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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-morrison-did-alter-method-01" category="info" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="The did:alter DID Method">The did:alter Decentralized Identifier Method</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-did-alter-method-01"/>
    <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
      <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
      <address>
        <email>blake@truealter.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
    <abstract>
      

<t>This document specifies the <tt>did:alter</tt> Decentralized Identifier
method.  A <tt>did:alter</tt> identifier names a <tt>~handle</tt> together with the
DNS zone that publishes the handle's signed envelope, and it resolves
to a DID document by running the envelope recognition procedure of
the companion specification for discovering Model Context Protocol
servers through DNS TXT records, then expressing the verified
envelope's Ed25519 key as a verification method.  The identifier
agrees with the handle grammar of the <tt>alter</tt> URI scheme and with the
<tt>did:alter</tt> form already written by the identity-attributed commits
specification.  The method defines no record, cryptographic primitive
or registry of its own.  Its create, update and deactivate operations
publish, replace and revoke that envelope, and its read operation
verifies it.  The document also sets
out what the method cannot yet do, because the envelope record it
reads carries no key history, and revocation cannot presently be
observed from DNS alone.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>A <tt>~handle</tt> is a textual identity reference with a tier read from its
lexical form <xref target="ALTER-URI"/>.  Its key is published in a signed envelope
at <tt>_alter.&lt;zone&gt;</tt>, and a resolver recognises the handle by
retrieving that record, validating it under DNSSEC <xref target="RFC4033"/> and
checking the envelope signature <xref target="MCPDNS"/>.  The <tt>alter:</tt> URI is the
dispatchable form of the same reference for operating-system
handlers.</t>
      <t>Software built on Decentralized Identifiers <xref target="DID-CORE"/> cannot use
either form directly.  A verifier of Verifiable Credentials, a wallet,
or any component that expects a DID needs a DID method that says how
the identifier is spelled, how it is resolved to a DID document, and
what the security and privacy properties of that resolution are.
This document defines that method for handles.</t>
      <t>The method defines:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>the <tt>did:alter</tt> method-specific identifier, in ABNF, built from the
handle grammar of <xref target="ALTER-URI"/> and the organisational scope that
names the publishing zone (Section 3);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the DID document a resolver produces from a verified envelope
(Section 4);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the create, read, update and deactivate operations, each in terms
of the envelope record and procedure of <xref target="MCPDNS"/> (Section 5);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the security and privacy considerations those operations inherit,
and the ones they add (Sections 7 and 8).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>It does not define a new record, a new key type, a service type, a
caveat surface or a fallback resolution path.  Where <xref target="MCPDNS"/> leaves
something unspecified, such as where a revocation is published, this
document leaves it unspecified too and says what a resolver can and
cannot conclude.</t>
      <t>The author's company is the only organisation behind the envelope record <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, the
<tt>alter:</tt> URI scheme <xref target="ALTER-URI"/> and this method.  The author's own
software contains no resolver that performs the read operation of
Section 5.2, and the author's own service writes <tt>did:alter:</tt> strings
into credentials in forms that Section 3.2 does not admit (Open
Issue 5).  The author knows of no party outside the company that
publishes an envelope for a handle or resolves a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID.
This revision describes the method ahead of any deployment.</t>
      <t>Four related DID methods are summarised here, each from its own
specification.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><tt>did:web</tt>: the method-specific identifier "is a fully qualified
domain name that is secured by a TLS/SSL certificate with an
optional path to the DID document", and the method "does not
specify any authentication or authorization mechanism for writing
to, removing or creating the DID Document" <xref target="DID-WEB"/>.  A
<tt>did:alter</tt> DID reads a signed envelope from a DNS record
validated under DNSSEC, and no web server document is involved.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>did:dns</tt>: the method-specific identifier "is a fully qualified
domain name", resolution "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use DNSSEC", and the verification
methods are built from URI resource records named
<tt>_&lt;id&gt;._did.&lt;method-specific-id&gt;</tt> <xref target="DID-DNS"/>.  A <tt>did:alter</tt> DID
names a handle together with a zone, reads one TXT record, and
makes DNSSEC validation and signature verification mandatory
(Section 5.2).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>did:plc</tt>: control "rests in a set of reconfigurable rotation keys
pairs", the identifier is the hash of the initial operation, and "a
central directory server collects and validates operations, and
maintains a transparent log of operations for each DID"
<xref target="DID-PLC"/>.  A <tt>did:alter</tt> DID has no directory server and no
operation log, and Section 6 records the key-history gap that
follows.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><tt>did:key</tt>: "reading a <tt>did:key</tt> value is a matter of
deterministically expanding the value to a DID Document", and the
method "does not support updating the DID Document" or
deactivating it <xref target="DID-KEY"/>.  A <tt>did:alter</tt> DID changes key when
its published envelope is replaced, with no continuity
(Section 7.2).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The examples use the handles <tt>~alice</tt>, <tt>~carol</tt> and <tt>~acme</tt>, and
zones under the <tt>example</tt> name reserved for documentation.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      

<dl>
        <dt>DID terms</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>DID, DID document, DID URL, DID resolver, verification method,
DID resolution metadata and DID document metadata are used as
<xref target="DID-CORE"/> defines them.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>~handle</tt></dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A textual identity reference beginning with U+007E TILDE, with its
tier (Sovereign, Bot or Instrument) determined by its lexical form,
as defined by the <tt>handle-name</tt> production of <xref target="ALTER-URI"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Zone</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The DNS zone under which a handle's envelope is published at the
owner name <tt>_alter.&lt;zone&gt;</tt>.  In an <tt>alter:</tt> URI the zone is the
<tt>org-scope</tt> component <xref target="ALTER-URI"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Envelope</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The signed identity record retrieved from <tt>_alter.&lt;zone&gt;</tt>, with the
seven required fields <tt>v</tt>, <tt>h</tt>, <tt>pk</tt>, <tt>ilr</tt>, <tt>ts</tt>, <tt>rev</tt> and <tt>sig</tt>
            <xref target="MCPDNS"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Recognition</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The procedure of <xref target="MCPDNS"/> that retrieves, DNSSEC-validates and
signature-verifies an envelope for a given zone and handle.  An
envelope that procedure treats as verified is a verified envelope.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>did:alter</tt> DID</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A DID whose method name is <tt>alter</tt> and whose method-specific
identifier conforms to Section 3.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="method-specific-identifier">
      <name>Method-Specific Identifier</name>
      <section anchor="method-name">
        <name>Method Name</name>
        <t>The method name is <tt>alter</tt>.  A DID that uses this method begins with
the string <tt>did:alter:</tt>, in lowercase, as <xref target="DID-CORE"/> requires.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="syntax">
        <name>Syntax</name>
        <t>The method-specific identifier carries a handle and, optionally, the
zone that publishes it.  The following ABNF <xref target="RFC5234"/> defines it.
<tt>handle-name</tt> and <tt>org-scope</tt> are the productions of the same names
in Section 3.3 of <xref target="ALTER-URI"/>, imported without change.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
alter-did      = "did:alter:" alter-msid
alter-msid     = tilde handle-name [ at zone ]

tilde          = "~" / "%7E"
                 ; the handle prefix of [ALTER-URI]
at             = "@" / "%40"
                 ; introduces the zone, as "@" introduces
                 ; org-scope in [ALTER-URI]
zone           = org-scope
                 ; the publishing zone, at most 253 octets

alter-did-url  = alter-did [ "#" key-fragment ]
key-fragment   = "key-" 1*DIGIT
                 ; names the verification method of Section 4
]]></artwork>
        <t>The percent-encoded spelling <xref target="RFC3986"/>, <tt>%7E</tt> for "~" and <tt>%40</tt> for
"@", is the canonical form of a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID.  It is the only
spelling that meets the <tt>idchar</tt> production of <xref target="DID-CORE"/>, as that
production admits neither "~" nor "@".  Every DID a resolver or publisher emits,
and every <tt>id</tt>, <tt>controller</tt> and verification method identifier in a
DID document, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the canonical form.</t>
        <t>The literal spelling is the display form.  It is the form written by
<xref target="IDCOMMITS"/> and by the <tt>alter:</tt> URI, and an application <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> show a
<tt>did:alter</tt> DID to a person in its display form.  A resolver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
accept either spelling on input and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> convert it to the canonical
form as Section 3.4 states before any other step.</t>
        <t>The handle and zone are ASCII.  A non-ASCII character in either <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
cause the resolver to return the <tt>invalidDid</tt> error of <xref target="DID-CORE"/>.</t>
        <t>This document defines no path and no query for a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID URL.
A DID URL carrying either is not defined by this document, and a
resolver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> dereference it as though the path or query were
absent.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="examples">
        <name>Examples</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
did:alter:%7Ealice%40alice.example
did:alter:%7Eacme%40acme.example
did:alter:%7Ecarol%40carol.acme.example
did:alter:%7Ealice%40alice.example#key-1767225600
did:alter:%7Ealice
]]></artwork>
        <t>The first three name a Sovereign-tier handle published under its own
zone.  The fourth is a DID URL naming the verification method of
Section 4.  The fifth carries no zone.  <xref target="IDCOMMITS"/> admits that form,
and it resolves only as Section 5.2 allows.  Their display
forms are <tt>did:alter:~alice@alice.example</tt>,
<tt>did:alter:~acme@acme.example</tt>, <tt>did:alter:~carol@carol.acme.example</tt>,
<tt>did:alter:~alice@alice.example#key-1767225600</tt> and
<tt>did:alter:~alice</tt>.</t>
        <t>The corresponding <tt>alter:</tt> URI <xref target="ALTER-URI"/> is the display form with
the <tt>did:</tt> prefix dropped, for example <tt>alter:~alice@alice.example</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="normalisation-and-equivalence">
        <name>Normalisation and Equivalence</name>
        <t>Before comparing two <tt>did:alter</tt> DIDs, or using one as a cache key,
a resolver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> normalise each to the canonical form, by encoding
"~" as <tt>%7E</tt> and "@" as <tt>%40</tt>, writing every percent-encoded
hexadecimal digit in uppercase, and converting the zone to
lowercase.  Two DIDs are equivalent when their normalised
forms are identical octet for octet.</t>
        <t>The handle is compared exactly, without case folding.  Neither
<xref target="ALTER-URI"/> nor <xref target="MCPDNS"/> states whether handle comparison is
case-sensitive, and the <tt>h=</tt> match of the recognition procedure is a
string match; this document therefore takes the stricter reading.
Publishers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use lowercase handles.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="the-zone-is-never-derived-from-the-handle">
        <name>The Zone Is Never Derived from the Handle</name>
        <t>A handle can be spelled so that it resembles a domain name, as
<tt>~example.com</tt> does.  The handle-domain confusion consideration of
Section 6.9 of <xref target="ALTER-URI"/> applies to every <tt>did:alter</tt> DID: a
resolver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> take the zone from the spelling of <tt>handle-name</tt>,
and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> resolve <tt>did:alter:~example.com</tt> against the zone
<tt>example.com</tt> unless that zone is the one the DID names after <tt>at</tt>
or the association is held as Section 5.2 allows.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="the-did-document">
      <name>The DID Document</name>
      <t>A resolver that has a verified envelope for the requested handle
produces a DID document in the JSON representation of <xref target="DID-CORE"/>,
with the media type <tt>application/did+json</tt>.  The document is a total
function of the verified envelope and the requested DID: two
resolvers that verify the same envelope produce the same document.</t>
      <t>The members are these, and no others.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt><tt>id</tt></dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The requested DID in its canonical form (Section 3.4), without any
fragment.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>controller</tt></dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The value of <tt>id</tt>.  The handle controls its own DID; Section 7.1
says what that control rests on.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>alsoKnownAs</tt></dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A one-element array holding the <tt>alter:</tt> URI of the same handle and
zone, as in Section 3.3.  Where the DID carries no zone, the
member is omitted.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>verificationMethod</tt></dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A one-element array holding the envelope key, expressed as a
verification method of type <tt>JsonWebKey</tt> <xref target="CID"/>:
</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>id</tt> is the value of the document's <tt>id</tt> followed by <tt>#key-</tt> and
the decimal digits of the envelope's <tt>ts</tt> field, verbatim;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>type</tt> is <tt>JsonWebKey</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>controller</tt> is the value of the document's <tt>id</tt>;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>publicKeyJwk</tt> is a JSON Web Key <xref target="RFC7517"/> of the Octet Key Pair
type defined by <xref target="RFC8037"/>, whose <tt>kty</tt> is <tt>OKP</tt>, whose <tt>crv</tt> is <tt>Ed25519</tt>, and
whose <tt>x</tt> is the base64url value that follows <tt>ed25519:</tt> in the
envelope's <tt>pk</tt> field, copied without re-encoding.  No
conversion is performed, because both encodings are base64url
without padding over the 32 key octets.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </dd>
        <dt><tt>authentication</tt> and <tt>assertionMethod</tt></dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Each a one-element array holding the <tt>id</tt> of that verification
method.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>The fragment carries the envelope's inception timestamp because a
signature naming the key of an earlier envelope has to be visibly
different from one naming the current key, and a fixed label would
make the two identical.
Section 6 says why a resolver cannot yet produce the earlier key
itself.</t>
      <t>The following is the document for <tt>did:alter:%7Ealice%40alice.example</tt>
where the verified envelope carries <tt>ts=1767225600</tt> and the public key
of the Ed25519 test vector in Appendix A of <xref target="RFC8037"/>.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "id": "did:alter:%7Ealice%40alice.example",
  "controller": "did:alter:%7Ealice%40alice.example",
  "alsoKnownAs": ["alter:~alice@alice.example"],
  "verificationMethod": [{
    "id": "did:alter:%7Ealice%40alice.example#key-1767225600",
    "type": "JsonWebKey",
    "controller": "did:alter:%7Ealice%40alice.example",
    "publicKeyJwk": {
      "kty": "OKP",
      "crv": "Ed25519",
      "x": "11qYAYKxCrfVS_7TyWQHOg7hcvPapiMlrwIaaPcHURo"
    }
  }],
  "authentication":
    ["did:alter:%7Ealice%40alice.example#key-1767225600"],
  "assertionMethod":
    ["did:alter:%7Ealice%40alice.example#key-1767225600"]
}
]]></artwork>
      <t>The document is JSON <xref target="RFC8259"/>.  This document defines no service
type and adds no <tt>service</tt> member.  A specification that defines a
service reachable through a handle <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> define how a resolver adds one.</t>
      <t>The resolver also returns DID document metadata, with <tt>created</tt> set
to the envelope's <tt>ts</tt> expressed as an XML Schema <tt>dateTime</tt> <xref target="XMLSCHEMA"/> in UTC,
and with <tt>deactivated</tt> set to <tt>true</tt> only as Section 5.4 provides.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="operations">
      <name>Operations</name>
      <section anchor="create">
        <name>Create</name>
        <t>A <tt>did:alter</tt> DID comes into being when its envelope is published.
There is no registration step and no registry.</t>
        <t>To create one, the controller of a zone:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>generates an Ed25519 key pair and a secret revocation pre-image;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>builds an envelope binding the handle to the public key, with
<tt>rev</tt> set to the SHA-256 digest of the pre-image and <tt>ts</tt> set to
the inception time, and signs it, all as <xref target="MCPDNS"/> specifies;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>publishes the envelope as the TXT record at <tt>_alter.&lt;zone&gt;</tt> in a
DNSSEC-signed zone, holding the envelope of that one handle only,
as <xref target="MCPDNS"/> requires.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The DID is then <tt>did:alter:</tt> followed by the handle and, after
<tt>at</tt>, the zone.  Since an Instrument-tier handle has no envelope of
its own <xref target="ALTER-URI"/>, no <tt>did:alter</tt> DID is created for one.</t>
        <t>Section 7.1.1 of <xref target="MCPDNS"/> states that publishing a per-individual
envelope in DNS is <bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>, for reasons of enumeration, size
and erasure.  Those reasons apply to every <tt>did:alter</tt> DID that names
a natural person, and Section 8 restates them.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="read-resolve">
        <name>Read (Resolve)</name>
        <t>Given a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID, a resolver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform these steps in order.</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t><em>Parse.</em>  Parse the DID against Section 3.2.  On failure, return
<tt>invalidDid</tt>.  Normalise it per Section 3.4.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><em>Tier.</em>  If <tt>handle-name</tt> is Instrument-tier, return <tt>notFound</tt>.
An Instrument-tier handle names no independent principal
<xref target="ALTER-URI"/>, and a resolver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> return a DID document for one.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><em>Zone.</em>  Take the zone from the DID.  Where the DID carries no
zone, the resolver proceeds only if it holds an association between
the handle and a zone established out of band, as Section 3.4 of
<xref target="ALTER-URI"/> allows for a URI with no <tt>org-scope</tt>; otherwise it
returns <tt>notFound</tt>.  The zone is never derived from the handle
(Section 3.5).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><em>Recognise.</em>  Run the envelope recognition procedure of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>
with that zone and the handle.  Every step that procedure makes
fatal is fatal here.  If the envelope is not verified, return
<tt>notFound</tt> and no document.  A resolver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> return a document
built from an unverified envelope, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> fall back to
unvalidated DNS or to any other source.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><em>Revocation.</em>  Where the resolver has access to a revocation
surface and observes that the pre-image of <tt>rev</tt> has been
revealed, it proceeds to Section 5.4.  Being unable to perform this
check does not stop resolution, as <xref target="MCPDNS"/> provides, and the
resolver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report the DID as not deactivated on the strength
of a check it did not perform.  What a relying party may then do
with the document is governed by Section 13.2 of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><em>Build.</em>  Build the DID document of Section 4 from the verified
envelope.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><em>Return.</em>  Return the document, its metadata, and DID resolution
metadata whose <tt>contentType</tt> is <tt>application/did+json</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>A resolver <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> cache a result for no longer than <xref target="MCPDNS"/> allows for
a cached verification of the envelope, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> re-run any revocation
check it is able to perform on each resolution rather than on each
cache refresh.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="update">
        <name>Update</name>
        <t>The controller updates a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID by replacing the envelope at
<tt>_alter.&lt;zone&gt;</tt> with a new envelope for the same handle, carrying the
new key, a new <tt>ts</tt>, a new <tt>rev</tt> commitment and a new signature.  The
DID itself does not change.  The verification method's fragment does,
because it carries <tt>ts</tt>.</t>
        <t>A resolver that has resolved the DID before <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> retain the key it
last returned.  Where a later resolution yields a different key, the
resolver <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> surface the change to whatever relies on it, and <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> treat the new key as continuous with the old on the strength of
the record alone, for the reason given in Section 7.2.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="deactivate">
        <name>Deactivate</name>
        <t>A <tt>did:alter</tt> DID is deactivated by revocation of its envelope:
revealing the pre-image whose SHA-256 digest is the envelope's <tt>rev</tt>
value, as <xref target="MCPDNS"/> specifies.  From that moment every claim signed
under the envelope's key is invalid, whenever it was signed.</t>
        <t>A resolver that observes such a reveal <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return DID document
metadata with <tt>deactivated</tt> set to <tt>true</tt>, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> return the
verification method as usable for authentication or assertion.</t>
        <t>Removing the TXT record is not deactivation.  <xref target="MCPDNS"/> holds that
absence of the record is indistinguishable from misconfiguration and
is never revocation.  A resolver that finds no record returns
<tt>notFound</tt>.</t>
        <t><xref target="MCPDNS"/> does not specify where a reveal is published, and states that
revocation status cannot presently be established from DNS alone.  A
resolver working from this document and <xref target="MCPDNS"/> therefore cannot
observe deactivation, and Section 7.3 sets out the consequence.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="key-history">
      <name>Key History</name>
      <t><xref target="IDCOMMITS"/> names the key that signed a commit by a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID
URL with a fragment, and defers key history to this section.  The
envelope of
<xref target="MCPDNS"/> carries one key and no key identifier, and a zone publishes
one envelope per owner name.  No resolver can therefore retrieve an
earlier key from DNS.</t>
      <t>This document does not add a key-history field.  A resolver resolves
only the current envelope.  A verifier presented with a DID URL whose
fragment names a <tt>ts</tt> other than the current envelope's knows that the
signature was made under an earlier envelope, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the
signature as unverified unless it holds that earlier key from a
verification it performed itself while that envelope was current.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The security considerations of <xref target="MCPDNS"/> and of <xref target="ALTER-URI"/> apply in
full.  The following are specific to using the envelope as a DID.</t>
      <section anchor="control-rests-on-the-zone">
        <name>Control Rests on the Zone</name>
        <t>The envelope signature is checked against the key in the same
envelope.  It proves the record is internally consistent, and says
nothing about whether its publisher also published the previous one.
Whoever controls the DNS zone a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID names therefore
controls the DID, as for the web DID method <xref target="DID-WEB"/>.  An attacker
who gains control of the zone, through registrar compromise, an
expired registration or a compromised signing key for the zone, can
publish a new envelope and will be resolved as the DID's controller.
Making DNSSEC validation fatal (Section 5.2) defends only against an
attacker on the path, since records published by whoever controls
the zone validate.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="key-change-without-continuity">
        <name>Key Change Without Continuity</name>
        <t>The envelope record has no key-continuity rule of its own.  A
resolver cannot distinguish a rotation by the rightful controller
from a replacement by someone who has taken the zone.  Section 5.3
therefore asks a resolver to surface a change of key to whatever
relies on it.  A relying party that needs continuity <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
retain the key it first verified and treat a later change as an event
to be confirmed outside resolution.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="revocation-not-observable">
        <name>Revocation Not Observable</name>
        <t>Because no revocation surface is specified (Section 5.4), a resolver
cannot learn that a DID has been deactivated.  A compromised key
continues to resolve as valid until the record is replaced, and a
replacement by the attacker is indistinguishable from a rotation
(Section 7.2).  A relying party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat a successful resolution
as evidence that the DID has not been deactivated.  The Revocation
Posture of Section 13.2 of <xref target="MCPDNS"/> applies to every action taken on
the strength of a <tt>did:alter</tt> signature.  The relying party declares
a bound within which it must establish revocation status, and refuses
an Adjust or State-change action whose status it has not established
within that bound.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="spelling-equivalence">
        <name>Spelling Equivalence</name>
        <t>The method has a canonical spelling and a display spelling of the
same DID (Section 3.2).  A resolver or relying party that compares,
caches or authorises on a string it has not normalised can be given two
spellings that it treats as two principals, or a cached result for
one that it fails to apply to the other.  Section 3.4 requires
normalisation before every comparison and cache lookup for this
reason.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="handle-domain-confusion-and-instrument-handles">
        <name>Handle-Domain Confusion and Instrument Handles</name>
        <t>A handle spelled like a domain name carries no DNS meaning
(Section 3.5).  An Instrument-tier handle names no principal and
resolves to nothing (Section 5.2).  A relying party that renders a
<tt>did:alter</tt> DID to a person <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> render the handle with its leading
tilde, as <xref target="ALTER-URI"/> requires of handles.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="no-fallback">
        <name>No Fallback</name>
        <t>A resolver that cannot complete recognition returns an error.  It
does not consult a mirror, a cache past its bound, or an unvalidated
lookup, because each of those would let an attacker who can disrupt
DNS for the zone choose what the resolver returns.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="a-did-is-a-correlator">
        <name>A DID Is a Correlator</name>
        <t>A <tt>did:alter</tt> DID is stable and public.  Every credential, signature
and presentation that carries it can be linked to every other that
carries it, and to the handle.  Because a handle exists to be
linked, it is unsuitable where a subject needs presentations that
cannot be linked.  This document defines no pairwise or per-relying-party
identifier.  A subject who needs one <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use an identifier from a
method designed for unlinkability, and a credential issuer <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>
make a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID the subject of a credential the subject did not
choose to make linkable.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="publication-in-dns">
        <name>Publication in DNS</name>
        <t>Resolution reads a public DNS record.  Section 7.1.1 of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>
gives three reasons a per-individual envelope in DNS is <bcp14>NOT
RECOMMENDED</bcp14>: the zone can be enumerated, the record set grows with
the handles it holds, and a published record cannot be recalled from
caches and passive collectors.  Each applies to a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID
naming a natural person.  A person who requires concealment cannot
hold a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID under this document, because they <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
publish an envelope.  The method suits organisations, Bot-tier handles, and
individuals who choose public publication with that understanding.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="query-metadata">
        <name>Query Metadata</name>
        <t>A resolver querying <tt>_alter.&lt;zone&gt;</tt> reveals to its recursive resolver
which DID it is resolving.  Resolvers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use DNS over HTTPS
<xref target="RFC8484"/> or DNS over TLS <xref target="RFC7858"/> where operationally feasible.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="revocation-linkage">
        <name>Revocation Linkage</name>
        <t>The <tt>rev</tt> value is a hash commitment and discloses nothing during the
envelope's life.  A reveal links the pre-image to the DID at the
moment of revocation only <xref target="MCPDNS"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
      <t>Method names for Decentralized Identifiers are recorded in the W3C
DID method registry <xref target="DID-EXTENSIONS"/>.  Registration of
the method name <tt>alter</tt> there has not been requested.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-issues">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <t>This section is removed before publication as an RFC.</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t><em>The display form in other documents.</em>  <xref target="IDCOMMITS"/> writes
<tt>did:alter</tt> DIDs in the display form, with the literal "~".
Because this document makes the percent-encoded form canonical
(Section 3.2), a DID carried in a commit trailer is converted
before comparison.
Whether <xref target="IDCOMMITS"/> should carry the canonical form on the wire is
open.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><em>Zoneless identifiers.</em>  This document and <xref target="IDCOMMITS"/> admit a
<tt>did:alter</tt> DID with no zone, and <xref target="IDCOMMITS"/> asks a signer to
include one.  Under <xref target="ALTER-URI"/> and <xref target="MCPDNS"/> a DID with no zone
resolves only through an association held out of band.  A DID that
only some resolvers can resolve falls short of what <xref target="DID-CORE"/>
expects of a method's read operation.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><em>Revocation surface.</em>  Deactivation cannot be observed until a
revocation surface is specified (Section 5.4).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><em>Natural persons.</em>  The DNS substrate is <bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14> for
per-individual publication (Section 8.2).  A means of resolving a
person's handle without publishing it in DNS would change who can
hold a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID, and is outside this document.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><em>Identifiers with no handle.</em>  This document admits only
identifiers built on a handle (Section 3.2).  An identifier derived
from a hash for a pseudonymous subject, one carrying an internal
account number, and a fixed name for an issuing service all have
no envelope to resolve.  None of them is a <tt>did:alter</tt> DID, and a
resolver returns <tt>invalidDid</tt> for each.  A pseudonymous subject is
better named by a method that needs no registry, and an issuing
service by its own handle.  Admitting them would add identifiers no
resolver can read, the shortfall item 2 already records.  Whether
the method should define a pairwise pseudonymous form of its own,
resolvable without revealing the subject behind it, is open.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3986" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4033" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4033.xml">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Security Introduction and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
            <date month="March" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System. This document introduces these extensions and describes their capabilities and limitations. This document also discusses the services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide. Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the documents that collectively describe DNSSEC. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4033"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4033"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5234.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
            <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker"/>
            <author fullname="P. Overell" initials="P." surname="Overell"/>
            <date month="January" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7517.xml">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8037" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8037" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8037.xml">
          <front>
            <title>CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)</title>
            <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
            <date month="January" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines how to use the Diffie-Hellman algorithms "X25519" and "X448" as well as the signature algorithms "Ed25519" and "Ed448" from the IRTF CFRG elliptic curves work in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8037"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8037"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8259" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8259.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format</title>
            <author fullname="T. Bray" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Bray"/>
            <date month="December" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight, text-based, language-independent data interchange format. It was derived from the ECMAScript Programming Language Standard. JSON defines a small set of formatting rules for the portable representation of structured data.</t>
              <t>This document removes inconsistencies with other specifications of JSON, repairs specification errors, and offers experience-based interoperability guidance.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="90"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8259"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8259"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DID-CORE" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/">
          <front>
            <title>Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="July" day="19"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="XMLSCHEMA" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema11-2/">
          <front>
            <title>W3C XML Schema Definition Language (XSD) 1.1 Part 2: Datatypes</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2012" month="April" day="05"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CID" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/cid-1.0/">
          <front>
            <title>Controlled Identifiers v1.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MCPDNS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery/">
          <front>
            <title>Discovery of Model Context Protocol Servers via DNS TXT Records</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery-10"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ALTER-URI" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme/">
          <front>
            <title>The 'alter' URI Scheme for Dispatchable ~handle References</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme-06"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7858" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7858.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title>
            <author fullname="Z. Hu" initials="Z." surname="Hu"/>
            <author fullname="L. Zhu" initials="L." surname="Zhu"/>
            <author fullname="J. Heidemann" initials="J." surname="Heidemann"/>
            <author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin"/>
            <author fullname="D. Wessels" initials="D." surname="Wessels"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <date month="May" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide privacy for DNS. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates opportunities for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries in the network, such as discussed in RFC 7626. In addition, this document specifies two usage profiles for DNS over TLS and provides advice on performance considerations to minimize overhead from using TCP and TLS with DNS.</t>
              <t>This document focuses on securing stub-to-recursive traffic, as per the charter of the DPRIVE Working Group. It does not prevent future applications of the protocol to recursive-to-authoritative traffic.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7858"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7858"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8484" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8484.xml">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <author fullname="P. McManus" initials="P." surname="McManus"/>
            <date month="October" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a protocol for sending DNS queries and getting DNS responses over HTTPS. Each DNS query-response pair is mapped into an HTTP exchange.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8484"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8484"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IDCOMMITS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits/">
          <front>
            <title>Identity-Attributed Git Commits via Tier-Structured Trailers</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DID-EXTENSIONS" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/did-extensions/">
          <front>
            <title>DID Extensions</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DID-WEB" target="https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-web/">
          <front>
            <title>did:web Method Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DID-DNS" target="https://danubetech.github.io/did-method-dns/">
          <front>
            <title>did:dns Method Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DID-KEY" target="https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-key/">
          <front>
            <title>The did:key Method v0.9</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DID-PLC" target="https://github.com/did-method-plc/did-method-plc">
          <front>
            <title>DID PLC Method (did:plc)</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    

<section anchor="document-history">
      <name>Document History</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-did-alter-method-01 (2026-11): the Introduction
states that a single company is behind the method and that the
author's software has no resolver for its read operation, and
compares the method with did:web, did:dns, did:plc and did:key.
Section 5.2 and Section 7.3 apply the Revocation Posture of
Section 13.2 of <xref target="MCPDNS"/> to a resolution whose revocation status is
unknown, in place of a <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> to bound reliance.  <xref target="IDCOMMITS"/> now
defers key history to Section 6 and asks a signer to include the
zone, and the Open Issues follow it.  The Introduction points at
Open Issue 5, the one on identifiers with no handle, where it
pointed at an issue number that does not exist.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-did-alter-method-00 (2026-10-05): first version.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-did-alter-method-00 (2026-10-19): prose rewritten,
and every citation of another draft in
the stack pinned to its latest posted revision.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>draft-morrison-did-alter-method-00 (2026-10-21): citations of other
drafts in the stack moved to the revisions going up with this one.
The <tt>alter:</tt> URI that corresponds to a DID is its display form with
the <tt>did:</tt> prefix dropped, and <xref target="XMLSCHEMA"/> is cited for the
<tt>dateTime</tt> form of <tt>ts</tt>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>None yet.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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