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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
     category="std"
     docName="draft-newton-agreement-evidence-01"
     ipr="trust200902"
     submissionType="IETF"
     consensus="true"
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     version="3">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="Agreement Evidence">Agreement Evidence for Multi-Party Agent Negotiation</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-newton-agreement-evidence-01"/>
    <author fullname="Erik Newton" initials="E." surname="Newton">
      <address>
        <email>eriknewton@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Avinash Saraff" initials="A." surname="Saraff">
      <organization>A2CN</organization>
      <address>
        <email>saraff.avinash@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Christian Magorrian" initials="C." surname="Magorrian">
      <organization>A2CN</organization>
      <address>
        <email>christian@a2cn.io</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>

    <area>Applications and Real-Time</area>

    <abstract>
      <t>
      Autonomous agents can exchange offers and signatures without
      producing an artifact that records which parties reached which
      outcome, over which binding values, and for how long that record may
      be relied upon. This document defines a protocol-neutral agreement
      attestation primitive, the contract a protocol profile meets to
      instantiate it, and two protocol profiles. A verified attestation
      establishes one thing: that a named
      set of parties jointly countersigned a stated outcome over stated
      binding values, together with behavioral counters each of them
      accepted. It does not establish that the outcome matches what a
      transcript says, that any statement a party made is true, that the
      binding values are complete, or that the parties are anonymous. The
      format provides no member for a negotiated price, quantity, date, or
      principal identity. A producer is obligated not to place those
      values in the free-text members the format does provide, and a
      verifier cannot detect a violation of that obligation, so the
      absence of term values from a received object is a producer's
      obligation rather than a verified property.
      </t>
      <t>
      This document does not define identity, authority delegation,
      payment, settlement, transport, boundary-decision receipts, or a
      general evidence composition and sufficiency model.
      </t>
    </abstract>
  </front>

  <middle>

    <section anchor="intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>
      A signature proves who signed particular bytes. It does not
      necessarily prove that two parties agreed or that a once-valid claim
      remains current. Single-issuer action receipts are useful evidence
      of what one policy engine, gateway, or observer recorded. They do
      not express a negotiated outcome that multiple counterparties jointly
      bind.
      </t>
      <t>
      This document occupies that narrower agreement-evidence layer.
      Negotiating parties exchange signed protocol messages. At session
      conclusion, they produce an agreement
      attestation under one of the two protocol profiles defined in <xref target="profiles"/>.
      Every listed party countersigns the same issuance snapshot before
      the outcome can be credited as outcome-bound. The snapshot includes
      binding values and, when the profile declares one, a completeness
      indicator that the parties countersigned. Its descriptive members
      are constrained so that behavioral evidence can be shared without
      disclosing the deal terms themselves.
      </t>
      <t>
      Verifying the object requires the object itself, one protocol
      profile defined in <xref target="profiles"/>, and a key-binding
      mechanism the deployment supplies. It does not require a particular
      transport, payment rail, transparency service, or cross-format
      composition framework. Transcript reconstruction is out of scope for
      this revision and may be specified in a later one.
      </t>
      <t>
      What a verified attestation establishes is stated exactly: a named
      set of parties jointly countersigned one stated outcome over stated
      binding values, with behavioral counters each of them accepted. This
      document defines no procedure for re-deriving the outcome from a
      transcript, so a verified attestation is no evidence that the
      outcome matches a transcript. It is no evidence that a statement a
      party made is true. It offers no anonymity: the agent identifier of
      every listed party is in the object, and a holder of two
      attestations can correlate them.
      </t>
      <section anchor="design-goals">
        <name>Design Goals</name>
        <t>This document has four goals:</t>
        <ol type="1">
          <li>Define evidence that a named set of parties reached a named
          negotiation outcome.</li>
          <li>Require all listed parties, not merely the holder, to bind
          that outcome.</li>
          <li>Carry useful behavioral signals without raw negotiated
          terms.</li>
          <li>Require both signer-asserted validity and an independent
          relying-side freshness policy.</li>
        </ol>
      </section>
      <section anchor="non-goals">
        <name>Non-Goals</name>
        <t>This document does not define:</t>
        <ul>
          <li>real-world or legal identity verification;</li>
          <li>mandates, delegation chains, or authorization-envelope
          formats;</li>
          <li>payment processing, settlement finality, or proof of
          delivery;</li>
          <li>network transport, routing, discovery, or service
          availability;</li>
          <li>a general-purpose action or access-control receipt;</li>
          <li>reputation scoring, Sybil resistance, or a centralized
          reputation service;</li>
          <li>a general cross-format evidence taxonomy, composer, or
          sufficiency verdict;</li>
          <li>end-to-end encryption; or</li>
          <li>proof that every statement in an attestation is objectively
          true.</li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <section anchor="reqlang">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>
        The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
        "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>",
        "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>",
        "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
        "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and
        "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
        described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/>
        <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all
        capitals, as shown here.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="definitions">
        <name>Definitions</name>
        <dl newline="false">
          <dt>Party:</dt>
          <dd>An autonomous agent participating in a negotiation.</dd>
          <dt>Offer:</dt>
          <dd>A protocol-defined object that the producing protocol treats
          as a proposed assignment of values to one or more terms.</dd>
          <dt>Agreement:</dt>
          <dd>The producing protocol's own object or state that records an
          accepted outcome. This document records evidence about an
          outcome and does not define that object or state.</dd>
          <dt>Negotiation transcript:</dt>
          <dd>The protocol material the binding members commit to, in the
          form the producing protocol defines. This document defines no
          transcript format.</dd>
          <dt>Agreement attestation:</dt>
          <dd>A signed, privacy-preserving statement about a completed
          negotiation session. It identifies the outcome and behavioral
          signals and does not carry the negotiated term values. This
          document calls it "the attestation" where no ambiguity
          arises.</dd>
          <dt>Protocol profile:</dt>
          <dd>A protocol's assignment of the primitive's version-member
          name, context-identifier name, vocabularies, binding members,
          completeness indicator if any, signature suite, and vectors.</dd>
          <dt>Deployment profile:</dt>
          <dd>The set of choices a deployment makes outside this document
          and states in its own specification. It names the key-binding
          mechanism and the revocation source if any. This document
          defines neither. A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
          supply or constrain it.</dd>
          <dt>Format version:</dt>
          <dd>The value of the profile-assigned version member, compared
          as three dot-separated non-negative decimal integers without
          leading zeros.</dd>
          <dt>Registered:</dt>
          <dd>Describes a version-member name whose normative
          protocol-profile text appears in this document.</dd>
          <dt>Binding member:</dt>
          <dd>A profile-assigned member inside the issuance snapshot whose
          value is countersigned as an opaque value. The Section 9 verifier neither
          recomputes nor compares it.</dd>
          <dt>Completeness indicator:</dt>
          <dd>A profile-assigned opaque integer in the issuance snapshot,
          if a profile declares one. It is the integer the parties
          countersigned and is not proof that nothing was dropped.</dd>
          <dt>Context identifier:</dt>
          <dd>The profile-assigned member that names the session or other
          interaction context the relying party expects at step 8.</dd>
          <dt>Issuance snapshot:</dt>
          <dd>The value derived from an attestation by the procedure in
          <xref target="countersig-payload"/>, over which all party
          countersignatures are computed.</dd>
          <dt>Holder:</dt>
          <dd>Any entity in possession of an attestation, whether or not
          it is a party.</dd>
          <dt>Outcome-bound:</dt>
          <dd>A property of an attestation for which every party listed in
          <tt>parties[]</tt> has a resolvable and valid countersignature
          over the same issuance snapshot.</dd>
          <dt>Terminal state:</dt>
          <dd>The single result <xref target="verification"/> exposes to
          application policy. This document defines exactly five terminal
          states, defined immediately below, and defines no other result
          label. A verifier reports exactly one of them for any received
          artifact.</dd>
          <dt>not-bound:</dt>
          <dd>The terminal state of an artifact the verification procedure
          rejects at any step, and of an attestation at or above the
          selected profile's floor whose outcome binding
          <xref target="outcome-binding"/> does not establish. It carries
          no outcome-binding claim.</dd>
          <dt>bound-only:</dt>
          <dd>The terminal state of an attestation that is outcome-bound,
          passed the freshness checks, and whose revocation status the verifier did not determine. The
          status is undetermined for any of three reasons: the deployment
          profile names no revocation source, the named source was
          unavailable, or the named source supplied a record that cannot be
          interpreted under the deployment's own definition of that source.
          All three reasons produce this one state when the attestation is not stale.</dd>
          <dt>current:</dt>
          <dd>The terminal state of an attestation that is outcome-bound,
          passed the verification procedure's freshness checks and is not stale, and whose
          named revocation source answered and reported the attestation as
          not revoked.</dd>
          <dt>legacy:</dt>
          <dd>The terminal state of an artifact whose version member is
          well formed and below the selected protocol profile's binding
          floor. Such an artifact is retained as a record of its own
          contents. It is never outcome-bound and never current, and the
          verification procedure runs no signature, binding, temporal, or
          revocation step over it.</dd>
          <dt>stale:</dt>
          <dd>The terminal state of an outcome-bound attestation that passed
          steps 1 through 4 and every step 5 check except that the current
          time is after its validity interval, or exceeded only the relying
          party's evidence-age ceiling at step 6, and then passed steps 7
          and 8. It is retained as a record that the listed parties
          countersigned, without being credited for reliance, subject to
          the key-compromise limitation in <xref target="sec-key-compromise"/>.</dd>
          <dt>Relying party:</dt>
          <dd>A verifier that decides whether to act on an attestation or
          related artifact.</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>
        The phrase "presentation profile" in <xref target="neighboring"/>
        is a neighboring draft's unrelated term.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="evidence-model">
      <name>Evidence Model</name>
      <t>
      The primitive fixes the evidence properties that make an attestation
      verifiable: a closed member set at every depth, a required version
      member that selects exactly one implemented protocol profile, a
      required context identifier, a required outcome object, a required
      party array, a required metadata object, one or more opaque binding
      members, required temporal validity, and a required
      <tt>countersignatures</tt> object. A protocol profile assigns the
      version-member name, the context-identifier name, the binding-member
      names and meanings, any completeness indicator, and the closed
      vocabularies named by <xref target="profile-contract"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
      A name or vocabulary is profile-assigned only when
      <xref target="profile-contract"/> says so. Every other member name,
      type, shape, bound, strip rule, cardinality, encoding, and check is
      fixed by the primitive. A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
      add, rename, nest, or omit a member at any depth except the names
      and vocabularies this document marks profile-assigned.
      </t>
      <t>
      Binding members are opaque. The Section 9 verifier neither recomputes nor
      compares them. The verified claim is that every listed party
      countersigned those values in the same issuance snapshot. A
      completeness indicator, when present, is likewise opaque: the
      verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report completeness from it.
      </t>
      <t>
      The artifact has no member for a term value. A producing protocol's
      own messages can carry terms, but the attestation primitive records
      only the outcome, parties, binding values, behavioral counters, and
      bounded context fields.
      </t>
      <t>
      An attestation whose <tt>outcome.status</tt> is <tt>not_agreed</tt>
      records that no agreement
      formed, so an attestation is evidence about a session rather than
      proof that an agreement exists.
      </t>
      <t>
      An attestation defined by this document is produced when a
      producing protocol concludes, and it records what the parties bound
      at that moment rather than a commitment fixed in advance of some
      later evaluation.
      </t>
      <t>
      A protocol profile can list companion artifacts and describe how
      <tt>references[]</tt> points at them, but this primitive verifies
      only the attestation it receives.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="attestation">
      <name>Agreement Attestation</name>
      <section anchor="required-fields">
        <name>Attestation Members</name>
        <t>
        This section defines the abstract member set of the primitive.
        Whether a session must produce one is a property of the producing
        protocol and is out of scope.
        </t>
        <t>
        The root contains a profile-assigned version member, a required
        <tt>attestation_id</tt>, a profile-assigned context identifier, a
        required <tt>timestamp</tt>, <tt>outcome</tt>,
        <tt>parties</tt>, <tt>meta</tt>, one or more profile-assigned
        binding members, a profile-assigned completeness
        indicator present when the profile declares one,
        <tt>validity_temporal</tt>, <tt>countersignatures</tt>, and the
        optional members <tt>summary</tt> and <tt>references</tt>.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="outcome-vocab">
        <name>Outcome Vocabulary</name>
        <t>
        <tt>outcome.status</tt> is exactly one of <tt>agreed</tt> or
        <tt>not_agreed</tt>. A profile <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> restrict status
        to one value and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> extend it. The required
        <tt>outcome.detail</tt> string is drawn from the selected profile's
        detail vocabulary. The profile declares exactly one status for
        each detail value. Step 2 rejects a status/detail pair that
        disagrees with that declaration. The primitive defines no detail
        values. The outcome also carries the
        number of rounds and the session duration, and can carry the term
        count and a profile-assigned resolution mechanism vocabulary.
        Those values describe the session; they do not expose the
        negotiated terms.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="behavioral-signals">
        <name>Behavioral Signals</name>
        <t>
        Each <tt>parties[]</tt> element carries a <tt>behavior</tt> object
        holding the profile-declared closed set of non-term counters. A
        present name the profile did not declare is an undefined member and
        terminates <tt>not-bound</tt>. An unmeasured counter is omitted,
        never zero or false. Omission is not a zero. Two artifacts are
        comparable only on counters both carry. These counters are evidence
        inputs and not a protocol-defined reputation score. A relying party
        <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> calculate its own score or ignore them.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="field-definitions">
        <name>Field Definitions</name>
        <t>
        This section is normative. It defines the primitive constraints
        that apply to every protocol profile. An implementation of the
        primitive and its verification can be written from Sections 3
        through 10 of this document, plus one protocol profile defined in
        <xref target="profiles"/> and two external inputs named by the
        deployment profile: the key-binding mechanism that step 3 of
        <xref target="verification"/> requires and the revocation source
        of step 7, if currency is sought.
        </t>
        <t>Encodings are pinned as follows.</t>
        <ul>
          <li>A signature value is the 64-octet Ed25519
          <xref target="RFC8032"/> signature of
          <xref target="RFC8032" section="5.1.6" sectionFormat="comma"/>,
          or the ES256 signature defined in <xref target="sig-verify"/>.
          Both suites use the same 64-octet size and the unchanged
          88-character encoding rule below. As a producer and
          profile-construction rule only, a profile's own wire encoding,
          such as unpadded base64url, is re-encoded to this form over the
          same 64 octets; a recipient still rejects absent padding.
          The signature is encoded with the base64url alphabet of
          <xref target="RFC4648" section="5" sectionFormat="comma"/> with
          the two trailing padding characters that section requires for a
          64-octet input. The encoded value is therefore exactly 88
          characters: 86 drawn from that alphabet followed by two padding
          characters. The final encoded group carries four unused bits,
          and those bits <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be zero. A recipient
          <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a signature value of any other
          length, a value whose padding is absent or misplaced, a value
          carrying any character outside that alphabet, a value carrying
          whitespace, and a value whose unused bits are not zero. Two
          signature values are equal when their 64 decoded octets are
          equal, and a recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compare the decoded
          octets rather than the encoded characters. This is a comparison
          rule, not an attestation identity rule.</li>
          <li>An Ed25519 public key is the 32-octet value of
          <xref target="RFC8032" section="5.1.5" sectionFormat="comma"/>.
          For ES256, the key is what the deployment's key-binding mechanism
          yields, validated as <xref target="sig-verify"/> specifies.
          No member defined by this document carries a public key.</li>
          <li>A timestamp is an RFC 3339 <xref target="RFC3339"/>
          date-time whose time-offset is the single character "Z". A
          recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a numeric offset, including
          "+00:00", and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a fractional second of
          more than three digits.</li>
          <li>A binding member that carries a digest string uses the
          literal "sha256:" followed by 64 lowercase hexadecimal
          characters for a SHA-256 <xref target="RFC6234"/> digest. A
          profile can assign a binding member whose preimage is
          unspecified and no meaning beyond countersigned opaque value.
          The Section 9 verifier neither recomputes nor
          compares a binding member.</li>
          <li>Every string member defined by this document is carried in
          Unicode Normalization Form C <xref target="UAX15"/>. A recipient
          <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a string member whose received value
          differs from its own Normalization Form C, and
          <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compare two identifier strings only after
          both are in that form. Where this section states a length in
          characters, the unit is the Unicode scalar value. Where it
          states a length in octets, the unit is the octet of the UTF-8
          <xref target="RFC3629"/> encoding of the normalized value.</li>
          <li>Where this section says a member carries no whitespace, that
          member <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry a character with the
          Unicode White_Space property, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry
          a character in the ranges U+0000 to U+001F, U+007F to U+009F,
          U+200B to U+200F, or U+2028 to U+202E.</li>
        </ul>
        <t>
        This primitive is extended by publishing a new primitive version
        rather than by adding members. Profile-owned vocabularies change
        by a new format version of the profile that owns them. The value
        vocabularies of a reference's <tt>type</tt> and
        <tt>relationship</tt> members are the exception: a recipient
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> preserve a <tt>type</tt> or
        <tt>relationship</tt> value it does not recognize as an opaque
        string rather than rejecting it, so that a later version's
        relationship survives a round trip through an earlier
        implementation.
        </t>
        <t>
        In the tables below, a bracketed cell names a slot the selected
        protocol profile fills. The cell's type, shape, range and note
        bind every profile; the member name, and for a vocabulary the
        value set, comes from the profile.
        </t>
        <table anchor="tbl-root">
          <name>Attestation Root Members</name>
          <thead>
            <tr><th>Member</th><th>Type</th><th>Cardinality</th><th>Constraints</th></tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>[version member]</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>Three dot-separated non-negative decimal integers, no leading zeros. Current value assigned by the selected profile.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>attestation_id</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>1 to 256 octets, no whitespace.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>[context identifier]</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>1 to 256 octets, no whitespace.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>timestamp</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>RFC 3339 date-time with a "Z" offset.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>outcome</td><td>object</td><td>required</td><td>Members of Table 2. No other member.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>parties</td><td>array</td><td>required</td><td>2 to 64 elements, each as in Table 3. Identifiers distinct per Section 6.2.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>meta</td><td>object</td><td>required</td><td>Members of Table 5. No other member.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>one or more [binding member] rows</td><td>string</td><td>required, or required at the selected profile's binding floor and later, as the profile declares; never optional</td><td>"sha256:" plus 64 lowercase hexadecimal characters. A profile MAY declare one binding member as retained.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>[completeness indicator]</td><td>integer</td><td>optional; when declared, required at the selected profile's binding floor and later</td><td>Range assigned by the selected profile.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>validity_temporal</td><td>object</td><td>required at the selected profile's binding floor and later</td><td>Modes and semantics in Section 8.3.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>countersignatures</td><td>object</td><td>required at the selected profile's binding floor and later</td><td>Member names are exactly the agent identifiers in parties; values are signatures. Section 6.1.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>summary</td><td>string</td><td>optional</td><td>At most 1024 Unicode scalar values. Constrained by Section 7.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>references</td><td>array</td><td>optional</td><td>At most 32 elements, each as in Table 6.</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>

        <table anchor="tbl-outcome">
          <name>Members of the outcome Object</name>
          <thead>
            <tr><th>Member</th><th>Type</th><th>Cardinality</th><th>Constraints</th></tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>status</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>agreed or not_agreed, as restricted by the selected profile.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>detail [profile vocabulary]</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>1 to 64 octets, no whitespace. The selected profile assigns exactly one status to each value.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>rounds</td><td>integer</td><td>required</td><td>0 to 2^53-1 inclusive.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>duration_seconds</td><td>integer</td><td>required</td><td>0 to 2^53-1 inclusive.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>terms_count</td><td>integer</td><td>optional</td><td>1 to 2^53-1 inclusive.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>resolution_mechanism [profile vocabulary]</td><td>string</td><td>optional</td><td>Value set assigned by the selected profile.</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>

        <table anchor="tbl-party">
          <name>Members of a parties Element</name>
          <thead>
            <tr><th>Member</th><th>Type</th><th>Cardinality</th><th>Constraints</th></tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>agent_id</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>1 to 256 octets, no whitespace. Compared after normalization as stated above.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>role [profile vocabulary]</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>Value set assigned by the selected profile.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>key_ref</td><td>string</td><td>required when the selected profile declares it, absent otherwise</td><td>1 to 256 octets, no whitespace, NFC. Identifier of the key the party countersigned with, never key material; inside the issuance snapshot.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>behavior</td><td>object</td><td>required</td><td>Members of Table 4. No other member.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>signature</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>Signature over that party's own behavioral record. See the note below this table.</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>

        <t>
        A <tt>parties[]</tt> element's <tt>signature</tt> member is
        removed before the issuance snapshot is derived
        (<xref target="countersig-payload"/>). This document defines no
        verification step over it. A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
        treat its presence or its validity as evidence that an outcome is
        outcome-bound. Outcome binding rests on
        <tt>countersignatures</tt> alone, as
        <xref target="outcome-binding"/> specifies.
        The phrase "its presence or its validity" refers to that
        <tt>signature</tt> member. The key_ref member
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> carry key material; this is a producer
        obligation the verifier cannot confirm.
        </t>

        <table anchor="tbl-behavior">
          <name>Members of a behavior Object</name>
          <thead>
            <tr><th>Member</th><th>Type</th><th>Cardinality</th><th>Constraints</th></tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>[profile-declared counter]</td><td>integer</td><td>optional</td><td>0 to 2^53-1 inclusive.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>[profile-declared counter]</td><td>number</td><td>optional</td><td>0.0 to 1.0 inclusive.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>[profile-declared counter]</td><td>number</td><td>optional</td><td>0 or greater.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>[profile-declared counter]</td><td>boolean</td><td>optional</td><td>true or false.</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>

        <t>
        Each Table 4 row is a shape a profile may declare any number
        of times; each declared counter is optional per artifact.
        </t>

        <table anchor="tbl-meta">
          <name>Members of the meta Object</name>
          <thead>
            <tr><th>Member</th><th>Type</th><th>Cardinality</th><th>Constraints</th></tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>category</td><td>string</td><td>optional</td><td>Taxonomy grammar below. At most 64 octets.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>value_range</td><td>string</td><td>optional</td><td>Bucket vocabulary below. At most 32 octets.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>extensions_used [profile vocabulary]</td><td>array</td><td>optional</td><td>At most 16 elements, each a string of 1 to 64 octets with no whitespace naming a protocol extension active in the session.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>mediator_invoked</td><td>boolean</td><td>optional</td><td>true or false.</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>

        <table anchor="tbl-reference">
          <name>Members of a references Element</name>
          <thead>
            <tr><th>Member</th><th>Type</th><th>Cardinality</th><th>Constraints</th></tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr><td>id</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>1 to 256 octets, no whitespace.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>type [profile vocabulary]</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>1 to 64 octets, no whitespace. Emit vocabulary below.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>relationship [profile vocabulary]</td><td>string</td><td>required</td><td>1 to 64 octets, no whitespace. Emit vocabulary below.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>version</td><td>string</td><td>optional</td><td>At most 256 octets, no whitespace.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>signed_at</td><td>string</td><td>optional</td><td>RFC 3339 date-time with a "Z" offset.</td></tr>
            <tr><td>signer_did</td><td>string</td><td>optional</td><td>1 to 256 octets, no whitespace.</td></tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>
        The <tt>category</tt> grammar is a dotted lowercase taxonomy path.
        Each segment is one or more characters drawn from a to z, 0 to 9,
        underscore, and hyphen, and a single full stop separates adjacent
        segments. The whole value is at most 64 octets.
        </t>
        <t>
        A <tt>value_range</tt> value is one of the bucket tokens 0-100,
        100-500, 500-1000, 1000-5000, 5000-10000, 10000-50000,
        50000-100000, 100000-500000, 500000-1000000, or 1000000+,
        followed by a single underscore and a three-letter uppercase
        currency code, for example 1000-5000_USD. The bands are
        enumerated so that an exact price cannot be encoded as a
        degenerate range. A recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject any
        other value.
        </t>
        <t>
        A reference element carries a <tt>type</tt> drawn from the
        selected profile's reference type vocabulary, and a
        <tt>relationship</tt> drawn from the selected profile's
        relationship vocabulary. A recipient preserves an unrecognized
        value of either member as an opaque string, as stated above. A
        reference element carries no member other than the six of Table 6.
        This primitive defines no extension point inside a reference
        element; a later version that needs one introduces it by
        publishing a new primitive version, as the extension rule earlier
        in this section states.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="canon">
      <name>Canonicalization and Signatures</name>
      <section anchor="canon-json">
        <name>Canonical JSON</name>
        <t>
        Objects defined by this document are JSON <xref target="RFC8259"/>
        values that use the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)
        <xref target="RFC8785"/>. A signer and verifier
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> canonicalize the same logical object to
        identical UTF-8 <xref target="RFC3629"/> bytes before signing or
        verification. Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject values
        that cannot be represented under
        <xref target="field-definitions"/> and the canonicalization rules.
        </t>
        <t>
        A verifier recanonicalizes the received object under JCS and
        verifies every signature over the recanonicalized bytes. All
        numeric members defined by this document are integers in the range
        0 to 2^53-1 inclusive except where the selected profile's counter
        declaration states a number type. Where this document states a
        narrower range for a particular member, including the positive
        <tt>duration_seconds</tt> of
        <xref target="freshness-required"/> and the bounds of
        <xref target="resource-limits"/>, that narrower range governs. A
        narrower range excludes values the general range would otherwise
        admit, and the general range above does not admit a value the
        narrower range excludes. A
        recipient <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a numeric value outside its
        stated range, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject an object in which a
        member name occurs more than once, as detected during parsing and
        before any duplicate-resolution rule is applied, and
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject input that is not well-formed UTF-8 or
        that contains an unpaired surrogate.
        </t>
        <t>
        The allowed suite set for this primitive version is exactly JCS
        plus Ed25519, and JCS plus ES256. A profile names exactly one suite per format
        version, drawn from that set, and never more.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sig-verify">
        <name>Signature Verification Criteria</name>
        <t>
        For JCS plus Ed25519, implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify Ed25519
        <xref target="RFC8032"/> signatures as specified in
        <xref target="RFC8032" section="5.1.7" sectionFormat="of"/> using
        the cofactorless equation, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a
        signature whose R or S component is not canonically encoded, or whose
        S is not reduced modulo L.
        </t>
        <t>
        For JCS plus ES256, implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify
        ECDSA over P-256 with SHA-256 computed over the Section 6.1
        canonical payload bytes, using <xref target="FIPS186-5"/>.
        <xref target="RFC7518" section="3.4" sectionFormat="of"/> supplies
        the algorithm identity and R-then-S encoding only; the P-256 domain
        parameters are specified in <xref target="NIST-SP-800-186"/>.
        The signature value is the 64-octet
        concatenation R followed by S, each a 32-octet unsigned big-endian
        integer. Verification <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject R or S outside
        [1, n-1], where n is the order of P-256. Low-S is not required.
        The criteria for the selected suite apply to each party
        countersignature of <xref target="countersig-payload"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
        At step 3, the verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject an Ed25519
        public key that is not a canonically encoded point of order L,
        or an ES256 public key that is not a valid point on P-256 or is
        the point at infinity. These key-validity checks apply to whatever
        key the deployment's key-binding mechanism yields.
        </t>
        <t>
        A third party holding a valid ES256 signature can produce a second
        valid signature over the same payload; this cannot change what was
        attested. The <tt>attestation_id</tt>, never signature bytes,
        identifies an attestation. A relying party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
        use signature bytes as an identifier or deduplication key.
        </t>
        <t>
        A signature required by this document is computed over canonical
        payload bytes that carry no context string separating a
        countersignature from any other signature of the selected suite made with the
        same key. A deployment that reuses keys across protocols relies on
        those payload shapes being distinguishable in practice rather than
        on a separation this document enforces. Section 11.4 states that
        bound.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
<section anchor="multiparty">
      <name>Multi-Party Binding</name>

      <section anchor="countersig-payload">
        <name>Countersignature Payload</name>
        <t>
        The countersignature payload is the JCS canonicalization of the
        issuance snapshot. To derive it, an implementation
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>:
        </t>
        <ol type="1">
          <li>begin with the fully assembled attestation;</li>
          <li>remove every member named <tt>signature</tt> recursively at
          every depth;</li>
          <li>remove the top-level <tt>countersignatures</tt> member;
          and</li>
          <li>canonicalize the result using JCS.</li>
        </ol>
        <t>
        No countersignature covers itself or a sibling countersignature.
        Every party therefore signs byte-identical, mutually independent
        payload bytes. Those bytes carry no context string that separates
        them from any other payload a party signs with the same key, on
        the terms stated in <xref target="sig-verify"/> and
        <xref target="sec-key-compromise"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
        <tt>countersignatures</tt> is a JSON object whose member names are
        the agent identifiers appearing in <tt>parties[]</tt> and whose
        values are signatures under the selected profile's suite over the payload derived above,
        encoded as <xref target="field-definitions"/> pins them.
        </t>
        <t>
        The member set of an attestation is closed: an attestation carries
        only the members defined in <xref target="field-definitions"/>, at
        the root and at every nested object. Step 2 of
        <xref target="verification"/> therefore rejects an attestation
        carrying any member <xref target="field-definitions"/> does not
        define, including a member named <tt>signature</tt> at a location
        <xref target="field-definitions"/> does not define, before any
        signature is verified. The removal rule in this section operates
        on that closed set.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="outcome-binding">
        <name>Outcome-Binding Verification</name>
        <t>
        For an artifact at or above the selected protocol profile's
        binding floor, a verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> credit an outcome as
        outcome-bound unless:
        </t>
        <ol type="1">
          <li><tt>parties[]</tt> contains at least two entries;</li>
          <li>every entry's agent identifier is distinct;</li>
          <li><tt>countersignatures</tt> is present;</li>
          <li>the member names of <tt>countersignatures</tt> are exactly
          the set of agent identifiers in <tt>parties[]</tt>, with no
          additional and no missing member;</li>
          <li>every party listed in <tt>parties[]</tt> has exactly one
          corresponding signature;</li>
          <li>the verifier resolves the key for every listed party;
          and</li>
          <li>every signature verifies over the payload in
          <xref target="countersig-payload"/>.</li>
        </ol>
        <t>
        The all-listed-parties rule, together with the minimum of two
        entries, prevents a holder from changing the outcome, removing a
        counterparty row, and re-signing with only its own key.
        </t>
        <t>
        An attestation carries no signature distinct from the party
        countersignatures, and it names no assembling role that a verifier
        could check. Its authenticity rests entirely on the
        countersignature of every listed party over the issuance snapshot,
        so an attestation whose outcome is not credited as outcome-bound
        is not authenticated by anything in this document.
        </t>
        <t>
        An attestation whose version member value does not
        match the grammar in <xref target="definitions"/> is rejected
        at step 2 of <xref target="verification"/> and is not retained.
        </t>
        <t>
        An artifact whose version is well formed and below the selected protocol profile's binding floor leaves
        the procedure of <xref target="verification"/> at step 2 with the
        terminal state legacy, and no check of this section is applied to
        it. Such an artifact <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be retained as a record of
        its own contents. Its outcome <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be credited
        as outcome-bound, and it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be reported as
        current. No requirement of <xref target="freshness"/> applies to
        it, because every requirement there is defined for the selected protocol profile's binding floor and later.
        </t>
        <t>
        A stale attestation retains the outcome-binding property established
        by the countersignatures. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be reported
        as current or bound-only and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be credited
        for reliance. It is retained as a record that the listed parties
        countersigned, subject to the key-compromise limitation in
        <xref target="sec-key-compromise"/>.
        </t>
      </section>

    </section><section anchor="privacy">
      <name>Privacy Requirements</name>
      <t>
      An attestation carries metadata about negotiation behavior. It does
      not disclose the deal. Items 1 through 4 below constrain the content
      an implementation places in free-form members, so they are
      producing-side obligations that a verifier cannot confirm by
      inspection, and the verification result vocabulary of
      <xref target="definitions"/> carries no state for them: an
      attestation that violates one of them still verifies. An
      implementation that assembles an attestation:
      </t>
      <ol type="1">
        <li><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> populate any field with an exact
        negotiated price, quantity, date, or other term value;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include an item or service description
        beyond the permitted <tt>category</tt> and <tt>value_range</tt>
        fields;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include free-text reasoning copied
        from negotiation messages;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include the identity of a human or
        organization represented by an agent; only the agent identifier
        is carried;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> draw <tt>value_range</tt>, when present,
        from the fixed bucket vocabulary defined in
        <xref target="field-definitions"/> and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject
        all other values rather than coerce them;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> encode <tt>category</tt>, when present, as
        a dotted lowercase taxonomy path of at most 64 octets matching the
        grammar in <xref target="field-definitions"/>, where each segment
        is one or more characters drawn from a to z, 0 to 9, underscore,
        and hyphen, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject any other value rather
        than coercing it;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MAY</bcp14> omit <tt>category</tt> for additional
        privacy;</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a reference identifier longer than
        256 octets or containing whitespace, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
        reject an attestation carrying more than 32 references, rather
        than truncating either; and</li>
        <li><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> keep <tt>summary</tt>, when present,
        within 1024 Unicode scalar values and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> copy
        a negotiated term value or free-text reasoning into it.
        <tt>summary</tt> is a free-text member, so this constraint is a
        producing-side obligation that a verifier cannot confirm by
        inspection, and it widens the residual channel described
        below.</li>
      </ol>
      <t>
      The taxonomy grammar constrains shape rather than meaning. A
      dishonest party can encode its own term in a syntactically valid
      <tt>category</tt> segment, and it has wider latitude still in the
      free-text <tt>summary</tt> member. This is an accepted, bounded
      residual channel over <tt>category</tt> and <tt>summary</tt>
      together: it can expose that party's own information, and it does
      not let that party sign on behalf of a counterparty. A future
      registered taxonomy could narrow the <tt>category</tt> half of it.
      </t>
    </section><section anchor="freshness">
      <name>Freshness and Replay</name>

      <section anchor="freshness-general">
        <name>General Relying-Side Obligation</name>
        <t>
        A currently valid signature is not evidence that the signed claim
        remains true. The freshness requirements below determine whether
        an attestation may be relied upon.
        </t>
        <t>
        A relying party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> configure a maximum evidence
        age not exceeding 90 days, a maximum accepted validity lifetime
        not exceeding 90 days, and a clock-skew allowance not exceeding
        300 seconds. Exceeding the lifetime or skew bound
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> terminate not-bound at step 5. An exceeded
        evidence-age ceiling means the artifact is not credited for reliance:
        step 6 marks it stale, and step 9 reports stale if steps 7 and 8 pass.
        A current time before the interval starts terminates not-bound at
        step 5 regardless of skew; the clock-skew allowance applies to
        the timestamp member. A relying party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> configure tighter
        values. Throughout this document 90 days is 7776000 seconds, which
        is 90 multiplied by 86400, and is not a calendar quantity.
        </t>
        <t>
        Every requirement of <xref target="freshness"/>, including the
        evidence-age anchor defined below, is defined for an
        attestation at or above the selected protocol profile's binding floor and for no other artifact.
        An artifact whose version is well formed and below the selected protocol profile's binding floor reaches
        the terminal state legacy at step 2 of
        <xref target="verification"/>, so no anchor is computed for it and
        no ceiling of this section is applied to it.
        </t>
        <t>
        Evidence age is the verifier's current time minus the evidence-age anchor defined below.
        </t>
        <t>
        A relying party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> enforce its own maximum
        evidence age independently of the signer's asserted validity
        window, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a signer-asserted
        timestamp or interval start that is future-dated beyond that
        clock-skew allowance. The evidence-age anchor is the earlier of
        the attestation's <tt>timestamp</tt> member and the start of its
        <tt>validity_temporal</tt> interval. A verifier
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> enforce that finite skew bound and fail closed
        outside it, whatever the quality of its clock synchronization.
        </t>
        <t>
        A relying party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> mark an attestation stale
        at step 5 when it passed steps 1 through 4 and every other step 5
        check but its <tt>validity_temporal</tt> interval has ended at the
        time of verification. It continues through steps 6, 7 and 8;
        revocation or a context or party-set mismatch terminates not-bound.
        Otherwise step 9 reports stale.
        </t>
        <t>
        A relying party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> apply a tighter freshness bound
        than the signer asserted.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="freshness-issuer">
        <name>Producing-Side Obligation</name>
        <t>
        A party <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> countersign an attestation whose
        <tt>validity_temporal</tt> lifetime exceeds 90 days as
        <xref target="freshness-general"/> defines that quantity. That
        lifetime
        is the length of the interval that
        <xref target="freshness-required"/> defines for the stated mode,
        which is the span between <tt>from</tt> and <tt>until</tt> in
        absolute mode and the value of <tt>duration_seconds</tt> in
        relative mode.
        A party <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> apply a shorter maximum.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="freshness-required">
        <name>Required Temporal Validity</name>
        <t>
        <tt>validity_temporal</tt> is <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> on every
        attestation at or above the selected protocol profile's binding floor. It is a JSON object
        carrying a <tt>mode</tt> member whose value is either "absolute"
        or "relative", and the members that mode requires. All timestamps
        are RFC 3339 <xref target="RFC3339"/> date-time values encoded as
        <xref target="field-definitions"/> states. When <tt>mode</tt> is
        "absolute", the members <tt>from</tt> and <tt>until</tt> are
        present, the interval is [from, until], and the lifetime is the
        span between those two times. When <tt>mode</tt> is
        "relative", the members <tt>from</tt> and
        <tt>duration_seconds</tt>, a positive integer, are present, the
        interval is [from, from + duration_seconds], and the lifetime is
        <tt>duration_seconds</tt>. Each mode therefore has exactly one
        interval and exactly one lifetime, which is the quantity the caps
        of <xref target="freshness-general"/> and
        <xref target="freshness-issuer"/> bound. A verifier
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a <tt>validity_temporal</tt> object
        whose <tt>mode</tt> member is absent or carries another value,
        whose members for the stated mode are absent, which carries any
        other member, or whose interval is empty or reversed, at step 2 with not-bound.
        </t>
        <t>
        An artifact whose version is well formed and below the selected protocol profile's binding floor reaches
        the terminal state legacy at step 2 of
        <xref target="verification"/> and is never read for this member.
        An artifact at or above the selected protocol profile's binding floor that omits this member is
        rejected at that step with the terminal state not-bound.
        </t>
      </section>


      <section anchor="single-use">
        <name>Single Use</name>
        <t>
        An attestation defined by this document carries no single-use
        semantics, and the temporal validity of
        <xref target="freshness-required"/> alone permits an unbounded
        number of effects inside the signed window. A relying party that
        treats one attestation as grounds for a consequential effect
        <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep a consumption record for that
        attestation, keyed by its <tt>attestation_id</tt>, inside its own
        accounting domain, and consult that record before admitting a
        further effect.
        </t>
        <t>
        This document defines no atomic check-and-record operation, no
        concurrency rule, and no maximum, so two simultaneous decisions
        inside one accounting domain, and two decisions in separate
        domains, can each admit an effect against the same attestation. A
        deployment that needs enforced single use obtains it from a
        mechanism that defines those semantics, for example the budgeted
        capability described in <xref target="rel-requirements"/>.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="verification">
      <name>Verification Procedure</name>
      <t>
      To reach a terminal state for a received artifact, a relying party
      <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> perform the following steps in fail-closed
      order. The five terminal states are defined in
      <xref target="definitions"/>, and step 9 exposes exactly one of
      them.
      </t>
      <ol type="1">
        <li>Reject the received bytes with the terminal state not-bound,
        without parsing them, if their length exceeds the relying party's
        maximum artifact size, which <xref target="resource-limits"/> caps
        at 262144 octets.</li>
        <li>Strictly parse the received bytes and reject the artifact with
        the terminal state not-bound if they are not I-JSON
        <xref target="RFC7493"/> or if their JSON nesting depth exceeds
        16. Then perform step 2a: profile determination. Exactly one
        registered version-member name for a profile this verifier
        implements is present at the root. Zero or more than one, or a
        name whose profile this verifier does not implement, terminates
        not-bound. The version member is inside the signed preimage in
        every profile. Then read that member. Reject with not-bound if it
        does not match the format-version grammar or is greater than the
        highest format version this verifier implements for the selected
        profile. An artifact whose value is well formed and below the
        selected profile's binding floor terminates here with the terminal
        state legacy, and the verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> apply any
        step below to it: it performs no signature verification, no
        outcome binding, no temporal check, and no revocation check over
        that artifact. For an artifact at the selected profile's floor or
        later, reject the artifact with the terminal state not-bound if
        any value is malformed under <xref target="field-definitions"/>,
        if any member at any depth is not a member of the
        <xref target="field-definitions"/> inventory as named by the
        selected profile, or if the completeness indicator the selected
        profile declares, by its profile-assigned name, is outside the
        range that profile declares. Reject with not-bound if the
        outcome's status or detail is outside the selected profile's
        vocabulary or the status/detail pair disagrees with its declared
        association, or if key_ref is missing when declared or present
        when not declared. Every check in this step precedes every signature
        verification below.</li>
        <li>Where the profile declares
        <tt>key_ref</tt>, the resolution input for each party is its agent
        identifier together with its key_ref, and the exactly-one test
        applies to that pair. Otherwise the input is its agent identifier.
        Resolve exactly one public key of the selected profile's suite
        valid at the attestation's issuance time for each input, using the
        key-binding mechanism the deployment profile defines. This document
        defines no such mechanism. If no key resolves, more than one key
        resolves, or the deployment defines no binding mechanism, terminate
        not-bound. The profile declares what the identifier names; the
        deployment defines how the identifier (and key_ref where declared)
        is resolved. The Section 5.2 key-validity checks apply to whatever
        key it yields, at step 3.</li>
        <li>Recompute the countersignature payload by the fixed names
        <tt>signature</tt> and <tt>countersignatures</tt> and verify every
        listed party's countersignature as specified in
        <xref target="outcome-binding"/>. No binding recomputation exists.
        If any check there fails, terminate with the terminal state
        not-bound.</li>
        <li>Every artifact that reaches this step carries a version at or
        above the selected profile's floor and therefore carries the
        member this step reads. Validate the interval's lifetime against
        the relying party's maximum, and both the attestation timestamp
        and the interval start against the relying party's clock-skew
        allowance. A current time before the interval starts, a lifetime
        over the cap, or a timestamp or interval start beyond the skew
        allowance terminates not-bound. Empty or reversed intervals have
        already been rejected at step 2. If every other check passes and
        the current time is after the interval ends, mark the attestation
        stale and continue; otherwise continue without that mark.</li>
        <li>Apply the relying party's own freshness ceiling, even when it
        is tighter than the signed window. When evidence age exceeds
        that ceiling, mark the attestation stale and continue. A stale mark
        from step 5 remains set.</li>
        <li>Determine revocation status. If the deployment profile names
        a revocation source, apply the records that source supplies as the
        deployment's own definition of that source specifies, and reject a
        revoked attestation with the terminal state not-bound. This
        document defines no revocation record format, no retrieval
        mechanism, and no authority model. The verifier
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat revocation status as undetermined in
        each of three cases: the deployment names no revocation source,
        the named source is unavailable, or the named source supplies a
        record that cannot be interpreted under the deployment's own
        definition of that source. In every one of those three cases the
        verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report the artifact as current
        and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> continue through step 8 to step 9 with
        revocation status undetermined, retaining any stale mark. If
        step 8 passes, step 9 reports stale when marked, and bound-only
        otherwise; both retain outcome binding.</li>
        <li>Compare the context identifier by its profile-assigned name
        and the agent identifiers in <tt>parties[]</tt> against the
        session and counterparty set the relying party expected for this
        interaction, and reject the attestation with the terminal state
        not-bound when either differs. A verified attestation is evidence
        about the context it names and about no other.</li>
        <li>Only then expose one terminal state to application policy:
        stale if step 5 or 6 marked it stale; otherwise current when
        step 7 determined revocation status and the artifact is not revoked,
        and bound-only otherwise. An artifact that reached
        this step is outcome-bound. No additional result label is
        reported.</li>
      </ol>
      <t>
      The five terminal states are the whole reported vocabulary. An
      implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> expose diagnostic detail
      alongside the state it reports, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report
      any other state name in its place. An implementation
      <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> silently replace one terminal state with
      another, and in particular <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report a legacy
      or bound-only artifact as current, or a stale artifact as current
      or bound-only. The five states are not-bound, legacy, stale,
      bound-only, and current. Profile-native results under
      <xref target="profile-native"/> are diagnostic detail, never
      additional terminal states.
      </t>
      <t>
      A verifier that returns a typed failure reason <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
      distinguish a result this document's checks cannot produce at all
      from a result this verifier could not reach with the inputs it held,
      and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> report the second as the first.
      This document defines no scope comparison, so a scope relation falls
      in the first category, while an unresolvable party key or an
      unavailable revocation source falls in the second.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="profiles">
      <name>Protocol Profiles</name>
      <section anchor="profile-contract">
        <name>Profile Contract</name>
        <ol type="1">
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> assign the version
          member's name, current value, and binding floor. The
          version-member name a protocol profile assigns
          <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be distinct from every other registered
          profile's version-member name. Every member name a protocol
          profile assigns or declares <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be distinct from
          every primitive-fixed name, including <tt>signature</tt> and
          <tt>countersignatures</tt>. Vocabulary values are not names. A protocol profile MUST NOT give any other root member a name equal to a registered profile's version-member name, so that step 2a of Section 9 counts exactly one registered name on a conforming artifact.
          This document registers a version-member name only for a
          protocol profile whose normative text is in this document. An artifact whose selected
          profile the verifier does not implement terminates not-bound at
          step 2a. A protocol profile whose first format version has no
          deployed base
          <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set its binding floor to that first
          version.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> assign the context
          identifier's name and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> define its meaning as
          the session or interaction the relying party expects for the
          verification; step 8 compares that member against that
          expectation.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> declare each binding
          member's name and meaning. A meaning <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> commit
          only to material the profile requires every listed party to have
          received, or independently derived from protocol messages that
          party received, before countersigning; that requirement is a producer
          obligation the verifier cannot confirm. A profile
          <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> declare a
          retained binding member whose preimage it does not specify; for
          it the profile states no meaning beyond countersigned opaque
          value and makes no availability statement. A profile
          <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> describe a binding value as proof of
          completeness or of transcript integrity. A profile
          <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> describe an out-of-band comparison a holder
          of the committed material can run after the verification
          procedure; that comparison cannot add to, remove, or replace a
          terminal state. A profile <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> instruct a
          relying party to treat an out-of-band comparison as proof of
          completeness, as evidence beyond the verified claim of
          <xref target="evidence-model"/>, or as changing a terminal
          state. A profile <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> instruct the
          Section 9 procedure to recompute or compare a binding value.
          Native verification <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> recompute a binding value
          from a presented object and report the comparison only as a
          separately named native check under <xref target="profile-native"/>.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> declare whether a
          completeness indicator exists, its name and integer range, and
          state that it is the integer the parties countersigned, not
          proof that nothing was dropped. A profile <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
          define completeness semantics the verifier reports.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> assign the
          vocabularies for <tt>role</tt>, <tt>resolution_mechanism</tt>,
          <tt>extensions_used</tt>, reference <tt>type</tt>, and
          <tt>relationship</tt>. A profile <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> declare the
          <tt>extensions_used</tt> vocabulary as an open shape, meaning
          any string of the Table 5 shape naming one of its extensions,
          and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> say so if it does. A profile can
          restrict and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> extend
          <tt>outcome.status</tt>. A profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> declare
          its <tt>outcome.detail</tt> vocabulary and assign each detail
          value to exactly one status. A profile version that restricts status
          admits only detail values belonging to an admitted status.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> name exactly one
          signature suite for the format version, drawn from the
          primitive's allowed set.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> declare the counter
          set as measured names, each with a type and range shape from
          Table 4: an integer from 0 to 2^53-1 inclusive, a number within
          the stated range, or a boolean. A profile <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
          declare a counter of any other type. Each declared counter has
          optional per-artifact cardinality. A profile <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
          instruct producers to emit a placeholder for an unmeasured
          counter.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> preserve the strip
          rule and every member name, at every depth, that this document
          does not mark profile-assigned. A profile-assigned or
          profile-declared member occupies exactly the position
          <xref target="field-definitions"/> gives it. A protocol profile
          <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> place a profile-assigned or
          profile-declared member anywhere other than the position
          <xref target="field-definitions"/> gives that member; it
          <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> add a member at any depth.
          Cardinalities are those of the <xref target="field-definitions"/>
          inventory, never inferred from prose.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> supply or
          constrain the deployment profile.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide at least one
          positive vector and the negative controls named in
          <xref target="profile-vector-controls"/>.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> list companion
          artifacts and how <tt>references[]</tt> points at them, or state
          that there are none.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> define any exit
          from the verification procedure other than the step 2 floor
          test. Native checks are not an exit from that procedure.</li>
          <li>A protocol profile <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> declare whether
          <tt>key_ref</tt> is present and, if so, what kind of key
          identifier it is. The key_ref member <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
          carry key material; this is a producer obligation the verifier
          cannot confirm.</li>
        </ol>
        <section anchor="profile-vector-controls">
          <name>Required Negative Controls</name>
          <t>
          For each protocol profile, the required negative controls are:
          oversize artifact, exercising step 1; undefined member at any
          depth, exercising step 2; malformed version, exercising step 2;
          version below the floor, exercising the step 2 legacy terminal
          state; malformed signature encoding at any location, exercising
          step 2; missing countersignature, exercising step 4; extra
          countersignature, exercising step 4; invalid countersignature,
          exercising step 4; ended validity interval, marking stale at
          step 5 and reporting stale at step 9; reversed validity interval,
          terminating not-bound at step 2; age ceiling exceeded, marking
          stale at step 6 and reporting stale at step 9;
          status and detail mismatch, terminating not-bound at step 2;
          future-dated anchor, exercising step 5;
          lifetime over the cap, exercising step 5; mismatched context
          identifier, exercising step 8; mismatched party set, exercising
          step 8; zero version-member names, exercising step 2a; a
          duplicate member name, exercising step 2; and two registered
          version-member names, exercising step 2a. Unless another state
          is stated above, every rejection control expects not-bound.
          A profile that does not declare key_ref also provides key_ref
          present when the profile does not declare it, exercising step 2.
          A profile that declares key_ref instead provides key_ref resolves
          to no key or a key of another suite, exercising step 3, with
          one case for each failure.
          </t>
          <t>
          The profile also names two labelled no-rejection illustrations:
          a term in <tt>summary</tt>, and a well-formed but
          cryptographically invalid <tt>parties[].signature</tt>.
          </t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="profile-native">
          <name>Profile-Native Verification</name>
          <t>A profile <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> define native verification of
          an object its binding members refer to. A verifier that performs
          native checks <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> run them only after Section 9
          has produced a terminal state, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> name each
          separately and report it as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN, and
          <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> report a check it does not perform as NOT RUN,
          never PASS.
          No native result adds, removes, or changes a terminal state.
          A native PASS is not evidence beyond Section 3's verified claim.
          The relying party decides what to do with the terminal state and
          the separate native results.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="concordia-profile">
        <name>Concordia Profile</name>
        <t>
        This profile is normative. It assigns the version member name
        <tt>concordia_attestation</tt>, current value <tt>0.7.0</tt>, and
        binding floor <tt>0.7.0</tt>. Its context identifier is
        <tt>session_id</tt>, the negotiation session. Its binding members
        are <tt>chain_head</tt>, the Concordia Protocol Specification
        <xref target="CONCORDIA"/> Section 9.6.3 final-message hash and required at 0.7.0 and later,
        and <tt>transcript_hash</tt>, a retained binding member whose
        preimage is unspecified, required at every version, and with no
        meaning beyond countersigned opaque value. Its completeness
        indicator is <tt>message_count</tt>, the countersigned integer
        from 1 to 10000 inclusive and not proof that nothing was dropped.
        Every listed party is required to have received the final
        transcript message before countersigning; this is a producer
        obligation the verifier cannot confirm.
        A holder of the transcript can run the out-of-band receipt
        set-binding comparison described by the Concordia Protocol
        Specification Section 9.6.5b after this document's verification
        procedure; that comparison never changes a terminal state.
        </t>
        <t>
        The profile's suite is JCS plus Ed25519. Its
        <tt>outcome.status</tt> vocabulary is <tt>agreed</tt>
        and <tt>not_agreed</tt>. Its detail vocabulary assigns
        <tt>agreed</tt> to status agreed, and <tt>rejected</tt>,
        <tt>expired</tt>, and <tt>withdrawn</tt> to status not_agreed.
        This profile declares no key_ref. Its
        <tt>resolution_mechanism</tt> vocabulary is <tt>direct</tt>,
        <tt>split</tt>, <tt>foa</tt>, <tt>tradeoff</tt>,
        <tt>escalation</tt>, and <tt>none</tt>. Its <tt>role</tt>
        vocabulary is <tt>initiator</tt>, <tt>responder</tt>,
        <tt>mediator</tt>, and <tt>witness</tt>. Its reference
        <tt>type</tt> vocabulary is <tt>receipt</tt>,
        <tt>chain_session</tt>, <tt>predicate</tt>, and <tt>mandate</tt>.
        Its reference <tt>relationship</tt> vocabulary is
        <tt>supersedes</tt>, <tt>extends</tt>, <tt>fulfills</tt>, and
        <tt>references</tt>. Its <tt>extensions_used</tt> vocabulary is
        an open shape: any string of the Table 5 shape naming one of its
        extensions.
        </t>
        <t>
        Concordia assigns the bracketed cells of
        <xref target="field-definitions"/> as follows: the
        <tt>[version member]</tt> cell is
        <tt>concordia_attestation</tt>; the
        <tt>[context identifier]</tt> cell is <tt>session_id</tt>; the
        <tt>[binding member]</tt> rows are <tt>transcript_hash</tt>,
        retained and required at every version, and <tt>chain_head</tt>,
        required at 0.7.0 and later; the
        <tt>[completeness indicator]</tt> cell is
        <tt>message_count</tt>, required at 0.7.0 and later; the profile
        vocabularies and profile-declared counters are the values listed
        above; and the counter names are <tt>offers_made</tt>,
        <tt>concessions</tt>, <tt>concession_magnitude</tt>,
        <tt>signals_shared</tt>, <tt>constraints_declared</tt>,
        <tt>constraints_violated</tt>, <tt>reasoning_provided</tt>,
        <tt>withdrawal</tt>, and <tt>response_time_avg_seconds</tt> with
        these shapes: <tt>offers_made</tt>, <tt>concessions</tt>,
        <tt>signals_shared</tt>, <tt>constraints_declared</tt> and
        <tt>constraints_violated</tt> are integers from 0 to 2^53-1
        inclusive; <tt>concession_magnitude</tt> is a number from 0.0 to
        1.0 inclusive; <tt>response_time_avg_seconds</tt> is a number of
        0 or greater; and <tt>reasoning_provided</tt> and
        <tt>withdrawal</tt> are booleans. This profile declares a number
        type for <tt>concession_magnitude</tt> and
        <tt>response_time_avg_seconds</tt>. Cardinalities are those of
        <xref target="field-definitions"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
        The Concordia lifecycle states PROPOSED, ACTIVE, AGREED,
        REJECTED, EXPIRED, and DORMANT are informative for this document.
        The Concordia definitions of Negotiation transcript, Agreement,
        and Offer remain the protocol definitions that produce artifacts
        under this profile.
        </t>
        <t>
        The identifier <tt>urn:concordia:schema:attestation:v0.5</tt>
        names the machine-readable form of the member set of the 0.5.0
        predecessor of this profile and is informative. It is registered
        in no IANA registry. The 0.6.0 profile differs from the 0.5.0 line
        by the removal of three members: the <tt>fulfillment</tt> member
        of the attestation root, the <tt>extensions</tt> member of a
        reference element, and the <tt>window</tt> mode of
        <tt>validity_temporal</tt>. The 0.7.0 profile differs from
        0.6.0 by changing the status values to agreed and not_agreed and
        adding the required outcome.detail member. Every 0.5.0 and 0.6.0
        artifact is legacy under the 0.7.0 floor. An artifact at 0.7.0
        carrying a removed member is rejected at step 2 of
        <xref target="verification"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
        The member name <tt>concordia_attestation</tt> is retained from
        the deployed base of artifacts that this format already describes.
        Renaming it would turn recognition of an existing legacy
        artifact into an unregistered-name not-bound result at the 0.7.0 floor. On the members it retains, this document adds
        constraints that a 0.5.0 implementation does not apply. Where a
        published schema document and this document disagree, this
        document governs.
        </t>
        <t>
        The version gate at step 2 is what keeps the Concordia legacy
        state coherent. Every artifact below 0.7.0 leaves at the floor
        test, before structural, signature, temporal, or revocation checks
        for the 0.7.0 shape. The earlier 0.5.0 and 0.6.0 shapes do not
        supply the status/detail pair this profile now requires.
        </t>
<section anchor="concordia-related-artifacts">
      <name>Related Evidence Artifacts</name>
      <t>
      This section is informative. It describes related companion
      artifacts whose full normative definition belongs to a separate
      document. It states no requirement of its own and uses no
      requirement keyword. No requirement of this document reads a member
      of any artifact sketched here. The sketches are drawn from the
      Concordia Protocol Specification named in <xref target="crosswalk"/>.
      </t>

      <section anchor="approval-receipt">
        <name>ApprovalReceipt</name>
        <t>
        An ApprovalReceipt records a human or policy approval decision
        over the digest of the canonical form of an Offer as defined by
        the Concordia Protocol Specification; that companion format specifies how
        the digest is computed. <tt>approve</tt> and <tt>deny</tt> are
        both binding signed decisions. The receipt can reference the
        mandate it fulfills without defining the mandate format. It is not
        proof that the approved transaction executed.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="fulfillment-attestation">
        <name>FulfillmentAttestation</name>
        <t>
        A FulfillmentAttestation records whether an agreed exchange was
        fulfilled, fulfilled with mediation, failed, or remained disputed.
        It references the agreement attestation it fulfills. It is
        distinct from payment settlement evidence: payment settled is not
        proof of delivery, and fulfillment is not proof of payment
        finality.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="revocation-record">
        <name>RevocationRecord and Cascade Decision</name>
        <t>
        A RevocationRecord identifies a specific artifact, its effective
        time, and whether revocation is limited to that artifact or
        cascades to dependents. In that companion format, a verifier
        recomputes any committed cascade decision from the retained raw
        artifact bytes. This document states no requirement over cascade
        traversal, because it defines no revocation record, no authority
        rule, and no cascade graph. A cascade decision is
        a scoped verifier result over the artifacts defined or referenced
        by this document; it is not a general-purpose cross-format
        composition or sufficiency engine.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="a2cn-profile">
        <name>A2CN Profile</name>
        <t anchor="a2cn-identification">This profile is normative. It assigns the version member
        <tt>a2cn_attestation</tt>, current value and binding floor
        <tt>0.1.0</tt>, and the context identifier <tt>session_id</tt>,
        the A2CN session. There is no deployed base for this profile.
        Its suite is JCS plus ES256. It maps the bilateral TransactionRecord
        0.4, record_type <tt>a2cn_transaction_record</tt> and record_version
        <tt>0.4</tt>, specified by
        <xref target="A2CN"/>, with schema
        <eref target="https://a2cn.dev/schemas/transaction-record/0.4"/>.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-bindings">The binding members are <tt>offer_chain_hash</tt> and
        <tt>record_hash</tt>, both required at 0.1.0. The first is the
        TransactionRecord's SHA-256 digest of the JCS array of protocol-act
        hashes for all Offers and Counteroffers in chronological order.
        The second is SHA-256 over the JCS record with record_hash set to
        the empty string. Both derivations are specified by <xref target="A2CN"/>
        Section 9.3. A2CN encodes both as unpadded base64url; this
        profile carries the same 32 octets as sha256: followed by lowercase
        hexadecimal. The committed bytes are identical. Every listed
        party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> independently derive the same
        TransactionRecord 0.4 before countersigning. These are commitments
        to material both parties derive, not proof of completeness or
        integrity. Because TransactionRecord 0.4 is deterministic
        (A2CN Section 9.2), every binding value is derivable by each party
        alone from the protocol messages, and the two countersignatures
        are made over values neither party had to receive from the other.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-completeness">The completeness indicator <tt>message_count</tt> is
        negotiation_summary.total_messages, an integer from 1 to 10000
        inclusive. It is the integer the parties countersigned, not proof
        that nothing was dropped.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-outcome">The profile's detail vocabulary is the full A2CN terminal
        set: <tt>COMPLETED</tt> belongs to <tt>agreed</tt>;
        <tt>REJECTED_FINAL</tt>, <tt>WITHDRAWN</tt>, <tt>TIMED_OUT</tt>,
        <tt>IMPASSE</tt>, <tt>ERROR</tt>, and <tt>HALTED_BY_CONTROLS</tt>
        belong to <tt>not_agreed</tt>. Profile version 0.1.0 restricts
        <tt>status</tt> to <tt>agreed</tt>, so its only admissible
        status/detail pair is <tt>agreed</tt>/<tt>COMPLETED</tt>.
        Any other pair terminates not-bound at step 2. The full detail
        vocabulary is declared so a later profile version can attest
        non-agreement sessions without a vocabulary change.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-parties">
        The roles are <tt>initiator</tt> and <tt>responder</tt>.
        A producer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> emit exactly two parties entries,
        initiator then responder, with agent_id
        equal to parties.initiator.did and parties.responder.did from the
        record and represented as DIDs <xref target="DID-CORE"/> (the
        primitive's agent_id is the DID; the record's own informational
        agent_id member is not used), and key_ref set to the DID URL of the verification method the party
        countersigned with; the bilateral order, mapping to record
        identifiers, and DID and DID URL forms are producer
        obligations that Section 9 does not check;
        step 8's party-set comparison is where a relying party catches
        an unexpected set.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-key-ref">This profile declares <tt>key_ref</tt> present.
        Section 9 passes it to the deployment's key-binding mechanism.
        The <tt>a2cn.party.verification_method</tt> native check compares
        it by exact string comparison to that party's TransactionRecord
        verification_method: parties.initiator.verification_method or
        parties.responder.verification_method. The generic verifier needs
        nothing from the TransactionRecord to resolve the key or verify
        the countersignature.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-suite">The profile expects the key that signs A2CN protocol acts to
        countersign, the key-reuse case of Section 11.4; the
        a2cn_attestation root member is expected to distinguish the
        countersignature payload shape from A2CN protocol-act payloads in
        practice; this document does not enforce that separation
        (Section 11.4).
        The countersignature is the Section 5.2 signature over the
        Section 6.1 canonical bytes, not an A2CN JWS. An implementation
        that produces it with A2CN's JWS tooling obtains the same 64
        octets in unpadded base64url and re-encodes them to the Section
        4.4 88-character form. ES256 is specified by <xref target="RFC7518"/>.
        Section 5.2 specifies the on-curve point check and R and S range
        checks. No low-S requirement is imposed; the primitive's
        malleability bound applies. The <tt>attestation_id</tt>, never
        signature bytes, identifies an attestation. ECDSA signatures are
        not deterministic, so vectors assert the stated octets and
        successful verification, never equality of independently generated
        signatures.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-deployment">Informatively, a DID-resolving deployment profile for A2CN,
        applying the rules both A2CN reference verifiers apply, checks
        that the key_ref value is a DID URL controlled by the party's DID
        (equal to it, or the DID followed by # and a fragment), that the
        named verification method is in the corresponding DID document
        and controlled by that DID, and that it is listed under
        <tt>assertionMethod</tt> or <tt>authentication</tt>. A method listed
        only under <tt>keyAgreement</tt> does not verify a countersignature
        under those deployment rules. It also checks that the key is
        compatible with ES256; step 3 already enforces suite compatibility.
        Both A2CN reference verifiers resolve <tt>did:web</tt> only;
        <xref target="A2CN"/> does not restrict parties to that method,
        so a deployment that admits another DID method supplies its own
        resolution. Such a
        deployment can resolve against a supplied DID document and separately
        report whether it confirmed that document against the DID resolution
        method. These are deployment key-binding rules, not constraints this
        protocol profile places on the deployment. A valid A2CN session using
        Ed25519 methods is outside this ES256 profile version; both party
        verification methods need P-256 keys usable with ES256. A later
        profile version may select EdDSA.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-counters">The resolution_mechanism vocabulary is <tt>direct</tt>.
        The counter set is <tt>offers_made</tt>, an integer from 0 to
        2^53-1 counting that party's Offers and Counteroffers in the offer
        chain whose sender_did is that party's DID, and <tt>withdrawal</tt>,
        a boolean. A producer
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> emit withdrawal only as false at 0.1.0;
        this is a producer obligation that Section 9 does not check.
        Both counters are optional when unmeasured.
        The six unmeasured counters concessions, concession_magnitude,
        signals_shared, constraints_declared, constraints_violated, and
        reasoning_provided are not declared; neither is
        response_time_avg_seconds. Any of those seven counters, present
        with any value including zero, is an undefined member and fails
        step 2. The rounds member is
        negotiation_summary.total_rounds. <tt>duration_seconds</tt> is
        negotiation_summary.accepted_at minus
        negotiation_summary.session_created_at, in whole seconds, rounded
        down; a negative difference, which the two parties' clocks can
        produce, is emitted as 0. <tt>terms_count</tt> is omitted at
        0.1.0.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-meta">When present, category maps goods_procurement to
        procurement.goods and saas_renewal to procurement.saas_renewal;
        otherwise it is procurement.&lt;deal_type&gt;; category is omitted
        unless the deal_type segment matches the Section 4.4 grammar.
        When present, value_range is the primitive bucket containing
        agreed_terms.total_value converted from minor to major units of
        currency by the currency's minor-unit exponent; a producer that
        cannot establish that exponent omits value_range. At a shared
        endpoint the higher bucket is used; a negative value has no bucket
        and the member is omitted. The uppermost bucket begins at 1000000.
        <tt>mediator_invoked</tt> is <tt>false</tt> or omitted; A2CN
        defines no mediator.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-extensions">The extensions_used vocabulary is empty: any listed value is
        outside it and fails step 2. A producer <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
        emit extensions_used; an empty array is a producer violation that
        Section 9 does not detect.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-companion">The companion artifact is the TransactionRecord 0.4;
        type is <tt>a2cn_transaction_record</tt> and relationship is
        <tt>references</tt>. These are the reference type and relationship
        vocabularies. references[].id is the record's record_id, the UUID
        version 5 that <xref target="A2CN"/> Section 9.3 derives from
        session_id under the A2CN namespace
        f4a2c1e0-8b3d-4f7a-9c2e-1d5b6a8f3e7c; references[].version is the
        record's record_version, <tt>0.4</tt>; signed_at and signer_did
        are omitted, because the record is signed by both parties and
        names no single signer.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-party-signature">A parties[] signature is the party's ES256 signature over the
        JCS canonicalization of its own parties[] element with signature
        removed, made with the key that key_ref names and using the
        Section 4.4 encoding. It is not a countersignature and Section 9
        does not verify it.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-native">Native verification reports four separately named checks
        on a presented TransactionRecord 0.4. Only
        <tt>a2cn.record.verify</tt> performs <xref target="A2CN"/> Section 9.5
        record verification; the other three compare the attestation's
        binding members and key_ref against the presented record. None of
        the four changes the Section 9 terminal state. Each is reported
        as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN as specified in
        <xref target="profile-native"/>:</t>
        <ol type="1">
          <li><tt>a2cn.binding.record_hash</tt>: recompute the record hash with record_hash empty,
          check the presented record_hash, and compare its digest octets to
          the attestation's record_hash.</li>
          <li><tt>a2cn.binding.offer_chain_hash</tt>: when the chronological offer-hash list is
          available, recompute its digest and compare to the record and
          attestation offer_chain_hash digest octets.</li>
          <li><tt>a2cn.party.verification_method</tt>: compare each party's key_ref
          by exact string comparison to its record verification_method.</li>
          <li><tt>a2cn.record.verify</tt>: verify TransactionRecord version 0.4
          only under A2CN Section 9.5. Its constituents are record_hash
          recomputation with record_hash empty and a check of the presented
          record_hash; rebuilding the signed final Offer or Counteroffer
          from final_offer and agreed_terms and verifying its signature;
          rebuilding the signed Acceptance from final_acceptance and
          verifying its signature; comparing accepted_protocol_act_hash
          to the final offer's protocol-act hash; basis consistency; and
          currency consistency.</li>
        </ol>
        <t anchor="a2cn-native-boundary">A check not performed, including one lacking its required input,
        is NOT RUN. A check whose input (the record, or the part of it the
        check reads) is not presented is reported NOT RUN, never PASS.
        Without an implementation of native verification, all four checks
        are NOT RUN, never PASS.
        In AP-3 case A, record content is altered and its record_hash
        recomputed while the attestation is untouched; check 1 is FAIL.
        In AP-3 case B, record content is altered while the presented
        record_hash field is left equal to the countersigned digest;
        check 1 recomputes, so it is FAIL, not PASS on the carried field.
        When the altered content is a final-act signature, check 4 also
        fails at the act rebuild and signature verification. A generic
        verifier never compares the presented record_hash field; its terminal
        state can remain bound-only while a2cn.binding.record_hash is FAIL. This is why native and
        generic verdicts stay separate.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-ap13">AP-13 is an additional control: a party's key_ref names a
        verification method the party controls and lists under assertionMethod,
        but which is not the TransactionRecord's verification_method for that
        party, and the countersignature verifies under it. The Section 9
        terminal state is unchanged by the native result, bound-only in the
        synthetic setup of <xref target="vectors-a2cn"/>, while
        <tt>a2cn.party.verification_method</tt> is FAIL. The no-key and
        wrong-suite controls of <xref target="profile-vector-controls"/>
        exercise different failures at step 3.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-validity">Informatively, A2CN defines no attestation-level revocation;
        this paragraph specifies no revocation
        behavior; the deployment profile still decides step 7. A deployment that
        names none reaches bound-only when the other checks pass and the
        attestation is not stale. Key status, mandate validity, and artifact
        revocation are distinct properties; later DID-document key status is
        not itself revocation of an already countersigned attestation.
        The attestation is a reliance signal bounded by the primitive's
        maximum evidence age and validity lifetime. A genuine attestation
        after its validity window, or past the relying party's age ceiling,
        terminates in stale if the remaining Section 9 checks pass. A time
        before the window starts still terminates not-bound at step 5.
        The bound TransactionRecord is A2CN's long-lived agreement evidence
        and remains independently verifiable under A2CN's own rules while
        its signers' DID documents are resolvable or retained beside it.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-session-scope">Informatively, this version covers only bilateral COMPLETED
        sessions ending in a valid signed Acceptance of a signed Offer or
        Counteroffer. REJECTED_FINAL, WITHDRAWN, TIMED_OUT, IMPASSE, ERROR,
        HALTED_BY_CONTROLS, an observed or non-signing responder, and completion
        through external_commitment_reference are not attestable at 0.1.0.
        A2CN's SessionEvidenceRecord 0.5, specified by <xref target="A2CN"/>
        Section 9A, is a distinct producer-sealed artifact covering broader sessions; this profile does not bind it.
        Its record_type is a2cn_session_evidence_record and its record_version
        is 0.5; it covers the sessions excluded here.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-privacy">In addition to the primitive's own members, the attestation
        discloses the two party DIDs and their
        verification-method ids, the agreement outcome, the primitive's
        permitted counters and meta fields, and the two binding digests.</t>
        <t>An implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> embed TransactionRecord
        term values into the attestation beyond profile-defined binding
        values and primitive-defined non-term metadata. As in Section 7,
        this is a producer obligation; the generic verifier cannot detect a
        term hidden in a syntactically permitted free-text field. The
        TransactionRecord itself carries commercial terms and is disclosed
        only under the party's own disclosure decision.</t>
        <t anchor="a2cn-controls">The co-authors' AP-1 to AP-13 vector scenarios are mapped in the AP
        paragraphs of <xref target="vectors-a2cn"/>. Each carries its expected
        Section 9 terminal state and separate native results. In the
        co-authors' vector scheme, a vector is marked active only when
        both A2CN reference implementations produce the stated result;
        otherwise it is marked known_gap. The hand-constructed vectors in
        this document carry no active or interoperability claim.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
<section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>
      This section is written against four attacker positions: an on-path
      attacker that can read, delay, suppress, or modify messages in
      transit; a single dishonest party to the negotiation; the complete
      listed party set acting together against a third party; and an
      attacker holding a compromised party key. What the checks preserve
      against each position, and what they leave open, is stated here
      rather than left to the reader.
      </t>
      <t>
      Against the on-path attacker, signature verification detects
      modification of the countersigned attestation bytes, and no check
      detects delay, suppression, or traffic analysis
      (<xref target="sec-delivery"/>).
      </t>
      <t>
      Against a single dishonest party, requiring every listed party's
      countersignature preserves the jointly bound members against
      unilateral rewriting, and no check makes that party's behavioral
      self-report objective or closes the residual channel over
      <tt>category</tt> and <tt>summary</tt> that
      <xref target="privacy"/> records
      (<xref target="sec-dishonest"/>).
      </t>
      <t>
      Against an attacker holding a compromised party key, revocation
      bounds how long such an artifact remains useful once the deployment
      detects the compromise and the verifier can reach a revocation
      source. No check detects an artifact that back-dates its own
      <tt>timestamp</tt> and <tt>validity_temporal</tt> members, so
      revocation bounds this attacker rather than detecting it
      (<xref target="sec-key-compromise"/>).
      </t>
      <t>
      Collusion of the entire listed party set against a third party is
      the design's primary residual risk, and no check defined here
      detects it.
      </t>

      <section anchor="sec-dishonest">
        <name>Dishonest Negotiation Party</name>
        <t>
        A party can issue a false behavioral self-report. Requiring every
        listed party's countersignature prevents one holder from
        rewriting the shared outcome, but it does not make every
        self-described behavioral detail objective truth. Applications
        must distinguish jointly bound outcome members from party-level
        self-reports.
        </t>
        <t>
        The outcome an attestation carries is what the listed parties
        jointly asserted at issuance. This document defines no procedure
        for re-deriving an outcome from the transcript and no check that
        the transcript's final message agrees with <tt>outcome.status</tt>,
        so a set of parties that agree to misdescribe their own session
        produces evidence this document's checks accept. Every check here
        is a check on what the parties bound together, and none is a check
        that what they bound is true.
        </t>
        <t>
        The binding values are opaque values in the issuance snapshot,
        and a completeness indicator is the integer the parties countersigned
        with them. This document defines no check that derives the
        transcript, proves completeness, or establishes the order in which
        messages were created.
        </t>
        <t>
        A retained binding member is opaque to the verifier this document
        defines. No check here reads it, and a verified result makes no
        claim about it beyond the fact that the listed parties
        countersigned a snapshot containing that string.
        </t>
        <t>
        A party can replay old but still correctly signed evidence.
        Required temporal validity and independent relying-side age
        limits reduce this risk; neither signature verification nor the
        signed window alone is sufficient.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="sec-delivery">
        <name>Compromised Delivery Path</name>
        <t>
        The negotiation messages of a protocol that produces an
        attestation are not protected by this document. A relay or mailbox
        can read offer terms and reasoning unless that separate protocol or
        transport protects them. Deployments <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
        describe this document as an end-to-end encryption protocol.
        </t>
        <t>
        Countersignature verification detects modification of the
        attestation bytes. It does not prevent delay, suppression, traffic
        analysis, or denial of service. Session and offer timeouts bound
        how long a party waits and do not guarantee availability.
        </t>
        <t>
        A holder that suppresses a relying party's access to a revocation
        source is not detectable by any check in this document. An
        attestation verified without a determination of revocation status
        is evidence that the parties bound an outcome at issuance, and it
        is not evidence that the outcome stands today.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="sec-privacy-leak">
        <name>Privacy Leakage</name>
        <t>
        The closed schema provides no member for a raw deal term. The
        residual channel described in <xref target="privacy"/> remains,
        and it has two halves: the <tt>category</tt> taxonomy, whose
        grammar constrains shape rather than meaning, and the free-text
        <tt>summary</tt>, whose content constraint is a producing-side
        obligation a verifier cannot confirm. A producer that violates
        either obligation still produces an artifact that verifies. Correlation across stable
        agent identifiers, timestamps, categories, and session metadata
        can also reveal patterns even when individual term values are
        absent. Implementers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> minimize retention and
        disclosure according to their deployment's risk model.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="sec-key-compromise">
        <name>Key Compromise and Identity</name>
        <t>
        This document does not define identity proofing, key discovery,
        key rotation, or key revocation. A deployment
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> define how keys are bound to agent identifiers
        and how compromise is detected and handled. Outcome binding proves
        control of the resolved keys. It does not prove the real-world
        identity or the authority of their holders.
        </t>
        <t>
        A deployment that does not define key binding, rotation, and
        revocation cannot perform step 3 of
        <xref target="verification"/> and therefore cannot verify an
        attestation defined by this document at all.
        </t>
        <t>
        Signatures defined by this document are computed over canonical
        payload bytes with no context string distinguishing a
        countersignature from a negotiation message. A deployment that
        signs both with one Ed25519 key, or both with one P-256 key
        under ES256, relies on the payload shapes being
        distinguishable in practice rather than on a separation this
        document enforces. Closing that gap would need a future version to
        introduce an explicit context string, and a version that did so
        would invalidate every signature produced under this one. This
        document specifies no such string and commits no future version to
        any particular construction.
        </t>
        <t>
        Agent identifiers are compared as the normalized strings of
        <xref target="field-definitions"/>. Two identifiers that a human
        reads as the same name but that differ after that normalization
        are different parties under this document, so preventing
        confusable identifiers is a property of the deployment's
        identifier issuance rather than of any check defined here.
        </t>
        <t>
        Agreement evidence is long-lived by design, and this document
        anchors no external time source. A party key that is compromised
        or that becomes forgeable long after issuance can be used to
        produce an artifact that back-dates its own <tt>timestamp</tt> and
        <tt>validity_temporal</tt> members, and nothing inside the
        artifact distinguishes that artifact from one issued at the time
        it claims. The relying-side evidence-age ceiling of
        <xref target="freshness-general"/> bounds how long such an
        artifact remains useful to an attacker; it does not detect the
        forgery. A deployment that needs that detection anchors the
        artifact in an external append-only service at issuance.
        A stale result is evidence that the listed parties countersigned
        only while their keys remain uncompromised. After a key exposure,
        a back-dated forgery under that key can also reach stale and cannot
        be distinguished from a genuine artifact by this procedure.
        A deployment that retains stale artifacts as long-lived records
        needs that external append-only anchor at issuance.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="sec-sybil">
        <name>Sybil Behavior and Completeness</name>
        <t>
        This document does not prevent one actor from operating multiple
        agent identities. It also does not prove that a selectively
        disclosed set of attestations is a party's complete history. A
        verified aggregate can prove that the revealed set is internally
        sound and party-bound; it cannot prove the set is representative
        without an external append-only history anchor.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="sec-pqc">
        <name>Post-Quantum Migration Path</name>
        <t>
        The allowed suites for this primitive version are JCS plus
        Ed25519 <xref target="RFC8032"/> and JCS plus ES256
        <xref target="RFC7518"/>. This document does not define per-object
        algorithm negotiation: the allowed set is fixed per primitive
        version and the selected suite per profile format version rather than
        negotiated on the wire, which removes the downgrade and
        attacker-choice failure modes that negotiation would otherwise
        introduce. <xref target="RFC7696"/> (BCP&#160;201) discusses the
        tradeoffs of algorithm agility in general terms and is cited here
        for background. Agreement evidence is long-lived by design (see
        <xref target="freshness"/>), so a signature algorithm that becomes
        cryptanalytically broken during an attestation's useful lifetime
        would retroactively weaken the probative value of evidence issued
        under it. <xref target="RFC9958"/> surveys the post-quantum
        signature landscape; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are the NIST-standardized
        post-quantum signature algorithms most likely to be named by a
        future primitive version of this format. This document does not
        adopt either algorithm, does not define a hybrid classical/
        post-quantum signature mode, and does not add a negotiation field:
        the migration mechanism is a new primitive version, consistent with
        the fixed-profile design this section describes.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="resource-limits">
        <name>Resource Limits</name>
        <t>
        The limits of this section are relying-party requirements, and
        <xref target="verification"/> states the step at which each one is
        applied. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject, before parsing it,
        a received artifact larger than its configured maximum artifact
        size, and that configured maximum <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> exceed
        262144 octets. A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject an artifact
        whose JSON nesting depth exceeds 16.         A declared completeness indicator <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an
        integer within the range its profile declares, and a verifier
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject an attestation outside that range. The
        rejections of steps 1 and 2 of <xref target="verification"/>,
        which are the artifact-size cap, the nesting-depth cap, and the
        declared completeness-indicator range, run before any signature
        verification. The member caps of
        <xref target="field-definitions"/> bound the
        remaining attacker-controlled lengths inside the attestation: at
        most 64 parties, at most 32 references, at most 16 extension
        names, at most 256 octets in any identifier, and at most 1024
        Unicode scalar values in <tt>summary</tt>. This document processes
        no transcript. The completeness-indicator cap instead bounds an
        attacker-controlled integer that applications may display, log, or
        use in policy.
        </t>
        <t>
        Two listed parties do not imply two transcript messages. A single
        message can carry a jointly meaningful commitment, so a profile's
        completeness-indicator floor can be 1 and the number of listed
        parties implies nothing about the number of messages.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section><section anchor="operational">
      <name>Operational and Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>
      Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep raw transcripts under the
      parties' control and present the narrower attestation when term
      disclosure is unnecessary. Logs and diagnostics
      <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> avoid copying raw deal terms or cryptographic
      material. Verifiers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> return typed failure
      reasons without echoing untrusted private content, on the terms
      stated in <xref target="verification"/>. Clock synchronization is
      operationally important; the finite skew bound a verifier enforces
      is specified in <xref target="freshness-general"/>.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>
      This document requests no IANA actions. The vocabularies it defines
      change by a new format version of the profile or primitive that owns
      them. A recipient rejects a <tt>status</tt> or <tt>value_range</tt>
      value outside the enumerated set, and preserves an unrecognized
      reference <tt>type</tt> or <tt>relationship</tt> value as an opaque
      string.
      </t>
      <t>
      This document registers no media type. An attestation defined here
      is carried inside a deployment's own protocol, which names the type
      it uses, and this document defines no transport. A version that
      defines a transport is where a media-type registration belongs.
      </t>
    </section>
<section anchor="neighboring">
      <name>Relationship to Neighboring Work</name>
      <t>This section is informative.</t>

      <section anchor="rel-composition">
        <name>Evidence Composition and Sufficiency</name>
        <t>
        A general evidence-composition framework can treat a verified
        attestation as a native evidence component, alongside the
        ApprovalReceipt, FulfillmentAttestation, and RevocationRecord that
        <xref target="concordia-related-artifacts"/> names. This document defines
        the attestation and defines none of those three: their member
        sets, signature preimages, and authority rules come from the
        Concordia Protocol Specification described in
        <xref target="crosswalk"/> or from whatever document a deployment
        names, and no requirement of this document reads a member of any
        of them. The verification procedure
        (<xref target="verification"/>) is authoritative for the
        attestation alone. An external composer decides whether a set of
        heterogeneous evidence is sufficient for its own relying
        policy.
        </t>
        <t>
        This composition is optional. No normative requirement in this
        document depends on any particular composition framework or draft
        revision. <xref target="epaec"/> illustrates one such external
        composition model without creating a dependency on it.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="rel-request">
        <name>Evidence Request and Refusal</name>
        <t>
        A relying party can refuse an interaction with a structured
        challenge that describes missing evidence, a freshness
        requirement, accepted presentation profiles, and retry state. This
        document's artifacts can be consumed in that pattern without this
        document defining a competing challenge format: a party can
        decline a proposed session with a reason and later open or
        reactivate a session after obtaining the requested evidence. This
        document does not define a machine-readable outstanding-evidence
        vocabulary in the decline message.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="rel-authority">
        <name>Authority and Mandates</name>
        <t>
        Authorization assertions and mandates describe what an agent is
        permitted to do before negotiation. This document describes what
        the parties negotiated and jointly bound afterward. A mandate can
        be referenced by an artifact defined in this document; the mandate
        format and authorization decision remain external.
        </t>
        <t>
        This document places obligations on the party that relies on an
        attestation and places none on a policy evaluator deciding whether
        an action may proceed. Binding an evaluator in advance to decide
        against a specific prior commitment is a property of the
        authorization layer described in this section, and an
        implementation that requires it obtains it there.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="rel-boundary">
        <name>Boundary-Decision and Action Receipts</name>
        <t>
        Access-control and action receipts record what one boundary,
        gateway, or policy engine decided or observed. An attestation
        defined by this document records what multiple negotiating
        parties jointly bound. A deployment can produce both artifacts for
        the same broader transaction; neither substitutes for the other.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="rel-settlement">
        <name>Settlement Evidence</name>
        <t>
        Payment and ledger evidence prove rail-specific authorization,
        consumption, or finality. This document intentionally does not.
        Likewise, a FulfillmentAttestation as described in
        <xref target="fulfillment-attestation"/> does not prove payment
        finality. Together they can describe different parts of one
        transaction without collapsing their signer positions.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="rel-scitt">
        <name>Relationship to the agentproto Working Group</name>
        <t>
        The proposed IETF agentproto working group charter describes a
        standards-track agentic dialog management protocol (dialog
        correlation,
        lifecycle, and transport bindings), an informational reference
        architecture, and informational use cases and requirements. Its
        charter-ietf-agentproto-00-04, dated 2026-10-02, lists this
        out-of-scope item: "Audit data structures and their production,
        validation, or consumption, though dialog identifiers may be used
        in auditing." Its coordination section names,
        verbatim,
        "Evidence and transparency: SCITT, RATS, on software and hardware
        security" and, for identity and authorization, "Security: Web
        Authorization Protocol (OAuth), webbotauth, WIMSE."
        </t>
        <t>
        The evidence objects defined by this document are not an
        agentproto deliverable and are not listed in its charter. This
        document touches the agentproto charter only at the
        evidence-and-transparency coordination point named above and at the
        dialog-identifier hook preserved in the out-of-scope line. This
        document defines no mapping from the context identifier to a dialog
        identifier, and it defines no dialog-management, transport-binding,
        session-lifecycle, or identity/authorization mechanism of its own.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="rel-umbrella">
        <name>Relationship to a Neutral Evidence-Composition Interface</name>
        <t>
        A related effort defines a protocol-neutral interface for
        composing evidence across multiple agent-evidence formats. This
        document defines this specification's own artifact family; the
        neutral-interface effort defines a composition interface across
        formats. Neither is a normative dependency of the other, and this
        document does not describe, reference, or rely on that effort's
        schema, status, or publication venue.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="rel-adjacent">
        <name>Adjacent Multi-Signer Evidence Work</name>
        <t>
        Other individual Internet-Drafts define multi-signer evidence for
        agent actions and transactions. <xref target="I-D.laxsharma-pact"/>
        defines a contract layer in which a buyer and a seller co-sign a
        JCS-canonicalized task contract; a Verdict is bound by digest to
        the Delivery it judges; and a Facilitator alone signs one Outcome
        Record per contract as input to reputation systems. That contract
        format binds pricing and scope terms directly into the signed
        object and does not specify an independent relying-side freshness
        discipline.
        <xref target="I-D.mih-agent-bilateral-attestation"/> defines a
        four-move exchange in which each of two organizations holds the
        other's signature over the same action digest; it covers a single
        directed action rather than a negotiated multi-attribute outcome,
        and its wire encoding is deferred to a future revision.
        </t>
        <t>
        The attestation defined by this document differs from both: it
        binds an outcome reached through a multi-round, multi-attribute
        negotiation; it structurally excludes
        negotiated price, quantity, date, and free-text term values from
        the signed object (<xref target="privacy"/>); and it defines an
        independent relying-side freshness obligation
        (<xref target="freshness"/>) that neither adjacent draft
        specifies. These efforts are complementary rather than competing;
        a relying party could in principle consume evidence from more than
        one of these formats for a single broader transaction.
        </t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="rel-requirements">
        <name>Adjacent Requirements and Single-Issuer Evidence Work</name>
        <t>
        <xref target="I-D.somoza-dmsc-atn-agent-trust-negotiation"/>
        defines a pre-negotiation trust handshake that binds a capability
        manifest, a delegation chain, a provenance attestation, and a
        session receipt to a discovered agent identity, and computes an
        agreed scope through a specified intersection algebra over the
        peers' declarations. That work establishes what a pair of agents
        is permitted to attempt before a negotiation of terms opens. This
        document defines the evidence produced after such a negotiation
        closes, and it carries no capability manifest, no delegation
        chain, and no scope algebra of its own.
        </t>
        <t>
        <xref target="I-D.wadkins-agentproto-action-determinability"/>
        states mechanism-independent requirements for establishing at a
        later time that a claimed action occurred under the conditions
        said to govern it, including that the governing conditions were
        fixed no later than the decision and that an independent evaluator
        can establish the claim without cooperation from an original
        participant. Those requirements are stated over any evidence
        format and define none. An attestation defined by this document is
        one artifact such an evaluator can read.
        <xref target="evidence-model"/> records that this document binds
        what the parties agreed at conclusion rather than a commitment
        fixed in advance, <xref target="rel-authority"/> records that it
        places no obligation on a policy evaluator, and
        <xref target="sec-dishonest"/> records what it does and does not
        establish about ordering.
        </t>
        <t>
        <xref target="I-D.sergeev-claim-boundaries"/> states
        protocol-neutral limits on what signed evidence can support, and
        the bounds in <xref target="sec-dishonest"/> and
        <xref target="sec-key-compromise"/> of this document correspond to
        rules 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 of its Section 6: a verified attestation
        supports the claim stated in <xref target="intro"/> under the
        key-binding premise of <xref target="sec-key-compromise"/>, and
        supports no claim about the truth of the outcome, the completeness
        of the transcript, or the order in which the transcript's messages
        were created.
        </t>
        <t>
        <xref target="I-D.bradleyb-audit-decision-records"/> records
        authorization decisions rather than actions, so that a denial, an
        expiry, or an unfulfilled commitment remains representable, and it
        requires a record to disclose what establishes the order of the
        decision against the effect and whether that mechanism sits inside
        the producer's own trust boundary. This document records a digest and, when the profile declares one, a
        count that the parties countersigned, and
        <xref target="sec-dishonest"/> states what it does and does not
        establish about precedence.
        </t>
        <t>
        <xref target="I-D.schrock-ep-bounded-capability-receipts"/>
        defines a signed capability carrying a budget with explicit units,
        together with a reserve, admit, and reconcile state machine that
        refuses overspend, prevents replay of an operation, serializes
        concurrent owners, and charges an indeterminate operation
        conservatively. It bounds how much authority an agent may consume
        before and while it acts. This document reports what a set of
        parties bound after a negotiation concluded, and it defines no
        budget, no reservation, no consumption record, and no single-use
        semantics of its own beyond the relying-side bound in
        <xref target="single-use"/>.
        </t>
        <t>
        <xref target="I-D.correctover-ccs"/> defines a runtime conformance
        check over an individual agent tool call across seven dimensions
        and emits a signed receipt carrying an allow, deny, or escalate
        verdict for one invocation, using Ed25519 signatures over JCS
        canonical JSON as this document does. It judges a single call at
        the moment that call is made and records one issuer's verdict.
        This document binds an outcome that several parties reached across
        many messages and records no verdict, so a deployment can produce
        both artifacts for one broader transaction without either standing
        in for the other.
        </t>
      </section>

    </section>
  </middle>

  <back>
    <references>
      <name>Normative References</name>
      <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">
        <front>
          <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="S. Bradner"/>
          <date year="1997" month="March"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">
        <front>
          <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
          <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="B. Leiba"/>
          <date year="2017" month="May"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8032" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032">
        <front>
          <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Josefsson" fullname="S. Josefsson"/>
          <author initials="I." surname="Liusvaara" fullname="I. Liusvaara"/>
          <date year="2017" month="January"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
        <annotation>
        Informational. Cited normatively for the Ed25519 signature
        algorithm and the verification criteria required by
        <xref target="sig-verify"/>; as with
        <xref target="RFC8785"/>, <xref target="RFC6234"/>, and
        <xref target="RFC7493"/>, this is a downward reference from a Standards Track document and is expected
        to be flagged and pre-approved at IETF Last Call.
        </annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8785" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785">
        <front>
          <title>JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)</title>
          <author initials="A." surname="Rundgren" fullname="A. Rundgren"/>
          <author initials="B." surname="Jordan" fullname="B. Jordan"/>
          <author initials="S." surname="Erdtman" fullname="S. Erdtman"/>
          <date year="2020" month="June"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8785"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8785"/>
        <annotation>
        Informational. Cited normatively for the canonicalization scheme
        used throughout this document; a Standards Track document citing
        an Informational RFC normatively is a downward reference and is
        expected to be flagged and pre-approved at IETF Last Call. Two
        verified errata are on file against this RFC and were checked at
        conversion time: Errata ID 6292 (editorial, Section 3.2.2.2 cross
        reference) and Errata ID 7920 (technical, Section 5, handling of
        negative zero); neither changes the normative text this document
        relies on.
        </annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8259" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">
        <front>
          <title>The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format</title>
          <author initials="T." surname="Bray" fullname="T. Bray" role="editor"/>
          <date year="2017" month="December"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="STD" value="90"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8259"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8259"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC3629" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629">
        <front>
          <title>UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646</title>
          <author initials="F." surname="Yergeau" fullname="F. Yergeau"/>
          <date year="2003" month="November"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="STD" value="63"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3629"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3629"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC6234" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234">
        <front>
          <title>US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)</title>
          <author initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd" fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd"/>
          <author initials="T." surname="Hansen" fullname="T. Hansen"/>
          <date year="2011" month="May"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6234"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6234"/>
        <annotation>
        Informational. Cited normatively for the digest-string binding
        members of <xref target="field-definitions"/>; as with
        <xref target="RFC8785"/>, <xref target="RFC8032"/>, and
        <xref target="RFC7493"/>, this is a downward reference from a
        Standards Track document and is expected to be flagged and
        pre-approved at IETF Last Call.
        </annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC3339" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339">
        <front>
          <title>Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps</title>
          <author initials="G." surname="Klyne" fullname="G. Klyne"/>
          <author initials="C." surname="Newman" fullname="C. Newman"/>
          <date year="2002" month="July"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3339"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3339"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC4648" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648">
        <front>
          <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Josefsson" fullname="S. Josefsson"/>
          <date year="2006" month="October"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7493" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7493">
        <front>
          <title>The I-JSON Message Format</title>
          <author initials="T." surname="Bray" fullname="T. Bray" role="editor"/>
          <date year="2015" month="March"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7493"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7493"/>
        <annotation>
        Informational. Cited normatively for the I-JSON restrictions
        applied at step 2 of <xref target="verification"/>; as with
        <xref target="RFC8785"/>, <xref target="RFC8032"/>, and
        <xref target="RFC6234"/>, this is a downward reference from a
        Standards Track document and is expected to be flagged and
        pre-approved at IETF Last Call.
        </annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7518" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518">
        <front><title>JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)</title>
          <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="M. Jones"/>
          <date year="2015" month="May"/></front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7518"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7518"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="FIPS186-5" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5">
        <front><title>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</title>
          <author><organization>NIST</organization></author>
          <date year="2023" month="February"/></front>
        <seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="186-5"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="NIST-SP-800-186" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-186">
        <front><title>Recommendations for Discrete Logarithm-based Cryptography: Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters</title>
          <author initials="L." surname="Chen"/>
          <author initials="D." surname="Moody"/>
          <author initials="A." surname="Regenscheid"/>
          <author initials="A." surname="Robinson"/>
          <author initials="K." surname="Randall"/>
          <date year="2023" month="February"/></front>
        <seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-186"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-186"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="UAX15" target="https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/">
        <front>
          <title>Unicode Standard Annex #15: Unicode Normalization Forms</title>
          <author>
            <organization>The Unicode Consortium</organization>
          </author>
        </front>
      </reference>
    </references>

    <references>
      <name>Informative References</name>
      <reference anchor="A2CN" target="https://github.com/A2CN-protocol/A2CN/blob/1ba8f0d/spec/a2cn-spec-v0.2.0.md">
        <front><title>A2CN Protocol Specification</title>
          <author><organization>A2CN Protocol</organization></author>
          <date year="2026" month="October"/></front>
        <annotation>A2CN-protocol/A2CN repository, spec/a2cn-spec-v0.2.0.md at commit 1ba8f0d.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="CONCORDIA" target="https://github.com/eriknewton/concordia-protocol/blob/847729cd95f7b64bfb05371da6a4f204beb42546/SPEC.md">
        <front><title>Concordia Protocol Specification</title>
          <author initials="E." surname="Newton" fullname="Erik Newton"/>
          <date year="2026" month="October"/></front>
        <annotation>eriknewton/concordia-protocol repository, SPEC.md (edition 0.7.0-draft) at commit 847729cd.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="DID-CORE" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/2022/REC-did-core-20220719/">
        <front><title>Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0</title>
          <author><organization>W3C</organization></author>
          <date year="2022" month="July" day="19"/></front>
        <seriesInfo name="W3C" value="Recommendation"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7696" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696">
        <front>
          <title>Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms</title>
          <author initials="R." surname="Housley" fullname="R. Housley"/>
          <date year="2015" month="November"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="201"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7696"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7696"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9958" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9958">
        <front>
          <title>Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers</title>
          <author initials="A." surname="Banerjee" fullname="A. Banerjee"/>
          <author initials="T." surname="Reddy.K" fullname="T. Reddy.K"/>
          <author initials="D." surname="Schoinianakis" fullname="D. Schoinianakis"/>
          <author initials="T." surname="Hollebeek" fullname="T. Hollebeek"/>
          <author initials="M." surname="Ounsworth" fullname="M. Ounsworth"/>
          <date year="2026" month="June"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9958"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9958"/>
        <annotation>
        Informational. Title, author list, and June 2026 publication date
        verified at the RFC Editor and the datatracker on 2026-09-16.
        </annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7942" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942">
        <front>
          <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
          <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer" fullname="Y. Sheffer"/>
          <author initials="A." surname="Farrel" fullname="A. Farrel"/>
          <date year="2016" month="July"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.laxsharma-pact" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-laxsharma-pact/">
        <front>
          <title>PACT: Co-Signed Task Contracts, Delivery and Verdict Records, and Outcome Records for Autonomous Agents</title>
          <author initials="L." surname="Sharma" fullname="Laxmikant Sharma"/>
          <date year="2026" month="September" day="16"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-laxsharma-pact-02"/>
        <annotation>Work in progress. Revision, date, title, and author verified active at the datatracker on 2026-10-03.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.mih-agent-bilateral-attestation" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mih-agent-bilateral-attestation/">
        <front>
          <title>Bilateral Attestation of Cross-Organization Agent Actions</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Mih" fullname="Steven Mih"/>
          <date year="2026" month="September" day="13"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mih-agent-bilateral-attestation-02"/>
        <annotation>Work in progress. Revision, date, title, and author verified active at the datatracker on 2026-09-16.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-evidence-chain" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schrock-ep-authorization-evidence-chain/">
        <front>
          <title>Authorization Evidence Chains: Composing Heterogeneous Agent-Action Evidence (EP-AEC)</title>
          <author initials="I." surname="Schrock" fullname="Iman Schrock"/>
          <date year="2026" month="September" day="28"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-schrock-ep-authorization-evidence-chain-07"/>
        <annotation>Work in progress. Revision, date, title, and author verified active at the datatracker on 2026-10-03; this is the document that carries the EP-AEC sufficiency and composition model referenced informatively in <xref target="epaec"/>, distinct from its sibling <xref target="I-D.schrock-ep-bounded-capability-receipts"/>, which defines a budgeted capability.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.somoza-dmsc-atn-agent-trust-negotiation" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-somoza-dmsc-atn-agent-trust-negotiation/">
        <front>
          <title>Agent Trust Negotiation: Capability, Delegation, and Provenance Binding for AI Agents</title>
          <author initials="E." surname="Somoza" fullname="Enrique Somoza"/>
          <date year="2026" month="May" day="29"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-somoza-dmsc-atn-agent-trust-negotiation-00"/>
        <annotation>Work in progress. Revision, date, title, and author verified active at the datatracker on 2026-09-16.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.wadkins-agentproto-action-determinability" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wadkins-agentproto-action-determinability/">
        <front>
          <title>Independent Determinability of Agent Actions</title>
          <author initials="D." surname="Wadkins" fullname="Douglas Wadkins"/>
          <date year="2026" month="September" day="10"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wadkins-agentproto-action-determinability-00"/>
        <annotation>Work in progress. Revision, date, title, and author verified active at the datatracker on 2026-09-16.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.sergeev-claim-boundaries" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sergeev-claim-boundaries/">
        <front>
          <title>Claim Boundaries for Execution Evidence</title>
          <author initials="M." surname="Sergeev" fullname="M. Sergeev"/>
          <date year="2026" month="September" day="23"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sergeev-claim-boundaries-01"/>
        <annotation>Work in progress. Revision, date, title, and author verified against the IETF archive on 2026-09-24.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.bradleyb-audit-decision-records" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bradleyb-audit-decision-records/">
        <front>
          <title>Signed Decision Records for Agent Authorization: Disclosures, Entry Emission, and Ordering Evidence</title>
          <author initials="B." surname="B" fullname="Bradley B"/>
          <date year="2026" month="August" day="13"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-bradleyb-audit-decision-records-00"/>
        <annotation>Work in progress. Revision, date, title, and author verified active at the datatracker on 2026-09-16; the author field at the datatracker renders as "Bradley B" and is cited here as it appears there.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.schrock-ep-bounded-capability-receipts" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schrock-ep-bounded-capability-receipts/">
        <front>
          <title>Bounded Capability Receipts and Durable Spend Control for Agent Actions</title>
          <author initials="I." surname="Schrock" fullname="Iman Schrock"/>
          <date year="2026" month="September" day="9"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-schrock-ep-bounded-capability-receipts-06"/>
        <annotation>Work in progress. Revision, date, title, and author verified active at the datatracker on 2026-09-16.</annotation>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.correctover-ccs" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-correctover-ccs/">
        <front>
          <title>Correctover Conformance Shape (CCS): Runtime Verification for AI Agent Tool Calls</title>
          <author initials="G." surname="Wang" fullname="Guigui Wang"/>
          <date year="2026" month="September" day="14"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-correctover-ccs-09"/>
        <annotation>Work in progress. Revision, date, title, and author verified active at the datatracker on 2026-09-16.</annotation>
      </reference>
    </references>

<section anchor="crosswalk" numbered="true">
      <name>Profile Crosswalks</name>
      <t>This appendix is informative. The source specifications are the Concordia Protocol Specification
      <xref target="CONCORDIA"/> and the A2CN Protocol Specification
      <xref target="A2CN"/>. The tables record which sections of each
      specification the corresponding profile subjects are derived from,
      for editor traceability; it is not part of the normative text, and
      no requirement of this document depends on it.</t>
      <table anchor="tbl-crosswalk">
        <name>Crosswalk to the Source Specification</name>
        <thead>
          <tr><th>Document subject</th><th>Concordia Protocol Specification section</th></tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr><td>Scope and non-goals</td><td>Sections 1.4 and 2</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Terms and agreement surfaces</td><td>Sections 3 and 4</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Lifecycle and offer grammar</td><td>Sections 5 and 6</td></tr>
          <tr><td>JCS, signatures, and transcript digest fields</td><td>Sections 9.2, 9.3, and 9.6.2</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Attestation schema and fields</td><td>Sections 9.6.2 and 9.6.3</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Approval, fulfillment, revocation</td><td>Sections 9.6.4a through 9.6.4d</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Outcome binding</td><td>Section 9.6.5a</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Privacy invariant</td><td>Section 9.6.6</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Freshness and replay</td><td>Section 9.7</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Threat-model security organization</td><td>Section 9.8</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Typed references</td><td>Section 11.5</td></tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <table anchor="tbl-a2cn-crosswalk">
        <name>A2CN Profile Crosswalk</name>
        <thead><tr><th>Profile subject</th><th>A2CN specification</th></tr></thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr><td>TransactionRecord 0.4 and deterministic derivation</td><td>Section 9</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Independent derivation of binding values</td><td>Section 9.2</td></tr>
          <tr><td>offer_chain_hash</td><td>Section 9.3</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Native record checks</td><td>Section 9.5</td></tr>
          <tr><td>Full terminal detail vocabulary: COMPLETED belongs to agreed; REJECTED_FINAL, WITHDRAWN, TIMED_OUT, IMPASSE, ERROR, HALTED_BY_CONTROLS belong to not_agreed</td><td>Section 9A.2 (<tt>terminal.outcome</tt>), listed in 9A.1; HALTED_BY_CONTROLS in 9A.10; profile 0.1.0 permits only agreed/COMPLETED (Section 10.3)</td></tr>
          <tr><td>SessionEvidenceRecord boundary</td><td>Section 9A</td></tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>The A2CN crosswalk refers to <xref target="A2CN"/> at commit
      1ba8f0d. Concordia's 0.7.0 status/detail change is specified here;
      the source crosswalk does not claim an SDK or specification update.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="impl-status">
      <name>Implementation Status by Profile</name>
      <t>This appendix is informative and follows <xref target="RFC7942"/>.
      The RFC Editor is requested to remove it before publication, with the
      reference to RFC 7942. The Concordia table has one row per applicable
      requirement-keyword occurrence in normative text, including definitions,
      security and operational requirements; the requirements-language
      boilerplate and informative sections are excluded.</t>
      <t>Concordia rows with unchanged requirement sentences retain their r3
      cells. Unchanged sentences newly counted take "specified here, no
      implementation" for producer or deployment obligations and "unchanged
      since r3; newly counted" for other requirements. The latter records
      census coverage, not an implementation assessment. The two copies of the deployment-profile
      prohibition use the same specified-here cell. Only new or changed
      sentences are scheduled for 0.7.0. Preserved
      scheduled-for-0.6.0 cells are historical r3 statements, not a fresh
      implementation assessment. A2CN status is a single statement, since
      no implementation of that profile is reported.</t>
<t>Concordia: 125 applicable occurrences (41 MUST NOT, 64 MUST, 1 REQUIRED, 5 SHOULD, 14 MAY).</t>
<table anchor="tbl-impl-concordia"><name>Concordia Per-Requirement Status</name><thead><tr><th>Requirement</th><th>Section</th><th>Status</th></tr></thead><tbody>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST NOT supply or constrain it.</td><td>2.2</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST NOT add, rename, nest, or omit a member at any depth except the names and vocabularies this document marks profile-assigned.</td><td>3</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>the verifier MUST NOT report completeness from it.</td><td>3</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MAY restrict status to one value and MUST NOT extend it.</td><td>4.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MAY restrict status to one value and MUST NOT extend it.</td><td>4.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A relying party MAY calculate its own score or ignore them.</td><td>4.3</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E1]</td></tr>
<tr><td>The final encoded group carries four unused bits, and those bits MUST be zero.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A recipient MUST reject a signature value of any other length, a value whose padding is absent or misplaced, a value carrying any character outside that alphabet, a value carrying whitespace, and a value whose unused bits are not zero.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Two signature values are equal when their 64 decoded octets are equal, and a recipient MUST compare the decoded octets rather than the encoded characters.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A recipient MUST reject a numeric offset, including &quot;+00:00&quot;, and MUST reject a fractional second of more than three digits.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A recipient MUST reject a numeric offset, including &quot;+00:00&quot;, and MUST reject a fractional second of more than three digits.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A recipient MUST reject a string member whose received value differs from its own Normalization Form C, and MUST compare two identifier strings only after both are in that form.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A recipient MUST reject a string member whose received value differs from its own Normalization Form C, and MUST compare two identifier strings only after both are in that form.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Where this section says a member carries no whitespace, that member MUST NOT carry a character with the Unicode White_Space property, and MUST NOT carry a character in the ranges U+0000 to U+001F, U+007F to U+009F, U+200B to U+200F, or U+2028 to U+202E.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Where this section says a member carries no whitespace, that member MUST NOT carry a character with the Unicode White_Space property, and MUST NOT carry a character in the ranges U+0000 to U+001F, U+007F to U+009F, U+200B to U+200F, or U+2028 to U+202E.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>a recipient MUST preserve a type or relationship value it does not recognize as an opaque string rather than rejecting it, so that a later version&#x27;s relationship survives a round trip through an earlier implementation.</td><td>4.4</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E2]</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MAY declare one binding member as retained.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier MUST NOT treat its presence or its validity as evidence that an outcome is outcome-bound.</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>The key_ref member MUST NOT carry key material;</td><td>4.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A recipient MUST reject any other value.</td><td>4.4</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E3]</td></tr>
<tr><td>A signer and verifier MUST canonicalize the same logical object to identical UTF-8 bytes before signing or verification.</td><td>5.1</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E4]</td></tr>
<tr><td>Implementations MUST reject values that cannot be represented under Section 4.4 and the canonicalization rules.</td><td>5.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A recipient MUST reject a numeric value outside its stated range, MUST reject an object in which a member name occurs more than once, as detected during parsing and before any duplicate-resolution rule is applied, and MUST reject input that is not well-formed UTF-8 or that contains an unpaired surrogate.</td><td>5.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A recipient MUST reject a numeric value outside its stated range, MUST reject an object in which a member name occurs more than once, as detected during parsing and before any duplicate-resolution rule is applied, and MUST reject input that is not well-formed UTF-8 or that contains an unpaired surrogate.</td><td>5.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A recipient MUST reject a numeric value outside its stated range, MUST reject an object in which a member name occurs more than once, as detected during parsing and before any duplicate-resolution rule is applied, and MUST reject input that is not well-formed UTF-8 or that contains an unpaired surrogate.</td><td>5.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>For JCS plus Ed25519, implementations MUST verify Ed25519 signatures as specified in Section 5.1.7 of [RFC8032] using the cofactorless equation, and MUST reject a signature whose R or S component is not canonically encoded, or whose S is not reduced modulo L.</td><td>5.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>For JCS plus Ed25519, implementations MUST verify Ed25519 signatures as specified in Section 5.1.7 of [RFC8032] using the cofactorless equation, and MUST reject a signature whose R or S component is not canonically encoded, or whose S is not reduced modulo L.</td><td>5.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>For JCS plus ES256, implementations MUST verify ECDSA over P-256 with SHA-256 computed over the Section 6.1 canonical payload bytes, using [FIPS186-5].</td><td>5.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Verification MUST reject R or S outside [1, n-1], where n is the order of P-256.</td><td>5.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>At step 3, the verifier MUST reject an Ed25519 public key that is not a canonically encoded point of order L, or an ES256 public key that is not a valid point on P-256 or is the point at infinity.</td><td>5.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A relying party MUST NOT use signature bytes as an identifier or deduplication key.</td><td>5.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>To derive it, an implementation MUST:</td><td>6.1</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E5]</td></tr>
<tr><td>For an artifact at or above the selected protocol profile&#x27;s binding floor, a verifier MUST NOT credit an outcome as outcome-bound unless:</td><td>6.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Such an artifact MAY be retained as a record of its own contents.</td><td>6.2</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E6]</td></tr>
<tr><td>Its outcome MUST NOT be credited as outcome-bound, and it MUST NOT be reported as current.</td><td>6.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Its outcome MUST NOT be credited as outcome-bound, and it MUST NOT be reported as current.</td><td>6.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>It MUST NOT be reported as current or bound-only and MUST NOT be credited for reliance.</td><td>6.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>It MUST NOT be reported as current or bound-only and MUST NOT be credited for reliance.</td><td>6.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST NOT populate any field with an exact negotiated price, quantity, date, or other term value;</td><td>7</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST NOT include an item or service description beyond the permitted category and value_range fields;</td><td>7</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST NOT include free-text reasoning copied from negotiation messages;</td><td>7</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST NOT include the identity of a human or organization represented by an agent;</td><td>7</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST draw value_range, when present, from the fixed bucket vocabulary defined in Section 4.4 and MUST reject all other values rather than coerce them;</td><td>7</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E3]</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST draw value_range, when present, from the fixed bucket vocabulary defined in Section 4.4 and MUST reject all other values rather than coerce them;</td><td>7</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E3]</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST encode category, when present, as a dotted lowercase taxonomy path of at most 64 octets matching the grammar in Section 4.4, where each segment is one or more characters drawn from a to z, 0 to 9, underscore, and hyphen, and MUST reject any other value rather than coercing it;</td><td>7</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E3]</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST encode category, when present, as a dotted lowercase taxonomy path of at most 64 octets matching the grammar in Section 4.4, where each segment is one or more characters drawn from a to z, 0 to 9, underscore, and hyphen, and MUST reject any other value rather than coercing it;</td><td>7</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E3]</td></tr>
<tr><td>MAY omit category for additional privacy;</td><td>7</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E7]</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST reject a reference identifier longer than 256 octets or containing whitespace, and MUST reject an attestation carrying more than 32 references, rather than truncating either;</td><td>7</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E3]</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST reject a reference identifier longer than 256 octets or containing whitespace, and MUST reject an attestation carrying more than 32 references, rather than truncating either;</td><td>7</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E3]</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST keep summary, when present, within 1024 Unicode scalar values and MUST NOT copy a negotiated term value or free-text reasoning into it.</td><td>7</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>MUST keep summary, when present, within 1024 Unicode scalar values and MUST NOT copy a negotiated term value or free-text reasoning into it.</td><td>7</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>A relying party MUST configure a maximum evidence age not exceeding 90 days, a maximum accepted validity lifetime not exceeding 90 days, and a clock-skew allowance not exceeding 300 seconds.</td><td>8.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Exceeding the lifetime or skew bound MUST terminate not-bound at step 5.</td><td>8.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A relying party MAY configure tighter values.</td><td>8.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A relying party MUST enforce its own maximum evidence age independently of the signer&#x27;s asserted validity window, and MUST reject a signer-asserted timestamp or interval start that is future-dated beyond that clock-skew allowance.</td><td>8.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A relying party MUST enforce its own maximum evidence age independently of the signer&#x27;s asserted validity window, and MUST reject a signer-asserted timestamp or interval start that is future-dated beyond that clock-skew allowance.</td><td>8.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier MUST enforce that finite skew bound and fail closed outside it, whatever the quality of its clock synchronization.</td><td>8.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A relying party MUST mark an attestation stale at step 5 when it passed steps 1 through 4 and every other step 5 check but its validity_temporal interval has ended at the time of verification.</td><td>8.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A relying party MAY apply a tighter freshness bound than the signer asserted.</td><td>8.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A party MUST NOT countersign an attestation whose validity_temporal lifetime exceeds 90 days as Section 8.1 defines that quantity.</td><td>8.2</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E6]</td></tr>
<tr><td>A party MAY apply a shorter maximum.</td><td>8.2</td><td>implemented at 847729cd [E6]</td></tr>
<tr><td>validity_temporal is REQUIRED on every attestation at or above the selected protocol profile&#x27;s binding floor.</td><td>8.3</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier MUST reject a validity_temporal object whose mode member is absent or carries another value, whose members for the stated mode are absent, which carries any other member, or whose interval is empty or reversed, at step 2 with not-bound.</td><td>8.3</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A relying party that treats one attestation as grounds for a consequential effect SHOULD keep a consumption record for that attestation, keyed by its attestation_id, inside its own accounting domain, and consult that record before admitting a further effect.</td><td>8.4</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>To reach a terminal state for a received artifact, a relying party MUST perform the following steps in fail-closed order.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>An artifact whose value is well formed and below the selected profile&#x27;s binding floor terminates here with the terminal state legacy, and the verifier MUST NOT apply any step below to it: it performs no signature verification, no outcome binding, no temporal check, and no revocation check over that artifact.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>The verifier MUST treat revocation status as undetermined in each of three cases: the deployment names no revocation source, the named source is unavailable, or the named source supplies a record that cannot be interpreted under the deployment&#x27;s own definition of that source.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>In every one of those three cases the verifier MUST NOT report the artifact as current and MUST continue through step 8 to step 9 with revocation status undetermined, retaining any stale mark.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>In every one of those three cases the verifier MUST NOT report the artifact as current and MUST continue through step 8 to step 9 with revocation status undetermined, retaining any stale mark.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>An implementation MAY expose diagnostic detail alongside the state it reports, and MUST NOT report any other state name in its place.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>An implementation MAY expose diagnostic detail alongside the state it reports, and MUST NOT report any other state name in its place.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>An implementation MUST NOT silently replace one terminal state with another, and in particular MUST NOT report a legacy or bound-only artifact as current, or a stale artifact as current or bound-only.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>An implementation MUST NOT silently replace one terminal state with another, and in particular MUST NOT report a legacy or bound-only artifact as current, or a stale artifact as current or bound-only.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier that returns a typed failure reason MUST distinguish a result this document&#x27;s checks cannot produce at all from a result this verifier could not reach with the inputs it held, and MUST NOT report the second as the first.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier that returns a typed failure reason MUST distinguish a result this document&#x27;s checks cannot produce at all from a result this verifier could not reach with the inputs it held, and MUST NOT report the second as the first.</td><td>9</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST assign the version member&#x27;s name, current value, and binding floor.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>The version-member name a protocol profile assigns MUST be distinct from every other registered profile&#x27;s version-member name.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Every member name a protocol profile assigns or declares MUST be distinct from every primitive-fixed name, including signature and countersignatures.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST NOT give any other root member a name equal to a registered profile&#x27;s version-member name, so that step 2a of Section 9 counts exactly one registered name on a conforming artifact.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile whose first format version has no deployed base MUST set its binding floor to that first version.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST assign the context identifier&#x27;s name and MUST define its meaning as the session or interaction the relying party expects for the verification;</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST assign the context identifier&#x27;s name and MUST define its meaning as the session or interaction the relying party expects for the verification;</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST declare each binding member&#x27;s name and meaning.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A meaning MUST commit only to material the profile requires every listed party to have received, or independently derived from protocol messages that party received, before countersigning;</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MAY declare a retained binding member whose preimage it does not specify;</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MUST NOT describe a binding value as proof of completeness or of transcript integrity.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MAY describe an out-of-band comparison a holder of the committed material can run after the verification procedure;</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MUST NOT instruct a relying party to treat an out-of-band comparison as proof of completeness, as evidence beyond the verified claim of Section 3, or as changing a terminal state.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MUST NOT instruct the Section 9 procedure to recompute or compare a binding value.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Native verification MAY recompute a binding value from a presented object and report the comparison only as a separately named native check under Section 10.1.2.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST declare whether a completeness indicator exists, its name and integer range, and state that it is the integer the parties countersigned, not proof that nothing was dropped.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MUST NOT define completeness semantics the verifier reports.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST assign the vocabularies for role, resolution_mechanism, extensions_used, reference type, and relationship.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MAY declare the extensions_used vocabulary as an open shape, meaning any string of the Table 5 shape naming one of its extensions, and MUST say so if it does.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MAY declare the extensions_used vocabulary as an open shape, meaning any string of the Table 5 shape naming one of its extensions, and MUST say so if it does.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile can restrict and MUST NOT extend outcome.status.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MUST declare its outcome.detail vocabulary and assign each detail value to exactly one status.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST name exactly one signature suite for the format version, drawn from the primitive&#x27;s allowed set.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST declare the counter set as measured names, each with a type and range shape from Table 4: an integer from 0 to 2^53-1 inclusive, a number within the stated range, or a boolean.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MUST NOT declare a counter of any other type.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MUST NOT instruct producers to emit a placeholder for an unmeasured counter.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST preserve the strip rule and every member name, at every depth, that this document does not mark profile-assigned.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST NOT place a profile-assigned or profile-declared member anywhere other than the position Section 4.4 gives that member;</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>it MUST NOT add a member at any depth.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST NOT supply or constrain the deployment profile.</td><td>10.1</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST provide at least one positive vector and the negative controls named in Section 10.1.1.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST list companion artifacts and how references[] points at them, or state that there are none.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST NOT define any exit from the verification procedure other than the step 2 floor test.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.6.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A protocol profile MUST declare whether key_ref is present and, if so, what kind of key identifier it is.</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>The key_ref member MUST NOT carry key material;</td><td>10.1</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A profile MAY define native verification of an object its binding members refer to.</td><td>10.1.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier that performs native checks MUST run them only after Section 9 has produced a terminal state, MUST name each separately and report it as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN, and MUST report a check it does not perform as NOT RUN, never PASS.</td><td>10.1.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier that performs native checks MUST run them only after Section 9 has produced a terminal state, MUST name each separately and report it as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN, and MUST report a check it does not perform as NOT RUN, never PASS.</td><td>10.1.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier that performs native checks MUST run them only after Section 9 has produced a terminal state, MUST name each separately and report it as PASS, FAIL, or NOT RUN, and MUST report a check it does not perform as NOT RUN, never PASS.</td><td>10.1.2</td><td>scheduled for 0.7.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Deployments MUST NOT describe this document as an end-to-end encryption protocol.</td><td>11.2</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>Implementers SHOULD minimize retention and disclosure according to their deployment&#x27;s risk model.</td><td>11.3</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>A deployment MUST define how keys are bound to agent identifiers and how compromise is detected and handled.</td><td>11.4</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier MUST reject, before parsing it, a received artifact larger than its configured maximum artifact size, and that configured maximum MUST NOT exceed 262144 octets.</td><td>11.7</td><td>unchanged since r3; newly counted</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier MUST reject, before parsing it, a received artifact larger than its configured maximum artifact size, and that configured maximum MUST NOT exceed 262144 octets.</td><td>11.7</td><td>unchanged since r3; newly counted</td></tr>
<tr><td>A verifier MUST reject an artifact whose JSON nesting depth exceeds 16.</td><td>11.7</td><td>unchanged since r3; newly counted</td></tr>
<tr><td>A declared completeness indicator MUST be an integer within the range its profile declares, and a verifier MUST reject an attestation outside that range.</td><td>11.7</td><td>unchanged since r3; newly counted</td></tr>
<tr><td>A declared completeness indicator MUST be an integer within the range its profile declares, and a verifier MUST reject an attestation outside that range.</td><td>11.7</td><td>unchanged since r3; newly counted</td></tr>
<tr><td>Implementations SHOULD keep raw transcripts under the parties&#x27; control and present the narrower attestation when term disclosure is unnecessary.</td><td>12</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>Logs and diagnostics SHOULD avoid copying raw deal terms or cryptographic material.</td><td>12</td><td>specified here, no implementation</td></tr>
<tr><td>Verifiers SHOULD return typed failure reasons without echoing untrusted private content, on the terms stated in Section 9.</td><td>12</td><td>unchanged since r3; newly counted</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<t>A2CN: no implementation of this profile is reported at -01.
    The native checks of Section 10.3 correspond to TransactionRecord 0.4
    verification that both A2CN reference implementations (Python and
    TypeScript) perform under <xref target="A2CN"/> Section 9.5; neither
    produces or verifies an a2cn_attestation. Per-requirement status will
    be reported with the profile's vectors.</t>
<t>Concordia's preserved implemented cells describe the JSON Schema,
    Python and JavaScript reference SDKs, and conformance suite maintained by
    this document's author at repository commit 847729cd. They describe that
    source tree, not a package publication. It emits 0.5.0; the profile here
    specifies 0.7.0. This appendix makes no new implementation claim.</t>
<t>Evidence keys are paths in the Concordia repository at commit 847729cd:</t>
<dl newline="false">
        <dt>E1:</dt>
        <dd>concordia/reputation/scorer.py, which computes scores outside
        the attestation.</dd>
        <dt>E2:</dt>
        <dd>tests/test_references.py, the unknown-type and
        unknown-relationship round-trip cases.</dd>
        <dt>E3:</dt>
        <dd>tests/test_attestation_l3_bucket_vocabulary.py, which pins the
        enumerated <tt>value_range</tt> vocabulary, the
        <tt>category</tt> grammar, the reference string caps, and the
        32-reference count cap, each rejected rather than coerced.</dd>
        <dt>E4:</dt>
        <dd>tests/test_canonicalization_rfc8785.py.</dd>
        <dt>E5:</dt>
        <dd>tests/test_attestation_signature_verification.py, against
        concordia/attestation.py and concordia/cosign.py, which strip every
        <tt>signature</tt> member, exclude the countersignature map, and
        canonicalize.</dd>
        <dt>E6:</dt>
        <dd>tests/test_validity_temporal.py, describing 0.5.0 behavior,
        including its ended-interval rejection case, the legacy-readable case, the issuer refusal above 90 days,
        and the shorter-window cases.</dd>
        <dt>E7:</dt>
        <dd>schemas/attestation.schema.json, where the <tt>meta</tt> object
        carries no required member, so <tt>category</tt> may be omitted.</dd>
      </dl>
</section>

<section anchor="epaec" numbered="true">
      <name>EP-AEC Compatibility</name>
      <t>This appendix is informative and creates no normative dependency.
      </t>
      <t>
      <xref target="I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-evidence-chain"/>, also
      known by its short name EP-AEC, defines a transport-agnostic
      composition object and a fail-closed evaluation algorithm for
      combining heterogeneous agent-action evidence against a relying
      party's pinned evidence requirement. It distinguishes whether a set
      of evidence is SATISFIED (it fills the stated requirement) from
      whether an action is AUTHORIZED (a separate, local policy decision),
      and states that native validity alone is not sufficient for
      composition.
      </t>
      <t>
      An attestation under a profile at or above its floor that reaches the terminal state
      current under <xref target="verification"/> of this document is a
      candidate native evidence component under that model: an EP-AEC
      composition layer could treat this document's own countersignature
      and freshness semantics as native validity inputs, while still
      applying its own requirement-level freshness bound. This document
      carries no artifact signature distinct from the party countersignatures
      (<xref target="outcome-binding"/>), and it determines revocation
      status only when the deployment supplies a revocation source
      (<xref target="verification"/>).
      </t>
      <t>
      This document does not require, normatively reference, or depend on
      EP-AEC or any other evidence-composition framework. An
      implementation of this document's attestation format and
      verification procedure (<xref target="attestation"/> and
      <xref target="verification"/>) is complete and independently useful
      without it.
      </t>
    </section>
<section anchor="vectors" numbered="true"><name>Test Vectors by Profile</name>
<t>This appendix is informative. Full artifacts, canonical payloads, deployment inputs, and controls accompany the source in vectors/. The executable reference verifier is test support, not a claim of implementation or interoperability.</t>
<section anchor="vectors-concordia"><name>Concordia Profile Vectors</name>
<t>No implementation has produced or confirmed these vectors; they are hand-constructed from this document's text.</t>
<t>The positive artifact is <tt>vectors/concordia/positive.json</tt>, SHA-256 <tt>bf8a547f06126d447fe3ac086af6ac9b258cda6d6ae3fae4c6bfe0dd0f0869f6</tt>. The manifest is <tt>vectors/concordia/manifest.json</tt>, SHA-256 <tt>e9fd6cf4b88b3f2e65643b90bea5280551e2852140357ea8e9a01cbc034dbee6</tt>.</t>
<t>The verifier clock is 2026-10-06T12:30:00Z. The positive interval is [2026-10-06T12:00:00Z, 2027-01-04T12:00:00Z]; age and lifetime ceilings are 7776000 seconds and skew is 300 seconds. The expected context and party set are the positive artifact&#39;s session_id and agent identifiers. No revocation source is named, so the positive result is bound-only at step 9.</t>
<t>The artifact uses Concordia 0.7.0, status agreed, detail agreed, message_count 3, and the RFC 8032 Section 7.1 TEST 1 and TEST 2 keys. Their public keys, in party order, are:</t>
<sourcecode type="text">d75a980182b10ab7d54bfed3c964073a0ee172f3daa62325af021a68f707511a
3d4017c3e843895a92b70aa74d1b7ebc9c982ccf2ec4968cc0cd55f12af4660c</sourcecode>
<t>Canonical-payload SHA-256: <tt>00d0b9427db96f06cb3a160dc415bbef0faf4a458994476d8f7208e0b37b48a9</tt>. The complete positive artifact follows, including every countersignature value. To recover the JSON bytes, remove each backslash at a line end and the following newline and two indentation spaces; retain a final newline.</t>
<sourcecode type="json">{
  &quot;attestation_id&quot;: &quot;att_rfc8032_profile_vector_01&quot;,
  &quot;chain_head&quot;: &quot;sha256:22222222222222222222222222222222222222222\
  22222222222222222222222&quot;,
  &quot;concordia_attestation&quot;: &quot;0.7.0&quot;,
  &quot;countersignatures&quot;: {
    &quot;agent_rfc8032_test1&quot;: &quot;WVAHrtEC8rsWEMOdSPEe8CxNc0-qxz2B0gME-\
  qQU54Tcy6hWQyfsNCEeOide-geA0vGkHulBpJmduwMnwKeaAg==&quot;,
    &quot;agent_rfc8032_test2&quot;: &quot;wCU6Bz-741Ar7yf_iQXBn4G-YKufDO1bzBD3m\
  jTrPYUgzxbReMKO3qSRuJUpPYvkS0LuTXqO3NV_e6JKcz4nDQ==&quot;
  },
  &quot;message_count&quot;: 3,
  &quot;meta&quot;: {
    &quot;category&quot;: &quot;electronics.cameras.mirrorless&quot;,
    &quot;extensions_used&quot;: [],
    &quot;mediator_invoked&quot;: false,
    &quot;value_range&quot;: &quot;1000-5000_USD&quot;
  },
  &quot;outcome&quot;: {
    &quot;detail&quot;: &quot;agreed&quot;,
    &quot;duration_seconds&quot;: 225,
    &quot;resolution_mechanism&quot;: &quot;direct&quot;,
    &quot;rounds&quot;: 3,
    &quot;status&quot;: &quot;agreed&quot;,
    &quot;terms_count&quot;: 6
  },
  &quot;parties&quot;: [
    {
      &quot;agent_id&quot;: &quot;agent_rfc8032_test1&quot;,
      &quot;behavior&quot;: {
        &quot;concession_magnitude&quot;: 0.25,
        &quot;concessions&quot;: 1,
        &quot;constraints_declared&quot;: 0,
        &quot;constraints_violated&quot;: 0,
        &quot;offers_made&quot;: 2,
        &quot;reasoning_provided&quot;: true,
        &quot;response_time_avg_seconds&quot;: 4.5,
        &quot;signals_shared&quot;: 1,
        &quot;withdrawal&quot;: false
      },
      &quot;role&quot;: &quot;initiator&quot;,
      &quot;signature&quot;: &quot;Z7QWIj9v7RENKTfzfLJhsnEXllT1dTKkXDkXSTCaYuxFH\
  J1ba6YBp9fmCTnvwxFa78qWRz2XGQMpnRu2yOM3AQ==&quot;
    },
    {
      &quot;agent_id&quot;: &quot;agent_rfc8032_test2&quot;,
      &quot;behavior&quot;: {
        &quot;concession_magnitude&quot;: 0.2,
        &quot;concessions&quot;: 1,
        &quot;constraints_declared&quot;: 0,
        &quot;constraints_violated&quot;: 0,
        &quot;offers_made&quot;: 1,
        &quot;reasoning_provided&quot;: true,
        &quot;response_time_avg_seconds&quot;: 5.0,
        &quot;signals_shared&quot;: 0,
        &quot;withdrawal&quot;: false
      },
      &quot;role&quot;: &quot;responder&quot;,
      &quot;signature&quot;: &quot;AFF-yp6ad5277gPCDODe1s6vL9q07Kln-VLBEchJuf90W\
  53p6bzUYL_hxx_d36D-k26i8OvTf6Eb54FV84A7Dw==&quot;
    }
  ],
  &quot;references&quot;: [
    {
      &quot;id&quot;: &quot;urn:concordia:attestation:att_previous&quot;,
      &quot;relationship&quot;: &quot;references&quot;,
      &quot;type&quot;: &quot;receipt&quot;
    }
  ],
  &quot;session_id&quot;: &quot;ses_rfc8032_profile_vector&quot;,
  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;Profile vector with no negotiated term value.&quot;,
  &quot;timestamp&quot;: &quot;2026-10-06T12:00:00Z&quot;,
  &quot;transcript_hash&quot;: &quot;sha256:111111111111111111111111111111111111\
  1111111111111111111111111111&quot;,
  &quot;validity_temporal&quot;: {
    &quot;from&quot;: &quot;2026-10-06T12:00:00Z&quot;,
    &quot;mode&quot;: &quot;absolute&quot;,
    &quot;until&quot;: &quot;2027-01-04T12:00:00Z&quot;
  }
}</sourcecode>
</section>
<section anchor="vectors-a2cn"><name>A2CN Profile Vectors</name>
<t>No implementation has produced or confirmed these vectors; they are hand-constructed from this document's text.</t>
<t>The positive artifact is <tt>vectors/a2cn/positive.json</tt>, SHA-256 <tt>e64dba64c4e994afbbd7608f974d977007879e237fc9aa8d9085ef48d03d9a7e</tt>. The manifest is <tt>vectors/a2cn/manifest.json</tt>, SHA-256 <tt>4740ab0787f4d8ca52f7d1850eb0443e179942943f2de99a1b51d64fa289f419</tt>.</t>
<t>The verifier clock is 2026-10-06T12:30:00Z. The positive interval is [2026-10-06T12:00:00Z, 2027-01-04T12:00:00Z]; age and lifetime ceilings are 7776000 seconds and skew is 300 seconds. The expected context and party set are the positive artifact&#39;s session_id and agent identifiers. No revocation source is named, so the positive result is bound-only at step 9.</t>
<t>The artifact uses A2CN profile 0.1.0 (a2cn_attestation "0.1.0") over TransactionRecord 0.4, status agreed, detail COMPLETED, message_count 4 (three Offers/Counteroffers plus the Acceptance), and the party DIDs did:web:initiator.invalid and did:web:responder.invalid. Each key_ref appends #test-key-1 to its DID. The two binding values are synthetic digests, with no TransactionRecord presented; all four native checks are NOT RUN. The references[].id is a synthetic urn:example value standing in for a record_id, and terms_count is omitted as Section 10.3 requires.</t>
<t>The first key is the public test key of <eref target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6979#appendix-A.2.5">RFC 6979 Appendix A.2.5</eref>. The second is derived from the fixed scalar 2 on P-256. Both test scalars are documented in the manifest. Public keys below use uncompressed SEC1 point encoding:</t>
<sourcecode type="text">0460fed4ba255a9d31c961eb74c6356d68c049b8923b61fa6ce669622e60f29f
b67903fe1008b8bc99a41ae9e95628bc64f2f1b20c2d7e9f5177a3c294d44622
99
047cf27b188d034f7e8a52380304b51ac3c08969e277f21b35a60b48fc476699
7807775510db8ed040293d9ac69f7430dbba7dade63ce982299e04b79d227873
d1</sourcecode>
<t>Canonical-payload SHA-256: <tt>e47437090b0355762ec71c69a9bceb2207ff8e28c58600f5412784e1ca2b1a90</tt>. The complete positive artifact follows, including every countersignature value. To recover the JSON bytes, remove each backslash at a line end and the following newline and two indentation spaces; retain a final newline.</t>
<sourcecode type="json">{
  &quot;a2cn_attestation&quot;: &quot;0.1.0&quot;,
  &quot;attestation_id&quot;: &quot;att_a2cn_synthetic_01&quot;,
  &quot;countersignatures&quot;: {
    &quot;did:web:initiator.invalid&quot;: &quot;Pxfwq2da4-VqoOdDxTYXSbLCJP2DlXW\
  _XatzQ-m8pE_cdGFDyxqU4Uph9xz3Ts3zUX5qwmbO-XHRhBuRW8lVNQ==&quot;,
    &quot;did:web:responder.invalid&quot;: &quot;CeWmU2Om2nO7DORsXUE_Geo6sgvYpth\
  Tj2ZLv8bVkaL45Yr4GL4E6cgIEoXFgLIqjiMSCoVQm_hUhfp5s5ycvA==&quot;
  },
  &quot;message_count&quot;: 4,
  &quot;meta&quot;: {
    &quot;category&quot;: &quot;procurement.goods&quot;,
    &quot;mediator_invoked&quot;: false,
    &quot;value_range&quot;: &quot;1000-5000_USD&quot;
  },
  &quot;offer_chain_hash&quot;: &quot;sha256:22222222222222222222222222222222222\
  22222222222222222222222222222&quot;,
  &quot;outcome&quot;: {
    &quot;detail&quot;: &quot;COMPLETED&quot;,
    &quot;duration_seconds&quot;: 225,
    &quot;resolution_mechanism&quot;: &quot;direct&quot;,
    &quot;rounds&quot;: 3,
    &quot;status&quot;: &quot;agreed&quot;
  },
  &quot;parties&quot;: [
    {
      &quot;agent_id&quot;: &quot;did:web:initiator.invalid&quot;,
      &quot;behavior&quot;: {
        &quot;offers_made&quot;: 2,
        &quot;withdrawal&quot;: false
      },
      &quot;key_ref&quot;: &quot;did:web:initiator.invalid#test-key-1&quot;,
      &quot;role&quot;: &quot;initiator&quot;,
      &quot;signature&quot;: &quot;badVHtHebnqURVg11uW8U5lDpcNq44q6Wc-6kzuC7Cr20\
  0duESe39E6ScU-kr1zq0vqeCYJV2Bh4nkyi445zbQ==&quot;
    },
    {
      &quot;agent_id&quot;: &quot;did:web:responder.invalid&quot;,
      &quot;behavior&quot;: {
        &quot;offers_made&quot;: 1,
        &quot;withdrawal&quot;: false
      },
      &quot;key_ref&quot;: &quot;did:web:responder.invalid#test-key-1&quot;,
      &quot;role&quot;: &quot;responder&quot;,
      &quot;signature&quot;: &quot;JZHad_VrrO05IHlx1_hiMXF6QS0VaruyyI9_DY0XoV-wx\
  vBNoUXCTxWeMSgceLdlBlyF_U2NKU4LqG-Xcdm5hw==&quot;
    }
  ],
  &quot;record_hash&quot;: &quot;sha256:1111111111111111111111111111111111111111\
  111111111111111111111111&quot;,
  &quot;references&quot;: [
    {
      &quot;id&quot;: &quot;urn:example:a2cn:record:synthetic-01&quot;,
      &quot;relationship&quot;: &quot;references&quot;,
      &quot;type&quot;: &quot;a2cn_transaction_record&quot;,
      &quot;version&quot;: &quot;0.4&quot;
    }
  ],
  &quot;session_id&quot;: &quot;ses_a2cn_synthetic&quot;,
  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;Synthetic A2CN attestation, no TransactionRecord su\
  pplied.&quot;,
  &quot;timestamp&quot;: &quot;2026-10-06T12:00:00Z&quot;,
  &quot;validity_temporal&quot;: {
    &quot;from&quot;: &quot;2026-10-06T12:00:00Z&quot;,
    &quot;mode&quot;: &quot;absolute&quot;,
    &quot;until&quot;: &quot;2027-01-04T12:00:00Z&quot;
  }
}</sourcecode>
<t>ECDSA vectors assert canonical bytes and successful verification, not equality of independently produced signature bytes. This hand construction uses RFC 6979 deterministic ECDSA through cryptography 50; check_vectors.py independently reproduces its nonce and signature and checks the RFC example. The es256-malleated-valid control verifies a second signature over the identical payload.</t>
<t>The A2CN co-authors' AP-1 to AP-13 vector files are expected in -02 and will replace or extend this set. Their A2CN half (records, DID documents and native inputs) can be produced from either A2CN reference implementation of TransactionRecord 0.4; no A2CN code yet produces or verifies an a2cn_attestation.</t>
<t anchor="vectors-a2cn-scenarios">The co-authors' AP scenarios below are specifications of
    expected behavior, not a report that their implementations produced
    these results. Check numbers refer to the four native checks in
    Section 10.3. AP-6 assumes the informative DID-resolving deployment
    rules there. AP-10 distinguishes structural rejection from a producer
    violation the generic verifier cannot detect.</t>
<sourcecode type="text">AP-1: COMPLETED, record 0.4, ES256, supplied .invalid DID
  documents; bound-only; native checks 1 to 4 PASS.
AP-2: independently derived Python/TypeScript records;
  identical bytes and digests without exchanging the record.
AP-3 A/B: changed record, recomputed/unchanged carried hash;
  generic state unchanged; check 1 FAIL in both cases;
  altered final-act signature also fails check 4.
AP-4: EdDSA countersignature under ES256; not-bound.
AP-5: wrong P-256 signing key; not-bound at step 4.
AP-6: absent, foreign-controlled or keyAgreement-only method;
  not-bound at step 3 under the named deployment rules.
AP-7: missing countersignature; not-bound at step 4.
AP-8: offer-hash list mismatch; generic state unchanged;
  native check 2 FAIL.
AP-9: other than agreed/COMPLETED; not-bound at step 2.
AP-10: malformed category or undefined term member;
  not-bound at step 2. A term in permitted free text can pass.
AP-11: undeclared unmeasured counter zero-filled;
  not-bound at step 2.
AP-12: excluded session; no conforming attestation emitted;
  missing required countersignature gives not-bound.
AP-13: controlled assertionMethod differs from session key;
  bound-only in this setup; native check 3 FAIL.</sourcecode>
<t>The signed AP-13 artifact is
<tt>vectors/a2cn/ap13-session-key-vs-party-key.json</tt>, SHA-256
<tt>39f9cc3ecf660cafceec92cfa44a30d37c6bc3e61c390af2b83240ff6af66943</tt>. Its companion
<tt>vectors/a2cn/ap13-native-inputs.json</tt> supplies synthetic DID
documents and a party-method excerpt, not a complete TransactionRecord.
The alternate key uses public test scalar 3 on P-256. The countersignature
verifies under that controlled assertionMethod; the native method
comparison fails. The other three native checks are NOT RUN. The
manifest pins the companion bytes and injected deployment keys.</t>
<t>The outcome-agreed-* and outcome-not_agreed-* vectors cover all
fourteen pairs of primitive statuses and declared A2CN details, plus
an UNKNOWN detail under each status. Only agreed/COMPLETED reaches
bound-only; the other fifteen cases terminate not-bound at step 2.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="vectors-controls"><name>Control Index</name>
<t>Each name below denotes a .json file in both profile directories unless marked C (Concordia only) or A (A2CN only). The manifest records exact file digests, mutations, keys, expected context and party-set inputs. An ended interval or exceeded age ceiling marks stale at the named step; stale is exposed only at step 9 after steps 7 and 8 pass.</t>
<t>Each line gives name: mutation; step; terminal state. Structural payload mutations are re-countersigned; malformed countersignature encoding is the deliberate exception.</t>
<sourcecode type="text">oversize-control: pad to 262145 octets; 1; not-bound
undefined-member: add outcome.price; 2; not-bound
malformed-version: add leading zero; 2; not-bound
legacy-below-floor: lower version below floor; 2; legacy
malformed-signature-encoding: bad encoding; 2; not-bound
missing-countersignature: remove one signature; 4; not-bound
extra-countersignature: add unlisted signer; 4; not-bound
invalid-countersignature: copy other signer; 4; not-bound
ended-interval: end at 12:15Z; 5; stale
reversed-interval: end before start; 2; not-bound
future-dated-anchor: move anchors to 2027; 5; not-bound
lifetime-over-cap: extend beyond 90 days; 5; not-bound
age-ceiling-exceeded: set age cap to 900 s; 6; stale
status-detail-mismatch: status not_agreed; 2; not-bound
mismatched-context: expect different session; 8; not-bound
mismatched-party-set: expect different set; 8; not-bound
zero-version-members: remove selector; 2a; not-bound
two-version-members: add other selector; 2a; not-bound
duplicate-member-name: repeat selector; 2; not-bound
key-ref-present (C): add undeclared key_ref; 2; not-bound
key-ref-no-key (A): reference unknown key; 3; not-bound
key-ref-another-suite (A): resolve Ed25519; 3; not-bound
summary-term-illustration: add price in summary; 9; bound-only
party-signature-illustration: zero party signature; 9; bound-only</sourcecode>
<t>The last two cases are no-rejection illustrations: a term in summary violates a producer obligation the generic verifier cannot inspect; a well-formed but invalid parties[] signature is not verified by Section 9. Additional manifest cases exercise all five terminal states, stale followed by revocation or context/party mismatch, inclusive interval ends, unsupported versions, empty intervals, the ES256 scalar and point checks, an A2CN extensions_used value outside its empty vocabulary (extension-outside-vocabulary, not-bound at step 2), and key_ref selection among two distinct keys for one party (key-ref-selects-one-of-many, bound-only).</t>
</section></section>

  </back>
</rfc>
