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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-morrison-acts-for-04" category="info" submissionType="independent" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.32.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Acts-For">Acts-For: Signing In to a Website with a ~handle, for a Person or an Agent Acting for One</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-acts-for-04"/>
    <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
      <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
      <address>
        <email>blake@truealter.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="20"/>
    <abstract>
      

<t>Acts-For lets a person sign in to any website with the ~handle they
already hold, and lets an AI agent sign in or register at that website
on the person's behalf. Neither needs a username, a password or an
account per site. A website joins by publishing
one DNS record. A person signs in through a standard OpenID Connect
authorization code flow and the site receives a short-lived token
naming the person by a number unique to that site. An agent obtains a
short-lived pass from the issuer over the Model Context Protocol and
presents it to the site. The pass names the same per-site number, the
agent's ~handle, a number and key the agent has for that site, and the
limits the person set. The site
checks it against a published key without contacting the issuer.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Most websites ask a person to register with a username, a password
and an email address to confirm. Single sign-on from a large provider
removes the password but ties the person to that provider, and each
site registers with each provider it accepts. OpenID Connect can
already give each site its own identifier for a person (<xref target="OIDC"/>,
Section 8.1). An agent that has to place an order or book a table for
a person at a site the person has no account with either holds the
person's password, which it should never be given, or stops and hands
the task back. An authorization code grant to the agent (<xref target="AIMS"/>,
Section 10.5.1) needs the person to hold an account at that site
first.</t>
      <t>Under Acts-For the person signs in with a ~handle they already hold
(<xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 2). A website that wants to accept it publishes one
DNS record. That record proves the site controls its domain and
registers the site as a client in the same step. From then on:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>a person clicks "Sign in with ~alter" and confirms with a passkey.
The site learns a number that identifies the person to that site
only. It learns the person's ~handle or email only if the person
shares them;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>an agent the person has authorised asks for a pass for that site
over MCP and presents it. The pass names the person by the same
per-site number and the agent by its ~handle and by a number and key
of its own for that site. The site then knows
who the person is to it and which agent is acting.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Out of scope are how a person obtains a ~handle, how the person grants
authority to an agent (only the grant's effect on the pass is
specified here), payment, anything the site does after sign-in, and a
seller with no domain of its own. <xref target="FEDRES"/> resolves such a seller
through a registry in place of DNS.</t>
      <section anchor="relationship">
        <name>Relationship to IETF Work</name>
        <t>This is an Independent Submission and is not a standard. It specifies
one Issuer's profile, published so that Sites and Agents can
interoperate with that Issuer and so that another Issuer can implement
the same. Person sign-in is OpenID Connect <xref target="OIDC"/> with pairwise
subjects. To that the document adds a DNS enrolment step and a
single-hop pass for an Agent.</t>
        <t>Working-group documents stand on the same ground. In OAuth these are
token exchange and its <tt>act</tt> claim <xref target="RFC8693"/>, key confirmation
<xref target="RFC8747"/>, DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/>, identity chaining <xref target="IDCHAIN"/> and client ID
metadata documents <xref target="CIMD"/>. Web Bot Auth <xref target="WBA"/> covers request signing
for automated traffic, and WIMSE <xref target="AIMS"/> covers agent identity. Each
place where this document relies on one of them cites it.</t>
        <t>The Site record sits at a label of its own and is not the envelope
of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, by the same author, whose <tt>_alter</tt> record requires a
signed zone (<xref target="record"/>).</t>
        <t><xref target="adds"/> says what the profile adds over those documents.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-terminology">
      <name>Conventions and Terminology</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      

<dl>
        <dt>~handle:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An identifier as defined in <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 2, with the grammar of
<tt>handle-name</tt> in <xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 3.3, and the tiers of
<xref target="IDCOMMITS"/>, Section 3. The tier is read from the lexical form alone:
a trailing <tt>.bot</tt> is the Bot tier, a leading <tt>cc-</tt> is the Instrument
tier, and anything else is the Sovereign tier. Where this document
names a ~handle as a reference it is written as an <tt>alter:</tt> URI
<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, as <xref target="MCPDNS"/> does.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Person:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A human who holds a Sovereign-tier ~handle. Where an Agent signs in
for a Person, the Person is the original principal in the sense of
<xref target="AGENTPROTO"/>, Section 6.2.1.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Agent:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Software acting for a Person under scoped delegation, holding its own
signing key and its own Bot-tier ~handle (<xref target="IDCOMMITS"/>, Section 3).
An Instrument-tier ~handle is never an Agent under this document,
because it has no envelope of its own and is not an independent
principal (<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 3.4).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Site:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A website that accepts sign-in under this document. Its operator is
the Site owner.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Site handle:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The Sovereign-tier ~handle a Site receives when its record verifies
(<xref target="produces"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Issuer:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The service that authenticates the Person, issues tokens and passes,
and publishes the keys that verify them. In the deployment described
in <xref target="impl"/> this is ~alter.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Site record:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The DNS TXT record of <xref target="record"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Per-site subject:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The identifier the Issuer gives a Person for one Site (<xref target="subject"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Acts-for pass:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The token an Agent presents to a Site (<xref target="pass"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Pass-signing key:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The Issuer's Ed25519 key that signs acts-for passes, published at the
Issuer's <tt>/.well-known/alter-keys.json</tt> (<xref target="pass"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Collective:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A Site handle held by more than one Person (<xref target="produces"/>).</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Overview</name>
      <figure anchor="fig-overview">
        <name>Acts-For in one picture</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
 Site                DNS              Issuer             Person / Agent
     |                |                  |                     |
     | 1. publish _alter-site record     |                     |
     |--------------->|                  |                     |
     | 2. verify      |                  |                     |
     |---------------------------------->|                     |
     |                | 3. read record   |                     |
     |                |<-----------------|                     |
     |   4. Site registered as a client  |                     |
     |<----------------------------------|                     |
     |                                   |                     |
     |  Person: 5. click, passkey, consent (OIDC + PKCE)       |
     |<------------------------------------------------------->|
     |  6. ID token, sub = per-site subject                    |
     |                                                         |
     |  Agent: 7. ask for an acts-for pass over MCP            |
     |                                   |<--------------------|
     |  8. present pass with a DPoP proof by the Agent's key   |
     |<--------------------------------------------------------|
     |  9. verify pass against the Issuer's published key      |
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>Steps 1 to 4 happen once per Site, done by the Site owner. Steps 5 and 6 are the Person
signing in. Steps 7 to 9 are an Agent signing in for the Person.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="record">
      <name>The Site Record</name>
      <section anchor="location-and-format">
        <name>Location and Format</name>
        <t>A Site joins by publishing one TXT record at the label <tt>_alter-site</tt>
prepended to its domain <xref target="RFC8552"/>:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
_alter-site.riverbakery.example. IN TXT
  "v=altersite1; h=~riverbakery.example; pk=ed25519:<key>;
   ts=<unix-seconds>; rev=<digest>; sig=<signature>"
]]></artwork>
        <t>Fields are written as <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7.2, writes the fields of its
envelope, and a reader ignores a field it does not know. The fields
are:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>v</tt>, the text <tt>altersite1</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>h</tt>, the Site handle (<xref target="handle"/>), with its leading tilde;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>pk</tt>, an Ed25519 public key <xref target="RFC8032"/> generated on the Site owner's
device. The private key <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> leave that device;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>ts</tt>, the time the record was signed, in Unix seconds, as the
publisher states it;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>rev</tt>, the base64url <xref target="RFC4648"/> SHA-256 of a revocation pre-image
generated on the Site owner's device beside <tt>pk</tt>. The pre-image <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> leave that device until the Site owner reveals it to revoke the
record;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>sig</tt>, the base64url Ed25519 signature under <tt>pk</tt> over the JSON
canonical form <xref target="RFC8785"/> of the object with members <tt>v</tt>, <tt>h</tt>,
<tt>domain</tt>, <tt>pk</tt>, <tt>ts</tt> and <tt>rev</tt>, where <tt>domain</tt> is the Site's domain
in the form <xref target="handle"/> gives it.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The one-time code the Issuer hands the Site owner when the claim
starts is published at a label of its own, and the Site owner removes
it once the record verifies:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
_alter-challenge.riverbakery.example. IN TXT "code=<code>"
]]></artwork>
        <t>A separate, removable challenge label is what <xref target="DOMVERIFY"/> recommends
and what <xref target="DNSAID"/>, Section 5.2, does. <tt>_alter-site</tt> then holds only the
long-lived record.</t>
        <t>The Site record is not the envelope of <xref target="MCPDNS"/> and does not sit at
its <tt>_alter</tt> label, whose records require a signed zone (<xref target="MCPDNS"/>,
Section 8). A Site that also wants its Site handle resolved as a
dispatchable reference by <xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 3.4, publishes that
envelope at <tt>_alter</tt> as well, under the rules of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="handle">
        <name>The Site Handle</name>
        <t>The Site handle is <tt>~</tt> followed by the Site's domain, in lowercase, in
its A-label form <xref target="RFC5890"/>, with no trailing dot. The domain the record
proves is its zone, and the Site handle's dispatchable reference
carries that zone as its <tt>org-scope</tt>:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
alter:~riverbakery.example@riverbakery.example
]]></artwork>
        <t>The spelling of a Site handle never establishes its zone. A party
that reads <tt>~riverbakery.example</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> resolve it against the
<tt>riverbakery.example</tt> zone on the strength of its characters
(<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 6.9; <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 12.3). Only the verified
record, or a reference that carries the zone, does.</t>
        <t>A domain whose Site handle would not be a Sovereign-tier
<tt>handle-name</tt> <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be enrolled. That excludes:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>a domain any of whose labels begins with a digit. <tt>handle-name</tt> does
not admit a leading digit, and <tt>org-scope</tt> (<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 3.3)
admits no label that begins with one;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a domain whose first label begins with <tt>cc-</tt>, since its Site handle
reads as an Instrument-tier handle;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a domain under the <tt>bot</tt> top-level domain, since its Site handle
reads as a Bot-tier handle.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>See <xref target="open"/>, item 1.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verify">
        <name>Verification</name>
        <t>The Issuer verifies a Site record when the Site owner asks it to, and
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check all of the following:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>the record parses with every field of <xref target="record"/>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>sig</tt> verifies under <tt>pk</tt> over the input <xref target="record"/> gives, with
<tt>domain</tt> the domain being claimed;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>h</tt> equals the ~handle being claimed;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the claim started no more than seven days earlier, by the Issuer's
own record of its start and the Issuer's own clock;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the digest of the <tt>code</tt> at <tt>_alter-challenge</tt> equals the digest the
Issuer stored when the claim started. The Issuer stores only the
digest;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the Issuer holds no revealed pre-image for <tt>rev</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t><tt>ts</tt> is written by the publisher and is never evidence that the record
is fresh. The code of step 5 shows that the record was published after
the claim started.</t>
        <t>The Issuer declares its time source and that source's uncertainty,
and evaluates the window of step 4 and every expiry it sets against
that uncertainty. A clock error can then only make a check refuse.
Where the uncertainty exceeds the window being checked, the check
refuses.</t>
        <t>The Issuer is the one party that relies on a Site record. A Site owner
revokes the record by revealing its pre-image to the Issuer. The
Issuer then refuses the record and disables the Site's client. Removing the
record from DNS does not revoke the client. Disabling it does, as
<xref target="AGENTDNSLINK"/>, Section 8.2, also holds for its own link record.</t>
        <t>The Issuer acknowledges each reveal it accepts with a statement it
signs, naming the <tt>rev</tt> value and the time it accepted the reveal. A
Site owner who holds no acknowledgement for a reveal sent treats the
reveal as not received. A reveal dropped on its way to the Issuer
shows as a missing acknowledgement.</t>
        <t>The first record to verify wins and clears every other pending claim
on that domain. DNSSEC validation is reported but not required, as
<xref target="DNSAID"/>, Section 6.4, holds DNS-AID deployable without it. The Issuer
reports whether it read the record over a validated path.</t>
        <t>A Site record already published under the same <tt>pk</tt> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be accepted in
place of a new one, without a new <tt>code</tt>, when the claimant proves
possession of the matching private key. This lets a Site owner who has
set up once, on the same device, add a second domain or return without
editing DNS again. The record still passes steps 1 to 3 and 6. The
Issuer declares, as local policy, how long after a record under that
<tt>pk</tt> last verified with a code it accepts the <tt>pk</tt> this way, and past
that period it asks for a new code. A <tt>pk</tt> that has never verified
with a code is never accepted this way.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="produces">
        <name>What Verification Produces</name>
        <t>A verified Site record produces, in one step:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the Site handle (<xref target="handle"/>), owned by the Site owner's own ~handle
as a sole-owned entity. An owner who does not already hold a
~handle claims one in the same flow, and the Site is paired to a
Person from the start. When a second Person joins, the Site handle
becomes a collective and is held under the collective's own rules.
Members of a collective need not all hold the same permissions. Only
the owner can change the Site's client;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>an OAuth 2.0 client <xref target="RFC6749"/> for the Site. The client is public
(<tt>token_endpoint_auth_method</tt> is <tt>none</tt>), its scopes are <tt>openid</tt> and
<tt>profile</tt>, and its single redirect URI is one exact <tt>https</tt> address
on the proven domain or its <tt>www.</tt> name, with no wildcard, port,
user information or fragment.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The Site needs no separate client registration <xref target="RFC7591"/>. A Site
that also publishes a client metadata document <xref target="CIMD"/> keeps it for
other issuers, and this Issuer reads the Site record. A DNS host that
supports <xref target="DOMAINCONNECT"/> can write the record and the challenge for the
Site owner.</t>
        <t>A Person who signs in to a Site, or for whom an Agent signs in, is the
Site's counterparty. Sign-in never makes a Person a member of the Site
handle.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="person">
      <name>Person Sign-In</name>
      <section anchor="on-the-page">
        <name>On the Page</name>
        <t>The Site embeds a button and a script:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
<div data-alter-sign-in></div>
<script src="https://issuer.example/sign-in/v1.js"
        integrity="sha384-<hash>" crossorigin="anonymous"
        data-client-id="<client_id>"
        data-return-page="https://riverbakery.example/callback"
        data-issuer="https://issuer.example"
        data-authorize="https://issuer.example/authorize"></script>
]]></artwork>
        <t>The script is pinned by its integrity hash. A changed script is
published at a new path.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-flow">
        <name>The Flow</name>
        <t>The flow is the OpenID Connect authorization code flow <xref target="OIDC"/> with
PKCE <xref target="RFC7636"/>, method <tt>S256</tt>, a one-time <tt>state</tt> and a <tt>nonce</tt>. The
Person confirms with a passkey at the Issuer, and the Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
require user verification <xref target="WEBAUTHN"/>. That one gesture is two factors,
the device held and the fingerprint, face or PIN that unlocks it. The
Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ask for it on every sign-in to a Site, including when the
Person already has a session at the Issuer. At the consent step the
Person <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> switch on sharing their ~handle, their email, or both. These
travel as the scopes <tt>handle</tt> and <tt>email</tt>, and only the consent step can
add them. <tt>email</tt> is the scope of <xref target="OIDC"/>, Section 5.4. Neither scope
carries an <tt>alter:</tt> prefix, because a scope token with one would read
as an <tt>alter:</tt> URI <xref target="ALTERURI"/>, and a scope is not one.</t>
        <t>The Site receives:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>an ID token, signed RS256 <xref target="RFC7518"/> by the Issuer, with <tt>iss</tt> the Issuer,
<tt>aud</tt> the client identifier, a lifetime of one hour, <tt>sub</tt> the
per-site subject (<xref target="subject"/>), <tt>verified</tt> set to <tt>yes</tt>, the same
band the acts-for pass carries (<xref target="pass"/>), and <tt>handle</tt> and <tt>email</tt>
only where the Person switched them on. <tt>email</tt> and <tt>email_verified</tt>
are the claims of <xref target="OIDC"/>, Section 5.1. <tt>handle</tt> carries the Person's
~handle in the bare form of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7.3.2. <tt>auth_time</tt> is
the time of the passkey confirmation for this sign-in, never the time
the token was minted, and <tt>amr</tt> <xref target="RFC8176"/> lists the methods that
confirmation used;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>an opaque access token, valid for 600 seconds, accepted only at the
userinfo endpoint. No refresh token is issued. It suits one read of
userinfo at sign-in.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The Site <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the ID token's signature against the Issuer's
published JSON Web Key Set <xref target="RFC7517"/> before acting on it. Checking <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>,
<tt>exp</tt> and <tt>nonce</tt> in the browser is not enough.</t>
        <t>A <tt>sub</tt> the Site has seen before is a returning Person. A <tt>sub</tt> it has
not seen is a new Person, and the Site opens the account from this
sign-in with no registration form.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="subject">
        <name>The Per-Site Subject</name>
        <t>The per-site subject is a pairwise identifier in the sense of <xref target="OIDC"/>,
Section 8.1. It is the lowercase base32 <xref target="RFC4648"/> encoding of the
first 20 bytes of an HMAC-SHA256 <xref target="RFC2104"/>, keyed by an Issuer secret,
over a fixed label, the Person's internal identifier and the Site's
domain, each prefixed by its length as a four-byte big-endian integer.</t>
        <t>The domain is normalised once before use, and the same normalised
form is the pass's <tt>aud</tt>. It is lowercased, one trailing dot is
removed, it is taken in its A-label form <xref target="RFC5890"/>, and then one
leading <tt>www.</tt> is removed. The fold is applied exactly once, because it
is not idempotent: <tt>www.www.example</tt> names the Site <tt>www.example</tt>.</t>
        <t>The per-site subject never begins with <tt>~</tt> and can never be read as a
~handle.</t>
        <t>A Person has the same subject at a Site whether they sign in
themselves or an Agent signs in for them. At different Sites they have
different subjects, and two Sites cannot join their records by
subject.</t>
        <t>The Issuer computes the per-site subject. The Person cannot derive it,
because the key is the Issuer's, and the Person neither holds nor
presents it. The Person holds no copy of it. Sign-in recomputes the
subject each time and does not read it from a store. It comes out the
same after a change of device or on a clean browser. The Issuer
learns the domain of each Site it computes a subject for
(<xref target="privacy"/>). The pass names the Person by this per-site number and
by no other identifier of the Person, and names the Agent's key for the
Site separately (<xref target="pass"/>). Sites can still join by the Agent's ~handle
and by the grant address (<xref target="privacy"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="agent">
      <name>Agent Sign-In</name>
      <section anchor="asking-for-a-pass">
        <name>Asking for a Pass</name>
        <t>An Agent that holds a grant from its Person calls the MCP <xref target="MCP"/> tool
<tt>alter_sign_in</tt> at the Issuer, naming the Site's domain. The Issuer
checks that the grant exists, is in force and covers that Site, then
returns an acts-for pass. The Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse an Agent whose ~handle
is not Bot-tier.</t>
        <t>The Agent signs this call with the one long-lived key it holds at the
Issuer. A Site never receives that key. The call names a separate
public key for the Site. The pass confirms that key, and the Agent
proves it at each request to that Site with a DPoP proof
(<xref target="presenting"/>). An Agent <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use a
different key at each Site, for the reason <xref target="POPPY"/> gives for its
delegated keys.</t>
        <t>Issuing a pass is in effect a token exchange at the Issuer. The Agent
presents its own credential and a grant and receives a token for one
audience. The Agent asks over MCP because that is where it already
reaches the Issuer. An Issuer <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also issue the pass at its token
endpoint, as a token exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/> carrying the same inputs.
<xref target="ACTORBOUND"/> profiles such an exchange for a token bound to the
actor's key.</t>
        <t><tt>alter_sign_in</tt> is a tool surface name in the sense of <xref target="TOOLNAMES"/>;
see <xref target="iana"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="pass">
        <name>The Acts-For Pass</name>
        <t>The pass is a CBOR Web Token <xref target="RFC8392"/> in a COSE_Sign1 structure
<xref target="RFC9052"/>, algorithm EdDSA <xref target="RFC8032"/>, signed by the Issuer's
pass-signing key. It carries the registered claims <tt>iss</tt> (1), <tt>sub</tt> (2), <tt>aud</tt> (3),
<tt>exp</tt> (4), <tt>iat</tt> (6) and <tt>cti</tt> (7), and <tt>nbf</tt> (5) where present, and
the following claims under Private Use keys, below -65536 as
<xref target="RFC8392"/>, Section 9.1 allows:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>profile</tt> (-65537):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the text <tt>alter-site-pass-v0</tt>. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse a pass whose
profile it does not know.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>grant</tt> (-65538):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the 32-byte content address of the grant the pass was issued under.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>bands</tt> (-65539):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>a map of band name to text label. A pass carries
<tt>{"verified": "yes"}</tt>, meaning the Issuer checked at issue the
Person's hold on the ~handle the subject is computed for. It asserts
nothing else about the Person. No number is ever a band value.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>act</tt> (-65540):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the Agent, with the meaning of the <tt>act</tt> claim of <xref target="RFC8693"/>,
Section 4.1. It is a map of <tt>sub</tt>, a number for the Agent at this
Site computed as in <xref target="subject"/> under a different fixed label over
the Agent's internal identifier and the Site's domain, and <tt>handle</tt>,
its Bot-tier ~handle in the bare form of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 7.3.2.
<tt>act</tt> has no CWT claim key in <xref target="CWTREG"/>. It sits under a Private Use
key here until one is registered (<xref target="iana"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>may_tools</tt> (-65541):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>an array of the tool surface names the Agent may use at this Site.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>valid_until</tt> (-65542):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>the end of the grant, in Unix seconds.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt><tt>max_value</tt> (-65543):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>optional, an ordered limit, a map of <tt>amount</tt>, a decimal string, and
<tt>currency</tt>, a code, with the comparison given below.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The pass also carries the registered claim <tt>cnf</tt> (8) <xref target="RFC8747"/> with
the <tt>jkt</tt> confirmation method of <xref target="CWTREG"/>, the JWK SHA-256 thumbprint
<xref target="RFC7638"/> of the Agent's key for this Site. That is the value the
<tt>jkt</tt> confirmation method of <xref target="RFC9449"/>, Section 6.1, carries. For an
Ed25519 key the thumbprint input is the members <tt>crv</tt>, <tt>kty</tt> and <tt>x</tt>
(<xref target="RFC8037"/>, Section 2). <tt>may_tools</tt>, <tt>valid_until</tt> and <tt>max_value</tt> are
claims of their own, since <xref target="RFC8693"/>, Section 4.1, holds non-identity
claims inside <tt>act</tt> not meaningful.</t>
        <t>The claims have these values:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>iss</tt> is the Issuer's <tt>https</tt> URL, the same value as the <tt>iss</tt> of the
ID token of <xref target="person"/>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>sub</tt> is the per-site subject of the Person at this Site, and is
never a ~handle;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>aud</tt> is the Site's domain, normalised as in <xref target="subject"/>, and a
Site refuses a pass whose <tt>aud</tt> is not its own (<xref target="presenting"/>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>exp</tt> is at most 300 seconds after <tt>iat</tt> and never later than
<tt>valid_until</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t><tt>act</tt> and <tt>cnf</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear together. A pass presented without both
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be refused. The pass <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry the Person's ~handle or
email; those reach a Site only through the ID token of <xref target="person"/>.</t>
        <t><tt>max_value</tt> is optional, and the Site reads it. Carrying it discloses
the Person's limit to every Site the pass is presented to, and
<xref target="privacy"/> gives the risk. <xref target="DSDJWT"/>, Section 4.1, defines
selective disclosure for the claims of a delegate payload, and its
Section 8.2 places delegation constraints in visible claims. This
document makes the same choice. In <xref target="INTENTTOKEN"/>, Section 3.1, the
token that can carry budget limits (Section 3.3) is exchanged at an
authorization server and is not intended to be presented directly to
a resource server. The limit rides in the pass because a Site that
never sees the grant can then check each act against it offline. The
pass discloses the limit whole or not at all, and an Issuer that has
no need to show it leaves it out (<xref target="privacy"/>).</t>
        <t><tt>max_value</tt> is compared as follows. An act is within the limit when
its amount, in the same currency, is no greater than <tt>amount</tt>, the two
compared as decimal numbers. An act in another currency is not within
it, and no exchange rate is applied. The limit is measured per act and
is not totalled across acts. This follows the per-action measurement
of the "max" type of <xref target="ASOR"/>, Section 4.2.
<xref target="BOUNDEDWORK"/>, Section 3.8, finds that authorization details have no
standardized comparison. This paragraph states one for this limit
only.</t>
        <t>The pass is a single-hop artefact, from a Person to one Site, and
starts no delegator-bound chain <xref target="CHAINS"/>. Its <tt>sub</tt> is
directed to one Site and is never copied into a token issued
downstream, as <xref target="AAUTH"/>, Section 10.1.1.2, says of a directed <tt>sub</tt>.
<xref target="ACTORPROFILE"/>, Section 3.2, keeps one <tt>sub</tt> for a whole chain,
the "Subject whose authorization is exercised". <xref target="CHAINS"/>, Section 4,
forbids an issuer to place in <tt>sub</tt> an identifier that another issuer
directed to a specific audience, such as a pairwise subject
identifier, and gives a per-chain pseudonym as the published form
where a chain needs a subject. An Agent that hands work to another
Agent does not pass its pass on. The second Agent asks the Issuer for
a pass under a grant of its own from the Person. Narrowing authority
along a chain belongs to chain formats (<xref target="ACTORPROFILE"/>, <xref target="DSDJWT"/>,
<xref target="ASOR"/>) and to the per-hop allowance of <xref target="CROSSOWNER"/>, requirement
XO-3, and is outside this document.</t>
        <t>In <tt>grant</tt> the pass carries the grant's address alone, with neither
the grant itself nor its approval-act record. The record travels
beside the grant, in a wrapper object or an <tt>Approval-Record</tt> header
(<xref target="APPROVALREC"/>, Section 3.1), and a verifier takes it from whoever
holds the grant. This document does not say how that holder is found.
A consent grant of <xref target="CONSENT"/>, Section 5.2, is one form a grant can
take, with <tt>grant</tt> as the <tt>grant_ref</tt> of its Section 5.3.
A record of an act cites the grant address as the standing authority
behind the act, since the address outlives the pass. The pass is gone
300 seconds after issue, and the grant has to be kept for longer than
that. An audit trail of the kind in <xref target="AUDITARCH"/>,
Section 7.4, records a user approval as a change of authorization
state, and it can cite the address for the authority in force.</t>
        <t>A pass is bounded in time by <tt>exp</tt>, and each act under it is bounded
by <tt>max_value</tt>. Nothing in this document makes a pass single use. It
carries <tt>cti</tt>, and no step of <xref target="presenting"/> checks it. A pass can
therefore cover more than one act in its life, each within the limit,
with no total across them. <xref target="ASOR"/>, Section 4.2, says that its per-action
"max" aggregates nothing and that a bound over a token's life needs a
running total held where actions are authorized. The pass carries no
such bound. The Site sets the amount of each act and is the party that
applies the limit. Requirement B2-6 of <xref target="UCREQ"/>,
Section 4.3, asks for authorisation at the granularity of a specific
operation. The pass narrows toward it by its limits and its short life
and does not meet it. The pass tells a Site nothing of the Person's
acknowledgement of a particular act. The binding-moment envelope <xref target="BME"/>
approves one specific operation and carries that acknowledgement.</t>
        <t>The ID token is signed RS256 under the Issuer's JSON Web Key Set, the
algorithm every OpenID Provider supports (<xref target="OIDC"/>, Section 15.1). The
pass is signed EdDSA under the separate pass-signing key. The keys stay
separate, and a Site that only signs people in never fetches the
pass-signing key.</t>
        <t>Private Use keys are not interoperable between issuers until the
claims they carry are registered (<xref target="iana"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="presenting">
        <name>Presenting and Checking the Pass</name>
        <t>The Agent presents the pass in the <tt>Authorization</tt> header under the
<tt>DPoP</tt> scheme <xref target="RFC9449"/>, the pass encoded in base64url <xref target="RFC4648"/>, with
a DPoP proof made with its key for this Site. The proof's <tt>ath</tt> is the
hash of that encoded pass. The Site <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>refuse a pass whose <tt>iss</tt> is not the <tt>https</tt> URL of an Issuer it
accepts, and verify the pass under that Issuer's Ed25519
pass-signing key, published at <tt>/.well-known/alter-keys.json</tt>
              <xref target="RFC8615"/> on the origin <tt>iss</tt> names;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>check <tt>profile</tt>, check that <tt>aud</tt> is its own domain normalised as
in <xref target="subject"/>, and refuse the pass at or past <tt>exp</tt>, as <xref target="RFC8392"/>,
Section 3.1.4 and <xref target="RFC7519"/>, Section 4.1.4 require. The Site
evaluates <tt>exp</tt> against a declared time source and uncertainty, as
the Issuer does in <xref target="verify"/>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>check the DPoP proof as <xref target="RFC9449"/>, Section 4.3, requires, and check
that the JWK thumbprint of the proof's key equals the <tt>jkt</tt> in
<tt>cnf</tt>. A pass presented without a valid proof <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be refused, since
the pass alone is a bearer token;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>refuse an act unless the Site has mapped it to a tool surface name
listed in <tt>may_tools</tt>, and refuse an act whose amount is not within
<tt>max_value</tt> as compared in <xref target="pass"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>A grant carried in a header as a bearer token can be replayed by
anyone who copies it. The pass cannot be used without a DPoP proof by
the key its <tt>cnf</tt> names, and it expires 300 seconds after issue at the
latest.</t>
        <t>The Site then treats <tt>sub</tt> as it would after a Person sign-in. A
subject it has seen before is a returning Person. A new one is a
Person the Agent has just registered.</t>
        <t>No token exchange happens at the Site, and the Site does not call the
Issuer.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="answering">
        <name>Answering for an Act</name>
        <t>A record of an act cites the grant address (<xref target="pass"/>) and the Person's
per-site subject. It never keeps the pass, since the pass has lapsed
by then. Only the Issuer can resolve the subject to the
Person, since only it holds the key the subject is computed from and
the record of which Person it was computed for (<xref target="subject"/>). The grant
address also resolves at whoever holds the grant (<xref target="pass"/>).</t>
        <t>The Issuer <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> resolve a per-site subject or a grant address to
the Person for anyone, the Site included, unless the Person agrees to
that resolution. An agreement covers the one resolution it was given
for and no other. What a Site learns at sign-in is unchanged
(<xref target="person"/>). How the Issuer obtains the Person's agreement, and how
a resolution compelled by law is handled, are <xref target="open"/>, item 3.</t>
        <t>The Person can withdraw a grant at any time. The Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse to
issue a pass under a withdrawn grant. A pass already issued lapses at
its <tt>exp</tt>. No Site therefore holds a valid pass under a grant more than
300 seconds after the Issuer records its withdrawal.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="returning">
      <name>Returning and Recovery</name>
      <t>A Site owner who loses the device holding the Site key proves the
domain again by publishing a new record. Proving a domain again signs
its owner straight back in only where the business account has no
confirmed email; otherwise the way back is a link sent to that email.
Proving a domain never signs anyone in to an account holding a
personal ~handle, because proving a domain proves the business
alone.</t>
      <t>A Site handle whose owner leaves without handing it over becomes
dormant. Proving its domain again revives it only after a wait in
which the former owner, or any member, can object. Revival is never
immediate, because control of a domain's DNS does not show who ran the
Site.</t>
      <t>Recovery for a Person who loses a passkey, or the platform account
that syncs it, is outside this document. It covers sign-in and not the
recovery of an account at the Issuer. A grant does not follow a Person whose
identifier at the Issuer changes, and the Person grants again, as
<xref target="SCIMSUPER"/>, Section 8, requires of a supersession event.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="adds">
      <name>What This Adds</name>
      <t>The parts exist. OpenID Connect gives pairwise subjects (<xref target="OIDC"/>,
Section 8.1). Token exchange names an actor in <tt>act</tt> <xref target="RFC8693"/>. Key
confirmation binds a token to a key <xref target="RFC8747"/>, and DPoP has the client
prove that key at each request <xref target="RFC9449"/>. A client ID
metadata document registers a client at an <tt>https</tt> URL <xref target="CIMD"/>.</t>
      <t><xref target="CIMD"/> lets a client use an Issuer it has never registered with, by a
document at an <tt>https</tt> URL that can carry the client's key (<xref target="CIMD"/>,
Section 5). <xref target="RFC7591"/> needs a call to each provider. <xref target="AGENTDNSLINK"/>
links an agent's DNS name to its OAuth client with one TXT record that
carries no key and names no handle. Under Acts-For a Site joins by
publishing one DNS record carrying a key its owner made on their own
device, and the same record is the Site's public ~handle.</t>
      <t>An authorization code grant reaches an Agent only at a Site where the
Person already has an account. Under Acts-For an Agent signs in, as the
Person's Agent, at a Site where the Person has none, and the Site
checks the pass offline. The Site never calls the Issuer and needs no
relationship with the Agent.</t>
      <t>The pass carries the Agent in <tt>act</tt> and its key in <tt>cnf</tt>, as
<xref target="RFC8693"/> and <xref target="RFC8747"/> define them, and a request proves the key by
DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="impl">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t>Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication,
per <xref target="RFC7942"/>.</t>
      <t>~alter has implemented the Site record and Person sign-in in a test
deployment.
As of 19 October 2026:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A small business site, on its own domain at a public host, published
its Site record, was verified, and minted its client.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A Person signed in to that site with a passkey through the embedded
button; consent, code issue and token exchange each succeeded.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>That deployment publishes the Site record of
draft-morrison-acts-for-03, at <tt>_alter</tt>. The record of <xref target="record"/>, at
<tt>_alter-site</tt>, is not yet implemented.</t>
      <t>As of 20 November 2026, the Issuer also implements <tt>alter_sign_in</tt> and
the acts-for pass of <xref target="agent"/>. They are not publicly available. The
built pass still carries the earlier <tt>acting</tt> and <tt>cnf_jkt</tt> claims, and
presentation with a DPoP proof is not yet implemented. No
Site has yet verified a pass outside the Issuer's own testing, and no
Issuer other than ~alter implements any part of this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This section follows <xref target="RFC3552"/>. In scope are:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>a party who controls a domain's DNS, or the login at its DNS host;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a network attacker between an Agent and a Site;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a party who copies a pass;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>an Agent that acts beyond its grant;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Sites that compare records to join a Person across them
(<xref target="privacy"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>an Issuer that is compromised or dishonest.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Out of scope are:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>a compromised device or passkey of the Person, since the Person's
own confirmation is then the attacker's;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a compromised Site, since a Site can act on its own accounts with
no pass;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>denial of service against the Issuer.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A Site relies on the Issuer's statement that a grant exists and covers
it. The pass carries no key of the Person. An Issuer that is
compromised or dishonest can mint a pass for any per-site subject and
any Agent, and no Site can detect it from the pass. A party holding the
grant and its approval-act record <xref target="APPROVALREC"/> can check the grant
address after the fact. This document gives a Site no means to check it
at sign-in.</t>
      <t>The Site record proves domain control only. Whoever
controls a domain's DNS can enrol it, including a former agency, a new
registrant of a lapsed domain, or an attacker holding the DNS host
login. On the code path the record proves control of the zone at the
time of the claim and needs no age bound. The reuse path of
<xref target="verify"/> accepts a key without a new code, and it is bounded. It
admits only a <tt>pk</tt> that has verified with a code before, within a
period the Issuer declares, and only while the revocation status of
the record can be established. A seller who never finished setup and
still holds a key cannot use that key to claim a domain whose buyer
leaves the old record in place. A former owner who verified within the
period can still use the reuse path while the old record stays
published, and a buyer closes it by removing that record. A Site owner whose key is lost or
taken revokes the record at the Issuer (<xref target="verify"/>). For a domain that was deleted and registered again,
the Issuer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse a Site record that verified before the domain's
registry creation date changed, the signal <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, Section 13.1.2,
gives for a change of control. The record then needs a new code.</t>
      <t>The Site handle spelled like a domain is a Handle-Domain Confusion
surface (<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, Section 6.9). The Issuer's consent page, and any
other page of the Issuer's that shows a Site handle to a person, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
keep its leading tilde.</t>
      <t>A session at the Issuer is never enough to sign a Person in to a
Site. A browser left signed in at the Issuer, on a shared or stolen
machine, would otherwise let whoever holds it sign in as the Person at
every Site. Each sign-in therefore asks for a fresh user-verified
passkey (<xref target="person"/>), and <tt>auth_time</tt> reports when that happened. A
Site that sends <tt>max_age</tt> or <tt>prompt=login</tt> <xref target="OIDC"/> is always met,
because every sign-in is already fresh. A Site can read <tt>amr</tt> to see
how the Person confirmed. A passkey that syncs between devices can be
exported, and <xref target="NIST80063B"/>, Section 2.3.2, bars syncable authenticators
at AAL3. An Issuer that needs AAL3 accepts no synced passkey.</t>
      <t>A Site should act only on the ID token and only after checking its
signature. The browser script does not check the
signature and is not a substitute.</t>
      <t>The acts-for pass is short-lived and bound to one audience. It is
useless without a DPoP proof by the Agent key it names. A Site that
skips the proof check turns the pass into a bearer token valid for up
to five minutes.</t>
      <t>The one-time code is stored only as a digest. A claimant can satisfy
only their own pending code and cannot replace another claimant's.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>The per-site subject stops Sites joining their records by subject.
It does not stop them joining by the Agent's ~handle or by the grant
address. The Person's ~handle and email reach a Site only when the
Person switches them on, and never through an acts-for pass. The Issuer sees
every sign-in it issues for, and this protocol gives a Person no way to
keep a sign-in from it. It learns the domain of each Site it computes a
subject for (<xref target="subject"/>).</t>
      <t>The pass names the Person only by a per-site number. Who answers for
an act is resolved at the Issuer, and only when the Person agrees
(<xref target="answering"/>). An unlinkable credential makes
the opposite choice. In <xref target="MOLE"/>, Section 2.2, a delegated agent's
presentations stay unlinkable to other sessions and the site learns
no stable identity. Acts-For gives a Site a stable number by which it
can recognise a returning Person. It gives the Issuer the means to
answer for an act when the Person agrees. A deployment that needs a
Person's visits to one Site to be unlinkable needs the other design.</t>
      <t>A Site that reads a Person's limit in <tt>max_value</tt> learns how much the Person will spend, and can use it as leverage against the
Person. <xref target="STIRAGENTIC"/>, Section 4, states REQ-9 as "The mechanism must
minimize the disclosure of information about the principal, and should
permit selective disclosure to different relying parties." The W3C
Agentic Web charter draft <xref target="W3CCHARTER"/> expects its identity mechanisms
to "minimize the information they disclose". An Issuer that has no
need to put a limit in front of a Site leaves <tt>max_value</tt> out. The pass
does not meet the second clause of REQ-9, since it offers no selective
disclosure of the limit. REQ-9 names no limits.
Carrying the cap is a design choice of this document. The same draft says
in Section 11 that intent objects should bound dimensions such as amount
and quantity, and that points toward carrying one.</t>
      <t><xref target="HTTP402"/>, Section 4, observes that making a payment can link a
client's requests to a payment instrument, and thereby to a person. An
intermediary in front of several Sites that is also an identity
provider can join per-site subjects by source address.</t>
      <t><tt>act.sub</tt> differs at each Site whatever key the Agent uses. An
Agent that uses a different key at each Site also gives Sites
different values of <tt>cnf</tt>. They cannot join
their records by those. An Agent that reuses a key at two Sites lets
them join by it.</t>
      <t>The per-site subject does not stop Sites joining their records by the
Agent's ~handle. <tt>act.handle</tt> is the same at every Site the same
Agent signs in to. Two Sites that compare it learn that their two
per-site subjects are one Person.</t>
      <t>A grant covering several Sites gives each of them the same <tt>grant</tt>
value. A record of an act cites the grant address (<xref target="pass"/>), and a
grant address cited downstream links the Sites that grant covers.
Where unlinkability matters, the default is a separate grant for each
Site, and a Person who wants no two Sites to join by <tt>grant</tt> keeps
that default.</t>
      <t>An Agent using a different key at each Site has no key directory of
the kind <xref target="WBA"/> describes. The DPoP proof carries the key with each
request. None of this stops Sites joining
their records by behaviour, network address or timing.</t>
      <t>The Issuer holds the key the per-site subject is computed from and can
compute any Person's subject at any Site.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This revision makes no IANA request. A revision meant for
publication would need to request:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>the underscored node names <tt>_alter-site</tt> and <tt>_alter-challenge</tt> in
the registry of <xref target="RFC8552"/>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the well-known URI suffix <tt>alter-keys.json</tt> <xref target="RFC8615"/>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>CWT claim keys for <tt>act</tt>, <tt>may_tools</tt>, <tt>valid_until</tt>, <tt>max_value</tt>,
<tt>profile</tt>, <tt>grant</tt> and <tt>bands</tt> of <xref target="pass"/>, carried under Private Use
keys in this revision;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the ID token claim <tt>handle</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the tool surface name <tt>alter_sign_in</tt> <xref target="TOOLNAMES"/>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="related-work">
      <name>Related Work</name>
      <t>In Acts-For one DNS record carrying the Site owner's own key is at
once the domain proof, a public ~handle for the business and the
relying-party registration. The documents below publish parts of this
design, and none of them combines the three in one record.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>AAuth <xref target="AAUTH"/> already makes the first call to a resource its
registration, gives a pairwise subject per resource, and treats
registration and login as one flow. Resources identify themselves by
HTTPS metadata, with no DNS and no direct human sign-in.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The Personal Agent Protocol <xref target="POPPY"/> has a person's agent reach a
company through a file at <tt>/.well-known/poppy.json</tt>, sign in by OAuth,
and hold a delegated key and a pairwise user identifier for each
company. The agent assigns that identifier. It uses no DNS record.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>PACE <xref target="PACE"/>, Section 8.4.2, has a personal agent use a different
identifier at each company.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>PACT <xref target="PACT"/> profiles OAuth for private agent delegation, with limits
on grants and pairwise agent identifiers. The authorization server
is the issuer.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>KYA-OS <xref target="KYAOS"/> has a service authorise a request from a signed proof
and a delegation chain carrying scopes, time bounds and budget caps.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The approval-act record <xref target="APPROVALREC"/> carries evidence of how a
standing grant's approval was performed, bound to the grant it
approves and carried with it, for a verifier who checks the grant
later with no person present. Acts-For leaves the grant out of
scope (<xref target="pass"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>auth.md <xref target="AUTHMD"/> publishes a file at the domain root telling agents
how to register, including a path where a trusted platform vouches
for the user. It matches users by issuer, subject and email with no
pairwise subject, and it covers agents only.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>OpenID Connect pairwise subjects <xref target="OIDC"/> are the per-site subject's
mechanism. Dynamic registration <xref target="RFC7591"/> and client ID metadata
documents <xref target="CIMD"/> remove per-provider registration over HTTPS, and a
metadata document can carry the client's key (<xref target="CIMD"/>, Section 5).
Neither uses DNS, and neither makes the record a public handle.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="AGENTDNSLINK"/> links an agent's DNS name to its OAuth client by one
TXT record at <tt>_agent-oauth</tt> naming the authorization server, the
client identifier and an audience. It is on the agent's side, carries
no key of the owner's and names no handle.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Web Bot Auth <xref target="WBA"/> puts a bot operator's keys in a directory at a
well-known URL. The keys are the operator's and there is no sign-in
for a person.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Token exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/> already names the agent in <tt>act</tt> with the
person in <tt>sub</tt>, and the pass carries the Agent the same way.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>AT Protocol handles <xref target="ATPROTO"/> make a domain a handle with one
<tt>_atproto</tt> TXT record, holding only an identifier, and are not used
to sign in elsewhere. DNS domain verification guidance <xref target="DOMVERIFY"/>
recommends a separate, removable challenge label with the token
first. The one-time code of <xref target="record"/> follows it.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>PACE Authorization <xref target="PACEAUTHZ"/> has a receiver reject a chain in which
a hop conveys more authority than the hop before it (Section 3.3),
and a participant refuse to act under a credential whose status it
cannot check within its staleness bound (Section 3.5). A pass is one
hop with a life of at most 300 seconds and carries no status
reference.
Its Section 6.3 has a verifier relate a confirming key to the
principal and not to an agent. The pass carries no key of the Person.
<xref target="DIALOGBIND"/> binds a dialog context to WIMSE and OAuth credentials.
Acts-For binds a pass to a request by a DPoP proof under the key in
<tt>cnf</tt>
(<xref target="presenting"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Reece <xref target="CROSSORG"/> sets requirements for cross-organisation delegation:
recursive attenuation (R1), no runtime callback (R3), proof of
possession (R4) and invariance of the principal along a chain (R5).
The pass meets R3 and R4 for one hop. Its per-site subject is not an
invariant principal, and <xref target="pass"/> says why.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Asor <xref target="ASOR"/> defines typed constraints and subsumption for attenuated
chains (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). <xref target="pass"/> follows them for
<tt>max_value</tt>. <xref target="DSDJWT"/> and <xref target="INTENTTOKEN"/> are the designs in which the
limit is selectively disclosed or stays at the authorization server
(<xref target="pass"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Signature Keys <xref target="SIGKEY"/> carry a key to a verifier with the request.
Its <tt>jkt-jwt</tt> scheme (Section 3.5) has a long-lived key sign a
JWT that binds an ephemeral key through <tt>cnf</tt>, and its <tt>jwt</tt> scheme
(Section 3.8) embeds a public key in a signed JWT with <tt>cnf</tt>. Both
are other shapes for carrying a key with a request.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>OAuth identity chaining <xref target="IDCHAIN"/>, Section 2.5, transcribes the
subject identifier between trust domains and removes claims for data
minimisation. AIMS <xref target="AIMS"/>, Sections 10.5.1 to 10.6, has a user
delegate authorization to an agent through an authorization code
grant with a passkey, and has transaction tokens limit a token's use
within a call chain.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Direct presentation <xref target="DIRECTPRES"/>, Section 5.1, separates the subject
of a credential from the presenter, and its Section 7.5 requires that
colluding verifiers cannot infer data absent from a presentation.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Agent attribution header fields <xref target="ATTRIB"/>, Section 2, name the
responsible humans of an agent that sends an email, and a DKIM
signature covers them. Acts-For adds
a signed grant by address, an Issuer key a Site can fetch, and a
request signature by the Agent's key.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Web Bot Auth architecture <xref target="WBAARCH"/>, Section 5.9, says a signing
key <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be tied to a specific human. The pass names the Agent's
key for a Site apart from the Person (<xref target="pass"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The W3C Agentic Web charter draft <xref target="W3CCHARTER"/> lists Agent Identity
and Agent Delegation deliverables, each marked "No draft", that
convey whom an agent acts for and bind delegated authority to the
agent.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Peterson <xref target="STIRAGENTIC"/> uses the delegation semantics of <xref target="RFC8693"/> for
agents, with <tt>act</tt> for the agent and <tt>orig</tt> for the party it acts for
(Section 6.1), and verifies an intent against the <tt>act</tt> claim
(Section 10). Its REQ-3 asks that intent never be conveyed solely by
the agent or its platform, and its REQ-9 asks for minimal disclosure
about the principal (Section 4).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="HTTP402"/>, Section 4, observes that making a payment can link a
client to a person. A pass's <tt>may_tools</tt> and <tt>valid_until</tt> bound an
Agent's tools and time, and neither carries payment.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><xref target="EVP"/>, Section 7.3, gives a private email address that <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be
unique per user and per relying-party origin, a choice comparable to
the per-site subject (<xref target="subject"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Accountable principal references <xref target="PRINCIPALREFS"/> states six
properties of the reference to the principal that a delegated request
carries. Its P4 (Section 3.4) allows only the issuer, or a party the
issuer names, to resolve a reference, on a request its published
process admits, and has the issuer record each resolution.
<xref target="answering"/> adds the Person's agreement to each resolution. By its
P3 test, <tt>grant</tt> and <tt>act.handle</tt> carry a common value across
Sites (<xref target="privacy"/>). The withdrawal bound of <xref target="answering"/> is its
P6.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <t>Each item below is open for the reason it gives.</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Which domains can become a Site handle. <xref target="handle"/> refuses those
with any label beginning with a digit, since neither <tt>handle-name</tt>
nor <tt>org-scope</tt> of <xref target="ALTERURI"/> admits one. It also refuses those
beginning with <tt>cc-</tt> or under <tt>bot</tt>, since they read as another
tier. Digit-led domains are common. Admitting them is a change to
<xref target="ALTERURI"/>, and this item stays open until that document makes it.
A proven <tt>www.</tt> name is folded by the per-site subject and not by
the Site handle.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Who in a collective can act for its Site handle, change its client,
or sign in to other Sites as it, and how an agency that set up a
Site hands its Site handle to the owner. Members need not all hold
the same permissions. This revision does not cover an Agent acting
for a collective. <xref target="GONDWANA"/>, Section 3.2, has an organisation or
role act through its own address or account with one or more
accountable Humans, each accountable as if they had acted under
their own identity. The rules for a collective are not yet settled
by the Issuer this document describes.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>How the Issuer obtains the Person's agreement to a resolution
(<xref target="answering"/>), and how a resolution compelled by law is recorded
and made known to the Person. <xref target="PRINCIPALREFS"/>, Section 3.4, has an
issuer publish the process under which it resolves and keep a record
of each resolution. This document takes no position on compelled
resolution yet.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="limits">
      <name>Applicability Limits</name>
      <t>Passes are for regimes where a Site can reach the Issuer's published
key and an Agent can reach the Issuer within the life of a pass. The
300 second cap on <tt>exp</tt> stays. A link with long delay or intermittent
contact cannot carry a pass, and a longer life would widen the window
in which an unsigned request is a bearer token (<xref target="security"/>).
Authority across such a link belongs to the security of the layer
below, such as the bundle-layer security of the Bundle Protocol
(<xref target="BPSAFE"/>, Section 1.1, puts the provisioning of certificates and
keys outside its scope), and to a command grant of the kind in
<xref target="OTCMD"/>, Section 3.3, verified offline against cached trust anchors as
its Section 8 requires of a segmented plant. The Issuer's key may reach a Site as managed data verified
out of band, and step 1 of <xref target="presenting"/> then needs no fetch.
Community networks with no upstream are in the same position as links
with long delay, since the key fetch and the issuance both need a
live path.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2104" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2104.xml">
          <front>
            <title>HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication</title>
            <author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>
            <author fullname="M. Bellare" initials="M." surname="Bellare"/>
            <author fullname="R. Canetti" initials="R." surname="Canetti"/>
            <date month="February" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2104"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2104"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4648.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5890" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5890.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework</title>
            <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/>
            <date month="August" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is one of a collection that, together, describe the protocol and usage context for a revision of Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA), superseding the earlier version. It describes the document collection and provides definitions and other material that are common to the set. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5890"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5890"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6749" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6749.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7517.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7518" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7518.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these identifiers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7518"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7518"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7519.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7636" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7636.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients</title>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." role="editor" surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Agarwal" initials="N." surname="Agarwal"/>
            <date month="September" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing the Authorization Code Grant are susceptible to the authorization code interception attack. This specification describes the attack as well as a technique to mitigate against the threat through the use of Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE, pronounced "pixy").</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7636"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7636"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7638" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7638.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="September" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a JSON Web Key (JWK). It defines which fields in a JWK are used in the hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form for those fields, and how to convert the resulting Unicode string into a byte sequence to be hashed. The resulting hash value can be used for identifying or selecting the key represented by the JWK that is the subject of the thumbprint.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7638"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7638"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8032" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8032.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
            <date month="January" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes elliptic curve signature scheme Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The algorithm is instantiated with recommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves. An example implementation and test vectors are provided.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8037" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8037" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8037.xml">
          <front>
            <title>CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)</title>
            <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
            <date month="January" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines how to use the Diffie-Hellman algorithms "X25519" and "X448" as well as the signature algorithms "Ed25519" and "Ed448" from the IRTF CFRG elliptic curves work in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8037"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8037"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8176" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8176" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8176.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Authentication Method Reference Values</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." surname="Hunt"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim is defined and registered in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry, but no standard Authentication Method Reference values are currently defined. This specification establishes a registry for Authentication Method Reference values and defines an initial set of Authentication Method Reference values.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8176"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8176"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8392" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8392.xml">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="E. Wahlstroem" initials="E." surname="Wahlstroem"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="May" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8392"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8392"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8552" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8552" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8552.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves</title>
            <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." surname="Crocker"/>
            <date month="March" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Formally, any DNS Resource Record (RR) may occur under any domain name. However, some services use an operational convention for defining specific interpretations of an RRset by locating the records in a DNS branch under the parent domain to which the RRset actually applies. The top of this subordinate branch is defined by a naming convention that uses a reserved node name, which begins with the underscore character (e.g., "_name"). The underscored naming construct defines a semantic scope for DNS record types that are associated with the parent domain above the underscored branch. This specification explores the nature of this DNS usage and defines the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry with IANA. The purpose of this registry is to avoid collisions resulting from the use of the same underscored name for different services.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="222"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8552"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8552"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8615" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8615.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <date month="May" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo defines a path prefix for "well-known locations", "/.well-known/", in selected Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t>In doing so, it obsoletes RFC 5785 and updates the URI schemes defined in RFC 7230 to reserve that space. It also updates RFC 7595 to track URI schemes that support well-known URIs in their registry.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8615"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8615"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8785" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8785.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
            <author fullname="A. Rundgren" initials="A." surname="Rundgren"/>
            <author fullname="B. Jordan" initials="B." surname="Jordan"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <date month="June" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Cryptographic operations like hashing and signing need the data to be expressed in an invariant format so that the operations are reliably repeatable. One way to address this is to create a canonical representation of the data. Canonicalization also permits data to be exchanged in its original form on the "wire" while cryptographic operations performed on the canonicalized counterpart of the data in the producer and consumer endpoints generate consistent results.</t>
              <t>This document describes the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). This specification defines how to create a canonical representation of JSON data by building on the strict serialization methods for JSON primitives defined by ECMAScript, constraining JSON data to the Internet JSON (I-JSON) subset, and by using deterministic property sorting.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9052" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9052.xml">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="August" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
              <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ALTERURI" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme-06">
          <front>
            <title>The 'alter' URI Scheme for Dispatchable ~handle References</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme-06"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IDCOMMITS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-05">
          <front>
            <title>Identity-Attributed Git Commits via Tier-Structured Trailers</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OIDC" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 2</title>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="M. Jones">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author surname="de Medeiros" fullname="B. de Medeiros">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="December"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WEBAUTHN" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/">
          <front>
            <title>Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials, Level 3</title>
            <author>
              <organization>W3C</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="January"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MCPDNS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery-10">
          <front>
            <title>Discovery of Model Context Protocol Servers via DNS TXT Records</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery-10"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC3552" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3552.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <author fullname="B. Korver" initials="B." surname="Korver"/>
            <date month="July" year="2003"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>All RFCs are required to have a Security Considerations section. Historically, such sections have been relatively weak. This document provides guidelines to RFC authors on how to write a good Security Considerations section. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="72"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3552"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3552"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7591" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7591.xml">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="M. Machulak" initials="M." surname="Machulak"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." surname="Hunt"/>
            <date month="July" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines mechanisms for dynamically registering OAuth 2.0 clients with authorization servers. Registration requests send a set of desired client metadata values to the authorization server. The resulting registration responses return a client identifier to use at the authorization server and the client metadata values registered for the client. The client can then use this registration information to communicate with the authorization server using the OAuth 2.0 protocol. This specification also defines a set of common client metadata fields and values for clients to use during registration.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7591"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7591"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8693.xml">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8747" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8747.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="L. Seitz" initials="L." surname="Seitz"/>
            <author fullname="G. Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="March" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT) (which is defined by RFC 8392) that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and CWTs rather than JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and JSON Web Tokens (JWTs).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8747"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8747"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7942.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <date month="July" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
              <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9449" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9449.xml">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access and refresh tokens.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9449"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CONSENT">
          <front>
            <title>Consent-Bound Identity Disclosure with Subject Settlement for HTTP-Native Agent Payments</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="22"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-consent-settlement-07"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TOOLNAMES">
          <front>
            <title>An IANA Registry for Model Context Protocol Tool Surface Names</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="21"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-mcp-tool-surface-names-registry-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AAUTH">
          <front>
            <title>AAuth Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="Dick Hardt">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September" day="25"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="POPPY" target="https://personalagentprotocol.org/docs/0.3/spec">
          <front>
            <title>Personal Agent Protocol, draft 0.3</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Personal Agent Protocol project</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PACE">
          <front>
            <title>PACE: Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="S. Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGENTPROTO">
          <front>
            <title>Architecture for AI Agent Communications on the Internet</title>
            <author fullname="J. Rosenberg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Z. Sarker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="T. Reddy">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="K. Yao">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="D. Liu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Krishnan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="30"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-manyfolks-agentproto-arch-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PACT">
          <front>
            <title>PACT: Private Agent Consent and Trust Profile for OAuth 2.1 and CIBA</title>
            <author fullname="G. Valverde">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="April" day="18"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-valverde-oauth-pact-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="APPROVALREC">
          <front>
            <title>An Approval-Act Record for Standing Authorization Grants</title>
            <author fullname="J. Ashcroft">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="N. Mathews">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ashcroft-approval-record-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KYAOS" target="https://github.com/decentralized-identity/kya-os-mcp">
          <front>
            <title>KYA-OS Protocol Specification, version 1.0.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization>KYA-OS Working Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AUTHMD" target="https://github.com/workos/auth.md">
          <front>
            <title>auth.md</title>
            <author>
              <organization>WorkOS</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="May"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CIMD">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Client ID Metadata Document</title>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Emelia Smith">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WBA">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Message Signatures for Automated Traffic</title>
            <author fullname="T. Meunier">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Major">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="29"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ATPROTO" target="https://atproto.com/specs/handle">
          <front>
            <title>AT Protocol Handle Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Bluesky Social PBC</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DOMVERIFY">
          <front>
            <title>Domain Control Validation using DNS</title>
            <author fullname="S. Sahib">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Huque">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="P. Wouters">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="E. Nygren">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="T. Wicinski">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="June" day="22"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques-13"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DOMAINCONNECT" target="https://www.domainconnect.org/">
          <front>
            <title>Domain Connect</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Domain Connect</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MCP" target="https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28">
          <front>
            <title>Model Context Protocol Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Model Context Protocol</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="July" day="28"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DSDJWT">
          <front>
            <title>Delegate SD-JWT</title>
            <author fullname="G. Oliver">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="26"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="INTENTTOKEN">
          <front>
            <title>The Intent Token - A Credential for Delegated User Intent</title>
            <author fullname="M. Chen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="L. Su">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="P. C. Liu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="19"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-chen-oauth-agent-intent-token-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ASOR">
          <front>
            <title>Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains</title>
            <author fullname="R. Asor">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="27"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BOUNDEDWORK">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work Authorization</title>
            <author fullname="D. Liu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="K. McGuinness">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="17"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CHAINS">
          <front>
            <title>Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents</title>
            <author fullname="S. Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ACTORPROFILE">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation</title>
            <author fullname="K. McGuinness">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="09"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="STIRAGENTIC">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Telephone Identity for Agents</title>
            <author fullname="J. Peterson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-peterson-stir-agentic-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PACEAUTHZ">
          <front>
            <title>PACE Authorization: Delegation and Action Approval</title>
            <author fullname="S. Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DIALOGBIND">
          <front>
            <title>Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE and OAuth Credentials</title>
            <author fullname="T. Reddy">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Z. Sarker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="30"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SIGKEY">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Signature Keys</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="T. Meunier">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September" day="13"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-hardt-httpbis-signature-key-09"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="HTTP402">
          <front>
            <title>The 402 (Payment Required) HTTP Status Code</title>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August" day="30"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nottingham-httpbis-402-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IDCHAIN">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains</title>
            <author fullname="A. Schwenkschuster">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="P. Kasselman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="K. Burgin">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="M. Jenkins">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="A. Parecki">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="12"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AIMS">
          <front>
            <title>AI Identity Management System</title>
            <author fullname="P. Kasselman">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="J. Lombardo">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Y. Rosomakho">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="N. Steele">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="A. Parecki">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CROSSORG">
          <front>
            <title>Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="M. Reece">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August" day="31"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DIRECTPRES">
          <front>
            <title>A reference architecture for direct presentation credential flows</title>
            <author fullname="L. Johansson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="B. Zundel">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="T. Cappalli">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="November" day="04"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-johansson-direct-presentation-arch-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ATTRIB">
          <front>
            <title>Agent Attribution Header Fields</title>
            <author fullname="W. Chuang">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="E. Gustafsson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-chuang-agent-attribution-header-fields-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GONDWANA">
          <front>
            <title>We Are All Individuals</title>
            <author fullname="B. Gondwana">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gondwana-we-are-all-individuals-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="W3CCHARTER" target="https://w3c.github.io/charter-drafts/2026/agenticweb-wg.html">
          <front>
            <title>Agentic Web Working Group Charter (draft)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>W3C</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EVP">
          <front>
            <title>Email Verification Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Goto">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August" day="25"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-hardt-email-verification-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WBAARCH">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Message Signatures for automated traffic Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="T. Meunier">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Major">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="March" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-meunier-web-bot-auth-architecture-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MOLE">
          <front>
            <title>Moderation of unLinkable Endorsements (MOLE) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="S. Schlesinger">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="D. Jackson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="T. Meunier">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-jms-mole-architecture-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PRINCIPALREFS">
          <front>
            <title>Accountable Principal References for Delegated Agent Requests: Properties and Evaluation</title>
            <author fullname="M. Molas">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-molas-agent-principal-refs-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AUDITARCH">
          <front>
            <title>An Architecture for Auditing Agent Delegation and Interactions</title>
            <author fullname="M. Kuehlewind">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September" day="07"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="UCREQ">
          <front>
            <title>Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="T. Reddy">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Z. Sarker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="K. Yao">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements-07"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BME">
          <front>
            <title>The Briefing-and-Binding Envelope: A Delivery Contract for Agent-to-Principal Decision Moments with Dual-Veto Reconciliation</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Whiteside">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="13"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-binding-moment-envelope-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OTCMD">
          <front>
            <title>Authorised and Attributable Agent Authority for Operational-Technology Control Actions</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Whiteside">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="I. Schrock">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="15"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-ot-command-authority-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SCIMSUPER">
          <front>
            <title>SCIM User Supersession and Identity Resolution Correction Events</title>
            <author fullname="Vivek">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="15"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-vivek-scim-user-supersession-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DNSAID">
          <front>
            <title>DNS for AI Discovery</title>
            <author fullname="J. Mozley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="N. Williams">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="B. Sarikaya">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="R. Schott">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="J. Damick">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mozleywilliams-dawn-dnsaid-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FEDRES">
          <front>
            <title>Registry-Assisted Resolution for Known Subjects Without DNS Discovery Anchors</title>
            <author fullname="R. Raskar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Sharaf">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="P. Chari">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ACTORBOUND">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange with Actor-Bound Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="S. Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CROSSOWNER">
          <front>
            <title>Cross-Owner Agent Use Cases and Requirements: Spending, Delegation Depth, Ownership, Disclosure and Retention</title>
            <author fullname="J. Curtis">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-curtis-agentproto-cross-owner-usecases-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CWTREG" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGENTDNSLINK">
          <front>
            <title>Linking an Agent's DNS Name to its OAuth Client</title>
            <author fullname="S. Shankarlingam">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BPSAFE">
          <front>
            <title>Bundle Protocol (BP) Security Associations with Few Exchanges (SAFE)</title>
            <author fullname="B. Sipos">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sipos-dtn-bp-safe-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="NIST80063B">
          <front>
            <title>Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management</title>
            <author>
              <organization>NIST</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-63B-4"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    

<section anchor="document-history">
      <name>Document History</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-acts-for-04 (2026-11-20): a new <xref target="answering"/> bars
the Issuer from resolving a per-site subject or grant address to the
Person without the Person's agreement to that resolution. A
withdrawn grant stops new passes, and no Site holds a valid pass more
than 300 seconds after withdrawal. Privacy Considerations follow it.
Open issues add how the agreement is obtained and resolution
compelled by law. Related Work adds <xref target="PRINCIPALREFS"/>. A new
<xref target="relationship"/> says the document is not a standard and names the
working-group documents on its ground. A new <xref target="adds"/> says what it
adds over them. Security Considerations open with a threat model and
cover a dishonest Issuer. The pass carries the Agent in <tt>act</tt> and its
key in <tt>cnf</tt>, and a Site checks a DPoP proof with each request. The
Site record moves to its own label, <tt>_alter-site</tt>, with the one-time
code at <tt>_alter-challenge</tt>, and no longer departs from <xref target="MCPDNS"/>.
Open issues are answered in the text where IETF 127 and the drafts
around it settle them, and three stay open, each saying why.
Implementation
Status reports the pass. A Site handle excludes any domain with a
label that begins with a digit. The floor key is renamed the
pass-signing key. The pass's <tt>iss</tt> is the Issuer's <tt>https</tt> URL, and a
Site fetches the pass-signing key from the origin it names. References to <xref target="CONSENT"/>, <xref target="PACE"/> and <xref target="IDCHAIN"/> are
updated.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-acts-for-03 (2026-11-18): the privacy text says that
<xref target="STIRAGENTIC"/> REQ-9 names no limits, that the pass does not meet its
second clause, and that carrying <tt>max_value</tt> is
this document's choice. <tt>max_value</tt> is an ordered
limit with a stated comparison, is optional, and is a disclosure with
its risk set out (<xref target="pass"/>, <xref target="privacy"/>). The pass is a single-hop
artefact and its per-site subject is never a chain root or copied
downstream. The pass carries an audience, is bound to the request by
<tt>cnf_jkt</tt>, and is not single use. <tt>max_value</tt> bounds each act with
no total across acts, and binds only a Site that applies it. <xref target="verify"/>
checks <tt>rev</tt>, states the revocation posture with enrolment as a
State-change, takes the reveal surface from <xref target="MCPDNS"/> with the Issuer
holding one copy and acknowledging each reveal, generates the
pre-image on the Site owner's device, bounds the reuse of a published key, and takes freshness
from the claim and the code, with <tt>ts</tt> advisory, under a declared time
source. The privacy text quotes REQ-9 whole and states which joins
the per-site subject does not stop. The <xref target="MCPDNS"/> reference is
revision -10. How the approval-act record
reaches a verifier and the grant address as standing authority are
stated. The per-site subject is recomputed at each sign-in with no
per-Site store, and is the Issuer's (<xref target="subject"/>). A new <xref target="limits"/> names the regimes a pass
does not suit. Open issues add selective disclosure of the limit,
sub-delegation, recovery, succession, conversation records, the
Person's acknowledgement, DNSSEC posture and where a Site record is
revoked. Privacy Considerations
add the unlinkable-credential comparison, payment linking and
source-address joins. Related Work adds newer documents.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-acts-for-02 (2026-11-15): an Agent names a key and a
number of its own for each Site (<xref target="agent"/>, <xref target="privacy"/>), after <xref target="POPPY"/>,
<xref target="PACE"/> and <xref target="PACT"/>. A pass is refused at or past <tt>exp</tt>. The Person is
named as the original principal of <xref target="AGENTPROTO"/>. Related Work adds
<xref target="PACE"/> and <xref target="APPROVALREC"/>. The <xref target="POPPY"/> reference carries no date, as its
page gives none.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-acts-for-01 (2026-11-03): a new Person's first sign-in
opens the account. Related Work adds <xref target="POPPY"/>, <xref target="PACT"/> and <xref target="KYAOS"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-acts-for-00 (2026-10-19): first version.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>None yet.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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