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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-morrison-command-authority-long-delay-00" category="info" submissionType="IETF" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Command Authority Across Long Delay">Command Authority Across Long Delay and Intermittent Contact</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-command-authority-long-delay-00"/>
    <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
      <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
      <address>
        <email>blake@truealter.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
    <abstract>
      

<t>The operational-technology command authority profile defines a Command Authority Envelope with which an enforcement point decides whether a software agent may perform a control action, on whose authority, and with which human approval. This document profiles that envelope for networks where the authority and the enforcement point are separated by round-trip times from about 2.6 seconds to about two weeks, as in the connectivity scenarios of the IP in deep space use-case document. It says how each element of the envelope is evaluated offline, how expiry and maximum age are checked against a declared clock uncertainty, how the revocation latency budget and trust-anchor staleness are declared for each scenario, how a human approval signed before a command departs stays bound to one action, how an outcome that cannot be observed across a contact gap or a reboot is recorded, what an agent may do once the origin has been silent past the revocation latency budget, and how the envelope is carried over the Space Packet Protocol on UDP, CoAP with OSCORE, and HTTP/3. It adds one grant field, with which a principal writes in advance the actions an agent may take during that silence and the interval in which it may take them. It states which way an unknown revocation check fails for each action class, and it adds one declared bound, a second revocation latency budget for the grants that field marks, beside the one budget the profile it builds on has a deployment declare.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <section anchor="the-question">
        <name>The question</name>
        <t>Section 2.1 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> says that spacecraft are controlled from Earth and "should always be manageable from Earth". Section 3 of the same document says that commands "may be time-sensitive, or have an 'expiration date'". Neither section says who may command an asset, or how the asset checks.</t>
        <t><xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> answers that question for operational technology. It defines a Command Authority Envelope (CAE) carrying five bindings (agent identity, principal reference, authorisation grant, binding moment and audit record) and an enforcement point that refuses any agent-originated control action whose required bindings it cannot evaluate. Section 7 of that document requires the envelope to be verifiable offline against cached trust anchors, because many OT environments are segmented from public networks for long, declared intervals. A spacecraft, a habitat or a relay out of contact with Earth is the same case at a longer interval.</t>
        <t>This document profiles the CAE for the connectivity scenarios of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/>. It applies the rules of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> as they stand and adds its own requirements on time (Section 5), on revocation posture (Section 6) and on authority during silence (Section 9). It says what each rule requires when the round-trip time to the party that authorises a command is from about 2.6 seconds to about two weeks.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="relation-to-other-documents">
        <name>Relation to other documents</name>
        <t><xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/> defines the disconnected trust model, the terms used here for held data, staleness bounds and unevaluable checks, and twelve requirements (R1 to R12) that any answer to its questions must meet. This profile is one such answer for command authority. It answers the five questions of Section 5 of that document for the actions it covers, question 3 in Section 9.</t>
        <t>This document is an individual submission. It profiles the scenarios of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> and is offered to the TIPTOP working group for review.</t>
        <t><xref target="SCSP"/> specifies a space command and telemetry security protocol. It already provides, at the frame layer, signatures over a command and its header, a per-key authorisation record naming the spacecraft, virtual channel, application process and command class a ground key may address, with a validity interval (Section 4.5 of <xref target="SCSP"/>), a Key Revocation List signed by a master key with a monotonic sequence number (Section 3.2), replay state kept per key in non-volatile memory (Section 4.4), signed telemetry for success and error (Section 4.7), and an acceptance window for deep-space frames that keeps propagation time apart from clock, ephemeris and margin terms (Section 6.1). This profile cites those mechanisms where it meets them and redefines none of them. <xref target="SCSP"/> authorises a ground controller key. It does not name the person on whose authority a command is sent, it carries no per-action human approval, and it has no state for an outcome that cannot be determined. A CAE can travel inside an SCSP frame (Section 10).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="scope">
        <name>Scope</name>
        <t>This document covers the five CAE bindings, time, revocation, binding moments, unresolved outcomes, authority during silence and carriage. It makes no change to IP, transport, routing or key management, and like Section 7 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> it does not define an outer encoding of the CAE. Everything this profile requires lies on the authority path. The safety carve-out of Section 6 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> applies unchanged.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      

<t>The terms CAE, enforcement point, principal, authorisation grant, binding moment, audit record, and the risk classes Observe, Adjust and State-change are those of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>. Held data, carried evidence, staleness bound, out of contact and unevaluable are those of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/>. The scenario labels CS, LF, LI, MF, MI and SC, and the terms minRTT, maxRTT and holdover, are those of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/>.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Origin:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The place where a command's CAE is assembled and its binding moment is signed, typically a mission operations centre.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Transit time:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The time between a CAE leaving the origin and its evaluation at the enforcement point, including any time it waits in a buffer for a contact.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Silence:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A condition an enforcement point evaluates for a grant. It holds when the enforcement point holds a revocation status for the grant that states a time, and that status has aged past the revocation latency budget both on the enforcement point's clock and on a monotonic counter, determined as Section 9.1 requires.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Contingency grant:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A grant whose silence field (Section 9.2) makes it dormant until silence holds for the grant it names, within an interval it states.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Capping grant:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The grant a contingency grant names. Its coverage and expiry cap the contingency grant, and its revocation ends the contingency grant once the enforcement point receives it.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Contingency budget:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A second revocation latency budget, declared by a deployment as the staleness bound for revocation status relied on by an admission under a contingency grant (Section 9.2).</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="applicability-by-scenario">
      <name>Applicability by Scenario</name>
      <t>Table 1 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> gives minRTT and maxRTT for each scenario. Section 5.1 of that document says that both components of the round-trip time are known in advance, from orbital dynamics and from the contact schedule, and that maxRTT "should be calculated using the actual contact schedule of the mission". The maxRTT column gives the values of Table 1 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/>.</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Scenario</th>
            <th align="left">maxRTT</th>
            <th align="left">What changes for this profile</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">LF</td>
            <td align="left">around 2.6 seconds</td>
            <td align="left">An approver can be asked while the command waits. Echo freshness (Section 10.2) is practical.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">LI</td>
            <td align="left">around 2.6 seconds plus the maximum contact gap</td>
            <td align="left">A CAE can wait in a buffer for the gap. Expiries are sized to it.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">MF</td>
            <td align="left">48 minutes</td>
            <td align="left">Every check is made without the origin.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">MI</td>
            <td align="left">48 minutes plus the maximum contact gap, 6 hours 48 minutes in the use-case example</td>
            <td align="left">As MF, with the gap added to transit time.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CS</td>
            <td align="left">the two-way delay at the farthest planned distance, growing slowly</td>
            <td align="left">Declared values are revisited as the distance grows.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">SC</td>
            <td align="left">the conjunction duration, about two weeks for Mars, plus the maximum two-way propagation delay, where communications are kept active across the conjunction</td>
            <td align="left">Section 4.6 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> records a moratorium during which no commands are sent. Revocation statements issued at the origin do not arrive until it ends.</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>A deployment that claims this profile for a scenario <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> declare, for that scenario:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>its maxRTT, computed from its own contact schedule as Section 5.1 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> describes, and the greatest transit time it expects;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>its time source and that source's uncertainty (Section 5);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the maximum age of the freshness element for each risk class (Section 5);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>its revocation latency budget and its maximum trust-anchor staleness (Section 6);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a staleness bound for each other kind of held data its checks rely on, as R2 and R12 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/> require; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>where it admits contingency grants, its contingency budget (Section 9.2), the monotonic counter it uses to determine silence and whether that counter survives a restart (Section 9.1), and whether the path by which revocation status reaches the enforcement point passes through an agent or through anything an agent controls (Section 9.1).</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>This document sets none of these values.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="the-envelope-bindings-under-long-delay">
      <name>The Envelope Bindings Under Long Delay</name>
      <t>Each binding is evaluated by the enforcement point from held data and carried evidence (R1 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/>). Section 4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> applies as written. A required binding that is absent, malformed, expired, revoked or unverifiable causes refusal, and so does an unevaluable binding.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Agent identity:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The agent's key material is held at the enforcement point with a declared staleness bound. Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> observes that discovery through a reachable resolver is not available to a segmented plant and requires offline verification against cached trust anchors. A deep-space enforcement point is in the same position for at least the scenario's transit time.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Principal reference:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The principal reference is evaluated against held data under its staleness bound. This profile adds no resolution step at the time of decision.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Authorisation grant:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The grant's expiry (G3) is checked as Section 5 requires, and its revocation state (G5) as Section 6 requires. Coverage is evaluated against the specific action. A grant may stand until its expiry and cover more than one action, and each action is admitted only on its own coverage check and, where its class requires one, its own binding moment (Section 3.3 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). A grant may carry a silence field (Section 9.2).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Binding moment:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Section 7.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Audit record:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The enforcement point records its decision and, before forwarding an accepted action, durably records the admission (Section 3.5 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). The admission record also names the held data the decision used, their ages, the staleness bounds in force (R11 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/>) and the declared clock uncertainty. Offline verification of a record needs an inclusion proof and a signed checkpoint covering it, and a verifier unable to obtain a required covering checkpoint or consistency proof cannot declare those checks satisfied (Section 3.5 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). Out of contact, those checks stay unsatisfied until the verifier obtains what it needs.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="expiry-and-maximum-age-under-clock-uncertainty">
      <name>Expiry and Maximum Age Under Clock Uncertainty</name>
      <t>A deployment <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> declare its time source and that source's uncertainty. An enforcement point <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> evaluate every maximum age and every expiry against that uncertainty, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fail closed on authority when the uncertainty exceeds the window being checked. A timestamp that is absent or zero cannot be evaluated, and the action is then refused on authority.</t>
      <t>The uncertainty is that of the enforcement point's own clock, as its deployment declares it. A value carried with a request does not reduce it. Let t be the enforcement point's clock reading and u its declared uncertainty. An expiry E is satisfied only if t + u is earlier than E. A maximum age M on a timestamp T is satisfied only if (t + u) - T is no greater than M and T is no later than t + u. A check that would pass at one instant within t - u to t + u and fail at another fails.</t>
      <t>Section 6.2 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> says that holdover should be expressed as the time until a node's clock uncertainty exceeds what its applications and protocols can tolerate, and that "lifetimes should take this clock uncertainty into account". Under this profile that tolerance is the window being checked. Once u exceeds a window, every check against that window fails closed on authority, and safety functions are unaffected (Section 6 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>).</t>
      <t>An issuer sizes each expiry it sets, on a grant or a binding moment, to exceed the greatest transit time declared for the scenario plus the uncertainty of the enforcement point's clock. The maximum age of the freshness element is declared by the deployment for each risk class (Section 3) and is sized the same way. Where a CAE carries a smaller maximum age, the enforcement point evaluates against the smaller, and it never evaluates against a larger one than the deployment declared. A window smaller than the transit time arrives expired and is refused. Section 7 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> asks the same of certificate renewal, whose lead time should exceed the worst-case one-way delay plus the growth of clock uncertainty. Section 7.1 of <xref target="TIPTOP-ARCH"/> asks that HTTP time headers cover the longest delay. A longer window widens the time in which a captured request can be replayed (Section 11).</t>
      <t>Section 6.1 of <xref target="SCSP"/> computes a deep-space acceptance window for frames as the ground transmit epoch plus the one-way light time, plus or minus separate terms for clock error, ephemeris uncertainty and margin, and requires that these "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be combined into a single static tolerance". That window governs the acceptance of an SCSP frame. The checks of this section govern the CAE the frame carries and are made separately. Where both apply, both pass before dispatch. Section 5.1 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> adds the waiting time before a contact to the propagation delay, and the transit time a CAE's windows cover includes it.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="revocation-latency-and-trust-anchor-staleness-by-scenario">
      <name>Revocation Latency and Trust-Anchor Staleness by Scenario</name>
      <t>Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> requires a deployment to declare its revocation latency budget and its maximum trust-anchor staleness, and forbids letting either gate a safety function.</t>
      <t>Under this profile's revocation posture, when the revocation status of a grant cannot be established within the bound that applies to it, an Observe action <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> proceed and an Adjust or State-change action <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be refused. It attaches nothing else to the action classes. An Observe action proceeds because a grant is not a binding its class requires (Section 5 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). Its required check does not take the grant's revocation status as an input, and no unevaluable check is accepted.</t>
      <t>The bound that applies is the revocation latency budget, with one exception. A deployment that admits contingency grants declares a second budget, the contingency budget, as the bound for revocation status relied on by an admission under a contingency grant (Section 9.2). Under every other grant, and under a contingency grant past its own budget, an Adjust or State-change action whose grant's revocation status cannot be established within the bound is refused. Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> has a deployment declare one budget, and the contingency budget is declared beside it.</t>
      <t>A deployment declares both values for each scenario it claims (Section 3), as durations. Where the links are scheduled contacts, a duration can be derived from the contact plan, for example from a maximum round-trip time. A count of contacts is not a duration and does not meet the requirement. Held data older than its staleness bound is treated as unavailable, and a check that needs it is unevaluable (R3 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/>). A trust anchor past its bound therefore causes refusal of every action whose bindings depend on it, and the approver directory is such an anchor for the binding moment (Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>).</t>
      <t>In SC, a revocation issued at the origin during the moratorium does not reach the enforcement point until the moratorium ends. Where the declared budget is shorter than the conjunction, the revocation status of an Earth-issued grant cannot be established within the bound once the bound has passed, and Adjust and State-change actions under that grant are refused. A deployment that lengthens its budget to span a conjunction keeps honouring a revoked grant for that long (Section 11). Section 9 provides for actions a principal writes in advance for such an interval.</t>
      <t>The means by which held data are replaced or withdrawn is the deployment's. It works over arbitrary delay and intermittence (R9 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/>), and this profile defines none. The Key Revocation List of <xref target="SCSP"/> revokes ground controller keys and accepts a list only if its sequence number exceeds the stored one (Section 3.2 of <xref target="SCSP"/>). It does not express the revocation of a principal's grant, and this profile does not extend it to do so.</t>
      <t>A revocation cannot recall an action already released to the process (Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). Long delay lengthens the interval between the release of an action and the arrival of a revocation, and leaves the rule unchanged.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="binding-moments-signed-before-departure">
      <name>Binding Moments Signed Before Departure</name>
      <t>Under long delay the approving human is at the origin, and the binding moment is signed before the command departs and evaluated when it arrives. The requirements of Section 3.4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> apply without change. The artefact carries the approver's own signature over a digest of the action. The enforcement point verifies it offline against cached key material and the approver directory, under B1 to B5. It carries an expiry, and it is not usable more than once. The artefact also names, by content address, the grant under which the approver acted. That requirement is this profile's addition, and Section 3.4 does not make it. Section 3.5 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> has the admission record name the grant.</t>
      <t>The action is fixed at the origin. The approver signs its asset, verb and parameters, and the enforcement point evaluates and forwards that same fixed action. Section 3.4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> forbids re-reading an action from a mutable structure after a wait, and time in a buffer is a wait of that kind.</t>
      <t>The expiry is sized as Section 5 requires. An enforcement point refuses an artefact presented after its expiry and does not treat a captured approval as valid for any window the artefact does not itself state (Section 3.4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>).</t>
      <t>The enforcement point records each artefact it accepts as spent, and the spend record survives a restart (Section 4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). Spend state held only in volatile memory weakens single use to once per uptime. Section 6.8 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> notes that recovery after a reboot is slow in deep space and that endpoints may keep a state context in permanent memory.</t>
      <t>Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> keep a per-action artefact at the binding moment from becoming a standing authorisation. Commands sent together, as Section 3 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> says related commands may be, each carry their own binding moment where their class requires one.</t>
      <t>Where a deployment requires more than one approver and declares an approval deadline, the deadline is a time check like any other and is evaluated as Section 5 requires. A change to the approver directory, or to the number of approvers required, needs the same approvals as the actions it protects.</t>
      <t><xref target="SCSP"/> binds a hardware attestation nonce to a frame's header and payload (Section 5.2 of <xref target="SCSP"/>) and authorises ground keys by record. It has no per-action human approval. A CAE carried in an SCSP frame keeps its own binding moment.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="unresolved-outcome-across-contact-gaps-conjunction-and-reboot">
      <name>Unresolved Outcome Across Contact Gaps, Conjunction and Reboot</name>
      <t>Section 4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> applies as written. An action that was accepted and dispatched and whose effect the enforcement point cannot determine is unresolved, and is reported neither as performed nor as refused. An unresolved outcome carries no authority forward. A retry is a new control action with its own CAE and, where its class requires one, its own binding moment. Fresh authorisation alone does not permit another attempt at the same unresolved operation. The deployment keeps a stable operation identifier and a durable unresolved state across restart and re-authorisation, and a party holding the identifier can later ask for the recorded outcome.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Reboot:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The admission is durably recorded before the action is forwarded (Section 3.5 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). After a restart, an admission with no outcome record is unresolved, and the enforcement point appends an outcome record saying so. <xref target="SCSP"/> writes its replay watermark to non-volatile memory at execution, after dispatch, and holds the reservation before that in volatile memory (Section 4.4 of <xref target="SCSP"/>). A deployment that carries a CAE in an SCSP frame still writes the admission record before dispatch.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Contact gap:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An outcome report sent from the enforcement point waits for the next contact. Until it arrives, the origin knows that the command was sent and nothing more. When contact resumes, the origin can ask for the recorded outcome by operation identifier. That query dispatches nothing and spends no artefact.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Conjunction:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The same holds for the length of the moratorium. A binding moment dispatched against an outcome that turns out to be unresolved is spent, and an action sent after the conjunction to achieve the same effect needs a new one.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>Signed telemetry from <xref target="SCSP"/> (Section 4.7) is one form an outcome report can take, and an SCSP error for an authorisation failure is a refusal. <xref target="SCSP"/> drops unauthenticated frames silently, and the absence of any report is therefore never evidence of refusal. Signed per-hop custody receipts, where they exist, report custody and do not establish what the process did.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="contingency-and-unattended-authority">
      <name>Contingency and Unattended Authority</name>
      <t>Under Sections 4 to 8, an enforcement point that cannot establish the revocation status of a grant within the revocation latency budget refuses every Adjust and State-change action under that grant (Section 6). Question 3 of Section 5 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/> asks what a node may do when the absence outlasts the bounds it holds. For the actions this profile covers, a principal can write in advance, in a contingency grant capped by a grant it has already issued, the actions an agent may take while the origin is silent and the interval in which it may take them. A contingency grant is dormant until silence holds and admits actions only within bounds the deployment declares. Each action admitted under it is attributed in its admission record to the principal, and is reported to the origin at the next contact. Nothing else is authorised during silence, and safety functions are unaffected (Section 6 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>).</t>
      <t>Under the exception of Section 6, an admission under a contingency grant relies on the revocation status of its capping grant after that status has aged past the revocation latency budget. It does so only within the contingency budget, a second revocation latency budget that the deployment declares for that reliance alone. Under R2 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/>, revocation status relied on by an admission under a contingency grant is its own kind of held data, and the contingency budget is its staleness bound. Within that bound the check is evaluated on inputs that are held and within their bounds (R3 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/>), and no action is admitted on the ground that a check could not be evaluated (R4). The principal chooses which actions may rely on the longer bound, and when, by signing a contingency grant for them. Past the contingency budget the revocation posture of Section 6 refuses, as it refuses past the revocation latency budget under every other grant.</t>
      <section anchor="silence">
        <name>Silence</name>
        <t>Silence is a condition the enforcement point evaluates from a revocation status it holds, and holding no status never establishes it.</t>
        <t>The revocation status the enforcement point relies on for a grant is a statement, signed by the party that issues revocation status for the grant and verifiable offline, that the grant was not revoked as of a time the statement gives. It is a portable proof of no revocation. The enforcement point keeps a copy with each admission record that relies on it, and a verifier can later check the admission against that copy without relying on the enforcement point's word.</t>
        <t>Let T be the latest stated time among the revocation statuses the enforcement point has accepted for the grant. A status with an earlier stated time never replaces one with a later time. The enforcement point keeps T in non-volatile memory, and no restore of held data lowers it. <xref target="SCSP"/> keeps the sequence number of its Key Revocation List in the same way (Section 3.2 of <xref target="SCSP"/>), and R9 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/> requires that a late or repeated update not corrupt held state.</t>
        <t>When it accepts the status that states T, the enforcement point records the reading r of a monotonic counter that no command sets, and the time t' it assigns to that moment. t' is the greater of two values. The first is its clock reading at that moment. The second is the latest t' it has recorded plus the counter's advance since that record, or that t' alone where the counter has restarted since. The enforcement point keeps the latest t' in non-volatile memory with the counter reading taken at that record, and no restore of held data lowers that t'. It also records the status's age at acceptance, a, equal to (t' + u) - T, or zero where that is negative. Let t and u be as in Section 5, m the counter's current reading and B the revocation latency budget. Silence holds for the grant only when all of the following hold:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>the enforcement point holds a revocation status for the grant that states a time T;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>(t - u) - T is greater than B; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>m - r is greater than B.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>A wall clock set forward, by an on-path delay in a time exchange or by a command that resets it, can satisfy item 2. It cannot satisfy item 3, because the counter has not advanced, and a forward displacement causes refusals only. A wall clock set back by the same means does not lower t' below the latest recorded t' plus the counter's advance since. A status held back in transit and accepted while the clock is set back therefore still has its age measured from that floor. Where the counter has restarted since the latest record, the floor is that t' with no advance, and a clock set back to a time between it and the true time lies outside the declared uncertainty (Section 13). Where no t' has been recorded, t' is the clock reading alone, and a displacement at that moment lies outside the declared uncertainty as well. Section 5 of <xref target="RFC9175"/> directs a server to use a monotonic clock, permits time since reboot, and requires values created before a reset of that timer to be rejected. A counter that does not survive a restart starts again at the restart. A status accepted before the restart then has no reading on the counter, silence cannot be established from it, and nothing is admitted on it until a status accepted after the restart has aged past B on the counter. The deployment declares its counter and whether it survives a restart (Section 3).</t>
        <t>Where the enforcement point holds no revocation status for the grant, or the status it holds states no time, silence does not hold. Where item 2 or item 3 fails, or where (t + u) - T is greater than B and (t - u) - T is not, the revocation status cannot be established within the budget and silence cannot be established either. Adjust and State-change actions under the grant, and under any contingency grant it caps, are then refused.</t>
        <t>Silence makes no claim about whether the origin can be reached. It ends when a revocation status for the grant arrives that is within the budget, by the means the deployment uses to replace held data (Section 6).</t>
        <t>Silence requires only that no newer status arrive, and any party on the path by which revocation status reaches the enforcement point can withhold one. It can then wake a contingency grant whose interval has begun, and hold a revocation off until the contingency budget passes. Where that path passes through the agent a contingency grant names, or through anything that agent controls, the party the grant benefits can produce its own silence. A deployment declares whether its path does so (Section 3). Where it does, an enforcement point <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> admit any action under a contingency grant naming that agent. That declaration is the deployment's own, and Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> treats the operator, who may also run the agent, as a potential adversary. The interval the principal signs into the contingency grant (Section 9.2) does not rest on that declaration. Whoever produces the silence, nothing is admitted under the grant outside that interval.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-silence-field">
        <name>The silence field</name>
        <t>A grant <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> carry a silence field, stating what the grant authorises during silence. The field is part of the grant, covered by the principal's signature (G1) and by the grant's content address (G4). Its value is Lapse or Contingency.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Lapse:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The grant authorises nothing during silence beyond what Sections 4 to 8 allow. Adjust and State-change actions under it are refused (Section 6). A grant without a silence field has this value.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Contingency:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The grant is a contingency grant. The field names its capping grant by content address and states an interval, as a start time and an end time. The contingency grant authorises actions only while silence holds for its capping grant and the interval contains the time, and is dormant at all other times.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The interval is the principal's signed statement of when it expects to be out of contact. A verifier can check it offline against the admission record, and its truth does not rest on what the enforcement point failed to receive. Section 4.6 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> says that solar conjunctions are predictable years in advance, and Section 5.1 that the contact schedule is known ahead. Silence outside the interval wakes nothing, and a party that withholds contact outside it causes only the refusals of Section 6. A principal that states a wide interval accepts that any silence within it, whatever its cause, wakes the grant.</t>
        <t>This profile defines the meaning of the field and no representation of it. Section 3.3 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> states requirements for a grant and mandates no one grant object. A grant artefact <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry the contingency value as a critical element of its signed container. A verifier that does not understand a critical element treats the artefact as invalid. In COSE, the "crit" header parameter lists the protected header parameters that an application processing a message is required to understand (Section 3.1 of <xref target="RFC9052"/>). A JWS whose "crit" header parameter lists an extension the recipient does not understand and support is invalid (Section 4.1.11 of <xref target="RFC7515"/>). The silence field is then a protected header parameter listed in the critical element. A grant format with no critical element <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry the contingency value. An enforcement point that does not implement this section therefore finds a contingency grant invalid and admits nothing under it, as G6 requires of any requirement it cannot meet.</t>
        <t>A contingency grant meets G1 to G6 in its own right, and its capping grant <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> itself be a contingency grant. Its coverage <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> exceed that of its capping grant. It names the same agent, and every asset and verb it names is one the capping grant names. An enforcement point <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse every action under a contingency grant whose coverage exceeds its capping grant's. An action is covered by a contingency grant only where it falls within the coverage of both, evaluated against the specific action (Section 3.3 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). The expiry of each grant is evaluated as Section 5 requires, and a contingency grant authorises nothing once either has expired. A revocation of the capping grant ends every contingency grant that names it, once the enforcement point receives it.</t>
        <t>A contingency grant is signed by the principal that signed its capping grant (G1). An enforcement point <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that both grants carry the same principal reference, and that both signatures verify against key material it holds for that principal within its staleness bound at the time of admission. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify in the same way that both grants name the same agent, and that the agent's key material is within its staleness bound. The admission record names the key identifiers used. Attribution is read from that record and never by resolving a reference again.</t>
        <t>A deployment that admits contingency grants <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> declare a contingency budget, as a duration (Section 3). It is the staleness bound for revocation status relied on by an admission under a contingency grant, for that grant and for its capping grant. It is a revocation latency budget in the sense of Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>, and the revocation posture of Section 6 applies under it as written. Silence needs (t - u) - T to exceed the revocation latency budget, and admission needs (t + u) - T to be no greater than the contingency budget. Nothing is admitted unless the contingency budget exceeds the revocation latency budget plus twice the declared clock uncertainty. In SC, a deployment can declare a contingency budget that spans the moratorium (Section 4.6 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/>). Its other grants still lapse at the revocation latency budget, and the longer bound applies only to revocation status relied on by an admission under a contingency grant (Section 11).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="admission-during-silence">
        <name>Admission during silence</name>
        <t>An enforcement point <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse every action presented under a contingency grant while silence does not hold for its capping grant, or while the interval the contingency grant states does not contain every instant from t - u to t + u. While both hold, it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> admit an action under a contingency grant unless all of the following hold:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>the agent the two grants name presents the action, the action is covered, and the principal and the agent are verified, each as Section 9.2 requires;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>neither grant has expired, evaluated as Section 5 requires;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>for the revocation status relied on for each grant, with T, r and a as Section 9.1 defines them for that grant, (t + u) - T and (m - r) + a are each no greater than the contingency budget, and neither grant is revoked;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the revocation status relied on for each grant states a time no earlier than the grant's issuance or the start of its validity, as the grant states it, and nothing is admitted under a grant that states neither;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the enforcement point received the contingency grant before silence began for its capping grant, as its own receipt record shows;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the deployment does not declare that the path by which revocation status reaches the enforcement point passes through the agent or through anything the agent controls (Section 9.1);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>every other binding the action's risk class requires is present and valid, each held datum within its own staleness bound (Sections 4 and 6); and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>where the class requires a binding moment, the binding moment names the contingency grant by content address and meets Section 7.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Item 3 measures the age of each status on both the clock and the counter, and a is measured from a t' that the counter keeps from falling back (Section 9.1). A clock set back after a status was accepted therefore cannot stretch reliance on that status past the contingency budget. The same holds for a clock set back before acceptance, where a t' was recorded before the displacement and the counter has not restarted since. Section 9.1 sets out the displacements that lie outside the declared uncertainty (Section 13). Under item 4 a status that predates a grant says nothing about it. Under item 5 a contingency grant that first arrives as carried evidence during silence wakes nothing, even when a compromised principal key signed it.</t>
        <t>Silence lowers no risk class and waives no binding, and an action's class is never downgraded to avoid one (Section 5 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). A State-change action admitted during silence carries a binding moment signed before departure for that exact action, with an expiry sized to cover the silence it provides for (Section 5), and the binding moment is spent on first use (Section 7). A binding moment that names the capping grant does not satisfy item 8. A binding moment that names a contingency grant is usable only during silence and within the grant's interval, because the grant it names is dormant at all other times. Silence is produced by whoever can withhold revocation status (Section 9.1). An approver who signs a binding moment naming a contingency grant approves that action for any silence within the interval, whatever its cause.</t>
        <t>Like any other grant, a contingency grant may stand until its expiry and cover more than one action. Each action is admitted on its own coverage check and, where its class requires one, its own binding moment, and no binding moment admitted under a contingency grant becomes a standing authorisation (Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). Silence confers no authority of its own. During silence an enforcement point admits an Adjust or State-change action only under a contingency grant.</t>
        <t>An action admitted during silence whose outcome cannot be determined is unresolved (Section 8). Another attempt is a new action, subject to the rule of Section 4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> on another attempt at an unresolved operation, and is admitted during silence only under the conditions above.</t>
        <t>The admission record (Section 4) of an action admitted under a contingency grant names both grants by content address and the key identifiers used. It records that silence held, with T, r, a and m for each grant, the interval, the revocation latency budget, the contingency budget and the declared clock uncertainty. It keeps a copy of the revocation status relied on for each grant.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="attribution-and-reporting">
        <name>Attribution and reporting</name>
        <t>An action admitted under a contingency grant is attributed in its admission record, at admission, to the principal that signed the grant, to the agent it names and, where its class required a binding moment, to the approver who signed that binding moment. The enforcement point <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> record silence, or any other party, as the authority for the action.</t>
        <t>The enforcement point <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include each admission made under a contingency grant, with its operation identifier and its recorded outcome, in the first report it sends to the origin after the admission. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include it again in every later report until the origin acknowledges it by operation identifier. The obligation does not wait for silence to end. A capping grant that expires during silence, or whose issuer publishes no further status for it, never leaves silence, and the admissions under it are reported all the same. The origin can ask for the recorded outcome of each by its operation identifier (Section 8). Offline verification of those records needs what Section 4 describes, and the checks stay unsatisfied until the verifier obtains it.</t>
        <t>A revocation that arrives after an action was admitted does not recall the action (Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). The admission record shows the revocation status the enforcement point held when it admitted the action. Once silence has ended the contingency grant is dormant again, and a later silence is determined afresh from the revocation status then held.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="when-every-bound-has-passed">
        <name>When every bound has passed</name>
        <t>Once the contingency budget has passed for a contingency grant or its capping grant, once either has expired, once the contingency grant's interval has ended, or where the enforcement point holds no contingency grant, no grant authorises an Adjust or State-change action, and each is refused (Section 4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>). An Observe action proceeds only while the bindings its class requires can still be evaluated, and once the agent's key material is past its staleness bound, Observe actions are refused as well. Once the declared clock uncertainty exceeds a window, every check against that window fails (Section 5).</t>
        <t>The enforcement point <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> lengthen a bound, admit under a contingency grant past its budget or expiry, or treat continued silence as authority. A bound or a grant changes only by held data that arrive by the deployment's means of replacing them (Section 6). Outcomes that cannot be determined stay unresolved until they can be reconciled (Section 8). Safety functions are not agent-originated control actions and continue unaffected (Section 6 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>).</t>
        <t>Every action this profile covers is gated on authority (R6 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/>). As in Section 6 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>, this profile makes no action fail open where refusing it is the harm. A deployment provides for an action that has to happen during silence by issuing a contingency grant for it in advance. An action a system takes to protect itself or people is a safety function, outside this profile.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="carriage">
      <name>Carriage</name>
      <t>Section 7 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> requires an encoding of the CAE to be verifiable offline, to carry a freshness element (a nonce and a timestamp with a declared maximum age), and to ride above the transport security of the underlying session without weakening it. Every carriage below meets those requirements in the same way. The CAE travels with the command as application data, and the enforcement point evaluates it before the command reaches the process.</t>
      <t>Section 7 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> does not specify the concrete outer encoding of the CAE, that is, how the five bindings are serialised together into one structure, and names it as a decision its current revision leaves open. That decision belongs to that document. This profile takes whatever encoding it defines and adds no requirement to it. Every check in this profile is made on the bindings and the silence field after decoding, and none depends on how they are serialised.</t>
      <section anchor="space-packet-protocol-over-udp">
        <name>Space Packet Protocol over UDP</name>
        <t>Section 7.2 of <xref target="TIPTOP-ARCH"/> says that a mission operations centre often uses the CCSDS Space Packet Protocol to send commands, that much common software already supports it over UDP/IP, and that command applications are "already designed for space communications use cases". Neither protocol says anything about authority. Link security below them protects frames, and the CAE carries the authority. Where a deployment uses <xref target="SCSP"/>, a CAE <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> travel as the command payload of an SCSP frame. SCSP's signature, authorisation record and replay window then apply to the frame, the checks of this profile apply to the CAE, and both pass before dispatch.</t>
        <t>An SCSP command class is a mission-profile defined string in a key's Authorization Policy Record, naming what that key may address (Section 4.5 of <xref target="SCSP"/>). It states nothing about physical consequence. The risk class of each action carried in an SCSP frame is assigned by the deployment from its process hazard analysis, as Section 5 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> requires of every action. An authorisation record that admits a command class at the frame layer neither sets nor lowers that risk class, and an enforcement point does not downgrade a class to avoid a binding requirement (Section 5 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="coap-with-oscore">
        <name>CoAP with OSCORE</name>
        <t>Section 7.1.1 of <xref target="TIPTOP-ARCH"/> names CoAP <xref target="RFC7252"/> as a candidate application protocol for space. OSCORE <xref target="RFC8613"/> "provides end-to-end protection between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP" and supports a range of proxy operations, and the protection holds across relays. Over CoAP, this profile has the enforcement point obtain the freshness of a request through the Echo option of <xref target="RFC9175"/>, because a CoAP server "is, in general, not able to verify when the request was sent", even under a security protocol (Section 2.1 of <xref target="RFC9175"/>). An Echo exchange costs a round trip, at least minRTT and up to maxRTT. Where that exceeds the maximum age of the action, the CAE's own timestamp, checked as Section 5 requires, is the freshness element. The timestamp lies under the signature of the party that assembled the CAE at the origin. Because a party that delays the request cannot sign it again, the timestamp bounds that delay. Where the enforcement point can establish freshness by neither, it acts on no authority and the action is refused (Section 5).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="http3">
        <name>HTTP/3</name>
        <t>HTTP/3 <xref target="RFC9114"/> maps HTTP semantics over QUIC. Section 6.3 of <xref target="TIPTOP-ARCH"/> says that QUIC stacks in their default configurations will not work in deep space, and Section 7.1 says that HTTP time headers such as Expires must be large enough to cover the longest delay. Those headers govern caching. The CAE's expiries are its own and are evaluated as Section 5 requires. QUIC authenticates the connection, and the proof of authority is the CAE in the request.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The considerations of Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> and Section 9 of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/> apply. Long delay adds the considerations below.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Delay attacks:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Section 2.1 of <xref target="RFC9175"/> notes that delayed requests are "particularly perilous in the case of actuators". An attacker who can hold a CAE and release it later can use the whole window the issuer allowed for transit. Section 10 of <xref target="TIPTOP-ARCH"/> notes the opposite case, that an attacker on a path with long delays and several routes might inject packets that arrive sooner than legitimate ones. An older revocation status replayed ahead of a newer one is such a packet, and Section 9.1 never lets it lower T. The window is bounded by the CAE's expiry and maximum age, evaluated against the enforcement point's declared uncertainty (Section 5), and a binding moment is spent on first use (Section 7).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Replay out of buffers:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Intermediate nodes buffer data for a long time (<xref target="TIPTOP-ARCH"/> Section 10). A copy of a CAE held in a buffer can be presented again. A binding moment presented twice is refused on its spend record. An Observe or Adjust action without a binding moment is bounded by its nonce and maximum age, and nonce protection lasts only as long as the enforcement point remembers the nonces it has accepted. State lost at a restart reopens the window, as Section 4 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> observes of spend state. An enforcement point <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> keep its record of accepted nonces across a restart for at least the declared maximum age of the freshness element, or <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refuse every CAE whose timestamp is earlier than its last restart. Section 5 of <xref target="RFC9175"/> requires the same of Echo values created before a timer reset. The per-key replay window of <xref target="SCSP"/> (Section 4.4) is a separate bound at the frame layer.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Buffered data at rest:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Section 10 of <xref target="TIPTOP-ARCH"/> says that data at rest in a buffer becomes available to an attacker who compromises the node. A buffered CAE reveals the agent, the principal reference, the grant reference, the asset and the verb. Its signatures stop the attacker forging a new one, and a captured copy can still be replayed within its windows. Confidentiality in transit and at rest comes from the carriage, for example OSCORE, BPSec, or SCSP's AEAD payload encryption.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Clock manipulation:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A declared uncertainty bounds only the error the deployment knows about. A clock displaced without the deployment's knowledge lies outside it. An on-path delay in a time exchange can shift a clock by half the delay with no sign in the protocol, and Section 6.2 of <xref target="TIPTOP-UC"/> notes that two-way offset estimation is biased by asymmetry between the forward and return paths. An enforcement point whose clock is set back accepts expired artefacts (Section 13). One whose clock is set forward fails its expiries and maximum ages sooner. It cannot make silence hold, because Section 9.1 also requires the time elapsed on a monotonic counter to pass the budget, and a clock set back after the enforcement point has recorded a t', with no restart of its counter since, cannot stretch the contingency budget (Section 9.3).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Withheld contact:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An attacker who keeps an enforcement point out of contact past its revocation budget causes Adjust and State-change actions under its grants to be refused. Section 8 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/> records this cost of refusing where authority cannot be verified. The same attacker wakes every contingency grant whose capping grant falls silent within the interval the contingency grant states, and gains nothing outside it (Section 9.2). Where the agent a contingency grant names sits on the path by which revocation status arrives, it could produce that silence itself and hold a revocation off. Section 9.1 refuses every admission under such a grant. A principal therefore writes into a contingency grant only actions it accepts being taken whenever its capping grant falls silent within the interval, whatever the cause. Safety functions are unaffected.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Lengthened bounds:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A budget or staleness bound lengthened to span a conjunction widens the time in which a revoked grant or a replaced anchor is still honoured. A deployment that does so states it in its declaration. A contingency budget is such a bound for revocation status relied on by an admission under a contingency grant. A revocation of either grant that the enforcement point has not received is honoured until that budget passes or the contingency grant's interval ends.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Safety:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A safety function <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be gated on any binding in this profile, and a safety action that a system would take autonomously <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> remain takeable when every authority is unreachable (Section 6 of <xref target="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY"/>).</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>A buffered CAE names an agent and the principal on whose authority it acts, and anyone with access to the buffer can read an unencrypted one. The audit record holds who commanded what, and it is kept for review after contact resumes. The privacy considerations of <xref target="DISCONNECTED-TRUST"/> apply. A deployment carries the least identifying evidence the checks need and bounds the retention and the readers of its records.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-issues">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Every expiry and maximum age of Sections 5 and 7 rests on the enforcement point's own clock. A clock set back without the deployment's knowledge lies outside the declared uncertainty and accepts expired artefacts (Section 11). Whether a profile can require more against that displacement without new mechanism is open. Silence and admission under a contingency grant also rest on a monotonic counter (Section 9), and this issue reaches them only through a displacement before any t' is recorded, or one that stays above the latest recorded t' after the counter has restarted (Section 9.1).</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-ot-command-authority/">
          <front>
            <title>Authorised and Attributable Agent Authority for Operational-Technology Control Actions</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Whiteside">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="I. Schrock">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="15"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-ot-command-authority-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DISCONNECTED-TRUST" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-tiptop-disconnected-trust/">
          <front>
            <title>A Disconnected Trust Model for Networks Without Continuous Connectivity</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-tiptop-disconnected-trust-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TIPTOP-UC" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tiptop-usecase/">
          <front>
            <title>IP in Deep Space: Key Characteristics, Use Cases and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="M. Blanchet">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="W. Eddy">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="M. Eubanks">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="28"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tiptop-usecase-04"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7252" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7252.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)</title>
            <author fullname="Z. Shelby" initials="Z." surname="Shelby"/>
            <author fullname="K. Hartke" initials="K." surname="Hartke"/>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <date month="June" year="2014"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained (e.g., low-power, lossy) networks. The nodes often have 8-bit microcontrollers with small amounts of ROM and RAM, while constrained networks such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) often have high packet error rates and a typical throughput of 10s of kbit/s. The protocol is designed for machine- to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation.</t>
              <t>CoAP provides a request/response interaction model between application endpoints, supports built-in discovery of services and resources, and includes key concepts of the Web such as URIs and Internet media types. CoAP is designed to easily interface with HTTP for integration with the Web while meeting specialized requirements such as multicast support, very low overhead, and simplicity for constrained environments.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7252"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7252"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7515.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8613" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8613.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)</title>
            <author fullname="G. Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"/>
            <author fullname="J. Mattsson" initials="J." surname="Mattsson"/>
            <author fullname="F. Palombini" initials="F." surname="Palombini"/>
            <author fullname="L. Seitz" initials="L." surname="Seitz"/>
            <date month="July" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCORE provides end-to-end protection between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP. OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a range of proxy operations, including translation between different transport protocols.</t>
              <t>Although an optional functionality of CoAP, OSCORE alters CoAP options processing and IANA registration. Therefore, this document updates RFC 7252.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8613"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8613"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9052" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9052.xml">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="August" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
              <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9114" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9114" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9114.xml">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP/3</title>
            <author fullname="M. Bishop" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Bishop"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The QUIC transport protocol has several features that are desirable in a transport for HTTP, such as stream multiplexing, per-stream flow control, and low-latency connection establishment. This document describes a mapping of HTTP semantics over QUIC. This document also identifies HTTP/2 features that are subsumed by QUIC and describes how HTTP/2 extensions can be ported to HTTP/3.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9114"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9114"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9175" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9175">
          <front>
            <title>Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP): Echo, Request-Tag, and Token Processing</title>
            <author initials="C." surname="Amsuess">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Preuss Mattsson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="G." surname="Selander">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9175"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9175"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TIPTOP-ARCH" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tiptop-ip-architecture/">
          <front>
            <title>An Architecture for IP in Deep Space</title>
            <author fullname="M. Blanchet">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="W. Eddy">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="T. Li">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="October" day="31"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tiptop-ip-architecture-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SCSP" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dua-scsp-space-uri/">
          <front>
            <title>The 'scsp' Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Scheme and Space Command &amp; Telemetry Security Protocol (SCSP)</title>
            <author fullname="K. Dua">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="K. Kanojia">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="September" day="04"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-dua-scsp-space-uri-00"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    

<section anchor="document-history">
      <name>Document History</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-command-authority-long-delay-00 (2026-11-18): first version. Profiles the Command Authority Envelope for the deep-space connectivity scenarios. Covers applicability by scenario, the five bindings, time checks under declared clock uncertainty, revocation and anchor staleness by scenario, binding moments signed before departure, unresolved outcomes across gaps and reboot, contingency grants dormant until silence and what an enforcement point may do once every bound has passed (answering question 3 of the disconnected trust model), and carriage over SPP/UDP, CoAP with OSCORE and HTTP/3, with SCSP command classes kept apart from risk classes and the outer encoding left to the profile this one builds on.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>None yet.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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