| Internet-Draft | Agreement Evidence | November 2026 |
| Newton, et al. | Expires 19 May 2027 | [Page] |
Autonomous agents can exchange offers and signatures without producing an artifact that records which parties reached which outcome, over which binding values, and for how long that record may be relied upon. This document defines a protocol-neutral agreement attestation primitive, the contract a protocol profile meets to instantiate it, and two protocol profiles. A verified attestation establishes one thing: that a named set of parties jointly countersigned a stated outcome over stated binding values, together with behavioral counters each of them accepted. It does not establish that the outcome matches what a transcript says, that any statement a party made is true, that the binding values are complete, or that the parties are anonymous. The format provides no member for a negotiated price, quantity, date, or principal identity. A producer is obligated not to place those values in the free-text members the format does provide, and a verifier cannot detect a violation of that obligation, so the absence of term values from a received object is a producer's obligation rather than a verified property.¶
This document does not define identity, authority delegation, payment, settlement, transport, boundary-decision receipts, or a general evidence composition and sufficiency model.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
A signature proves who signed particular bytes. It does not necessarily prove that two parties agreed or that a once-valid claim remains current. Single-issuer action receipts are useful evidence of what one policy engine, gateway, or observer recorded. They do not express a negotiated outcome that multiple counterparties jointly bind.¶
This document occupies that narrower agreement-evidence layer. Negotiating parties exchange signed protocol messages. At session conclusion, they produce an agreement attestation under one of the two protocol profiles defined in Section 10. Every listed party countersigns the same issuance snapshot before the outcome can be credited as outcome-bound. The snapshot includes binding values and, when the profile declares one, a completeness indicator that the parties countersigned. Its descriptive members are constrained so that behavioral evidence can be shared without disclosing the deal terms themselves.¶
Verifying the object requires the object itself, one protocol profile defined in Section 10, and a key-binding mechanism the deployment supplies. It does not require a particular transport, payment rail, transparency service, or cross-format composition framework. Transcript reconstruction is out of scope for this revision and may be specified in a later one.¶
What a verified attestation establishes is stated exactly: a named set of parties jointly countersigned one stated outcome over stated binding values, with behavioral counters each of them accepted. This document defines no procedure for re-deriving the outcome from a transcript, so a verified attestation is no evidence that the outcome matches a transcript. It is no evidence that a statement a party made is true. It offers no anonymity: the agent identifier of every listed party is in the object, and a holder of two attestations can correlate them.¶
This document has four goals:¶
This document does not define:¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
parties[] has a resolvable and valid countersignature
over the same issuance snapshot.¶
The phrase "presentation profile" in Section 14 is a neighboring draft's unrelated term.¶
The primitive fixes the evidence properties that make an attestation
verifiable: a closed member set at every depth, a required version
member that selects exactly one implemented protocol profile, a
required context identifier, a required outcome object, a required
party array, a required metadata object, one or more opaque binding
members, required temporal validity, and a required
countersignatures object. A protocol profile assigns the
version-member name, the context-identifier name, the binding-member
names and meanings, any completeness indicator, and the closed
vocabularies named by Section 10.1.¶
A name or vocabulary is profile-assigned only when Section 10.1 says so. Every other member name, type, shape, bound, strip rule, cardinality, encoding, and check is fixed by the primitive. A protocol profile MUST NOT add, rename, nest, or omit a member at any depth except the names and vocabularies this document marks profile-assigned.¶
Binding members are opaque. The Section 9 verifier neither recomputes nor compares them. The verified claim is that every listed party countersigned those values in the same issuance snapshot. A completeness indicator, when present, is likewise opaque: the verifier MUST NOT report completeness from it.¶
The artifact has no member for a term value. A producing protocol's own messages can carry terms, but the attestation primitive records only the outcome, parties, binding values, behavioral counters, and bounded context fields.¶
An attestation whose outcome.status is not_agreed
records that no agreement
formed, so an attestation is evidence about a session rather than
proof that an agreement exists.¶
An attestation defined by this document is produced when a producing protocol concludes, and it records what the parties bound at that moment rather than a commitment fixed in advance of some later evaluation.¶
A protocol profile can list companion artifacts and describe how
references[] points at them, but this primitive verifies
only the attestation it receives.¶
This section defines the abstract member set of the primitive. Whether a session must produce one is a property of the producing protocol and is out of scope.¶
The root contains a profile-assigned version member, a required
attestation_id, a profile-assigned context identifier, a
required timestamp, outcome,
parties, meta, one or more profile-assigned
binding members, a profile-assigned completeness
indicator present when the profile declares one,
validity_temporal, countersignatures, and the
optional members summary and references.¶
outcome.status is exactly one of agreed or
not_agreed. A profile MAY restrict status
to one value and MUST NOT extend it. The required
outcome.detail string is drawn from the selected profile's
detail vocabulary. The profile declares exactly one status for
each detail value. Step 2 rejects a status/detail pair that
disagrees with that declaration. The primitive defines no detail
values. The outcome also carries the
number of rounds and the session duration, and can carry the term
count and a profile-assigned resolution mechanism vocabulary.
Those values describe the session; they do not expose the
negotiated terms.¶
Each parties[] element carries a behavior object
holding the profile-declared closed set of non-term counters. A
present name the profile did not declare is an undefined member and
terminates not-bound. An unmeasured counter is omitted,
never zero or false. Omission is not a zero. Two artifacts are
comparable only on counters both carry. These counters are evidence
inputs and not a protocol-defined reputation score. A relying party
MAY calculate its own score or ignore them.¶
This section is normative. It defines the primitive constraints that apply to every protocol profile. An implementation of the primitive and its verification can be written from Sections 3 through 10 of this document, plus one protocol profile defined in Section 10 and two external inputs named by the deployment profile: the key-binding mechanism that step 3 of Section 9 requires and the revocation source of step 7, if currency is sought.¶
Encodings are pinned as follows.¶
This primitive is extended by publishing a new primitive version
rather than by adding members. Profile-owned vocabularies change
by a new format version of the profile that owns them. The value
vocabularies of a reference's type and
relationship members are the exception: a recipient
MUST preserve a type or
relationship value it does not recognize as an opaque
string rather than rejecting it, so that a later version's
relationship survives a round trip through an earlier
implementation.¶
In the tables below, a bracketed cell names a slot the selected protocol profile fills. The cell's type, shape, range and note bind every profile; the member name, and for a vocabulary the value set, comes from the profile.¶
| Member | Type | Cardinality | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|
| [version member] | string | required | Three dot-separated non-negative decimal integers, no leading zeros. Current value assigned by the selected profile. |
| attestation_id | string | required | 1 to 256 octets, no whitespace. |
| [context identifier] | string | required | 1 to 256 octets, no whitespace. |
| timestamp | string | required | RFC 3339 date-time with a "Z" offset. |
| outcome | object | required | Members of Table 2. No other member. |
| parties | array | required | 2 to 64 elements, each as in Table 3. Identifiers distinct per Section 6.2. |
| meta | object | required | Members of Table 5. No other member. |
| one or more [binding member] rows | string | required, or required at the selected profile's binding floor and later, as the profile declares; never optional | "sha256:" plus 64 lowercase hexadecimal characters. A profile MAY declare one binding member as retained. |
| [completeness indicator] | integer | optional; when declared, required at the selected profile's binding floor and later | Range assigned by the selected profile. |
| validity_temporal | object | required at the selected profile's binding floor and later | Modes and semantics in Section 8.3. |
| countersignatures | object | required at the selected profile's binding floor and later | Member names are exactly the agent identifiers in parties; values are signatures. Section 6.1. |
| summary | string | optional | At most 1024 Unicode scalar values. Constrained by Section 7. |
| references | array | optional | At most 32 elements, each as in Table 6. |
| Member | Type | Cardinality | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | string | required | agreed or not_agreed, as restricted by the selected profile. |
| detail [profile vocabulary] | string | required | 1 to 64 octets, no whitespace. The selected profile assigns exactly one status to each value. |
| rounds | integer | required | 0 to 2^53-1 inclusive. |
| duration_seconds | integer | required | 0 to 2^53-1 inclusive. |
| terms_count | integer | optional | 1 to 2^53-1 inclusive. |
| resolution_mechanism [profile vocabulary] | string | optional | Value set assigned by the selected profile. |
| Member | Type | Cardinality | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | required | 1 to 256 octets, no whitespace. Compared after normalization as stated above. |
| role [profile vocabulary] | string | required | Value set assigned by the selected profile. |
| key_ref | string | required when the selected profile declares it, absent otherwise | 1 to 256 octets, no whitespace, NFC. Identifier of the key the party countersigned with, never key material; inside the issuance snapshot. |
| behavior | object | required | Members of Table 4. No other member. |
| signature | string | required | Signature over that party's own behavioral record. See the note below this table. |
A parties[] element's signature member is
removed before the issuance snapshot is derived
(Section 6.1). This document defines no
verification step over it. A verifier MUST NOT
treat its presence or its validity as evidence that an outcome is
outcome-bound. Outcome binding rests on
countersignatures alone, as
Section 6.2 specifies.
The phrase "its presence or its validity" refers to that
signature member. The key_ref member
MUST NOT carry key material; this is a producer
obligation the verifier cannot confirm.¶
| Member | Type | Cardinality | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|
| [profile-declared counter] | integer | optional | 0 to 2^53-1 inclusive. |
| [profile-declared counter] | number | optional | 0.0 to 1.0 inclusive. |
| [profile-declared counter] | number | optional | 0 or greater. |
| [profile-declared counter] | boolean | optional | true or false. |
Each Table 4 row is a shape a profile may declare any number of times; each declared counter is optional per artifact.¶
| Member | Type | Cardinality | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|
| category | string | optional | Taxonomy grammar below. At most 64 octets. |
| value_range | string | optional | Bucket vocabulary below. At most 32 octets. |
| extensions_used [profile vocabulary] | array | optional | At most 16 elements, each a string of 1 to 64 octets with no whitespace naming a protocol extension active in the session. |
| mediator_invoked | boolean | optional | true or false. |
| Member | Type | Cardinality | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | required | 1 to 256 octets, no whitespace. |
| type [profile vocabulary] | string | required | 1 to 64 octets, no whitespace. Emit vocabulary below. |
| relationship [profile vocabulary] | string | required | 1 to 64 octets, no whitespace. Emit vocabulary below. |
| version | string | optional | At most 256 octets, no whitespace. |
| signed_at | string | optional | RFC 3339 date-time with a "Z" offset. |
| signer_did | string | optional | 1 to 256 octets, no whitespace. |
The category grammar is a dotted lowercase taxonomy path.
Each segment is one or more characters drawn from a to z, 0 to 9,
underscore, and hyphen, and a single full stop separates adjacent
segments. The whole value is at most 64 octets.¶
A value_range value is one of the bucket tokens 0-100,
100-500, 500-1000, 1000-5000, 5000-10000, 10000-50000,
50000-100000, 100000-500000, 500000-1000000, or 1000000+,
followed by a single underscore and a three-letter uppercase
currency code, for example 1000-5000_USD. The bands are
enumerated so that an exact price cannot be encoded as a
degenerate range. A recipient MUST reject any
other value.¶
A reference element carries a type drawn from the
selected profile's reference type vocabulary, and a
relationship drawn from the selected profile's
relationship vocabulary. A recipient preserves an unrecognized
value of either member as an opaque string, as stated above. A
reference element carries no member other than the six of Table 6.
This primitive defines no extension point inside a reference
element; a later version that needs one introduces it by
publishing a new primitive version, as the extension rule earlier
in this section states.¶
Objects defined by this document are JSON [RFC8259] values that use the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) [RFC8785]. A signer and verifier MUST canonicalize the same logical object to identical UTF-8 [RFC3629] bytes before signing or verification. Implementations MUST reject values that cannot be represented under Section 4.4 and the canonicalization rules.¶
A verifier recanonicalizes the received object under JCS and
verifies every signature over the recanonicalized bytes. All
numeric members defined by this document are integers in the range
0 to 2^53-1 inclusive except where the selected profile's counter
declaration states a number type. Where this document states a
narrower range for a particular member, including the positive
duration_seconds of
Section 8.3 and the bounds of
Section 11.7, that narrower range governs. A
narrower range excludes values the general range would otherwise
admit, and the general range above does not admit a value the
narrower range excludes. A
recipient MUST reject a numeric value outside its
stated range, MUST reject an object in which a
member name occurs more than once, as detected during parsing and
before any duplicate-resolution rule is applied, and
MUST reject input that is not well-formed UTF-8 or
that contains an unpaired surrogate.¶
The allowed suite set for this primitive version is exactly JCS plus Ed25519, and JCS plus ES256. A profile names exactly one suite per format version, drawn from that set, and never more.¶
For JCS plus Ed25519, implementations MUST verify Ed25519 [RFC8032] signatures as specified in Section 5.1.7 of [RFC8032] using the cofactorless equation, and MUST reject a signature whose R or S component is not canonically encoded, or whose S is not reduced modulo L.¶
For JCS plus ES256, implementations MUST verify ECDSA over P-256 with SHA-256 computed over the Section 6.1 canonical payload bytes, using [FIPS186-5]. Section 3.4 of [RFC7518] supplies the algorithm identity and R-then-S encoding only; the P-256 domain parameters are specified in [NIST-SP-800-186]. The signature value is the 64-octet concatenation R followed by S, each a 32-octet unsigned big-endian integer. Verification MUST reject R or S outside [1, n-1], where n is the order of P-256. Low-S is not required. The criteria for the selected suite apply to each party countersignature of Section 6.1.¶
At step 3, the verifier MUST reject an Ed25519 public key that is not a canonically encoded point of order L, or an ES256 public key that is not a valid point on P-256 or is the point at infinity. These key-validity checks apply to whatever key the deployment's key-binding mechanism yields.¶
A third party holding a valid ES256 signature can produce a second
valid signature over the same payload; this cannot change what was
attested. The attestation_id, never signature bytes,
identifies an attestation. A relying party MUST NOT
use signature bytes as an identifier or deduplication key.¶
A signature required by this document is computed over canonical payload bytes that carry no context string separating a countersignature from any other signature of the selected suite made with the same key. A deployment that reuses keys across protocols relies on those payload shapes being distinguishable in practice rather than on a separation this document enforces. Section 11.4 states that bound.¶
The countersignature payload is the JCS canonicalization of the issuance snapshot. To derive it, an implementation MUST:¶
signature recursively at
every depth;¶
countersignatures member;
and¶
No countersignature covers itself or a sibling countersignature. Every party therefore signs byte-identical, mutually independent payload bytes. Those bytes carry no context string that separates them from any other payload a party signs with the same key, on the terms stated in Section 5.2 and Section 11.4.¶
countersignatures is a JSON object whose member names are
the agent identifiers appearing in parties[] and whose
values are signatures under the selected profile's suite over the payload derived above,
encoded as Section 4.4 pins them.¶
The member set of an attestation is closed: an attestation carries
only the members defined in Section 4.4, at
the root and at every nested object. Step 2 of
Section 9 therefore rejects an attestation
carrying any member Section 4.4 does not
define, including a member named signature at a location
Section 4.4 does not define, before any
signature is verified. The removal rule in this section operates
on that closed set.¶
For an artifact at or above the selected protocol profile's binding floor, a verifier MUST NOT credit an outcome as outcome-bound unless:¶
parties[] contains at least two entries;¶
countersignatures is present;¶
countersignatures are exactly
the set of agent identifiers in parties[], with no
additional and no missing member;¶
parties[] has exactly one
corresponding signature;¶
The all-listed-parties rule, together with the minimum of two entries, prevents a holder from changing the outcome, removing a counterparty row, and re-signing with only its own key.¶
An attestation carries no signature distinct from the party countersignatures, and it names no assembling role that a verifier could check. Its authenticity rests entirely on the countersignature of every listed party over the issuance snapshot, so an attestation whose outcome is not credited as outcome-bound is not authenticated by anything in this document.¶
An attestation whose version member value does not match the grammar in Section 2.2 is rejected at step 2 of Section 9 and is not retained.¶
An artifact whose version is well formed and below the selected protocol profile's binding floor leaves the procedure of Section 9 at step 2 with the terminal state legacy, and no check of this section is applied to it. Such an artifact MAY be retained as a record of its own contents. Its outcome MUST NOT be credited as outcome-bound, and it MUST NOT be reported as current. No requirement of Section 8 applies to it, because every requirement there is defined for the selected protocol profile's binding floor and later.¶
A stale attestation retains the outcome-binding property established by the countersignatures. It MUST NOT be reported as current or bound-only and MUST NOT be credited for reliance. It is retained as a record that the listed parties countersigned, subject to the key-compromise limitation in Section 11.4.¶
An attestation carries metadata about negotiation behavior. It does not disclose the deal. Items 1 through 4 below constrain the content an implementation places in free-form members, so they are producing-side obligations that a verifier cannot confirm by inspection, and the verification result vocabulary of Section 2.2 carries no state for them: an attestation that violates one of them still verifies. An implementation that assembles an attestation:¶
category and value_range
fields;¶
value_range, when present,
from the fixed bucket vocabulary defined in
Section 4.4 and MUST reject
all other values rather than coerce them;¶
category, when present, as
a dotted lowercase taxonomy path of at most 64 octets matching the
grammar in Section 4.4, where each segment
is one or more characters drawn from a to z, 0 to 9, underscore,
and hyphen, and MUST reject any other value rather
than coercing it;¶
category for additional
privacy;¶
summary, when present,
within 1024 Unicode scalar values and MUST NOT copy
a negotiated term value or free-text reasoning into it.
summary is a free-text member, so this constraint is a
producing-side obligation that a verifier cannot confirm by
inspection, and it widens the residual channel described
below.¶
The taxonomy grammar constrains shape rather than meaning. A
dishonest party can encode its own term in a syntactically valid
category segment, and it has wider latitude still in the
free-text summary member. This is an accepted, bounded
residual channel over category and summary
together: it can expose that party's own information, and it does
not let that party sign on behalf of a counterparty. A future
registered taxonomy could narrow the category half of it.¶
A currently valid signature is not evidence that the signed claim remains true. The freshness requirements below determine whether an attestation may be relied upon.¶
A relying party MUST configure a maximum evidence age not exceeding 90 days, a maximum accepted validity lifetime not exceeding 90 days, and a clock-skew allowance not exceeding 300 seconds. Exceeding the lifetime or skew bound MUST terminate not-bound at step 5. An exceeded evidence-age ceiling means the artifact is not credited for reliance: step 6 marks it stale, and step 9 reports stale if steps 7 and 8 pass. A current time before the interval starts terminates not-bound at step 5 regardless of skew; the clock-skew allowance applies to the timestamp member. A relying party MAY configure tighter values. Throughout this document 90 days is 7776000 seconds, which is 90 multiplied by 86400, and is not a calendar quantity.¶
Every requirement of Section 8, including the evidence-age anchor defined below, is defined for an attestation at or above the selected protocol profile's binding floor and for no other artifact. An artifact whose version is well formed and below the selected protocol profile's binding floor reaches the terminal state legacy at step 2 of Section 9, so no anchor is computed for it and no ceiling of this section is applied to it.¶
Evidence age is the verifier's current time minus the evidence-age anchor defined below.¶
A relying party MUST enforce its own maximum
evidence age independently of the signer's asserted validity
window, and MUST reject a signer-asserted
timestamp or interval start that is future-dated beyond that
clock-skew allowance. The evidence-age anchor is the earlier of
the attestation's timestamp member and the start of its
validity_temporal interval. A verifier
MUST enforce that finite skew bound and fail closed
outside it, whatever the quality of its clock synchronization.¶
A relying party MUST mark an attestation stale
at step 5 when it passed steps 1 through 4 and every other step 5
check but its validity_temporal interval has ended at the
time of verification. It continues through steps 6, 7 and 8;
revocation or a context or party-set mismatch terminates not-bound.
Otherwise step 9 reports stale.¶
A relying party MAY apply a tighter freshness bound than the signer asserted.¶
A party MUST NOT countersign an attestation whose
validity_temporal lifetime exceeds 90 days as
Section 8.1 defines that quantity. That
lifetime
is the length of the interval that
Section 8.3 defines for the stated mode,
which is the span between from and until in
absolute mode and the value of duration_seconds in
relative mode.
A party MAY apply a shorter maximum.¶
validity_temporal is REQUIRED on every
attestation at or above the selected protocol profile's binding floor. It is a JSON object
carrying a mode member whose value is either "absolute"
or "relative", and the members that mode requires. All timestamps
are RFC 3339 [RFC3339] date-time values encoded as
Section 4.4 states. When mode is
"absolute", the members from and until are
present, the interval is [from, until], and the lifetime is the
span between those two times. When mode is
"relative", the members from and
duration_seconds, a positive integer, are present, the
interval is [from, from + duration_seconds], and the lifetime is
duration_seconds. Each mode therefore has exactly one
interval and exactly one lifetime, which is the quantity the caps
of Section 8.1 and
Section 8.2 bound. A verifier
MUST reject a validity_temporal object
whose mode member is absent or carries another value,
whose members for the stated mode are absent, which carries any
other member, or whose interval is empty or reversed, at step 2 with not-bound.¶
An artifact whose version is well formed and below the selected protocol profile's binding floor reaches the terminal state legacy at step 2 of Section 9 and is never read for this member. An artifact at or above the selected protocol profile's binding floor that omits this member is rejected at that step with the terminal state not-bound.¶
An attestation defined by this document carries no single-use
semantics, and the temporal validity of
Section 8.3 alone permits an unbounded
number of effects inside the signed window. A relying party that
treats one attestation as grounds for a consequential effect
SHOULD keep a consumption record for that
attestation, keyed by its attestation_id, inside its own
accounting domain, and consult that record before admitting a
further effect.¶
This document defines no atomic check-and-record operation, no concurrency rule, and no maximum, so two simultaneous decisions inside one accounting domain, and two decisions in separate domains, can each admit an effect against the same attestation. A deployment that needs enforced single use obtains it from a mechanism that defines those semantics, for example the budgeted capability described in Section 14.9.¶
To reach a terminal state for a received artifact, a relying party MUST perform the following steps in fail-closed order. The five terminal states are defined in Section 2.2, and step 9 exposes exactly one of them.¶
key_ref, the resolution input for each party is its agent
identifier together with its key_ref, and the exactly-one test
applies to that pair. Otherwise the input is its agent identifier.
Resolve exactly one public key of the selected profile's suite
valid at the attestation's issuance time for each input, using the
key-binding mechanism the deployment profile defines. This document
defines no such mechanism. If no key resolves, more than one key
resolves, or the deployment defines no binding mechanism, terminate
not-bound. The profile declares what the identifier names; the
deployment defines how the identifier (and key_ref where declared)
is resolved. The Section 5.2 key-validity checks apply to whatever
key it yields, at step 3.¶
signature and countersignatures and verify every
listed party's countersignature as specified in
Section 6.2. No binding recomputation exists.
If any check there fails, terminate with the terminal state
not-bound.¶
parties[] against the
session and counterparty set the relying party expected for this
interaction, and reject the attestation with the terminal state
not-bound when either differs. A verified attestation is evidence
about the context it names and about no other.¶
The five terminal states are the whole reported vocabulary. An implementation MAY expose diagnostic detail alongside the state it reports, and MUST NOT report any other state name in its place. An implementation MUST NOT silently replace one terminal state with another, and in particular MUST NOT report a legacy or bound-only artifact as current, or a stale artifact as current or bound-only. The five states are not-bound, legacy, stale, bound-only, and current. Profile-native results under Section 10.1.2 are diagnostic detail, never additional terminal states.¶
A verifier that returns a typed failure reason MUST distinguish a result this document's checks cannot produce at all from a result this verifier could not reach with the inputs it held, and MUST NOT report the second as the first. This document defines no scope comparison, so a scope relation falls in the first category, while an unresolvable party key or an unavailable revocation source falls in the second.¶
signature and
countersignatures. Vocabulary values are not names. A protocol profile MUST NOT give any other root member a name equal to a registered profile's version-member name, so that step 2a of Section 9 counts exactly one registered name on a conforming artifact.
This document registers a version-member name only for a
protocol profile whose normative text is in this document. An artifact whose selected
profile the verifier does not implement terminates not-bound at
step 2a. A protocol profile whose first format version has no
deployed base
MUST set its binding floor to that first
version.¶
role, resolution_mechanism,
extensions_used, reference type, and
relationship. A profile MAY declare the
extensions_used vocabulary as an open shape, meaning
any string of the Table 5 shape naming one of its extensions,
and MUST say so if it does. A profile can
restrict and MUST NOT extend
outcome.status. A profile MUST declare
its outcome.detail vocabulary and assign each detail
value to exactly one status. A profile version that restricts status
admits only detail values belonging to an admitted status.¶
references[] points at them, or state
that there are none.¶
key_ref is present and, if so, what kind of key
identifier it is. The key_ref member MUST NOT
carry key material; this is a producer obligation the verifier
cannot confirm.¶
For each protocol profile, the required negative controls are: oversize artifact, exercising step 1; undefined member at any depth, exercising step 2; malformed version, exercising step 2; version below the floor, exercising the step 2 legacy terminal state; malformed signature encoding at any location, exercising step 2; missing countersignature, exercising step 4; extra countersignature, exercising step 4; invalid countersignature, exercising step 4; ended validity interval, marking stale at step 5 and reporting stale at step 9; reversed validity interval, terminating not-bound at step 2; age ceiling exceeded, marking stale at step 6 and reporting stale at step 9; status and detail mismatch, terminating not-bound at step 2; future-dated anchor, exercising step 5; lifetime over the cap, exercising step 5; mismatched context identifier, exercising step 8; mismatched party set, exercising step 8; zero version-member names, exercising step 2a; a duplicate member name, exercising step 2; and two registered version-member names, exercising step 2a. Unless another state is stated above, every rejection control expects not-bound. A profile that does not declare key_ref also provides key_ref present when the profile does not declare it, exercising step 2. A profile that declares key_ref instead provides key_ref resolves to no key or a key of another suite, exercising step 3, with one case for each failure.¶
The profile also names two labelled no-rejection illustrations:
a term in summary, and a well-formed but
cryptographically invalid parties[].signature.¶
A profile MAY define native verification of an object its binding members refer to. A verifier that performs native checks MUST run them only after Section 9 has produced a terminal state, MUST name each separately and report it as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN, and MUST report a check it does not perform as NOT RUN, never PASS. No native result adds, removes, or changes a terminal state. A native PASS is not evidence beyond Section 3's verified claim. The relying party decides what to do with the terminal state and the separate native results.¶
This profile is normative. It assigns the version member name
concordia_attestation, current value 0.7.0, and
binding floor 0.7.0. Its context identifier is
session_id, the negotiation session. Its binding members
are chain_head, the Concordia Protocol Specification
[CONCORDIA] Section 9.6.3 final-message hash and required at 0.7.0 and later,
and transcript_hash, a retained binding member whose
preimage is unspecified, required at every version, and with no
meaning beyond countersigned opaque value. Its completeness
indicator is message_count, the countersigned integer
from 1 to 10000 inclusive and not proof that nothing was dropped.
Every listed party is required to have received the final
transcript message before countersigning; this is a producer
obligation the verifier cannot confirm.
A holder of the transcript can run the out-of-band receipt
set-binding comparison described by the Concordia Protocol
Specification Section 9.6.5b after this document's verification
procedure; that comparison never changes a terminal state.¶
The profile's suite is JCS plus Ed25519. Its
outcome.status vocabulary is agreed
and not_agreed. Its detail vocabulary assigns
agreed to status agreed, and rejected,
expired, and withdrawn to status not_agreed.
This profile declares no key_ref. Its
resolution_mechanism vocabulary is direct,
split, foa, tradeoff,
escalation, and none. Its role
vocabulary is initiator, responder,
mediator, and witness. Its reference
type vocabulary is receipt,
chain_session, predicate, and mandate.
Its reference relationship vocabulary is
supersedes, extends, fulfills, and
references. Its extensions_used vocabulary is
an open shape: any string of the Table 5 shape naming one of its
extensions.¶
Concordia assigns the bracketed cells of
Section 4.4 as follows: the
[version member] cell is
concordia_attestation; the
[context identifier] cell is session_id; the
[binding member] rows are transcript_hash,
retained and required at every version, and chain_head,
required at 0.7.0 and later; the
[completeness indicator] cell is
message_count, required at 0.7.0 and later; the profile
vocabularies and profile-declared counters are the values listed
above; and the counter names are offers_made,
concessions, concession_magnitude,
signals_shared, constraints_declared,
constraints_violated, reasoning_provided,
withdrawal, and response_time_avg_seconds with
these shapes: offers_made, concessions,
signals_shared, constraints_declared and
constraints_violated are integers from 0 to 2^53-1
inclusive; concession_magnitude is a number from 0.0 to
1.0 inclusive; response_time_avg_seconds is a number of
0 or greater; and reasoning_provided and
withdrawal are booleans. This profile declares a number
type for concession_magnitude and
response_time_avg_seconds. Cardinalities are those of
Section 4.4.¶
The Concordia lifecycle states PROPOSED, ACTIVE, AGREED, REJECTED, EXPIRED, and DORMANT are informative for this document. The Concordia definitions of Negotiation transcript, Agreement, and Offer remain the protocol definitions that produce artifacts under this profile.¶
The identifier urn:concordia:schema:attestation:v0.5
names the machine-readable form of the member set of the 0.5.0
predecessor of this profile and is informative. It is registered
in no IANA registry. The 0.6.0 profile differs from the 0.5.0 line
by the removal of three members: the fulfillment member
of the attestation root, the extensions member of a
reference element, and the window mode of
validity_temporal. The 0.7.0 profile differs from
0.6.0 by changing the status values to agreed and not_agreed and
adding the required outcome.detail member. Every 0.5.0 and 0.6.0
artifact is legacy under the 0.7.0 floor. An artifact at 0.7.0
carrying a removed member is rejected at step 2 of
Section 9.¶
The member name concordia_attestation is retained from
the deployed base of artifacts that this format already describes.
Renaming it would turn recognition of an existing legacy
artifact into an unregistered-name not-bound result at the 0.7.0 floor. On the members it retains, this document adds
constraints that a 0.5.0 implementation does not apply. Where a
published schema document and this document disagree, this
document governs.¶
The version gate at step 2 is what keeps the Concordia legacy state coherent. Every artifact below 0.7.0 leaves at the floor test, before structural, signature, temporal, or revocation checks for the 0.7.0 shape. The earlier 0.5.0 and 0.6.0 shapes do not supply the status/detail pair this profile now requires.¶
This profile is normative. It assigns the version member
a2cn_attestation, current value and binding floor
0.1.0, and the context identifier session_id,
the A2CN session. There is no deployed base for this profile.
Its suite is JCS plus ES256. It maps the bilateral TransactionRecord
0.4, record_type a2cn_transaction_record and record_version
0.4, specified by
[A2CN], with schema
https://a2cn.dev/schemas/transaction-record/0.4.¶
The binding members are offer_chain_hash and
record_hash, both required at 0.1.0. The first is the
TransactionRecord's SHA-256 digest of the JCS array of protocol-act
hashes for all Offers and Counteroffers in chronological order.
The second is SHA-256 over the JCS record with record_hash set to
the empty string. Both derivations are specified by [A2CN]
Section 9.3. A2CN encodes both as unpadded base64url; this
profile carries the same 32 octets as sha256: followed by lowercase
hexadecimal. The committed bytes are identical. Every listed
party MUST independently derive the same
TransactionRecord 0.4 before countersigning. These are commitments
to material both parties derive, not proof of completeness or
integrity. Because TransactionRecord 0.4 is deterministic
(A2CN Section 9.2), every binding value is derivable by each party
alone from the protocol messages, and the two countersignatures
are made over values neither party had to receive from the other.¶
The completeness indicator message_count is
negotiation_summary.total_messages, an integer from 1 to 10000
inclusive. It is the integer the parties countersigned, not proof
that nothing was dropped.¶
The profile's detail vocabulary is the full A2CN terminal
set: COMPLETED belongs to agreed;
REJECTED_FINAL, WITHDRAWN, TIMED_OUT,
IMPASSE, ERROR, and HALTED_BY_CONTROLS
belong to not_agreed. Profile version 0.1.0 restricts
status to agreed, so its only admissible
status/detail pair is agreed/COMPLETED.
Any other pair terminates not-bound at step 2. The full detail
vocabulary is declared so a later profile version can attest
non-agreement sessions without a vocabulary change.¶
The roles are initiator and responder.
A producer MUST emit exactly two parties entries,
initiator then responder, with agent_id
equal to parties.initiator.did and parties.responder.did from the
record and represented as DIDs [DID-CORE] (the
primitive's agent_id is the DID; the record's own informational
agent_id member is not used), and key_ref set to the DID URL of the verification method the party
countersigned with; the bilateral order, mapping to record
identifiers, and DID and DID URL forms are producer
obligations that Section 9 does not check;
step 8's party-set comparison is where a relying party catches
an unexpected set.¶
This profile declares key_ref present.
Section 9 passes it to the deployment's key-binding mechanism.
The a2cn.party.verification_method native check compares
it by exact string comparison to that party's TransactionRecord
verification_method: parties.initiator.verification_method or
parties.responder.verification_method. The generic verifier needs
nothing from the TransactionRecord to resolve the key or verify
the countersignature.¶
The profile expects the key that signs A2CN protocol acts to
countersign, the key-reuse case of Section 11.4; the
a2cn_attestation root member is expected to distinguish the
countersignature payload shape from A2CN protocol-act payloads in
practice; this document does not enforce that separation
(Section 11.4).
The countersignature is the Section 5.2 signature over the
Section 6.1 canonical bytes, not an A2CN JWS. An implementation
that produces it with A2CN's JWS tooling obtains the same 64
octets in unpadded base64url and re-encodes them to the Section
4.4 88-character form. ES256 is specified by [RFC7518].
Section 5.2 specifies the on-curve point check and R and S range
checks. No low-S requirement is imposed; the primitive's
malleability bound applies. The attestation_id, never
signature bytes, identifies an attestation. ECDSA signatures are
not deterministic, so vectors assert the stated octets and
successful verification, never equality of independently generated
signatures.¶
Informatively, a DID-resolving deployment profile for A2CN,
applying the rules both A2CN reference verifiers apply, checks
that the key_ref value is a DID URL controlled by the party's DID
(equal to it, or the DID followed by # and a fragment), that the
named verification method is in the corresponding DID document
and controlled by that DID, and that it is listed under
assertionMethod or authentication. A method listed
only under keyAgreement does not verify a countersignature
under those deployment rules. It also checks that the key is
compatible with ES256; step 3 already enforces suite compatibility.
Both A2CN reference verifiers resolve did:web only;
[A2CN] does not restrict parties to that method,
so a deployment that admits another DID method supplies its own
resolution. Such a
deployment can resolve against a supplied DID document and separately
report whether it confirmed that document against the DID resolution
method. These are deployment key-binding rules, not constraints this
protocol profile places on the deployment. A valid A2CN session using
Ed25519 methods is outside this ES256 profile version; both party
verification methods need P-256 keys usable with ES256. A later
profile version may select EdDSA.¶
The resolution_mechanism vocabulary is direct.
The counter set is offers_made, an integer from 0 to
2^53-1 counting that party's Offers and Counteroffers in the offer
chain whose sender_did is that party's DID, and withdrawal,
a boolean. A producer
MUST emit withdrawal only as false at 0.1.0;
this is a producer obligation that Section 9 does not check.
Both counters are optional when unmeasured.
The six unmeasured counters concessions, concession_magnitude,
signals_shared, constraints_declared, constraints_violated, and
reasoning_provided are not declared; neither is
response_time_avg_seconds. Any of those seven counters, present
with any value including zero, is an undefined member and fails
step 2. The rounds member is
negotiation_summary.total_rounds. duration_seconds is
negotiation_summary.accepted_at minus
negotiation_summary.session_created_at, in whole seconds, rounded
down; a negative difference, which the two parties' clocks can
produce, is emitted as 0. terms_count is omitted at
0.1.0.¶
When present, category maps goods_procurement to
procurement.goods and saas_renewal to procurement.saas_renewal;
otherwise it is procurement.<deal_type>; category is omitted
unless the deal_type segment matches the Section 4.4 grammar.
When present, value_range is the primitive bucket containing
agreed_terms.total_value converted from minor to major units of
currency by the currency's minor-unit exponent; a producer that
cannot establish that exponent omits value_range. At a shared
endpoint the higher bucket is used; a negative value has no bucket
and the member is omitted. The uppermost bucket begins at 1000000.
mediator_invoked is false or omitted; A2CN
defines no mediator.¶
The extensions_used vocabulary is empty: any listed value is outside it and fails step 2. A producer MUST NOT emit extensions_used; an empty array is a producer violation that Section 9 does not detect.¶
The companion artifact is the TransactionRecord 0.4;
type is a2cn_transaction_record and relationship is
references. These are the reference type and relationship
vocabularies. references[].id is the record's record_id, the UUID
version 5 that [A2CN] Section 9.3 derives from
session_id under the A2CN namespace
f4a2c1e0-8b3d-4f7a-9c2e-1d5b6a8f3e7c; references[].version is the
record's record_version, 0.4; signed_at and signer_did
are omitted, because the record is signed by both parties and
names no single signer.¶
A parties[] signature is the party's ES256 signature over the JCS canonicalization of its own parties[] element with signature removed, made with the key that key_ref names and using the Section 4.4 encoding. It is not a countersignature and Section 9 does not verify it.¶
Native verification reports four separately named checks
on a presented TransactionRecord 0.4. Only
a2cn.record.verify performs [A2CN] Section 9.5
record verification; the other three compare the attestation's
binding members and key_ref against the presented record. None of
the four changes the Section 9 terminal state. Each is reported
as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN as specified in
Section 10.1.2:¶
a2cn.binding.record_hash: recompute the record hash with record_hash empty,
check the presented record_hash, and compare its digest octets to
the attestation's record_hash.¶
a2cn.binding.offer_chain_hash: when the chronological offer-hash list is
available, recompute its digest and compare to the record and
attestation offer_chain_hash digest octets.¶
a2cn.party.verification_method: compare each party's key_ref
by exact string comparison to its record verification_method.¶
a2cn.record.verify: verify TransactionRecord version 0.4
only under A2CN Section 9.5. Its constituents are record_hash
recomputation with record_hash empty and a check of the presented
record_hash; rebuilding the signed final Offer or Counteroffer
from final_offer and agreed_terms and verifying its signature;
rebuilding the signed Acceptance from final_acceptance and
verifying its signature; comparing accepted_protocol_act_hash
to the final offer's protocol-act hash; basis consistency; and
currency consistency.¶
A check not performed, including one lacking its required input, is NOT RUN. A check whose input (the record, or the part of it the check reads) is not presented is reported NOT RUN, never PASS. Without an implementation of native verification, all four checks are NOT RUN, never PASS. In AP-3 case A, record content is altered and its record_hash recomputed while the attestation is untouched; check 1 is FAIL. In AP-3 case B, record content is altered while the presented record_hash field is left equal to the countersigned digest; check 1 recomputes, so it is FAIL, not PASS on the carried field. When the altered content is a final-act signature, check 4 also fails at the act rebuild and signature verification. A generic verifier never compares the presented record_hash field; its terminal state can remain bound-only while a2cn.binding.record_hash is FAIL. This is why native and generic verdicts stay separate.¶
AP-13 is an additional control: a party's key_ref names a
verification method the party controls and lists under assertionMethod,
but which is not the TransactionRecord's verification_method for that
party, and the countersignature verifies under it. The Section 9
terminal state is unchanged by the native result, bound-only in the
synthetic setup of Appendix D.2, while
a2cn.party.verification_method is FAIL. The no-key and
wrong-suite controls of Section 10.1.1
exercise different failures at step 3.¶
Informatively, A2CN defines no attestation-level revocation; this paragraph specifies no revocation behavior; the deployment profile still decides step 7. A deployment that names none reaches bound-only when the other checks pass and the attestation is not stale. Key status, mandate validity, and artifact revocation are distinct properties; later DID-document key status is not itself revocation of an already countersigned attestation. The attestation is a reliance signal bounded by the primitive's maximum evidence age and validity lifetime. A genuine attestation after its validity window, or past the relying party's age ceiling, terminates in stale if the remaining Section 9 checks pass. A time before the window starts still terminates not-bound at step 5. The bound TransactionRecord is A2CN's long-lived agreement evidence and remains independently verifiable under A2CN's own rules while its signers' DID documents are resolvable or retained beside it.¶
Informatively, this version covers only bilateral COMPLETED sessions ending in a valid signed Acceptance of a signed Offer or Counteroffer. REJECTED_FINAL, WITHDRAWN, TIMED_OUT, IMPASSE, ERROR, HALTED_BY_CONTROLS, an observed or non-signing responder, and completion through external_commitment_reference are not attestable at 0.1.0. A2CN's SessionEvidenceRecord 0.5, specified by [A2CN] Section 9A, is a distinct producer-sealed artifact covering broader sessions; this profile does not bind it. Its record_type is a2cn_session_evidence_record and its record_version is 0.5; it covers the sessions excluded here.¶
In addition to the primitive's own members, the attestation discloses the two party DIDs and their verification-method ids, the agreement outcome, the primitive's permitted counters and meta fields, and the two binding digests.¶
An implementation MUST NOT embed TransactionRecord term values into the attestation beyond profile-defined binding values and primitive-defined non-term metadata. As in Section 7, this is a producer obligation; the generic verifier cannot detect a term hidden in a syntactically permitted free-text field. The TransactionRecord itself carries commercial terms and is disclosed only under the party's own disclosure decision.¶
The co-authors' AP-1 to AP-13 vector scenarios are mapped in the AP paragraphs of Appendix D.2. Each carries its expected Section 9 terminal state and separate native results. In the co-authors' vector scheme, a vector is marked active only when both A2CN reference implementations produce the stated result; otherwise it is marked known_gap. The hand-constructed vectors in this document carry no active or interoperability claim.¶
This section is written against four attacker positions: an on-path attacker that can read, delay, suppress, or modify messages in transit; a single dishonest party to the negotiation; the complete listed party set acting together against a third party; and an attacker holding a compromised party key. What the checks preserve against each position, and what they leave open, is stated here rather than left to the reader.¶
Against the on-path attacker, signature verification detects modification of the countersigned attestation bytes, and no check detects delay, suppression, or traffic analysis (Section 11.2).¶
Against a single dishonest party, requiring every listed party's
countersignature preserves the jointly bound members against
unilateral rewriting, and no check makes that party's behavioral
self-report objective or closes the residual channel over
category and summary that
Section 7 records
(Section 11.1).¶
Against an attacker holding a compromised party key, revocation
bounds how long such an artifact remains useful once the deployment
detects the compromise and the verifier can reach a revocation
source. No check detects an artifact that back-dates its own
timestamp and validity_temporal members, so
revocation bounds this attacker rather than detecting it
(Section 11.4).¶
Collusion of the entire listed party set against a third party is the design's primary residual risk, and no check defined here detects it.¶
A party can issue a false behavioral self-report. Requiring every listed party's countersignature prevents one holder from rewriting the shared outcome, but it does not make every self-described behavioral detail objective truth. Applications must distinguish jointly bound outcome members from party-level self-reports.¶
The outcome an attestation carries is what the listed parties
jointly asserted at issuance. This document defines no procedure
for re-deriving an outcome from the transcript and no check that
the transcript's final message agrees with outcome.status,
so a set of parties that agree to misdescribe their own session
produces evidence this document's checks accept. Every check here
is a check on what the parties bound together, and none is a check
that what they bound is true.¶
The binding values are opaque values in the issuance snapshot, and a completeness indicator is the integer the parties countersigned with them. This document defines no check that derives the transcript, proves completeness, or establishes the order in which messages were created.¶
A retained binding member is opaque to the verifier this document defines. No check here reads it, and a verified result makes no claim about it beyond the fact that the listed parties countersigned a snapshot containing that string.¶
A party can replay old but still correctly signed evidence. Required temporal validity and independent relying-side age limits reduce this risk; neither signature verification nor the signed window alone is sufficient.¶
The negotiation messages of a protocol that produces an attestation are not protected by this document. A relay or mailbox can read offer terms and reasoning unless that separate protocol or transport protects them. Deployments MUST NOT describe this document as an end-to-end encryption protocol.¶
Countersignature verification detects modification of the attestation bytes. It does not prevent delay, suppression, traffic analysis, or denial of service. Session and offer timeouts bound how long a party waits and do not guarantee availability.¶
A holder that suppresses a relying party's access to a revocation source is not detectable by any check in this document. An attestation verified without a determination of revocation status is evidence that the parties bound an outcome at issuance, and it is not evidence that the outcome stands today.¶
The closed schema provides no member for a raw deal term. The
residual channel described in Section 7 remains,
and it has two halves: the category taxonomy, whose
grammar constrains shape rather than meaning, and the free-text
summary, whose content constraint is a producing-side
obligation a verifier cannot confirm. A producer that violates
either obligation still produces an artifact that verifies. Correlation across stable
agent identifiers, timestamps, categories, and session metadata
can also reveal patterns even when individual term values are
absent. Implementers SHOULD minimize retention and
disclosure according to their deployment's risk model.¶
This document does not define identity proofing, key discovery, key rotation, or key revocation. A deployment MUST define how keys are bound to agent identifiers and how compromise is detected and handled. Outcome binding proves control of the resolved keys. It does not prove the real-world identity or the authority of their holders.¶
A deployment that does not define key binding, rotation, and revocation cannot perform step 3 of Section 9 and therefore cannot verify an attestation defined by this document at all.¶
Signatures defined by this document are computed over canonical payload bytes with no context string distinguishing a countersignature from a negotiation message. A deployment that signs both with one Ed25519 key, or both with one P-256 key under ES256, relies on the payload shapes being distinguishable in practice rather than on a separation this document enforces. Closing that gap would need a future version to introduce an explicit context string, and a version that did so would invalidate every signature produced under this one. This document specifies no such string and commits no future version to any particular construction.¶
Agent identifiers are compared as the normalized strings of Section 4.4. Two identifiers that a human reads as the same name but that differ after that normalization are different parties under this document, so preventing confusable identifiers is a property of the deployment's identifier issuance rather than of any check defined here.¶
Agreement evidence is long-lived by design, and this document
anchors no external time source. A party key that is compromised
or that becomes forgeable long after issuance can be used to
produce an artifact that back-dates its own timestamp and
validity_temporal members, and nothing inside the
artifact distinguishes that artifact from one issued at the time
it claims. The relying-side evidence-age ceiling of
Section 8.1 bounds how long such an
artifact remains useful to an attacker; it does not detect the
forgery. A deployment that needs that detection anchors the
artifact in an external append-only service at issuance.
A stale result is evidence that the listed parties countersigned
only while their keys remain uncompromised. After a key exposure,
a back-dated forgery under that key can also reach stale and cannot
be distinguished from a genuine artifact by this procedure.
A deployment that retains stale artifacts as long-lived records
needs that external append-only anchor at issuance.¶
This document does not prevent one actor from operating multiple agent identities. It also does not prove that a selectively disclosed set of attestations is a party's complete history. A verified aggregate can prove that the revealed set is internally sound and party-bound; it cannot prove the set is representative without an external append-only history anchor.¶
The allowed suites for this primitive version are JCS plus Ed25519 [RFC8032] and JCS plus ES256 [RFC7518]. This document does not define per-object algorithm negotiation: the allowed set is fixed per primitive version and the selected suite per profile format version rather than negotiated on the wire, which removes the downgrade and attacker-choice failure modes that negotiation would otherwise introduce. [RFC7696] (BCP 201) discusses the tradeoffs of algorithm agility in general terms and is cited here for background. Agreement evidence is long-lived by design (see Section 8), so a signature algorithm that becomes cryptanalytically broken during an attestation's useful lifetime would retroactively weaken the probative value of evidence issued under it. [RFC9958] surveys the post-quantum signature landscape; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are the NIST-standardized post-quantum signature algorithms most likely to be named by a future primitive version of this format. This document does not adopt either algorithm, does not define a hybrid classical/ post-quantum signature mode, and does not add a negotiation field: the migration mechanism is a new primitive version, consistent with the fixed-profile design this section describes.¶
The limits of this section are relying-party requirements, and
Section 9 states the step at which each one is
applied. A verifier MUST reject, before parsing it,
a received artifact larger than its configured maximum artifact
size, and that configured maximum MUST NOT exceed
262144 octets. A verifier MUST reject an artifact
whose JSON nesting depth exceeds 16. A declared completeness indicator MUST be an
integer within the range its profile declares, and a verifier
MUST reject an attestation outside that range. The
rejections of steps 1 and 2 of Section 9,
which are the artifact-size cap, the nesting-depth cap, and the
declared completeness-indicator range, run before any signature
verification. The member caps of
Section 4.4 bound the
remaining attacker-controlled lengths inside the attestation: at
most 64 parties, at most 32 references, at most 16 extension
names, at most 256 octets in any identifier, and at most 1024
Unicode scalar values in summary. This document processes
no transcript. The completeness-indicator cap instead bounds an
attacker-controlled integer that applications may display, log, or
use in policy.¶
Two listed parties do not imply two transcript messages. A single message can carry a jointly meaningful commitment, so a profile's completeness-indicator floor can be 1 and the number of listed parties implies nothing about the number of messages.¶
Implementations SHOULD keep raw transcripts under the parties' control and present the narrower attestation when term disclosure is unnecessary. Logs and diagnostics SHOULD avoid copying raw deal terms or cryptographic material. Verifiers SHOULD return typed failure reasons without echoing untrusted private content, on the terms stated in Section 9. Clock synchronization is operationally important; the finite skew bound a verifier enforces is specified in Section 8.1.¶
This document requests no IANA actions. The vocabularies it defines
change by a new format version of the profile or primitive that owns
them. A recipient rejects a status or value_range
value outside the enumerated set, and preserves an unrecognized
reference type or relationship value as an opaque
string.¶
This document registers no media type. An attestation defined here is carried inside a deployment's own protocol, which names the type it uses, and this document defines no transport. A version that defines a transport is where a media-type registration belongs.¶
This section is informative.¶
A general evidence-composition framework can treat a verified attestation as a native evidence component, alongside the ApprovalReceipt, FulfillmentAttestation, and RevocationRecord that Section 10.2.1 names. This document defines the attestation and defines none of those three: their member sets, signature preimages, and authority rules come from the Concordia Protocol Specification described in Appendix A or from whatever document a deployment names, and no requirement of this document reads a member of any of them. The verification procedure (Section 9) is authoritative for the attestation alone. An external composer decides whether a set of heterogeneous evidence is sufficient for its own relying policy.¶
This composition is optional. No normative requirement in this document depends on any particular composition framework or draft revision. Appendix C illustrates one such external composition model without creating a dependency on it.¶
A relying party can refuse an interaction with a structured challenge that describes missing evidence, a freshness requirement, accepted presentation profiles, and retry state. This document's artifacts can be consumed in that pattern without this document defining a competing challenge format: a party can decline a proposed session with a reason and later open or reactivate a session after obtaining the requested evidence. This document does not define a machine-readable outstanding-evidence vocabulary in the decline message.¶
Access-control and action receipts record what one boundary, gateway, or policy engine decided or observed. An attestation defined by this document records what multiple negotiating parties jointly bound. A deployment can produce both artifacts for the same broader transaction; neither substitutes for the other.¶
Payment and ledger evidence prove rail-specific authorization, consumption, or finality. This document intentionally does not. Likewise, a FulfillmentAttestation as described in Section 10.2.1.2 does not prove payment finality. Together they can describe different parts of one transaction without collapsing their signer positions.¶
The proposed IETF agentproto working group charter describes a standards-track agentic dialog management protocol (dialog correlation, lifecycle, and transport bindings), an informational reference architecture, and informational use cases and requirements. Its charter-ietf-agentproto-00-04, dated 2026-10-02, lists this out-of-scope item: "Audit data structures and their production, validation, or consumption, though dialog identifiers may be used in auditing." Its coordination section names, verbatim, "Evidence and transparency: SCITT, RATS, on software and hardware security" and, for identity and authorization, "Security: Web Authorization Protocol (OAuth), webbotauth, WIMSE."¶
The evidence objects defined by this document are not an agentproto deliverable and are not listed in its charter. This document touches the agentproto charter only at the evidence-and-transparency coordination point named above and at the dialog-identifier hook preserved in the out-of-scope line. This document defines no mapping from the context identifier to a dialog identifier, and it defines no dialog-management, transport-binding, session-lifecycle, or identity/authorization mechanism of its own.¶
A related effort defines a protocol-neutral interface for composing evidence across multiple agent-evidence formats. This document defines this specification's own artifact family; the neutral-interface effort defines a composition interface across formats. Neither is a normative dependency of the other, and this document does not describe, reference, or rely on that effort's schema, status, or publication venue.¶
Other individual Internet-Drafts define multi-signer evidence for agent actions and transactions. [I-D.laxsharma-pact] defines a contract layer in which a buyer and a seller co-sign a JCS-canonicalized task contract; a Verdict is bound by digest to the Delivery it judges; and a Facilitator alone signs one Outcome Record per contract as input to reputation systems. That contract format binds pricing and scope terms directly into the signed object and does not specify an independent relying-side freshness discipline. [I-D.mih-agent-bilateral-attestation] defines a four-move exchange in which each of two organizations holds the other's signature over the same action digest; it covers a single directed action rather than a negotiated multi-attribute outcome, and its wire encoding is deferred to a future revision.¶
The attestation defined by this document differs from both: it binds an outcome reached through a multi-round, multi-attribute negotiation; it structurally excludes negotiated price, quantity, date, and free-text term values from the signed object (Section 7); and it defines an independent relying-side freshness obligation (Section 8) that neither adjacent draft specifies. These efforts are complementary rather than competing; a relying party could in principle consume evidence from more than one of these formats for a single broader transaction.¶
[I-D.somoza-dmsc-atn-agent-trust-negotiation] defines a pre-negotiation trust handshake that binds a capability manifest, a delegation chain, a provenance attestation, and a session receipt to a discovered agent identity, and computes an agreed scope through a specified intersection algebra over the peers' declarations. That work establishes what a pair of agents is permitted to attempt before a negotiation of terms opens. This document defines the evidence produced after such a negotiation closes, and it carries no capability manifest, no delegation chain, and no scope algebra of its own.¶
[I-D.wadkins-agentproto-action-determinability] states mechanism-independent requirements for establishing at a later time that a claimed action occurred under the conditions said to govern it, including that the governing conditions were fixed no later than the decision and that an independent evaluator can establish the claim without cooperation from an original participant. Those requirements are stated over any evidence format and define none. An attestation defined by this document is one artifact such an evaluator can read. Section 3 records that this document binds what the parties agreed at conclusion rather than a commitment fixed in advance, Section 14.3 records that it places no obligation on a policy evaluator, and Section 11.1 records what it does and does not establish about ordering.¶
[I-D.sergeev-claim-boundaries] states protocol-neutral limits on what signed evidence can support, and the bounds in Section 11.1 and Section 11.4 of this document correspond to rules 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 of its Section 6: a verified attestation supports the claim stated in Section 1 under the key-binding premise of Section 11.4, and supports no claim about the truth of the outcome, the completeness of the transcript, or the order in which the transcript's messages were created.¶
[I-D.bradleyb-audit-decision-records] records authorization decisions rather than actions, so that a denial, an expiry, or an unfulfilled commitment remains representable, and it requires a record to disclose what establishes the order of the decision against the effect and whether that mechanism sits inside the producer's own trust boundary. This document records a digest and, when the profile declares one, a count that the parties countersigned, and Section 11.1 states what it does and does not establish about precedence.¶
[I-D.schrock-ep-bounded-capability-receipts] defines a signed capability carrying a budget with explicit units, together with a reserve, admit, and reconcile state machine that refuses overspend, prevents replay of an operation, serializes concurrent owners, and charges an indeterminate operation conservatively. It bounds how much authority an agent may consume before and while it acts. This document reports what a set of parties bound after a negotiation concluded, and it defines no budget, no reservation, no consumption record, and no single-use semantics of its own beyond the relying-side bound in Section 8.4.¶
[I-D.correctover-ccs] defines a runtime conformance check over an individual agent tool call across seven dimensions and emits a signed receipt carrying an allow, deny, or escalate verdict for one invocation, using Ed25519 signatures over JCS canonical JSON as this document does. It judges a single call at the moment that call is made and records one issuer's verdict. This document binds an outcome that several parties reached across many messages and records no verdict, so a deployment can produce both artifacts for one broader transaction without either standing in for the other.¶
This appendix is informative. The source specifications are the Concordia Protocol Specification [CONCORDIA] and the A2CN Protocol Specification [A2CN]. The tables record which sections of each specification the corresponding profile subjects are derived from, for editor traceability; it is not part of the normative text, and no requirement of this document depends on it.¶
| Document subject | Concordia Protocol Specification section |
|---|---|
| Scope and non-goals | Sections 1.4 and 2 |
| Terms and agreement surfaces | Sections 3 and 4 |
| Lifecycle and offer grammar | Sections 5 and 6 |
| JCS, signatures, and transcript digest fields | Sections 9.2, 9.3, and 9.6.2 |
| Attestation schema and fields | Sections 9.6.2 and 9.6.3 |
| Approval, fulfillment, revocation | Sections 9.6.4a through 9.6.4d |
| Outcome binding | Section 9.6.5a |
| Privacy invariant | Section 9.6.6 |
| Freshness and replay | Section 9.7 |
| Threat-model security organization | Section 9.8 |
| Typed references | Section 11.5 |
| Profile subject | A2CN specification |
|---|---|
| TransactionRecord 0.4 and deterministic derivation | Section 9 |
| Independent derivation of binding values | Section 9.2 |
| offer_chain_hash | Section 9.3 |
| Native record checks | Section 9.5 |
| Full terminal detail vocabulary: COMPLETED belongs to agreed; REJECTED_FINAL, WITHDRAWN, TIMED_OUT, IMPASSE, ERROR, HALTED_BY_CONTROLS belong to not_agreed | Section 9A.2 (terminal.outcome), listed in 9A.1; HALTED_BY_CONTROLS in 9A.10; profile 0.1.0 permits only agreed/COMPLETED (Section 10.3) |
| SessionEvidenceRecord boundary | Section 9A |
The A2CN crosswalk refers to [A2CN] at commit 1ba8f0d. Concordia's 0.7.0 status/detail change is specified here; the source crosswalk does not claim an SDK or specification update.¶
This appendix is informative and follows [RFC7942]. The RFC Editor is requested to remove it before publication, with the reference to RFC 7942. The Concordia table has one row per applicable requirement-keyword occurrence in normative text, including definitions, security and operational requirements; the requirements-language boilerplate and informative sections are excluded.¶
Concordia rows with unchanged requirement sentences retain their r3 cells. Unchanged sentences newly counted take "specified here, no implementation" for producer or deployment obligations and "unchanged since r3; newly counted" for other requirements. The latter records census coverage, not an implementation assessment. The two copies of the deployment-profile prohibition use the same specified-here cell. Only new or changed sentences are scheduled for 0.7.0. Preserved scheduled-for-0.6.0 cells are historical r3 statements, not a fresh implementation assessment. A2CN status is a single statement, since no implementation of that profile is reported.¶
Concordia: 125 applicable occurrences (41 MUST NOT, 64 MUST, 1 REQUIRED, 5 SHOULD, 14 MAY).¶
| Requirement | Section | Status |
|---|---|---|
| A protocol profile MUST NOT supply or constrain it. | 2.2 | specified here, no implementation |
| A protocol profile MUST NOT add, rename, nest, or omit a member at any depth except the names and vocabularies this document marks profile-assigned. | 3 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| the verifier MUST NOT report completeness from it. | 3 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MAY restrict status to one value and MUST NOT extend it. | 4.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A profile MAY restrict status to one value and MUST NOT extend it. | 4.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A relying party MAY calculate its own score or ignore them. | 4.3 | implemented at 847729cd [E1] |
| The final encoded group carries four unused bits, and those bits MUST be zero. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A recipient MUST reject a signature value of any other length, a value whose padding is absent or misplaced, a value carrying any character outside that alphabet, a value carrying whitespace, and a value whose unused bits are not zero. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| Two signature values are equal when their 64 decoded octets are equal, and a recipient MUST compare the decoded octets rather than the encoded characters. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A recipient MUST reject a numeric offset, including "+00:00", and MUST reject a fractional second of more than three digits. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A recipient MUST reject a numeric offset, including "+00:00", and MUST reject a fractional second of more than three digits. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A recipient MUST reject a string member whose received value differs from its own Normalization Form C, and MUST compare two identifier strings only after both are in that form. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A recipient MUST reject a string member whose received value differs from its own Normalization Form C, and MUST compare two identifier strings only after both are in that form. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| Where this section says a member carries no whitespace, that member MUST NOT carry a character with the Unicode White_Space property, and MUST NOT carry a character in the ranges U+0000 to U+001F, U+007F to U+009F, U+200B to U+200F, or U+2028 to U+202E. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| Where this section says a member carries no whitespace, that member MUST NOT carry a character with the Unicode White_Space property, and MUST NOT carry a character in the ranges U+0000 to U+001F, U+007F to U+009F, U+200B to U+200F, or U+2028 to U+202E. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| a recipient MUST preserve a type or relationship value it does not recognize as an opaque string rather than rejecting it, so that a later version's relationship survives a round trip through an earlier implementation. | 4.4 | implemented at 847729cd [E2] |
| A profile MAY declare one binding member as retained. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A verifier MUST NOT treat its presence or its validity as evidence that an outcome is outcome-bound. | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| The key_ref member MUST NOT carry key material; | 4.4 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A recipient MUST reject any other value. | 4.4 | implemented at 847729cd [E3] |
| A signer and verifier MUST canonicalize the same logical object to identical UTF-8 bytes before signing or verification. | 5.1 | implemented at 847729cd [E4] |
| Implementations MUST reject values that cannot be represented under Section 4.4 and the canonicalization rules. | 5.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A recipient MUST reject a numeric value outside its stated range, MUST reject an object in which a member name occurs more than once, as detected during parsing and before any duplicate-resolution rule is applied, and MUST reject input that is not well-formed UTF-8 or that contains an unpaired surrogate. | 5.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A recipient MUST reject a numeric value outside its stated range, MUST reject an object in which a member name occurs more than once, as detected during parsing and before any duplicate-resolution rule is applied, and MUST reject input that is not well-formed UTF-8 or that contains an unpaired surrogate. | 5.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A recipient MUST reject a numeric value outside its stated range, MUST reject an object in which a member name occurs more than once, as detected during parsing and before any duplicate-resolution rule is applied, and MUST reject input that is not well-formed UTF-8 or that contains an unpaired surrogate. | 5.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| For JCS plus Ed25519, implementations MUST verify Ed25519 signatures as specified in Section 5.1.7 of [RFC8032] using the cofactorless equation, and MUST reject a signature whose R or S component is not canonically encoded, or whose S is not reduced modulo L. | 5.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| For JCS plus Ed25519, implementations MUST verify Ed25519 signatures as specified in Section 5.1.7 of [RFC8032] using the cofactorless equation, and MUST reject a signature whose R or S component is not canonically encoded, or whose S is not reduced modulo L. | 5.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| For JCS plus ES256, implementations MUST verify ECDSA over P-256 with SHA-256 computed over the Section 6.1 canonical payload bytes, using [FIPS186-5]. | 5.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| Verification MUST reject R or S outside [1, n-1], where n is the order of P-256. | 5.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| At step 3, the verifier MUST reject an Ed25519 public key that is not a canonically encoded point of order L, or an ES256 public key that is not a valid point on P-256 or is the point at infinity. | 5.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A relying party MUST NOT use signature bytes as an identifier or deduplication key. | 5.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| To derive it, an implementation MUST: | 6.1 | implemented at 847729cd [E5] |
| For an artifact at or above the selected protocol profile's binding floor, a verifier MUST NOT credit an outcome as outcome-bound unless: | 6.2 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| Such an artifact MAY be retained as a record of its own contents. | 6.2 | implemented at 847729cd [E6] |
| Its outcome MUST NOT be credited as outcome-bound, and it MUST NOT be reported as current. | 6.2 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| Its outcome MUST NOT be credited as outcome-bound, and it MUST NOT be reported as current. | 6.2 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| It MUST NOT be reported as current or bound-only and MUST NOT be credited for reliance. | 6.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| It MUST NOT be reported as current or bound-only and MUST NOT be credited for reliance. | 6.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| MUST NOT populate any field with an exact negotiated price, quantity, date, or other term value; | 7 | specified here, no implementation |
| MUST NOT include an item or service description beyond the permitted category and value_range fields; | 7 | specified here, no implementation |
| MUST NOT include free-text reasoning copied from negotiation messages; | 7 | specified here, no implementation |
| MUST NOT include the identity of a human or organization represented by an agent; | 7 | specified here, no implementation |
| MUST draw value_range, when present, from the fixed bucket vocabulary defined in Section 4.4 and MUST reject all other values rather than coerce them; | 7 | implemented at 847729cd [E3] |
| MUST draw value_range, when present, from the fixed bucket vocabulary defined in Section 4.4 and MUST reject all other values rather than coerce them; | 7 | implemented at 847729cd [E3] |
| MUST encode category, when present, as a dotted lowercase taxonomy path of at most 64 octets matching the grammar in Section 4.4, where each segment is one or more characters drawn from a to z, 0 to 9, underscore, and hyphen, and MUST reject any other value rather than coercing it; | 7 | implemented at 847729cd [E3] |
| MUST encode category, when present, as a dotted lowercase taxonomy path of at most 64 octets matching the grammar in Section 4.4, where each segment is one or more characters drawn from a to z, 0 to 9, underscore, and hyphen, and MUST reject any other value rather than coercing it; | 7 | implemented at 847729cd [E3] |
| MAY omit category for additional privacy; | 7 | implemented at 847729cd [E7] |
| MUST reject a reference identifier longer than 256 octets or containing whitespace, and MUST reject an attestation carrying more than 32 references, rather than truncating either; | 7 | implemented at 847729cd [E3] |
| MUST reject a reference identifier longer than 256 octets or containing whitespace, and MUST reject an attestation carrying more than 32 references, rather than truncating either; | 7 | implemented at 847729cd [E3] |
| MUST keep summary, when present, within 1024 Unicode scalar values and MUST NOT copy a negotiated term value or free-text reasoning into it. | 7 | specified here, no implementation |
| MUST keep summary, when present, within 1024 Unicode scalar values and MUST NOT copy a negotiated term value or free-text reasoning into it. | 7 | specified here, no implementation |
| A relying party MUST configure a maximum evidence age not exceeding 90 days, a maximum accepted validity lifetime not exceeding 90 days, and a clock-skew allowance not exceeding 300 seconds. | 8.1 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| Exceeding the lifetime or skew bound MUST terminate not-bound at step 5. | 8.1 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A relying party MAY configure tighter values. | 8.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A relying party MUST enforce its own maximum evidence age independently of the signer's asserted validity window, and MUST reject a signer-asserted timestamp or interval start that is future-dated beyond that clock-skew allowance. | 8.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A relying party MUST enforce its own maximum evidence age independently of the signer's asserted validity window, and MUST reject a signer-asserted timestamp or interval start that is future-dated beyond that clock-skew allowance. | 8.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A verifier MUST enforce that finite skew bound and fail closed outside it, whatever the quality of its clock synchronization. | 8.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A relying party MUST mark an attestation stale at step 5 when it passed steps 1 through 4 and every other step 5 check but its validity_temporal interval has ended at the time of verification. | 8.1 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A relying party MAY apply a tighter freshness bound than the signer asserted. | 8.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A party MUST NOT countersign an attestation whose validity_temporal lifetime exceeds 90 days as Section 8.1 defines that quantity. | 8.2 | implemented at 847729cd [E6] |
| A party MAY apply a shorter maximum. | 8.2 | implemented at 847729cd [E6] |
| validity_temporal is REQUIRED on every attestation at or above the selected protocol profile's binding floor. | 8.3 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A verifier MUST reject a validity_temporal object whose mode member is absent or carries another value, whose members for the stated mode are absent, which carries any other member, or whose interval is empty or reversed, at step 2 with not-bound. | 8.3 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A relying party that treats one attestation as grounds for a consequential effect SHOULD keep a consumption record for that attestation, keyed by its attestation_id, inside its own accounting domain, and consult that record before admitting a further effect. | 8.4 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| To reach a terminal state for a received artifact, a relying party MUST perform the following steps in fail-closed order. | 9 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| An artifact whose value is well formed and below the selected profile's binding floor terminates here with the terminal state legacy, and the verifier MUST NOT apply any step below to it: it performs no signature verification, no outcome binding, no temporal check, and no revocation check over that artifact. | 9 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| The verifier MUST treat revocation status as undetermined in each of three cases: the deployment names no revocation source, the named source is unavailable, or the named source supplies a record that cannot be interpreted under the deployment's own definition of that source. | 9 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| In every one of those three cases the verifier MUST NOT report the artifact as current and MUST continue through step 8 to step 9 with revocation status undetermined, retaining any stale mark. | 9 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| In every one of those three cases the verifier MUST NOT report the artifact as current and MUST continue through step 8 to step 9 with revocation status undetermined, retaining any stale mark. | 9 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| An implementation MAY expose diagnostic detail alongside the state it reports, and MUST NOT report any other state name in its place. | 9 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| An implementation MAY expose diagnostic detail alongside the state it reports, and MUST NOT report any other state name in its place. | 9 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| An implementation MUST NOT silently replace one terminal state with another, and in particular MUST NOT report a legacy or bound-only artifact as current, or a stale artifact as current or bound-only. | 9 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| An implementation MUST NOT silently replace one terminal state with another, and in particular MUST NOT report a legacy or bound-only artifact as current, or a stale artifact as current or bound-only. | 9 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A verifier that returns a typed failure reason MUST distinguish a result this document's checks cannot produce at all from a result this verifier could not reach with the inputs it held, and MUST NOT report the second as the first. | 9 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A verifier that returns a typed failure reason MUST distinguish a result this document's checks cannot produce at all from a result this verifier could not reach with the inputs it held, and MUST NOT report the second as the first. | 9 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST assign the version member's name, current value, and binding floor. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| The version-member name a protocol profile assigns MUST be distinct from every other registered profile's version-member name. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| Every member name a protocol profile assigns or declares MUST be distinct from every primitive-fixed name, including signature and countersignatures. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST NOT give any other root member a name equal to a registered profile's version-member name, so that step 2a of Section 9 counts exactly one registered name on a conforming artifact. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile whose first format version has no deployed base MUST set its binding floor to that first version. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST assign the context identifier's name and MUST define its meaning as the session or interaction the relying party expects for the verification; | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST assign the context identifier's name and MUST define its meaning as the session or interaction the relying party expects for the verification; | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST declare each binding member's name and meaning. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A meaning MUST commit only to material the profile requires every listed party to have received, or independently derived from protocol messages that party received, before countersigning; | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A profile MAY declare a retained binding member whose preimage it does not specify; | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MUST NOT describe a binding value as proof of completeness or of transcript integrity. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MAY describe an out-of-band comparison a holder of the committed material can run after the verification procedure; | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MUST NOT instruct a relying party to treat an out-of-band comparison as proof of completeness, as evidence beyond the verified claim of Section 3, or as changing a terminal state. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MUST NOT instruct the Section 9 procedure to recompute or compare a binding value. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| Native verification MAY recompute a binding value from a presented object and report the comparison only as a separately named native check under Section 10.1.2. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST declare whether a completeness indicator exists, its name and integer range, and state that it is the integer the parties countersigned, not proof that nothing was dropped. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MUST NOT define completeness semantics the verifier reports. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST assign the vocabularies for role, resolution_mechanism, extensions_used, reference type, and relationship. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MAY declare the extensions_used vocabulary as an open shape, meaning any string of the Table 5 shape naming one of its extensions, and MUST say so if it does. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MAY declare the extensions_used vocabulary as an open shape, meaning any string of the Table 5 shape naming one of its extensions, and MUST say so if it does. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile can restrict and MUST NOT extend outcome.status. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MUST declare its outcome.detail vocabulary and assign each detail value to exactly one status. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST name exactly one signature suite for the format version, drawn from the primitive's allowed set. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST declare the counter set as measured names, each with a type and range shape from Table 4: an integer from 0 to 2^53-1 inclusive, a number within the stated range, or a boolean. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MUST NOT declare a counter of any other type. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A profile MUST NOT instruct producers to emit a placeholder for an unmeasured counter. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST preserve the strip rule and every member name, at every depth, that this document does not mark profile-assigned. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST NOT place a profile-assigned or profile-declared member anywhere other than the position Section 4.4 gives that member; | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| it MUST NOT add a member at any depth. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST NOT supply or constrain the deployment profile. | 10.1 | specified here, no implementation |
| A protocol profile MUST provide at least one positive vector and the negative controls named in Section 10.1.1. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST list companion artifacts and how references[] points at them, or state that there are none. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST NOT define any exit from the verification procedure other than the step 2 floor test. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.6.0 |
| A protocol profile MUST declare whether key_ref is present and, if so, what kind of key identifier it is. | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| The key_ref member MUST NOT carry key material; | 10.1 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A profile MAY define native verification of an object its binding members refer to. | 10.1.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A verifier that performs native checks MUST run them only after Section 9 has produced a terminal state, MUST name each separately and report it as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN, and MUST report a check it does not perform as NOT RUN, never PASS. | 10.1.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A verifier that performs native checks MUST run them only after Section 9 has produced a terminal state, MUST name each separately and report it as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN, and MUST report a check it does not perform as NOT RUN, never PASS. | 10.1.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| A verifier that performs native checks MUST run them only after Section 9 has produced a terminal state, MUST name each separately and report it as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN, and MUST report a check it does not perform as NOT RUN, never PASS. | 10.1.2 | scheduled for 0.7.0 |
| Deployments MUST NOT describe this document as an end-to-end encryption protocol. | 11.2 | specified here, no implementation |
| Implementers SHOULD minimize retention and disclosure according to their deployment's risk model. | 11.3 | specified here, no implementation |
| A deployment MUST define how keys are bound to agent identifiers and how compromise is detected and handled. | 11.4 | specified here, no implementation |
| A verifier MUST reject, before parsing it, a received artifact larger than its configured maximum artifact size, and that configured maximum MUST NOT exceed 262144 octets. | 11.7 | unchanged since r3; newly counted |
| A verifier MUST reject, before parsing it, a received artifact larger than its configured maximum artifact size, and that configured maximum MUST NOT exceed 262144 octets. | 11.7 | unchanged since r3; newly counted |
| A verifier MUST reject an artifact whose JSON nesting depth exceeds 16. | 11.7 | unchanged since r3; newly counted |
| A declared completeness indicator MUST be an integer within the range its profile declares, and a verifier MUST reject an attestation outside that range. | 11.7 | unchanged since r3; newly counted |
| A declared completeness indicator MUST be an integer within the range its profile declares, and a verifier MUST reject an attestation outside that range. | 11.7 | unchanged since r3; newly counted |
| Implementations SHOULD keep raw transcripts under the parties' control and present the narrower attestation when term disclosure is unnecessary. | 12 | specified here, no implementation |
| Logs and diagnostics SHOULD avoid copying raw deal terms or cryptographic material. | 12 | specified here, no implementation |
| Verifiers SHOULD return typed failure reasons without echoing untrusted private content, on the terms stated in Section 9. | 12 | unchanged since r3; newly counted |
A2CN: no implementation of this profile is reported at -01. The native checks of Section 10.3 correspond to TransactionRecord 0.4 verification that both A2CN reference implementations (Python and TypeScript) perform under [A2CN] Section 9.5; neither produces or verifies an a2cn_attestation. Per-requirement status will be reported with the profile's vectors.¶
Concordia's preserved implemented cells describe the JSON Schema, Python and JavaScript reference SDKs, and conformance suite maintained by this document's author at repository commit 847729cd. They describe that source tree, not a package publication. It emits 0.5.0; the profile here specifies 0.7.0. This appendix makes no new implementation claim.¶
Evidence keys are paths in the Concordia repository at commit 847729cd:¶
value_range vocabulary, the
category grammar, the reference string caps, and the
32-reference count cap, each rejected rather than coerced.¶
signature member, exclude the countersignature map, and
canonicalize.¶
meta object
carries no required member, so category may be omitted.¶
This appendix is informative and creates no normative dependency.¶
[I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-evidence-chain], also known by its short name EP-AEC, defines a transport-agnostic composition object and a fail-closed evaluation algorithm for combining heterogeneous agent-action evidence against a relying party's pinned evidence requirement. It distinguishes whether a set of evidence is SATISFIED (it fills the stated requirement) from whether an action is AUTHORIZED (a separate, local policy decision), and states that native validity alone is not sufficient for composition.¶
An attestation under a profile at or above its floor that reaches the terminal state current under Section 9 of this document is a candidate native evidence component under that model: an EP-AEC composition layer could treat this document's own countersignature and freshness semantics as native validity inputs, while still applying its own requirement-level freshness bound. This document carries no artifact signature distinct from the party countersignatures (Section 6.2), and it determines revocation status only when the deployment supplies a revocation source (Section 9).¶
This document does not require, normatively reference, or depend on EP-AEC or any other evidence-composition framework. An implementation of this document's attestation format and verification procedure (Section 4 and Section 9) is complete and independently useful without it.¶
This appendix is informative. Full artifacts, canonical payloads, deployment inputs, and controls accompany the source in vectors/. The executable reference verifier is test support, not a claim of implementation or interoperability.¶
No implementation has produced or confirmed these vectors; they are hand-constructed from this document's text.¶
The positive artifact is vectors/concordia/positive.json, SHA-256 bf8a547f06126d447fe3ac086af6ac9b258cda6d6ae3fae4c6bfe0dd0f0869f6. The manifest is vectors/concordia/manifest.json, SHA-256 e9fd6cf4b88b3f2e65643b90bea5280551e2852140357ea8e9a01cbc034dbee6.¶
The verifier clock is 2026-10-06T12:30:00Z. The positive interval is [2026-10-06T12:00:00Z, 2027-01-04T12:00:00Z]; age and lifetime ceilings are 7776000 seconds and skew is 300 seconds. The expected context and party set are the positive artifact's session_id and agent identifiers. No revocation source is named, so the positive result is bound-only at step 9.¶
The artifact uses Concordia 0.7.0, status agreed, detail agreed, message_count 3, and the RFC 8032 Section 7.1 TEST 1 and TEST 2 keys. Their public keys, in party order, are:¶
d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a 3d4017c3e843895a92b70aa74d1b7ebc9c982ccf2ec4968cc0cd55f12af4660c¶
Canonical-payload SHA-256: 00d0b9427db96f06cb3a160dc415bbef0faf4a458994476d8f7208e0b37b48a9. The complete positive artifact follows, including every countersignature value. To recover the JSON bytes, remove each backslash at a line end and the following newline and two indentation spaces; retain a final newline.¶
{
"attestation_id": "att_rfc8032_profile_vector_01",
"chain_head": "sha256:22222222222222222222222222222222222222222\
22222222222222222222222",
"concordia_attestation": "0.7.0",
"countersignatures": {
"agent_rfc8032_test1": "WVAHrtEC8rsWEMOdSPEe8CxNc0-qxz2B0gME-\
qQU54Tcy6hWQyfsNCEeOide-geA0vGkHulBpJmduwMnwKeaAg==",
"agent_rfc8032_test2": "wCU6Bz-741Ar7yf_iQXBn4G-YKufDO1bzBD3m\
jTrPYUgzxbReMKO3qSRuJUpPYvkS0LuTXqO3NV_e6JKcz4nDQ=="
},
"message_count": 3,
"meta": {
"category": "electronics.cameras.mirrorless",
"extensions_used": [],
"mediator_invoked": false,
"value_range": "1000-5000_USD"
},
"outcome": {
"detail": "agreed",
"duration_seconds": 225,
"resolution_mechanism": "direct",
"rounds": 3,
"status": "agreed",
"terms_count": 6
},
"parties": [
{
"agent_id": "agent_rfc8032_test1",
"behavior": {
"concession_magnitude": 0.25,
"concessions": 1,
"constraints_declared": 0,
"constraints_violated": 0,
"offers_made": 2,
"reasoning_provided": true,
"response_time_avg_seconds": 4.5,
"signals_shared": 1,
"withdrawal": false
},
"role": "initiator",
"signature": "Z7QWIj9v7RENKTfzfLJhsnEXllT1dTKkXDkXSTCaYuxFH\
J1ba6YBp9fmCTnvwxFa78qWRz2XGQMpnRu2yOM3AQ=="
},
{
"agent_id": "agent_rfc8032_test2",
"behavior": {
"concession_magnitude": 0.2,
"concessions": 1,
"constraints_declared": 0,
"constraints_violated": 0,
"offers_made": 1,
"reasoning_provided": true,
"response_time_avg_seconds": 5.0,
"signals_shared": 0,
"withdrawal": false
},
"role": "responder",
"signature": "AFF-yp6ad5277gPCDODe1s6vL9q07Kln-VLBEchJuf90W\
53p6bzUYL_hxx_d36D-k26i8OvTf6Eb54FV84A7Dw=="
}
],
"references": [
{
"id": "urn:concordia:attestation:att_previous",
"relationship": "references",
"type": "receipt"
}
],
"session_id": "ses_rfc8032_profile_vector",
"summary": "Profile vector with no negotiated term value.",
"timestamp": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z",
"transcript_hash": "sha256:111111111111111111111111111111111111\
1111111111111111111111111111",
"validity_temporal": {
"from": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z",
"mode": "absolute",
"until": "2027-01-04T12:00:00Z"
}
}¶
No implementation has produced or confirmed these vectors; they are hand-constructed from this document's text.¶
The positive artifact is vectors/a2cn/positive.json, SHA-256 e64dba64c4e994afbbd7608f974d977007879e237fc9aa8d9085ef48d03d9a7e. The manifest is vectors/a2cn/manifest.json, SHA-256 4740ab0787f4d8ca52f7d1850eb0443e179942943f2de99a1b51d64fa289f419.¶
The verifier clock is 2026-10-06T12:30:00Z. The positive interval is [2026-10-06T12:00:00Z, 2027-01-04T12:00:00Z]; age and lifetime ceilings are 7776000 seconds and skew is 300 seconds. The expected context and party set are the positive artifact's session_id and agent identifiers. No revocation source is named, so the positive result is bound-only at step 9.¶
The artifact uses A2CN profile 0.1.0 (a2cn_attestation "0.1.0") over TransactionRecord 0.4, status agreed, detail COMPLETED, message_count 4 (three Offers/Counteroffers plus the Acceptance), and the party DIDs did:web:initiator.invalid and did:web:responder.invalid. Each key_ref appends #test-key-1 to its DID. The two binding values are synthetic digests, with no TransactionRecord presented; all four native checks are NOT RUN. The references[].id is a synthetic urn:example value standing in for a record_id, and terms_count is omitted as Section 10.3 requires.¶
The first key is the public test key of RFC 6979 Appendix A.2.5. The second is derived from the fixed scalar 2 on P-256. Both test scalars are documented in the manifest. Public keys below use uncompressed SEC1 point encoding:¶
0460fed4ba255a9d31c961eb74c6356d68c049b8923b61fa6ce669622e60f29f b67903fe1008b8bc99a41ae9e95628bc64f2f1b20c2d7e9f5177a3c294d44622 99 047cf27b188d034f7e8a52380304b51ac3c08969e277f21b35a60b48fc476699 7807775510db8ed040293d9ac69f7430dbba7dade63ce982299e04b79d227873 d1¶
Canonical-payload SHA-256: e47437090b0355762ec71c69a9bceb2207ff8e28c58600f5412784e1ca2b1a90. The complete positive artifact follows, including every countersignature value. To recover the JSON bytes, remove each backslash at a line end and the following newline and two indentation spaces; retain a final newline.¶
{
"a2cn_attestation": "0.1.0",
"attestation_id": "att_a2cn_synthetic_01",
"countersignatures": {
"did:web:initiator.invalid": "Pxfwq2da4-VqoOdDxTYXSbLCJP2DlXW\
_XatzQ-m8pE_cdGFDyxqU4Uph9xz3Ts3zUX5qwmbO-XHRhBuRW8lVNQ==",
"did:web:responder.invalid": "CeWmU2Om2nO7DORsXUE_Geo6sgvYpth\
Tj2ZLv8bVkaL45Yr4GL4E6cgIEoXFgLIqjiMSCoVQm_hUhfp5s5ycvA=="
},
"message_count": 4,
"meta": {
"category": "procurement.goods",
"mediator_invoked": false,
"value_range": "1000-5000_USD"
},
"offer_chain_hash": "sha256:22222222222222222222222222222222222\
22222222222222222222222222222",
"outcome": {
"detail": "COMPLETED",
"duration_seconds": 225,
"resolution_mechanism": "direct",
"rounds": 3,
"status": "agreed"
},
"parties": [
{
"agent_id": "did:web:initiator.invalid",
"behavior": {
"offers_made": 2,
"withdrawal": false
},
"key_ref": "did:web:initiator.invalid#test-key-1",
"role": "initiator",
"signature": "badVHtHebnqURVg11uW8U5lDpcNq44q6Wc-6kzuC7Cr20\
0duESe39E6ScU-kr1zq0vqeCYJV2Bh4nkyi445zbQ=="
},
{
"agent_id": "did:web:responder.invalid",
"behavior": {
"offers_made": 1,
"withdrawal": false
},
"key_ref": "did:web:responder.invalid#test-key-1",
"role": "responder",
"signature": "JZHad_VrrO05IHlx1_hiMXF6QS0VaruyyI9_DY0XoV-wx\
vBNoUXCTxWeMSgceLdlBlyF_U2NKU4LqG-Xcdm5hw=="
}
],
"record_hash": "sha256:1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\
111111111111111111111111",
"references": [
{
"id": "urn:example:a2cn:record:synthetic-01",
"relationship": "references",
"type": "a2cn_transaction_record",
"version": "0.4"
}
],
"session_id": "ses_a2cn_synthetic",
"summary": "Synthetic A2CN attestation, no TransactionRecord su\
pplied.",
"timestamp": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z",
"validity_temporal": {
"from": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z",
"mode": "absolute",
"until": "2027-01-04T12:00:00Z"
}
}¶
ECDSA vectors assert canonical bytes and successful verification, not equality of independently produced signature bytes. This hand construction uses RFC 6979 deterministic ECDSA through cryptography 50; check_vectors.py independently reproduces its nonce and signature and checks the RFC example. The es256-malleated-valid control verifies a second signature over the identical payload.¶
The A2CN co-authors' AP-1 to AP-13 vector files are expected in -02 and will replace or extend this set. Their A2CN half (records, DID documents and native inputs) can be produced from either A2CN reference implementation of TransactionRecord 0.4; no A2CN code yet produces or verifies an a2cn_attestation.¶
The co-authors' AP scenarios below are specifications of expected behavior, not a report that their implementations produced these results. Check numbers refer to the four native checks in Section 10.3. AP-6 assumes the informative DID-resolving deployment rules there. AP-10 distinguishes structural rejection from a producer violation the generic verifier cannot detect.¶
AP-1: COMPLETED, record 0.4, ES256, supplied .invalid DID documents; bound-only; native checks 1 to 4 PASS. AP-2: independently derived Python/TypeScript records; identical bytes and digests without exchanging the record. AP-3 A/B: changed record, recomputed/unchanged carried hash; generic state unchanged; check 1 FAIL in both cases; altered final-act signature also fails check 4. AP-4: EdDSA countersignature under ES256; not-bound. AP-5: wrong P-256 signing key; not-bound at step 4. AP-6: absent, foreign-controlled or keyAgreement-only method; not-bound at step 3 under the named deployment rules. AP-7: missing countersignature; not-bound at step 4. AP-8: offer-hash list mismatch; generic state unchanged; native check 2 FAIL. AP-9: other than agreed/COMPLETED; not-bound at step 2. AP-10: malformed category or undefined term member; not-bound at step 2. A term in permitted free text can pass. AP-11: undeclared unmeasured counter zero-filled; not-bound at step 2. AP-12: excluded session; no conforming attestation emitted; missing required countersignature gives not-bound. AP-13: controlled assertionMethod differs from session key; bound-only in this setup; native check 3 FAIL.¶
The signed AP-13 artifact is
vectors/a2cn/ap13-session-key-vs-party-key.json, SHA-256
39f9cc3ecf660cafceec92cfa44a30d37c6bc3e61c390af2b83240ff6af66943. Its companion
vectors/a2cn/ap13-native-inputs.json supplies synthetic DID
documents and a party-method excerpt, not a complete TransactionRecord.
The alternate key uses public test scalar 3 on P-256. The countersignature
verifies under that controlled assertionMethod; the native method
comparison fails. The other three native checks are NOT RUN. The
manifest pins the companion bytes and injected deployment keys.¶
The outcome-agreed-* and outcome-not_agreed-* vectors cover all fourteen pairs of primitive statuses and declared A2CN details, plus an UNKNOWN detail under each status. Only agreed/COMPLETED reaches bound-only; the other fifteen cases terminate not-bound at step 2.¶
Each name below denotes a .json file in both profile directories unless marked C (Concordia only) or A (A2CN only). The manifest records exact file digests, mutations, keys, expected context and party-set inputs. An ended interval or exceeded age ceiling marks stale at the named step; stale is exposed only at step 9 after steps 7 and 8 pass.¶
Each line gives name: mutation; step; terminal state. Structural payload mutations are re-countersigned; malformed countersignature encoding is the deliberate exception.¶
oversize-control: pad to 262145 octets; 1; not-bound undefined-member: add outcome.price; 2; not-bound malformed-version: add leading zero; 2; not-bound legacy-below-floor: lower version below floor; 2; legacy malformed-signature-encoding: bad encoding; 2; not-bound missing-countersignature: remove one signature; 4; not-bound extra-countersignature: add unlisted signer; 4; not-bound invalid-countersignature: copy other signer; 4; not-bound ended-interval: end at 12:15Z; 5; stale reversed-interval: end before start; 2; not-bound future-dated-anchor: move anchors to 2027; 5; not-bound lifetime-over-cap: extend beyond 90 days; 5; not-bound age-ceiling-exceeded: set age cap to 900 s; 6; stale status-detail-mismatch: status not_agreed; 2; not-bound mismatched-context: expect different session; 8; not-bound mismatched-party-set: expect different set; 8; not-bound zero-version-members: remove selector; 2a; not-bound two-version-members: add other selector; 2a; not-bound duplicate-member-name: repeat selector; 2; not-bound key-ref-present (C): add undeclared key_ref; 2; not-bound key-ref-no-key (A): reference unknown key; 3; not-bound key-ref-another-suite (A): resolve Ed25519; 3; not-bound summary-term-illustration: add price in summary; 9; bound-only party-signature-illustration: zero party signature; 9; bound-only¶
The last two cases are no-rejection illustrations: a term in summary violates a producer obligation the generic verifier cannot inspect; a well-formed but invalid parties[] signature is not verified by Section 9. Additional manifest cases exercise all five terminal states, stale followed by revocation or context/party mismatch, inclusive interval ends, unsupported versions, empty intervals, the ES256 scalar and point checks, an A2CN extensions_used value outside its empty vocabulary (extension-outside-vocabulary, not-bound at step 2), and key_ref selection among two distinct keys for one party (key-ref-selects-one-of-many, bound-only).¶