Network Working Group B. Morrison Internet-Draft Alter Meridian Pty Ltd Intended status: Experimental 19 November 2026 Expires: 23 May 2027 Relay Storage Allowances That Expire at a Planned Contact draft-morrison-relay-storage-authorisation-01 Abstract The use case and requirements document for IP in deep space asks that relays guard their buffers by authenticating and authorising the traffic sources allowed to consume buffer space, and by accounting for storage per source or traffic class. This document gives that requirement a mechanism. A storage allowance is a signed object in which a party with authority over a relay's storage states that a named holder may keep up to a stated number of octets at each named relay, until a planned contact between that relay and its next hop. A relay checks an allowance from data it already holds, without contacting the party that issued it. It charges stored data to an allowance by tagging the data in its own buffer and keeps no other state for it. No state is shared between relays, and at any instant the storage held under one allowance is no more than the sum of its rows. An allowance ends at the first contact it lists that takes place. A missed contact moves the end to the next contact listed, up to the last. The document defines the allowance, its issuance and delegation, enforcement at the relay, revocation, carriage in the Bundle Protocol and over IP, and its use with signed custody receipts for accounting. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2027. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. The requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Requirement trace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4. Deployment scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.5. Relationship to other documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. The Storage Allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4. Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Storage authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.2. Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3. Issuer obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Enforcement at the Relay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.1. Held data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.2. Admission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.3. Charging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.4. Coverage and drop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.5. Data under no allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.6. Counters and record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.7. Conformance with the disconnected trust model . . . . . . 16 6. Double Spending Across Relays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.1. The problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.2. One row, one accounting point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.3. Ceilings per key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.4. Repeated presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.5. The bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7. Expiry at a Planned Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.1. The end of storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 7.2. The covering contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.3. Taken place or missed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.4. Clock uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.5. Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.6. Revocation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. Carriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.1. Bundle Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.2. IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9. Interaction with Custody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 9.1. Charging until forwarded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 9.2. Receipts naming the allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9.3. Usage statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Appendix A. Worked Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix B. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 1. Introduction 1.1. The requirement Section 6.1 of [TIPTOP-UC] says: "Proper guards should be designed to avoid denial-of-service attacks that fill buffers within the network This may include authentication and authorization of the traffic sources allowed to consume buffer space, and accounting of storage usage per source or traffic class." The same section warns that "there is potential for unplanned events resulting in missed communication windows". [TIPTOP-ARCH] describes the buffer. In Section 4.1 a forwarder whose link is down "may buffer the IP packets locally instead of dropping them", the buffer needs "proper provisioning of buffer storage memory", and the choice of which packets to drop when it is full "depends on the policies configured on the node". Section 8.2 asks a forwarder to expose, per queue, current and high-water occupancy, the age of the oldest buffered packet, drop counters and an event when a buffer is cleared other than by transmission. Section 10 lists among the threats that "An attacker could generate traffic to exhaust buffers at forwarding nodes". Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 None of these documents says how a relay knows that a source may consume its storage, how much, or until when. The Bundle Protocol [RFC9171] does not say either. The custody receipt block [CUSTODY-RECEIPT] says its receipts "are evidence for accounting and dispute resolution between operators", and leaves the choice of bundles a custodian signs for to local policy (Section 5.1). 1.2. Scope This document specifies a storage allowance (Section 3) and the rules for its issuance and delegation (Section 4), its enforcement at a relay (Section 5), the prevention of double spending across relays that share no state (Section 6), its expiry at a planned contact and its revocation (Section 7), its carriage (Section 8), and its use with signed custody receipts (Section 9). Routing, the computation of contact plans, the choice of how much storage to grant, the drop policy for data held under no allowance, and the exchange by which a holder asks an issuer for an allowance are out of scope. 1.3. Requirement trace Authentication of traffic sources: An allowance names its holder's public key. A relay charges an item to an allowance only when the item is bound to that key (Section 8). Authorisation to consume buffer space: An allowance states an amount and an end for each relay. A relay admits an item under it only within both (Section 5.2). Accounting of storage per source: Each stored item is charged to one allowance. A relay exposes counters per allowance and signs a usage statement per contact (Sections 5.6 and 9.3). Missed communication windows: An allowance lists alternate contacts that take effect when a planned contact is missed (Section 7.3). Buffer observability, Section 8.2 of [TIPTOP-ARCH]: The counters of Section 5.6 extend the per-queue information to each allowance and each issuing key. Buffer exhaustion, Section 10 of [TIPTOP-ARCH]: Data held under allowances never exceeds the ceilings a relay's own trust anchors set (Section 6.5). Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 1.4. Deployment scenario The relay this document is written for is the lunar relay satellite described by the NASA Lunar Communications Relay and Navigation Systems project. [LCRNS-OBP] says such relays are to provide IP and Bundle Protocol networking with onboard store-and-forward, and expects multi-hop networks run by diverse providers. The LunaNet Interoperability Specification [LNIS] selects the Bundle Protocol as an interoperable network protocol for them. A lander on the far side of the Moon reaches Earth through such a relay. The relay holds the lander's bundles until its planned contact with a ground station, and the lander's operator has no link to the relay's operator while the relay is out of contact with Earth. Another mission's lander can reach the same relay and send more than the relay can hold. The Bundle Protocol gives the relay no way to tell which of them was meant to use its storage, and an operator today sets a limit in the relay's configuration for each customer. A custodian in the Bundle Protocol implementation of the European Space Agency already weighs its own storage when it decides whether to accept custody [ESA-CUSTODY], and this document gives that decision a signed and bounded statement about the source. With this document the relay's operator holds an anchor key and delegates a key with a ceiling to each mission operator. A mission operator issues an allowance for its lander's key - 300,000,000 octets at the relay until the contact with the ground station that follows. The relay checks the allowance from data it already holds and charges each stored bundle to it. When the contact is missed, coverage moves to the next contact listed, as Section 7.2 says. The relay needs no other relay and no link to either operator to do this. A first relay gains from this at once. It bounds the storage each mission can hold and removes it when the contact takes place, and it needs no neighbour to run the same code. The Worked Example in Appendix A gives the structures for a case with two relays. The Bundle Protocol part of this document extends [RFC9171] with a block type, and the IP part applies to forwarders of the kind [TIPTOP-ARCH] describes. The Bundle Protocol extension is a matter for the working group that maintains the Bundle Protocol. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 1.5. Relationship to other documents A relay deciding whether to store data for an absent next hop is often out of contact with the party that controls its storage. [DISCONNECTED-TRUST] defines a disconnected trust model, in which a node makes each decision from held data and carried evidence that it can verify alone, with a declared staleness bound for each kind of held data. An allowance is carried evidence. The keys, ceilings and revocations a relay checks it against are held data. Section 5.7 traces each of that model's requirements to this mechanism. It meets every one except R11, from which it departs for checks 4 to 7 of an admitted item, for the reason Section 5.6 gives. The allowance takes the shape of the authorisation grant of [OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY], where "The grant MUST name the specific asset (the zone, conduit, device, or point), the specific control verb it authorises, and the specific agent authorised to exercise it, and it MUST carry an expiry" (Section 3.3). Here the asset is a relay's storage, the verb is to store, the agent is the holder, and the expiry is a planned contact. [LONG-DELAY] profiles that grant for long delay. This document takes from its Section 9.1 the shape of a signed revocation status whose stated time measures the age of revocation information (Section 7.6), and a relay time that a clock set back cannot lower (Section 7.4). 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Relay: A node that holds data for a next hop it cannot currently reach. An IP forwarder buffering as in Section 4.1 of [TIPTOP-ARCH] and a Bundle Protocol node holding a bundle for a later contact are both relays. Accounting point: One buffer, or a set of buffers sharing one charge state, named by one relay identifier. Each buffer belongs to exactly one accounting point. Relay identifier: A text string naming one accounting point. For a Bundle Protocol node it is a node ID (Section 4.2.5.2 of [RFC9171]). Over IP it is a name the deployment assigns. Relay identifiers are compared octet for octet. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 Storage authority: A party whose trust anchor a relay holds for authorising storage. Usually the relay's operator. Key identifier: The SHA-256 hash [FIPS180-4] of a public key's COSE_Key structure [RFC9052] encoded with the core deterministic encoding requirements of Section 4.2.1 of [RFC8949]. Wherever this document names a key, it names it by its key identifier. Two keys with the same key identifier are the same key. Issuing key: The key that signs an allowance. It is a storage authority's trust anchor key or a key delegated from it (Section 4.2). Holder: The party an allowance authorises, identified by a public key. Storage allowance (allowance): A signed object stating that a holder may keep data at named relays, up to a stated amount at each, until a stated planned contact (Section 3). Row: The part of an allowance that applies to one relay. It names the relay, an amount in octets and a list of contacts. Contact: A planned interval in which a relay can transmit to a named next hop, as given by a contact plan. Covering contact: The contact in a row whose end is, for the time being, the end of admission under the allowance at that relay (Section 7.2). Stored item: A packet or bundle a relay holds because no link to its next hop is available. Charge: The total size in octets of the stored items a relay has tagged with a given allowance. Ceiling: The greatest total charge a relay permits over every allowance whose chain includes a given key. DTN time: As defined in Section 4.2.6 of [RFC9171]: "the number of milliseconds that have elapsed since the DTN Epoch, 2000-01-01 00:00:00 +0000 (UTC)". Held data, carried evidence, staleness bound and unevaluable have the meanings given in [DISCONNECTED-TRUST]. 3. The Storage Allowance Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 3.1. Contents An allowance carries: * the identifier of the issuing key; * the holder's public key; * a selector naming the traffic the allowance covers; * one or more rows, each naming one relay, an amount in octets and one or more contacts in which that relay transmits to its next hop; * a not-before time; * a nonce unique to the issuing key; * the chain of delegation certificates from a storage authority's trust anchor to the issuing key, empty when the anchor key signs the allowance. An allowance names no total across relays. Each row grants storage at its own relay and nowhere else (Section 6). 3.2. Encoding Every signed structure this document defines is an untagged COSE_Sign1 structure [RFC9052] whose payload carries its type at key 0: 1 for an allowance, 2 for a delegation certificate (Section 4.2), 3 for a revocation (Section 7.5), 4 for a revocation status (Section 7.6), 5 for a presentation (Section 8.2) and 6 for a usage statement (Section 9.3). A relay MUST treat a structure whose key 0 does not hold the type expected where it is found as malformed. One key can sign structures of several types, and the type keeps a signature made for one from being taken for another. In an allowance, a delegation certificate, a revocation and a revocation status, key 1 of the payload is the key identifier of the signing key. The protected header MUST carry the algorithm and a key identifier (kid) equal to key 1, and the structure is malformed unless its signature verifies with the key key 1 identifies. An allowance is signed by the issuing key. Its payload is the CBOR [RFC8949] encoding of the following map, written in CDDL [RFC8610]. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 allowance-payload = { 0 => 1, ; type, allowance 1 => key-id, ; issuing key identifier 2 => COSE_Key, ; holder's public key 3 => selector, 4 => [+ row], 5 => dtn-time, ; not before 6 => bstr .size (8..32), ; nonce 7 => [* bstr .cbor COSE_Sign1], ; chain, anchor end first } key-id = bstr .size 32 ; key identifier (Section 2) allowance-id = bstr .size 32 ; allowance identifier (Section 3.3) selector = { ? 1 => tstr, ; source node ID or IP prefix ? 2 => tstr, ; destination EID or IP prefix ? 3 => uint, ; traffic class } row = [ relay: tstr, ; relay identifier octets: uint, ; greatest charge at this relay contacts: [+ contact], ] contact = [ id: tstr, ; contact identifier in the contact plan next-hop: tstr, ; node the relay transmits to start: dtn-time, end: dtn-time, ] dtn-time = uint .gt 0 Each element of the delegation chain is an encoded delegation certificate (Section 4.2). The traffic class is a value whose meaning the deployment states, such as a Differentiated Services codepoint over IP. The primary block of a version 7 bundle has no traffic class field (Section 4.3.1 of [RFC9171]), and a deployment that uses field 3 for bundles states where the class is read from. An item matches a selector when it matches every field present. A source or destination given as a node ID or EID matches by equality. One given as an IP prefix matches every address within it. An absent field matches anything. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 A relay MUST treat an allowance as malformed unless all of these hold: * key 0 is 1, the kid in the protected header equals key 1 of the payload, and the signature verifies with the key key 1 identifies; * every row has an amount greater than zero and at least one contact; * no two rows name the same relay; * within a row, each contact starts before it ends, and starts no earlier than the end of the contact before it; * the not-before time is earlier than the end of the last contact of every row. 3.3. Identifier The identifier of an allowance is the SHA-256 hash [FIPS180-4] of the octets of its COSE_Sign1 structure as issued. A carrier MUST NOT re- encode an allowance. Two allowances with the same identifier are the same allowance. 3.4. Lifecycle At a given relay, an allowance is in one of four states. Pending: The relay's time is before the not-before time. In force: The allowance is valid, its row for the relay has a covering contact, and nothing has closed or ended it. Items may be admitted under it while its covering contact has not ended (Section 7.2). Closed: A revocation with effect on admission only has been applied (Section 7.5). No item is admitted. Items already charged stay covered until the allowance ends. Ended: The relay has decided a covering contact that took place, or the last contact in the row (Section 7.2). A revocation with effect on held data also ends an allowance, as does a key in its chain passing its not-after time or being revoked with that effect. Nothing is admitted and nothing is covered. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 An allowance with no row for a relay is never in force at that relay. A relay moves an allowance only forward through these states, from pending towards ended, and never back. A closed allowance whose covering contact is decided as missed moves its coverage to the next contact in its row as Section 7.2 says, and stays closed. 4. Issuance 4.1. Storage authorities A relay holds one or more storage authority trust anchor keys, each with an anchor ceiling, the greatest total charge the relay permits under that anchor. The sum of a relay's anchor ceilings MUST NOT exceed the storage it sets aside for data held under allowances. Where several accounting points share physical storage, the sum of the anchor ceilings of all of them MUST NOT exceed the storage set aside in it for data held under allowances. How a relay is given its anchors and ceilings is configuration. The means of replacing them MUST meet requirement R9 of [DISCONNECTED-TRUST]. 4.2. Delegation A storage authority can delegate issuance. A delegation certificate is an untagged COSE_Sign1 structure signed by the parent key, which is the anchor key or a key delegated earlier, with the following payload. delegation-payload = { 0 => 2, ; type, delegation certificate 1 => key-id, ; parent key identifier 2 => key-id, ; delegated key identifier 3 => COSE_Key, ; delegated public key 4 => [+ ceiling], 5 => dtn-time, ; not before 6 => dtn-time, ; not after } ceiling = [ relay: tstr, ; relay identifier octets: uint, ] Key 1 of a certificate names its signer, the parent key, and equals the kid in its protected header (Section 3.2). A certificate is malformed unless key 2 is the key identifier of key 3. A chain is valid at a relay when: Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 * every certificate in it is well formed; * the first certificate is signed by an anchor key the relay holds; * each later certificate is signed by the key the certificate before it delegates; * the issuing key of the allowance is the key the last certificate delegates; * the chain is no longer than the maximum the relay declares; * each certificate has a ceiling naming the relay, no greater than the parent's ceiling at the relay, where the anchor's is its anchor ceiling. The ceiling of a key at a relay is the one in the certificate that delegates it, or the anchor ceiling for an anchor key. A delegated key may sign allowances and further certificates. 4.3. Issuer obligations An issuer: * MUST set each row's amount no greater than the issuing key's ceiling at that relay; * MUST take each contact's identifier, next hop, start and end from the contact plan it holds for that relay; * MUST set the end of each row's last contact no later than the not- after time of every certificate in the chain; * MUST use a fresh nonce for each allowance; * SHOULD keep the sum of the amounts of its unended allowances at each relay within its ceiling there. The last obligation is a SHOULD because a relay enforces the ceiling itself (Section 6.3). An issuer that commits more than its ceiling at a relay makes its own holders contend for that ceiling and takes nothing from any other key. A change to the contact plan after issuance does not change an allowance. An issuer that wants storage to follow a changed plan issues a new allowance. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 5. Enforcement at the Relay 5.1. Held data A relay holds: * its anchor keys and anchor ceilings (Section 4.1); * the greatest delegation chain length it accepts; * the revocations it has received and kept (Section 7.5); * for each storage authority, the latest revocation status it has accepted and its stated time (Section 7.6); * its clock, the uncertainty it assigns to it and its recorded time (Section 7.4); * for each allowance it holds, its state and covering contact (Sections 3.4 and 7.2); * for each contact named in a row for it, a record of whether the contact took place (Section 7.3). The deployment declares a staleness bound for each, as requirement R2 of [DISCONNECTED-TRUST] asks. The age of a relay's revocation information from a storage authority is the age of the latest revocation status it has accepted from that authority (Section 7.6), and the revocations the relay holds, or the absence of any, play no part in it. Where that age exceeds its bound, or the relay holds no revocation status from the authority, every check against an allowance under that authority is unevaluable. A deployment that relies on the contact-bounded life of its allowances to limit what a revocation could change declares a revocation bound no shorter than the longest coverage it grants, including the 2u by which coverage can outrun the end of a contact (Section 7.2). A relay keeps all of these in non-volatile storage, and where it keeps its buffer across a restart it keeps them with it. A relay that loses its record of a contact treats the contact as one it cannot tell about (Section 7.3). A relay that loses any of its revocations holds, from that moment, no revocation status from any storage authority. Every check against an allowance under an authority is then unevaluable until the relay accepts a new status from that authority. A status whose stated time is earlier than one the relay still holds is never accepted in its place (Section 7.6). Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 5.2. Admission When a relay is to store an item, it finds the allowances the item may be charged to (Section 8) and takes them in the order of Section 5.3. It admits the item under the first for which every one of these checks succeeds: 1. The allowance is well formed (Section 3.2), and its signature verifies with the issuing key. 2. The delegation chain is valid at the relay (Section 4.2), and the relay's time is within the not-before and not-after times of every certificate in it. 3. The allowance has a row for the relay. 4. The item is bound to the holder's key (Section 8) and matches the selector. 5. The allowance is in force at the relay (Section 3.4), and its covering contact has not ended (Section 7.2). 6. The allowance's charge at the relay plus the item's size is no greater than the row's amount. 7. For each key in the chain, from the anchor key of that chain to the issuing key, the total charge at the relay over every allowance whose chain includes a key with the same key identifier, plus the item's size, is no greater than that key's ceiling at the relay. A check that is unevaluable fails. A relay MUST NOT admit an item under an allowance for which any check fails. An item admitted under no allowance is handled as Section 5.5 says. A relay MAY keep the outcome of checks 1 to 3 for an allowance under its identifier and reuse it for later items. It MUST make checks 4 to 7 for each item. 5.3. Charging A relay admitting an item tags it with the identifier of the allowance it was admitted under. The charge of an allowance at the relay is the sum of the sizes of the stored items carrying its tag. The size of an item is its length as stored: the total length of an IP packet, or the length of the encoded bundle. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 The tags are the relay's only state for an allowance beyond the allowance itself, its cached checks and any revocation naming it. When an item leaves the buffer, whether transmitted, dropped or cleared, its size leaves the charge. A buffer cleared by a reboot, as Section 4.1 of [TIPTOP-ARCH] describes, clears its charges with it. A relay that keeps its buffer across a reboot keeps the tags with it. Where an item matches more than one allowance, the relay takes them in order of the end of their covering contacts at the relay, earliest first, and then by identifier in ascending order of octets. Each item is charged to exactly one allowance. 5.4. Coverage and drop An item is covered while the allowance it is charged to is in force or closed at the relay. When the allowance ends, the relay removes the tags from the items charged to it, their sizes leave the charge, and the items are held as data under no allowance (Section 5.5). A relay MUST NOT drop a covered item to make room for any other item. A covered item leaves the buffer only by transmission, by a clearing the relay cannot prevent, or by the end of its allowance. 5.5. Data under no allowance A relay MAY store items that no allowance covers, in storage apart from the storage it sets aside for data under allowances, under its own drop policy (Section 4.1 of [TIPTOP-ARCH]). A profile MAY name traffic classes whose storage does not depend on any allowance, such as the "Emergency and Search and Rescue" traffic of Section 6.1 of [TIPTOP-UC]. Storage for those classes MUST be set aside apart from both other kinds, and admission to it MUST NOT depend on the outcome of any allowance check. A traffic class marking, such as a Differentiated Services codepoint, is written by the sender, and anyone can mark traffic as an emergency. The primary block of a version 7 bundle has no traffic class field (Section 4.3.1 of [RFC9171]). A profile that names such a class MUST state how a relay establishes that an item belongs to it without trusting a marking the sender writes, for example by the interface it arrived on or by the ingress filtering of Section 8.2. It MUST bound the share of the set-aside storage that each source can hold. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 Requirement R6 of [DISCONNECTED-TRUST] asks a profile to state, for each action it covers, whether the action is gated on authority, and to say so where refusing it is itself the harmful outcome. Storing an item of a class named here is not gated on authority, and refusing it is the harmful outcome the class exists to avoid. The profile that names the class says so. 5.6. Counters and record A relay exposes, for each allowance with a row for it and for each key in force at it: * the current charge and its high-water mark; * the age of the oldest item charged; * the octets admitted; * the items refused, by the check of Section 5.2 that failed; * the octets released to data under no allowance when the allowance ended; * the items lost while covered, and the cause. These carry the per-queue information of Section 8.2 of [TIPTOP-ARCH] down to each allowance and each issuing key. That section asks for enough to "distinguish a buffer exhaustion attack Section 10 from legitimate traffic being queued during a long outage". An attack appears as refusals at checks 6 and 7. Legitimate traffic held through an outage appears as charges within the rows. A relay records each evaluation of checks 1 to 3, naming the held data used, their ages and the staleness bounds in force. It records each refusal with the check that failed. Checks 4 to 7 of an item it admits are recorded only in aggregate, in the counters and in the usage statement of Section 9.3. This departs from requirement R11 of [DISCONNECTED-TRUST]. R11 asks for a record of each authority check. A record of each admitted item would grow with every item stored and would take from the storage it accounts for. 5.7. Conformance with the disconnected trust model R1: Every input is an allowance or presentation carried with the item, or held data listed in Section 5.1. R2 and R3: Section 5.1. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 R4: A check that is unevaluable fails, and no item is admitted on it (Section 5.2). R5: Storing an item is not a safety function in the sense of that document, and this mechanism gates none. R6: Storage under an allowance is gated on authority. Storage for a class a profile names under Section 5.5 is not, and the profile says so. R7: Section 7.4. R8: An allowance's validity is its signed contact times. A relay relies on its cached checks no longer than those times and its revocation bound allow. R9: Revocations, revocation statuses and anchor updates take effect in any order and are harmless when repeated (Sections 7.5 and 7.6). R10: Storage has no unresolved outcome of its own. An item transmitted to its next hop leaves the charge whether or not it arrives. R11: Not met in full. Section 5.6 records each evaluation of checks 1 to 3 and each refusal. It records checks 4 to 7 of an admitted item only in aggregate, for the reason it gives. R12: A profile using this mechanism states its bounds for each scenario it serves. 6. Double Spending Across Relays 6.1. The problem A holder may reach the network through more than one relay, and an item may be stored at several relays on its path. Relays in deep space are often out of contact with each other as well as with the storage authority. Were an allowance a single total spendable at any relay, a holder could present it at every relay it can reach and consume the whole total at each, and no relay could learn the charges at the others. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 6.2. One row, one accounting point An allowance states its amount per relay. A relay charges an allowance only against the row whose relay identifier equals its own, octet for octet. A row can name only one accounting point, and a set of relays, a wildcard or a pattern in a row matches no relay. A node with more than one accounting point MUST give each its own relay identifier. A relay MUST recognise exactly one relay identifier for each accounting point. A node known by more than one name, such as a Bundle Protocol node with node IDs in two schemes, or an IP forwarder and a Bundle Protocol node sharing one store, names each accounting point by one of them, and a row naming any other charges nothing there. A holder that may arrive at any of several relays receives a row at each, and the issuer reserves storage at each of them for a path it does not know. The charge at each relay stays within that relay's row whichever path the holder takes. 6.3. Ceilings per key Check 7 of Section 5.2 charges every stored item against each key in its allowance's chain, by key identifier. A key's identifier is computed from the key itself. A chain that includes a key ends in an allowance only through that key's signature, on the allowance or on the next certificate. No party without the key's private part can therefore make an allowance count against that key's ceiling. The total charge under a key at a relay can never exceed that key's ceiling there, however many allowances the key signs. A key that issues more than its ceiling, by fault or after compromise, makes its own holders contend for that ceiling and takes no storage from any other key. 6.4. Repeated presentation An allowance presented again at the same relay, carried in a later bundle or presented again over IP, is the same allowance by its identifier (Section 3.3). Its items join the same charge. A relay MUST charge by identifier and MUST NOT open a second charge for an allowance whose identifier it already holds. 6.5. The bound At every instant, and at every relay R: * the charge of an allowance A at R is at most the amount in A's row for R; Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 * the total charge at R under a key K is at most K's ceiling at R; * the total charge at R under all allowances is at most the sum of R's anchor ceilings. Across all relays, the storage held under A at any instant is at most the sum of the amounts in A's rows. A relay computes every bound from its own buffer. No relay needs any other relay's charge, and no relay keeps a ledger that could disagree with what it stores. An allowance bounds storage held at an instant. Storage consumed over time is reported in the usage statements of Section 9.3, and a storage authority bounds it through the allowances it issues next. 7. Expiry at a Planned Contact 7.1. The end of storage Data a relay stores for an absent next hop is meant to leave at the next contact with that hop. The contact plan gives the time of that contact in advance, and an allowance names the contact with its planned times. A relay can then tell a contact that took place from one that was missed, and an allowance can outlast a missed contact without being open-ended. Each contact in a row carries absolute DTN times copied from the contact plan, and a relay never derives an end by counting contacts. 7.2. The covering contact For each row, the relay tracks a covering contact. It starts as the first contact in the row. A covering contact ends at the relay once t + u reaches its end (Section 7.4). From then on no item is admitted under the allowance at the relay, and the items already charged to it stay covered. The relay decides the contact once t - u reaches its end, as Section 7.3 says. When it decides it: * if the contact was missed and the row lists a later contact, the next contact becomes the covering contact; * otherwise the allowance ends at the relay. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 An allowance thus ends at a relay when the first contact in its row that takes place is decided, and at the latest when the last contact in its row is decided. In true time a relay can decide a contact as much as 2u after its end. Coverage can therefore run up to 2u past the planned end of the contact that ends it, and the revocation bound of Section 5.1 covers that time. 7.3. Taken place or missed A relay judges a contact over the interval from its planned start minus u to its planned end plus u, by the relay's time. A link at any time within the planned interval falls within that interval on the relay's clock. The contact took place if, at any time in that interval, the relay had a link to the named next hop over which it could transmit. It was missed only if the relay had no such link at any time in that interval and its record of all of that interval is complete. A relay that was not running for any part of the interval, has lost its record of any part of it, or cannot otherwise tell, MUST record the contact as taken place. Moving coverage to a later contact extends what the allowance authorises. An extension resting on an incomplete record would fail open on authority. Recording a contact as taken place ends the allowance, and the items charged to it become data under no allowance without being dropped by that act alone (Section 5.4). A contact that took place but was too short to drain the charge still ends the allowance. An issuer that expects a short contact can issue a second allowance whose row lists only later contacts. 7.4. Clock uncertainty Each comparison of the relay's time with a time in an allowance, certificate or revocation status allows for the uncertainty u the relay assigns to its clock. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 The relay's time t never decreases. It is the greater of two values. The first is the relay's clock reading. The second is the latest t the relay has recorded plus the advance, since that record, of a monotonic counter that no command sets, or that t alone where the counter has restarted since. The relay records t in non-volatile storage as it advances. A clock set back cannot then lower t, and a covering contact that has ended stays ended. Section 9.1 of [LONG-DELAY] places the same floor under the time at which a revocation status is accepted, and reads elapsed time from a counter in the same way. A clock set forward ends coverage early and causes refusals only. A counter that does not survive a restart leaves t at its recorded value until the clock passes it, and the deployment declares its counter and whether it survives a restart. With t the relay's time: * an allowance is pending while t - u is earlier than its not-before time; * a covering contact has ended once t + u reaches its end; * a covering contact is decided once t - u reaches its end; * a certificate's not-before time is met once t - u reaches it; * a certificate's not-after time has passed once t + u reaches it. Each comparison that governs admission resolves the uncertainty against the allowance. The decision of a covering contact waits until the relay has observed all of the interval Section 7.3 judges. No contact is then recorded as missed on part of a record. Items stay covered while it waits, and no item is admitted. A relay with no trusted time, or whose time is zero (Section 4.2.6 of [RFC9171]: "The DTN time value zero indicates that the time is unknown"), cannot make check 5 of Section 5.2. It admits nothing under any allowance, and its covered items lose the protection of Section 5.4 until it has a trusted time again. It then applies Section 7.2 to each allowance with the record it holds. 7.5. Revocation A revocation is an untagged COSE_Sign1 structure with the following payload. It names one allowance, by allowance identifier, or one key, by key identifier. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 revocation-payload = { 0 => 3, ; type, revocation 1 => key-id, ; signing key identifier ((2 => allowance-id) // ; allowance identifier (3 => key-id)), ; or key identifier 4 => effect, 5 => dtn-time, ; time of issue 6 => [* bstr .cbor COSE_Sign1], ; signer's chain } effect = 0 / 1 ; 0, admission only; 1, admission and held data A revocation carries the chain of delegation certificates from an anchor key to its signing key (empty when an anchor key signs it) for a relay to verify on arrival, before it holds anything the revocation names. A relay keeps a revocation only when it is well formed and its chain is valid at the relay as Section 4.2 states, with the signing key in place of the issuing key. It discards any other. Keys are matched by key identifier. A relay applies a revocation of an allowance to that allowance when the signing key is the allowance's issuing key or a key in the allowance's chain. It applies a revocation of a key K only to allowances whose issuing key is K or whose chain contains K, and to each of them only where the signing key is K or a key above K in that allowance's own chain, the anchor key of that chain included. A revocation with effect 0 closes the allowances it applies to. One with effect 1 ends them. A relay checks each allowance it receives against the revocations it has kept. A revocation that arrives before its allowance takes effect when the allowance arrives. A revocation only moves allowances forward through the states of Section 3.4. Applying one twice, or applying several in any order, gives the same state. This meets requirement R9 of [DISCONNECTED-TRUST]. A relay MAY discard a revocation of an allowance once that allowance has ended at the relay, and a revocation of a key once that key's not-after time has passed. It MAY discard a revocation signed by a delegated key once that key's not-after time has passed, since every allowance that key could revoke has then ended. It MAY discard a revocation signed by an anchor key once it has accepted a revocation status from that anchor whose time of issue is later than the revocation's (Section 7.6). The revocations a relay must keep are bounded by the coverage it has granted and by the statuses it receives. A revocation reaches a relay after a delay, and a revoked allowance is honoured until it arrives. The end of the covering contact bounds that window. Without contact it is the only bound, and an allowance Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 ends at a planned contact for that reason. Any party on the path can withhold a revocation. The revocation status of Section 7.6 bounds how long a relay relies on revocation information that withholding has left incomplete. 7.6. Revocation status A relay cannot tell from the revocations it holds whether others were issued and withheld. It measures the age of its revocation information from a revocation status, in the shape Section 9.1 of [LONG-DELAY] gives the revocation status of a grant. That is a statement, signed by the party that issues revocations and verifiable offline, that states the time as of which it holds. A storage authority signs revocation statuses with its anchor key, at an interval the deployment declares that is shorter than the staleness bound for revocation information, with the following payload. revocation-status-payload = { 0 => 4, ; type, revocation status 1 => key-id, ; anchor key identifier 2 => dtn-time, ; time of issue 3 => [* [allowance-id, effect]], ; allowances revoked 4 => [* [key-id, effect]], ; keys revoked } A status lists every revocation in force under that anchor that the storage authority has issued or received by its time of issue. The authority MAY omit an entry once nothing it names can still be covered at any relay. A relay accepts a status when it is well formed, key 1 names an anchor key the relay holds, and its time of issue is no later than t + u, as Section 5 of [LONG-DELAY] requires of a timestamp. It applies each entry as a revocation signed by that anchor key (Section 7.5). Let T be the latest time of issue among the statuses a relay has accepted from an anchor key. A status with an earlier time of issue never replaces one with a later time, and the relay keeps T in non- volatile storage, as Section 9.1 of [LONG-DELAY] keeps its own. The age of the relay's revocation information from that storage authority is (t + u) - T, with t as in Section 7.4. A relay that holds no status from an authority has no age it can state for its revocation information from that authority, and every check against an allowance under that authority is unevaluable (Section 5.1). Neither the number of revocations a relay holds nor the time since it last received one says anything about whether its revocation information is current. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 Any party on the path by which statuses reach a relay can withhold them. Withholding never makes revocation information look fresher. T stops advancing, the age grows until it passes its bound, and admission under that authority then stops. 8. Carriage 8.1. Bundle Protocol A bundle carries an allowance in a Storage Allowance block, an extension block (Section 4.3.2 of [RFC9171]) of type TBD1. Its block-type-specific data is the allowance's COSE_Sign1 structure as issued. A bundle carries at most one Storage Allowance block. The block's processing control flags MUST have bit 0 ("Block must be replicated in every fragment") set and bits 2 and 4 clear. A node not implementing this document then forwards the block unchanged. A bundle is bound to the holder's key when it carries a Block Integrity Block [RFC9172] using the COSE context of [BPSEC-COSE], whose security source is the bundle source, whose security targets include the payload block and the Storage Allowance block, whose AAD scope includes the primary block (Section 2.2.2 of [BPSEC-COSE]), and whose signature verifies with the holder's key named in the allowance. A relay MUST NOT charge a bundle to an allowance without verifying that block. Section 6.1 of [BPSEC-COSE] says that including the primary block in the AAD scope "disallows replay of any block with its BIB or BCB". The payload, the allowance and the binding therefore cannot be moved together into a new bundle. A relay MUST NOT charge a bundle to an allowance while it stores another bundle charged to that allowance with the same source node ID and creation timestamp (Section 4.3.1 of [RFC9171]). The binding covers the whole payload, and a fragment carries only part of it. A relay cannot verify the binding of a fragment and does not charge a fragment to an allowance. A bundle fragmented before it reaches a relay is stored there under no allowance. The selector's source and destination are compared with the bundle's source node ID and destination EID. 8.2. IP An IP packet carries no allowance. A holder presents an allowance to a relay in a presentation, an untagged COSE_Sign1 structure signed by the holder's key with the following payload. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 presentation-payload = { 0 => 5, ; type, presentation 1 => bstr .cbor COSE_Sign1, ; the allowance, as issued 2 => tstr, ; relay presented to } The holder sends a presentation to each relay that has a row in the allowance, by any transport the deployment chooses. A relay accepts a presentation when it names that relay and its signature verifies with the holder's key in the allowance. A replayed presentation re- presents the same allowance and has no further effect (Section 6.4). Over IP, the selector MUST name a source prefix. A relay holding an accepted presentation charges to the allowance the stored packets that match the selector and are bound to the holder's key. A packet is bound to the holder's key when the deployment states, for the interface it arrived on, one of the following: * it arrived over a security association whose peer authenticated with the holder's key, such as an IPsec security association [RFC4301]; * the deployment's ingress filtering ensures that only the holder can send from the selector's source prefix on that interface. Section 10 of [TIPTOP-ARCH] expects that "aggressive ingress filtering may be expected to protect deep space networks". A relay further along the path charges an IP packet to an allowance only where one of these holds for it. 9. Interaction with Custody 9.1. Charging until forwarded An item stays charged until it leaves the relay's buffer. A relay that keeps an item until a downstream node acknowledges it keeps the charge for that time. The covering contact bounds this as it bounds all coverage. When the allowance ends, the item becomes data under no allowance whether or not it has been acknowledged. The custody receipt block notes that "BPv7 [RFC9171] does not include custody transfer" and answers a separate question, "who can prove they held this bundle, and when" (Section 1 of [CUSTODY-RECEIPT]). An allowance answers who authorised the holding. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 9.2. Receipts naming the allowance A relay that signs custody receipts [CUSTODY-RECEIPT] for a bundle charged to an allowance SHOULD set the receipt's subject (key 7, Section 3.2 of that document) to "storage-allowance:" followed by the lowercase hexadecimal form of the allowance identifier, where the deployment uses the subject for no other purpose. A receipt's receivedAt and forwardedAt are written and signed by the custodian it describes, and so is its subject. Storage time computed from them for a bundle charged to an allowance is that custodian's signed claim. Section 9 of [CUSTODY-RECEIPT] says: "A custodian can sign false receivedAt and forwardedAt values. Receipts bind a custodian to its claims; they do not prove the claims are true. Inconsistent times across adjacent receipts can be flagged by the verifier." A verifier can check a custodian's forwardedAt only against the receivedAt that the next custodian, a different party, signed, and only for bundles that reached the verifier carrying their receipts. A bundle released or dropped on the way leaves the verifier no receipt. A receipt states no size (Section 3.2 of [CUSTODY-RECEIPT]), and the verifier knows a bundle's size only as received. That size differs from its size as stored by the blocks added in transit. Accounting derived from receipts therefore consists of custodians' claims, and a verifier can do no more than cross-check them between neighbours. 9.3. Usage statement At the end of each contact, a relay SHOULD sign a usage statement for the allowances it charged since its last statement. It is an untagged COSE_Sign1 structure signed by a key of the relay, with the following payload, and it is sent to the storage authority by any means. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 usage-statement-payload = { 0 => 6, ; type, usage statement 1 => tstr, ; relay identifier 2 => tstr, ; contact identifier, or "" for none 3 => dtn-time, ; start of the period covered 4 => dtn-time, ; end of the period covered 5 => [* usage], } usage = [ allowance: bstr .size 32, ; allowance identifier admitted: uint, ; octets admitted in the period peak: uint, ; highest charge in the period octet-ms: uint, ; charge integrated over the period released: uint, ; octets released at the end refused: uint, ; octets refused under the allowance ] A usage statement gives accounting of storage per source without a receipt in every bundle. Section 8 of [CUSTODY-RECEIPT] lists as an open issue that "A custodian could instead sign one receipt per contact over a Merkle root of the bundles it held, as the reference implementation does outside the block; how such a receipt is carried in each bundle is not yet specified." A usage statement is a record about allowances that goes to the storage authority outside any bundle, and it neither answers that issue nor depends on its answer. 10. Security Considerations Forged allowances: A relay honours an allowance only when its signature verifies through a valid chain to an anchor key it holds (checks 1 and 2 of Section 5.2). Copied allowances: An allowance is readable by every node on a bundle's path. A copy gives an attacker nothing, since a relay charges an item only when it is bound to the holder's key (Section 8). Replayed items: Any node on a bundle's path can replay a holder's bundle. While the original is stored, a copy with the same source node ID and creation timestamp is not charged (Section 8.1), and the binding's coverage of the primary block keeps the payload and allowance from being moved into a new bundle. A copy replayed after the original has left the buffer is charged to the holder's own allowance. The row bounds the effect, and only the holder's storage is consumed. Over-issuance: A faulty or compromised key can sign any number of Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 allowances. Check 7 holds the storage they consume at each relay to that key's ceiling (Section 6.3), and revoking the key (Section 7.5) closes or ends them. Withheld contact: An attacker that jams a link for a whole planned contact makes the relay record it as missed and moves coverage to the next contact listed. The last contact in the row bounds the effect. An attacker that keeps a relay out of contact with its storage authority delays revocations, and the end of the covering contact bounds that. Section 10 of [TIPTOP-ARCH] describes flooding a link for a whole contact window. The next hop itself can also withhold its link. A relay does not check a row's contacts against its own contact plan and takes them as the issuer gives them. A next hop the holder controls can therefore withhold its link for every contact listed and carry coverage to the last. Withheld revocations: Any party on the path can withhold a revocation or a revocation status. A relay measures the age of its revocation information only from the statuses it has accepted (Section 7.6). Withholding ends admission once the bound passes and never makes the information look current. Clock manipulation: Setting a relay's clock back would extend every covering contact. The relay's time never decreases (Section 7.4), and a clock set back while the relay's counter runs does not lower it. One set forward ends coverage early. A counter that does not survive a restart leaves the relay's time at its recorded value across one, and a clock set back across a restart holds the relay's time there until the clock passes it. Section 7.4 also makes the uncertainty explicit and admits nothing without a trusted time. A clock that is wrong from the start, without the relay knowing, defeats it, and the relay's time source is held data whose bound the deployment declares. Verification load: Signature verification costs computation. A relay SHOULD bound the verification work it does per source and per contact, and caches the outcome of checks 1 to 3 by identifier (Section 5.2). An item whose allowance fails is data under no allowance. Compromised relay: A relay controls its own storage and can ignore allowances. The network is then no worse off than without them. Its counters and usage statements are its own claims, and so are the times in the custody receipts it signs. A third party can flag a relay's receipt times that disagree with the receipts of its neighbours, for the bundles that reach that party, and no more (Section 9.2). Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 Exhaustion of other storage: Filling the storage for data under no allowance affects neither covered items (Section 5.4) nor the classes a profile sets aside (Section 5.5). Lost covered items: A reboot or memory fault can lose covered items. The relay counts them (Section 5.6), and Section 8.2 of [TIPTOP-ARCH] asks for an event when a buffer is cleared other than by transmission. 11. Privacy Considerations An allowance carried in a bundle is readable by every node on the path, including nodes it names no row for. It reveals the holder's key, the relays the holder expects to use and the contacts it expects. A holder SHOULD use a holder key for no purpose other than its allowances. An issuer SHOULD name in an allowance no more relays, contacts or selector fields than the storage needs. Over IP, a presentation goes only to the relays named in it. Usage statements and custody receipts tie storage per source to times. They reveal each holder's traffic volume to the storage authority, and Section 9 of [CUSTODY-RECEIPT] notes that "Receipts reveal the custodians on a route and their timing to anyone who can read the bundle." A deployment should bound who reads these records and how long they are kept, as for the record of requirement R11 of [DISCONNECTED-TRUST]. 12. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "Bundle Block Types" registry in the "Bundle Protocol" registry group. The registry's policy is Specification Required. Bundle Protocol Version: 7 Value: TBD1 Description: Storage Allowance Reference: This document This is a request for a new Bundle Block Type. The block carries the allowance in a bundle and a relay needs a type value to find it. The Specification Required policy calls for review by the designated experts of a stable specification, and this document is not one until the working group that maintains the Bundle Protocol has reviewed it. A deployment before the value is assigned has no value of its own to use. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 The prefix "storage-allowance:" used in custody receipt subjects (Section 9.2) needs no registry. 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, June 2019, . [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, . [RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022, . [RFC9171] Burleigh, S., Fall, K., and E. Birrane, III, "Bundle Protocol Version 7", RFC 9171, DOI 10.17487/RFC9171, January 2022, . [RFC9172] Birrane, III, E. and K. McKeever, "Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec)", RFC 9172, DOI 10.17487/RFC9172, January 2022, . [FIPS180-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, August 2015. Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 [BPSEC-COSE] Sipos, B., "Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec) COSE Context", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- dtn-bpsec-cose-18, 2 November 2026, . [DISCONNECTED-TRUST] Morrison, B., "A Disconnected Trust Model for Networks Without Continuous Connectivity", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-tiptop-disconnected-trust- 00, 18 November 2026, . 13.2. Informative References [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301, December 2005, . [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, . [TIPTOP-ARCH] Blanchet, M., Eddy, W., and T. Li, "An Architecture for IP in Deep Space", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- ietf-tiptop-ip-architecture-03, 31 October 2026, . [TIPTOP-UC] Blanchet, M., Eddy, W., and M. Eubanks, "IP in Deep Space: Key Characteristics, Use Cases and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tiptop-usecase-04, 28 October 2026, . [CUSTODY-RECEIPT] Mamakos, P., "Signed Custody Receipts Carried in a Bundle Protocol Version 7 Extension Block", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bsvkey-dtn-custody-receipt-block-02, 25 October 2026, . Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 [OT-COMMAND-AUTHORITY] Morrison, B., Whiteside, C., and I. Schrock, "Authorised and Attributable Agent Authority for Operational- Technology Control Actions", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-morrison-ot-command-authority-04, 15 October 2026, . [LCRNS-OBP] Verville, J. and W. Eddy, "Onboard Processing for LunaNet Data Services", IEEE 46th IEEE Aerospace Conference, March 2025, . [LNIS] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "LunaNet Interoperability Specification, Version 5", 29 January 2025, . [ESA-CUSTODY] Bihan, A. L., Flentge, F., and J. A. Fraire, "Custody Transfer and Compressed Status Reporting for Bundle Protocol Version 7", arXiv 2507.17403, July 2025, . [LONG-DELAY] Morrison, B., "Command Authority Across Long Delay and Intermittent Contact", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-command-authority-long-delay-00, 18 November 2026, . Appendix A. Worked Example This example uses invented values. T is a DTN time, and offsets from it are in hours (h) and minutes (m). A rover, dtn://rover.example/, reaches a ground station through two orbiters, dtn://orbiter-a.example/ and dtn://orbiter-b.example/. Each orbiter holds the anchor key of the storage authority ops.example with an anchor ceiling of 400,000,000 octets. ops.example delegates a key, called surface-ops here and named in every structure by its key identifier, with a ceiling of 100,000,000 octets at each orbiter. surface-ops signs allowance A for the rover's holder key, with the selector source dtn://rover.example/, not before T, and two rows: Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 * dtn://orbiter-a.example/, 40,000,000 octets, contacts c-a-17 to dtn://ground.example/ from T+6h to T+6h20m and c-a-18 from T+12h to T+12h20m; * dtn://orbiter-b.example/, 40,000,000 octets, contact c-b-09 to dtn://ground.example/ from T+8h to T+8h15m. The rover sends bundles through orbiter-a until A's charge there reaches 40,000,000 octets. Orbiter-a refuses the next bundle at check 6. The rover sends further bundles carrying A through orbiter- b. Orbiter-b charges its own row from zero. The storage held under A cannot exceed 80,000,000 octets, and neither orbiter learns the other's charge. Space weather blocks orbiter-a's link for the whole of c-a-17. Orbiter-a ran throughout and had no link to the ground station in the interval, widened by its clock uncertainty. Once its time less that uncertainty reaches the end of c-a-17, it records the contact as missed, and c-a-18 becomes the covering contact. c-a-18 takes place, and when orbiter-a decides it, 2,000,000 octets are still charged to A. A ends at orbiter-a, and those octets become data under no allowance. Meanwhile surface-ops, by a fault, signs allowance B for another holder with 80,000,000 octets at orbiter-a. While A holds 38,000,000 octets there, B's holder can store at most 62,000,000 octets there, by check 7 against the ceiling of surface-ops. Storage under any other key at orbiter-a is untouched. Orbiter-a's usage statement for c-a-18 reports A's peak of 40,000,000 octets and 2,000,000 octets released. Appendix B. Implementation Status This section is to be removed before publication as an RFC, as [RFC7942] describes. No implementation of this document exists. The author has written none. No operator of a relay and no implementer of the Bundle Protocol has said that it will implement the allowance or that it wants it. The first implementation would add enforcement to one open-source Bundle Protocol node that stores bundles for later contacts. It would hold an anchor key and its ceiling, verify an allowance and the Block Integrity Block that binds a bundle to its holder, tag stored bundles with the allowance identifier, and apply checks 1 to 7 of Section 5.2 to each. A second tool would issue allowances and Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Relay Storage Allowances November 2026 delegation certificates. The test is to fill the node's store from two sources and confirm the three bounds of Section 6.5 hold at every instant, and to withhold one planned contact and confirm coverage moves to the next. Appendix C. Document History * draft-morrison-relay-storage-authorisation-01 (2026-11-19): adds a deployment scenario drawn from lunar relay architecture, states the Bundle Block Type request and the condition on its registry policy in the IANA Considerations, and adds an Implementation Status section. The mechanism is unchanged. * draft-morrison-relay-storage-authorisation-00 (2026-11-18): first version. Defines the storage allowance, its issuance and delegation with per-relay ceilings, enforcement at the relay with the buffer as the only ledger, rows that keep one allowance from being spent twice across relays, expiry at the first planned contact that takes place, revocation and revocation status, carriage in the Bundle Protocol and over IP, and use with signed custody receipts. Acknowledgments None yet. Author's Address Blake Morrison Alter Meridian Pty Ltd Email: blake@truealter.com Morrison Expires 23 May 2027 [Page 34]