Internet-Draft Acts-For November 2026
Morrison Expires 24 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-morrison-acts-for-04
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
B. Morrison
Alter Meridian Pty Ltd

Acts-For: Signing In to a Website with a ~handle, for a Person or an Agent Acting for One

Abstract

Acts-For lets a person sign in to any website with the ~handle they already hold, and lets an AI agent sign in or register at that website on the person's behalf. Neither needs a username, a password or an account per site. A website joins by publishing one DNS record. A person signs in through a standard OpenID Connect authorization code flow and the site receives a short-lived token naming the person by a number unique to that site. An agent obtains a short-lived pass from the issuer over the Model Context Protocol and presents it to the site. The pass names the same per-site number, the agent's ~handle, a number and key the agent has for that site, and the limits the person set. The site checks it against a published key without contacting the issuer.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Most websites ask a person to register with a username, a password and an email address to confirm. Single sign-on from a large provider removes the password but ties the person to that provider, and each site registers with each provider it accepts. OpenID Connect can already give each site its own identifier for a person ([OIDC], Section 8.1). An agent that has to place an order or book a table for a person at a site the person has no account with either holds the person's password, which it should never be given, or stops and hands the task back. An authorization code grant to the agent ([AIMS], Section 10.5.1) needs the person to hold an account at that site first.

Under Acts-For the person signs in with a ~handle they already hold ([MCPDNS], Section 2). A website that wants to accept it publishes one DNS record. That record proves the site controls its domain and registers the site as a client in the same step. From then on:

Out of scope are how a person obtains a ~handle, how the person grants authority to an agent (only the grant's effect on the pass is specified here), payment, anything the site does after sign-in, and a seller with no domain of its own. [FEDRES] resolves such a seller through a registry in place of DNS.

1.1. Relationship to IETF Work

This is an Independent Submission and is not a standard. It specifies one Issuer's profile, published so that Sites and Agents can interoperate with that Issuer and so that another Issuer can implement the same. Person sign-in is OpenID Connect [OIDC] with pairwise subjects. To that the document adds a DNS enrolment step and a single-hop pass for an Agent.

Working-group documents stand on the same ground. In OAuth these are token exchange and its act claim [RFC8693], key confirmation [RFC8747], DPoP [RFC9449], identity chaining [IDCHAIN] and client ID metadata documents [CIMD]. Web Bot Auth [WBA] covers request signing for automated traffic, and WIMSE [AIMS] covers agent identity. Each place where this document relies on one of them cites it.

The Site record sits at a label of its own and is not the envelope of [MCPDNS], by the same author, whose _alter record requires a signed zone (Section 4).

Section 8 says what the profile adds over those documents.

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

~handle:

An identifier as defined in [MCPDNS], Section 2, with the grammar of handle-name in [ALTERURI], Section 3.3, and the tiers of [IDCOMMITS], Section 3. The tier is read from the lexical form alone: a trailing .bot is the Bot tier, a leading cc- is the Instrument tier, and anything else is the Sovereign tier. Where this document names a ~handle as a reference it is written as an alter: URI [ALTERURI], as [MCPDNS] does.

Person:

A human who holds a Sovereign-tier ~handle. Where an Agent signs in for a Person, the Person is the original principal in the sense of [AGENTPROTO], Section 6.2.1.

Agent:

Software acting for a Person under scoped delegation, holding its own signing key and its own Bot-tier ~handle ([IDCOMMITS], Section 3). An Instrument-tier ~handle is never an Agent under this document, because it has no envelope of its own and is not an independent principal ([ALTERURI], Section 3.4).

Site:

A website that accepts sign-in under this document. Its operator is the Site owner.

Site handle:

The Sovereign-tier ~handle a Site receives when its record verifies (Section 4.4).

Issuer:

The service that authenticates the Person, issues tokens and passes, and publishes the keys that verify them. In the deployment described in Section 9 this is ~alter.

Site record:

The DNS TXT record of Section 4.

Per-site subject:

The identifier the Issuer gives a Person for one Site (Section 5.3).

Acts-for pass:

The token an Agent presents to a Site (Section 6.2).

Pass-signing key:

The Issuer's Ed25519 key that signs acts-for passes, published at the Issuer's /.well-known/alter-keys.json (Section 6.2).

Collective:

A Site handle held by more than one Person (Section 4.4).

3. Overview

 Site                DNS              Issuer             Person / Agent
     |                |                  |                     |
     | 1. publish _alter-site record     |                     |
     |--------------->|                  |                     |
     | 2. verify      |                  |                     |
     |---------------------------------->|                     |
     |                | 3. read record   |                     |
     |                |<-----------------|                     |
     |   4. Site registered as a client  |                     |
     |<----------------------------------|                     |
     |                                   |                     |
     |  Person: 5. click, passkey, consent (OIDC + PKCE)       |
     |<------------------------------------------------------->|
     |  6. ID token, sub = per-site subject                    |
     |                                                         |
     |  Agent: 7. ask for an acts-for pass over MCP            |
     |                                   |<--------------------|
     |  8. present pass with a DPoP proof by the Agent's key   |
     |<--------------------------------------------------------|
     |  9. verify pass against the Issuer's published key      |
Figure 1: Acts-For in one picture

Steps 1 to 4 happen once per Site, done by the Site owner. Steps 5 and 6 are the Person signing in. Steps 7 to 9 are an Agent signing in for the Person.

4. The Site Record

4.1. Location and Format

A Site joins by publishing one TXT record at the label _alter-site prepended to its domain [RFC8552]:

_alter-site.riverbakery.example. IN TXT
  "v=altersite1; h=~riverbakery.example; pk=ed25519:<key>;
   ts=<unix-seconds>; rev=<digest>; sig=<signature>"

Fields are written as [MCPDNS], Section 7.2, writes the fields of its envelope, and a reader ignores a field it does not know. The fields are:

  • v, the text altersite1;

  • h, the Site handle (Section 4.2), with its leading tilde;

  • pk, an Ed25519 public key [RFC8032] generated on the Site owner's device. The private key MUST NOT leave that device;

  • ts, the time the record was signed, in Unix seconds, as the publisher states it;

  • rev, the base64url [RFC4648] SHA-256 of a revocation pre-image generated on the Site owner's device beside pk. The pre-image MUST NOT leave that device until the Site owner reveals it to revoke the record;

  • sig, the base64url Ed25519 signature under pk over the JSON canonical form [RFC8785] of the object with members v, h, domain, pk, ts and rev, where domain is the Site's domain in the form Section 4.2 gives it.

The one-time code the Issuer hands the Site owner when the claim starts is published at a label of its own, and the Site owner removes it once the record verifies:

_alter-challenge.riverbakery.example. IN TXT "code=<code>"

A separate, removable challenge label is what [DOMVERIFY] recommends and what [DNSAID], Section 5.2, does. _alter-site then holds only the long-lived record.

The Site record is not the envelope of [MCPDNS] and does not sit at its _alter label, whose records require a signed zone ([MCPDNS], Section 8). A Site that also wants its Site handle resolved as a dispatchable reference by [ALTERURI], Section 3.4, publishes that envelope at _alter as well, under the rules of [MCPDNS].

4.2. The Site Handle

The Site handle is ~ followed by the Site's domain, in lowercase, in its A-label form [RFC5890], with no trailing dot. The domain the record proves is its zone, and the Site handle's dispatchable reference carries that zone as its org-scope:

alter:~riverbakery.example@riverbakery.example

The spelling of a Site handle never establishes its zone. A party that reads ~riverbakery.example MUST NOT resolve it against the riverbakery.example zone on the strength of its characters ([ALTERURI], Section 6.9; [MCPDNS], Section 12.3). Only the verified record, or a reference that carries the zone, does.

A domain whose Site handle would not be a Sovereign-tier handle-name MUST NOT be enrolled. That excludes:

  • a domain any of whose labels begins with a digit. handle-name does not admit a leading digit, and org-scope ([ALTERURI], Section 3.3) admits no label that begins with one;

  • a domain whose first label begins with cc-, since its Site handle reads as an Instrument-tier handle;

  • a domain under the bot top-level domain, since its Site handle reads as a Bot-tier handle.

See Section 14, item 1.

4.3. Verification

The Issuer verifies a Site record when the Site owner asks it to, and MUST check all of the following:

  1. the record parses with every field of Section 4;

  2. sig verifies under pk over the input Section 4 gives, with domain the domain being claimed;

  3. h equals the ~handle being claimed;

  4. the claim started no more than seven days earlier, by the Issuer's own record of its start and the Issuer's own clock;

  5. the digest of the code at _alter-challenge equals the digest the Issuer stored when the claim started. The Issuer stores only the digest;

  6. the Issuer holds no revealed pre-image for rev.

ts is written by the publisher and is never evidence that the record is fresh. The code of step 5 shows that the record was published after the claim started.

The Issuer declares its time source and that source's uncertainty, and evaluates the window of step 4 and every expiry it sets against that uncertainty. A clock error can then only make a check refuse. Where the uncertainty exceeds the window being checked, the check refuses.

The Issuer is the one party that relies on a Site record. A Site owner revokes the record by revealing its pre-image to the Issuer. The Issuer then refuses the record and disables the Site's client. Removing the record from DNS does not revoke the client. Disabling it does, as [AGENTDNSLINK], Section 8.2, also holds for its own link record.

The Issuer acknowledges each reveal it accepts with a statement it signs, naming the rev value and the time it accepted the reveal. A Site owner who holds no acknowledgement for a reveal sent treats the reveal as not received. A reveal dropped on its way to the Issuer shows as a missing acknowledgement.

The first record to verify wins and clears every other pending claim on that domain. DNSSEC validation is reported but not required, as [DNSAID], Section 6.4, holds DNS-AID deployable without it. The Issuer reports whether it read the record over a validated path.

A Site record already published under the same pk MAY be accepted in place of a new one, without a new code, when the claimant proves possession of the matching private key. This lets a Site owner who has set up once, on the same device, add a second domain or return without editing DNS again. The record still passes steps 1 to 3 and 6. The Issuer declares, as local policy, how long after a record under that pk last verified with a code it accepts the pk this way, and past that period it asks for a new code. A pk that has never verified with a code is never accepted this way.

4.4. What Verification Produces

A verified Site record produces, in one step:

  • the Site handle (Section 4.2), owned by the Site owner's own ~handle as a sole-owned entity. An owner who does not already hold a ~handle claims one in the same flow, and the Site is paired to a Person from the start. When a second Person joins, the Site handle becomes a collective and is held under the collective's own rules. Members of a collective need not all hold the same permissions. Only the owner can change the Site's client;

  • an OAuth 2.0 client [RFC6749] for the Site. The client is public (token_endpoint_auth_method is none), its scopes are openid and profile, and its single redirect URI is one exact https address on the proven domain or its www. name, with no wildcard, port, user information or fragment.

The Site needs no separate client registration [RFC7591]. A Site that also publishes a client metadata document [CIMD] keeps it for other issuers, and this Issuer reads the Site record. A DNS host that supports [DOMAINCONNECT] can write the record and the challenge for the Site owner.

A Person who signs in to a Site, or for whom an Agent signs in, is the Site's counterparty. Sign-in never makes a Person a member of the Site handle.

5. Person Sign-In

5.1. On the Page

The Site embeds a button and a script:

<div data-alter-sign-in></div>
<script src="https://issuer.example/sign-in/v1.js"
        integrity="sha384-<hash>" crossorigin="anonymous"
        data-client-id="<client_id>"
        data-return-page="https://riverbakery.example/callback"
        data-issuer="https://issuer.example"
        data-authorize="https://issuer.example/authorize"></script>

The script is pinned by its integrity hash. A changed script is published at a new path.

5.2. The Flow

The flow is the OpenID Connect authorization code flow [OIDC] with PKCE [RFC7636], method S256, a one-time state and a nonce. The Person confirms with a passkey at the Issuer, and the Issuer MUST require user verification [WEBAUTHN]. That one gesture is two factors, the device held and the fingerprint, face or PIN that unlocks it. The Issuer MUST ask for it on every sign-in to a Site, including when the Person already has a session at the Issuer. At the consent step the Person MAY switch on sharing their ~handle, their email, or both. These travel as the scopes handle and email, and only the consent step can add them. email is the scope of [OIDC], Section 5.4. Neither scope carries an alter: prefix, because a scope token with one would read as an alter: URI [ALTERURI], and a scope is not one.

The Site receives:

  • an ID token, signed RS256 [RFC7518] by the Issuer, with iss the Issuer, aud the client identifier, a lifetime of one hour, sub the per-site subject (Section 5.3), verified set to yes, the same band the acts-for pass carries (Section 6.2), and handle and email only where the Person switched them on. email and email_verified are the claims of [OIDC], Section 5.1. handle carries the Person's ~handle in the bare form of [MCPDNS], Section 7.3.2. auth_time is the time of the passkey confirmation for this sign-in, never the time the token was minted, and amr [RFC8176] lists the methods that confirmation used;

  • an opaque access token, valid for 600 seconds, accepted only at the userinfo endpoint. No refresh token is issued. It suits one read of userinfo at sign-in.

The Site MUST verify the ID token's signature against the Issuer's published JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517] before acting on it. Checking iss, aud, exp and nonce in the browser is not enough.

A sub the Site has seen before is a returning Person. A sub it has not seen is a new Person, and the Site opens the account from this sign-in with no registration form.

5.3. The Per-Site Subject

The per-site subject is a pairwise identifier in the sense of [OIDC], Section 8.1. It is the lowercase base32 [RFC4648] encoding of the first 20 bytes of an HMAC-SHA256 [RFC2104], keyed by an Issuer secret, over a fixed label, the Person's internal identifier and the Site's domain, each prefixed by its length as a four-byte big-endian integer.

The domain is normalised once before use, and the same normalised form is the pass's aud. It is lowercased, one trailing dot is removed, it is taken in its A-label form [RFC5890], and then one leading www. is removed. The fold is applied exactly once, because it is not idempotent: www.www.example names the Site www.example.

The per-site subject never begins with ~ and can never be read as a ~handle.

A Person has the same subject at a Site whether they sign in themselves or an Agent signs in for them. At different Sites they have different subjects, and two Sites cannot join their records by subject.

The Issuer computes the per-site subject. The Person cannot derive it, because the key is the Issuer's, and the Person neither holds nor presents it. The Person holds no copy of it. Sign-in recomputes the subject each time and does not read it from a store. It comes out the same after a change of device or on a clean browser. The Issuer learns the domain of each Site it computes a subject for (Section 11). The pass names the Person by this per-site number and by no other identifier of the Person, and names the Agent's key for the Site separately (Section 6.2). Sites can still join by the Agent's ~handle and by the grant address (Section 11).

6. Agent Sign-In

6.1. Asking for a Pass

An Agent that holds a grant from its Person calls the MCP [MCP] tool alter_sign_in at the Issuer, naming the Site's domain. The Issuer checks that the grant exists, is in force and covers that Site, then returns an acts-for pass. The Issuer MUST refuse an Agent whose ~handle is not Bot-tier.

The Agent signs this call with the one long-lived key it holds at the Issuer. A Site never receives that key. The call names a separate public key for the Site. The pass confirms that key, and the Agent proves it at each request to that Site with a DPoP proof (Section 6.3). An Agent SHOULD use a different key at each Site, for the reason [POPPY] gives for its delegated keys.

Issuing a pass is in effect a token exchange at the Issuer. The Agent presents its own credential and a grant and receives a token for one audience. The Agent asks over MCP because that is where it already reaches the Issuer. An Issuer MAY also issue the pass at its token endpoint, as a token exchange [RFC8693] carrying the same inputs. [ACTORBOUND] profiles such an exchange for a token bound to the actor's key.

alter_sign_in is a tool surface name in the sense of [TOOLNAMES]; see Section 12.

6.2. The Acts-For Pass

The pass is a CBOR Web Token [RFC8392] in a COSE_Sign1 structure [RFC9052], algorithm EdDSA [RFC8032], signed by the Issuer's pass-signing key. It carries the registered claims iss (1), sub (2), aud (3), exp (4), iat (6) and cti (7), and nbf (5) where present, and the following claims under Private Use keys, below -65536 as [RFC8392], Section 9.1 allows:

profile (-65537):

the text alter-site-pass-v0. A verifier MUST refuse a pass whose profile it does not know.

grant (-65538):

the 32-byte content address of the grant the pass was issued under.

bands (-65539):

a map of band name to text label. A pass carries {"verified": "yes"}, meaning the Issuer checked at issue the Person's hold on the ~handle the subject is computed for. It asserts nothing else about the Person. No number is ever a band value.

act (-65540):

the Agent, with the meaning of the act claim of [RFC8693], Section 4.1. It is a map of sub, a number for the Agent at this Site computed as in Section 5.3 under a different fixed label over the Agent's internal identifier and the Site's domain, and handle, its Bot-tier ~handle in the bare form of [MCPDNS], Section 7.3.2. act has no CWT claim key in [CWTREG]. It sits under a Private Use key here until one is registered (Section 12).

may_tools (-65541):

an array of the tool surface names the Agent may use at this Site.

valid_until (-65542):

the end of the grant, in Unix seconds.

max_value (-65543):

optional, an ordered limit, a map of amount, a decimal string, and currency, a code, with the comparison given below.

The pass also carries the registered claim cnf (8) [RFC8747] with the jkt confirmation method of [CWTREG], the JWK SHA-256 thumbprint [RFC7638] of the Agent's key for this Site. That is the value the jkt confirmation method of [RFC9449], Section 6.1, carries. For an Ed25519 key the thumbprint input is the members crv, kty and x ([RFC8037], Section 2). may_tools, valid_until and max_value are claims of their own, since [RFC8693], Section 4.1, holds non-identity claims inside act not meaningful.

The claims have these values:

  • iss is the Issuer's https URL, the same value as the iss of the ID token of Section 5;

  • sub is the per-site subject of the Person at this Site, and is never a ~handle;

  • aud is the Site's domain, normalised as in Section 5.3, and a Site refuses a pass whose aud is not its own (Section 6.3);

  • exp is at most 300 seconds after iat and never later than valid_until.

act and cnf MUST appear together. A pass presented without both MUST be refused. The pass MUST NOT carry the Person's ~handle or email; those reach a Site only through the ID token of Section 5.

max_value is optional, and the Site reads it. Carrying it discloses the Person's limit to every Site the pass is presented to, and Section 11 gives the risk. [DSDJWT], Section 4.1, defines selective disclosure for the claims of a delegate payload, and its Section 8.2 places delegation constraints in visible claims. This document makes the same choice. In [INTENTTOKEN], Section 3.1, the token that can carry budget limits (Section 3.3) is exchanged at an authorization server and is not intended to be presented directly to a resource server. The limit rides in the pass because a Site that never sees the grant can then check each act against it offline. The pass discloses the limit whole or not at all, and an Issuer that has no need to show it leaves it out (Section 11).

max_value is compared as follows. An act is within the limit when its amount, in the same currency, is no greater than amount, the two compared as decimal numbers. An act in another currency is not within it, and no exchange rate is applied. The limit is measured per act and is not totalled across acts. This follows the per-action measurement of the "max" type of [ASOR], Section 4.2. [BOUNDEDWORK], Section 3.8, finds that authorization details have no standardized comparison. This paragraph states one for this limit only.

The pass is a single-hop artefact, from a Person to one Site, and starts no delegator-bound chain [CHAINS]. Its sub is directed to one Site and is never copied into a token issued downstream, as [AAUTH], Section 10.1.1.2, says of a directed sub. [ACTORPROFILE], Section 3.2, keeps one sub for a whole chain, the "Subject whose authorization is exercised". [CHAINS], Section 4, forbids an issuer to place in sub an identifier that another issuer directed to a specific audience, such as a pairwise subject identifier, and gives a per-chain pseudonym as the published form where a chain needs a subject. An Agent that hands work to another Agent does not pass its pass on. The second Agent asks the Issuer for a pass under a grant of its own from the Person. Narrowing authority along a chain belongs to chain formats ([ACTORPROFILE], [DSDJWT], [ASOR]) and to the per-hop allowance of [CROSSOWNER], requirement XO-3, and is outside this document.

In grant the pass carries the grant's address alone, with neither the grant itself nor its approval-act record. The record travels beside the grant, in a wrapper object or an Approval-Record header ([APPROVALREC], Section 3.1), and a verifier takes it from whoever holds the grant. This document does not say how that holder is found. A consent grant of [CONSENT], Section 5.2, is one form a grant can take, with grant as the grant_ref of its Section 5.3. A record of an act cites the grant address as the standing authority behind the act, since the address outlives the pass. The pass is gone 300 seconds after issue, and the grant has to be kept for longer than that. An audit trail of the kind in [AUDITARCH], Section 7.4, records a user approval as a change of authorization state, and it can cite the address for the authority in force.

A pass is bounded in time by exp, and each act under it is bounded by max_value. Nothing in this document makes a pass single use. It carries cti, and no step of Section 6.3 checks it. A pass can therefore cover more than one act in its life, each within the limit, with no total across them. [ASOR], Section 4.2, says that its per-action "max" aggregates nothing and that a bound over a token's life needs a running total held where actions are authorized. The pass carries no such bound. The Site sets the amount of each act and is the party that applies the limit. Requirement B2-6 of [UCREQ], Section 4.3, asks for authorisation at the granularity of a specific operation. The pass narrows toward it by its limits and its short life and does not meet it. The pass tells a Site nothing of the Person's acknowledgement of a particular act. The binding-moment envelope [BME] approves one specific operation and carries that acknowledgement.

The ID token is signed RS256 under the Issuer's JSON Web Key Set, the algorithm every OpenID Provider supports ([OIDC], Section 15.1). The pass is signed EdDSA under the separate pass-signing key. The keys stay separate, and a Site that only signs people in never fetches the pass-signing key.

Private Use keys are not interoperable between issuers until the claims they carry are registered (Section 12).

6.3. Presenting and Checking the Pass

The Agent presents the pass in the Authorization header under the DPoP scheme [RFC9449], the pass encoded in base64url [RFC4648], with a DPoP proof made with its key for this Site. The proof's ath is the hash of that encoded pass. The Site MUST:

  1. refuse a pass whose iss is not the https URL of an Issuer it accepts, and verify the pass under that Issuer's Ed25519 pass-signing key, published at /.well-known/alter-keys.json [RFC8615] on the origin iss names;

  2. check profile, check that aud is its own domain normalised as in Section 5.3, and refuse the pass at or past exp, as [RFC8392], Section 3.1.4 and [RFC7519], Section 4.1.4 require. The Site evaluates exp against a declared time source and uncertainty, as the Issuer does in Section 4.3;

  3. check the DPoP proof as [RFC9449], Section 4.3, requires, and check that the JWK thumbprint of the proof's key equals the jkt in cnf. A pass presented without a valid proof MUST be refused, since the pass alone is a bearer token;

  4. refuse an act unless the Site has mapped it to a tool surface name listed in may_tools, and refuse an act whose amount is not within max_value as compared in Section 6.2.

A grant carried in a header as a bearer token can be replayed by anyone who copies it. The pass cannot be used without a DPoP proof by the key its cnf names, and it expires 300 seconds after issue at the latest.

The Site then treats sub as it would after a Person sign-in. A subject it has seen before is a returning Person. A new one is a Person the Agent has just registered.

No token exchange happens at the Site, and the Site does not call the Issuer.

6.4. Answering for an Act

A record of an act cites the grant address (Section 6.2) and the Person's per-site subject. It never keeps the pass, since the pass has lapsed by then. Only the Issuer can resolve the subject to the Person, since only it holds the key the subject is computed from and the record of which Person it was computed for (Section 5.3). The grant address also resolves at whoever holds the grant (Section 6.2).

The Issuer MUST NOT resolve a per-site subject or a grant address to the Person for anyone, the Site included, unless the Person agrees to that resolution. An agreement covers the one resolution it was given for and no other. What a Site learns at sign-in is unchanged (Section 5). How the Issuer obtains the Person's agreement, and how a resolution compelled by law is handled, are Section 14, item 3.

The Person can withdraw a grant at any time. The Issuer MUST refuse to issue a pass under a withdrawn grant. A pass already issued lapses at its exp. No Site therefore holds a valid pass under a grant more than 300 seconds after the Issuer records its withdrawal.

7. Returning and Recovery

A Site owner who loses the device holding the Site key proves the domain again by publishing a new record. Proving a domain again signs its owner straight back in only where the business account has no confirmed email; otherwise the way back is a link sent to that email. Proving a domain never signs anyone in to an account holding a personal ~handle, because proving a domain proves the business alone.

A Site handle whose owner leaves without handing it over becomes dormant. Proving its domain again revives it only after a wait in which the former owner, or any member, can object. Revival is never immediate, because control of a domain's DNS does not show who ran the Site.

Recovery for a Person who loses a passkey, or the platform account that syncs it, is outside this document. It covers sign-in and not the recovery of an account at the Issuer. A grant does not follow a Person whose identifier at the Issuer changes, and the Person grants again, as [SCIMSUPER], Section 8, requires of a supersession event.

8. What This Adds

The parts exist. OpenID Connect gives pairwise subjects ([OIDC], Section 8.1). Token exchange names an actor in act [RFC8693]. Key confirmation binds a token to a key [RFC8747], and DPoP has the client prove that key at each request [RFC9449]. A client ID metadata document registers a client at an https URL [CIMD].

[CIMD] lets a client use an Issuer it has never registered with, by a document at an https URL that can carry the client's key ([CIMD], Section 5). [RFC7591] needs a call to each provider. [AGENTDNSLINK] links an agent's DNS name to its OAuth client with one TXT record that carries no key and names no handle. Under Acts-For a Site joins by publishing one DNS record carrying a key its owner made on their own device, and the same record is the Site's public ~handle.

An authorization code grant reaches an Agent only at a Site where the Person already has an account. Under Acts-For an Agent signs in, as the Person's Agent, at a Site where the Person has none, and the Site checks the pass offline. The Site never calls the Issuer and needs no relationship with the Agent.

The pass carries the Agent in act and its key in cnf, as [RFC8693] and [RFC8747] define them, and a request proves the key by DPoP [RFC9449].

9. Implementation Status

Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, per [RFC7942].

~alter has implemented the Site record and Person sign-in in a test deployment. As of 19 October 2026:

That deployment publishes the Site record of draft-morrison-acts-for-03, at _alter. The record of Section 4, at _alter-site, is not yet implemented.

As of 20 November 2026, the Issuer also implements alter_sign_in and the acts-for pass of Section 6. They are not publicly available. The built pass still carries the earlier acting and cnf_jkt claims, and presentation with a DPoP proof is not yet implemented. No Site has yet verified a pass outside the Issuer's own testing, and no Issuer other than ~alter implements any part of this document.

10. Security Considerations

This section follows [RFC3552]. In scope are:

Out of scope are:

A Site relies on the Issuer's statement that a grant exists and covers it. The pass carries no key of the Person. An Issuer that is compromised or dishonest can mint a pass for any per-site subject and any Agent, and no Site can detect it from the pass. A party holding the grant and its approval-act record [APPROVALREC] can check the grant address after the fact. This document gives a Site no means to check it at sign-in.

The Site record proves domain control only. Whoever controls a domain's DNS can enrol it, including a former agency, a new registrant of a lapsed domain, or an attacker holding the DNS host login. On the code path the record proves control of the zone at the time of the claim and needs no age bound. The reuse path of Section 4.3 accepts a key without a new code, and it is bounded. It admits only a pk that has verified with a code before, within a period the Issuer declares, and only while the revocation status of the record can be established. A seller who never finished setup and still holds a key cannot use that key to claim a domain whose buyer leaves the old record in place. A former owner who verified within the period can still use the reuse path while the old record stays published, and a buyer closes it by removing that record. A Site owner whose key is lost or taken revokes the record at the Issuer (Section 4.3). For a domain that was deleted and registered again, the Issuer MUST refuse a Site record that verified before the domain's registry creation date changed, the signal [MCPDNS], Section 13.1.2, gives for a change of control. The record then needs a new code.

The Site handle spelled like a domain is a Handle-Domain Confusion surface ([ALTERURI], Section 6.9). The Issuer's consent page, and any other page of the Issuer's that shows a Site handle to a person, MUST keep its leading tilde.

A session at the Issuer is never enough to sign a Person in to a Site. A browser left signed in at the Issuer, on a shared or stolen machine, would otherwise let whoever holds it sign in as the Person at every Site. Each sign-in therefore asks for a fresh user-verified passkey (Section 5), and auth_time reports when that happened. A Site that sends max_age or prompt=login [OIDC] is always met, because every sign-in is already fresh. A Site can read amr to see how the Person confirmed. A passkey that syncs between devices can be exported, and [NIST80063B], Section 2.3.2, bars syncable authenticators at AAL3. An Issuer that needs AAL3 accepts no synced passkey.

A Site should act only on the ID token and only after checking its signature. The browser script does not check the signature and is not a substitute.

The acts-for pass is short-lived and bound to one audience. It is useless without a DPoP proof by the Agent key it names. A Site that skips the proof check turns the pass into a bearer token valid for up to five minutes.

The one-time code is stored only as a digest. A claimant can satisfy only their own pending code and cannot replace another claimant's.

11. Privacy Considerations

The per-site subject stops Sites joining their records by subject. It does not stop them joining by the Agent's ~handle or by the grant address. The Person's ~handle and email reach a Site only when the Person switches them on, and never through an acts-for pass. The Issuer sees every sign-in it issues for, and this protocol gives a Person no way to keep a sign-in from it. It learns the domain of each Site it computes a subject for (Section 5.3).

The pass names the Person only by a per-site number. Who answers for an act is resolved at the Issuer, and only when the Person agrees (Section 6.4). An unlinkable credential makes the opposite choice. In [MOLE], Section 2.2, a delegated agent's presentations stay unlinkable to other sessions and the site learns no stable identity. Acts-For gives a Site a stable number by which it can recognise a returning Person. It gives the Issuer the means to answer for an act when the Person agrees. A deployment that needs a Person's visits to one Site to be unlinkable needs the other design.

A Site that reads a Person's limit in max_value learns how much the Person will spend, and can use it as leverage against the Person. [STIRAGENTIC], Section 4, states REQ-9 as "The mechanism must minimize the disclosure of information about the principal, and should permit selective disclosure to different relying parties." The W3C Agentic Web charter draft [W3CCHARTER] expects its identity mechanisms to "minimize the information they disclose". An Issuer that has no need to put a limit in front of a Site leaves max_value out. The pass does not meet the second clause of REQ-9, since it offers no selective disclosure of the limit. REQ-9 names no limits. Carrying the cap is a design choice of this document. The same draft says in Section 11 that intent objects should bound dimensions such as amount and quantity, and that points toward carrying one.

[HTTP402], Section 4, observes that making a payment can link a client's requests to a payment instrument, and thereby to a person. An intermediary in front of several Sites that is also an identity provider can join per-site subjects by source address.

act.sub differs at each Site whatever key the Agent uses. An Agent that uses a different key at each Site also gives Sites different values of cnf. They cannot join their records by those. An Agent that reuses a key at two Sites lets them join by it.

The per-site subject does not stop Sites joining their records by the Agent's ~handle. act.handle is the same at every Site the same Agent signs in to. Two Sites that compare it learn that their two per-site subjects are one Person.

A grant covering several Sites gives each of them the same grant value. A record of an act cites the grant address (Section 6.2), and a grant address cited downstream links the Sites that grant covers. Where unlinkability matters, the default is a separate grant for each Site, and a Person who wants no two Sites to join by grant keeps that default.

An Agent using a different key at each Site has no key directory of the kind [WBA] describes. The DPoP proof carries the key with each request. None of this stops Sites joining their records by behaviour, network address or timing.

The Issuer holds the key the per-site subject is computed from and can compute any Person's subject at any Site.

12. IANA Considerations

This revision makes no IANA request. A revision meant for publication would need to request:

14. Open Issues

Each item below is open for the reason it gives.

  1. Which domains can become a Site handle. Section 4.2 refuses those with any label beginning with a digit, since neither handle-name nor org-scope of [ALTERURI] admits one. It also refuses those beginning with cc- or under bot, since they read as another tier. Digit-led domains are common. Admitting them is a change to [ALTERURI], and this item stays open until that document makes it. A proven www. name is folded by the per-site subject and not by the Site handle.

  2. Who in a collective can act for its Site handle, change its client, or sign in to other Sites as it, and how an agency that set up a Site hands its Site handle to the owner. Members need not all hold the same permissions. This revision does not cover an Agent acting for a collective. [GONDWANA], Section 3.2, has an organisation or role act through its own address or account with one or more accountable Humans, each accountable as if they had acted under their own identity. The rules for a collective are not yet settled by the Issuer this document describes.

  3. How the Issuer obtains the Person's agreement to a resolution (Section 6.4), and how a resolution compelled by law is recorded and made known to the Person. [PRINCIPALREFS], Section 3.4, has an issuer publish the process under which it resolves and keep a record of each resolution. This document takes no position on compelled resolution yet.

15. Applicability Limits

Passes are for regimes where a Site can reach the Issuer's published key and an Agent can reach the Issuer within the life of a pass. The 300 second cap on exp stays. A link with long delay or intermittent contact cannot carry a pass, and a longer life would widen the window in which an unsigned request is a bearer token (Section 10). Authority across such a link belongs to the security of the layer below, such as the bundle-layer security of the Bundle Protocol ([BPSAFE], Section 1.1, puts the provisioning of certificates and keys outside its scope), and to a command grant of the kind in [OTCMD], Section 3.3, verified offline against cached trust anchors as its Section 8 requires of a segmented plant. The Issuer's key may reach a Site as managed data verified out of band, and step 1 of Section 6.3 then needs no fetch. Community networks with no upstream are in the same position as links with long delay, since the key fetch and the issuance both need a live path.

16. Normative References

[RFC2104]
Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4648]
Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5890]
Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework", RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7517]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7518]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7636]
Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636, DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636>.
[RFC7638]
Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8037]
Liusvaara, I., "CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)", RFC 8037, DOI 10.17487/RFC8037, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8037>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8176]
Jones, M., Hunt, P., and A. Nadalin, "Authentication Method Reference Values", RFC 8176, DOI 10.17487/RFC8176, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8176>.
[RFC8392]
Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
[RFC8552]
Crocker, D., "Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves", BCP 222, RFC 8552, DOI 10.17487/RFC8552, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8552>.
[RFC8615]
Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
[RFC9052]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
[ALTERURI]
Morrison, B., "The 'alter' URI Scheme for Dispatchable ~handle References", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme-06, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme-06>.
[IDCOMMITS]
Morrison, B., "Identity-Attributed Git Commits via Tier-Structured Trailers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-05>.
[OIDC]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B. D., and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 2", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[WEBAUTHN]
W3C, "Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials, Level 3", , <https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/>.
[MCPDNS]
Morrison, B., "Discovery of Model Context Protocol Servers via DNS TXT Records", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery-10, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery-10>.

17. Informative References

[RFC3552]
Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC7591]
Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol", RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.
[RFC8747]
Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747>.
[RFC7942]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
Morrison, B., "Consent-Bound Identity Disclosure with Subject Settlement for HTTP-Native Agent Payments", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-consent-settlement-07, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-consent-settlement-07>.
[TOOLNAMES]
Morrison, B., "An IANA Registry for Model Context Protocol Tool Surface Names", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-mcp-tool-surface-names-registry-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-mcp-tool-surface-names-registry-03>.
[AAUTH]
Hardt, D., "AAuth Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol-11, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol-11>.
[POPPY]
Personal Agent Protocol project, "Personal Agent Protocol, draft 0.3", n.d., <https://personalagentprotocol.org/docs/0.3/spec>.
[PACE]
Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "PACE: Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-01>.
[AGENTPROTO]
Rosenberg, J., Sarker, Z., Reddy, T., Yao, K., Liu, D., and S. Krishnan, "Architecture for AI Agent Communications on the Internet", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-manyfolks-agentproto-arch-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-manyfolks-agentproto-arch-00>.
[PACT]
Valverde, G., "PACT: Private Agent Consent and Trust Profile for OAuth 2.1 and CIBA", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-valverde-oauth-pact-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-valverde-oauth-pact-00>.
[APPROVALREC]
Ashcroft, J., Morrison, B., and N. Mathews, "An Approval-Act Record for Standing Authorization Grants", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ashcroft-approval-record-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ashcroft-approval-record-00>.
[KYAOS]
KYA-OS Working Group, "KYA-OS Protocol Specification, version 1.0.0", , <https://github.com/decentralized-identity/kya-os-mcp>.
[AUTHMD]
WorkOS, "auth.md", , <https://github.com/workos/auth.md>.
[CIMD]
Parecki, A. and E. Smith, "OAuth Client ID Metadata Document", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-03>.
[WBA]
Meunier, T. and S. Major, "HTTP Message Signatures for Automated Traffic", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-01>.
[ATPROTO]
Bluesky Social PBC, "AT Protocol Handle Specification", n.d., <https://atproto.com/specs/handle>.
[DOMVERIFY]
Sahib, S., Huque, S., Wouters, P., Nygren, E., and T. Wicinski, "Domain Control Validation using DNS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques-13, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques-13>.
[DOMAINCONNECT]
Domain Connect, "Domain Connect", n.d., <https://www.domainconnect.org/>.
[MCP]
Model Context Protocol, "Model Context Protocol Specification", , <https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28>.
[DSDJWT]
Oliver, G. and C. Bormann, "Delegate SD-JWT", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00>.
[INTENTTOKEN]
Chen, M., Su, L., and P. C. Liu, "The Intent Token - A Credential for Delegated User Intent", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-chen-oauth-agent-intent-token-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chen-oauth-agent-intent-token-00>.
[ASOR]
Asor, R., "Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03>.
[BOUNDEDWORK]
Liu, D. and K. McGuinness, "OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00>.
[CHAINS]
Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00>.
[ACTORPROFILE]
McGuinness, K., "OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01>.
[STIRAGENTIC]
Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity for Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-peterson-stir-agentic-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-peterson-stir-agentic-00>.
[PACEAUTHZ]
Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "PACE Authorization: Delegation and Action Approval", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz-00>.
[DIALOGBIND]
Reddy, T. and Z. Sarker, "Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE and OAuth Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00>.
[SIGKEY]
Hardt, D. and T. Meunier, "HTTP Signature Keys", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hardt-httpbis-signature-key-09, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hardt-httpbis-signature-key-09>.
[HTTP402]
Nottingham, M., "The 402 (Payment Required) HTTP Status Code", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nottingham-httpbis-402-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nottingham-httpbis-402-00>.
[IDCHAIN]
Schwenkschuster, A., Kasselman, P., Burgin, K., Jenkins, M., Campbell, B., and A. Parecki, "OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17>.
[AIMS]
Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B., Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01>.
[CROSSORG]
Reece, M., "Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02>.
[DIRECTPRES]
Johansson, L., Zundel, B., and T. Cappalli, "A reference architecture for direct presentation credential flows", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-johansson-direct-presentation-arch-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-johansson-direct-presentation-arch-01>.
[ATTRIB]
Chuang, W. and E. Gustafsson, "Agent Attribution Header Fields", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-chuang-agent-attribution-header-fields-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chuang-agent-attribution-header-fields-01>.
[GONDWANA]
Gondwana, B., "We Are All Individuals", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-gondwana-we-are-all-individuals-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gondwana-we-are-all-individuals-03>.
[W3CCHARTER]
W3C, "Agentic Web Working Group Charter (draft)", , <https://w3c.github.io/charter-drafts/2026/agenticweb-wg.html>.
[EVP]
Hardt, D. and S. Goto, "Email Verification Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hardt-email-verification-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hardt-email-verification-02>.
[WBAARCH]
Meunier, T. and S. Major, "HTTP Message Signatures for automated traffic Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-meunier-web-bot-auth-architecture-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-meunier-web-bot-auth-architecture-05>.
[MOLE]
Schlesinger, S., Jackson, D., and T. Meunier, "Moderation of unLinkable Endorsements (MOLE) Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-jms-mole-architecture-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jms-mole-architecture-01>.
[PRINCIPALREFS]
Molas, M., "Accountable Principal References for Delegated Agent Requests: Properties and Evaluation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-molas-agent-principal-refs-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-molas-agent-principal-refs-00>.
[AUDITARCH]
Kuehlewind, M. and H. Birkholz, "An Architecture for Auditing Agent Delegation and Interactions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01>.
[UCREQ]
Reddy, T., Sarker, Z., and K. Yao, "Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07>.
[BME]
Morrison, B. and C. Whiteside, "The Briefing-and-Binding Envelope: A Delivery Contract for Agent-to-Principal Decision Moments with Dual-Veto Reconciliation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-binding-moment-envelope-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-binding-moment-envelope-04>.
[OTCMD]
Morrison, B., Whiteside, C., and I. Schrock, "Authorised and Attributable Agent Authority for Operational-Technology Control Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-ot-command-authority-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-ot-command-authority-04>.
[SCIMSUPER]
Vivek, "SCIM User Supersession and Identity Resolution Correction Events", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-vivek-scim-user-supersession-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vivek-scim-user-supersession-00>.
[DNSAID]
Mozley, J., Williams, N., Sarikaya, B., Schott, R., and J. Damick, "DNS for AI Discovery", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mozleywilliams-dawn-dnsaid-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mozleywilliams-dawn-dnsaid-00>.
[FEDRES]
Raskar, R., Sharaf, S., and P. Chari, "Registry-Assisted Resolution for Known Subjects Without DNS Discovery Anchors", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution-03>.
[ACTORBOUND]
Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange with Actor-Bound Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange-00>.
[CROSSOWNER]
Curtis, J., "Cross-Owner Agent Use Cases and Requirements: Spending, Delegation Depth, Ownership, Disclosure and Retention", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-curtis-agentproto-cross-owner-usecases-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-curtis-agentproto-cross-owner-usecases-00>.
[CWTREG]
IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", n.d., <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
Shankarlingam, S., "Linking an Agent's DNS Name to its OAuth Client", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link-02>.
[BPSAFE]
Sipos, B., "Bundle Protocol (BP) Security Associations with Few Exchanges (SAFE)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-sipos-dtn-bp-safe-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sipos-dtn-bp-safe-02>.
[NIST80063B]
NIST, "Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management", NIST SP 800-63B-4, .

Appendix A. Document History

Acknowledgments

None yet.

Author's Address

Blake Morrison
Alter Meridian Pty Ltd