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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer-05" category="info" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Reviewed-By Trailer">Reviewed-By Trailer: Sovereign-Portable Peer-Review Attribution for Content-Hash-Bound Artefacts</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer-05"/>
    <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
      <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
      <address>
        <email>blake@truealter.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
    <abstract>
      

<t>This document defines a trailer grammar for sovereign-portable peer
review as an extension of the identity-attributed commit grammar of
draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits.  The grammar introduces one required trailer
(<tt>Reviewed-By:</tt>) and three optional companion trailers
(<tt>Review-Stance:</tt>, <tt>Review-Of:</tt>, <tt>Witnessed-By:</tt>) that bind a
Sovereign-tier <tt>~handle</tt> to a specific act of review over a specific
content artefact, cryptographically signed using the Ed25519
mechanism of that grammar.  Because the signature covers the
reviewer's role, the stance and the review target together, changing
any of them after signing fails verification.  The mechanism applies to git
commits, document manifests, pre-prints, patent disclosures, and
any other content-addressable artefact.  A reviewer's signed
reviews are bound to the reviewer's sovereign handle and can be
verified without the publisher.
For anonymous peer review, the reviewer signs under a Sovereign
handle whose underlying party is concealed through out-of-band key
custody; the review act stays verifiable and the reviewer's
identity is not disclosed.  The grammar can be used together with
CRediT, ORCID and DOI attribution.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <section anchor="problem-statement">
        <name>Problem Statement</name>
        <t>Peer review of scholarly, scientific, and technical artefacts is
recorded by the publishers that run it, and their editorial
platforms hold the only durable record of a reviewer's
contribution.  When a reviewer accepts an invitation from a journal,
the journal records the review against an internal reviewer
profile; when the reviewer moves to another venue, that record does
not travel with them.  The existing mechanisms for attaching
reviewer identity to a review are these:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><strong>Journal reviewer databases.</strong>  Each publisher (Elsevier,
Springer Nature, Wiley, PLOS) maintains an internal reviewer
profile.  Reviewer reputation is platform-local, and a reviewer
who moves to another publisher starts with no record there.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>ORCID reviewer credit <xref target="ORCID"/>.</strong>  ORCID supports a "Peer Review"
activity type in which a publisher asserts that a given ORCID iD
performed a review.  The assertion is publisher-attested; the
reviewer cannot publish a review record without publisher
cooperation, and cannot cryptographically demonstrate the review
occurred without that cooperation.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>CRediT contributor roles <xref target="CREDIT"/>.</strong>  CRediT is a controlled
vocabulary for author-level contribution (conceptualisation,
methodology, writing, etc.).  It describes what authors did and
has no role for reviewers.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Open-review initiatives (eLife <xref target="ELIFE-OPENREVIEW"/>, F1000,
arXiv trackbacks).</strong>  These publish review content openly but
continue to locate reviewer identity inside the publisher's
platform; leaving the platform ends the review's discoverability.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>COPE guidance <xref target="COPE"/>.</strong>  Establishes ethical norms for peer
review but does not specify a format, attribution mechanism, or
cryptographic binding.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>None of the above provides a provider-neutral, DNS-resolvable,
cryptographically-bound attribution mechanism for peer review that
lets a reviewer accumulate portable reputation outside any
publisher's platform.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="design-goals">
        <name>Design Goals</name>
        <t>This document defines a review-trailer grammar with the following
goals:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t><strong>Provider-neutral.</strong>  No dependency on any specific publisher,
pre-print server, or editorial platform.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Sovereign-portable.</strong>  Reviewer reputation accumulates on the
reviewer's sovereign <tt>~handle</tt> rather than on any publisher's
platform.  A reviewer who moves between journals, or between
open review and private review, carries their signed review
history with them.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Content-bound.</strong>  Every review trailer is bound to a specific
content hash.  A review of version 1 of a manuscript therefore
cannot be silently re-attributed to version 2.  The same
signature binds the reviewer's role and stance, and changing
either invalidates it.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Cryptographically verifiable.</strong>  Review attribution is bound
by an Ed25519 signature whose public key is reachable from DNS
without prior trust establishment, reusing the signature model
of <xref target="COMMITS"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Pseudonymity-preserving.</strong>  Some disciplines require
anonymous peer review.  The grammar supports pseudonymous review
by permitting a Sovereign handle whose underlying party is
concealed through out-of-band key custody.  The review act stays
verifiable and the reviewer's identity is not disclosed.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong>Category-safe against misattribution.</strong>  Conformant parsers
reject cross-tier handle placement (e.g., an Instrument-tier
handle in a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> slot) as a violation of the grammar
itself.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
      </section>
      <section anchor="scope">
        <name>Scope</name>
        <t>This document specifies:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt>, <tt>Review-Stance:</tt>, <tt>Review-Of:</tt>, and
<tt>Witnessed-By:</tt> trailer grammar in ABNF <xref target="RFC5234"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reuse of the <tt>Identity-Signature:</tt>, <tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt>, and
<tt>Identity-Anchor:</tt> cryptographic trailers from <xref target="COMMITS"/>, and the
review payload that their signature covers.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Multiplicity, placement, and ordering rules.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Verifier behaviour for accepting, rejecting, and surfacing
review states.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Security and privacy considerations specific to peer review.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>This document does not specify:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The <tt>~handle</tt> identity primitive itself, defined by <xref target="MCPDNS"/> and
incorporated by reference through <xref target="COMMITS"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The normative tier taxonomy, defined in <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 3 and
restated briefly in Section 3 of this document.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>An editorial workflow or an editorial decision algorithm.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reviewer compensation.  Section 8.4 mentions reviewer payment only
where it bears on conflict of interest.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        

</section>
      <section anchor="definitions">
        <name>Definitions</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>Handle</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A <tt>~</tt>-prefixed identifier per <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, as incorporated into
<xref target="COMMITS"/>.  Handles are the unit of identity addressing in this
document.  A handle that matches the <tt>handle-ref</tt> rule of
<xref target="ALTER-URI"/> names the same subject as the <tt>alter:</tt> URI formed by
prefixing it with <tt>alter:</tt>; the trailer value <tt>~alice</tt> corresponds
to <tt>alter:~alice</tt>.  The trailer grammar of Section 4.1 carries the
handle without the scheme name.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Sovereign Tier Handle</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Per <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 2.2.  A handle representing a human
individual or formal organisation with direct cryptographic
agency; holds its own private key; can sign.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Pseudonymous Sovereign Handle</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A Sovereign-tier handle whose underlying real-world party is
intentionally concealed.  No syntactic marker distinguishes a
pseudonymous Sovereign handle from a directly-identified one;
the distinction is policy-level and is held by the reviewer (or
by an editorial intermediary) through out-of-band key custody
and assignment records.  Pseudonymous Sovereign handles sign
with the same cryptographic weight as any other Sovereign
handle and are admissible wherever a Sovereign handle is
admissible.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Instrument Tier Handle</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Per <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 2.2.  A handle representing an AI model,
API endpoint, or tool class; holds no key; cannot sign.
Instrument handles are inadmissible in review slots.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Review Act</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A discrete act of evaluation performed by a Sovereign reviewer
against a specific content artefact identified by content hash.
A review act produces one trailer block.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Content Hash</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A cryptographic digest (SHA-256 or SHA-512) of the canonicalised
artefact being reviewed, or, for a git commit, its patch
identifier.  The hash binds the review to a specific artefact
state and prevents silent re-attribution across revisions.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Patch Identifier</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The identifier of a git change as defined in <xref target="COMMITS"/>: the
output of <tt>git patch-id --verbatim</tt> over the output of
<tt>git diff-tree -p --root</tt> for the commit.  This document does not
restate the definition.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Review Payload</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The byte string defined in Section 5.2 that the reviewer's
signature covers.  It carries the role, the signer, the reviewer,
the stance, and the <tt>Review-Of:</tt> value.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Review Stance</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A controlled-vocabulary enumeration of the reviewer's disposition
toward the artefact.  Permitted values are <tt>accept</tt>, <tt>reject</tt>,
<tt>revise</tt>, <tt>endorse</tt>, and <tt>dispute</tt>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Witness</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A second Sovereign-tier handle that attests to having observed
the review act being performed, without taking review
responsibility.  Used for signing ceremonies and high-stakes
review contexts (patent disclosures, adversarial reviews).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Conformant Verifier</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A consumer of review trailers that implements the parsing,
rejection, and signature-verification rules defined in
Section 7.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="identity-tier-taxonomy-informative-reference">
      <name>Identity Tier Taxonomy (Informative Reference)</name>
      <t>The review-trailer grammar reuses the three-tier taxonomy defined
in <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 3 without extension.  Pseudonymous review is
expressed as a Sovereign handle whose underlying party is concealed
through out-of-band key custody (Section 2.2); no separate tier or
syntactic suffix is introduced.</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Tier</th>
            <th align="left">Cryptographic Agency</th>
            <th align="left">Admissible in Reviewed-By: / Witnessed-By:</th>
            <th align="left">Examples</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Sovereign</td>
            <td align="left">Holds own key, signs</td>
            <td align="left">Yes</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>~alice</tt>, <tt>~example.com</tt>, <tt>~reviewer-kappa</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Bot</td>
            <td align="left">Scoped delegated key</td>
            <td align="left">No</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>~example-deps.bot</tt>, <tt>~example-triage.bot</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Instrument</td>
            <td align="left">No key, no signature</td>
            <td align="left">No</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>~cc-example-model-1</tt>, <tt>~cc-example-model-2</tt></td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>The Bot and Instrument tiers are inadmissible in review slots
because peer review is an attestational act that requires
cryptographic sovereign agency.  Conformant verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject
cross-tier placement per Section 7.  Where AI-instrument
involvement in review drafting must be disclosed, the separate
<tt>Drafted-With:</tt> trailer of <xref target="COMMITS"/> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used alongside
<tt>Reviewed-By:</tt>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="trailer-grammar-normative">
      <name>Trailer Grammar (Normative)</name>
      <section anchor="abnf">
        <name>ABNF</name>
        <t>The following ABNF <xref target="RFC5234"/> defines the syntax of each trailer.
Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept exactly this grammar.  Terminals not
defined here are imported from <xref target="RFC5234"/> or from <xref target="COMMITS"/>
Section 4.1.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
reviewed-by-trailer   = "Reviewed-By:" SP review-handle LF
review-stance-trailer = "Review-Stance:" SP stance-value LF
review-of-trailer     = "Review-Of:" SP content-hash-ref LF
witnessed-by-trailer  = "Witnessed-By:" SP sovereign-handle LF
                        ; MAY be immediately followed by its own
                        ; Identity-Signature:/Identity-Key-Id:
                        ; pair; see Section 4.4 and Section 7
                        ; step 5

review-handle         = sovereign-handle
                        ; sovereign-handle and handle-name per
                        ; [COMMITS] Section 4.1

stance-value          = "accept" / "reject" / "revise"
                      / "endorse" / "dispute"

content-hash-ref      = hash-algorithm ":" hash-value
hash-algorithm        = "sha256" / "sha512" / "git-patch-id"
                      / "git-sha1" / "git-sha256"
hash-value            = 1*HEXDIG
                        ; the Review Payload of Section 5.2 uses
                        ; the lower-case form
]]></artwork>
        <t>The trailer rules end in <tt>LF</tt>, as git commit messages and the
trailers of <xref target="COMMITS"/> do.</t>
        <t>Pseudonymous review is grammatically indistinguishable from
direct-identity review: both forms appear as a <tt>sovereign-handle</tt>
production.  Whether the underlying party is concealed is a
policy-level property held out-of-band by the reviewer (or by an
editorial intermediary that manages pseudonym assignment) and is
not exposed in the trailer grammar.  Cryptographic verification
proceeds identically in either case.</t>
        <t>The cryptographic trailers <tt>Identity-Signature:</tt>,
<tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt>, and <tt>Identity-Anchor:</tt> are imported unchanged
from <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 4.1 and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> appear in a review trailer
block under the multiplicity rules of Section 4.4 below.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="placement">
        <name>Placement</name>
        <t>Review trailers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear in the trailer/footer block of the
containing artefact.  For git commits, this is the commit message
footer as defined in <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 4.2.  For document
manifests (e.g., a <tt>REVIEW.md</tt> review record, a manifest appended
to a pre-print, or a trailer block embedded in a patent disclosure
submission form), the trailer block <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear as the final
block of the document, separated from the preceding content by
exactly one blank line.</t>
        <t>A review trailer block is distinguished from a commit trailer
block of <xref target="COMMITS"/> by the presence of at least one
<tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> trailer.  The two trailer types <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> coexist on the
same artefact: for example, a pre-print draft committed to a git
repository <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> carry both an <tt>Acted-By:</tt> trailer (attributing the
commit) and a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> trailer (attributing a subsequent
review of the committed content).  Verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> parse them
independently.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ordering">
        <name>Ordering</name>
        <t>Review trailers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> appear in the following canonical order:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t><tt>Reviewed-By:</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>Review-Stance:</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>Review-Of:</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>Witnessed-By:</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>Identity-Signature:</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>Identity-Anchor:</tt></t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept trailers in any order, but emitters <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
follow the canonical order to support diff-based review.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="multiplicity-rules">
        <name>Multiplicity Rules</name>
        <t>The following multiplicity constraints apply to a single review
trailer block:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><strong><tt>Reviewed-By:</tt></strong> - Exactly one trailer per review block.  A
single artefact <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> receive multiple review blocks over its
lifetime (one per reviewer); each block is independently
attributed and verified.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong><tt>Review-Stance:</tt></strong> - At most one trailer per review block.
A review takes exactly one stance at a time.  Where the block
carries no <tt>Review-Stance:</tt>, the Review Payload records the
stance as <tt>none</tt> (Section 5.2).  If the reviewer's
disposition is nuanced (e.g., "revise and resubmit with stance
leaning toward accept"), the primary stance <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be selected
and the nuance recorded in the review body, not in additional
stance trailers.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong><tt>Review-Of:</tt></strong> - At most one trailer per review block, and
exactly one where the block carries an <tt>Identity-Signature:</tt>.  A
review is bound to exactly one content-hash reference.  A
reviewer commenting on multiple artefacts <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> emit a separate
review block per artefact.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong><tt>Witnessed-By:</tt></strong> - Zero or more trailers per review block.
Multi-witness ceremonies (e.g., patent disclosure reviews
requiring two witness signatures) are permitted.
Multiple witnesses form an unordered set.  The relative order
of different witnesses' groups is not semantically significant.
Within a single witness's group, however, an
<tt>Identity-Signature:</tt>/<tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt> pair bound to that witness
(see below) <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> immediately follow its <tt>Witnessed-By:</tt> trailer.
A signature pair then binds to one witness without ambiguity even
when several witnesses are present.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong><tt>Identity-Signature:</tt> and <tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt></strong> - These two
trailers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear together or not at all, per <xref target="COMMITS"/>
Section 4.4.  A pair immediately following a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt>
trailer binds to that <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> trailer.  Witness
signatures <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> instead be recorded as a separate trailer block
each rooted at a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> copy of the witness's own
handle (verified as any other <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> block, per
Section 7), or as an <tt>Identity-Signature:</tt>/<tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt>
pair immediately following the corresponding <tt>Witnessed-By:</tt>
trailer.  A pair placed there binds to that witness directly and
is verified per Section 7 step 5.  The containing manifest is not part of
this binding.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><strong><tt>Identity-Anchor:</tt></strong> - <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> in this version of the
specification.  Implementations targeting
transparency-log-anchored review attribution <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> emit it.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="signature-algorithm-normative">
      <name>Signature Algorithm (Normative)</name>
      <section anchor="algorithm">
        <name>Algorithm</name>
        <t>The signature algorithm is Ed25519 <xref target="RFC8032"/>, reused unchanged
from <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 5, with the Review Payload below as the
message; Ed25519ph and Ed25519ctx <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="signed-payload">
        <name>Signed Payload</name>
        <t>The signed payload is the Review Payload: the following six lines,
each terminated by a single LF (0x0A), encoded as US-ASCII, with no
other bytes before, between or after them.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
reviewed-by-trailer-v1 LF
role: <role> LF
signer: <signer-handle> LF
reviewer: <reviewer-handle> LF
stance: <stance> LF
review-of: <content-hash-ref> LF
]]></artwork>
        <t>The first line is a domain-separation prefix.  Its value is the
literal <tt>reviewed-by-trailer-v1</tt>.  Because it is distinct from any
payload prefix defined in <xref target="COMMITS"/>, a signature made under one
document cannot verify under the other.</t>
        <t>The remaining lines are filled as follows.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>&lt;role&gt;</tt> is <tt>reviewer</tt> when the signature pair follows a
<tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> trailer, and <tt>witness</tt> when it follows a
<tt>Witnessed-By:</tt> trailer.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>&lt;signer-handle&gt;</tt> is the handle of the key holder producing the
signature, spelled exactly as in the trailer, including the
leading <tt>~</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>&lt;reviewer-handle&gt;</tt> is the handle in the <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> trailer
of the same review block.  For <tt>reviewer</tt> it equals the signer.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>&lt;stance&gt;</tt> is the value of the block's <tt>Review-Stance:</tt> trailer,
or the literal <tt>none</tt> where the block has none.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>&lt;content-hash-ref&gt;</tt> is the value of the block's <tt>Review-Of:</tt>
trailer, with the hash value in lower-case hexadecimal.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Signers and verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> build the Review Payload from the
trailer values, not from any normalised or case-folded form of
them, apart from the lower-casing of the hash value.  The Ed25519
signature is computed over the payload bytes directly.  The
payload is not hashed first and is not hex-encoded.</t>
        <t>The reviewed change is identified by the value in <tt>Review-Of:</tt>.
For a git commit it is the commit's Patch Identifier, written
<tt>git-patch-id:&lt;hex&gt;</tt>, the same basis the signature of <xref target="COMMITS"/>
uses.  For any other artefact it is the canonicalised-content digest
named by the <tt>hash-algorithm</tt>.  In both cases the payload carries
the <tt>Review-Of:</tt> value, and with it both the algorithm and the
digest.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="rationale-for-signing-the-role-stance-and-target-together">
        <name>Rationale for Signing the Role, Stance and Target Together</name>
        <t>A signature over the content hash alone proves that a key holder
signed that hash and nothing about what the holder said of
it.  Under such a scheme the same signature value is valid for any
role and any stance.  A <tt>Review-Stance: reject</tt> can be rewritten
as <tt>accept</tt>, a <tt>Witnessed-By:</tt> pair can be replayed as a
<tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> pair, and a <tt>Review-Of:</tt> that carries a different
algorithm label over the same digest bytes is indistinguishable.
The Review Payload puts every one of those values inside the
signed bytes, and changing any of them fails verification.</t>
        <t>Binding the review to the content hash, or for a git commit to its
Patch Identifier, preserves the review's attribution across
re-export of the artefact into different containers (a pre-print
re-uploaded to arXiv, the same manuscript ingested by a journal's
submission system, a patent specification exported to PDF) and
across a rebase or cherry-pick that leaves the change unchanged,
as long as the canonicalisation or the patch identifier yields the
same digest.  Since the Patch Identifier of a git commit ignores the
commit message, a review of a commit does not attest to the message
text.</t>
        <t>Manifest hashes (envelope digests of the publisher's submission
record) are not used as the signed payload.  If a publisher
re-packages the artefact, the manifest hash changes while the
content is identical; binding reviews to manifest hashes would
invalidate reviewer signatures under routine publisher operations.
A review stays portable between venues because the authority over
what constitutes "canonical content" rests with the artefact's
originator (the author) rather than with the publisher.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="signature-format">
        <name>Signature Format</name>
        <t>Signature encoding follows <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 5.4 without
modification.  The trailer value is <tt>ed25519:</tt> followed by the
base64url-encoded 64-byte signature per <xref target="RFC4648"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="example-a-review-of-a-message">
        <name>Example: A Review of a Message</name>
        <t>The trailers do not need a git repository.  Take a mailing-list
message whose text is canonicalised and hashed with SHA-256.  A
reader wants to vouch for it as a contribution.  <xref target="GONDWANA"/> Section
3.4 requires every contribution to be vouched for by at least one
human.  The reader appends this block as the final block of the
message (Section 4.2).</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
Reviewed-By: ~alice
Review-Stance: endorse
Review-Of: sha256:9f2c...e41a
Identity-Signature: ed25519:<base64url signature>
Identity-Key-Id: <key-id>
]]></artwork>
        <t>The signature covers the Review Payload of Section 5.2 built from
this block. It carries the role <tt>reviewer</tt>, the signer and reviewer
<tt>~alice</tt>, the stance <tt>endorse</tt> and the <tt>Review-Of:</tt> value.  Changing the role,
the stance or the hash after signing fails verification, as it does
for a commit.  A verifier follows Section 7 unchanged.  The block
uses only the trailers of Section 4.1 and the signature of
Section 5.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="dns-resolution-normative-reference">
      <name>DNS Resolution (Normative Reference)</name>
      <section anchor="reviewer-key-resolution">
        <name>Reviewer Key Resolution</name>
        <t>The reviewer's public key is resolved via the <tt>_alter.&lt;zone&gt;</tt> DNS
record mechanism of <xref target="MCPDNS"/>, exactly as specified in <xref target="COMMITS"/>
Section 6.1, under the zone associated with the handle and never a
zone read from its spelling.  No mechanism is provided for verifiers to learn,
from the trailer grammar or the DNS record alone, whether a given
Sovereign handle is operated by a directly-identified party or by
a concealed party under pseudonymous key custody.  Where the
distinction matters editorially, it is conveyed through separate
out-of-band channels (editorial assignment records, conference of
record); the protocol layer does not surface it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="witness-resolution">
        <name>Witness Resolution</name>
        <t>Witness handles resolve identically to reviewer handles.
Witnesses <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be Sovereign-tier handles.  Although the grammar
does not distinguish pseudonymous from directly-identified
Sovereign handles, the witness role is an on-the-record
presence attestation; witnesses <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> therefore use Sovereign
handles whose underlying identity is publicly resolvable by the
intended verifier audience, since concealed-party witnessing
materially weakens the attestation.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="verifier-behaviour-normative">
      <name>Verifier Behaviour (Normative)</name>
      <t>A conformant verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform the following steps in order:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t><strong>Parse all review trailers from the trailer block.</strong>  Trailers
appearing outside the block <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Reject cross-slot category errors.</strong>  For each trailer,
read the handle's tier from its lexical form per <xref target="COMMITS"/>
Section 3, with no DNS lookup.  If any handle appears
in a slot other than its tier's admissible slot (for example,
an Instrument-tier handle in a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> slot, or a
Bot-tier handle in a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> or <tt>Witnessed-By:</tt> slot),
the trailer block is malformed and the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject it
as a category error.  The error message <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> identify the
offending trailer by name.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Validate the controlled-vocabulary stance.</strong>  If a
<tt>Review-Stance:</tt> trailer is present, its value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be one of
the five stance values defined in Section 4.1.  Unknown stance
values <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cause the review to be marked as malformed.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Verify signatures, if present.</strong>  If <tt>Identity-Signature:</tt>
and <tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt> are present, the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>:  </t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
              <t>Extract the <tt>key-id</tt> from the <tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt> trailer.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Resolve the corresponding public key from the <tt>_alter</tt> record
of the zone associated with the <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> handle, per
Section 6.1.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Build the Review Payload of Section 5.2 with role
<tt>reviewer</tt>, from the <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt>, <tt>Review-Stance:</tt> and
<tt>Review-Of:</tt> trailers of the block as received.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Verify the Ed25519 signature against that payload using the
resolved public key.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>
A block that carries <tt>Identity-Signature:</tt> without <tt>Review-Of:</tt>
is malformed and has no verifiable payload.  </t>
          <t>
If signature verification fails, the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> mark the
review as <tt>unverified</tt> and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report it as having a valid
sovereign attribution.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Verify witness signatures, if present.</strong>  For each
<tt>Witnessed-By:</tt> trailer accompanied by its own bound
<tt>Identity-Signature:</tt>/<tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt> pair (per Section
4.4), the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>:  </t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
              <t>Extract the <tt>key-id</tt> from that pair's <tt>Identity-Key-Id:</tt>
trailer.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Resolve the corresponding public key from the <tt>_alter</tt> record
of the zone associated with the witness handle, per
Section 6.2.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Build the Review Payload with role <tt>witness</tt>, the witness
handle as signer, and the reviewer handle, stance and
<tt>Review-Of:</tt> value of the same block, and verify the Ed25519
signature against it.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>
If a witness signature fails to verify, the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
mark that witness attestation as <tt>unverified</tt> and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
report it as a valid witness signature.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>Verify content-hash binding.</strong>  If <tt>Review-Of:</tt> is present,
the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> recompute the content hash (for a git commit,
the Patch Identifier) from the artefact as delivered and compare
it to the value in
<tt>Review-Of:</tt>, using the algorithm it names.  Mismatch indicates
either artefact tampering or review attribution to a different version; the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
surface this condition and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> silently accept the
review.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>A conformant verifier <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t><strong>Distinguish review states in user-facing output.</strong>  Verifiers
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> present three distinct states:
          </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>verified</tt> - <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> present with a valid
<tt>Identity-Signature:</tt> over the Review Payload, resolving to
the published key, AND content-hash match.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>claimed</tt> - <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> present without a signature, or
with a signature whose key cannot be resolved.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>hash-mismatch</tt> - signature valid but content digest differs
from <tt>Review-Of:</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>
Conflating these states is a security defect.  Whether a
<tt>verified</tt> review is directly-identified or pseudonymous is
not derivable from the grammar; verifiers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> attempt to
classify reviews along that axis from the trailer block alone.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="reviewer-reputation-portability">
        <name>Reviewer Reputation Portability</name>
        <t>Once a reviewer accumulates a signed review history on a sovereign
<tt>~handle</tt>, that history is outside any publisher's control.  A publisher cannot unilaterally revoke, rewrite, or
platform-lock the reviewer's past signed reviews; a reviewer
migrating to a new publisher carries the chain of signed review
acts with them, and any verifier (a future organisation, a tenure
committee, a grant panel, an adversarial peer) can check the
chain end-to-end without publisher cooperation.  The editorial
decision process stays with the publisher.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="pseudonymity-and-anonymous-peer-review">
        <name>Pseudonymity and Anonymous Peer Review</name>
        <t>A Sovereign handle whose underlying party is concealed carries
the same cryptographic weight as a directly-identified Sovereign
handle and is grammatically indistinguishable from it.
Double-blind review therefore remains possible where a discipline
requires it, and the signed review chain is still verifiable.
Publishers operating anonymous-review workflows <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> mint or
delegate a per-review Sovereign handle for the reviewer, discard
the assignment-to-real-identity binding after the editorial
process concludes, and rely on the reviewer's own key custody to
retain the signed record for future portability.</t>
        <t>The mapping between a concealed Sovereign handle and its
underlying party is the responsibility of the reviewer and,
optionally, of the editorial intermediary that facilitates the
pseudonymous assignment.  This document does not specify that
mapping mechanism; implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> document the assignment
and custody model they use.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="review-spam">
        <name>Review Spam</name>
        <t>A malicious sovereign <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> publish arbitrary signed reviews
attributing nonsense stances to arbitrary artefact hashes.  The
protocol does not filter such reviews.  Because they accumulate
against the same sovereign key that carries the reviewer's
legitimate work, the reputational cost falls on the reviewer's own
handle.  Verifiers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> surface reviewer history to readers
(e.g., "this handle has produced 12 reviews
across 4 venues, of which 2 appear to be spam").</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="review-bribery-and-conflict-of-interest">
        <name>Review Bribery and Conflict of Interest</name>
        <t>The grammar cannot prevent a reviewer from being
bribed to produce an unjustified positive review, nor from
concealing a conflict of interest.  Any economic counter-incentive
is external to this specification.  An implementation that pays
reviewers can make sustained honest reviewing raise a reviewer's
earnings over time and make a single detected conflict-of-interest
violation cancel a disproportionate fraction of them.  Conflict
disclosure is a policy-layer concern.  This protocol lets an honest
reviewer attribute a review truthfully and offers no means of
detecting a dishonest one.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="witness-collusion">
        <name>Witness Collusion</name>
        <t>Witness trailers attest to the presence of the reviewer at the
review act; they do not attest to the review's substantive
merit.  Two witnesses colluding with a dishonest reviewer can
still produce a validly-signed multi-witness block over a
fraudulent review.  Witness signatures therefore raise the cost
of forgery but do not eliminate it.  High-stakes review contexts
(patent disclosure reviews, adversarial expert reviews) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
require witnesses whose sovereign identities have independent
reputational stakes that are lost by collusion.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="role-and-stance-rewriting">
        <name>Role and Stance Rewriting</name>
        <t>In revisions before -03 the signature covered only the content
hash, and a reviewer's stance, the role of a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> or
<tt>Witnessed-By:</tt> signature, and the <tt>Review-Of:</tt> label could be
changed by anyone holding the block without invalidating the
signature.  The Review Payload of Section 5.2 covers all of them.
A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> build the payload from the trailers as received
and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> substitute defaults for absent ones other than the
<tt>none</tt> stance defined there.  A signature made under the earlier
scheme does not verify under this one and is reported as
<tt>unverified</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="content-hash-forgery">
        <name>Content-Hash Forgery</name>
        <t>An attacker who can forge content with the same canonicalised
hash as an honestly-reviewed artefact can silently re-attribute
the reviewer's signature to forged content.  The mitigation is
the cryptographic strength of the chosen <tt>hash-algorithm</tt>.
Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> default to <tt>sha256</tt> or stronger and <bcp14>SHOULD
NOT</bcp14> accept <tt>git-sha1</tt> for high-assurance review contexts, in
line with <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 9.5.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="key-custody-at-the-review-signing-boundary">
        <name>Key Custody at the Review-Signing Boundary</name>
        <t>The same key-custody considerations as the "Key Custody at the
Commit-Signing Boundary" section of <xref target="COMMITS"/> apply unchanged: the signing operation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> occur in an
unprivileged process that does not mediate access to the private
key.  Signing ceremonies for high-stakes reviews (patent
disclosures, adversarial expert reviews) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also
bind the signing key to a hardware authenticator and record the
witness handles inside the trailer block before the signature is
produced.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="negative-attribution-missing-review-disclosure">
        <name>Negative Attribution: Missing Review Disclosure</name>
        <t>A publisher <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> elect to omit the <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> trailer when
publishing a review in order to conceal the reviewer's identity
even after review acceptance; this is detectable by the reviewer
themselves (who retains their own signed copy) but not by third
parties.  The grammar gives a positive attribution path and leaves
a publisher free to withhold reviewer identity where editorial
policy forbids disclosing it.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="pseudonymous-review">
        <name>Pseudonymous Review</name>
        <t>Anonymous peer review is used where a discipline judges the costs
of fully-attributed review (retaliation, seniority bias,
disciplinary politics) to exceed its benefits.  This document
treats a pseudonymous Sovereign handle exactly as it treats any
other Sovereign handle.  Because pseudonymous and
directly-identified Sovereign handles are grammatically
indistinguishable, implementations cannot reliably classify a
review as pseudonymous from the trailer block alone; they <bcp14>MUST
NOT</bcp14> emit operational warnings or user-facing nudges that
characterise a review as lower-trust on the basis of suspected
pseudonymity.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="dns-linkability-risk">
        <name>DNS-Linkability Risk</name>
        <t>Every DNS resolution of a <tt>~handle</tt> leaks the verifying party's
interest in that handle to the DNS path (recursive resolvers,
on-path observers, zone operators).  Reviewers performing
sensitive reviews under pseudonymous Sovereign handles <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
publish the handle's envelope in a zone hosted by an
infrastructure provider that is
not the same entity as the publisher; otherwise the publisher's
own DNS telemetry can de-pseudonymise review-assignment patterns.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="right-to-withdraw-a-review">
        <name>Right to Withdraw a Review</name>
        <t>A reviewer who wishes to withdraw a past review cannot unmake
the cryptographic fact of the signed block; they <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> publish a
superseding trailer block (a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> carrying a
<tt>Review-Stance: dispute</tt> against their own prior review hash)
that records the retraction without erasing the prior signature.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="trailer-name-registration">
        <name>Trailer Name Registration</name>
        <t>If a git/document trailer name registry is established by IANA
(see <xref target="COMMITS"/> Section 10.1), this document requests registration
of the following additional trailer names with reference to this
specification:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>Reviewed-By</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>Review-Stance</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>Review-Of</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>Witnessed-By</tt></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The cryptographic trailers (<tt>Identity-Signature</tt>,
<tt>Identity-Key-Id</tt>, <tt>Identity-Anchor</tt>) are registered by <xref target="COMMITS"/>
and are not separately registered here.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="stance-value-registry">
        <name>Stance Value Registry</name>
        <t>This document requests IANA registration of a "Peer Review Stance
Values" registry, initially populated with the five values of
Section 4.1 (<tt>accept</tt>, <tt>reject</tt>, <tt>revise</tt>, <tt>endorse</tt>, <tt>dispute</tt>).
The registration policy is "Specification Required" <xref target="RFC8126"/>.
Extensions to the vocabulary <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> justify why the existing five
values are insufficient for the proposed use case.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="no-other-iana-actions">
        <name>No Other IANA Actions</name>
        <t>This document requests no other IANA actions.  The <tt>did:alter:</tt>
identifier form, the <tt>identitylog://</tt> URI scheme, and the Ed25519
signature encoding are all inherited from <xref target="COMMITS"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="relationship-to-existing-standards">
      <name>Relationship to Existing Standards</name>
      <t>The review-trailer grammar coexists with existing peer-review
attribution mechanisms and does not replace them.</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Mechanism</th>
            <th align="left">Purpose</th>
            <th align="left">Coexistence with this spec</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">ORCID peer-review activity <xref target="ORCID"/></td>
            <td align="left">Publisher-attested review record</td>
            <td align="left">Complementary.  ORCID records that a review occurred; <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> records what the review was.  Both can coexist on the same review act.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">CRediT contributor roles <xref target="CREDIT"/></td>
            <td align="left">Author-side contribution taxonomy</td>
            <td align="left">Orthogonal.  CRediT describes what authors did; <tt>Review-Stance:</tt> describes what reviewers said.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">DOI attribution <xref target="DOI"/></td>
            <td align="left">Persistent identifier for the artefact</td>
            <td align="left">Complementary.  A DOI names the artefact; <tt>Review-Of:</tt> binds the review to the artefact's content hash.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">COPE ethics guidance <xref target="COPE"/></td>
            <td align="left">Normative ethical framework for peer review</td>
            <td align="left">Orthogonal.  COPE specifies duties; this document specifies attribution grammar.  An implementation can conform to both.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">eLife publish-review-curate</td>
            <td align="left">Open-review editorial model</td>
            <td align="left">Complementary.  A review published under the eLife model can carry a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> block bound to the reviewer's handle.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">arXiv trackbacks <xref target="ARXIV"/></td>
            <td align="left">Informal linkage between reviews and pre-prints</td>
            <td align="left">Complementary.  A trackback can carry a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> block as a machine-readable, signed review record.</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>Co-Authored-By: Claude</tt> <xref target="ANTHROPIC-COAUTHOR"/></td>
            <td align="left">Informal AI co-authorship convention</td>
            <td align="left">Inadmissible in review slots.  AI drafting assistance on a review <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be disclosed via the <tt>Drafted-With:</tt> trailer of <xref target="COMMITS"/>, not via co-authorship.</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>None of ORCID, CRediT or DOI carries a signed review act under a
handle whose underlying party is concealed.  The grammar of
Section 4 carries one under a Sovereign handle, with no tier or
syntax of its own (Section 2.2).</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The author thanks colleagues at Alter Meridian Pty Ltd for the
framing of sovereign-portable reputation, and the eLife open-review
community and the arXiv operators for their prior work on open peer
review.
Additional contributors will be named at review time.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="change-log">
      <name>Change Log</name>
      <section anchor="draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer-05">
        <name>draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer-05</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Adds a short example of a review of a mailing-list message to
the Signature Algorithm section, using only the trailers and the
signature already defined, and cites <xref target="GONDWANA"/> Section 3.4 for
the vouching of each contribution by a human.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Prose edited throughout.  Contrasts, recaps and closing restatements
are removed, a dash-style aside in Section 7 becomes a parenthesis,
and Section 8.4 describes reviewer payment in plain terms.  No
requirement changes.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Section 5.2 counts the Review Payload as six lines, the prefix
line and the five value lines, where it said five.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The DOI row of the table in Section 11 no longer says a
<tt>Review-Of:</tt> trailer may carry a DOI, as the grammar of Section
4.1 admits a content-hash reference only.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The lettered sub-steps of Section 7 steps 4 and 5 are set as a
list.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer-04">
        <name>draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer-04</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Prose rewritten against the drafting rules: sentence-final "so"
and "which" tails joined or split, and words broken across a line
rejoined.  No requirement changes.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>References to other drafts pin their current posted revisions.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Editorial pass: the references to other drafts move to the
revisions submitted alongside this one.  Adds <xref target="RFC8126"/> for the
registration policy named in the IANA section, rewords the
Role and Stance Rewriting section so that it names the revision it
refers to, and sets the <tt>did:alter:</tt> identifier form apart from
URI schemes.  No requirement changes.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer-03">
        <name>draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer-03</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Change the signed payload.  The -02 signature covered the content
hash only, so a reviewer's stance, the role of a <tt>Reviewed-By:</tt> or
<tt>Witnessed-By:</tt> signature, and the <tt>Review-Of:</tt> label could be
altered without breaking it.  Section 5.2 now defines a Review
Payload, byte-exact, with a domain-separation prefix distinct from
<xref target="COMMITS"/>, that carries role, signer, reviewer, stance and the
<tt>Review-Of:</tt> value.  Section 5.3 gives the reasoning.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Require <tt>Review-Of:</tt> wherever <tt>Identity-Signature:</tt> is present,
and give a block with no <tt>Review-Stance:</tt> the payload stance
<tt>none</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Move the reviewed change of a git commit to its Patch Identifier,
following the basis of draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-03,
and add <tt>git-patch-id</tt> to <tt>hash-algorithm</tt>.  Add Patch Identifier
and Review Payload to Terminology.  The definition of the Patch
Identifier is in <xref target="COMMITS"/> and is not restated.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Update the <xref target="COMMITS"/> reference to -03 and correct its section
pointers: Section 8.4 is now 9.5, Section 9.1 is now 10.1, and the
key-custody pointer is by section title.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Add a Role and Stance Rewriting security consideration.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reword the closing paragraph of Relationship to Existing Standards
and the Acknowledgments to plain statements of what the grammar
covers.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>State how a handle corresponds to an <tt>alter:</tt> URI <xref target="ALTER-URI"/>, and
remove self-description and padding from the prose.  No
requirement changes.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Replace the <xref target="ANTHROPIC-COAUTHOR"/> target, which no longer
resolves, with the page that documents the <tt>Co-Authored-By</tt>
trailer Claude Code adds by default.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>ABNF: take <tt>sovereign-handle</tt> and <tt>handle-name</tt> from <xref target="COMMITS"/>
Section 4.1 and drop the local <tt>handle-label</tt> rule, as it admitted
"_" and a leading digit.  Trailer rules end in <tt>LF</tt>, as in
<xref target="COMMITS"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Read a handle's tier from its lexical form, with no DNS lookup, and
take the zone a key is resolved under from the handle's
association, never from its spelling, both as in <xref target="ALTER-URI"/>.  The
Instrument examples carry the <tt>cc-</tt> prefix.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4648.xml">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5234.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
            <author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker"/>
            <author fullname="P. Overell" initials="P." surname="Overell"/>
            <date month="January" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8032" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8032.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
            <date month="January" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes elliptic curve signature scheme Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The algorithm is instantiated with recommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves. An example implementation and test vectors are provided.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="COMMITS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits/">
          <front>
            <title>Identity-Attributed Git Commits via Tier-Structured Trailers</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MCPDNS" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery/">
          <front>
            <title>Discovery of Model Context Protocol Servers via DNS TXT Records</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery-10"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC8126" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t>
              <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t>
              <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CREDIT" target="https://credit.niso.org/">
          <front>
            <title>CRediT (Contributor Roles Taxonomy), NISO Z39.104-2022</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Information Standards Organization</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2022"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ORCID" target="https://info.orcid.org/documentation/">
          <front>
            <title>ORCID Public API</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ORCID, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="COPE" target="https://publicationethics.org/core-practices">
          <front>
            <title>Committee on Publication Ethics - Core Practices and Guidance</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Committee on Publication Ethics</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2019"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ELIFE-OPENREVIEW" target="https://elifesciences.org/about/peer-review">
          <front>
            <title>eLife's Publish-Review-Curate Model</title>
            <author>
              <organization>eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd.</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ARXIV" target="https://arxiv.org/">
          <front>
            <title>arXiv.org - An Open-Access Archive</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Cornell University</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="1991"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DOI" target="https://www.doi.org/the-identifier/resources/handbook/">
          <front>
            <title>The DOI Handbook</title>
            <author>
              <organization>International DOI Foundation</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2020"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ANTHROPIC-COAUTHOR" target="https://code.claude.com/docs/en/settings-reference#attribution">
          <front>
            <title>Claude Code settings reference: attribution</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Anthropic</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GONDWANA" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gondwana-we-are-all-individuals/">
          <front>
            <title>We Are All Individuals</title>
            <author fullname="Bron Gondwana">
              <organization>Fastmail</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gondwana-we-are-all-individuals-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ALTER-URI" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme/">
          <front>
            <title>The 'alter' URI Scheme for Dispatchable ~handle References</title>
            <author fullname="Blake Morrison">
              <organization>Alter Meridian Pty Ltd</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme-06"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
  </back>
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