Internet-Draft WIMSE HTTP Signature Test Vectors November 2026
Miao Expires 22 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Individual Submission
Internet-Draft:
draft-miao-wimse-http-signature-test-vectors-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
J. Miao
Vertciti

Test Vectors for the WIMSE HTTP Message Signatures Protocol

Abstract

This document provides a set of test vectors for the WIMSE Workload-to-Workload Authentication protocol based on HTTP Message Signatures, as specified in draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature. The collection comprises six positive test cases, twenty-three negative test cases each mapped to a specific normative requirement of that specification, and three documented observations. All key material is test-only and fully published in this document, so that every vector can be recomputed independently. This document defines no new protocol behavior.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This document provides test vectors for the Workload-to-Workload Authentication protocol based on HTTP Message Signatures, as specified in [WIMSE-HTTPSig]. It defines no new protocol behavior; it records a fixed, publicly reproducible set of messages, signature bases, and expected verification outcomes against which implementations of that specification can be checked.

The set was first published on 6 November 2026 as a public comment in the issue tracker of the base specification (issue #419 of ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol) and announced on the WIMSE mailing list. Earlier versions were reproduced in full by two independent implementers with complete agreement, and the full set was additionally validated by a third-party implementation (cred-ninja). Review by a co-author of the base specification led to the corrections recorded in the Change Log (Appendix A). The current version of the set (v4) is archived as a dataset at Zenodo, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24203971; this document is the Internet-Draft form of that version.

Each negative vector is constructed as a single mutation of a positive vector (or as a described implementation behavior) and is mapped to the specific normative requirement it exercises, quoted from the base specification. Three further entries are observations: points at which the base specification's text, read literally, does not support a pass/fail judgment; they are recorded for the working group's attention and are not part of the judged set.

2. Conventions and Usage

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Most occurrences in this document appear inside quotations of, or references to, the requirements of the base specification.

Fixed verification clock. All vectors use T0 = 1795000000 (Unix seconds) as the created baseline. The default verification time is T0+60; any deviation is stated in the vector itself. The expires value is in every case created+300, consistent with the base specification's guidance that the validity window be on the order of minutes.

Key material. All key material, including private keys, is test-only and is published in full in the Test Key Material section, so that every vector can be recomputed independently. Keys are derived deterministically from fixed seeds, as stated there.

Placeholders. Message material that would otherwise repeat the full text of a Workload Identity Token appears in messages and signature bases as a placeholder of the form [WIT-x, full text in the Test Key Material section]. The placeholder is retained verbatim in the signed material; deterministic expansion substitutes the full token text where a verifier needs the component value.

Signature bases. Each positive vector gives its complete signature base (constructed per [RFC9421], Section 2.5), so verification can be reproduced without the author's code. Ed25519 signatures are computed per [RFC8032]; ES256 signatures use the deterministic nonce generation of [RFC6979] and are therefore byte-for-byte reproducible from the same input.

Literal and regenerated signatures. Positive vectors and N-15 give their Signature values literally. In the remaining negative vectors whose construction is a textual mutation, the signature is regenerated by the test runner: the stated mutation is applied to the base message and the result is re-signed as in Section 3.1 of the base specification with the key bound by the WIT's cnf.jwk. Because both signature algorithms used here are deterministic, regenerated values are exactly reproducible. Each affected entry states that its signature is regenerated; entries whose Signature value is carried over unchanged from the base vector state that instead.

Expected outcomes. For message vectors, the expected outcome is stated as acceptance, rejection with the error surface of Section 3.6 of the base specification (HTTP 400 with problem type https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types#wimse-signature-invalid, unless a different outcome is stated), or client rejection of a response. For behavior vectors (N-16 through N-22 in part), the expected outcome is a conformance judgment about the implementation under test, and the procedure for reaching it is stated in the entry.

Set-level rule. Entries prefixed O- are observations. They are not part of the judged set and produce no pass/fail outcome. The judged set is the 6 positive and 23 negative vectors: 29 in total.

Folding. Long lines in the artwork of this document are folded following the convention of [RFC8792]: a backslash at the end of a line marks a fold, and removing the backslash, the line break, and the leading whitespace of the continuation line restores the exact original line. Folding is presentational only.

3. Test Key Material

Derivation: an Ed25519 seed is SHA-256("s01-validation-vectors:<name>"), and the JWK parameter d is the base64url encoding of the seed. The svcC P-256 private scalar is SHA-256("s01-validation-vectors:svcC") mod (n-1) + 1. All values below are test-only.

Issuer (WIT issuer), Ed25519, kid = issuer-key

Public JWK: {"alg":"Ed25519","crv":"Ed25519","kid":"issuer-key","kt\
  y":"OKP","x":"QH_Zu0pnwyO8xdFQm9upOUFAbpb4nhMrGc29L3uJXDA"}
Private d: 4nRAPQQyr8cUgAtCESLc4ZIGIxZT9-guqxcc3wV-2NI

svcA, Ed25519, kid = vec-a-key (sub = wimse://example.com/svcA)

Public JWK: {"alg":"Ed25519","crv":"Ed25519","kid":"vec-a-key","kty\
  ":"OKP","x":"O3OfVmPJ3peYhdDrMweNIiBOQU6JZCNcYMK2kjV0i3Y"}
Private d: F8BhX5poMswcVwTgEMGETOhdN72PaxIiwuGYWrzSUvk

svcB, Ed25519, kid = vec-b-key (sub = wimse://example.com/svcB)

Public JWK: {"alg":"Ed25519","crv":"Ed25519","kid":"vec-b-key","kty\
  ":"OKP","x":"4jVAzgEPO5n-6jujSiyQME5t-tIzZApbhR5cTPoedII"}
Private d: 4MaIKp1h5mkTS7ZSawz6QYN6FYA_rOYBPDfGEZCpPDg

svcC, ES256 / P-256, kid = vec-c-key (sub = wimse://example.com/svcC)

Public JWK: {"alg":"ES256","crv":"P-256","kid":"vec-c-key","kty":"E\
  C","x":"jZjfUBQgD1l9R_lm4nzo1rP82pGVDBxHD6YmOo_xoCo","y":"CBGv9b8\
  hB-l0mov9rlu223g-vNE_SquCC2IhPi2IweE"}
Private d: X94ti7AkOiC4JcxdbSmLkwWEzyEU4wMqBX_9LHfXQaU

other (decoy signer in P-06), Ed25519, kid = other-key

Public JWK: {"alg":"Ed25519","crv":"Ed25519","kid":"other-key","kty\
  ":"OKP","x":"Lo6grJBjN252d2huS1-ckJIql2FZR2vrTOF2qKRBTm4"}
Private d: KL4_B1CdV7qwZkVYvyK0I5SrsEzv6yb1p1PNAfbC7LY

WIT-A (iat = T0-60, exp = T0+3600, jti = wit-a-1795000000. The WIT lifetime is longer than the signature lifetime, as noted in Section 3 of the base specification.)

eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoiaXNzdWVyLWtleSIsInR5cCI6IndpdCtqd3Q\
  ifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkMjU1MTkiLCJjcnYiOiJFZDI1NTE5I\
  iwia2lkIjoidmVjLWEta2V5Iiwia3R5IjoiT0tQIiwieCI6Ik8zT2ZWbVBKM3BlWW\
  hkRHJNd2VOSWlCT1FVNkpaQ05jWU1LMmtqVjBpM1kifX0sImV4cCI6MTc5NTAwMzY\
  wMCwiaWF0IjoxNzk0OTk5OTQwLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL2lz\
  c3VlciIsImp0aSI6IndpdC1hLTE3OTUwMDAwMDAiLCJzdWIiOiJ3aW1zZTovL2V4Y\
  W1wbGUuY29tL3N2Y0EifQ.JCh9sN__1Al9xVB-K7CFafw1tDV8PCeZvyKdFyMmb9v\
  vN4mK2ZGNbC6VLFpNzpVsgGBV0FwmzerDAFuikSJBCw

WIT-B (iat = T0-60, exp = T0+3600, jti = wit-b-1795000000.)

eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoiaXNzdWVyLWtleSIsInR5cCI6IndpdCtqd3Q\
  ifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkMjU1MTkiLCJjcnYiOiJFZDI1NTE5I\
  iwia2lkIjoidmVjLWIta2V5Iiwia3R5IjoiT0tQIiwieCI6IjRqVkF6Z0VQTzVuLT\
  ZqdWpTaXlRTUU1dC10SXpaQXBiaFI1Y1RQb2VkSUkifX0sImV4cCI6MTc5NTAwMzY\
  wMCwiaWF0IjoxNzk0OTk5OTQwLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL2lz\
  c3VlciIsImp0aSI6IndpdC1iLTE3OTUwMDAwMDAiLCJzdWIiOiJ3aW1zZTovL2V4Y\
  W1wbGUuY29tL3N2Y0IifQ.iBAAT-2xF6Polfa49cDu4THgh3zhCdbAitBM5JIgxuu\
  CEdbjMKglKVskt7E78jdE42i3FMMP9-Lw0PLRXwXaBQ

WIT-C (iat = T0-60, exp = T0+3600, jti = wit-c-1795000000.)

eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia2lkIjoiaXNzdWVyLWtleSIsInR5cCI6IndpdCtqd3Q\
  ifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwiY3J2IjoiUC0yNTYiLCJra\
  WQiOiJ2ZWMtYy1rZXkiLCJrdHkiOiJFQyIsIngiOiJqWmpmVUJRZ0QxbDlSX2xtNG\
  56bzFyUDgycEdWREJ4SEQ2WW1Pb194b0NvIiwieSI6IkNCR3Y5YjhoQi1sMG1vdjl\
  ybHUyMjNnLXZORV9TcXVDQzJJaFBpMkl3ZUUifX0sImV4cCI6MTc5NTAwMzYwMCwi\
  aWF0IjoxNzk0OTk5OTQwLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL2lzc3Vlc\
  iIsImp0aSI6IndpdC1jLTE3OTUwMDAwMDAiLCJzdWIiOiJ3aW1zZTovL2V4YW1wbG\
  UuY29tL3N2Y0MifQ.8-bmHNavOVSxyr2hAtnKfrC-kdm5L4XMP4n1cGGMLh5DjSPm\
  djTWkpKtTO9tPZfKMIfLVC7xGaDvoJXUdizGCg

Trusted configuration (shared by all vectors unless an entry states otherwise): the verifier at svcB trusts the wimse-aud set {"https://svcb.example.com/gimme-ice-cream", "https://svcb.example.com/inventory/cones", "https://svcb.example.com/status", "https://svcb.example.com"}; the trust anchor for WITs is the Issuer public key above.

4. Positive Test Vectors

4.1. P-01 - Signed request, Ed25519 (svcA to svcB, requesting a signed response)

P-01. Exercises: the Section 3 coverage list (@method, @path, @query, plus present headers that must be signed), the required signature parameters (created, expires, nonce, tag, and, for requests, wimse-aud), and wimse-sign-response (Section 3.3). The @query component value carries the leading '?' per RFC 9421, Section 2.2.7.

Message:

GET /gimme-ice-cream?flavor=vanilla HTTP/1.1
Host: svcb.example.com
Workload-Identity-Token: [WIT-A,§2 全文]
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identit\
  y-token");created=1795000000;expires=1795000300;nonce="7f3a9c1e5b\
  284d06a1f4e8c2b6d50937";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-au\
  d="https://svcb.example.com/gimme-ice-cream";wimse-sign-response
Signature: sig1=:qrIGE6wS80/UvhJx96iDiz90OIYmUX8CFO4vOeK/40D7pnukei\
  kqvsYGDs6aqXx099ILxgZliEepCw1P5M7YDg==:

Signature base:

"@method": GET
"@path": /gimme-ice-cream
"@query": ?flavor=vanilla
"workload-identity-token": [WIT-A,§2 全文]
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identity\
  -token");created=1795000000;expires=1795000300;nonce="7f3a9c1e5b2\
  84d06a1f4e8c2b6d50937";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-aud\
  ="https://svcb.example.com/gimme-ice-cream";wimse-sign-response

Expected: the request verifies, and because wimse-sign-response is true the server is obliged to sign its response (see P-02). Procedure: validate the WIT first (issuer signature, exp after the verification time); verify the signature with the cnf.jwk key (Ed25519, vec-a-key) per Section 3.1; check the coverage list and required parameters item by item; compare wimse-aud against the trusted configuration by Simple String Comparison (Section 3.2); confirm the verification time (T0+60) falls within [created, expires]. Any failure is reported through the Section 3.6 error surface without distinguishing which check failed.

4.2. P-02 - Signed response (svcB to svcA, answering P-01)

P-02. Exercises: the Section 3 response coverage list (@status, the ;req components, Workload-Identity-Token, and Content-Type / Content-Digest where present), wimse-req-nonce (Section 3.4), and response verification (Section 3.5). The response body is "No ice cream today.\n" (20 bytes); its Content-Digest value agrees byte-for-byte with the corresponding example in Section 3.7.1 of the base specification, an independent cross-check of the generation pipeline against the specification's own examples.

Message:

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Digest: sha-256=:uJC3qmCc7n6/6w4N2I0vAfj1cd/hTOAhxLEYXmPbNn\
  o=:
Workload-Identity-Token: [WIT-B,§2 全文]
Signature-Input: sig1=("@status" "workload-identity-token" "content\
  -type" "content-digest" "@method";req "@path";req "@query";req);c\
  reated=1795000002;expires=1795000302;nonce="2b8e4f0a9d1c3756e0a2b\
  4c6d8f0a1b3";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-req-nonce="7f\
  3a9c1e5b284d06a1f4e8c2b6d50937"
Signature: sig1=:XugjjXCtpc0lkt5QSnjVF/OcQwqhQAqAzuykBUw36FsGV6BmXc\
  MKfY0YZTMTnvpsjIZkmOeTN+PvQEzAb/veDQ==:

No ice cream today.

Signature base:

"@status": 404
"workload-identity-token": [WIT-B,§2 全文]
"content-type": text/plain
"content-digest": sha-256=:uJC3qmCc7n6/6w4N2I0vAfj1cd/hTOAhxLEYXmPb\
  Nno=:
"@method";req: GET
"@path";req: /gimme-ice-cream
"@query";req: ?flavor=vanilla
"@signature-params": ("@status" "workload-identity-token" "content-\
  type" "content-digest" "@method";req "@path";req "@query";req);cr\
  eated=1795000002;expires=1795000302;nonce="2b8e4f0a9d1c3756e0a2b4\
  c6d8f0a1b3";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-req-nonce="7f3\
  a9c1e5b284d06a1f4e8c2b6d50937"

Expected: the client verifies and accepts the response. Procedure: validate WIT-B; verify the signature; confirm wimse-req-nonce is present and equals the nonce of P-01 (Section 3.5); recompute the Content-Digest of the body and compare; confirm the verification time (T0+60) falls within the response's [created, expires].

4.3. P-03 - Signed request with body, ES256 (svcC to svcB)

P-03. Exercises: algorithm selection by cnf.jwk.alg (Section 3.1) and the rule that a message with a body carries Content-Digest, with Content-Type and Content-Digest signed when present. The request body is {"flavor":"vanilla","amount":1} (31 bytes); its Content-Digest value agrees byte-for-byte with the example in Section 3.7.2 of the base specification.

Message:

POST /inventory/cones HTTP/1.1
Host: svcb.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Digest: sha-256=:TzKXT0tUEfiTFkjRzwE8nCFnQljMuX5xwJaJgJCp+1\
  g=:
Workload-Identity-Token: [WIT-C,§2 全文]
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identit\
  y-token" "content-type" "content-digest");created=1795000000;expi\
  res=1795000300;nonce="c51d7a2e8f093b46a5c1d2e3f4a5b6c7";tag="wims\
  e-workload-to-workload";wimse-aud="https://svcb.example.com/inven\
  tory/cones"
Signature: sig1=:n7QUfcBz5ruH3anRYFpW7drn1CInZfV4TZPxlqBIlHg1g78FnR\
  hk7CQudkHN8kNGAHfsBTgIvfHGJMZ8f2QTbQ==:

Signature base:

"@method": POST
"@path": /inventory/cones
"@query": ?
"workload-identity-token": [WIT-C,§2 全文]
"content-type": application/json
"content-digest": sha-256=:TzKXT0tUEfiTFkjRzwE8nCFnQljMuX5xwJaJgJCp\
  +1g=:
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identity\
  -token" "content-type" "content-digest");created=1795000000;expir\
  es=1795000300;nonce="c51d7a2e8f093b46a5c1d2e3f4a5b6c7";tag="wimse\
  -workload-to-workload";wimse-aud="https://svcb.example.com/invent\
  ory/cones"

Expected: the request verifies. Procedure: validate WIT-C; verify the ES256 signature with the P-256 public key (the signature value is the raw r||s concatenation); recompute the body digest and compare; compare wimse-aud; check the validity window.

4.4. P-04 - CONNECT request, the exception case (svcA to svcB)

P-04. Exercises: the Section 3 CONNECT exception: a CONNECT request covers @method and @authority instead of @path and @query, and must not cover @path or @query. The @authority component value is normalized per RFC 9421, Section 2.2.3 (lowercase host, default port omitted): the request line and Host carry svcb.example.com:443 as the message's original form, while the derived component value is svcb.example.com, 443 being the default port for https. The wimse-aud value "https://svcb.example.com" follows the deployment-specific provision of Section 3.2, the CONNECT target being in authority form.

Message:

CONNECT svcb.example.com:443 HTTP/1.1
Host: svcb.example.com:443
Workload-Identity-Token: [WIT-A,§2 全文]
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@authority" "workload-identity-to\
  ken");created=1795000000;expires=1795000300;nonce="9a0b1c2d3e4f50\
  61728394a5b6c7d8e9";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-aud="h\
  ttps://svcb.example.com"
Signature: sig1=:oQvU3xBjXSOTm2zDvjGMWa/lsOGPyB8+AYxoA9aNd1Dgx2ulyM\
  ynph+/lR6d6Vkdl1rXR62kHuaG0sG4q3m2AQ==:

Signature base:

"@method": CONNECT
"@authority": svcb.example.com
"workload-identity-token": [WIT-A,§2 全文]
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@authority" "workload-identity-tok\
  en");created=1795000000;expires=1795000300;nonce="9a0b1c2d3e4f506\
  1728394a5b6c7d8e9";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-aud="ht\
  tps://svcb.example.com"

Expected: the request verifies. Procedure: recognize CONNECT; check the coverage list against the exception set (@method and @authority present, @path and @query absent); then proceed as in P-01.

4.5. P-05 - Request without a query component (@query is "?")

P-05. Exercises: the Section 3 rule that @query is covered even when the request has no query component, in which case its value is the single character '?' (RFC 9421, Section 2.2.7).

Message:

GET /status HTTP/1.1
Host: svcb.example.com
Workload-Identity-Token: [WIT-A,§2 全文]
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identit\
  y-token");created=1795000000;expires=1795000300;nonce="13579bdf24\
  68ace013579bdf2468ace0";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-au\
  d="https://svcb.example.com/status"
Signature: sig1=:62NICDRikwhl4IlI2ls8cGIACVyuFNtmSZdYOZKiO88AqsKZLQ\
  uybOkQx5SQYkREcB0OiU4xT+qn9/hoAj1LAg==:

Signature base:

"@method": GET
"@path": /status
"@query": ?
"workload-identity-token": [WIT-A,§2 全文]
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identity\
  -token");created=1795000000;expires=1795000300;nonce="13579bdf246\
  8ace013579bdf2468ace0";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-aud\
  ="https://svcb.example.com/status"

Expected: the request verifies. Procedure: as in P-01, with the @query component value required to be exactly "?".

4.6. P-06 - Multiple signatures; selection by tag

P-06. Exercises: the Section 3 rule that the recipient uses the tag to find the WIMSE signature and must not choose by label (see also RFC 9421, Section 7.2.5), and the provision of Section 5.2 of the base specification under which intermediaries may add their own signatures. Here sig1 is a non-WIMSE signature by 'other', appearing first; sig2 is the WIMSE signature.

Message:

GET /gimme-ice-cream?flavor=vanilla HTTP/1.1
Host: svcb.example.com
Workload-Identity-Token: [WIT-A,§2 全文]
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@path");created=1795000000;keyid=\
  "other-key";tag="example-other", sig2=("@method" "@path" "@query"\
   "workload-identity-token");created=1795000000;expires=1795000300\
  ;nonce="f0e1d2c3b4a5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f";tag="wimse-workload-to-\
  workload";wimse-aud="https://svcb.example.com/gimme-ice-cream"
Signature: sig1=:C9vDZlqwPqD3dPtkwhQDz0cmpsy0Z2tSE/ewIHjMCdgmdNN7nq\
  rZTLLZqGobMOjswZF43HMaJXGGjFVuRYB5BQ==:, sig2=:Dyr5ErLhw5LmeYIztg\
  6QZmfARn96ucIGuMXUgsyGj9MMc4Y9cQmQ6345/c8/n584kmlk1TfL7xmNVDQKkG7\
  EAw==:

Signature base:

"@method": GET
"@path": /gimme-ice-cream
"@query": ?flavor=vanilla
"workload-identity-token": [WIT-A,§2 全文]
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identity\
  -token");created=1795000000;expires=1795000300;nonce="f0e1d2c3b4a\
  5968778695a4b3c2d1e0f";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-aud\
  ="https://svcb.example.com/gimme-ice-cream"

Signature base (sig1, the decoy signature):

"@method": GET
"@path": /gimme-ice-cream
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@path");created=1795000000;keyid="\
  other-key";tag="example-other"

Expected: the verifier selects sig2 by its tag and the WIMSE verification passes; sig1 does not enter the WIMSE judgment. Procedure: enumerate all signatures; select the unique one whose tag is "wimse-workload-to-workload"; apply the P-01 procedure to it. An implementation that selects sig1 by label order fails this vector's companion behavior case, N-22.

5. Negative Test Vectors

Each entry states its construction as a mutation of a base vector (or, for behavior cases, as a described implementation behavior), the normative requirement it exercises, and the expected outcome. Unless an entry states otherwise, rejection means HTTP 400 with the problem type https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types#wimse-signature-invalid and no distinction between failing checks.

5.1. N-01 - Missing @query coverage

Construction. Base P-01. Mutation: "@query" is removed from the coverage list. The Signature value is carried over unchanged from P-01.

Requirement. Section 3: "The following derived components MUST be signed: @method, @path, @query".

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. The coverage check fails on the missing component; signature verification is not reached.

5.2. N-02 - CONNECT request covering @path

Construction. Base P-04. Mutation: "@path" is added to the coverage list (its value would be "/"). The signature is regenerated (see Conventions).

Requirement. Section 3: "For a CONNECT request, senders MUST cover @method and @authority instead of @path and @query, and MUST NOT cover @path or @query".

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. In the CONNECT branch, the presence of @path or @query in the coverage list fails the check.

5.3. N-03 - Body without Content-Digest

Construction. Base P-03. Mutation: the Content-Digest header and its coverage entry are removed. The Signature value is carried over unchanged from P-03.

Requirement. Section 3: "if the request or response includes a body, the sender MUST include (and the receiver MUST verify) a Content-Digest header".

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. A body is present and the Content-Digest header is absent.

5.4. N-04 - Content-Digest does not match the body

Construction. Base P-03. Mutation: the body is replaced with {"flavor":"chocolate","amount":1}; the Content-Digest header value is unchanged. The Signature value is carried over unchanged from P-03.

Requirement. Section 3: "the receiver MUST compute the Content-Digest value for the message content received and compare it with the Content-Digest value provided".

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. The recomputed digest differs. (The mutation also invalidates the signature; the error surface must not distinguish the failing check - see N-17.)

5.5. N-05 - Missing expires parameter

Construction. Base P-01. Mutation: expires is removed from Signature-Input. The Signature value is carried over unchanged from P-01.

Requirement. Section 3: "the following signature parameters MUST be included: created, expires, nonce, tag".

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. The required-parameter check fails.

5.6. N-06 - keyid parameter present

Construction. Base P-01. Mutation: keyid="vec-a-key" is added to the parameter set and the signature is regenerated over the mutated base, so the signature is cryptographically valid for the message as sent.

Requirement. Section 3: "The following signature parameters in the Signature-Input header MUST NOT be used: keyid".

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. The presence of keyid fails the check regardless of cryptographic validity: the signature does not constitute a conforming WIMSE signature. This reading was confirmed by a co-author of the base specification on the WIMSE mailing list on 7 November 2026.

5.7. N-07 - alg parameter present

Construction. Base P-01. Mutation: alg="ed25519" is added to the parameter set and the signature is regenerated.

Requirement. Section 3 (the MUST NOT list includes alg) and Section 3.1: "The alg signature parameter MUST NOT be used".

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type, as in N-06; the co-author confirmation recorded there applies equally.

5.8. N-08 - Two signatures carrying the WIMSE tag

Construction. Base P-06. Mutation: the decoy signature sig1 has its tag set to "wimse-workload-to-workload"; its coverage and signature are regenerated accordingly.

Requirement. Section 3: "If more than one signature has that tag value, the recipient MUST reject the message".

Expected. Reject the whole message: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. The tag match count exceeds one; the failure precedes any signature verification.

5.9. N-09 - Verification outside the validity window

Construction. Base P-01, message unmodified. Mutation: the verification time is T0+3600, after expires (T0+300). The Signature value is as in P-01.

Requirement. Section 3: "Recipients MUST reject signatures that fall outside their validity time window".

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. Note: at T0+3600 the WIT has also expired, so this case does not isolate the signature window; N-09b provides the isolated boundary case.

5.10. N-09b - Validity-window boundary: one second past expires

Construction. Base P-01, message unmodified. This is a contrast case with two evaluations of the same message: at verification time T0+300 the expected outcome is ACCEPT; at T0+301 it is REJECT. Every other stage of the decision procedure (WIT validation, selection, parameters, coverage, base, digest, cryptography, audience) is invariant across the two evaluations, and at T0+301 WIT-A remains within its own validity period (exp = T0+3600), so the rejection is attributable solely to the signature validity window.

Requirement. Section 3: "Recipients MUST reject signatures that fall outside their validity time window".

Expected. At T0+300: accept. At T0+301: reject, HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. Together with N-09 (far outside the window), this brackets the right edge of the closed interval [created, expires] and catches implementations that treat expires as exclusive or round it to a coarser granularity.

5.11. N-10 - wimse-aud differing only by URI normalization

Construction. Base P-01. Mutation: wimse-aud is set to "https://svcb.example.com/gimme-ice-cream/" (a trailing slash is added) and the signature is regenerated.

Requirement. Section 3.2: "The recipient MUST verify that wimse-aud matches one of the audience values in its trusted configuration using the Simple String Comparison method of RFC 3986 Section 6.2.1"; strings differing only by URI normalization do not match under that method.

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. The byte-for-byte comparison fails; normalization equivalence must not be applied.

5.12. N-11 - Request missing wimse-aud

Construction. Base P-01. Mutation: wimse-aud is removed from the parameter set and the signature is regenerated.

Requirement. Section 3: "For requests only, the following signature parameter MUST also be included: wimse-aud".

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type.

5.13. N-12 - Signed response missing wimse-req-nonce

Construction. Base P-02. Mutation: wimse-req-nonce is removed from the response parameter set and the signature is regenerated.

Requirement. Section 3.4: "Every signed response MUST include wimse-req-nonce"; Section 3 lists it among the required response parameters.

Expected. The client rejects the response. The response parameter check fails.

5.14. N-13 - wimse-req-nonce not equal to the request nonce

Construction. Base P-02. Mutation: wimse-req-nonce is set to "00000000000000000000000000000000" and the signature is regenerated.

Requirement. Section 3.5: "the client MUST verify that wimse-req-nonce is present and equals the nonce from the corresponding request".

Expected. The client rejects the response. The value differs byte-for-byte from the nonce of the request that triggered it; this binding is the defense against response mix-up and replay across requests.

5.15. N-14 - Signed response required, response unsigned

Construction. Base P-01 with P-02. Construction: the server returns the status line and body of P-02 but with no Signature or Signature-Input header at all.

Requirement. Section 3.5: "The client MUST reject an unsigned response when the request's Signature-Input included wimse-sign-response with the Boolean value true".

Expected. The client rejects the response.

5.16. N-15 - Signature algorithm does not match cnf.jwk.alg

Construction. Independent construction (not a re-signing mutation). The message has the form of P-01 and carries WIT-A, whose cnf declares Ed25519 / vec-a-key; but the signature was produced by svcC's ES256 key over the same signature base and is cryptographically valid under svcC's public key. The literal message and signature base follow; in the base, the @signature-params line carries nonce "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789" and no wimse-sign-response parameter.

Requirement. Section 3.1: "Recipients MUST verify the HTTP message signature using the algorithm identified by cnf.jwk.alg and MUST reject the message if that algorithm is not acceptable".

Message and signature:

Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@path" "@query" "workload-identit\
  y-token");created=1795000000;expires=1795000300;nonce="abcdef0123\
  456789abcdef0123456789";tag="wimse-workload-to-workload";wimse-au\
  d="https://svcb.example.com/gimme-ice-cream"
Signature: sig1=:28GmtKZAQJ1w6QtPGGrrrXMhdSgWXCmMbTVIuFNUh+PvOWS1oy\
  SwSUAPGhhvoad18zrTZXYh/Dh0ixcHcfB77g==:

Expected. Reject: HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type. Verification is performed only with the algorithm and key bound by the WIT's cnf; that the signature verifies under a different key is not a ground for acceptance.

5.17. N-16 - Insufficient nonce entropy (sender behavior)

Construction. Construction: a sender implementation under test draws its nonces from a 32-bit space (for example, 8 hexadecimal characters).

Requirement. Section 3: "the nonce MUST contain at least 64 bits of entropy" and must be generated from a cryptographically secure random source.

Expected. Conformance judgment on the sender. A verifier cannot measure entropy from a single nonce; the judgment is made at the test-harness level: collect the nonces of N requests from the implementation, and if their value space or generation distribution provides less than 64 bits of entropy, the implementation is nonconformant.

5.18. N-17 - Error surface distinguishes failures, or uses 401 (server behavior)

Construction. Construction: a server under test returns different problem types or distinguishable text for an invalid WIT and for an invalid signature, or returns 401 for an authentication failure.

Requirement. Section 3.6: "the server MUST return 400 (Bad Request)"; "The server MUST NOT distinguish in the response which check failed"; 401 is NOT RECOMMENDED.

Expected. Conformance judgment on the server. Procedure: submit both failure classes; the responses must both be HTTP 400 with the wimse-signature-invalid problem type and must be indistinguishable; a 401 response also fails.

5.19. N-18 - Successful unsigned response where a signed response is required (server behavior)

Construction. Construction: the request carries wimse-sign-response with value true; the server does not support response signing, or this response cannot be signed, yet returns 200 with an unsigned body.

Requirement. Section 3.5: "it MUST NOT return a successful unsigned response; it MUST return an error"; Section 3.6: 501 with wimse-signed-response-unsupported where response signing is not supported, 400 with wimse-signed-response-unavailable where it is supported but this response cannot be signed.

Expected. Conformance judgment on the server. A response with status 200 and no signature is nonconformant; the conforming behavior is the 501 or 400 error, matched to the case.

5.20. N-19 - Accept-Signature requesting weaker-than-profile coverage (sender behavior)

Construction. Construction: a client sends Accept-Signature in a request, asking that the response cover only "@status".

Requirement. Section 3.5: "Accept-Signature MUST NOT be used to request coverage weaker than this profile".

Expected. Conformance judgment on the sender; a server must not lower the Section 3 response coverage on the basis of such a request. Procedure: if the component set requested by Accept-Signature does not include the full Section 3 response coverage set, the case fails.

5.21. N-20 - Processing before the WIT is validated (verifier behavior)

Construction. Construction: a verifier implementation under test verifies the message signature first, or allows the message content to reach business processing before validation has fully completed (process first, verify later). The WIT validation procedure referenced is that of [WORKLOAD-CREDS].

Requirement. Section 3: "Recipients ... MUST validate the WIT as specified in Section 5.1.4 of [workload-creds] before validating the HTTP message signature. They MUST ensure that the message is not processed further before it has been fully validated".

Expected. Conformance judgment on the verifier. Probe: present a message whose WIT is expired but whose message signature is cryptographically valid; if processing produces a business side effect instead of the 400 rejection, the implementation is nonconformant. Ordering is additionally assessed by implementation inspection or instrumentation evidence.

5.22. N-21 - CONNECT signed response covering @path;req

Construction. Base: the P-02 form migrated to a CONNECT exchange. Mutation: "@path";req is added to the response coverage list. The signature is regenerated (migration construction).

Requirement. Section 3: "When the signed response corresponds to a CONNECT request, senders MUST cover @method;req and @authority;req instead of @path;req and @query;req, and MUST NOT cover @path;req or @query;req".

Expected. The client rejects the response signature. In the CONNECT response branch, the presence of @path;req or @query;req in the coverage list fails the check.

5.23. N-22 - Signature selection by label (verifier behavior)

Construction. Base P-06, at the verifier. Construction: an implementation under test selects the signature to verify by label order (taking sig1 first) or by a fixed label name.

Requirement. Section 3: "recipients MUST use that tag to find the WIMSE signature; they MUST NOT choose by label" (see RFC 9421, Section 7.2.5).

Expected. Conformance judgment on the verifier. In the P-06 scenario, failure to select sig2 (the tag match) is nonconformant. This case is the mirror image of N-08, which exercises the sender side (two signatures with the same tag).

6. Observations

O-1 - The replay cache is a SHOULD. Section 3 provides that recipients MAY maintain a replay cache and SHOULD reject a message whose nonce they have already seen. Because this is not a MUST, replay of an identical message is not a negative vector. It is nevertheless the profile's only replay defense; where verifier caches are not shared, a replay can still succeed, as the base specification itself notes in Sections 3 and 5.1. Testing guidance for this behavior may merit a note alongside the vector set.

O-2 - Example nonces in the base specification versus the entropy MUST. The examples in Section 3.7 of the base specification use nonces such as "abcd1111" - 8 hexadecimal digits, literally 32 bits - against Section 3's requirement of at least 64 bits of entropy. Examples are non-normative and illustrative values are customary, so this is not an error in the specification; but the risk of implementers copying example values is real. A co-author of the base specification confirmed on 7 November 2026 that an editorial note ("example nonces are illustrative and do not meet the entropy minimum") will be added and tracked in an issue. This entry is retained until the note appears in the text.

O-3 - Covering @authority in non-CONNECT requests. For ordinary requests the profile does not cover @authority, but Section 3 states no MUST NOT against covering it (the MUST NOT appears only in the CONNECT branch); additional coverage of @authority in an ordinary request is therefore not a negative case. Its division of labor with wimse-aud (Section 5.1) is left as a deployment-reading observation.

7. Security Considerations

All private keys, seeds, and tokens appearing in this document are test material generated exclusively for these test vectors and published intentionally. They MUST NOT be used in any production system. The deterministic derivation of the test keys from public seeds means that any party can reproduce them; that is by design, and it is also why they must never be reused elsewhere. This document introduces no protocol behavior and no new security considerations beyond those of [WIMSE-HTTPSig].

8. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6979]
Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9421]
Backman, A., Richter, J., and M. Sporny, "HTTP Message Signatures", RFC 9421, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421>.
[WIMSE-HTTPSig]
Salowey, J. and Y. Sheffer, "Workload-to-Workload Authentication with HTTP Signatures", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08>.

9.2. Informative References

[RFC8792]
Leiba, B., "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.
[WORKLOAD-CREDS]
Sheffer, Y., "WIMSE Workload Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds>.

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

The author thanks Yaron Sheffer, co-author of the base specification, whose review points led to the corrections recorded in the Change Log and who confirmed the readings relied on in N-06, N-07, and O-2; the independent implementers whose reproductions of the set found the @query defect corrected in v2, including kanywst, who also proposed the P-04 normalization check and the N-09b boundary case; and Kieran Sweeney, whose cred-ninja implementation validated the full set.

Appendix B. Change Log

v1 (6 November 2026). Initial set published as a public comment in issue #419 of the base specification's repository and announced on the WIMSE mailing list: 28 vectors (6 positive, 22 negative) and 3 observations.

v2 (November 2026). Corrections arising from independent reproduction and working-group review: in P-01, P-02, and P-06 (sig2), the @query line of the signature base was corrected to include the leading '?' per RFC 9421, Section 2.2.7, and the signatures were re-issued; the N-15 signature was recomputed per RFC 6979 over the corrected base; N-06 and N-07 were annotated with the co-author confirmation described in those entries; the status note of O-2 was updated.

v3 (12 November 2026). In P-04, the @authority component value was normalized to omit the default port per RFC 9421, Section 2.2.3, and the signature was re-issued. Archived at Zenodo, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24184599.

v4 (13 November 2026). Added the N-09b boundary vector and a machine-readable anchor layer supporting automated extraction by the companion conformance suite; no other vector content changed. Archived at Zenodo, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24203971.

This document. The v4 set presented in Internet-Draft form, as -00.

Author's Address

Jiahui Miao
Vertciti