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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Accountable Principal References">Accountable Principal References for Delegated Agent Requests: Properties and Evaluation</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-molas-agent-principal-refs-00"/>
    <author fullname="Marc Molas">
      <organization>MintID Foundation</organization>
      <address>
        <email>marc@mintid.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
    <keyword>agent</keyword>
    <keyword>delegation</keyword>
    <keyword>accountability</keyword>
    <keyword>privacy</keyword>
    <keyword>pseudonymity</keyword>
    <keyword>audit</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 71?>

<t>When a software agent makes a request on behalf of a person or an organization, the party that receives it often needs to know that someone answers for the request, without needing to know who. Several specifications in progress carry some reference to the principal behind an agent, and they make different choices about who learns the principal's identity, when the reference can be linked across services, who can resolve it, and how fast a withdrawn principal stops being accepted. This document states six properties of such a principal reference in testable terms, maps each to existing specifications that already provide part of it (OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, the JWT profile for OAuth 2.0 access tokens, OAuth identity chaining, Token Status List and Selective Disclosure for JWTs), and gives a first-pass evaluation of five current drafts against them. It defines no token format, protocol or claim, and it does not rank the drafts.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 75?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <section anchor="problem">
        <name>The Problem</name>
        <t>Agent identity and principal identity are separate questions. OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange already separates the acting party ("act", <xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/>) from the subject of a token, and <xref section="10.3" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/> conveys the agent in "client_id" and the user or system it acts for in "sub".</t>
        <t>Many relying parties do not need the principal's identity to decide. A bot manager, an API or a merchant may only need to know that an established principal stands behind the request, at what assurance, and that it is the same principal as earlier in the interaction. The KYAPay drafts start from a related premise: a "chain of responsibility -- from agent action back to an accountable human" (<xref section="3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="KYAPAY-USING"/>).</t>
        <t>Audit and dispute resolution still need the identity, after the fact and for some requests only. <xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/> requires audit events to record the "delegated subject (user or system), when present".</t>
        <t>Today these two needs are met either by carrying a stable identifier everywhere, which is simple to audit and correlatable across services, or by pseudonymous identifiers whose resolution rests on the cooperation of the party that assigned them, under conditions that the specification does not state (<xref section="3.4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="KYAPAY-TOKEN"/>; <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="KYAPAY-TOKEN"/>).</t>
        <t>No specification states, as a set of checkable properties, what a principal reference reveals and to whom, who can undo the pseudonymity and under what condition, and how fast a withdrawal takes effect. This document addresses that gap. In one phrase, the aim is anonymity without loss of audit: a relying party can verify that an established principal stands behind the agent, proven and not named, and the principal is identified only under stated conditions.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="what-this-document-does">
        <name>What This Document Does</name>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>It defines terms (<xref target="terminology"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It states six properties, each with a test that a reviewer can apply to a specification or a deployment (<xref target="properties"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It maps each property to existing IETF text that provides part of it (<xref target="mapping"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It states an evaluation method (<xref target="method"/>) and applies it to five drafts (<xref target="evaluation"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It lists the security and privacy considerations that the properties raise (<xref target="security"/> and <xref target="privacy"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
      </section>
      <section anchor="what-this-document-does-not-do">
        <name>What This Document Does Not Do</name>
        <t>See <xref target="out-of-scope"/>. In short: no format, no protocol, no identity-proofing method, no trust framework, no ranking and no recommendation of an implementation.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Principal:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The natural person or organization that answers for a request that an agent makes. <xref section="10.3" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/> calls this the "User or System"; <xref section="3.4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="KYAPAY-TOKEN"/> calls it the "human principal".</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Agent:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A workload acting for a principal (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Principal reference:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>What a request carries that refers to the principal: an identifier, a proof or a commitment. A principal reference is distinct from the agent's identifier.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Reference issuer:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The party that established the principal, by identity proofing or an equivalent process, and issued the principal reference. It is the party that can map a reference to the principal.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Relying party (RP):</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A party that receives a request with a principal reference and decides on it. This document says "relying party" because "verifier" means the identity-verification provider in <xref section="3.4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="KYAPAY-TOKEN"/> and the recipient of a presentation in <xref target="RFC9901"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Trust domain:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>As used in OAuth identity chaining (<xref section="2.5" sectionFormat="of" target="ID-CHAINING"/>): a set of parties under one authorization server's policy.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Delegation chain:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The sequence of requests from the first agent to the last relying party, possibly across trust domains.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Resolution:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Mapping a principal reference to the principal's identity.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Resolution process:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The reference issuer's published statement of who may request resolution, on what grounds, what is returned and to whom, and what record is kept.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Status:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Whether a principal reference, or the principal's standing behind it, is still accepted. Principal standing and token status are different checks: "a status list revokes a token, not a principal" (<xref section="3.6" sectionFormat="of" target="WIMSE-EVAL"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Withdrawal event:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The event from which a withdrawal bound is measured, for example the issuer's decision, the publication of the status list or commitment that carries it, or the principal's own request.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>This document is Informational and places no requirement on any implementation. It uses no BCP 14 requirement keywords of its own.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="properties">
      <name>Properties</name>
      <t>Each property is stated and then followed by a test. A specification provides a property when every conforming implementation of it has the property; it allows the property when a deployment can choose to have it.</t>
      <section anchor="p1">
        <name>Accountability (P1)</name>
        <t>A relying party can verify, from what the request carries or references:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="(%c)"><li>
            <t>that a principal reference is bound to the request and to the acting agent;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>which reference issuer issued it; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the assurance at which the issuer states it established the principal.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The principal reference is distinct from the agent's identifier.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Test:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Remove the reference, or replace it with one bound to another agent or request: the relying party's check fails. Present a reference from an issuer outside the relying party's accepted set: the relying party refuses. The agent identifier and the principal reference are different values.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="p2">
        <name>Continuity Across the Chain (P2)</name>
        <t>Every party in a delegation chain that receives a principal reference can establish that it refers to the same principal as the reference received by the preceding party. Within a trust domain this can be equality of the value. Across trust domains the value may change, and the party that changed it then records the correspondence (value received, value issued, its own identity) in a record that it signs.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Test:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Build a chain in which one hop carries a reference to a different principal. The receiving party detects it, or the signed records of the chain show the break.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="p3">
        <name>Non-Identification (P3)</name>
        <t>No party other than the reference issuer can, from the principal references it receives and without the issuer's participation:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="(%c)"><li>
            <t>obtain an attribute that identifies the principal, beyond those the relying party requested and the principal authorized; or</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>link two references to the same principal presented in different trust domains.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <dl>
          <dt>Test (structural):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Two references to the same principal, presented in two trust domains, carry no common value other than the issuer's identity and public parameters: no common identifier, signature, salt, key or status-list index. The specification lists any common value as a residual.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Item (b) is the cross-domain case of the distinct "sub" values that "cannot be correlated in the event of resource server collusion" (<xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9068"/>) and of Verifier/Verifier unlinkability (<xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9901"/>). P3 does not cover behavioral correlation (timing, IP addresses, the content of requests); see <xref target="privacy"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="p4">
        <name>Conditioned Resolution (P4)</name>
        <t>Only the reference issuer, or a party that the issuer names in its resolution process, can resolve a principal reference. The issuer publishes its resolution process, resolves only on a request that the process admits, and keeps a record of each resolution (reference, requester, ground, time, outcome) for the period that the process states.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Test:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The relying party can retrieve the issuer's resolution process before relying on a reference. An auditor can sample resolution records against requests. The record-keeping half can be checked by audit only; a specification can say no more than that the record exists and what it contains.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>P4 is the property for which the least existing text was found (<xref target="mapping"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="p5">
        <name>Unobserved Status (P5)</name>
        <t>A relying party can establish the current status of a principal reference, and of the principal's standing where that is a separate check, without sending to the issuer or to a status provider any value that identifies which reference it is checking.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Test:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The status request carries no per-reference value: it fetches a list or a commitment shared by many references (herd privacy, <xref section="12.1" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>), or the status reaches the relying party without a request.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>P5 concerns status checks. A reference minted for one named audience tells the issuer the audience at issuance time. That is a separate observation; the evaluation records it where it applies (<xref target="evaluation"/>) and does not grade it as P5.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="p6">
        <name>Bounded Withdrawal (P6)</name>
        <t>For each way in which a principal reference or a principal's standing can be withdrawn, the specification or the deployment states:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="(%c)"><li>
            <t>the withdrawal event from which the bound is measured; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the maximum time after that event until a conforming relying party refuses requests that rely on it.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>"Immediately" and "without undue delay" are not stated bounds.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Test:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Withdraw at time t0, measured from the stated event. A conforming relying party refuses at or before t0 plus the bound. Bounds measured from the receipt of a notification do not count, since the time of receipt is not observable by the party that withdrew.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="mapping">
      <name>Mapping to Existing Specifications</name>
      <t>For each property, this section names the existing text that provides part of it and what that text leaves open.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>P1:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Existing text: "act" identifies the acting party separately from the subject (<xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/>); <xref section="10.3" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/> puts the agent in "client_id" and the principal in "sub". Left open: the assurance of the principal, and the issuer of the principal reference as distinct from the token issuer.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>P2:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Existing text: "Transcribing the subject identifier", where the mapping can happen at the token exchange step or at the assertion step (<xref section="2.5" sectionFormat="of" target="ID-CHAINING"/>). Left open: where the mapping is recorded, and that it stays out of the receiving domain.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>P3:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Existing text: distinct "sub" values per resource server against collusion (<xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9068"/>); "Data Minimization" in claims transcription (<xref section="2.5" sectionFormat="of" target="ID-CHAINING"/>); the four kinds of unlinkability, batch issuance for Verifier/Verifier unlinkability, and the limit that salted-hash formats cannot give Issuer/Verifier unlinkability against a colluding verifier (<xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9901"/>). Left open: non-linkage across trust domains for references passed along a chain.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>P4:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Existing text: none that conditions resolution. The nearest phrases are audit records "retained according to the security policy of the deployment" (<xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>); issuer records that let an issuer "resolve a token, given its iss and jti, to the verifications and authorizations behind it", with their disclosure left to applicable law (<xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="KYAPAY-TOKEN"/>); and the requirement that a WHO profile define "a hiding commitment construction, its scope, its binding to the verified WHO record, and how an authorized verifier obtains any required disclosure" (<xref section="6.2" sectionFormat="of" target="ACCOUNTABILITY-COMPOSITION"/>). Left open: the condition on resolution and the record of it.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>P5:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Existing text: herd privacy, under which the issuer "does not learn for which Referenced Token the Relying Party is requesting the Status List" (<xref section="12.1" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>); issuer tracking through one list per token (<xref section="12.2" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>); the list index as traceable data (<xref section="12.5" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>); a revocation callback "could potentially disclose information about the credential's usage to the Issuer" (<xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9901"/>). Left open: principal standing as distinct from token status.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>P6:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Existing text: "exp" and "ttl" of a status list (<xref section="13.7" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>; <xref section="11.5" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>); principal standing established from a source the relying party pins, within a maximum age it pins, failing closed (<xref section="3.6" sectionFormat="of" target="WIMSE-EVAL"/>). Left open: the start event of the bound, per withdrawal path.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>Related, not mapped: <xref section="9" sectionFormat="of" target="AUDIT-ARCH"/> observes that, at an organizational boundary, the Tracing Delegation Chain "could be replaced ... by an opaque identifier whose mapping is retained only at the originating side's Audit Store". That is P2 and P3 at the audit layer, with P4 left open.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="method">
      <name>Evaluation Method</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>What is evaluated:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The current revision of each draft as published on the Datatracker, read in full. Deployments, products, editors' copies and other revisions are not evaluated.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Grades per property and draft:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>One of the following.
</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Provides: the text requires behavior that meets the property, as an absolute requirement or a recommendation in the terms of BCP 14.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Allows: the text permits it (an optional feature, an optional claim, or a choice left to deployment).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Partial: the text meets part of the property; the entry names the part.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Not addressed: the text says nothing that meets or prevents it.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Prevents: the text requires behavior that rules the property out.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Out of stated scope: the draft itself declares the topic out of its scope.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </dd>
        <dt>Rules:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Every entry cites a section. Residuals that a draft states about itself are credited to the draft. A property that a draft does not aim at is still graded, and the notes for that draft say what it does aim at.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Not a ranking:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The five drafts solve different problems, and a draft that grades low here may be the right tool for its own purpose. This document does not rank them.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Review:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The authors of each evaluated draft are asked to correct the entries for their draft. Corrections are taken, or recorded with the reason they were not taken, in the next revision.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="evaluation">
      <name>Evaluation (First Pass)</name>
      <t>This first pass covers the following revisions, each confirmed as the current one on the Datatracker on 18 November 2026:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><xref target="AIMS"/>, draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01 (2 November 2026);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the KYAPay family: <xref target="KYAPAY-TOKEN"/>, <xref target="KYAPAY-USING"/> and <xref target="KYAPAY-EXCHANGE"/> (16 November 2026), cited below as "token", "using" and "exchange";</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>, draft-le-agent-passport-00 (30 October 2026);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>, draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00 (dated 26 October 2026, posted 30 October 2026);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>, draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00 (16 November 2026).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The summary table gives the grades. The subsections that follow give, for each draft, the reasons and the sections they rest on. The table is a summary of those entries, not a score.</t>
      <table>
        <name>Grades of the first pass</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Property</th>
            <th align="left">AIMS -01</th>
            <th align="left">KYAPay family</th>
            <th align="left">Agent Passport -00</th>
            <th align="left">Delegate SD-JWT -00</th>
            <th align="left">Delegator-Bound -00</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">P1</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Allows</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">P2</td>
            <td align="left">Allows</td>
            <td align="left">Not addressed</td>
            <td align="left">Provides</td>
            <td align="left">Provides</td>
            <td align="left">Provides within a chain</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">P3</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Provides, with stated residuals</td>
            <td align="left">Prevents within a chain</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Allows, with stated residuals</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">P4</td>
            <td align="left">Not addressed</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Not addressed</td>
            <td align="left">Not addressed</td>
            <td align="left">Not addressed</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">P5</td>
            <td align="left">Not addressed</td>
            <td align="left">Not addressed</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Not addressed</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">P6</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
            <td align="left">Partial</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <section anchor="eval-aims">
        <name>AIMS (draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01)</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>P1, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The agent is conveyed in "client_id" and the principal in "sub" (<xref section="10.3" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>). The text covers the authentication of a user who delegates (<xref section="10.5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>) and says nothing on how the principal was established or at what assurance.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P2, Allows:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Cross-domain access should use identity chaining (<xref section="10.7" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>), which permits transcription of the subject identifier; where a transcribed value and its correspondence are recorded is not stated. <xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/> states that end-to-end audit is enabled by stable, verifiable identifiers.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P3, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Minimization is required: user identity information delegated to agents is "not exposed to unrelated services", and cross-domain exchanges disclose only what the target authorization decision needs (<xref section="10.10" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>). Nothing addresses non-linkage across trust domains, and the audit model of <xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/> relies on stable identifiers.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P4, Not addressed:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Audit records are "retained according to the security policy of the deployment" (<xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>); nothing conditions the mapping of "sub" back to the user.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P5, Not addressed:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The status paths named are Shared Signals events that a participant may subscribe to (<xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>) and token introspection, a call to the authorization server per token (<xref section="10.3" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>; <xref section="10.10" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/> prefers opaque tokens with introspection for claim minimization). The text does not consider what either path shows the party that answers.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P6, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Revoked authorization is enforced "without undue delay", and cached decisions and tokens are not used "after a revocation or risk notification is received" (<xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>): no number, and the bound is measured from receipt.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>What it aims at:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>AIMS composes existing specifications (<xref section="14" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>; <xref section="15" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>) and leaves compliance criteria and the policy format to deployments (<xref section="12" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>; <xref section="13" sectionFormat="of" target="AIMS"/>). It is a natural place for a pointer to these properties. An open pull request on its Section 10.10 (<xref target="AIMS-PR176"/>, not merged on 18 November 2026) would add subject identifiers specific to a party or trust domain, claims transcription with a retained mapping, and resolution "according to the security policy of the deployment". If merged as proposed, P3 would move to Allows and P4 to Partial. This evaluation grades -01 only.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="eval-kyapay">
        <name>The KYAPay Family</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>P1, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Items (b) and (c) are provided. The human principal claim "hid", the agent platform claim "apd" and the agent claim "aid" are each required and distinct (token, Section 3.4), and "aid" "identifies the agent, not the human principal on whose behalf the agent acts" (token, Section 3.4.3); the issuer is "iss"; the methods by which the principal was verified and authenticated can be conveyed in "ivm", "amr" and "aml", which an issuer should include when it knows them, and the time of authentication in "auth_time" (token, Section 3.4.1); and a recipient derives assurance per layer (using, Section 6.2). Item (a) is a deployment choice: the token is bound to one Target (token, Section 3.1.1), but it is a bearer token unless it carries a confirmation key (token, Section 6.5; using, Section 4.1).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P2, Not addressed:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A token is minted for one Target ("aud", "tsi"; token, Sections 3.1.1 and 3.4) and is not forwarded beyond the parties needed for the interaction (token, Section 6.2). The exchange for an access token carries no actor token (exchange, Section 4). The "chain of responsibility" is the three identity layers within one token (token, Section 2.1.1). No text lets a Target pass the principal reference on to a further party.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P3, Provides, with stated residuals:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>"hid.id", "sub" and "aid.id" differ per Target, and "hid.id" also per agent platform; values for different platforms or Targets are not "linkable to one another without the issuer's cooperation" (token, Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3), and two Targets "cannot link the principal from these values" (token, Section 7). Directly identifying claims are included only when a Target requires them for the action at hand and the principal has authorized their disclosure (token, Sections 3.4.1 and 7). Residuals stated by the draft: "apd" and "aid.name" are the same at every Target and can link a principal's activity (token, Section 7); "verification_id" is the same at every Target and is disclosed under the same condition as the identifying claims (token, Section 3.4.1); and "whether the services of one Target share a value is left to the issuer" (token, Section 7).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P4, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The part provided is the record that makes resolution possible. An issuer "MUST keep the following records": verification records, authorization records for each disclosure that needs the principal's authorization, and issuance records that tie each token to the verifications and authorizations it relied on; together they let an issuer "resolve a token, given its iss and jti, to the verifications and authorizations behind it", and the issuer must protect them against unauthorized access (token, Section 5). The condition is not stated: the specification "does not set how long an issuer keeps these records, or when it discloses them to third parties such as courts or regulators", which it leaves to applicable law, and it "does not define an interface for querying them" (token, Section 5). The text requires neither a published resolution process nor a record of each resolution. The feedback channel from a recipient to the issuer is left open (using, Section 6.10).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P5, Not addressed:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>No revocation mechanism is defined; recipients should consult "an issuer's live-status or revocation endpoint, where one is offered" (using, Section 8.8), which is not specified. Separate observation: a token minted per Target tells the issuer the Target at issuance, and the issuance records keep "aud" and "tsi" for each token (token, Sections 3.1.1, 3.4 and 5); the privacy considerations cover Targets and third-party observers (token, Section 7).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P6, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>There is no revocation (using, Section 8.8). The only bound is the token lifetime: issuers set "exp" "to the shortest value compatible with the intended interaction" (token, Section 6.4), and recipients reject tokens whose lifetime exceeds their local policy maximum (using, Section 8.2). Both are measured from issuance. A token attests authorization "at the time of issuance" (using, Section 8.9).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>What it aims at:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The KYAPay family starts from the premise of this document (<xref target="problem"/>), and it is the only one of the five that provides P3, through pairwise identifiers, and the only one that requires the issuer records on which resolution rests. Its documents state their own boundaries: no revocation (using, Section 8.8), issuer trust "an open problem analogous to the Certificate Authority model" (using, Section 8.7), bearer use by default with an optional confirmation key (token, Section 6.5; using, Section 4), and retention and disclosure of issuer records left to the law that applies to the issuer (token, Section 5). Two further readings bear on P4. "Where a separate verifier performed the verification, the issuer keeps the verifier's identity, the verification_id and the result, and the verifier keeps the rest of the record" (token, Section 5): P4's "issuer, or a party the issuer names" then covers a pair of parties, and neither is given a stated process. Keyed derivation of "hid.id" (token, Section 3.4.1) changes how the issuer computes a mapping, not what a resolution record under P4 contains. The companion drafts on verification methods, authentication method values and AML/CFT methods define claim values and bear on P1, item (c), only. The issuer records come from a pull request merged on 15 November 2026 (<xref target="KYAPAY-PR72"/>). An open issue plans exchange for a sub-agent's token at the issuer, with the issuer keeping "a record linking the issued token to the subject token" (<xref target="KYAPAY-EXCHANGE-ISSUE10"/>); it bears on P2. This evaluation grades the published revisions only.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="eval-passport">
        <name>Agent Passport (draft-le-agent-passport-00)</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>P1, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The accountable party is the controller's origin (<xref section="1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>; "agent_controller", <xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>; "contact", <xref section="4.5" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>). The principal is the root receipt's "sub", "as identified by the root receipt's authorisation server" (<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>), with no stated assurance. Binding is provided: the leaf receipt is bound to the key that signs the request (<xref section="5.5" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>, step 4).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P2, Provides (by equality):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>"Every receipt in a chain" carries "the same sub as the root" (<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>), checked at each step (<xref section="5.5" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P3, Prevents within a chain:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>"Receipts identify the principal (sub) to every RP they are shown to" (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>), and the same-"sub" rule (<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>) excludes values specific to a trust domain. Linkage of the agent across relying parties can be avoided with distinct holder keys and passports per relying party (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P4, Not addressed:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The receipt carries the principal's identifier as the root authorization server assigns it (<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>); nothing addresses mapping it back or recording that mapping (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P5, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Passports and receipts should carry a Token Status List reference (<xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>; <xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>; <xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>), which gives herd privacy where lists are shared (<xref section="12.1" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>; <xref section="12.2" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>). There is no separate check of the principal's standing. Separate observation: each verification fetches the controller's "/.well-known/agent-controller" document, cacheable for up to 24 hours (<xref section="4.5" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P6, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Stated: a controller's withdrawal of authorization takes effect within the 24-hour cache of its document (<xref section="4.5" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>); a passport lives at most 86400 seconds (<xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>); status lists are cached for no longer than their time-to-live (<xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>). No bound is stated for the principal's own standing.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>What it aims at:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Accountable organizations and verifiable builds, with attenuation guaranteed by construction (<xref section="1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>). The low P3 and P4 grades follow from that aim: the controller is meant to be known. Its open issues include a root receipt signed directly by the principal's authenticator (<xref section="B" sectionFormat="of" target="AGENT-PASSPORT"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="eval-dsdjwt">
        <name>Delegate SD-JWT (draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00)</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>P1, Allows:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The properties of the principal depend on the credential delegated; the verifier can "link the presentations back to the initial Issuer" (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>). Nothing addresses the principal's assurance.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P2, Provides:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Each Key Binding SD-JWT in the chain is bound to the preceding one (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>; <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>; <xref section="8.1" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P3, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Selective disclosure applies to both the original credential and the delegate payload (<xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>), and the privacy considerations of <xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9901"/> apply (<xref section="9" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>). By <xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9901"/>, presentations of one credential are linkable across verifiers unless batch-issued, and the verifier sees the full chain (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P4, Not addressed:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Beyond the privacy considerations inherited from <xref target="RFC9901"/> (<xref section="9" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>), nothing addresses resolution.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P5, Not addressed:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Not addressed for delegations: a holder "can not easily distribute revocation information to Verifiers" (<xref section="8.3" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>). The initial SD-JWT inherits <xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9901"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P6, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A short "exp" and claims constraining the use of the delegated SD-JWT "limit this problem" (<xref section="8.3" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>); no bound is stated.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>What it aims at:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Onward presentation of an SD-JWT to a delegate with minimal disclosure (<xref section="1" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>). Principal properties come from the credential delegated. Its note on revocation (<xref section="8.3" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>) is the P6 gap as stated by its authors.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="eval-delegator">
        <name>Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains (draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00)</name>
        <t>The draft extends Delegation Tokens (<xref target="DELEGATION-CHAIN"/>), which this revision does not evaluate (<xref target="not-evaluated"/>). The entries grade the extension's own text, and the base only where the extension states what it takes from it.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>P1, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Items (a) and (b) are provided in a delegator-bound chain. The principal is carried in "sub", distinct from the acting agent in "client_id" (<xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). Each child is signed with the key that its parent confirms, so a verifier knows that "each child was issued by the holder of the key that its parent confirmed, and therefore by the Acting Agent that the parent named" (<xref section="3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>); the same key is the one bound for proof of possession (<xref section="3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>), and the last agent proves possession of the key that the last token confirms (<xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). An optional "ctx" binds a chain to the dialog or transaction it was issued for (<xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). The root token is verified under a trusted root key (<xref section="3.3" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>), and how the verifier trusts that key "is outside this document" (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). Nothing addresses how the principal was established or at what assurance.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P2, Provides within a chain:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A child follows "the principal invariant" of the base (<xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>); the verifier checks at each hop "that sub, sub_kind, and del_bind are unchanged" (<xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>) and rejects a chain in which a child omits or changes "sub_kind" (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). Continuity is by equality, also between organizations whose agents delegate directly (<xref section="9" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). A chain that crosses a trust domain through an authorization server is re-issued there (<xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>), or the delegator at the boundary obtains a new root, "ending the chain" (<xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>); whether the new chain refers to the same principal, and where that correspondence is recorded, is not stated.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P3, Allows, with stated residuals:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>When the issuer of the root token marks "sub" as a pseudonym, "sub" is a keyed hash of the issuer's identifier for the principal and the root token's "jti", and "The pseudonym differs for every chain, so chains for the same Principal cannot be linked by sub" (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>; <xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). Within one chain every agent and enforcement point sees the same value, which is what P2 needs. An issuer must not place in "sub" an identifier that another issuer directed to a specific audience (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). The pseudonym is optional: "The value identifier, or absence, means that sub identifies the Principal directly" (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). Residuals stated by the draft: "A delegation chain discloses the client_id of every hop to each later hop and to the enforcement point", and per-chain "client_id" values reduce that linkability at the cost of cycle detection (<xref section="11" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>; <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>); "Anyone who holds K can link pseudonyms to Principals" (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P4, Not addressed:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>"The issuer of DT_0 can resolve the pseudonym, for example for audit or revocation" (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). Nothing states when it resolves, to whom it returns the result, or what record it keeps. The pseudonym is a keyed hash, so the issuer resolves it from a stored record of the principal for which each root token was issued, or by computing the value for each of its principals, and that record is sensitive data about principals. The issuer must protect the key and should rotate it (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>), which protects the ability to resolve without conditioning it.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P5, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>"Short lifetimes and status lists" limit the exposure of a compromised key, and a verifier should deny a chain when it cannot obtain current status for a token that carries a status claim (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). Where that status is a Token Status List shared by many tokens, the check has herd privacy (<xref section="12.1" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>). Status is per token; there is no separate check of the principal's standing.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>P6, Partial:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>"Revoking DT_i invalidates every chain through it", and a verifier should deny a chain whose status it cannot obtain "within its configured staleness bound" (<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). The bound is each verifier's configuration, not a time measured from the issuer's decision, and no value is stated. Withdrawing the principal, rather than one chain, means revoking every root token issued for it, since relying parties cannot relate the pseudonyms; that path and its bound are not stated.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>What it aims at:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Evidence at every hop that the agent before it granted the hop, with no authorization server after the root (<xref section="3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>): "This extension is for agents that delegate directly to each other" (<xref section="9" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). It is the only one of the five that keeps the principal reference equal along a chain and different between chains, and it maps the same rules onto Delegate SD-JWT (<xref section="8" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>). Its resolution sentence (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATOR-BOUND"/>) is where a stated resolution process would attach.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="first-pass-shows">
        <name>What the First Pass Shows</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>No draft provides P1 in full. The KYAPay family states the issuer and the assurance and leaves the binding to the agent optional; Agent Passport and the delegator-bound chains bind the reference to the agent's key and state no assurance for the principal.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>P2 is provided by Agent Passport and Delegate SD-JWT, and by the delegator-bound chains within a chain.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>P3 is met by the pairwise identifiers of the KYAPay family, within its single-hop scope, and allowed by the per-chain pseudonym of the delegator-bound chains, which keeps one value along a chain and a different one for each chain. The other drafts that keep the principal constant along a chain do it by identifier equality or by showing the full chain, which works against P3 across trust domains.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>P4 is met in part by the KYAPay family only: its issuer records make resolution possible, and the condition on disclosure is left to applicable law. No draft requires a published resolution process or a record of each resolution. The delegator-bound chains state that the issuer of the root token can resolve the pseudonym, and leave the condition open.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>P5 and P6 are met in part, and P5 only where a draft adopts Token Status List. None of the five bounds the principal's own standing from a stated event.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="out-of-scope">
      <name>Out of Scope</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Token formats, claim names, media types, protocols and wire encodings.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Identity-proofing methods and assurance scales.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>How a relying party decides which reference issuers to accept (trust frameworks).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The legal basis for resolution, and who may compel it.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Cryptographic constructions. Pairwise identifiers, claims transcription, commitments and anonymous credentials can each meet some of the properties; none is recommended here.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Rankings, conformance claims and recommendations of implementations.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Concentration at the issuer:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>P3 and P4 together put the ability to identify the principal at one party. Compromise or coercion of that party exposes every principal it issued for. <xref target="AIMS-PR176"/> says the same of transcription: it "concentrates the ability to identify the User at that server". A deployment can reduce this by splitting the ability to resolve between parties that must act together; the properties neither require nor exclude it.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Attested continuity is trust:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Under P2 across trust domains, a relying party relies on the transcribing party's statement that two values refer to one principal. A false statement is not detectable from the reference alone; the signed record makes it attributable.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Binding:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A principal reference that is not bound to the request and to the agent (P1, item (a)) can be replayed by another agent. The tokens of <xref target="KYAPAY-TOKEN"/> are bearer tokens unless they carry a confirmation key (<xref section="6.5" sectionFormat="of" target="KYAPAY-TOKEN"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Fail-closed status:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Where status or standing cannot be established within the stated bound, the properties assume refusal, as in <xref section="3.6" sectionFormat="of" target="WIMSE-EVAL"/>. A specification that fails open in that case does not meet P6.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Abuse of resolution:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The resolution process is itself an attack surface: false requests, overbroad grounds, social engineering of the issuer. The record that P4 requires is what makes such abuse auditable.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Herd size and list design:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>P5 depends on the number of references per list and on the issuer not issuing one list per token (<xref section="12.1" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>; <xref section="12.2" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Issuance-time observation:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A reference minted for a named audience tells the issuer the audience. This is outside P5 as stated and is to be weighed separately.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Side channels:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>IP addresses (<xref section="12.1" sectionFormat="of" target="STATUS-LIST"/>), request timing (<xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9901"/>), stable agent names (<xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="KYAPAY-TOKEN"/>) and the content of requests can link a principal across trust domains whatever the reference does.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>The resolution record:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The record that P4 requires is sensitive data about principals. Its retention period and who may access it belong in the stated resolution process.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Purpose:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>P4 limits resolution to stated grounds. Whether those grounds are acceptable is a policy question outside this document.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9068">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="V. Bertocci" initials="V." surname="Bertocci"/>
            <date month="October" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth 2.0 access tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format. Authorization servers and resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to issue and consume access tokens in an interoperable manner.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9068"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9068"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9901">
          <front>
            <title>Selective Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="K. Yasuda" initials="K." surname="Yasuda"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="November" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a mechanism for the selective disclosure
of individual elements of a JSON data structure used as the payload
of a JSON Web Signature (JWS). The primary use case is the selective
disclosure of JSON Web Token (JWT) claims.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9901"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9901"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="ID-CHAINING">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains</title>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kelley Burgin" initials="K." surname="Burgin">
              <organization>MITRE</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael J. Jenkins" initials="M. J." surname="Jenkins">
              <organization>NSA-CCSS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="19" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes a mechanism for preserving identity and
   authorization information across trust domains that use the OAuth 2.0
   Framework.  A JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization grant, obtained
   through an intra-domain OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, facilitates the
   cross-domain acquisition of an access token.  The relevant identity
   and authorization information is chained throughout the flow by being
   conveyed in the respective artifacts exchanged at each step of the
   process.  Chaining across multiple domains is achieved by using the
   same protocol every time a trust domain boundary is crossed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="STATUS-LIST">
          <front>
            <title>Token Status List (TSL)</title>
            <author fullname="Tobias Looker" initials="T." surname="Looker">
              <organization>MATTR</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Paul Bastian" initials="P." surname="Bastian">
              <organization>Bundesdruckerei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christian Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="21" month="June" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines a status mechanism called Token Status
   List (TSL), data structures and processing rules for representing the
   status of tokens secured by JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
   or CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE), such as JWT, SD-JWT,
   CBOR Web Token, and ISO mdoc.  It also defines an extension point and
   a registry for future status mechanisms.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AIMS">
          <front>
            <title>AI Identity Management System</title>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeff Lombardo" initials="J." surname="Lombardo">
              <organization>AWS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nick Steele" initials="N." surname="Steele">
              <organization>OpenAI</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document proposes best practices for authentication and
   authorization of AI agent interactions.  It leverages existing
   standards such as the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments
   (WIMSE) architecture and OAuth 2.0 family of specifications.  Rather
   than defining new protocols, this document describes how existing and
   widely deployed standards can be applied or extended to establish
   agent authentication and authorization.  By doing so, it aims to
   provide a framework within which to use existing standards, identify
   gaps and guide future standardization efforts for agent
   authentication and authorization.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KYAPAY-TOKEN">
          <front>
            <title>KYAPay Token</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a token format for agent identity and payment
   tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format.  Authorization servers and
   resource servers from different vendors can leverage this token
   format to consume identity and payment tokens in an interoperable
   manner.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KYAPAY-USING">
          <front>
            <title>Using KYAPay Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Srinivasa" initials="" surname="Srinivasa">
              <organization>Akamai</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The KYAPay Token is a JSON Web Token (JWT) that carries verified
   identity ("Know Your Agent", KYA) and payment (PAY) information for
   requests made by software agents on behalf of human principals.  This
   document describes how security intermediaries -- bot managers, fraud
   managers, account-takeover (ATO) protection systems, and customer
   identity and access management (CIAM) systems -- consume KYAPay
   tokens to answer a question that traditional bot detection cannot:
   "did a verified human authorize this agent?", rather than "is this a
   human?".  It specifies how KYAPay tokens are carried in HTTP
   requests, how they are validated (including in combination with
   request-signing layers such as HTTP Message Signatures), and how the
   verified, layered identity in a token is used to make access,
   routing, fraud detection, account-lifecycle, and step-up decisions.
   It defines the token-consuming "recipient" role that the KYAPay Token
   leaves unspecified.  It is intentionally non-prescriptive about how
   tokens are created, because agent architectures, agent-identity
   technologies, and agent-communication protocols are diverse and still
   emerging; the token itself is the interoperability contract.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KYAPAY-EXCHANGE">
          <front>
            <title>KYAPay Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire Systems Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
              <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Abhishek Hingnikar" initials="A." surname="Hingnikar">
              <organization>WorkOS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeffrey Hickman" initials="J." surname="Hickman">
              <organization>Ory</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes how KYAPay tokens can be exchanged for
   OAuth access tokens to dynamically grant agents access to resources
   they need to accomplish their mission.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGENT-PASSPORT">
          <front>
            <title>Agent Passports and Delegation Receipts for Autonomous Software Agents</title>
            <author fullname="Ben Le" initials="B." surname="Le">
              <organization>Redthread Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Autonomous software agents call APIs, tools and other agents on
   behalf of people and organisations.  A party receiving such a call
   today can usually learn only that some bearer credential was
   presented.  It cannot learn which organisation is accountable for the
   agent, which model, configuration and tools the agent is running, on
   whose behalf it is acting, or whether any of that has changed since
   it was approved.

   This document defines two signed objects and how they travel on HTTP
   requests.  An Agent Passport binds an agent's public key to its
   accountable controller and to a digest of its build.  A Delegation
   Receipt records one step of authority passing from a principal,
   through a delegator, to an agent; a chain of receipts can only narrow
   that authority.  Requests carry both, and are signed with the agent's
   key using HTTP Message Signatures, so a relying party can check,
   without contacting the issuer per request, who the agent is, what it
   is running, on whose behalf it acts and what it may do.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-le-agent-passport-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATE-SD-JWT">
          <front>
            <title>Delegate SD-JWT</title>
            <author fullname="Gareth Oliver" initials="G." surname="Oliver">
              <organization>Google</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christian Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies an extension to Selective Disclosure JSON Web
   Tokens [RFC9901] to support further delegation from the Holder to a
   Delegate Holder.  This is done by allowing the Key Binding JWT to
   also be an SD-JWT, optionally with its own Key Binding.  This has
   particular applicability to Agentic systems.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WIMSE-EVAL">
          <front>
            <title>Verifier-Side Evaluation Semantics for Delegated Authority Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Wes Jackson" initials="W." surname="Jackson">
         </author>
            <date day="28" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Delegation chain specifications describe the shape of conveyed
   authority.  They leave the verifier's half of the exchange
   underdetermined.  Two verifiers can check the same chain, both report
   success, and enforce different policy.  This document states what a
   verifier must do: the explicit inputs evaluation depends on, how
   those inputs behave when their sources are stale or unavailable, and
   four rules that keep evaluation fail-closed.  The rules are drawn
   from the Grant &amp; Autonomy Lifecycle (GAL) and Provenance &amp; Trust
   Context (PTC) specifications and from a public reference
   implementation.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-jackson-wimse-evaluation-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ACCOUNTABILITY-COMPOSITION">
          <front>
            <title>Agent Accountability: Composition and Conformance</title>
            <author fullname="Steven Mih" initials="S." surname="Mih">
              <organization>Action State Group, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Tom Sato" initials="" surname="Sato">
              <organization>MyAuberge K.K.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Iman Schrock" initials="I." surname="Schrock">
              <organization>EMILIA Protocol, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Songbo Bu" initials="S." surname="Bu">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Anton Sokolov" initials="A." surname="Sokolov">
              <organization>Tyche Institute</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Autonomous and semi-autonomous software agents increasingly take
   consequential actions across administrative and trust domains.
   Holding such an action accountable — to a regulator, auditor, or
   counterparty who does not trust the operator — requires answering
   several questions, each answerable by an independently-verifiable
   profile: whether the agent was permitted to act (CAN), which
   accountable human authorized the specific action (WHO), what outcome
   the agent system recorded and what is known to have crossed the
   effect boundary (WHAT), and whether the runtime enforced correctly
   (AUDIT).

   This document specifies, in Informational terms, how such profiles
   compose — by a shared action-digest, each verifying independently —
   and defines a shared conformance-vector suite against which any
   profile may be tested.  It complements existing audit-architecture
   and record-format work rather than replacing it, reusing existing
   signing, transport, and transparency mechanisms.  Its focus is an
   assurance tier those documents leave open: most agent records today
   are self-attested by an interested party; this document makes
   reachable and testable an anchored, third-party-verifiable tier, in
   which a record is registered to a transparency service (SCITT) so a
   party who trusts neither the agent nor the operator can verify it.
   Self-attestation remains a valid baseline; convergence on the
   disinterested tier — by any conforming profile — is the goal, not a
   single mandated format.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mih-sato-agent-accountability-composition-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AUDIT-ARCH">
          <front>
            <title>An Architecture for Auditing Agent Delegation and Interactions</title>
            <author fullname="Mirja Kühlewind" initials="M." surname="Kühlewind">
              <organization>Ericsson</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="7" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes an architecture for auditing of agent-driven
   interactions on the Internet.  Autonomous and semi-autonomous
   software agents, including those based on artificial intelligence,
   increasingly act on behalf of users, organizations, and services.
   Existing auditing mechanisms often capture isolated system events but
   do not consistently represent delegation relationships, user intent,
   or evolving authorization.  In agent-driven systems, auditability
   requires linking intent, delegation, authorization, and execution.
   The proposed architecture enables this through distributed audit
   record generation, propagation of audit context, optional
   attestation, and additional logging for transparency.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AUTHZ-INFO-SHARING">
          <front>
            <title>Cross-Domain AuthZ Information sharing for Agents</title>
            <author fullname="Jean Diaconu" initials="J." surname="Diaconu">
              <organization>Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Marcelo Yannuzzi" initials="M." surname="Yannuzzi">
              <organization>Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hervé Muyal" initials="H." surname="Muyal">
              <organization>Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Frank Brockners" initials="F." surname="Brockners">
              <organization>Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nik Kale" initials="N." surname="Kale">
              <organization>Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ankit Agarwal" initials="A." surname="Agarwal">
              <organization>Skyfire, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeffrey Hickman" initials="J." surname="Hickman">
              <organization>Ory Corp, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Amritha Lal" initials="A." surname="Lal">
              <organization>Amazon Web Services</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="4" month="August" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Distributed Multi-Agent Systems consist of Agents and MCP Servers
   operating across multiple administrative domains, each with its own
   Identity Providers (IdPs) and Authorization Servers (AS).

   This document discusses the challenges and solution approaches for
   sharing authorization information securely and flexibly across
   domains, including the use of dynamic identity, interoperable claims,
   and verifiable credentials.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-diaconu-agents-authz-info-sharing-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATION-CHAIN">
          <front>
            <title>Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Rafael Asor" initials="R." surname="Asor">
              <organization>Attenu</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI agents increasingly delegate tasks to other agents.  Each
   delegation should convey only a subset of the delegating party's
   authority, that subset should be bounded in scope, magnitude, and
   time, and any enforcement point should be able to verify -- offline,
   with no call to an authorization server -- that a token presented at
   hop N carries authority no greater than the token at hop N-1, back to
   a trusted root, and that every hop acts under the same accountable
   principal.  OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) models two-party
   delegation and records prior actors in a nested "act" claim, but that
   claim is informational only and cannot enforce attenuation across a
   chain of depth two or more.  This document defines the Agent
   Delegation Chain: a profile of OAuth 2.0 JWT access tokens (RFC 9068)
   that carries authority as Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396),
   binds the chain to one principal and names the agent acting at each
   hop, links each delegation to its parent by a cryptographic byte-
   commitment, and specifies a deterministic offline verification
   algorithm that enforces monotonic attenuation, bounded depth,
   monotonic expiry, and principal invariance.  It reuses existing JOSE,
   proof-of-possession (RFC 9449), and status-list machinery (the OAuth
   Status List draft) and introduces no new cryptography.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CREDENTIAL-DELEGATION">
          <front>
            <title>Credential Delegation Protocol for AI Agents in Multi-System Environments</title>
            <author fullname="Kieran Sweeney" initials="K." surname="Sweeney">
         </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Autonomous AI agents increasingly require access to protected
   resources across multiple service providers on behalf of human users.
   Existing OAuth 2.0 extensions address individual aspects of this
   problem (token exchange, proof-of-possession, and structured
   authorization) but no current specification defines how these
   mechanisms compose into a coherent credential delegation framework
   for AI agents.

   This document specifies the Credential Delegation Protocol: a profile
   of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), Demonstrating Proof-of-
   Possession (RFC 9449), Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396), and
   Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (OpenID Connect CIBA)
   that enables human users to delegate scoped, attenuated credentials
   to AI agents operating across heterogeneous service providers.

   The protocol defines: agent identity lifecycle management using
   ephemeral key pairs; capability-shaped delegation tokens bound to
   specific operations and resources; credential wrapping semantics that
   prevent exposure of underlying OAuth tokens to agents; consent-gated
   delegation flows for asynchronous agents; real-time cascading
   revocation; and tamper-evident audit chains.

   This document does not define new token formats, new OAuth grant
   types, or modifications to existing authorization server behavior.
   It specifies how existing mechanisms are combined to achieve secure,
   auditable credential delegation for AI agents.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sweeney-wimse-credential-delegation-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGENT-MANDATE">
          <front>
            <title>Verifiable Mandates for Agents Acting Across Administrative Domains</title>
            <author fullname="Claudiu Hulea" initials="C." surname="Hulea">
              <organization>Braincap SRL</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines how a relying party in one administrative
   domain validates the mandate under which a software agent, including
   an AI agent, acts for a principal in another domain.  Its distinctive
   element is evidence of the delegator's authority: a statement from an
   authority source about which permissions the person or entity
   granting the mandate may delegate to agents, kept separate from the
   statement that the mandate was granted.  The document specifies the
   mandate format with precisely defined limit semantics, a
   deterministic validation procedure driven by an explicit validation
   profile and kept separate from the relying party's authorization
   decision, the attribution of every validated claim to the issuer and
   role that asserted it, rules for enforcing the mandate after token
   exchange, and the boundary between this protocol and a trust
   framework.  It reuses JSON Web Tokens, OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, Rich
   Authorization Requests, WIMSE workload credentials and HTTP Message
   Signatures, Token Status Lists, and Entity Attestation Tokens.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-hulea-wimse-agent-mandate-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ATTENUATING-TOKENS">
          <front>
            <title>Attenuating Authorization Tokens for Agentic Delegation Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Niki Aimable" initials="N." surname="Aimable">
              <organization>Tenuo</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="26" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines Attenuating Authorization Tokens (AATs), a
   signed credential format for task-scoped delegation in AI agent
   systems.  An AAT encodes the tools an agent may invoke and the
   argument constraints that apply to those invocations.  A token holder
   authorized to delegate can derive a token offline with equal or
   narrower authority, subject to the parent token's depth and lifetime
   limits.  The resulting delegation chain is verifiable offline by any
   enforcement point that has the root issuer's trust anchor key.

   This specification profiles the OAuth Rich Authorization Requests
   format (RFC 9396) for tool-level capability claims, adds delegation-
   chain claims, and defines a core constraint vocabulary for argument
   restrictions.  The chain verification algorithm authenticates each
   delegation step and enforces monotonic attenuation without network
   contact with the root issuer.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGENT-SD-CARD">
          <front>
            <title>Agent SD-Card: Selective Disclosure of Agent Metadata for Discovery and Authentication</title>
            <author fullname="Suhas Nandakumar" initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Cullen Fluffy Jennings" initials="C. F." surname="Jennings">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="31" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines SD-Card, an SD-JWT encoding of AI agent
   metadata that lets an agent reveal to each verifier only the
   capabilities, endpoints, and security requirements it is authorized
   to see, while the verifier can check that they are authentic and
   issuer-attested.  SD-Card keeps agent metadata confidential; it does
   not make agents anonymous.  The document specifies the SD-Card data
   model, issuance, discovery, and key-bound presentation, and defines
   bindings for the Model Context Protocol (MCP), the Personal Agent
   Protocol (PAP), and the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-agent-sd-card-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATOR-BOUND">
          <front>
            <title>Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents</title>
            <author fullname="Suhas Nandakumar" initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Cullen Fluffy Jennings" initials="C. F." surname="Jennings">
              <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="16" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Attenuated delegation chains let a verifier check, without contacting
   any server, that no hop of a chain of AI agents holds more authority
   than the root granted.  They do not show that each hop was granted by
   the agent before it: a child token can be signed by any key the
   verifier accepts.  This document defines an extension that requires
   each child token to be signed with the key that its parent token
   confirms, so that every hop provably granted the next, with no
   authorization server in the path.  The extension also defines a per-
   chain pseudonym for the principal, a rule that rejects chains in
   which an agent appears twice, a rule that keeps a child's audience
   within its parent's, and a claim that binds a chain to the dialog or
   transaction it was issued for.  The extension builds on an existing
   attenuated delegation token format and can be mapped to other
   chained-token formats.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AIMS-PR176" target="https://github.com/ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-aims/pull/176">
          <front>
            <title>Add privacy text on correlation and user identity in delegation chains</title>
            <author initials="N." surname="Kale" fullname="Nik Kale">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="09"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="GitHub" value="ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-aims pull request 176"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KYAPAY-PR72" target="https://github.com/skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token/pull/72">
          <front>
            <title>Add an Issuer Records section</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Agarwal" fullname="Ankit Agarwal">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="08"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="GitHub" value="skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token pull request 72"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KYAPAY-EXCHANGE-ISSUE10" target="https://github.com/skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange/issues/10">
          <front>
            <title>Sub-agent delegation: exchanging an agent's KYAPay token for a sub-agent's token at the issuer</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Agarwal" fullname="Ankit Agarwal">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="07"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="GitHub" value="skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange issue 10"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 451?>

<section anchor="not-evaluated">
      <name>Drafts Not Evaluated in This Revision</name>
      <t>The following drafts address agent delegation or agent identity and are candidates for a later revision. They are listed here so that their absence from <xref target="evaluation"/> is not read as a judgment.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><xref target="AUTHZ-INFO-SHARING"/>, draft-diaconu-agents-authz-info-sharing-01;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="DELEGATION-CHAIN"/>, draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="CREDENTIAL-DELEGATION"/>, draft-sweeney-wimse-credential-delegation-02;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="AGENT-MANDATE"/>, draft-hulea-wimse-agent-mandate-01;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="ATTENUATING-TOKENS"/>, draft-niyikiza-oauth-attenuating-agent-tokens-02;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="AGENT-SD-CARD"/>, draft-nandakumar-agent-sd-card-00.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
  </back>
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