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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Delegation Revocation Events">Security Events for Revocation of Agent Delegations</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-00"/>
    <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar" fullname="Suhas Nandakumar">
      <organization>Cisco</organization>
      <address>
        <email>snandaku@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C." surname="Jennings" fullname="Cullen Jennings">
      <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      <address>
        <email>fluffy@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Web Authorization Protocol</workgroup>
    <keyword>revocation</keyword>
    <keyword>security event token</keyword>
    <keyword>delegation</keyword>
    <keyword>AI agents</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 79?>

<t>When a person withdraws a task from an agent, or a delegating agent is
compromised, every credential delegated below that point has to stop
working, and the agents holding those credentials have to stop the
work they were doing under them. Token status lists and token
introspection tell a verifier that asks whether one token is still
valid. They do not tell the agents further down a delegation chain,
which may be in other organizations and which the revoking party may
not know. This document defines a Security Event Token that revokes a
delegation and everything delegated from it, a subject identifier
format that names a delegation token, the parties entitled to issue
the event, how agents propagate it down the chain, and how verifiers
check the status of a whole chain so that revocation reaches them
even when the event does not.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:oauth@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/"/>.
      </t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 95?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Agents delegate to agents. A user's assistant delegates a task to a
planning agent, which delegates parts of it to agents run by other
organizations, which delegate again. Each hop is represented by a
credential: a token issued by an authorization server with an <tt>act</tt>
claim <xref target="RFC8693"/> <xref target="ACTOR-PROFILE"/>, a Delegation Token
<xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>, or a Delegate SD-JWT <xref target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>.</t>
      <t>Revocation has to reach the whole subtree below the revoked hop:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The revoking party knows the hop it is revoking, but in peer
delegation it does not know the agents further down, which were
chosen by the agents it delegated to.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A verifier that caches a chain may hold a status answer for a token
for its time to live, so that a revoked token remains usable for that
window (<xref section="9.5" sectionFormat="of" target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>An agent that holds a revoked delegation is in the middle of work.
Learning about the revocation only when its next request is denied
leaves work running, and children of its own still delegated.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Shared Signals <xref target="SSF"/> and CAEP <xref target="CAEP"/> push events about sessions,
credentials, and accounts, and <xref target="AIMS"/> describes their use for agents.
No event type identifies a delegation, and none states that its effect
extends to every token delegated from it.</t>
      <t>This document defines:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>the <tt>delegation</tt> subject identifier format (<xref target="subject"/>), which names
a delegation token by its issuer and identifier;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the delegation revoked event (<xref target="event"/>), a Security Event Token
<xref target="RFC8417"/> whose effect is the revocation of the named token and of
every token whose chain contains it;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>who may issue the event (<xref target="authority"/>);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>how receivers act on it and pass it on to the holders of tokens they
delegated (<xref target="processing"/>); and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>how verifiers check the status of a whole chain, so that revocation
reaches them even when a party in the middle of the chain does not
relay the event (<xref target="chain-status"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>Delegation token:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A credential that conveys authority from a delegator to a delegatee,
such as an access token with an <tt>act</tt> claim, a Delegation Token
<xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>, or a Delegate SD-JWT <xref target="DELEGATE-SD-JWT"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Chain:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The sequence of delegation tokens from the root grant to a given
token. For tokens issued by token exchange, the chain is the sequence
of tokens exchanged one for the next, possibly at different
authorization servers.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Descendant:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A token whose chain contains a given token, other than that token.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Holder:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The party whose key a delegation token's <tt>cnf</tt> claim <xref target="RFC7800"/>
confirms.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Overview</name>
      <t>Revocation travels two ways, and a verifier needs only one of them
to work:</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-overview">
        <name>Push down the chain, pull chain status</name>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
  Revoking party                         Status mechanism
  (issuer, ancestor, designee, holder)   of each token
       |                                        ^
       | (1) delegation revoked event           | (3) status of every
       v                                        |     token in the chain
  Holder --(2) relays, wrapped--> Holder --> ... Verifier
  stops work                      stops work
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>A party entitled to revoke (<xref target="authority"/>) issues a delegation
revoked event naming one token, and revokes the token in its
status mechanism (<xref target="issuers"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Each holder stops acting under the revoked tokens and relays the
event, with the original signature, to the holders of the tokens it
delegated (<xref target="propagation"/>, <xref target="relay"/>). This is fast, but depends on
every holder.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Verifiers check the status of every token in the chain, within a
staleness bound (<xref target="chain-status"/>). This is slower, but depends on
no holder, and bounds how long a revocation can go unnoticed.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="subject">
      <name>The delegation Subject Identifier Format</name>
      <t>The <tt>delegation</tt> subject identifier format identifies one delegation
token. A subject identifier in this format is a JSON object with these
members:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>format:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. <tt>delegation</tt>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>iss:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The <tt>iss</tt> claim of the token.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>jti:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. The <tt>jti</tt> claim of the token.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>Other claims of the token, such as a context claim
<xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>, are not included: a holder of the token already
has them, and they would reveal the token's purpose to a party that
does not.</t>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "format": "delegation",
  "iss": "https://planner.example",
  "jti": "dt-7f3a9c"
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>A token is identified by the pair (<tt>iss</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>). Issuers of delegation
tokens that are to be revocable with this document <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include <tt>jti</tt>
and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reuse a <tt>jti</tt>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="event">
      <name>The Delegation Revoked Event</name>
      <t>The event type is:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked
]]></artwork>
      <t>The SET <xref target="RFC8417"/> is signed with JWS <xref target="RFC7515"/>, has <tt>typ</tt>
        <tt>secevent+jwt</tt>, and carries <tt>iss</tt>, <tt>iat</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>, <tt>aud</tt>, <tt>events</tt>, and
<tt>sub_id</tt> <xref target="RFC9493"/>, a subject identifier in the <tt>delegation</tt> format
(<xref target="subject"/>) that names the revoked token. Its <tt>iss</tt> is the party
revoking the token (<xref target="authority"/>), or, when relayed, the holder that
relays it (<xref target="relay"/>).</t>
      <t>The event payload is a JSON object with these members:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>revoked_at:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. A NumericDate <xref target="RFC7519"/> from which the token and its
descendants are revoked.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>reason:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. One of <tt>principal_request</tt> (the principal withdrew the
task), <tt>task_complete</tt>, <tt>compromise</tt> (a key or agent in the chain is
believed compromised), or <tt>policy</tt>. Receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore values they
do not recognize.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>original:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. The original SET, in JWS Compact Serialization, when this
SET relays it (<xref target="relay"/>).</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "iss": "https://assistant.example",
  "iat": 1794643200,
  "jti": "set-0b51",
  "aud": "https://planner.example",
  "sub_id": {
    "format": "delegation",
    "iss": "https://assistant.example",
    "jti": "dt-41c2"
  },
  "events": {
    "urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked": {
      "revoked_at": 1794643200,
      "reason": "principal_request"
    }
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>The effect of the event is the same as revoking, through the token's
own status mechanism, the named token and each of its descendants. A
revocation cannot be undone; a delegator that wants to restore
authority issues a new token.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="authority">
      <name>Who May Revoke</name>
      <t>A receiver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept the event only if the SET verifies under a key
of one of these parties:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>The issuer of the named token. For a token issued by an
authorization server, this is that server. For a Delegation Token
or Delegate SD-JWT with delegator binding <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>, it
is the delegator, and the key is the one confirmed by the parent
token's <tt>cnf</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The issuer of any ancestor of the named token, determined in the
same way. A party that could revoke an ancestor, and with it the
whole subtree, can revoke a part of that subtree.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A party that the issuer of the root token designates for its chains,
such as the authorization server or principal's server that issued
it. How the designation reaches receivers, for example by
configuration or in the issuer's metadata, is outside this
document.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The holder of the named token, giving up its own delegation. Its
event revokes the token and its descendants, and gives it no
authority over any other token. It sends the event to the token's
issuer, which revokes the token in its status mechanism
(<xref target="issuers"/>), and to the holders of the tokens it delegated from
it (<xref target="relay"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>A receiver resolves the key for the first, second, and fourth cases
from the chain it holds. A receiver that does not hold the chain of
the named token has no token to revoke and no descendants of it, and
ignores the event.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="processing">
      <name>Processing</name>
      <section anchor="issuers">
        <name>Issuers</name>
        <t>The event supplements the token's status mechanism (<xref target="chain-status"/>),
such as a Token Status List <xref target="STATUS-LIST"/>; it does not replace it.
A party that issues the event and is also the issuer of the named
token, or operates its status mechanism, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also revoke the token
there, so that verifiers that miss the event still learn of the
revocation within their staleness bound. Any other issuer of the
event (<xref target="authority"/>) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also send it to the issuer of the named
token, which then <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> revoke the token in its status mechanism.</t>
        <t>An issuer that issues an event for a token it issued, or receives one,
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> send it to the verifiers that subscribe to its events
(<xref target="delivery"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verifiers">
        <name>Verifiers</name>
        <t>A verifier, such as a resource server or an enforcement point, that
receives a valid event:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> deny, from <tt>revoked_at</tt>, any request authorized by the named
token or by any chain that contains it; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> continue to rely on a cached status answer for those tokens.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A verifier that caches chains therefore indexes them by the (<tt>iss</tt>,
<tt>jti</tt>) of every token in each chain, not only by the presented token.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="propagation">
        <name>Holders</name>
        <t>A holder of the named token or of a descendant that receives a valid
event:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> stop acting under the revoked tokens from <tt>revoked_at</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> send the event on to the holder of each token it issued
itself from a revoked token, as <xref target="relay"/> describes, so that the
event reaches the end of the chain even when no single party knows
every holder. Tokens that an authorization server issued from a
revoked token are handled by that server (<xref target="chain-status"/>);</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> stop work that depends on the revoked tokens, for example by
ending the dialogs it controls under them, as the application
protocol defines; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> tell the verifiers it used the revoked tokens with, where it
has a channel to them.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>A holder that cannot obtain the current status of its chain, within
the staleness bound its policy sets, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> suspend work under the
chain until it can, so that a lost event does not leave it working
under revoked authority.</t>
        <t>Processing is idempotent. A holder that has already processed an event
for the same token, or for an ancestor of it, processes it again only
to retry delivery.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="relay">
        <name>Relaying the Event</name>
        <t>A holder passes the event on unchanged, with the original signature,
inside a SET of its own:</t>
        <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "iss": "https://planner.example",
  "iat": 1794643202,
  "jti": "set-77e0",
  "aud": "https://researcher.example",
  "sub_id": {
    "format": "delegation",
    "iss": "https://assistant.example",
    "jti": "dt-41c2"
  },
  "events": {
    "urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked": {
      "revoked_at": 1794643200,
      "reason": "principal_request",
      "original": "eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3Qi..."
    }
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>The relaying SET has the same <tt>sub_id</tt>, <tt>revoked_at</tt>, and <tt>reason</tt> as
the original. The <tt>original</tt> member (<xref target="event"/>) carries the SET that
revoked the token, never a relaying SET: a holder that relays an event
it received by relay copies its <tt>original</tt> unchanged. The receiver
validates the original SET under <xref target="authority"/> and checks that the
relaying SET's <tt>sub_id</tt> equals the original's. The relaying SET tells
the receiver that the event reached it through its delegator, but the
authority to revoke comes from the original.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Across a trust boundary:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>When the token below the boundary was issued by an authorization
server at the boundary, for example by identity chaining, the
parties below hold only that server's tokens and do not hold the
named token. The original event would tell them the issuer and
identifier of a token upstream, which the boundary is meant to keep
from them. The authorization server therefore does not relay it.
It revokes the tokens it issued from the revoked token
(<xref target="chain-status"/>) and sends, for each, a new event that it issues
itself, naming that token and without <tt>original</tt>, to the token's
holder. It is the issuer of those tokens, so the new events are
accepted under <xref target="authority"/> item 1.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="delivery">
        <name>Delivery</name>
        <t>SETs can be delivered with push <xref target="RFC8935"/> or poll <xref target="RFC8936"/>
delivery, through a Shared Signals stream <xref target="SSF"/>, or in the messages
of the application protocol that the agents already use, such as the
dialogs that depend on the revoked delegation. The delivery mechanism
does not affect the authority to revoke, which comes only from the
signature.</t>
        <t>A verifier that needs to learn of a revocation sooner than its
staleness bound (<xref target="chain-status"/>) allows <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> subscribe to events
from the issuers of the tokens in the chains it accepts, for example
with a Shared Signals stream <xref target="SSF"/>. A verifier that does not
subscribe still learns of the revocation through chain status, within
its staleness bound; events only let it learn sooner.</t>
        <t>A delegator <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> retry delivery to each holder of a token it
delegated until the delivery mechanism reports success or the token
expires.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="chain-status">
      <name>Chain Status</name>
      <t>Relaying (<xref target="relay"/>) depends on every holder in the chain being
reachable and willing to pass the event on. A holder that is offline,
compromised, or simply slow leaves the parties below it uninformed.
Verifiers therefore do not depend on relaying for safety. Relaying
makes revocation fast; checking the status of the whole chain bounds
how long a revocation can go unnoticed.</t>
      <t>In this section, a token's status mechanism is a Token Status List
<xref target="STATUS-LIST"/> referenced by its <tt>status</tt> claim, token introspection
<xref target="RFC7662"/> at its issuer, or another mechanism through which its
issuer reports that it is no longer valid. A token is revoked in its
status mechanism when its status is set to INVALID in a Token Status
List, or when introspection reports it inactive.</t>
      <t>A verifier that relies on a chain of delegation tokens:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check the status, through each token's status mechanism, of
every token in the chain that carries a status reference, not only
of the token presented to it. A revoked token anywhere in the chain
revokes the chain.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> define a staleness bound for the status answers it relies on,
and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject requests that rely on the chain while it has no
status answer for every such token that is fresher than that bound.
This is not a revocation: once the verifier obtains a current answer
showing the tokens valid, it accepts the chain again. For a Token
Status List, freshness is measured from the <tt>iat</tt> of the Status
List Token, not from when the verifier fetched it; the verifier
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> rely on a Status List Token past its <tt>exp</tt>, and <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>
cache one for longer than its <tt>ttl</tt>. A verifier that cannot trust
its own clock cannot measure staleness, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat its status
answers as stale until it can; a secure time source such as
Roughtime <xref target="ROUGHTIME"/> can provide this.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>A verifier that also receives events applies them as <xref target="verifiers"/>
describes.</t>
      <t>Issuers of delegation tokens that are to be revocable with this
document <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> give each token a status mechanism. When the root
token has one, its status entry is the single point at which the
whole tree can be revoked: its issuer revokes it there, and every
verifier that checks the chain sees the revocation no later than the
issuer's publication delay plus the verifier's staleness bound,
whether or not any holder in the chain relayed the event. A token
without a status mechanism can be revoked, for verifiers that miss the
event, only by its expiry.</t>
      <t>These rules need the verifier to see the chain. A verifier receives
every link of a Delegation Token chain <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>
        <xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/>. A verifier of a token issued by token exchange
<xref target="RFC8693"/> sees only that token: nested <tt>act</tt> claims identify prior
actors but carry no reference to their tokens or to their status, and
<xref section="4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/> makes them informational only. This
document does not add such references. Verifiers of these tokens rely
on the authorization server, which takes the verifier's place:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>An authorization server that issues a token by token exchange <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
record the (<tt>iss</tt>, <tt>jti</tt>) of the <tt>subject_token</tt> and of any
<tt>actor_token</tt> it was issued from. When it revokes a token, or learns
by an event or by its status that one has been revoked, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also
revoke, in their status mechanism, every token it issued from that
token, directly or indirectly, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> send an event of its own
for each to its holder (<xref target="relay"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>An authorization server <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> limit the lifetime of a token it
issues by token exchange to the remaining lifetime of the tokens it
was issued from.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>An authorization server that issues a token by exchanging a token
from another issuer cannot learn of that token's revocation from its
own records. It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> check the status of the tokens it was issued
from at least as often as its own staleness bound, and revoke their
descendants when one is revoked. It <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also receive delegation
revoked events from that issuer, for example through a Shared
Signals stream <xref target="SSF"/>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="relationship-to-other-work">
      <name>Relationship to Other Work</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Token Status List <xref target="STATUS-LIST"/>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Remains the authoritative status of each token. This document adds
push, subtree effect, and propagation to holders.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Delegation Tokens <xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Its Section 8 provides revocation per token through status lists.
Its Section 9.5 describes the window between revocation and a
verifier's next status refresh; this document narrows it for
verifiers that receive events.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Bounded Work <xref target="BOUNDED-WORK"/>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Ends the authority of a unit of work at the authorization server.
The event in this document can carry that ending to agents that
delegated further without the server.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Cross-organization delegation <xref target="CROSS-ORG"/>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Its requirements for timely revocation across organizations are met
by propagation along the chain, with chain status as the backstop.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Revocation closure <xref target="REVOCATION-CLOSURE"/>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Distinguishes invalidating tokens from closing the authority they
conveyed, and defines authority epochs, delegation lineage,
admission fencing, and closure states such as CLOSED, PARTIAL, and
UNKNOWN. The event and chain status in this document are
invalidation mechanisms: they can supply evidence toward closure,
and the lineage that <xref target="chain-status"/> requires of authorization
servers parallels its lineage requirement, but they do not by
themselves establish that work admitted under the revoked authority
has stopped.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Forged events:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A forged event can stop legitimate work. Receivers accept events
only under <xref target="authority"/>, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify the signature before
acting.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Suppressed events:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A delegator that does not relay an event, because it is unreachable,
compromised, or uncooperative, leaves its delegatees acting under
revoked tokens until they next check status or contact a verifier.
Verifiers do not depend on relaying (<xref target="chain-status"/>), so for a
chain whose tokens have status mechanisms and that the verifier
sees, the exposure is bounded by the issuer's publication delay plus
the staleness bound, not by the reachability of the delegators.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Chains a verifier cannot see:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>When a verifier sees only the last token of a chain, revocation of
an earlier token reaches it only through the authorization server
that issued the last token. Across issuers, the exposure is bounded
by how often that server checks the status of the tokens it
exchanged, and by token lifetimes (<xref target="chain-status"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Replay:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Replaying a valid event has no effect beyond the first, since
revocation is permanent. Receivers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> discard SETs whose <tt>jti</tt> they
have seen.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Denial of service:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Receivers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> rate-limit events from each issuer, and ignore an
event for a token whose chain they do not hold before doing any
further work (<xref target="authority"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Revocation of the root:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Revoking the root token revokes the whole tree. Parties named under
<xref target="authority"/> item 3 hold that power for every chain of the root;
root issuers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> designate them narrowly.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>The subject identifier reveals the token issuer and identifier, which
are linkable across verifiers that see the same token, and nothing
else about the token (<xref target="subject"/>). Events <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be sent only to
parties that hold the chain. Across a trust boundary, the boundary's
authorization server sends events of its own instead of relaying the
original (<xref target="relay"/>), so parties below the boundary learn nothing
about tokens above it. A token whose <tt>sub</tt> is a pseudonym
<xref target="AGENT-DELEGATION"/> keeps the principal hidden in the event as in the
token.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="oauth-uri">
        <name>OAuth URI</name>
        <t>This document registers the following in the "OAuth URI" registry
<xref target="RFC6755"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>URN: <tt>urn:ietf:params:oauth:event-type:delegation-revoked</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Common Name: Delegation revoked security event</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification Document: <xref target="event"/></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="subject-identifier-formats">
        <name>Subject Identifier Formats</name>
        <t>This document registers the following in the "Subject Identifier
Formats" registry <xref target="RFC9493"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Format Name: <tt>delegation</tt></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Format Description: A delegation token, identified by its issuer and
token identifier</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification Document: <xref target="subject"/></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6755">
          <front>
            <title>An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth</title>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document establishes an IETF URN Sub-namespace for use with OAuth-related specifications. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6755"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6755"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7800">
          <front>
            <title>Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="April" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification describes how to declare in a JSON Web Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular proof-of- possession key and how the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof of possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7800"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7800"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8417">
          <front>
            <title>Security Event Token (SET)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." role="editor" surname="Hunt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="W. Denniss" initials="W." surname="Denniss"/>
            <author fullname="M. Ansari" initials="M." surname="Ansari"/>
            <date month="July" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data structure. A SET describes statements of fact from the perspective of an issuer about a subject. These statements of fact represent an event that occurred directly to or about a security subject, for example, a statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on behalf of a subject. This specification is intended to enable representing security- and identity-related events. A SET is a JSON Web Token (JWT), which can be optionally signed and/or encrypted. SETs can be distributed via protocols such as HTTP.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8417"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8417"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9493">
          <front>
            <title>Subject Identifiers for Security Event Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
            <author fullname="M. Scurtescu" initials="M." surname="Scurtescu"/>
            <author fullname="P. Jain" initials="P." surname="Jain"/>
            <date month="December" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Security events communicated within Security Event Tokens may support a variety of identifiers to identify subjects related to the event. This specification formalizes the notion of Subject Identifiers as structured information that describes a subject and named formats that define the syntax and semantics for encoding Subject Identifiers as JSON objects. It also establishes a registry for defining and allocating names for such formats as well as the JSON Web Token (JWT) "sub_id" Claim.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9493"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9493"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATION-TOKENS">
          <front>
            <title>Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains</title>
            <author fullname="Rafael Asor" initials="R." surname="Asor">
              <organization>Attenu</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="27" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   AI agents increasingly delegate tasks to other agents.  Each
   delegation should convey only a subset of the delegating party's
   authority, that subset should be bounded in scope, magnitude, and
   time, and any enforcement point should be able to verify -- offline,
   with no call to an authorization server -- that a token presented at
   hop N carries authority no greater than the token at hop N-1, back to
   a trusted root, and that every hop acts under the same accountable
   principal.  OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) models two-party
   delegation and records prior actors in a nested "act" claim, but that
   claim is informational only and cannot enforce attenuation across a
   chain of depth two or more.  This document defines the Agent
   Delegation Chain: a profile of OAuth 2.0 JWT access tokens (RFC 9068)
   that carries authority as Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396),
   binds the chain to one principal and names the agent acting at each
   hop, links each delegation to its parent by a cryptographic byte-
   commitment, and specifies a deterministic offline verification
   algorithm that enforces monotonic attenuation, bounded depth,
   monotonic expiry, and principal invariance.  It reuses existing JOSE,
   proof-of-possession (RFC 9449), and status-list machinery (the OAuth
   Status List draft) and introduces no new cryptography.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="STATUS-LIST">
          <front>
            <title>Token Status List (TSL)</title>
            <author fullname="Tobias Looker" initials="T." surname="Looker">
              <organization>MATTR</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Paul Bastian" initials="P." surname="Bastian">
              <organization>Bundesdruckerei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christian Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="21" month="June" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines a status mechanism called Token Status
   List (TSL), data structures and processing rules for representing the
   status of tokens secured by JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
   or CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE), such as JWT, SD-JWT,
   CBOR Web Token, and ISO mdoc.  It also defines an extension point and
   a registry for future status mechanisms.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-status-list-21"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7662">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection</title>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <date month="October" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a method for a protected resource to query an OAuth 2.0 authorization server to determine the active state of an OAuth 2.0 token and to determine meta-information about this token. OAuth 2.0 deployments can use this method to convey information about the authorization context of the token from the authorization server to the protected resource.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7662"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7662"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ROUGHTIME">
          <front>
            <title>Roughtime</title>
            <author fullname="Watson Ladd" initials="W." surname="Ladd">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Marcus Dansarie" initials="M." surname="Dansarie">
              <organization>Netnod</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="17" month="March" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes Roughtime, an experimental protocol that aims
   to achieve two things: secure rough time synchronization even for
   clients without any idea of what time it is, and give clients a
   format for reporting any inconsistencies they observe between
   timeservers.  This document specifies the on-wire protocol required
   for these goals, and discusses aspects of the ecosystem needed for it
   to work.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-ntp-roughtime-19"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8935">
          <front>
            <title>Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP</title>
            <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="M. Scurtescu" initials="M." surname="Scurtescu"/>
            <author fullname="M. Ansari" initials="M." surname="Ansari"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <date month="November" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines how a Security Event Token (SET) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS. The SET is transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST request to an endpoint operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or failed transmission via the HTTP response.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8935"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8935"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8936">
          <front>
            <title>Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP</title>
            <author fullname="A. Backman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Backman"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="M. Scurtescu" initials="M." surname="Scurtescu"/>
            <author fullname="M. Ansari" initials="M." surname="Ansari"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <date month="November" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens (SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's need for assurance.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8936"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8936"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ACTOR-PROFILE">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Actor Profile for Delegation</title>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="8" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a common representation of delegated actors in
   OAuth JSON Web Token (JWT) assertion grants, JWT access tokens, and
   Transaction Tokens.  It profiles the act claim defined by OAuth 2.0
   Token Exchange, requires issuer-scoped actor identifiers, and uses
   the sub_profile claim to classify actor entity types.  It specifies
   token processing, delegation-chain propagation, sender-constraint
   handling, and discovery metadata, so that issuers and resource
   servers in different trust domains interpret delegated actors
   consistently.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mcguinness-oauth-actor-profile-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DELEGATE-SD-JWT">
          <front>
            <title>Delegate SD-JWT</title>
            <author fullname="Gareth Oliver" initials="G." surname="Oliver">
              <organization>Google</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christian Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
              <organization>SPRIND</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies an extension to Selective Disclosure JSON Web
   Tokens [RFC9901] to support further delegation from the Holder to a
   Delegate Holder.  This is done by allowing the Key Binding JWT to
   also be an SD-JWT, optionally with its own Key Binding.  This has
   particular applicability to Agentic systems.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-delegate-sd-jwt-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BOUNDED-WORK">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work Authorization</title>
            <author fullname="Dapeng Liu" initials="D." surname="Liu">
              <organization>Alibaba</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Karl McGuinness" initials="K." surname="McGuinness">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="17" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   OAuth 2.0 provides mechanisms for requesting and granting access,
   constraining access tokens, and managing their lifecycle.  It does
   not define a common way to identify the work a user approved and to
   associate that work's bounds and termination with the credentials
   issued for it.  When an AI agent acts on a user's behalf, that work
   is what most needs governing: the agent's authority should come from
   the approval of a bounded piece of work, should stay within the
   bounds the user approved, and should end when the work is done or the
   user withdraws it.

   This document presents a use case in which a user withdraws an
   agent's approved work and the agent's further operations are denied,
   and identifies the semantics that independently implemented clients,
   Authorization Servers, and Resource Servers need to share to deliver
   that outcome.  It then describes a framework for approved bounded
   work, built on three objects: a bounded work proposal, the governing
   authorization established when it is approved, and approval evidence,
   a durable record of the authorization decision and the approved
   bounds.  Credentials issued for the work are associated with the
   governing authorization, and ending the authorization has defined
   consequences for further issuance and, within a stated acceptance
   window, for resource access.

   This version specifies no wire formats and requests no IANA actions.
   It is a direction-setting document: its goal is agreement on the
   problem and the conceptual model, with details left to subsequent
   revisions and working group discussion.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work-00"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AIMS">
          <front>
            <title>AI Identity Management System</title>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jeff Lombardo" initials="J." surname="Lombardo">
              <organization>AWS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Yaroslav Rosomakho" initials="Y." surname="Rosomakho">
              <organization>Zscaler</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nick Steele" initials="N." surname="Steele">
              <organization>OpenAI</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document proposes best practices for authentication and
   authorization of AI agent interactions.  It leverages existing
   standards such as the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments
   (WIMSE) architecture and OAuth 2.0 family of specifications.  Rather
   than defining new protocols, this document describes how existing and
   widely deployed standards can be applied or extended to establish
   agent authentication and authorization.  By doing so, it aims to
   provide a framework within which to use existing standards, identify
   gaps and guide future standardization efforts for agent
   authentication and authorization.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-wimse-aims-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CROSS-ORG">
          <front>
            <title>Cross-Organizational Delegation for Workload and Agent Identity: Problem Statement and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="Morgan Reece" initials="M." surname="Reece">
              <organization>TowerGuardian Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="31" month="August" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Autonomous software agents increasingly act on behalf of human
   principals by invoking tools, services, and other agents, frequently
   across organizational boundaries.  Existing workload and token-based
   authorization mechanisms were designed for a single trust domain and
   a small number of delegation hops.  They do not adequately express,
   constrain, or verify authority that is delegated recursively among
   agents and that crosses the boundary between independently
   administered organizations.  This document describes the problem of
   cross-organizational agent delegation, identifies the gaps in current
   mechanisms, and enumerates requirements that any solution within the
   scope of the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE)
   working group should satisfy.  It does not specify a solution.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-reece-wimse-cross-org-delegation-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="REVOCATION-CLOSURE">
          <front>
            <title>Revocation Closure and Authority Epochs for Agent Delegation</title>
            <author fullname="Deonté Watts" initials="D." surname="Watts">
              <organization>GoodShyt Group Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="31" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Automated agents can exercise OAuth-derived authority through
   delegated credentials, child agents, asynchronous work, and
   operations spanning multiple administrative domains.  Invalidating an
   individual token does not necessarily establish that the authority
   represented by that token can no longer cause a new consequential
   operation.

   This document defines authority epochs, delegation-lineage
   requirements, admission fencing, and revocation-closure states for
   OAuth-based agent delegation.  It distinguishes token invalidation
   from authority closure and specifies that unresolved in-scope state
   produces UNKNOWN or PARTIAL rather than CLOSED.  The profile composes
   with OAuth Token Revocation, Token Exchange, Token Introspection,
   proof-of-possession mechanisms, Transaction Tokens, and workload-
   identity systems such as WIMSE.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure-03"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SSF" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-sharedsignals-framework-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Shared Signals Framework Specification 1.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization>OpenID Foundation</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CAEP" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-caep-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Continuous Access Evaluation Profile 1.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization>OpenID Foundation</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AGENT-DELEGATION" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains/">
          <front>
            <title>Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Jennings">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains-00"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 627?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>This document builds on the revocation sections of
<xref target="DELEGATION-TOKENS"/> and on the Shared Signals work of the OpenID
Foundation.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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