is an event, distinct from the standing policy that governed it. A Decision Record is an integrity-protected record of one such Decision that identifies at least: the accountable role that made it, the case or matter it applies to, the time it was made, and the scope of Action it authorizes. The policy that governed the Decision SHOULD be referenced separately.¶
Where the Decision is an Adverse Determination (see Section 3), a Decision Record MUST exist, and the Action MUST reference that record by a content-binding reference as required for Decision references generally (see the Decision-reference stability text below). A reference to the governing policy alone MUST NOT satisfy this requirement for an Adverse Determination. For other Decisions, a Decision Record SHOULD exist and the Action SHOULD reference it in the same way.¶
Where Authority or a Decision is time-bounded or may be withdrawn, the authorizing record MUST make the following facts available to a verifier that can resolve the Decision reference (see the Decision-reference stability and resolution text in this section): (1) the end of the validity window, if any; (2) whether and when the Authority or Decision was revoked; and (3) when a later act (for example a release) supersedes an earlier Decision for a specific Action, which later record the Action is to reference. Absence of these facts, when the operating profile claims time bounds or revocation, MUST NOT be treated as continuing validity.¶
A Decision reference MUST allow an independent implementation to identify the exact Decision that authorized the Action, even if the system that originally held the Decision changes, is migrated or is no longer available. A content digest of the preserved Decision record, or another authenticated reference with equivalent properties, satisfies this requirement; a mutable pointer alone (for example a URL or database row identifier) does not.¶
The Decision record referenced under this requirement SHOULD keep three facts distinct: on whose account the Action is taken, what was observed or presented to the approver, and who approved. These facts MUST NOT be inferred from one another.¶
A Decision reference MUST resolve: a reader with access to the referenced record MUST be able to determine which Decision it identifies, which Subject adopted it, and the scope it covers. A reference that cannot be resolved to such a record does not satisfy this requirement.¶
Note (non-normative): approval of a broader task or mission is not, by itself, the Decision for a later Action taken under it. A Decision reference identifies the specific decision event, with a separate reference to the policy that governed it. The kind of oversight act (for example approval, override or release) is a property of the referenced record, not of the reference; stating it in both places creates a second place where the act could be described differently (see [I-D.ehstand-oversight-acts]).¶
Example (non-normative): a Decision to pay a supplier is adopted by one Subject, and a different Subject later releases the payment after a hold. The payment Action references the release, because the release is the act that authorized that Action at that time. The release record in turn references the underlying Decision. A verifier following the reference therefore finds both acts, who performed each, and over what scope, without the Action record restating either.¶
Material Context (Context whose loss would change interpretation, authorization or risk) MUST survive a Delegation or handoff under Context Qualification rules. Context transfer MUST NOT be assumed automatic. Non-material Context SHOULD be minimized for privacy (see Section 8).¶
Note (non-normative): Material Context required under this requirement, and any justification that accompanies a Decision, MAY be carried with the Decision record, in a capability certificate (for example a zcap- or UCAN-style certificate), or with a delegation or token-exchange request. This document does not prefer a carriage; profiles choose the carrier that fits their protocol.¶
Note (non-normative): the end of a validity window, a revocation event, and a superseding release are Material Context under this requirement when they affect whether an Action is authorized. Profiles MAY carry them in the Decision record, in a linked revocation or release record, or with the Action; they SHOULD NOT leave the executing party dependent on a cached copy that omits a later revocation or supersession.¶
Records of Action SHOULD allow later linkage to observed Outcomes without collapsing Action and Outcome into one record. Systems MUST NOT treat successful tool invocation as proof of the business Outcome.¶
Evidence cited to support Claims about Delegation, Decision, Action or Outcome MUST distinguish at least: Agent self-report, platform/runtime record, and externally verifiable evidence. Self-report MUST NOT be treated as sufficient proof of Action for high-risk settings.¶
Every Agent Subject that receives Authority through Delegation MUST have an identifiable accountable owner for the organization. Accountability relationships MUST NOT be inferred solely from causality or from who performed the Action.¶
Trust and Confidence MUST NOT be transferred automatically across a Delegation or handoff. Any reliance on another Subject's Trust or Confidence MUST be re-justified in the receiving context.¶
New Evidence that appears after a Decision MUST NOT rewrite the historical record of what Evidence and Context were available at Decision time. Learning updates future cognition; it does not alter the audit trail of past Decisions. Historical Integrity is satisfied by an append-only, content-bound evidence record that a third party can verify (for example a transparency log of hash-chained receipts with externally witnessed heads). A parent-byte or hop-linkage property of a token chain MAY support other requirements; it MUST NOT by itself be treated as satisfying REQ-8. Historical integrity does not imply continuing validity: a Decision that was valid when it was made can be revoked, expire or lose its approver's standing before a later Action relies on it (see Section 7, Paragraph 6).¶
Implementers of ACS-style hooks MAY attach optional semantic fields corresponding to REQ-1 through REQ-4 (for example authority_scope, decision_ref, outcome_ref, evidence.kind). AACP Agent Certification Credentials and Proof-of-Control verifiable evidence MAY be treated as Evidence under REQ-5; they are not Authority under REQ-1. Exact schema is left to those projects.¶
EAGF distinguishes Design Conformance (architecture and artefacts show the required distinctions) from Operational Conformance (a real system produces authentic Operational Evidence). These are evidence scopes, not maturity levels. Conformance results are evidence-based Judgments (PASS / FAIL / NOT DEMONSTRATED / NOT APPLICABLE), not percentage scores.¶
An Operational Conformance claim SHOULD be assessed by an assessor independent of the implementer. An implementer MUST NOT assess its own customers and present the result as independent.¶
The normative rule catalogue (68 rules across 16 domains and 7 profiles) and the assessment instrument (68 items) are maintained in the EAGF conformance work products (WO-013, WO-014). This Internet-Draft states only the delegation and handoff requirements above; it does not reproduce the full catalogue.¶
An assessment that cannot establish authority status at time of use for a sampled Action SHOULD record the related requirement as NOT DEMONSTRATED for that Action rather than PASS.¶
When an assessment samples an Action that the profile claims is time-bounded or revocable, and the resolved Decision or Authority record does not make the validity end, revocation time, or superseding release (as applicable) available, the related requirement SHOULD be recorded as NOT DEMONSTRATED for that Action rather than PASS.¶
Appendix A maps each requirement in this document to the conformance rules that test it.¶
Authority escalation through Delegation chains: if REQ-1 is not enforced, a chain of Delegations can accumulate into broader Authority than any single delegator intended. Implementations SHOULD bound chain depth and re-validate scope at each hop.¶
Unbounded cumulative Actions under one Delegation: if REQ-1 only bounds purpose and excluded scopes, and not Action volume or aggregate effect, an Agent can exhaust the intended mandate through many individually in-scope Actions. Implementations SHOULD declare and enforce cumulative bounds (count, spend, rate or equivalent) and SHOULD record when a bound is reached so a later Action cannot silently continue under the same Delegation.¶
Context stripping: if REQ-3 is not enforced, a handoff can drop purpose, limits or risk signals and produce Actions that look authorized under the remaining credentials. Material Context MUST be treated as security-relevant.¶
Forged or unverified self-reports: if REQ-5 is not enforced, an Agent can assert that an Action occurred or was authorized. Self-report MUST be distinguishable from platform and external Evidence.¶
Replay of Decision references: Decision references used for REQ-2 MUST be bound to scope and time so that a past Decision cannot authorize a later, different Action.¶
Status at time of use: a verifier that only checks that a Delegation, Authority scope or Decision was valid when it was issued can accept an Action that relies on Authority that has since been revoked, has expired, or whose approver no longer holds the standing required to approve it. Implementations that rely on REQ-1 or REQ-2 SHOULD be able to establish the status of the relevant Authority and Decision at the time the Action is taken, not only at issuance. Where status at time of use cannot be established, the Action record SHOULD say so explicitly rather than imply that status was checked. This document does not define a status mechanism; status lists, short-lived credentials, online checks and transparency receipts are possible carriers.¶
Collapsing Recommendation into Decision (HV-18) creates unauthorized organizational commitments. Adoption rules are a security control, not only a governance nicety.¶
Material Context under REQ-3 SHOULD be minimized to what is necessary for interpretation, authorization and risk. Evidence cited under REQ-5 may contain personal or confidential data; Evidence handling MUST respect applicable confidentiality and retention rules. Publishing Operational Evidence packages for assessment SHOULD use redaction or scoped disclosure rather than wholesale log dumps.¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
This appendix maps the requirements of this document to rule identifiers in the EAGF conformance model (WO-013: 68 rules in 16 domains). The rule text is maintained with the EAGF specification [EAGF-SPEC]; it is not reproduced here.¶
| Requirement | EAGF conformance rules |
|---|---|
| REQ-1 Bounded Authority Scope | ECA-CONF-MUL-001, ECA-CONF-AGT-002, ECA-CONF-TRU-001, ECA-CONF-CTX-004 |
| REQ-2 Decision Reference | ECA-CONF-DEC-002, ECA-CONF-DEC-003, ECA-CONF-AGT-001, ECA-CONF-RSN-004 |
| REQ-3 Material Context Preservation | ECA-CONF-CTX-001, ECA-CONF-CTX-002, ECA-CONF-MUL-002 |
| REQ-4 Outcome Reference | ECA-CONF-DEC-001, ECA-CONF-DEC-005, ECA-CONF-AGT-003, ECA-CONF-REA-001 |
| REQ-5 Evidence Kind | ECA-CONF-EVD-004, ECA-CONF-AGT-003, ECA-CONF-EVD-002 |
| REQ-6 Accountable Owner | ECA-CONF-MUL-005, ECA-CONF-AGT-004 |
| REQ-7 No Automatic Trust or Confidence Transfer | ECA-CONF-MUL-003, ECA-CONF-MUL-004, ECA-CONF-TRU-002, ECA-CONF-ASM-006 |
| REQ-8 Historical Integrity | ECA-CONF-HIS-002, ECA-CONF-LRN-001, ECA-CONF-TRU-004, ECA-CONF-ASM-004 |
| Unauthorized Action recorded (HV-11) | ECA-CONF-DEC-004 |
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
This document draws on the EAGF architecture developed under Alygn (Intention Alliance Inc.). Operational contact for the project: taniaalygn@gmail.com.¶