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  <front>
    <title abbrev="CBAP-1">Contestability Binding Application Profile 1 (CBAP-1)</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-pinto-cbap-1-01"/>
    <author initials="T." surname="Pinto" fullname="Tiago Pinto">
      <organization>Independent Researcher</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Portugal</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tiago@donttrustverify.pt</email>
        <uri>https://donttrustverify.pt</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="19"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <keyword>agent authorization</keyword>
    <keyword>contestability</keyword>
    <keyword>CBAP-1</keyword>
    <keyword>verifiable evidence</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 46?>

<t>Signed authorization records can show that an action was authorized under specified rules, but they do not by themselves establish a stable or verifiable path for an Affected Party to contest that action.</t>
      <t>This document defines Contestability Binding Application Profile 1 (CBAP-1), a closed application profile that binds an Authorization Artifact to signed contestation terms before execution. CBAP-1 specifies deterministic CBOR and COSE encoding, fixed artifact formats, executor-verification and execution records, by-value policy material, a half-open filing window, a closed structured result, and deterministic first-failure reason codes.</t>
      <t>CBAP-1 does not define contestation notices, active execution-state effects, network reachability checks, policy-freshness evaluation, dispute adjudication, or remedy. It reports authenticated protocol facts and signed claims without asserting forum independence, legal validity, physical execution order, or fairness.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 54?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Securing an agent authorization with signatures, receipts, validity limits, and logs can answer one question: was the action authorized under the specified rules? It does not answer a different question: where and how an Affected Party can contest the action, or which contestation parameters were bound before execution.</t>
      <t>A locator alone is insufficient. If the forum, procedure, policy references, or filing window can be substituted after authorization, two implementations can validate the same authorization while deriving different contestation paths.</t>
      <t>CBAP-1 removes that ambiguity by binding the Authorization Artifact to signed contestation parameters, Exact Forum Acceptance, executor-verification evidence, an Execution Record, and the policy material required by those objects. It defines one deterministic verification procedure and one closed structured-result contract.</t>
      <t>The profile is intentionally narrow. Successful CBAP-1 verification reports <tt>selection_provenance: unilateral</tt>, exact forum acceptance, <tt>pre_execution_evidence: executor_attested</tt>, and no active execution-state effect. It does not infer forum independence, policy fairness, legal standing, current endpoint availability, human receipt, physical execution order, or remedy.</t>
      <t>CBAP-1 is an executable profile of the Contestability Binding architecture described in <xref target="I-D.pinto-agent-authz-contestability"/>. That document covers the wider design space, including class-based forum acceptance, contestability notices, multiparty selection evidence, and active execution-state effects. None of those are part of CBAP-1. This document is self-contained: an implementation needs only this document and its normative references to produce and verify CBAP-1 objects. Where the two documents differ on CBAP-1 encoding, verification, or results, this document controls.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="requirements-language">
      <name>Requirements Language</name>
      <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
<xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
as shown here.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="scope">
      <name>Scope</name>
      <t>This document specifies one self-contained application profile. It defines the encoding rules, payload structures, trust inputs, verification procedure, and result contract required to bind an authorization to contestation terms before execution.</t>
      <t>CBAP-1 specifies:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Core Deterministic CBOR encoding with fixed resource ceilings for the complete bundle and its signed objects;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>tagged embedded-payload COSE_Sign1 objects using the fixed CBAP-1 Ed25519 profile;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>closed schemas for the Contestation Parameters Object, Exact Forum Acceptance Statement, Authorization Artifact, Executor Verification record, Execution Record, policy set, and bundle;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>direct binding between the Authorization Artifact and CPO, together with exact forum-terms binding;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>local trust inputs for issuer, forum, and executor roles;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a half-open filing window <tt>[executed-at, filing_deadline)</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a deterministic 22-boundary verification procedure;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a 17-entry structured result comprising 16 semantic fields plus <tt>reasons</tt>, with a closed CBAP-1-reachable vocabulary; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>a closed first-failure vocabulary of 22 reason codes.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>CBAP-1 does not define class-based forum acceptance, separate contestability notices, multiparty or external selection evidence, active hold or fence effects, network reachability checks, policy-freshness evaluation, or generic extension machinery.</t>
      <t>This document also does not define dispute adjudication, evidence exchange, appeals, remedies, legal standing, forum impartiality, legal enforceability, or the legitimacy of the underlying authorization or policy.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t><strong>Authorization Artifact:</strong> The signed <tt>cbap1-authorization</tt> object defined by this profile. It binds the authorization identifier, issuer, validity interval, action digest, and CPO digest.</t>
      <t><strong>Authorization Instance Identifier (<tt>authorization-id</tt>):</strong> The <tt>authorization-id</tt> CDDL member is a 16-byte identifier for one authorization instance, intended to be globally unique or collision-resistant.</t>
      <t><strong>Action Digest (<tt>action_digest</tt>):</strong> <tt>SHA-256(action_bytes)</tt> over the exact action byte string carried by the bundle, recomputed and checked against each signed object that carries the action digest.</t>
      <t><strong>Contestation Parameters Object (CPO):</strong> The closed signed data structure defined by the CBAP-1 CDDL in Section 5.3.</t>
      <t><strong>Contestation Terms:</strong> The per-authorization <tt>cbap1-terms</tt> data carried in the signed CPO payload, including profile identifiers, authorization validity, forum and policy references, affected-party access declarations, and filing-window parameters. The terms have no standalone signature: the CPO signature authenticates them, and the Authorization Artifact binds the signed CPO by digest.</t>
      <t><strong>Contestability Binding:</strong> The cryptographic binding from the Authorization Artifact to the exact signed CPO through its digest, together with the cross-object bindings verified by Section 7.</t>
      <t><strong>Forum:</strong> The service or institution designated to receive a contestation. Successful signature verification authenticates the forum-signed statement under the configured trust inputs; it does not establish forum independence, competence, fairness, or legal jurisdiction.</t>
      <t><strong>Exact Forum Acceptance Statement:</strong> The forum-signed acceptance of the exact <tt>forum_terms</tt> projection bound to the CPO.</t>
      <t><strong>Authorization Binding Profile (ABP):</strong> The rules used to verify and project the Authorization Artifact. CBAP-1 fixes one Authorization Artifact format and one ABP identifier.</t>
      <t><strong>Authorization Trust Profile:</strong> The exact opaque 32-byte digest supplied by trusted local policy and bound in CPO terms label <tt>3</tt> to identify the authorization trust semantics accepted by the verifier. CBAP-1 does not derive this identifier from a locally provided profile object.</t>
      <t><strong>Standing Policy:</strong> Versioned policy material identified by digest and URI that describes which roles or parties may file. CBAP-1 verifies its bound identity and by-value integrity but does not establish the legitimacy of the policy.</t>
      <t><strong>Affected Party:</strong> A person or organization whose interests may be materially affected by an authorized action. An Affected Party need not be the principal, agent, issuer, executor, or relying party.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="cbap-1-profile">
      <name>CBAP-1 Profile</name>
      <section anchor="mandatory-encoding-cbap-1-core-deterministic-cbor">
        <name>Mandatory encoding: CBAP-1 Core Deterministic CBOR</name>
        <t>The Contestability Binding Application Profile 1 (CBAP-1) is the mandatory-to-implement encoding and executable profile defined by this document. CBAP-1 uses the Core Deterministic Encoding Requirements in Section 4.2.1 of <xref target="RFC8949"/>. It does not use the length-first map key ordering in Section 4.2.3 of <xref target="RFC8949"/>, historically called canonical CBOR by <xref target="RFC7049"/>.</t>
        <t>A CBAP-1 encoder and verifier MUST enforce all of the following:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>preferred and shortest serialization for every integer, length, and tag argument;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>definite-length byte strings, text strings, arrays, and maps only;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>bytewise-lexicographic ordering of the deterministic encodings of map keys;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>rejection of duplicate map keys before conversion to a host-language map;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>rejection of floating-point values and simple values other than <tt>false</tt>, <tt>true</tt>, and <tt>null</tt>; at the bundle outer-item boundary, rejection of every CBOR tag, including tag 18; for each signed COSE_Sign1 object carried inside a bundle <tt>bstr</tt>, exactly one CBOR tag is permitted: the required outermost tag 18. A missing outer tag 18, an outer tag other than 18, any additional nested or repeated tag 18, and any other tag occurrence in the item decoded from the bundle member <tt>bstr</tt> fail P01, before tagged COSE_Sign1 shape is evaluated. A tag occurrence in the CBOR decoded from the protected-header <tt>bstr</tt> fails P03, and a tag occurrence in the CBOR decoded from the payload <tt>bstr</tt> fails P04;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>well-formed UTF-8 text strings, compared as encoded bytes without Unicode, URI, case, or percent-encoding normalization;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>deterministic encoding of each map key according to its CBOR type. Whether a map member label is an unsigned integer and one of the labels admitted by the closed CDDL is a closed-schema constraint, not a Core Deterministic CBOR constraint.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The closed CBAP-1 CDDL uses none of the simple values <tt>false</tt>, <tt>true</tt>, or <tt>null</tt>. Their allowance at the Core Deterministic CBOR layer does not make them valid where the closed CDDL requires another type; such a mismatch fails at the relevant closed-schema boundary.</t>
        <t>Before allocating, slicing, advancing an input cursor, or iterating a declared collection length, a decoder MUST verify with checked arithmetic that the length is representable by the host and does not exceed the remaining input. A declared length or count that cannot be consumed from the received bytes MUST be rejected at the enclosing encoding boundary. It MUST NOT wrap an offset, panic, abort the process, or attempt an allocation based only on the received length.</t>
        <t>CBAP-1 additionally fixes the following limits. <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS</tt> is listed here but is a profile-specific policy-set limit evaluated only at B5; it is not a generic CBOR decoding resource ceiling at B3:</t>
        <sourcecode type="text"><![CDATA[
MAX_BUNDLE_BYTES         = 8388608
MAX_BSTR_BYTES           = 1048576
MAX_TSTR_UTF8_BYTES      = 4096
MAX_COLLECTION_MEMBERS   = 64
MAX_NESTING_DEPTH        = 32
MAX_POLICY_PAIRS         = 5
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>After verification-time and required local-input validation (B1 and B2) and before parsing the outer CBOR item, a verifier MUST require the complete received bundle to be no more than <tt>MAX_BUNDLE_BYTES</tt> bytes. A larger bundle fails at <tt>outer_encoding_invalid</tt> without parsing the bundle.</t>
        <t>At each CBOR decoding boundary, before allocation or iteration, the decoder MUST require every definite-length byte string to be no more than <tt>MAX_BSTR_BYTES</tt>, every definite-length text string to contain no more than <tt>MAX_TSTR_UTF8_BYTES</tt> received UTF-8 bytes, every array or map to contain no more than <tt>MAX_COLLECTION_MEMBERS</tt> members, and nesting depth to be no more than <tt>MAX_NESTING_DEPTH</tt>. For the nesting-depth predicate at each independently decoded CBOR boundary, the root item has depth 0; descending from an item to the data item carried by a tag, to an array element, or to a map key or map value increments depth by one, and the decoder MUST reject before descending when the resulting child depth would exceed <tt>MAX_NESTING_DEPTH</tt>. A byte string is opaque for nesting-depth accounting at the boundary that decodes it; when bytes carried in a byte string are subsequently decoded as CBOR by this profile, that parse is a new independent CBOR boundary whose root again has depth 0. Thus depth 32 is permitted and an attempted descent to depth 33 is rejected. The text-string ceiling is measured on received UTF-8 bytes, not Unicode scalar values.</t>
        <t>Generic resource-ceiling predicates belong to the boundary currently decoding the item. At the outer-item boundary, violation returns <tt>outer_encoding_invalid</tt>; at signed-object boundaries 6 through 10, violation returns that signed object's existing invalid reason. Generic resource-ceiling predicates are evaluated before allocation, iteration, closed-schema predicates, and later cross-object or profile predicates that require the decoded value. In particular, <tt>MAX_COLLECTION_MEMBERS = 64</tt> is a generic CBOR decoding ceiling for the outer policy-pair array: an array declaring 65 or more members fails B3 <tt>outer_encoding_invalid</tt> before B4 or B5. <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS = 5</tt> is the exception listed with the ceilings: it is a separate profile-specific policy-set predicate evaluated only at step 5 (B5), not at the boundary decoding the array. A CDDL-valid array of 6 through 64 policy pairs passes B3's generic count check but fails B5 <tt>policy_set_invalid</tt>.</t>
        <t>For example, a 5000-byte payload signer <tt>key-id</tt> text string or CPO forum <tt>key-id</tt> text string exceeds <tt>MAX_TSTR_UTF8_BYTES</tt> while the signed payload is decoded and therefore fails at the enclosing signed-object boundary; a later 1-through-64-byte key rule or step 14 forum-key length predicate is not evaluated. A 5000-byte URI text string inside a signed payload likewise fails at that signed-object boundary before the step 14 HTTPS-URI predicate. A 5000-byte protected <tt>kid</tt> byte string does not exceed <tt>MAX_BSTR_BYTES</tt>, but it still fails the existing protected-<tt>kid</tt> 1-through-64-byte constraint at the same signed-object boundary.</t>
        <t>The existing 64-byte key-identifier rules remain stricter than the generic string ceilings wherever they apply and MUST NOT be weakened by these resource limits. Because CBAP-1 carries action bytes and by-value policy bytes as byte strings, each such byte string is limited to <tt>MAX_BSTR_BYTES</tt>.</t>
        <t>Every <tt>cbap1-uri</tt> value in CBAP-1 MUST satisfy the generic URI syntax of <xref target="RFC3986"/> and the <tt>https</tt> URI scheme requirements in Section 4.2.2 of <xref target="RFC9110"/>, with these additional profile restrictions:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the scheme is the exact lowercase ASCII string <tt>https</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>an authority introduced by <tt>//</tt> is present and contains a non-empty host;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>user information is absent;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>if a port delimiter is present, the port contains only ASCII digits, begins with a digit in <tt>1..9</tt>, is the shortest decimal representation of its value, and has a numeric value in <tt>1..65535</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>every percent-encoded triplet is syntactically complete; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a fragment component is absent.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Conformance is determined by the complete component grammar, not by a prefix
test or a character allowlist. In particular:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>authority</tt>, <tt>host</tt>, <tt>IP-literal</tt>, <tt>IPv6address</tt>, <tt>IPvFuture</tt>,
<tt>path-abempty</tt>, <tt>segment</tt>, <tt>pchar</tt>, and <tt>query</tt> have the meanings and ABNF
defined by <xref target="RFC3986"/>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a bracketed host MUST contain exactly one syntactically valid <xref target="RFC3986"/>
              <tt>IPv6address</tt> or <tt>IPvFuture</tt> value;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>[</tt> and <tt>]</tt> are permitted only as the delimiters of that <tt>IP-literal</tt> and
MUST be rejected in a registered name, path, or query;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a registered name is validated as <tt>reg-name</tt>; accepting the characters of
a putative hostname without parsing its component boundaries is
insufficient; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>IPv6 zone identifiers, including a percent-encoded zone suffix inside an
IP-literal, are not supported by CBAP-1 and MUST be rejected.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t><xref target="RFC9844"/> obsoletes <xref target="RFC6874"/> and does not define a replacement URI syntax for
zone identifiers. CBAP-1 deliberately excludes them because a locally scoped
zone identifier is not a stable signed identifier across verifiers.</t>
        <t>Path and query components are permitted only when their complete <xref target="RFC3986"/>
grammar matches. An explicit port MUST be validated in its received lexical
form before numeric conversion; a verifier MUST NOT strip leading zeros and
then validate the resulting number. CBAP-1 performs no URI normalization: the
exact ASCII bytes are the identifier and signature input. A different but
allegedly equivalent spelling is a different value. In particular,
<tt>https://forum.example/</tt> and <tt>https://forum.example:443/</tt> remain distinct
signed URI values even when a deployment routes both to the same HTTPS
service. A prefix test such as <tt>starts_with("https://")</tt>, a search for
forbidden delimiters, or a component-wide character allowlist is not URI
validation.</t>
        <t>The following examples are normative CBAP-1 URI conformance probes. Each
value is evaluated as written, without normalization or network resolution.</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">URI</th>
              <th align="left">Required result</th>
              <th align="left">Boundary exercised</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example</tt></td>
              <td align="left">accept</td>
              <td align="left">empty path</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example:1/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">accept</td>
              <td align="left">minimum explicit port</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example:443/cases?open=1</tt></td>
              <td align="left">accept</td>
              <td align="left">shortest decimal port, path and query</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example:65535/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">accept</td>
              <td align="left">maximum explicit port</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://[2001:db8::1]/cases</tt></td>
              <td align="left">accept</td>
              <td align="left">IPv6 address literal</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://[v1.a]/cases</tt></td>
              <td align="left">accept</td>
              <td align="left">IPvFuture</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example/%2Fcase</tt></td>
              <td align="left">accept</td>
              <td align="left">complete percent triplet in path</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>HTTPS://forum.example/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">scheme is not exact lowercase <tt>https</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">empty host</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://user@forum.example/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">user information</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example:/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">empty explicit port</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example:0/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">explicit port zero</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example:00/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">explicit port zero and non-shortest form</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example:0443/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">leading zero / non-shortest form</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example:00001/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">leading zeros / non-shortest form</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example:65536/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">port outside profile range</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example/%2/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">incomplete percent triplet</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example/#part</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">fragment present</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://[:::]/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">invalid IPv6 address literal</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://[v1.]/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">invalid IPvFuture</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://[fe80::1%25eth0]/</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">zone identifier unsupported</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example/a[b]</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">brackets in path</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>https://forum.example/?a=[b]</tt></td>
              <td align="left">reject</td>
              <td align="left">brackets in query</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The following conformance probe distinguishes the ordering of Section 4.2.1 of <xref target="RFC8949"/> from length-first ordering. A conforming CBAP-1 encoder MUST encode the diagnostic map <tt>{100: -1, -1: 100}</tt> as hexadecimal <tt>a2186420201864</tt>. An encoder that places key <tt>-1</tt> before key <tt>100</tt> is not conformant even if a library describes its output as canonical.</t>
        <t>CBAP-1 fixes SHA-256 as specified by <xref target="RFC6234"/> as its only digest function. A digest is a 32-byte byte string; an algorithm identifier is not carried beside each digest. Algorithm substitution is therefore impossible inside the profile. Adding another hash function requires a new application-profile version.</t>
        <t>Let <tt>dCBOR(x)</tt> be the exact CBAP-1 deterministic encoding of data item <tt>x</tt>. Domain-separated hashes are computed as:</t>
        <sourcecode type="text"><![CDATA[
H(domain, value) = SHA-256(dCBOR([domain, value]))
]]></sourcecode>
        <t><tt>domain</tt> is the exact lowercase ASCII text string defined at each use. Digests of signed artifacts are SHA-256 over all the exact received bytes of the complete tagged COSE_Sign1 item carried in the corresponding bundle <tt>bstr</tt>, including the tag, protected-header bytes, payload, and signature; a decoded prefix or a reconstructed encoding is not a digest input. Policy and action digests are SHA-256 over the exact supplied bytes. A verifier MUST NOT hash a decoded and reconstructed signed object in place of its received conforming bytes.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="mandatory-signature-envelope">
        <name>Mandatory signature envelope</name>
        <t>Every signed CBAP-1 object is an embedded-payload, tagged COSE_Sign1 object as defined by <xref target="RFC9052"/>. The CBOR decoding of that item from the bundle member <tt>bstr</tt> MUST consume all bytes of that <tt>bstr</tt> and produce exactly one item; a parseable prefix followed by trailing bytes is invalid at P01 of the current signed-object boundary. Its complete received CBOR item MUST contain exactly one tag occurrence, the required outermost tag 18, and no nested, repeated, or other tag. Its structure is:</t>
        <sourcecode type="text"><![CDATA[
18([protected, unprotected, payload, signature])
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>The protected header map MUST contain exactly:</t>
        <sourcecode type="text"><![CDATA[
{ 1: -19, 4: kid }
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>Header label <tt>1</tt> is <tt>alg</tt>; value <tt>-19</tt> is the fully specified Ed25519 algorithm registered by <xref target="RFC9864"/>. CBAP-1 MUST NOT use the deprecated polymorphic <tt>EdDSA</tt> value <tt>-8</tt>. Header label <tt>4</tt> is <tt>kid</tt>, encoded as a byte string of 1 through 64 bytes. The unprotected header map MUST be empty. The CBOR decoding of the protected-header <tt>bstr</tt> MUST consume all its bytes as exactly one map at P03, and the CBOR decoding of the embedded payload <tt>bstr</tt> MUST consume all its bytes as exactly one CBOR item at P04. Trailing bytes within either <tt>bstr</tt> fail at the current signed-object boundary rather than at a later digest comparison. The payload MUST be present as a byte string containing one closed CBAP-1 payload. Detached payloads, countersignatures, critical headers, and additional protected or unprotected headers are not supported by CBAP-1.</t>
        <t>The signature is computed over the <xref target="RFC9052"/> Sig_structure with context <tt>Signature1</tt>, the received protected-header bytes, an empty external AAD byte string, and the embedded payload bytes. Ed25519 is defined by <xref target="RFC8032"/>. The received <tt>signature</tt> byte string MUST be exactly 64 bytes; this length constraint belongs to the tagged COSE_Sign1 shape predicate and MUST be evaluated before trust resolution or signature verification. The public key is an Ed25519 COSE_Key as defined by <xref target="RFC9053"/>, with <tt>kty = 1</tt>, <tt>crv = 6</tt>, and a 32-byte <tt>x</tt> public-key value. Within signature verification, the following subconditions MUST be evaluated in the order stated, and evaluation stops at the first failure. First, <tt>A</tt>, exactly the 32-byte <tt>x</tt> value of the uniquely resolved COSE_Key, MUST decode under Section 5.1.3 of <xref target="RFC8032"/>; in particular, after clearing the encoded x-sign bit, the encoded y coordinate MUST be less than p, and decoding MUST fail if recovery produces x = 0 while the encoded x-sign bit is 1; no reduction of y modulo p, sign-bit repair, re-encoding repair, or other normalization is permitted. Second, <tt>R</tt>, exactly the first 32 bytes of the received signature, MUST satisfy the same decoding and canonical-encoding requirements of Section 5.1.3 of <xref target="RFC8032"/>, with no reduction, repair, or normalization. Third, <tt>S</tt>, the unsigned little-endian integer represented by the final 32 bytes of the received signature, MUST satisfy <tt>0 &lt;= S &lt; L</tt> and MUST NOT be reduced modulo L by the verifier. Fourth, after successful decoding, <tt>A</tt> MUST be a non-identity point in the prime-order subgroup generated by the Ed25519 base point <tt>B</tt>: <tt>[L]A</tt> MUST equal the identity and <tt>A</tt> MUST NOT equal the identity. Fifth, after successful decoding, <tt>R</tt> MUST be a non-identity point in that same prime-order subgroup: <tt>[L]R</tt> MUST equal the identity and <tt>R</tt> MUST NOT equal the identity. These prime-subgroup requirements for <tt>A</tt> and <tt>R</tt> are additional CBAP-1 profile restrictions beyond RFC 8032 point decoding. Sixth, verification MUST use the uncofactored equation <tt>[S]B = R + [k]A</tt>, with <tt>k</tt> and the remaining notation as in Section 5.1.7 of <xref target="RFC8032"/>; the cofactored equation is not an alternative CBAP-1 acceptance rule. Failure of any of these six subconditions is a signature-verification failure at the current signed-object boundary.</t>
        <t><tt>kid</tt> is a key-selection hint, not a trust assertion. The verifier's local trust set MUST resolve the exact protected <tt>kid</tt> bytes to exactly one authorized public key for the required role. Zero matching entries, multiple matching entries (including exact duplicates), or no entry authorized for the required role fails trust resolution at the current signed-object boundary as specified by the calling verification step. Two <tt>forum-role</tt> entries with the same <tt>entry-kid</tt> but different <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt> values remain two matches and do not form a single conforming authorized trust entry. Within that same trust-resolution predicate, the verifier MUST first match each local entry's <tt>role</tt> exactly against the required role and its <tt>entry-kid</tt> bytes exactly against the protected <tt>kid</tt>, counting every matching entry occurrence, and require exactly one match. The COSE_Key <tt>kid</tt> member (label <tt>2</tt>) is not an entry selector, and neither its presence nor its value affects matching or cardinality. Only after the exactly-one decision, the selected entry's <tt>key-value</tt> MUST be a structurally admissible COSE_Key having <tt>kty = 1</tt>, <tt>crv = 6</tt>, an <tt>x</tt> member that is a 32-byte byte string and, if its <tt>alg</tt> member is present, <tt>alg = -19</tt>. The <tt>key_ops</tt> COSE_Key member is ignored for CBAP-1 admission and resolution. A verifier MUST NOT import COSE_KeySet malformed-key filtering or any other rule that drops entries before counting matching occurrences. Wrong <tt>kty</tt>, wrong <tt>crv</tt>, a missing <tt>x</tt>, or an <tt>x</tt> value that is not a 32-byte byte string is a trust-resolution failure at the current signed-object boundary. These COSE_Key checks MUST NOT filter entries before the exactly-one cardinality decision and MUST be completed before signature verification. Decoding an otherwise structurally admissible 32-byte <tt>x</tt> value as an Ed25519 point remains part of signature verification as specified above. The signer <tt>key-id</tt> is the CPO payload member <tt>6</tt>, Exact Forum Acceptance member <tt>9</tt>, Authorization Artifact member <tt>4</tt>, Executor Verification member <tt>10</tt>, or Execution Record member <tt>10</tt>, as applicable; each is a text string. The protected <tt>kid</tt> MUST equal the UTF-8 encoding of that <tt>key-id</tt> byte-for-byte; no Unicode normalization or other transformation is applied. A protected <tt>kid</tt> that is not exactly such an encoding is invalid in CBAP-1.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cbap-1-closed-data-model">
        <name>CBAP-1 closed data model</name>
        <t>CBAP-1 defines one closed end-to-end path comprising direct authorization binding, exact forum acceptance, issuer-only selection provenance, by-value policy verification, executor-attested pre-execution evidence, an execution-time filing clock, and <tt>effect_policy = none</tt>. Class manifests, companion bindings, notices, active execution effects, multiparty selection, and external selection are outside CBAP-1 and are unsupported by this profile.</t>
        <t>In CBAP-1, <tt>epoch</tt> is an unsigned integer counting seconds from <tt>1970-01-01T00:00Z</tt> UTC on the POSIX numeric timeline described for nonnegative epoch-based date/time values in Section 3.4.2 of <xref target="RFC8949"/>. CBAP-1 encodes this integer directly as the untagged CDDL <tt>uint</tt>; it does not use CBOR tag 1. Fractional and negative epoch values are therefore outside the profile. Leap seconds follow POSIX-time handling: CBAP-1 does not assign an inserted leap second an additional distinct integer value, and comparisons and deadline arithmetic use that same POSIX numeric timeline.</t>
        <t>The normative CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/> is:</t>
        <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
digest = bstr .size 32
id16 = bstr .size 16
epoch = uint
key-id = tstr
cbap1-uri = tstr

policy-ref = [cbap1-uri, digest]
validity = [not-before: epoch, not-after: epoch]
forum = [forum-id: cbap1-uri, submission-endpoint: cbap1-uri,
         forum-key-id: key-id]
filing-window = [basis: 1, duration-seconds: uint]
effect-policy = [mode: 0]
affected-party-access = [method: 3, discovery-uri: cbap1-uri,
                         available-until: epoch]

cbap1-terms = {
  1: id16,                       ; authorization-id
  2: digest,                     ; abp-digest
  3: digest,                     ; authorization-trust-profile-digest
  4: key-id,                     ; authorization-issuer-key-id
  5: validity,                   ; authorization-validity
  6: digest,                     ; action-digest
  7: forum,
  8: policy-ref,                 ; standing-policy
  9: policy-ref,                 ; procedure
  10: filing-window,
  11: effect-policy,
  12: policy-ref,                ; selection-policy
  13: [1* affected-party-access],
  14: epoch,                     ; issued-at
  15: epoch,                     ; expires-at
  16: id16                       ; nonce
}

cbap1-cpo = {
  1: 1,                         ; profile version
  2: 1,                         ; object type: CPO
  3: cbap1-terms,
  4: [mode: 0, exact-acceptance-digest: digest],
  5: [],                        ; no selection statements: unilateral
  6: key-id                     ; issuer-key-id
}

cbap1-exact-acceptance = {
  1: 1,
  2: 2,                         ; exact forum acceptance
  3: digest,                    ; forum-terms-digest
  4: epoch,                     ; valid-from
  5: epoch,                     ; valid-until
  6: policy-ref,                ; submission-receipt-profile
  7: policy-ref,                ; withdrawal-policy
  8: epoch,                     ; signed-at
  9: key-id                     ; forum-key-id
}

cbap1-authorization = {
  1: 1,
  2: 3,                         ; CBAP-1 Authorization Artifact
  3: id16,                      ; authorization-id
  4: key-id,                    ; issuer-key-id
  5: tstr,                      ; agent-id
  6: digest,                    ; action-digest
  7: epoch,                     ; not-before
  8: epoch,                     ; not-after
  9: digest,                    ; cpo-digest
  10: id16                      ; nonce
}

cbap1-executor-verification = {
  1: 1,
  2: 4,                         ; executor verification record
  3: digest,                    ; authorization-digest
  4: id16,                      ; authorization-id
  5: digest,                    ; action-digest
  6: digest,                    ; cpo-digest
  7: 1,                         ; decision: execute
  8: epoch,                     ; verified-at
  9: id16,                      ; nonce
  10: key-id                    ; executor-key-id
}

cbap1-execution-record = {
  1: 1,
  2: 5,                         ; execution record
  3: digest,                    ; authorization-digest
  4: digest,                    ; executor-verification-digest
  5: id16,                      ; authorization-id
  6: digest,                    ; action-digest
  7: 1,                         ; disposition: executed
  8: epoch,                     ; executed-at
  9: id16,                      ; nonce
  10: key-id                    ; executor-key-id
}

cbap1-bundle = {
  1: 1,
  2: bstr,                      ; cpo-cose
  3: bstr,                      ; exact-acceptance-cose
  4: bstr,                      ; authorization-cose
  5: bstr,                      ; executor-verification-cose
  6: bstr,                      ; execution-record-cose
  7: bstr,                      ; action-bytes
  8: [+ [digest, bstr]]         ; policy-digest, policy-bytes
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>The CDDL entry rule for the received bundle is <tt>cbap1-bundle</tt>. The signed payload entry rules are <tt>cbap1-cpo</tt>, <tt>cbap1-exact-acceptance</tt>, <tt>cbap1-authorization</tt>, <tt>cbap1-executor-verification</tt>, and <tt>cbap1-execution-record</tt>, each applied to the payload of its corresponding tagged COSE_Sign1 item at the assigned signed-object boundary. The <tt>cbap1-terms</tt> rule is embedded in CPO member <tt>3</tt>. These identifications do not change the CDDL or add any wire fields.</t>
        <t>The following member-label registry is normative. The names identify protocol semantics, not merely implementation variables. An implementation that assigns a listed semantic value to another label is not CBAP-1 conformant even when its producer and verifier agree with each other.</t>
        <sourcecode type="text"><![CDATA[
cbap1-terms
   1 authorization-id
   2 abp-digest
   3 authorization-trust-profile-digest
   4 authorization-issuer-key-id
   5 authorization-validity
   6 action-digest
   7 forum
   8 standing-policy
   9 procedure
  10 filing-window
  11 effect-policy
  12 selection-policy
  13 affected-party-access
  14 issued-at
  15 expires-at
  16 nonce

cbap1-cpo
   1 profile-version
   2 object-type
   3 terms
   4 exact-acceptance-reference
   5 selection-statements
   6 issuer-key-id

cbap1-exact-acceptance
   1 profile-version
   2 object-type
   3 forum-terms-digest
   4 valid-from
   5 valid-until
   6 submission-receipt-profile
   7 withdrawal-policy
   8 signed-at
   9 forum-key-id

cbap1-authorization
   1 profile-version
   2 object-type
   3 authorization-id
   4 issuer-key-id
   5 agent-id
   6 action-digest
   7 not-before
   8 not-after
   9 cpo-digest
  10 nonce

cbap1-executor-verification
   1 profile-version
   2 object-type
   3 authorization-digest
   4 authorization-id
   5 action-digest
   6 cpo-digest
   7 decision
   8 verified-at
   9 nonce
  10 executor-key-id

cbap1-execution-record
   1 profile-version
   2 object-type
   3 authorization-digest
   4 executor-verification-digest
   5 authorization-id
   6 action-digest
   7 disposition
   8 executed-at
   9 nonce
  10 executor-key-id

cbap1-bundle
   1 profile-version
   2 cpo-cose
   3 exact-acceptance-cose
   4 authorization-cose
   5 executor-verification-cose
   6 execution-record-cose
   7 action-bytes
   8 policy-pairs
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>Each <tt>nonce</tt> in CBAP-1 is an object-local opaque <tt>id16</tt> member authenticated by the signature of its enclosing signed object. CBAP-1 defines no equality or inequality relation among CPO terms label <tt>16</tt>, Authorization Artifact label <tt>10</tt>, Executor Verification label <tt>9</tt>, and Execution Record label <tt>9</tt>. A verifier MUST NOT reject a bundle merely because any two of those nonce values are equal or different, and MUST NOT infer freshness, uniqueness, single use, replay resistance, or protocol ordering from their presence or value. Cross-object binding in CBAP-1 is established by the authorization identifier, action digest, CPO digest, Authorization Artifact digest, Executor Verification digest, and the required signer/key relations.</t>
        <t>In particular, executor-verification member <tt>5</tt> is always <tt>action-digest</tt> and member <tt>6</tt> is always <tt>cpo-digest</tt>. Execution-record member <tt>5</tt> is <tt>authorization-id</tt> and member <tt>6</tt> is <tt>action-digest</tt>. Reusing a semantic label number across different maps is not a CBAP-1 design rule; only the registry above assigns meaning.</t>
        <t>The integer values have the following fixed meanings in CBAP-1: filing-window basis <tt>1</tt> is <tt>execution_time</tt>; effect mode <tt>0</tt> is <tt>none</tt>; affected-party access method <tt>3</tt> is <tt>public_transparency</tt>; forum-acceptance mode <tt>0</tt> is <tt>exact</tt>; executor decision <tt>1</tt> is <tt>execute</tt>; and execution disposition <tt>1</tt> is <tt>executed</tt>. For every fixed CBAP-1 integer vocabulary, any value other than a listed fixed value is outside the CBAP-1 CDDL and fails at the containing object's closed-schema boundary; it is not an extension point. In particular, a CPO effect-mode integer other than <tt>0</tt> fails the B6 closed-schema predicate before <tt>declared_effect</tt> is completed, so <tt>declared_effect</tt> remains <tt>indeterminate</tt> under the closed transition table.</t>
        <t>The filing-window <tt>duration-seconds</tt> value MUST be in the inclusive range <tt>1..18446744073709551615</tt>. A zero-duration contestation window is not valid in CBAP-1 and fails at <tt>profile_binding_mismatch</tt> rather than being interpreted as an instantaneous window.</t>
        <t>Policy pairs in bundle member <tt>8</tt> MUST be sorted in nondecreasing bytewise order of <tt>policy-digest</tt> and MUST NOT repeat a digest. Equality satisfies the ordering predicate and is rejected by the separate no-repeat predicate. This makes the by-value bundle unique rather than treating arbitrary array order as a new encoding of the same evidence set. After the five signed payloads have been validated, the set of <tt>policy-digest</tt> values in bundle member <tt>8</tt> MUST equal exactly the set referenced by CPO terms labels <tt>8</tt>, <tt>9</tt>, and <tt>12</tt> and Exact Forum Acceptance labels <tt>6</tt> and <tt>7</tt>. Missing or additional policy digests fail at <tt>profile_binding_mismatch</tt>. A bundle member <tt>8</tt> that violates its CDDL non-empty cardinality, exact pair shape, 32-byte digest type/size, or policy-byte <tt>bstr</tt> type fails at <tt>bundle_schema_invalid</tt>; only a CDDL-valid policy array that exceeds <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS</tt>, is unsorted, repeats a digest, or is internally digest-inconsistent fails at <tt>policy_set_invalid</tt>.</t>
        <t><tt>cbap1-authorization</tt> is the deliberately small Authorization Artifact format admitted by this profile. The expected CBAP-1 ABP identifier is fixed by this profile as defined below; other authorization formats and ABP behaviors are outside CBAP-1. It is not proposed as a universal agent-authorization format.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cbap-1-digest-and-construction-rules">
        <name>CBAP-1 digest and construction rules</name>
        <t>CBAP-1 uses these exact derivations:</t>
        <sourcecode type="text"><![CDATA[
action_digest = SHA-256(action_bytes)
policy_digest = SHA-256(policy_bytes)
forum_terms = [terms[1], terms[2], terms[3], terms[4], terms[5],
               terms[6], terms[7], terms[8], terms[9], terms[10]]
forum_terms_digest = H("agent-contestation-forum-terms-v1",
                       forum_terms)
acceptance_digest = SHA-256(exact_acceptance_cose_bytes)
cpo_digest = SHA-256(cpo_cose_bytes)
authorization_digest = SHA-256(authorization_cose_bytes)
executor_verification_digest = SHA-256(
    executor_verification_cose_bytes)
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>CBAP-1 permits <tt>action_bytes</tt> to be a zero-length byte string. In that case, <tt>action_digest</tt> is SHA-256 of the zero-length byte string.</t>
        <t>The construction steps describe the dependency order, not the full conditions for a positive bundle. For a positive CBAP-1 result, all applicable Section 5 encoding, resource-ceiling, and closed-schema constraints and all Section 7.1 verification checks must pass. The construction sequence creates no independent verifier predicate and does not replace any of those checks.</t>
        <t>The construction order is fixed:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Fix the action bytes, policy bytes, trust inputs, identifiers, validity, forum, filing window, access method, times, and nonces.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Compute the action and policy digests and construct <tt>cbap1-terms</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Project <tt>forum_terms</tt>, compute its digest, and obtain the forum-signed exact acceptance.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Hash the complete signed acceptance and place that digest in the CPO payload.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Sign the CPO and hash the complete tagged COSE_Sign1 bytes.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Place the CPO digest in the CBAP-1 Authorization Artifact and sign it.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Hash the signed Authorization Artifact and construct the executor verification record. Place <tt>authorization-digest</tt> at label <tt>3</tt>, <tt>authorization-id</tt> at label <tt>4</tt>, <tt>action-digest</tt> at label <tt>5</tt>, and <tt>cpo-digest</tt> at label <tt>6</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Sign that record, hash it, and construct the execution record. Place <tt>authorization-digest</tt> at label <tt>3</tt>, <tt>executor-verification-digest</tt> at label <tt>4</tt>, <tt>authorization-id</tt> at label <tt>5</tt>, and <tt>action-digest</tt> at label <tt>6</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Sign the execution record and assemble the unsigned by-value bundle.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>No step signs or hashes a placeholder for an object that is completed later. The construction sequence specifies dependencies among complete signed objects and digests; it does not define a verifier-observable producer chronology. A verifier checks only the received conforming bytes and the applicable signature, digest, and binding predicates in Section 7.1. A different construction chronology that yields the same conforming received bytes does not fail verification solely because of that chronology. Inconsistent signed bytes or digest dependencies fail at the applicable existing predicate; construction order is not a separate verification predicate. A verifier MUST hash each signed artifact from its exact received conforming bytes rather than substitute a decoded-and-reconstructed representation. A reconstruction that differs by one or more bytes changes the relevant digest and MUST fail verification; a byte-identical reconstruction has the same digest.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cbap-1-trust-and-verification-inputs">
        <name>CBAP-1 trust and verification inputs</name>
        <t>The bundle is evidence, not a trust store. A CBAP-1 verifier receives separately:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the expected Authorization Trust Profile identifier supplied by trusted local policy as an exact opaque 32-byte digest;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a required ordered sequence of local trust entries, which MAY be empty; each entry carries the local <tt>role</tt>, exact <tt>entry-kid</tt> bytes and a <tt>key-value</tt>, and forum-role entries can carry one explicit <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt> text string; the complete B2 shape is specified in Section 7.1;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a typed integer verification-time input at the verifier boundary, without textual parsing or coercion by CBAP-1.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The verifier-local inputs are abstract values, not a wire format; this document defines no serialization for them. As applied to these inputs, the terms integer, byte string, text string, sequence, and map denote an integer, a byte string, a text string, an array, and a map of the generic data model in Section 2 of <xref target="RFC8949"/>. The trust-entry member names <tt>role</tt>, <tt>entry-kid</tt>, <tt>key-value</tt>, and <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt> are text-string map keys with exactly those spellings. Absence means that no value is supplied; <tt>null</tt> or any other placeholder is a present value.</t>
        <t>For verifier-local input, a trust entry is a map closed to <tt>role</tt>, <tt>entry-kid</tt>, <tt>key-value</tt>, and optional <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt>. The first three members are required: <tt>role</tt> is a text string, <tt>entry-kid</tt> a byte string, and <tt>key-value</tt> a present value whose contents are opaque at B2. <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt>, if present, is exactly one text string and is permitted only where <tt>role</tt> is byte-for-byte the text <tt>forum-role</tt>. Any other role with that member is malformed at B2; an unknown text-string role without it is a valid local entry at B2 but never matches a required signing role. B2 visits entries in sequence order for first-failure attribution only. The values <tt>issuer-role</tt>, <tt>forum-role</tt>, and <tt>executor-role</tt> identify the signed-object role assignments; the set of syntactically valid local role strings is not closed to those three values.</t>
        <t>The expected CBAP-1 ABP identifier is fixed by this profile as <tt>H("cbap1-authorization-binding-profile-v1", 1)</tt> and MUST be derived by the verifier rather than replaced by a caller-supplied alternative. The expected Authorization Trust Profile identifier is supplied by local policy as an exact opaque 32-byte digest. The verifier MUST compare those supplied bytes directly and byte-for-byte with CPO terms member <tt>3</tt>; it MUST NOT derive, recompute, normalize, or reinterpret that local identifier at the profile-binding predicate. Untrusted bytes carried in the bundle cannot replace the locally supplied identifier. Policy bytes in the bundle establish discoverability and digest equality only. They do not become trusted merely because the issuer supplied them.</t>
        <t>The <strong>CBAP-1 signed-object role table</strong> is closed:</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Signed object</th>
              <th align="left">Required trust role</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">CPO</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>issuer-role</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Exact Forum Acceptance</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>forum-role</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Authorization Artifact</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>issuer-role</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Executor Verification</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>executor-role</tt></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">Execution Record</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>executor-role</tt></td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>For each signed CBAP-1 object, trust resolution matches the entry's exact <tt>role</tt> to the role assigned in the CBAP-1 signed-object role table and its <tt>entry-kid</tt> bytes to the exact protected <tt>kid</tt>. Zero matches or more than one matching occurrence, including duplicates or entries with different forum authorizations under the same matching <tt>role</tt> and <tt>entry-kid</tt>, fail at that signed-object boundary; exactly one match supplies the <tt>key-value</tt> used for signature verification after structural COSE_Key checks. Additional entries under the same role with different <tt>entry-kid</tt> values are allowed, and sequence order does not change match cardinality. CBAP-1 resolves the Executor Verification and Execution Record independently and MUST NOT require their protected <tt>kid</tt> values or resolved trust entries to be equal; different <tt>kid</tt> values are conforming when each object independently resolves to exactly one <tt>executor-role</tt> trust entry and all remaining predicates pass. Independent role authorization plus the required Execution Record binding to the exact signed Executor Verification record does not by itself establish that the two signer keys belong to the same legal, organizational, physical, or logical executor identity. An entry carrying the same <tt>kid</tt> under a different role does not satisfy the assigned role. For the Exact Forum Acceptance signer, authorization for the CPO terms <tt>forum-id</tt> is evaluated separately at the forum-terms boundary and MUST NOT be folded into signed-object trust resolution. The resolved forum-role entry's <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt> MUST equal the exact UTF-8 bytes of the CPO terms <tt>forum-id</tt>; no case folding, URI normalization, prefix matching, patterns, globbing or wildcards apply. Absence of explicit <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt> on the resolved <tt>forum-role</tt> entry means authorization for no forum identifier; omission MUST NOT be interpreted as wildcard authorization.</t>
        <t>The CBAP-1 verification-time input MUST reach the verifier boundary as a typed integer in the range <tt>0..18446744073709551615</tt>. Text, including the string <tt>"5"</tt>, is not a CBAP-1 integer and MUST NOT be parsed, coerced or normalized into a number at this boundary. A negative integer, an integer above that range, or any non-integer value fails with <tt>verification_time_invalid</tt> before B2 and before any bundle byte is consumed. An external adapter MAY define its own textual grammar outside CBAP-1, but it MUST NOT change the typed verifier boundary or make a textual value reaching that boundary acceptable. Invalid inputs reaching that boundary MUST yield the closed B1 reason, not an unhandled exception, panic, process abort, clamping, wrapping, or substitution. The conformance boundary for B1 and B2 is the point at which an implementation accepts the verifier-local inputs as abstract values. An implementation whose native interface cannot represent every such value conforms at B1 and B2 only together with the component that accepts them and returns the B1 or B2 result for those the native interface cannot carry.</t>
        <t>After the complete successful CBAP-1 procedure through boundary 22 passes, the final structured result contains <tt>selection_provenance: unilateral</tt>, <tt>forum_acknowledgement: valid_exact</tt>, <tt>pre_execution_evidence: executor_attested</tt>, and <tt>declared_effect: none</tt>. During evaluation, each field completes only where Section 7.2 assigns its positive transition; this descriptive successful-path sentence neither delays nor advances any field completion. The execution record's authenticated <tt>executed-at</tt> value starts the filing window. This is an executor-signed clock claim authenticated under the closed <tt>executor-role</tt> trust-resolution rules; neither its signature nor its temporal ordering establishes external wall-clock accuracy or separate clock authority. CBAP-1 uses its closed local ATP digest and trust-entry sequence for their specified role and profile checks, but defines no verifier-local clock-authority or skew input. Clock-authority and skew assessments belong solely to the application after the CBAP-1 structured result has been returned; they MUST NOT modify that returned result, its first-failure reason, or any semantic field. An application decision informed by such assessments is not a CBAP-1 result value.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="structured-result">
      <name>Structured result</name>
      <t>CBAP-1 returns one closed structured result. The result has exactly sixteen semantic fields plus <tt>reasons</tt>; implementations MUST NOT add profile-defined result fields or result values to this CBAP-1 result.</t>
      <t>The closed scalar vocabulary is:</t>
      <table>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Field</th>
            <th align="left">CBAP-1 values</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>binding</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>valid</tt>, <tt>invalid</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>pre_execution_evidence</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>executor_attested</tt>, <tt>invalid</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>discoverability</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>complete</tt>, <tt>incomplete</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>forum_acknowledgement</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>valid_exact</tt>, <tt>invalid_scope</tt>, <tt>invalid</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>forum_operational_status</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not_checked</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>selection_provenance</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>unilateral</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>access_binding</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>valid</tt>, <tt>invalid</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>notice_evidence</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not_claimed</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>retrievability</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not_checked</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>filing_window_status</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not_open</tt>, <tt>open</tt>, <tt>closed</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>policy_freshness</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>declared_effect</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>none</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>effect_acceptance</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not_required</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>effect_trigger</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not_applicable</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>effect_ordering</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not_applicable</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>effect_application</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>not_applicable</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt></td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t><tt>filing_window_status</tt> is derived by step 22 of the CBAP-1 verification procedure as <tt>not_open</tt>, <tt>open</tt>, or <tt>closed</tt>, and B22 completes the field with that derived value on its positive transition. Its <tt>indeterminate</tt> value is the initialized value preserved when verification stops before B22 completes the field.</t>
      <t><tt>reasons</tt> has a separate closed vocabulary. It is <tt>[]</tt> on the positive path. On a negative path it contains exactly one of the twenty-two reason codes defined by the B1 through B22 failure-precedence table, and that code is the first failing boundary under the specified precedence. An implementation MAY retain additional diagnostics for operators, but MUST NOT return implementation-specific strings or a second reason code in <tt>reasons</tt>.</t>
      <t>Before evaluating B1, a verifier MUST initialize the result exactly as follows:</t>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "binding": "indeterminate",
  "pre_execution_evidence": "indeterminate",
  "discoverability": "indeterminate",
  "forum_acknowledgement": "indeterminate",
  "forum_operational_status": "not_checked",
  "selection_provenance": "indeterminate",
  "access_binding": "indeterminate",
  "notice_evidence": "indeterminate",
  "retrievability": "not_checked",
  "filing_window_status": "indeterminate",
  "policy_freshness": "indeterminate",
  "declared_effect": "indeterminate",
  "effect_acceptance": "indeterminate",
  "effect_trigger": "indeterminate",
  "effect_ordering": "indeterminate",
  "effect_application": "indeterminate",
  "reasons": []
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>The two <tt>not_checked</tt> initial values mean that CBAP-1 has not performed an operational reachability or retrievability check. Every other semantic field begins as <tt>indeterminate</tt> because no validated protocol input has yet established a more specific CBAP-1 value. The <tt>reasons</tt> array begins empty.</t>
      <t>For <tt>binding</tt>, <tt>discoverability</tt>, and <tt>declared_effect</tt>, <tt>indeterminate</tt> means that the verifier has not established enough validated input to select another value in that field's CBAP-1 vocabulary. It MUST NOT replace an already established <tt>binding: invalid</tt> or <tt>discoverability: incomplete</tt> result. More generally, each semantic field transitions from its initial value at most once and then retains that value for the remainder of verification.</t>
      <t>The result evolves monotonically under the closed B1 through B22 boundaries:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>For B1 through B5, a positive semantic-field completion occurs only where the closed transition table explicitly assigns one after the whole boundary passes. No other semantic field completes in those boundaries.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>For signed-object boundaries B6 through B10, no positive semantic-field completion assigned to a boundary occurs unless the complete signed-object validation pipeline passes. On failure, only the negative transition explicitly assigned to the first failed predicate may occur.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>For cross-object boundaries B11 through B22, a predicate that passes earlier in the current boundary may complete a semantic field before a later predicate in that boundary fails only where the closed transition table explicitly assigns that completion. There is no open-ended post-failure derivation.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>On a negative path, <tt>reasons</tt> MUST transition exactly once from <tt>[]</tt> to the one-element array containing the first failure-precedence reason code. On the positive path, <tt>reasons</tt> remains <tt>[]</tt> and transitions zero times.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>When a predicate fails, verification stops for result derivation at that predicate. Later predicates in the same boundary and all later boundaries do not derive additional result values.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t><tt>access_binding</tt> reports only the integrity and CBAP-1 constraint status of the declared affected-party access data. It is <tt>valid</tt> only when the B22 positive completion occurs after the required prior CBAP-1 checks and the access horizon passes. It is <tt>invalid</tt> only where the closed transition table assigns that value: CPO signature failure; authenticated CPO signer <tt>key-id</tt> mismatch against the authorization-issuer <tt>key-id</tt> declared in the CPO terms; failure of an affected-party <tt>discovery-uri</tt>; or failure of the affected-party access horizon. Otherwise it retains its current value, including initialized <tt>indeterminate</tt> on paths that stop before a listed completion. <tt>access_binding</tt> does not report delivery or current retrievability.</t>
      <t>CBAP-1 performs no policy-freshness evaluation. <tt>policy_freshness</tt> therefore remains <tt>indeterminate</tt> on every CBAP-1 path.</t>
      <t>One positive-path result, for a <tt>verification_time</tt> before <tt>executed-at</tt>, is:</t>
      <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "binding": "valid",
  "pre_execution_evidence": "executor_attested",
  "discoverability": "complete",
  "forum_acknowledgement": "valid_exact",
  "forum_operational_status": "not_checked",
  "selection_provenance": "unilateral",
  "access_binding": "valid",
  "notice_evidence": "not_claimed",
  "retrievability": "not_checked",
  "filing_window_status": "not_open",
  "policy_freshness": "indeterminate",
  "declared_effect": "none",
  "effect_acceptance": "not_required",
  "effect_trigger": "not_applicable",
  "effect_ordering": "not_applicable",
  "effect_application": "not_applicable",
  "reasons": []
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>The positive-path <tt>filing_window_status</tt> value is derived by step 22 as <tt>not_open</tt> when <tt>verification_time &lt; executed-at</tt>, <tt>open</tt> when <tt>executed-at &lt;= verification_time &lt; filing_deadline</tt>, and <tt>closed</tt> when <tt>verification_time &gt;= filing_deadline</tt>.</t>
      <t>A conforming implementation MUST NOT collapse this structured result into a boolean such as <tt>contestable: true</tt> or into an independence claim without applying an explicitly identified local policy. In particular, <tt>forum_acknowledgement: valid_exact</tt> does not establish forum reachability or independence; <tt>access_binding: valid</tt> does not establish delivery or current retrievability; and <tt>pre_execution_evidence: executor_attested</tt> does not prove physical state or remedy.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="verification">
      <name>Verification</name>
      <section anchor="cbap-1-verification-procedure">
        <name>CBAP-1 verification procedure</name>
        <t>The following eight signed-object validation predicates (P01-P08) form an ordered pipeline within each of steps 6 through 10 below; they are not separate top-level verification steps:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>CBAP-1 resource ceilings and Core Deterministic CBOR conformance under Section 5.1 of exactly one complete tagged COSE_Sign1 item consuming every byte of the bundle member <tt>bstr</tt> (P01); no trailing bytes are permitted.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Tagged COSE_Sign1 shape, unprotected-header constraints, and the 64-byte received-signature length constraint.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Resource ceilings and Core Deterministic CBOR conformance of the CBOR encoded in the protected-header byte string, and the protected-header constraints, consuming the entire protected-header <tt>bstr</tt> as one item with no trailing bytes (P03).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Resource ceilings and Core Deterministic CBOR conformance of exactly one CBOR item consuming the entire payload <tt>bstr</tt>, with no trailing bytes (P04).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Closed payload schema, profile version, and object type.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Protected <tt>kid</tt> equality (P06) to the exact UTF-8 bytes of the payload signer <tt>key-id</tt>, without normalization: CPO payload member <tt>6</tt>, Exact Forum Acceptance member <tt>9</tt>, Authorization Artifact member <tt>4</tt>, Executor Verification member <tt>10</tt>, and Execution Record member <tt>10</tt>, respectively. This comparison precedes P07 trust resolution.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Unique role-authorized trust resolution: compare each entry's <tt>role</tt> to the required role and <tt>entry-kid</tt> to the exact protected <tt>kid</tt>, count all matching occurrences without prefiltering the entry's <tt>key-value</tt>, require exactly one, and only then require the selected COSE_Key to have <tt>kty = 1</tt>, <tt>crv = 6</tt>, a 32-byte byte-string <tt>x</tt>, and <tt>alg = -19</tt> when <tt>alg</tt> is present; ignore COSE_Key label-2 <tt>kid</tt> and <tt>key_ops</tt> for entry matching and resolution.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Signature verification over the received protected and payload bytes with empty external AAD, including Ed25519 point decoding of the structurally admissible 32-byte <tt>x</tt> value.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>For failure-precedence purposes, the closed payload schema includes every constraint expressed directly by the CBAP-1 CDDL, including fixed integer values, CDDL cardinality constraints, and fixed empty arrays; a fixed CDDL constraint that fails at steps 6 through 10 MUST NOT be re-evaluated at steps 14, 18, or 19. Within a closed map, member constraints are evaluated in ascending numeric-label order; within a list, items are evaluated from index zero upward. For steps 11 through 22, predicates are evaluated in the order stated in the corresponding step. A single requirement stated over a set, a grammar, or a chained inequality is one predicate; unless the step expressly states an internal order, no evaluation order is defined among its sub-conditions. Where several predicates within one step have no defined relative order (such as the ordering, uniqueness, and digest-integrity predicates in step 5), or one predicate has unordered subconditions, there is no normative first-failed predicate or subcondition among those unordered checks and no implicit tie-break order. First-failure precedence still identifies the boundary; the existing reason and assigned semantic-field transitions are unchanged. Implementations MAY identify multiple unordered failed predicates or subconditions in separate operator diagnostics, but MUST NOT use that attribution to alter <tt>reasons</tt>, semantic fields, or subsequent boundary evaluation for result derivation.</t>
        <t>A CBAP-1 verifier performs the following closed procedure in order. Steps 1 through 22 correspond one-to-one with failure-precedence boundaries B1 through B22; step 23 returns the structured result and is not a failure boundary. Steps 1 and 2 establish the verification-time and required local-input boundaries before any bundle byte is read; steps 3 through 10 then establish the outer-item, closed bundle-schema, policy-set, and signed-object boundaries in Section 7.2 order. Generic resource ceilings from Section 5.1 belong to the boundary currently decoding the item and are evaluated before allocation, iteration, closed-schema checks, or later predicates that require the decoded value. The profile-specific <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS</tt> check is the exception: it belongs only to step 5/B5. For steps 6 through 10, the verifier applies the eight signed-object predicates listed above in their stated order before examining the next signed object. A P01, P03, or P04 incomplete-consumption failure returns the current signed-object reason under its existing predicates 1 through 7 negative transition, not a later digest-binding reason.</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Require the verifier-boundary input to be a typed integer in <tt>0..18446744073709551615</tt>. Return <tt>verification_time_invalid</tt> on a type, sign, or range failure without parsing or coercing text, without evaluating B2, and without consuming any bundle byte. A textual value such as <tt>"5"</tt> is a type failure even if an external adapter could parse it.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Before parsing or consuming any bundle byte, validate the separately supplied local inputs as a closed local-input boundary, in the following first-failure order. First require the expected Authorization Trust Profile identifier to be present as a byte string of exactly 32 bytes. Next require the local trust set to be present as an ordered sequence (an empty sequence is valid). Then visit trust entries from index zero upward, requiring each entry, in order, to be a map; that it contain no members other than <tt>role</tt>, <tt>entry-kid</tt>, <tt>key-value</tt>, and optional <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt>; that <tt>role</tt> be present and a text string; that <tt>entry-kid</tt> be present and a byte string; and that <tt>key-value</tt> be present (its value remains opaque at B2). Finally, for that entry, if <tt>role</tt> is exactly the UTF-8 bytes of <tt>forum-role</tt>, <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt> MAY be absent or be exactly one text-string value; for every other role, presence of <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt> is invalid. Unknown text-string roles without forum authorization are permitted and cannot match a required signing role. Failure at the first applicable condition returns <tt>local_input_invalid</tt>, without consuming bundle bytes or completing a semantic result field. Entry sequence order is used only for B2 first-failure attribution and MUST NOT affect later role-and-<tt>kid</tt> match cardinality. B2 does not parse or validate a <tt>COSE_Key</tt>, resolve a signature key, or evaluate its cryptographic usability. No numeric CBAP-1 resource ceiling is imposed on the local inputs. Operational resource failure MUST NOT silently truncate, sample, or partially process them and continue; it yields no CBAP-1 structured result unless a B1 or B2 reason was already deterministically established in the prescribed order before that failure.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Before parsing the bundle, require the complete received bundle to be no more than <tt>MAX_BUNDLE_BYTES</tt>. Then parse exactly one outer CBOR item and require complete input consumption, the generic CBAP-1 resource ceilings applicable at the outer-item boundary (including <tt>MAX_COLLECTION_MEMBERS</tt>, but excluding the B5-only <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS</tt>), and the Core Deterministic CBOR constraints that can be evaluated without applying the closed <tt>cbap1-bundle</tt> schema. At this outer-item boundary, reject every CBOR tag, including tag 18; the required tag 18 applies only to each signed COSE_Sign1 object carried inside a bundle <tt>bstr</tt>. Also reject duplicate map keys, indefinite-length items, non-shortest arguments, disallowed simple values, floats, invalid UTF-8, any declared length that cannot be consumed with checked cursor arithmetic, or any outer-boundary resource ceiling exceeded by a declared item. As a required confirmation of the deterministic-conformance check, re-encode that outer item under Section 5.1 and require byte-for-byte equality. This re-encoding equality does not define an independently reachable validation predicate: after the preceding complete outer-item deterministic-conformance requirements have passed, no received bundle can first fail only this equality check. Do not reject an otherwise deterministic outer item merely because its bundle version, members, or member types do not match <tt>cbap1-bundle</tt>; those checks belong to step 4.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Require the outer item to be the closed <tt>cbap1-bundle</tt> with the supported profile version, all required members, no unknown members, and the required outer member types. For bundle member <tt>8</tt>, apply the complete CDDL grammar <tt>8: [+ [digest, bstr]]</tt> together with <tt>digest = bstr .size 32</tt> at this step: require a non-empty policy-set array; require each item to be exactly a two-element <tt>[digest, bstr]</tt> pair; require the digest to be a 32-byte byte string; and require the policy bytes to be a byte string. These CDDL-expressed member-8 constraints belong to this boundary and MUST NOT be re-evaluated at step 5. The <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS</tt> upper bound, profile-defined ordering, uniqueness, and digest integrity are evaluated only at step 5.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Validate the already CDDL-valid policy set. First require the array to contain no more than <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS = 5</tt> pairs: a CDDL-valid array of 6 through 64 pairs fails at this B5 predicate, while an outer array of 65 or more members already fails B3 under <tt>MAX_COLLECTION_MEMBERS = 64</tt>. Then require the <tt>policy-digest</tt> sequence to be in nondecreasing bytewise order, reject duplicate policy digests, and recompute SHA-256 over each policy byte string and require equality; no evaluation order is defined among these three predicates. At this step only the <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS</tt> upper bound, order, uniqueness, and internal digest integrity are evaluated. Member-8 non-empty cardinality, exact pair shape, 32-byte digest type/size, and policy-byte <tt>bstr</tt> type were already established at step 4 and MUST NOT be re-evaluated here. Referenced-policy presence is evaluated at step 14 after all five signed payloads have passed their object-validation pipelines. The upper-bound predicate remains inside B5 <tt>policy_set_invalid</tt>; it creates no semantic-field transition, so B5 remains P <tt>--</tt> / N <tt>--</tt> as specified in Section 7.2.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Apply the complete signed-object validation pipeline above to the CPO using its <tt>issuer-role</tt> assignment in the CBAP-1 signed-object role table, and no later signed object.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Apply the complete signed-object validation pipeline above to the Exact Forum Acceptance using its <tt>forum-role</tt> assignment in the CBAP-1 signed-object role table, and no later signed object.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Apply the complete signed-object validation pipeline above to the Authorization Artifact using its <tt>issuer-role</tt> assignment in the CBAP-1 signed-object role table, and no later signed object.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Apply the complete signed-object validation pipeline above to the Executor Verification record using its <tt>executor-role</tt> assignment in the CBAP-1 signed-object role table, and no later signed object.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Apply the complete signed-object validation pipeline above to the Execution Record using its <tt>executor-role</tt> assignment in the CBAP-1 signed-object role table.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Hash the complete signed CPO and require equality with the Authorization Artifact's CPO digest.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Hash the complete signed Exact Forum Acceptance and require equality with the CPO acceptance reference.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Recompute <tt>action_digest</tt> from the bundle's action bytes. Then, in this order, require equality with CPO terms label <tt>6</tt>, Authorization Artifact label <tt>6</tt>, Executor Verification label <tt>5</tt>, and Execution Record label <tt>6</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Evaluate these predicates in order. Require the CPO terms to use the expected CBAP-1 ABP identifier, then require direct byte-for-byte equality of CPO terms label <tt>3</tt> with the exact opaque 32-byte Authorization Trust Profile digest supplied by trusted local policy; no ATP derivation is performed at this predicate. Require the CPO signer <tt>key-id</tt> to equal the CPO terms authorization-issuer <tt>key-id</tt>. Require CPO terms member <tt>5</tt> to satisfy <tt>terms[5][0] &lt;= terms[5][1]</tt>, where <tt>terms[5][0]</tt> is <tt>not-before</tt> and <tt>terms[5][1]</tt> is <tt>not-after</tt>; the Authorization Artifact is not an operand of this B14 predicate. Require the filing-window duration to be in <tt>1..18446744073709551615</tt>. Require conforming HTTPS URIs, first evaluating the URI-bearing <tt>cbap1-terms</tt> members in ascending numeric-label order and nested list entries in ascending index order: forum-id <tt>7[0]</tt>, submission-endpoint <tt>7[1]</tt>, Standing Policy URI <tt>8[0]</tt>, procedure URI <tt>9[0]</tt>, selection-policy URI <tt>12[0]</tt>, and each affected-party <tt>discovery-uri</tt> at <tt>13[i][1]</tt> for increasing <tt>i</tt>; then evaluate Exact Forum Acceptance submission-receipt-profile URI <tt>6[0]</tt> and withdrawal-policy URI <tt>7[0]</tt>, in that order. Require the CPO terms forum <tt>key-id</tt> to encode as 1 through 64 UTF-8 bytes. Let <tt>referenced_policy_digests</tt> be the set of policy digests carried at CPO terms labels <tt>8</tt>, <tt>9</tt>, and <tt>12</tt> and Exact Forum Acceptance labels <tt>6</tt> and <tt>7</tt>. Require every digest in <tt>referenced_policy_digests</tt> to be present in bundle member <tt>8</tt>; this is a set-quantified predicate and imposes no evaluation order among different digests. Then require bundle member <tt>8</tt> to contain no policy digest outside <tt>referenced_policy_digests</tt>. Do not compare the Authorization Artifact projection or any other signed-artifact digest at this step.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Require the Authorization Artifact's authorization identifier, issuer <tt>key-id</tt>, and validity projection to equal the corresponding CPO terms. Specifically, Authorization Artifact members <tt>7</tt> and <tt>8</tt> MUST equal CPO <tt>terms[5][0]</tt> and <tt>terms[5][1]</tt>, respectively. Do not compare its action digest or CPO digest at this step.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Project <tt>forum_terms</tt> exactly as Section 5.4 specifies. Require its digest in the already-validated and CPO-bound Exact Forum Acceptance to equal the <tt>forum_terms</tt> projection. Require the Exact Forum Acceptance signer <tt>key-id</tt> to equal the CPO terms forum <tt>key-id</tt> exactly. Require the trust entry resolved for that signer at step 7 to carry a <tt>forum-id-authorization</tt> text-string value with exact byte-for-byte UTF-8 equality to the CPO terms <tt>forum-id</tt>; absence or any byte difference fails this predicate; no pattern or wildcard semantics are applied.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Hash the complete signed Authorization Artifact and require equality at Executor Verification label <tt>3</tt> and Execution Record label <tt>3</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Require the already-validated Executor Verification record to carry the bound authorization identifier at label <tt>4</tt> and CPO digest at label <tt>6</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Hash the complete signed Executor Verification record. Require the already-validated Execution Record to carry that digest at label <tt>4</tt> and the bound authorization identifier at label <tt>5</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Using CPO terms member <tt>5</tt> for <tt>not-before</tt> and <tt>not-after</tt>, whose equality to Authorization Artifact members <tt>7</tt> and <tt>8</tt> was established at step 15, require <tt>not-before &lt;= verified-at &lt;= executed-at &lt;= not-after</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Compute <tt>filing_deadline = executed-at + duration-seconds</tt> with checked unsigned arithmetic.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Using CPO terms member <tt>5</tt> for <tt>not-before</tt> and <tt>not-after</tt> after step 15 has established the Authorization Artifact projection, require the Exact Forum Acceptance <tt>signed-at &lt;= not-before</tt>, <tt>valid-from &lt;= not-before</tt>, and <tt>valid-until &gt;= filing_deadline</tt>; require CPO <tt>issued-at &lt;= verified-at</tt> and <tt>expires-at &gt;= filing_deadline</tt>; and require at least one declared access method with <tt>available-until &gt;= filing_deadline</tt>. Treat the filing window as the half-open interval <tt>[executed-at, filing_deadline)</tt>. No additional rejection occurs merely because <tt>verification_time &lt; executed-at</tt>; if all other checks pass, that case yields the positive result with <tt>filing_window_status: not_open</tt> and <tt>reasons: []</tt>. Derive <tt>filing_window_status</tt> as <tt>not_open</tt> when <tt>verification_time &lt; executed-at</tt>, <tt>open</tt> when <tt>executed-at &lt;= verification_time &lt; filing_deadline</tt>, and <tt>closed</tt> when <tt>verification_time &gt;= filing_deadline</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Only after step 22 has passed in full, return every field in the CBAP-1 structured-result contract independently. No positive result assignment from step 22 is made before that boundary has passed in full. The positive CBAP-1 path then yields <tt>binding: valid</tt>, <tt>pre_execution_evidence: executor_attested</tt>, <tt>discoverability: complete</tt>, <tt>forum_acknowledgement: valid_exact</tt>, <tt>forum_operational_status: not_checked</tt>, <tt>selection_provenance: unilateral</tt>, <tt>access_binding: valid</tt>, <tt>notice_evidence: not_claimed</tt>, <tt>retrievability: not_checked</tt>, <tt>policy_freshness: indeterminate</tt>, <tt>declared_effect: none</tt>, <tt>effect_acceptance: not_required</tt>, <tt>effect_trigger: not_applicable</tt>, <tt>effect_ordering: not_applicable</tt>, <tt>effect_application: not_applicable</tt>, and <tt>reasons: []</tt>; <tt>filing_window_status</tt> is derived as <tt>not_open</tt>, <tt>open</tt>, or <tt>closed</tt> from the supplied verification time. It does not yield forum reachability, delivery, independence, policy fairness, or physical execution order.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>A failure at steps 1 through 22 MUST produce the corresponding first reason code at the same precedence number in the CBAP-1 failure-precedence table. The verifier MUST NOT evaluate a later failure boundary for purposes of <tt>reasons</tt> before the current boundary has passed. When a boundary fails, the verifier MUST stop result derivation at the first failed predicate, MUST NOT use any later predicate of that boundary or any later boundary to derive the CBAP-1 structured result or its <tt>reasons</tt>, and MUST complete that result only through the closed transition rules in the table while preserving every field already completed by an earlier boundary.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cbap-1-failure-precedence-and-reason-codes">
        <name>CBAP-1 failure precedence and reason codes</name>
        <t>CBAP-1 closes the externally observable failure boundary. On the positive path, <tt>reasons</tt> MUST be the empty array. On a negative path, <tt>reasons</tt> MUST contain exactly one of the codes in the table below: the first failing boundary under the stated precedence. An implementation MAY retain more detailed diagnostics for operators, but it MUST NOT place implementation-specific strings in <tt>reasons</tt> or substitute a later, more specific failure for the first one.</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="right">Precedence</th>
              <th align="left">Reason code</th>
              <th align="left">Boundary</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">1</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>verification_time_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The typed verifier-boundary input is not an integer within the CBAP-1 unsigned range; text is never parsed or coerced at B1.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">2</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>local_input_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">A required 32-byte opaque local Authorization Trust Profile digest or local ordered trust sequence is absent or malformed, or a trust entry violates the required closed map, member presence, type, or forum authorization rules, before any bundle byte is consumed.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">3</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>outer_encoding_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The outer item is truncated, has trailing bytes, violates Core Deterministic CBOR, uses a forbidden CBOR construct, or exceeds any applicable outer-item resource ceiling, including <tt>MAX_COLLECTION_MEMBERS = 64</tt> for the policy-pair array. The profile-specific <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS</tt> is not tested at B3.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">4</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>bundle_schema_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The outer item is not the closed <tt>cbap1-bundle</tt>, has an unsupported profile version, contains a member of the wrong CDDL type, or violates member <tt>8</tt> CDDL non-empty cardinality, exact pair shape, 32-byte digest, or policy-byte <tt>bstr</tt> constraints.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">5</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>policy_set_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The CDDL-valid policy array exceeds <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS</tt>, is not in nondecreasing bytewise <tt>policy-digest</tt> order, contains a duplicate policy digest, or is internally digest-inconsistent.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">6</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>cpo_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The CPO COSE envelope, payload schema including fixed CDDL constraints, object type, <tt>kid</tt>, role resolution, or signature is invalid.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">7</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>forum_acceptance_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The Exact Forum Acceptance COSE envelope, payload schema including fixed CDDL constraints, object type, <tt>kid</tt>, role resolution, or signature is invalid.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">8</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>authorization_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The Authorization Artifact COSE envelope, payload schema including fixed CDDL constraints, object type, <tt>kid</tt>, role resolution, or signature is invalid.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">9</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>executor_verification_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The executor-verification COSE envelope, payload schema including fixed CDDL constraints, object type, <tt>kid</tt>, role resolution, or signature is invalid.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">10</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>execution_record_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The execution-record COSE envelope, payload schema including fixed CDDL constraints, object type, <tt>kid</tt>, role resolution, or signature is invalid.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">11</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>cpo_binding_mismatch</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The complete signed CPO digest is not the digest bound into the Authorization Artifact.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">12</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>acceptance_binding_mismatch</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The complete signed acceptance digest is not the digest bound into the CPO.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">13</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>action_digest_mismatch</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The action bytes do not hash to the one action digest required across the four signed payloads that carry it: CPO terms label <tt>6</tt>, Authorization Artifact label <tt>6</tt>, Executor Verification label <tt>5</tt>, and Execution Record label <tt>6</tt>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">14</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>profile_binding_mismatch</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The ABP, direct comparison with the locally supplied opaque 32-byte Authorization Trust Profile digest, CPO signer-to-terms issuer <tt>key-id</tt> equality, CPO terms member <tt>5</tt> validity ordering, non-zero filing duration, HTTPS URI syntax for the required forum identifier, submission endpoint, policy-reference, and affected-party discovery URI values, CPO terms forum <tt>key-id</tt> length, presence of every referenced policy digest, or absence of unreferenced policy digests does not match the supplied trust inputs and closed profile.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">15</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>authorization_projection_mismatch</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The Authorization Artifact projection does not equal the authorization identifier or issuer required by the CPO terms, or the validity in CPO terms member <tt>5</tt> (Authorization Artifact members <tt>7</tt> and <tt>8</tt> compared separately to the two CPO validity members). The action digest is evaluated at precedence 13; the Authorization Artifact CPO-digest binding is evaluated at precedence 11, and the Executor Verification CPO-digest binding is evaluated at precedence 18.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">16</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>forum_terms_mismatch</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The accepted forum-terms digest is not the exact projection defined in Section 5.4, the Exact Forum Acceptance signer <tt>key-id</tt> does not exactly equal the CPO terms forum <tt>key-id</tt>, or the resolved forum key is not authorized for the CPO terms <tt>forum-id</tt>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">17</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>authorization_digest_mismatch</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The complete signed Authorization Artifact digest is not the digest bound into both executor records.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">18</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>executor_verification_mismatch</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Executor Verification label <tt>4</tt> does not carry the bound authorization identifier or label <tt>6</tt> does not carry the bound CPO digest.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">19</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>execution_record_mismatch</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Execution Record label <tt>4</tt> does not bind the exact signed Executor Verification record or label <tt>5</tt> does not carry the bound authorization identifier.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">20</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>executor_ordering_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">The authenticated executor times do not satisfy <tt>not-before &lt;= verified-at &lt;= executed-at &lt;= not-after</tt>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">21</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>filing_deadline_overflow</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Adding the filing duration to <tt>executed-at</tt> exceeds the CBAP-1 unsigned-integer range.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="right">22</td>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>filing_horizon_invalid</tt></td>
              <td align="left">Exact Forum Acceptance <tt>signed-at</tt> is after <tt>not-before</tt>, <tt>valid-from</tt> is after <tt>not-before</tt>, or <tt>valid-until</tt> is before the filing deadline; CPO <tt>issued-at</tt> is after executor <tt>verified-at</tt> or <tt>expires-at</tt> is before the filing deadline; or no affected-party access declaration remains valid through the filing deadline.</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The verifier evaluates B1 verification time, then B2 required local inputs, before consuming any bundle byte; only then does it evaluate the outer item, the closed bundle schema, the policy set, and the five signed objects in table order. For precedences 6 through 10, the verifier applies the complete signed-object validation pipeline in Section 7.1 in its stated order. Cross-object checks then follow precedences 11 through 22, with predicates inside each step evaluated in the order stated in Section 7.1. Evaluation stops at the first failed boundary and, within that boundary, at the first failed predicate. Later predicates of that boundary and all later boundaries are not evaluated for purposes of the CBAP-1 structured result.</t>
        <t>The first-reason rule is a reproducibility rule, not permission to collapse the CBAP-1 structured result. For predicates without a defined evaluation order within one step (such as the three predicates in step 5 after the <tt>MAX_POLICY_PAIRS</tt> check), or for unordered subconditions within one predicate, first-failure precedence identifies the boundary, not a first failed predicate or subcondition among unordered checks; no tie-break order is introduced. On failure, the verifier applies only the structured-result transition assigned below to the first failed predicate where a predicate order is defined, or to the failing boundary where none is defined, changes <tt>reasons</tt> from <tt>[]</tt> to the corresponding one-element array, preserves every previously completed field, and returns the result. A field without a listed transition preserves its current value. On the positive path, the listed positive completions occur at their stated boundaries. Positive completions at boundaries 6 through 10 occur only after the complete signed-object boundary passes; at boundaries 11 through 22, an earlier passed predicate may complete a field before a later predicate fails only where explicitly stated below.</t>
        <section anchor="cbap-1-structured-result-transitions">
          <name>CBAP-1 structured-result transitions</name>
          <t>The following transition rules are closed. <tt>P</tt> identifies positive completion when the boundary passes. <tt>N</tt> identifies the transition caused by the first failed predicate. <tt>--</tt> means no semantic-field transition.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><strong>B1 <tt>verification_time_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; N <tt>--</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B2 <tt>local_input_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; N <tt>--</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B3 <tt>outer_encoding_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; N <tt>--</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B4 <tt>bundle_schema_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>notice_evidence = not_claimed</tt>; N <tt>--</tt>. This is the profile-determined completion for a valid closed <tt>cbap1-bundle</tt>, which carries no notice member.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B5 <tt>policy_set_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; N <tt>--</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B6 <tt>cpo_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>declared_effect = none</tt>, <tt>effect_acceptance = not_required</tt>, <tt>effect_trigger = not_applicable</tt>, <tt>effect_ordering = not_applicable</tt>, and <tt>effect_application = not_applicable</tt>. For N, signed-object predicates 1 through 7 have no semantic-field transition; signature failure sets <tt>binding = invalid</tt> and <tt>access_binding = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B7 <tt>forum_acceptance_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; any first failed signed-object predicate sets <tt>forum_acknowledgement = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B8 <tt>authorization_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; any first failed signed-object predicate sets <tt>binding = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B9 <tt>executor_verification_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; any first failed signed-object predicate sets <tt>pre_execution_evidence = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B10 <tt>execution_record_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; any first failed signed-object predicate sets <tt>pre_execution_evidence = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B11 <tt>cpo_binding_mismatch</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; N sets <tt>binding = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B12 <tt>acceptance_binding_mismatch</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; N sets <tt>forum_acknowledgement = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B13 <tt>action_digest_mismatch</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>. A mismatch at CPO terms label <tt>6</tt> or Authorization Artifact label <tt>6</tt> sets <tt>binding = invalid</tt>. A mismatch at Executor Verification label <tt>5</tt> or Execution Record label <tt>6</tt> sets <tt>pre_execution_evidence = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B14 <tt>profile_binding_mismatch</tt>:</strong> P <tt>discoverability = complete</tt>. Expected-ABP or direct expected-Authorization-Trust-Profile digest mismatch has no semantic-field transition. CPO signer <tt>key-id</tt> mismatch against the terms authorization-issuer <tt>key-id</tt> sets <tt>binding = invalid</tt> and <tt>access_binding = invalid</tt>. Failure of the CPO terms member <tt>5</tt> ordering <tt>not-before &lt;= not-after</tt>, filing duration, any HTTPS URI other than an affected-party <tt>discovery-uri</tt>, or forum <tt>key-id</tt> length has no semantic-field transition. Failure of an affected-party <tt>discovery-uri</tt> sets <tt>access_binding = invalid</tt>. A missing referenced policy digest sets <tt>discoverability = incomplete</tt>. An unreferenced policy digest sets <tt>discoverability = complete</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B15 <tt>authorization_projection_mismatch</tt>:</strong> P <tt>selection_provenance = unilateral</tt>, <tt>binding = valid</tt>; N sets <tt>binding = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B16 <tt>forum_terms_mismatch</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>. Accepted-digest mismatch sets <tt>forum_acknowledgement = invalid_scope</tt>. Acceptance-signer <tt>key-id</tt> mismatch or resolved-signer authorization failure sets <tt>forum_acknowledgement = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B17 <tt>authorization_digest_mismatch</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; N sets <tt>pre_execution_evidence = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B18 <tt>executor_verification_mismatch</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; failure of either label <tt>4</tt> authorization-identifier binding or label <tt>6</tt> CPO-digest binding sets <tt>pre_execution_evidence = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B19 <tt>execution_record_mismatch</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; failure of either label <tt>4</tt> exact Executor Verification binding or label <tt>5</tt> authorization-identifier binding sets <tt>pre_execution_evidence = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B20 <tt>executor_ordering_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>pre_execution_evidence = executor_attested</tt>; N sets <tt>pre_execution_evidence = invalid</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B21 <tt>filing_deadline_overflow</tt>:</strong> P <tt>--</tt>; N <tt>--</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><strong>B22 <tt>filing_horizon_invalid</tt>:</strong> P <tt>forum_acknowledgement = valid_exact</tt>, <tt>access_binding = valid</tt>, and <tt>filing_window_status</tt> derived as specified in Section 7.1. Failure of Exact Forum Acceptance <tt>signed-at</tt>, <tt>valid-from</tt>, or <tt>valid-until</tt> sets <tt>forum_acknowledgement = invalid_scope</tt>. Failure of CPO <tt>issued-at</tt> or <tt>expires-at</tt> has no semantic-field transition. Failure of the affected-party access horizon sets <tt>access_binding = invalid</tt>. The B22 positive transition is applied only if all B22 predicates pass. Passing an earlier subset of B22 predicates does not complete <tt>forum_acknowledgement</tt>, <tt>access_binding</tt>, or <tt>filing_window_status</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t><tt>forum_operational_status</tt> remains <tt>not_checked</tt>, <tt>retrievability</tt> remains <tt>not_checked</tt>, and <tt>policy_freshness</tt> remains <tt>indeterminate</tt> on every CBAP-1 path.</t>
          <t>The following list is the complete set of CBAP-1 field-ownership clarifications for the closed failure classifications above:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>B6 signed-object predicates 1 through 7 do not transition <tt>binding</tt>; only CPO signature failure does.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>B13 Executor Verification and Execution Record action-digest failures transition <tt>pre_execution_evidence</tt>, not <tt>binding</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>B14 expected-ABP and expected-Authorization-Trust-Profile mismatches leave <tt>binding</tt> unchanged.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>B17 transitions <tt>pre_execution_evidence</tt>, not <tt>binding</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>B18 and B19 identifier or digest mismatches transition <tt>pre_execution_evidence</tt>, not <tt>binding</tt>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>The closed transitions above are exhaustive for CBAP-1 failure classification. In particular, <tt>policy_set_invalid</tt> does not by itself prove <tt>binding: invalid</tt>, and reachability failure is outside this closed CBAP-1 byte-verification procedure.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-status">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t>This section follows the guidance in <xref target="RFC7942"/> and is intended to be removed before publication as an RFC.</t>
      <t>The implementation evidence snapshot recorded here is current through 4 September 2026. It is non-normative and does not define or override CBAP-1 requirements.</t>
      <t>The development evidence includes a Python reference implementation, an oracle-blind, context-isolated Rust reconstruction, and a JavaScript cross-check. The cross-check re-encoded the external positive bundle fixture byte-for-byte and verified all five Ed25519 signatures. That fixture has SHA-256:</t>
      <t><tt>8a47e89abb2c77a9de27ffb59a5bc89a7226509236e35b0f11cf6819fd1b6646</tt></t>
      <t>The first frozen Rust reconstruction exposed a digest-label ambiguity and remains frozen at SHA-256:</t>
      <t><tt>956b88d2832e4265913cb73f93e69b960ef6f1d860f8acbc5b50ea453cbab2f0</tt></t>
      <t>After specification repair, the frozen A3 source-and-artifact package was recorded at SHA-256:</t>
      <t><tt>f2b9b0745ca8b751322f416ed62e73769b2396934b8beb811d5f71b4fc88b129</tt></t>
      <t>That reconstruction passed its 56-test baseline and matched the retained evaluator for the positive fixture, the closed failure-precedence corpus, and 28 URI cases. A later specification refresh implemented exact policy-set equality and the half-open filing interval, added nonce non-relation regression coverage, and passed 61 tests. Subsequent public-key-decoding, trust/profile-input, resource-limit, and URI-port hardening on the same Rust lineage extended the locked suite to 73/73 with zero failures.</t>
      <t>The Rust reconstruction and associated test suite described in this section correspond to a historical implementation snapshot completed on 2026-09-04. That snapshot predates the final CBAP-1 procedure published in this document and is known to differ from that procedure in some respects. Later implementation revisions, if any, are outside the scope of this snapshot. This evidence does not establish an independent human implementation, production deployment, interoperability certification, exhaustive parser safety, or a security audit.</t>
      <t>A stable public location and explicit software license for the implementation and evidence packages are to be designated as part of a verifiable release publication. Until then, this section records development evidence but does not claim public package availability.</t>
      <t>Implementation and test-package contact: Tiago Pinto <eref target="mailto:tiago@donttrustverify.pt">tiago@donttrustverify.pt</eref>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="issuer-controlled-forum">
        <name>Issuer-Controlled Forum</name>
        <t>A discoverable forum can still be biased or controlled by the issuer. On the successful path, CBAP-1 reports <tt>selection_provenance: unilateral</tt>. A valid forum signature therefore does not establish institutional independence.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="forum-substitution">
        <name>Forum Substitution</name>
        <t>The forum identifier, submission endpoint, key identifier, procedure, and bound policy references are protected by the CBAP-1 digest and signature bindings. Substituting any of them after authorization changes signed bytes or the bound <tt>forum_terms</tt> projection and therefore fails at the applicable existing signature or digest-binding predicate; substitution after authorization is not a separate verification predicate.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="policy-equivocation">
        <name>Policy Equivocation</name>
        <t>Serving different CPOs or policy documents to different audiences can move equivocation into the contestation layer. Deployments claiming a consistent view SHOULD register CPOs or their digests in a transparency service and MUST define how readers detect split views.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="endpoint-availability-and-network-access">
        <name>Endpoint Availability and Network Access</name>
        <t>Cryptographic binding and Exact Forum Acceptance do not prove current endpoint availability. CBAP-1 performs no forum-operational-status or retrievability check; <tt>forum_operational_status</tt> and <tt>retrievability</tt> remain <tt>not_checked</tt>.</t>
        <t>CBAP-1 verification does not require dereferencing a signed URI. A deployment that chooses to dereference one SHOULD treat the target, each redirect, and each resolved address as untrusted network input. It SHOULD bound redirects, time, response size, and other resource use, and SHOULD reject loopback, private, link-local, metadata-service, or otherwise privileged destinations unless such access is explicitly intended and separately authorized.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="deadline-control-and-clock-bias">
        <name>Deadline Control and Clock Bias</name>
        <t>An issuer can declare a filing window that is too short to be useful. Verification authenticates the filing-window inputs and checks the required arithmetic; it does not establish fairness. Relying parties SHOULD apply an appropriate minimum-window policy and MUST NOT infer legitimacy from syntactic validity.</t>
        <t>The authenticated <tt>executed-at</tt> value is an executor-signed clock claim, not proof of external wall-clock accuracy. The ordering predicate constrains that claim relative to <tt>verified-at</tt> and the authorization interval, but it does not prevent executor-controlled clock bias. A deployment that requires protection against such bias SHOULD assess clock authority and acceptable skew as a separate application policy decision after CBAP-1 verification. That assessment is not a local input or a rejection predicate of the closed CBAP-1 verifier. An application MAY make a separate decision, but MUST NOT modify the returned CBAP-1 result, its first-failure reason, or any semantic field; the application decision is not a CBAP-1 result value. In particular, a claimed <tt>executed-at</tt> later than <tt>verification_time</tt> does not itself cause a CBAP-1 failure: when all other predicates pass, the filing-window status is <tt>not_open</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="standing-and-privacy">
        <name>Standing and Privacy</name>
        <t>A Standing Policy can exclude a person materially affected by an action. CBAP-1 makes the policy identity and supplied bytes verifiable; it does not establish legal standing or policy legitimacy.</t>
        <t>Standing SHOULD be expressed by role or policy where possible. Personally identifying evidence SHOULD be disclosed only under an appropriate confidentiality mechanism.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="abuse-controls-and-credential-survivability">
        <name>Abuse Controls and Credential Survivability</name>
        <t>Anti-replay, rate limiting, authentication, and other abuse controls MUST NOT silently alter the bound Standing Policy or filing window.</t>
        <t>An action can disable the only credential or lookup path available to an Affected Party after execution. CBAP-1 binds the declared access information but does not prove that a real-world retrieval method survives the action. Deployments requiring survivable access need an operational method that remains usable independently of the contested action.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="replay-and-exact-acceptance-scope">
        <name>Replay and Exact-Acceptance Scope</name>
        <t>The Exact Forum Acceptance signs its own payload, including its <tt>forum_terms_digest</tt>; it does not by itself authenticate every CBAP-1 cross-object relationship. The verifier separately checks that digest against the <tt>forum_terms</tt> projection, checks the forum signer and resolved key authorization, and enforces other cross-object bindings at their assigned boundaries. Evidence from different terms, keys, profile identifiers, policy references, or authorization bytes does not become valid because labels or URIs appear similar.</t>
        <t>CBAP-1 nonce members are object-local opaque values. Their presence or value does not establish freshness, uniqueness, single use, replay resistance, or protocol ordering.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="executor-claims-and-confidentiality">
        <name>Executor Claims and Confidentiality</name>
        <t>Signatures establish integrity and signer attribution, not physical execution order or organizational identity across different keys. <tt>pre_execution_evidence: executor_attested</tt> therefore establishes only the signed claims accepted under the configured executor-role trust inputs and the required digest and time bindings.</t>
        <t>CBAP-1 fixes <tt>action_digest = SHA-256(action_bytes)</tt> and carries <tt>action_bytes</tt> by value in the complete bundle. When the action bytes are drawn from a low-entropy space, disclosure of their action digest can permit offline guessing. Deployments SHOULD restrict access to the bundle and action bytes when confidentiality is required. A deployment MUST NOT replace CBAP-1's <tt>SHA-256(action_bytes)</tt> construction with a salted commitment and still claim CBAP-1 conformance.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="historical-verification-and-common-control">
        <name>Historical Verification and Common Control</name>
        <t>Historical verification depends on the signed bytes and the trust inputs accepted by the verifier for the relevant role. CBAP-1 does not define a separate key-rotation or continuity protocol.</t>
        <t>Distinct issuer, forum, and executor keys establish cryptographic separation, not organizational, legal, physical, or logical independence. Implementations MUST NOT infer institutional independence merely from the number of valid signatures or distinct key identifiers.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document requests no IANA action.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3986">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6234">
          <front>
            <title>US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
            <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
            <date month="May" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6234"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6234"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8032">
          <front>
            <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
            <date month="January" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes elliptic curve signature scheme Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The algorithm is instantiated with recommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves. An example implementation and test vectors are provided.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8610">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <date month="June" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8949">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <date month="December" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9052">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="August" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
              <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9053">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="August" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines a set of algorithms that can be used with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol (RFC 9052).</t>
              <t>This document, along with RFC 9052, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9053"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9053"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9110">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Semantics</title>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9864">
          <front>
            <title>Fully-Specified Algorithms for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)</title>
            <author fullname="M.B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="O. Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele"/>
            <date month="October" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that fully specify the cryptographic operations to be performed, including any curve, key derivation function (KDF), and hash functions, as being "fully specified". It refers to cryptographic algorithm identifiers that require additional information beyond the algorithm identifier to determine the cryptographic operations to be performed as being "polymorphic". This specification creates fully-specified algorithm identifiers for registered JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) polymorphic algorithm identifiers, enabling applications to use only fully-specified algorithm identifiers. It deprecates those polymorphic algorithm identifiers.</t>
              <t>This specification updates RFCs 7518, 8037, and 9053. It deprecates polymorphic algorithms defined by RFCs 8037 and 9053 and provides fully-specified replacements for them. It adds to the instructions to designated experts in RFCs 7518 and 9053.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9864"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9864"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="I-D.pinto-agent-authz-contestability">
          <front>
            <title>Contestability Bindings for Authorized Agent Actions</title>
            <author fullname="Tiago Pinto" initials="T." surname="Pinto">
              <organization>Independent Researcher</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="10" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Authorization artifacts can provide signed evidence of a permission
   under specified authorization rules.  Receipts can record a signed
   claim or protocol event that the authorization was exercised, and
   outcome evidence can describe what followed.  None of those artifacts
   necessarily tells a person or organization affected by the action
   where the authorization can be contested, which procedure applies,
   whether a filing changes execution state, or who selected the
   contestation forum.

   This document defines a transport-independent Contestability Binding
   for authorized agent actions.  The binding commits an authorization
   to a versioned Contestation Parameters Object that identifies the
   forum, submission mechanism, Standing Policy, procedure, time bounds,
   declared effect policy, and selection evidence.  A forum can
   acknowledge one exact authorization or publish a reusable acceptance
   manifest for closed Authorization Binding Profile and Authorization
   Trust Profile identifier pairs.  A deterministic verifier validates
   the binding, separately classifies evidence claiming pre-execution
   verification by the executor, and reports forum-selection provenance
   as unilateral, multiparty, externally selected, or indeterminate.
   Where a filing is declared to affect execution state, the verifier
   also separates the issuer's declared policy, the executor's signed
   acceptance, the authenticated trigger, and the executor's claimed
   application.

   The mechanism makes the bound contestation parameters identifiable
   and verifiable, supporting discoverability while resisting post-
   action substitution.  It does not determine standing, prove forum
   independence, resolve a dispute, select a remedy, establish legal
   enforceability, or decide whether the original authorization was
   legitimate.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-pinto-agent-authz-contestability-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6874">
          <front>
            <title>Representing IPv6 Zone Identifiers in Address Literals and Uniform Resource Identifiers</title>
            <author fullname="B. Carpenter" initials="B." surname="Carpenter"/>
            <author fullname="S. Cheshire" initials="S." surname="Cheshire"/>
            <author fullname="R. Hinden" initials="R." surname="Hinden"/>
            <date month="February" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how the zone identifier of an IPv6 scoped address, defined as in the IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture (RFC 4007), can be represented in a literal IPv6 address and in a Uniform Resource Identifier that includes such a literal address. It updates the URI Generic Syntax specification (RFC 3986) accordingly.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6874"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6874"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7049">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <date month="October" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7049"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7049"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <date month="July" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
              <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9844">
          <front>
            <title>Entering IPv6 Zone Identifiers in User Interfaces</title>
            <author fullname="B. Carpenter" initials="B." surname="Carpenter"/>
            <author fullname="R. Hinden" initials="R." surname="Hinden"/>
            <date month="August" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how the zone identifier of an IPv6 scoped address, defined in the IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture specification (RFC 4007), should be entered into a user interface. This document obsoletes RFC 6874 and updates RFCs 4007, 7622, and 8089.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9844"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9844"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 849?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>The author thanks Emek Can Doğru and Iman Schrock for their review of <xref target="I-D.pinto-agent-authz-contestability"/>, from which this profile was extracted.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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