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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-parecki-oauth-userinfo-response-00" category="info" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="OAuth Userinfo Response">OAuth Userinfo Response</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-parecki-oauth-userinfo-response-00"/>
    <author fullname="Aaron Parecki">
      <organization>Okta</organization>
      <address>
        <email>aaron@parecki.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Web Authorization Protocol</workgroup>
    <keyword>oauth</keyword>
    <keyword>userinfo</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 40?>

<t>This specification defines an extension to the OAuth 2.0 Token Endpoint Response to allow the authorization server to return an identifier for the user who authorized the request, and optionally additional information about that user, directly in the token response as plain JSON.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://drafts.aaronpk.com/oauth-userinfo-response/draft-parecki-oauth-userinfo-response.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-parecki-oauth-userinfo-response/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:oauth@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/aaronpk/oauth-userinfo-response"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 44?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>This specification defines an extension to the OAuth 2.0 <xref target="RFC6749"/> Token Endpoint Response to allow the authorization server to return an identifier for the user who authorized the request, and optionally additional information about that user, directly in the token response.</t>
      <t>OAuth 2.0 does not define a way for the authorization server to tell the client which user authorized the request. Many clients only need to know a user identifier, for example to associate the authorization with a local account, and do not require a signed statement about the user or their authentication from the authorization server. Returning this information as plain JSON in the token response avoids an additional request, as well as the overhead, complexity, and dependency management associated with parsing and validating a JSON Web Token (JWT).</t>
      <t>This specification provides two different ways the authorization server can return info in the Token Response:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The "Subject Response", returning only the user identifier as a new top-level property <tt>sub</tt> in the token response</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The "Userinfo Response", returning a new top-level property <tt>userinfo</tt> as a JSON object containing the user identifier and any additional claims the authorization server chooses to return.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>This specification only gives the authorization server a way to return a user identifier to the client. It does not prove the identity of the user, and the identifier says nothing about a real person: it is the authorization server's own identifier for the account that authorized the request.</t>
      <t>This mechanism <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used when the client requires a signed statement about the user, such as when the client needs non-repudiation of the claims.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<t>This specification uses the terms "authorization server", "client", "resource owner", "authorization request", "token endpoint", and "scope" defined by OAuth 2.0 <xref target="RFC6749"/>. The term "user" refers to the resource owner who authorized the request.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="subject-response">
      <name>Subject Response</name>
      <t>To signal its intent to receive the user identifier in the Token Response, the client uses a new scope value in the Authorization Request.</t>
      <section anchor="requesting-the-subject-response">
        <name>Requesting the Subject Response</name>
        <t>This specification defines a new scope value: <tt>subject</tt></t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>subject</tt></dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Requests that the authorization server return the user identifier (<tt>sub</tt>) directly in the Token Response.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="authorization-request">
        <name>Authorization Request</name>
        <t>The client <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include the <tt>subject</tt> scope along with any other required scopes in the Authorization Request.</t>
        <t>Example request:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
GET /authorize?
  response_type=code
  &client_id=e69b14fe3fdcf1b432deb0c
  &scope=subject
  &state=9e6d47801c833bfc8
  &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.com%2Fcb
  &code_challenge=dy57vyachQ...&code_challenge_method=S256
]]></artwork>
        <t>Note: This is not limited to the <xref target="RFC6749"/> Authorization Code flow and applies the same to extensions such as Pushed Authorization Request <xref target="RFC9126"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="subject-token-response">
        <name>Token Endpoint Response</name>
        <t>This specification defines a new field to be returned in the Token Endpoint response: <tt>sub</tt>.</t>
        <t>In the Authorization Code flow, upon successful validation of the Authorization Code, the PKCE Code Verifier, and optional client authentication, the authorization server constructs a Token Response including the new field <tt>sub</tt>.</t>
        <t>The value of <tt>sub</tt> is a string containing the authorization server's identifier for the user who authorized the request. It has the same meaning as the <tt>sub</tt> claim defined in <xref section="4.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC7519"/>. The value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be unique within the authorization server and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be reassigned to a different user. The value is an opaque identifier that is only meaningful in the context of the authorization server that issued it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="response-rules">
        <name>Response Rules</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>If the client included the <tt>subject</tt> scope in the initial Authorization Request, the authorization server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the <tt>sub</tt> parameter in the Token Response. The authorization server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also return the <tt>sub</tt> parameter if the client did not include the <tt>subject</tt> scope in the initial Authorization Request.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>No change is made to the requirements of the standard OAuth 2.0 <xref target="RFC6749"/> parameters in the response or any additional parameters defined by extensions.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Example successful token response</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "access_token": "a5c64fbb3e03d973d3c7ef",
  "token_type": "Bearer",
  "expires_in": 3600,
  "sub": "b46b2f1f2b7686d"
}
]]></artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="userinfo-response">
      <name>Userinfo Response</name>
      <t>To signal its intent to receive information about the user in the Token Response, the client uses a new scope value in the Authorization Request.</t>
      <section anchor="requesting-the-userinfo-response">
        <name>Requesting the Userinfo Response</name>
        <t>This specification defines a new scope value: <tt>userinfo</tt></t>
        <dl>
          <dt><tt>userinfo</tt></dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Requests that the authorization server return information about the user directly in the Token Response.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="authorization-request-1">
        <name>Authorization Request</name>
        <t>The client <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include the <tt>userinfo</tt> scope along with any other required scopes in the Authorization Request.</t>
        <t>Example request:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
GET /authorize?
  response_type=code
  &client_id=e69b14fe3fdcf1b432deb0c
  &scope=userinfo
  &state=9e6d47801c833bfc8
  &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.com%2Fcb
  &code_challenge=dy57vyachQ...&code_challenge_method=S256
]]></artwork>
        <t>Note: This is not limited to the <xref target="RFC6749"/> Authorization Code flow and applies the same to extensions such as Pushed Authorization Request <xref target="RFC9126"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="userinfo-token-response">
        <name>Token Endpoint Response</name>
        <t>This specification defines a new field to be returned in the Token Endpoint response: <tt>userinfo</tt>.</t>
        <t>In the Authorization Code flow, upon successful validation of the Authorization Code, the PKCE Code Verifier, and optional client authentication, the authorization server constructs a Token Response including the new field <tt>userinfo</tt>.</t>
        <t>The value of <tt>userinfo</tt> is a JSON object containing the user identifier and any additional claims the authorization server chooses to return. The claim names and their meanings are those registered in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry established by <xref target="RFC7519"/>. The object <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain the <tt>sub</tt> claim, as described in <xref target="subject-token-response"/>. Which additional claims are returned is at the discretion of the authorization server, and may depend on the scopes granted.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="response-rules-1">
        <name>Response Rules</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>If the client included the <tt>userinfo</tt> scope in the initial Authorization Request, the authorization server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the <tt>userinfo</tt> parameter in the Token Response. The authorization server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also return the <tt>userinfo</tt> parameter if the client did not include the <tt>userinfo</tt> scope in the initial Authorization Request.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>No change is made to the requirements of the standard OAuth 2.0 <xref target="RFC6749"/> parameters in the response or any additional parameters defined by extensions.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Example successful token response</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  "access_token": "a5c64fbb3e03d973d3c7ef",
  "token_type": "Bearer",
  "expires_in": 3600,
  "userinfo": {
    "sub": "b46b2f1f2b7686d",
    "name": "Alice Example",
    "preferred_username": "alice",
    "picture": "https://as.example.com/u/b46b2f1f2b7686d.jpg"
  }
}
]]></artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="not-a-proof-of-identity">
        <name>Not a Proof of Identity</name>
        <t>The <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>userinfo</tt> values are not an assertion of the user's identity. They tell the client which identifier the authorization server associates with the user who authorized the request, and nothing more. In particular, they do not establish that the user is a particular real person. Clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the user identifier as scoped to the authorization server that returned it, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assume that the same value returned by a different authorization server refers to the same user.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-endpoint">
        <name>Token Endpoint</name>
        <t>The <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>userinfo</tt> response fields <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only be returned from the token endpoint.</t>
        <t>The <tt>sub</tt> and <tt>userinfo</tt> values <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be returned in the Authorization Response (the URL redirect back to the client), as this passes through the front channel and provides no mechanism for the client to validate the legitimacy of the value in the response.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="authorization-code-flow">
        <name>Authorization Code Flow</name>
        <t>If using the Authorization Code flow, or any flow that utilizes a browser redirect, the flow <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be secured with PKCE as defined in <xref target="RFC7636"/> to prevent authorization code injection attacks.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="tamper-resistance">
        <name>Tamper Resistance</name>
        <t>The response defined here provides no cryptographic signature over the <tt>sub</tt> or <tt>userinfo</tt> values. Their integrity and authenticity are solely reliant on the security of the transport layer of the Token Endpoint and the preceding Authorization Code + PKCE exchange.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="oauth-parameters-registration">
        <name>OAuth Parameters Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following values in the "OAuth Parameters" registry of the "OAuth Parameters" registry group established by <xref section="11.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><tt>sub</tt></t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Parameter Usage Location:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>token response</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>IETF</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><xref target="subject-token-response"/> of this document</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><tt>userinfo</tt></t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Parameter Usage Location:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>token response</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>IETF</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><xref target="userinfo-token-response"/> of this document</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6749">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7636">
          <front>
            <title>Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients</title>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." role="editor" surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Agarwal" initials="N." surname="Agarwal"/>
            <date month="September" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing the Authorization Code Grant are susceptible to the authorization code interception attack. This specification describes the attack as well as a technique to mitigate against the threat through the use of Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE, pronounced "pixy").</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7636"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7636"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9126">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests</title>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="D. Tonge" initials="D." surname="Tonge"/>
            <author fullname="F. Skokan" initials="F." surname="Skokan"/>
            <date month="September" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines the pushed authorization request (PAR) endpoint, which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0 authorization request to the authorization server via a direct request and provides them with a request URI that is used as reference to the data in a subsequent call to the authorization endpoint.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9126"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9126"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 242?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The authors would like to thank the following people for their review and contributions to this draft: Brian Campbell.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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