Internet-Draft Delegation Revocation Events November 2026
Nandakumar & Jennings Expires 23 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Web Authorization Protocol
Internet-Draft:
draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
S. Nandakumar
Cisco
C. Jennings
Cisco Systems

Security Events for Revocation of Agent Delegations

Abstract

When a person withdraws a task from an agent, or a delegating agent is compromised, every credential delegated below that point has to stop working, and the agents holding those credentials have to stop the work they were doing under them. Token status lists and token introspection tell a verifier that asks whether one token is still valid. They do not tell the agents further down a delegation chain, which may be in other organizations and which the revoking party may not know. This document defines a Security Event Token that revokes a delegation and everything delegated from it, a subject identifier format that names a delegation token, the parties entitled to issue the event, how agents propagate it down the chain, and how verifiers check the status of a whole chain so that revocation reaches them even when the event does not.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (mailto:oauth@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Agents delegate to agents. A user's assistant delegates a task to a planning agent, which delegates parts of it to agents run by other organizations, which delegate again. Each hop is represented by a credential: a token issued by an authorization server with an act claim [RFC8693] [ACTOR-PROFILE], a Delegation Token [DELEGATION-TOKENS], or a Delegate SD-JWT [DELEGATE-SD-JWT].

Revocation has to reach the whole subtree below the revoked hop:

Shared Signals [SSF] and CAEP [CAEP] push events about sessions, credentials, and accounts, and [AIMS] describes their use for agents. No event type identifies a delegation, and none states that its effect extends to every token delegated from it.

This document defines:

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Terminology

Delegation token:

A credential that conveys authority from a delegator to a delegatee, such as an access token with an act claim, a Delegation Token [DELEGATION-TOKENS], or a Delegate SD-JWT [DELEGATE-SD-JWT].

Chain:

The sequence of delegation tokens from the root grant to a given token. For tokens issued by token exchange, the chain is the sequence of tokens exchanged one for the next, possibly at different authorization servers.

Descendant:

A token whose chain contains a given token, other than that token.

Holder:

The party whose key a delegation token's cnf claim [RFC7800] confirms.

2. Overview

Revocation travels two ways, and a verifier needs only one of them to work:

  Revoking party                         Status mechanism
  (issuer, ancestor, designee, holder)   of each token
       |                                        ^
       | (1) delegation revoked event           | (3) status of every
       v                                        |     token in the chain
  Holder --(2) relays, wrapped--> Holder --> ... Verifier
  stops work                      stops work
Figure 1: Push down the chain, pull chain status
  1. A party entitled to revoke (Section 5) issues a delegation revoked event naming one token, and revokes the token in its status mechanism (Section 6.1).

  2. Each holder stops acting under the revoked tokens and relays the event, with the original signature, to the holders of the tokens it delegated (Section 6.3, Section 6.4). This is fast, but depends on every holder.

  3. Verifiers check the status of every token in the chain, within a staleness bound (Section 7). This is slower, but depends on no holder, and bounds how long a revocation can go unnoticed.

3. The delegation Subject Identifier Format

The delegation subject identifier format identifies one delegation token. A subject identifier in this format is a JSON object with these members:

format:

REQUIRED. delegation.

iss:

REQUIRED. The iss claim of the token.

jti:

REQUIRED. The jti claim of the token.

Other claims of the token, such as a context claim [AGENT-DELEGATION], are not included: a holder of the token already has them, and they would reveal the token's purpose to a party that does not.

{
  "format": "delegation",
  "iss": "https://planner.example",
  "jti": "dt-7f3a9c"
}

A token is identified by the pair (iss, jti). Issuers of delegation tokens that are to be revocable with this document MUST include jti and MUST NOT reuse a jti.

4. The Delegation Revoked Event

The event type is:

urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked

The SET [RFC8417] is signed with JWS [RFC7515], has typ secevent+jwt, and carries iss, iat, jti, aud, events, and sub_id [RFC9493], a subject identifier in the delegation format (Section 3) that names the revoked token. Its iss is the party revoking the token (Section 5), or, when relayed, the holder that relays it (Section 6.4).

The event payload is a JSON object with these members:

revoked_at:

REQUIRED. A NumericDate [RFC7519] from which the token and its descendants are revoked.

reason:

OPTIONAL. One of principal_request (the principal withdrew the task), task_complete, compromise (a key or agent in the chain is believed compromised), or policy. Receivers MUST ignore values they do not recognize.

original:

OPTIONAL. The original SET, in JWS Compact Serialization, when this SET relays it (Section 6.4).

{
  "iss": "https://assistant.example",
  "iat": 1794643200,
  "jti": "set-0b51",
  "aud": "https://planner.example",
  "sub_id": {
    "format": "delegation",
    "iss": "https://assistant.example",
    "jti": "dt-41c2"
  },
  "events": {
    "urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked": {
      "revoked_at": 1794643200,
      "reason": "principal_request"
    }
  }
}

The effect of the event is the same as revoking, through the token's own status mechanism, the named token and each of its descendants. A revocation cannot be undone; a delegator that wants to restore authority issues a new token.

5. Who May Revoke

A receiver MUST accept the event only if the SET verifies under a key of one of these parties:

  1. The issuer of the named token. For a token issued by an authorization server, this is that server. For a Delegation Token or Delegate SD-JWT with delegator binding [AGENT-DELEGATION], it is the delegator, and the key is the one confirmed by the parent token's cnf.

  2. The issuer of any ancestor of the named token, determined in the same way. A party that could revoke an ancestor, and with it the whole subtree, can revoke a part of that subtree.

  3. A party that the issuer of the root token designates for its chains, such as the authorization server or principal's server that issued it. How the designation reaches receivers, for example by configuration or in the issuer's metadata, is outside this document.

  4. The holder of the named token, giving up its own delegation. Its event revokes the token and its descendants, and gives it no authority over any other token. It sends the event to the token's issuer, which revokes the token in its status mechanism (Section 6.1), and to the holders of the tokens it delegated from it (Section 6.4).

A receiver resolves the key for the first, second, and fourth cases from the chain it holds. A receiver that does not hold the chain of the named token has no token to revoke and no descendants of it, and ignores the event.

6. Processing

6.1. Issuers

The event supplements the token's status mechanism (Section 7), such as a Token Status List [STATUS-LIST]; it does not replace it. A party that issues the event and is also the issuer of the named token, or operates its status mechanism, MUST also revoke the token there, so that verifiers that miss the event still learn of the revocation within their staleness bound. Any other issuer of the event (Section 5) SHOULD also send it to the issuer of the named token, which then MUST revoke the token in its status mechanism.

An issuer that issues an event for a token it issued, or receives one, SHOULD send it to the verifiers that subscribe to its events (Section 6.5).

6.2. Verifiers

A verifier, such as a resource server or an enforcement point, that receives a valid event:

  • MUST deny, from revoked_at, any request authorized by the named token or by any chain that contains it; and

  • MUST NOT continue to rely on a cached status answer for those tokens.

A verifier that caches chains therefore indexes them by the (iss, jti) of every token in each chain, not only by the presented token.

6.3. Holders

A holder of the named token or of a descendant that receives a valid event:

  1. MUST stop acting under the revoked tokens from revoked_at;

  2. MUST send the event on to the holder of each token it issued itself from a revoked token, as Section 6.4 describes, so that the event reaches the end of the chain even when no single party knows every holder. Tokens that an authorization server issued from a revoked token are handled by that server (Section 7);

  3. MUST stop work that depends on the revoked tokens, for example by ending the dialogs it controls under them, as the application protocol defines; and

  4. SHOULD tell the verifiers it used the revoked tokens with, where it has a channel to them.

A holder that cannot obtain the current status of its chain, within the staleness bound its policy sets, SHOULD suspend work under the chain until it can, so that a lost event does not leave it working under revoked authority.

Processing is idempotent. A holder that has already processed an event for the same token, or for an ancestor of it, processes it again only to retry delivery.

6.4. Relaying the Event

A holder passes the event on unchanged, with the original signature, inside a SET of its own:

{
  "iss": "https://planner.example",
  "iat": 1794643202,
  "jti": "set-77e0",
  "aud": "https://researcher.example",
  "sub_id": {
    "format": "delegation",
    "iss": "https://assistant.example",
    "jti": "dt-41c2"
  },
  "events": {
    "urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked": {
      "revoked_at": 1794643200,
      "reason": "principal_request",
      "original": "eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3Qi..."
    }
  }
}

The relaying SET has the same sub_id, revoked_at, and reason as the original. The original member (Section 4) carries the SET that revoked the token, never a relaying SET: a holder that relays an event it received by relay copies its original unchanged. The receiver validates the original SET under Section 5 and checks that the relaying SET's sub_id equals the original's. The relaying SET tells the receiver that the event reached it through its delegator, but the authority to revoke comes from the original.

Across a trust boundary:

When the token below the boundary was issued by an authorization server at the boundary, for example by identity chaining, the parties below hold only that server's tokens and do not hold the named token. The original event would tell them the issuer and identifier of a token upstream, which the boundary is meant to keep from them. The authorization server therefore does not relay it. It revokes the tokens it issued from the revoked token (Section 7) and sends, for each, a new event that it issues itself, naming that token and without original, to the token's holder. It is the issuer of those tokens, so the new events are accepted under Section 5 item 1.

6.5. Delivery

SETs can be delivered with push [RFC8935] or poll [RFC8936] delivery, through a Shared Signals stream [SSF], or in the messages of the application protocol that the agents already use, such as the dialogs that depend on the revoked delegation. The delivery mechanism does not affect the authority to revoke, which comes only from the signature.

A verifier that needs to learn of a revocation sooner than its staleness bound (Section 7) allows SHOULD subscribe to events from the issuers of the tokens in the chains it accepts, for example with a Shared Signals stream [SSF]. A verifier that does not subscribe still learns of the revocation through chain status, within its staleness bound; events only let it learn sooner.

A delegator SHOULD retry delivery to each holder of a token it delegated until the delivery mechanism reports success or the token expires.

7. Chain Status

Relaying (Section 6.4) depends on every holder in the chain being reachable and willing to pass the event on. A holder that is offline, compromised, or simply slow leaves the parties below it uninformed. Verifiers therefore do not depend on relaying for safety. Relaying makes revocation fast; checking the status of the whole chain bounds how long a revocation can go unnoticed.

In this section, a token's status mechanism is a Token Status List [STATUS-LIST] referenced by its status claim, token introspection [RFC7662] at its issuer, or another mechanism through which its issuer reports that it is no longer valid. A token is revoked in its status mechanism when its status is set to INVALID in a Token Status List, or when introspection reports it inactive.

A verifier that relies on a chain of delegation tokens:

  1. MUST check the status, through each token's status mechanism, of every token in the chain that carries a status reference, not only of the token presented to it. A revoked token anywhere in the chain revokes the chain.

  2. MUST define a staleness bound for the status answers it relies on, and MUST reject requests that rely on the chain while it has no status answer for every such token that is fresher than that bound. This is not a revocation: once the verifier obtains a current answer showing the tokens valid, it accepts the chain again. For a Token Status List, freshness is measured from the iat of the Status List Token, not from when the verifier fetched it; the verifier MUST NOT rely on a Status List Token past its exp, and SHOULD NOT cache one for longer than its ttl. A verifier that cannot trust its own clock cannot measure staleness, and MUST treat its status answers as stale until it can; a secure time source such as Roughtime [ROUGHTIME] can provide this.

A verifier that also receives events applies them as Section 6.2 describes.

Issuers of delegation tokens that are to be revocable with this document SHOULD give each token a status mechanism. When the root token has one, its status entry is the single point at which the whole tree can be revoked: its issuer revokes it there, and every verifier that checks the chain sees the revocation no later than the issuer's publication delay plus the verifier's staleness bound, whether or not any holder in the chain relayed the event. A token without a status mechanism can be revoked, for verifiers that miss the event, only by its expiry.

These rules need the verifier to see the chain. A verifier receives every link of a Delegation Token chain [DELEGATION-TOKENS] [AGENT-DELEGATION]. A verifier of a token issued by token exchange [RFC8693] sees only that token: nested act claims identify prior actors but carry no reference to their tokens or to their status, and Section 4.1 of [RFC8693] makes them informational only. This document does not add such references. Verifiers of these tokens rely on the authorization server, which takes the verifier's place:

8. Relationship to Other Work

Token Status List [STATUS-LIST]:

Remains the authoritative status of each token. This document adds push, subtree effect, and propagation to holders.

Delegation Tokens [DELEGATION-TOKENS]:

Its Section 8 provides revocation per token through status lists. Its Section 9.5 describes the window between revocation and a verifier's next status refresh; this document narrows it for verifiers that receive events.

Bounded Work [BOUNDED-WORK]:

Ends the authority of a unit of work at the authorization server. The event in this document can carry that ending to agents that delegated further without the server.

Cross-organization delegation [CROSS-ORG]:

Its requirements for timely revocation across organizations are met by propagation along the chain, with chain status as the backstop.

Revocation closure [REVOCATION-CLOSURE]:

Distinguishes invalidating tokens from closing the authority they conveyed, and defines authority epochs, delegation lineage, admission fencing, and closure states such as CLOSED, PARTIAL, and UNKNOWN. The event and chain status in this document are invalidation mechanisms: they can supply evidence toward closure, and the lineage that Section 7 requires of authorization servers parallels its lineage requirement, but they do not by themselves establish that work admitted under the revoked authority has stopped.

9. Security Considerations

Forged events:

A forged event can stop legitimate work. Receivers accept events only under Section 5, and MUST verify the signature before acting.

Suppressed events:

A delegator that does not relay an event, because it is unreachable, compromised, or uncooperative, leaves its delegatees acting under revoked tokens until they next check status or contact a verifier. Verifiers do not depend on relaying (Section 7), so for a chain whose tokens have status mechanisms and that the verifier sees, the exposure is bounded by the issuer's publication delay plus the staleness bound, not by the reachability of the delegators.

Chains a verifier cannot see:

When a verifier sees only the last token of a chain, revocation of an earlier token reaches it only through the authorization server that issued the last token. Across issuers, the exposure is bounded by how often that server checks the status of the tokens it exchanged, and by token lifetimes (Section 7).

Replay:

Replaying a valid event has no effect beyond the first, since revocation is permanent. Receivers MAY discard SETs whose jti they have seen.

Denial of service:

Receivers SHOULD rate-limit events from each issuer, and ignore an event for a token whose chain they do not hold before doing any further work (Section 5).

Revocation of the root:

Revoking the root token revokes the whole tree. Parties named under Section 5 item 3 hold that power for every chain of the root; root issuers SHOULD designate them narrowly.

10. Privacy Considerations

The subject identifier reveals the token issuer and identifier, which are linkable across verifiers that see the same token, and nothing else about the token (Section 3). Events SHOULD be sent only to parties that hold the chain. Across a trust boundary, the boundary's authorization server sends events of its own instead of relaying the original (Section 6.4), so parties below the boundary learn nothing about tokens above it. A token whose sub is a pseudonym [AGENT-DELEGATION] keeps the principal hidden in the event as in the token.

11. IANA Considerations

11.1. OAuth URI

This document registers the following in the "OAuth URI" registry [RFC6755]:

  • URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked

  • Common Name: Delegation revoked security event

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document: Section 4

11.2. Subject Identifier Formats

This document registers the following in the "Subject Identifier Formats" registry [RFC9493]:

  • Format Name: delegation

  • Format Description: A delegation token, identified by its issuer and token identifier

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document: Section 3

12. References

12.1. Normative References

[DELEGATION-TOKENS]
Asor, R., "Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC6755]
Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6755>.
[RFC7515]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC7800]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8417]
Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417, DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8417>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.
[RFC9493]
Backman, A., Ed., Scurtescu, M., and P. Jain, "Subject Identifiers for Security Event Tokens", RFC 9493, DOI 10.17487/RFC9493, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9493>.
[STATUS-LIST]
Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21>.

12.2. Informative References

[ACTOR-PROFILE]
McGuinness, K., "OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01>.
[AGENT-DELEGATION]
Nandakumar, S. and C. Jennings, "Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains/>.
[AIMS]
Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B., Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01>.
[BOUNDED-WORK]
Liu, D. and K. McGuinness, "OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00>.
[CAEP]
OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Continuous Access Evaluation Profile 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-caep-1_0.html>.
[CROSS-ORG]
Reece, M., "Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02>.
[DELEGATE-SD-JWT]
Oliver, G. and C. Bormann, "Delegate SD-JWT", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00>.
[REVOCATION-CLOSURE]
Watts, D., "Revocation Closure and Authority Epochs for Agent Delegation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure-03>.
[RFC7662]
Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662>.
[RFC8935]
Backman, A., Ed., Jones, M., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP", RFC 8935, DOI 10.17487/RFC8935, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8935>.
[RFC8936]
Backman, A., Ed., Jones, M., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Nadalin, "Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP", RFC 8936, DOI 10.17487/RFC8936, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8936>.
[ROUGHTIME]
Ladd, W. and M. Dansarie, "Roughtime", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-19, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-19>.
[SSF]
OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Shared Signals Framework Specification 1.0", , <https://openid.net/specs/openid-sharedsignals-framework-1_0.html>.

Acknowledgments

This document builds on the revocation sections of [DELEGATION-TOKENS] and on the Shared Signals work of the OpenID Foundation.

Authors' Addresses

Suhas Nandakumar
Cisco
Cullen Jennings
Cisco Systems