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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-03" category="info" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="DIEM Architectural Considerations">Digital Emblems - Architectural Considerations</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-03"/>
    <author fullname="Alex Rosenberg">
      <organization>Veridigo</organization>
      <address>
        <email>alexr@veridigo.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="20"/>
    <area>Applications and Real-Time</area>
    <workgroup>Digital Emblems</workgroup>
    <keyword>digital emblems</keyword>
    <keyword>architecture</keyword>
    <keyword>DNS</keyword>
    <keyword>DNSSEC</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 116?>

<t>This document describes an architecture for digital emblems in which emblems are authenticated, typed metadata about assets, published in the DNS and protected by DNSSEC.
A single architecture serves many use cases.
Use cases differ in the shape of their metadata, which is described by profiles, rather than in their transport or trust machinery.
The document illustrates the architecture with a strawman encoding (an EMBLEM resource record carrying a deterministic CBOR map with registered, typed map keys) and with worked examples drawn from International Humanitarian Law, logistics and customs, diplomatic pouches, and peacekeeping.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://ohmantics.github.io/diem-architecture/draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Digital Emblems Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:diem@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/diem/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/diem/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ohmantics/diem-architecture"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 123?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The DIEM working group is developing standards for digital emblems: a means for associating metadata with physical or virtual assets, often to indicate what treatment they should receive under some normative framework <xref target="CHARTER"/> <xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>.
The use cases range from protections under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to trade and logistics labeling, environmental designations, and diplomatic privileges.</t>
      <t>The central claim of this document is that these use cases differ mainly in <em>what they say</em>, not in <em>how it is said</em>.
A hospital, a pallet of smartphones, and a diplomatic pouch all need an identifier that a validator can learn, a way to retrieve statements about the identified asset, assurance that the statements come from the party entitled to make them, and in some cases confidentiality, third-party authorization, or offline operation.
These are architectural concerns that can be addressed once.
What differs between use cases is the dictionary of facts being conveyed, and that is the job of a profile.</t>
      <t>An architecture document would ordinarily stay clear of protocol detail.
In DIEM's case, several participants (including the author) have found it difficult to reason about the architecture without thinking concretely about the protocol it implies.
This document therefore includes a strawman encoding (<xref target="strawman"/>).
The strawman is illustrative: it exists to show that the architecture can be realized with existing DNS machinery and to give the working group something concrete to criticize.
Normative protocol specifications would follow in separate documents.</t>
      <t>This revision substantially reworks draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-00 in response to working group feedback, particularly from DNS practitioners who urged that DIEM lean on DNSSEC rather than duplicate its integrity guarantees at the application layer.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>This document uses the terms "(digital) emblem", "asset", "emblem issuer", "authorizing entity", "validator", and "validation" as defined in <xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>.
It also uses the following terms:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Profile:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A digital emblem profile as defined in <xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>: a specification of an emblem's data elements and their types, which are required or confidential, how validators interpret them, how emblems are discovered, and whether validation or authorization is required.
In this architecture, a profile defines its data and <em>selects</em> among the discovery, validation, authorization, and confidentiality options described here; it does not define its own transport or trust machinery.
Different profiles therefore share one validator implementation.
One profile may serve several use cases (for example, a consignment profile used by both customs and recyclers), and one asset may carry emblems from several profiles.
<xref target="profiles"/> lists what a profile specifies.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Emblem name:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The DNS owner name at which an asset's emblem records are published.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Emblem record:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A DNS resource record conveying all or part of an emblem.
In the strawman, the EMBLEM RRType.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Facet:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A subset of an emblem's data that is retrieved, cached, or signed independently of the rest, and is therefore published as its own RRset (a separate RRType, or a separate owner name).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Subject:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The asset that an emblem describes, named by the emblem's <tt>asset</tt> map key (<xref target="subject"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Map key:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A registered identifier for one property in an emblem's dictionary, with a defined value type.
This document says "map key" for these, and reserves "key" alone for cryptographic keys.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Code list:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An externally maintained controlled vocabulary (for example, ISO 3166-1 country codes <xref target="ISO3166"/> or UNECE Recommendation 20 unit codes) used as the type of a map key's value.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Issuer authorization:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A third party's assurance that an emblem issuer is entitled to issue emblems of a given profile or scope; in this architecture, an endorsement (<xref target="endorsement"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Validator authorization:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Permission for a validator to read restricted emblem data; in this architecture, possession of a key to which the data is encrypted (<xref target="confidentiality"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Endorsement:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A statement by an authorizing entity that an emblem issuer is authorized to issue emblems of a given profile or scope, published as an RRset in the authorizing entity's own zone.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Visual mark:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An image of the physical emblem, sign, or logo associated with an emblem's profile or issuer, carried as an optional facet (<xref target="marks"/>).
A visual mark depicts; it is not itself an emblem, and confers nothing.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Offline bundle:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A self-contained serialization of emblem RRsets, their RRSIGs, and the DNSSEC chain needed to validate them, suitable for transfer without network access.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="principles">
      <name>Design Principles</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>One architecture, many profiles:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Use cases vary the data, not the plumbing.
A validator that understands discovery, DNSSEC validation, and the common encoding can retrieve and authenticate any emblem, even one whose profile it cannot interpret.
This avoids a family of disjoint per-use-case systems, which would multiply implementation cost and fragment the validator base.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Use the DNS for what it already does:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>DNSSEC <xref target="RFC4033"/> <xref target="RFC4034"/> <xref target="RFC4035"/> <xref target="RFC9364"/> provides data origin authentication and integrity for RRsets, authenticated denial of existence, and a delegation model that maps naturally onto organizational boundaries.
DIEM should rely on these rather than re-create them with application-layer signatures.
Application-layer cryptography is reserved for what DNSSEC does not provide: confidentiality, cross-zone endorsement, and offline transfer.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Typed data:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Every map key has a registered type, and every value can be checked against it.
A validator must be able to tell malformed data from well-formed data, and to tell one property from another without reading free text.
Externally maintained code lists are value types bound to map keys, not free-standing records.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Query granularity equals record granularity:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Data that a validator needs to retrieve independently, or that changes on a different schedule, belongs in its own RRset.
Data that is always used together belongs in one record.
The DNS offers projection (by owner name and type) but no predicates, so the record layout is the query model.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Encryption, not audience-dependent answers:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Restricted fields are encrypted inside signed records, so that every validator receives the same cacheable, signed answer and only validators holding the right keys can read the restricted parts.
Serving different answers to authenticated clients is possible as a deployment option but is not the architectural primitive (see <xref target="confidentiality"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Neutral about normative frameworks:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The architecture conveys statements; it does not adjudicate them.
Legal meaning (what an emblem entitles an asset to, who may authorize it) lives in profile data and in the frameworks that profiles reference.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="roles">
      <name>Roles and Trust</name>
      <t>The architecture has two active roles on the wire:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>An <em>emblem issuer</em> publishes emblem records in a DNS zone it controls (directly, or through a contracted DNS operator).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A <em>validator</em> retrieves emblem records and validates them.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>An <em>authorizing entity</em>, where a profile requires one, participates by publishing endorsements in its own zone, which validators either query or receive stapled to the emblem (<xref target="endorsement"/>).
It does not need to be online during validation.</t>
      <figure>
        <name>Roles</name>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
  authorizing entity       emblem issuer          validator
  (state, treaty body,     (hospital, maker,      (armed forces,
   NPPO, ministry ...)      shipper, foreign       customs, recycler)
                            ministry ...)
         |                        |                      |
         | endorsement            | emblem records       |
         | (own zone; queried     | (DNSSEC-signed,      |
         |  or stapled)           |  maybe delegated)    |
         v                        v                      |
  +--------------------------------------------+         |
  |                    DNS                     |<--------+
  | root -> TLD -> issuer zone -> emblem names |  query and
  +--------------------------------------------+  validate
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>Trust in an emblem's content derives from the DNSSEC chain of trust to the zone that publishes it.
A validated EMBLEM RRset establishes that the holder of the zone's signing keys published that data, and nothing more.
Whether that zone holder is entitled to make the statement is a separate question (issuer authorization), answered by endorsements where a profile requires them and otherwise by the validator's own knowledge (a customs officer knows which shippers they deal with).</t>
      <t>This model has a single technical root (the DNS root zone), but it does not create a central authority over emblems.
No party needs another's permission to publish emblems in its own zone, and authorizing entities operate independently of one another.
Profiles whose frameworks require it can place their own authorizing entities wherever the framework places them.</t>
      <t>Three consequences deserve emphasis:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>DNSSEC authenticates the zone, not the real-world identity behind it.
A lookalike domain (for example, one using Cyrillic "a" (U+0430) in place of Latin "a" (U+0061)) validates just as well as the genuine one.
Profiles should carry cross-check identifiers (a GTIN, a container number, a registration number) that a validator can compare against the physical or contextual evidence in front of it, and endorsements help where a third party vouches for the issuer.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>In practice, many signed zones are signed by contracted operators rather than by registrants.
The architecture treats the zone's signing keys as the issuer's voice, so issuers should choose operators accordingly.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The architecture depends on DNSSEC deployment.
An issuer needs a signed chain from the root to its emblem names, so an issuer whose TLD is not signed must publish under one that is.
Validators must validate themselves or use a validating resolver they trust over a secure channel.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="discovery">
      <name>Naming and Discovery</name>
      <section anchor="subject">
        <name>The Subject of an Emblem</name>
        <t>The subject of an emblem is the asset it describes, which the emblem names in its <tt>asset</tt> map key.
An asset may be a person, a place, or a thing, and may be physical, digital, or a combination of the two; the architecture treats them all alike.
The emblem name is a handle for finding the emblem, not its subject: it may be the asset's own name, a name derived from it, or an unguessable label conveyed on or with the asset.
Cross-check identifiers in the emblem (a seal number, a serial number, a container number) identify the same subject by other means.
For a diplomatic pouch, for example, the subject is the pouch, and its seal number is a cross-check identifier; for a hospital's records service, the subject is the service, not the host that runs it or the data it holds.
How firmly a physical carrier (a label, a tag, a badge) is bound to its subject is a separate question, listed as an open issue (<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="identifying-the-asset">
        <name>Identifying the Asset</name>
        <t>Assets are identified by domain names.
Names are compared in DNS A-label form <xref target="RFC5890"/>, lowercase and without a trailing dot, so internationalized names are carried as A-labels (<xref target="strawman"/>).
How a validator learns an asset's name depends on the asset:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>For digital services, the asset's own name is usually already known (the validator is about to connect to it).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>For physical assets, the name is conveyed out of band: printed, in a QR code, in an NFC or RFID tag, or in shipping documents.
A URI form for emblem names would let general-purpose scanners recognize them.
The existing <tt>dns:</tt> URI scheme <xref target="RFC4501"/> already names a DNS owner name, class, and type, and may suffice; a payload that also carries an offline bundle (<xref target="offline"/>) may warrant something more.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Some assets are found by other means (a location, a registry listing), and <xref target="DIEM-REQS"/> notes asset identifier discovery as a possible future extension.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="choosing-emblem-names">
        <name>Choosing Emblem Names</name>
        <t>The architecture does not constrain emblem names.
An issuer may publish emblems at an asset's own name or at any name in a zone it controls, and validators use whatever emblem name they are given; they do not construct names from a fixed pattern.
Where a profile derives an emblem name from an asset's name (for example, for network services whose names validators already know), that profile defines the derivation.</t>
        <t>As an operational recommendation, issuers should consider placing emblem names under a dedicated label, <tt>_diem</tt> in this document's examples, because it permits delegating them (a zone cut, in the terms of <xref target="RFC9499"/>):</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
example.org.                  NS   ordinary-dns.example.net.
_diem.example.org.            NS   ns1.diem-provider.example.
                              DS   ...
]]></artwork>
        <t>With <tt>_diem</tt> delegated, the issuer's ordinary DNS service needs no knowledge of DIEM.
Emblem names are served by an authoritative server specialized for emblems, which may be backed by an asset-management or inventory system rather than a zone file, and which may have different security and signing arrangements.
Resolvers need no DIEM awareness at all; they cache and validate emblem records like any other RRType.
The delegation is purely operational: answers from the delegated zone are ordinary DNS answers, identical for every client and cacheable by any resolver.</t>
        <t>The delegation also addresses a practical obstacle.
Many hosted DNS services and provisioning interfaces accept only a fixed list of RRTypes, and some network equipment mishandles types it does not recognize, even though <xref target="RFC3597"/> requires transparent handling.
An issuer whose existing provider cannot serve new RRTypes need not change providers for the rest of its zone; it delegates only the emblem names.</t>
        <t>Below the delegation, the issuer arranges names however suits its inventory.
Names may mirror the structure of what they describe, but validators follow explicit references between emblems (<xref target="hierarchy"/>) rather than deriving one name from another, and wildcards <xref target="RFC4592"/> can cover classes of assets that share all of their data.
Wildcards have limits: they do not match names that exist (including empty non-terminals), and because every name under a wildcard appears to carry an emblem, they must not be used where the existence of an emblem for a particular item (such as a serial number) is itself meant to be evidence.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="retrieval">
        <name>Retrieval</name>
        <t>A validator retrieves an emblem by querying for the relevant RRType at the emblem name, and validates the response with DNSSEC.
Where a profile places facets in separate RRsets (<xref target="facets"/>), the validator retrieves only the facets it needs.
A validator that receives NXDOMAIN or NODATA with a valid denial-of-existence proof learns authoritatively that no emblem (or no such facet) is published.</t>
        <t>DNS transports are interchangeable here.
Large responses use TCP or encrypted transports (DoT <xref target="RFC7858"/>, DoH <xref target="RFC8484"/>, DoQ <xref target="RFC9250"/>); the encrypted transports also provide confidentiality between the validator and its resolver.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="data-model">
      <name>Data Model</name>
      <t>An emblem is a dictionary: a set of map keys and their values, in which values may themselves be arrays or dictionaries.
Every emblem identifies the profile that defines its map keys.</t>
      <section anchor="map-keys-and-types">
        <name>Map Keys and Types</name>
        <t>Map keys are drawn from registries.
A small set of common map keys applies to all profiles (profile identifier, the FQDN of the marked asset, cross-check asset identifiers, validity period, issuer display name, and the treatment requested of validators, <xref target="treatment"/>).
The charter requires that emblems explicitly identify the marked asset by FQDN <xref target="CHARTER"/>, so the <tt>asset</tt> map key is required even when the emblem is published at the asset's own name.
Each profile defines additional map keys.
Every map key definition specifies the value's type, preferably in CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/>.
A plausible arrangement is one registry of common map keys, a map key space scoped to each registered profile (so that profiles allocate map keys without coordinating with one another), and a private-use range for experimentation; profiles that share a concept (an ISO 3166 country of origin, say) should reuse a common map key rather than define their own.
Map keys outside the registries are text strings named under a domain the issuer controls, so that issuers can define keys of their own (for internal forensic data, say) without coordination or collision.</t>
        <t>A validator checks each value against its map key's type.
A value that does not match its type is an error, not a curiosity to be displayed.
Validators skip map keys they do not understand, unless the emblem marks them as critical (in the manner of the COSE "crit" header parameter <xref target="RFC9052"/>), in which case a validator that does not understand them must not rely on the emblem.
This lets profiles evolve without breaking old validators, while still allowing an issuer to say "do not act on this emblem unless you understand all of it".</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="multi-profile">
        <name>Several Profiles for One Asset</name>
        <t>An asset may fall under several profiles: a shipment of batteries is both a consignment and dangerous goods, and a medical facility may carry both a protective emblem and a facility registration.
Its EMBLEM RRset then holds one record per profile, each naming its own profile.
A validator uses the records whose profiles it understands and skips the rest, just as it skips unknown map keys, so a dangerous goods inspector need not interpret a customs profile to find the hazard data.
One query retrieves all of them, and each profile's data stays separately typed and separately interpreted.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="value-types">
        <name>Value Types</name>
        <t>The following value types cover the use cases identified so far:</t>
        <table>
          <name>Value types</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Type</th>
              <th align="left">Purpose</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">integer, boolean, byte string</td>
              <td align="left">as usual</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">decimal</td>
              <td align="left">exact decimal fixed-point (base-10 exponent and mantissa)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">floating point</td>
              <td align="left">binary floating point, only where the map key's definition permits it</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">quantity</td>
              <td align="left">decimal plus a unit code from UNECE Recommendation 20 <xref target="UNECE20"/>, or an integer count plus a package type code from UNECE Recommendation 21</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">monetary amount</td>
              <td align="left">decimal plus a currency code from ISO 4217 <xref target="ISO4217"/></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">timestamp, duration</td>
              <td align="left">64-bit seconds since the epoch; durations in seconds or calendar units</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">text</td>
              <td align="left">UTF-8 with a language tag <xref target="RFC5646"/> where it is meant for humans</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">enumeration</td>
              <td align="left">a value from a list defined by DIEM or by the profile (in an encoding, a small integer)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">external code</td>
              <td align="left">a code from an external code list fixed by the map key's definition, carried verbatim in the list's canonical form and compared by that list's rules (case-sensitive unless the list says otherwise)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">citation</td>
              <td align="left">a reference to a legal or other normative instrument, in an identified citation scheme, with optional text</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">location</td>
              <td align="left">a point (as in LOC <xref target="RFC1876"/>) or an area (representation to be determined)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">URI, domain name</td>
              <td align="left">references to other resources and other emblems</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">media</td>
              <td align="left">an embedded image, such as a visual mark (<xref target="marks"/>)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">encrypted</td>
              <td align="left">ciphertext of any of the above, readable by the validators it is encrypted to (<xref target="confidentiality"/>)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">dictionary, array</td>
              <td align="left">nesting</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Each map key's definition says whether a numeric value is an exact decimal or a floating-point number.
Binary floating point cannot represent most decimal fractions exactly, so implementations can round the same value differently.
That is unacceptable for some values (monetary amounts above all, and declared quantities that two parties must agree on) and harmless for others (many physical measurements).
A protocol specification would need to guide profile authors to consider exactness, rounding, and special values (not-a-number, infinities, negative zero) carefully when choosing.</t>
        <t>Two distinctions from <xref target="I-D.woodcock-faltstrom-external-registry-rrtypes"/> are worth adopting: a value that is <em>not applicable</em> (the map key is absent) differs from a value that <em>exists but is unknown to the issuer</em> (the map key is present with an explicit "unknown" marker), and an issuer's signed assertion of ignorance is itself meaningful.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="treatment">
        <name>Treatment</name>
        <t>Emblems often exist to ask something of whoever encounters the asset: that it not be attacked, opened, detained, or read.
Such requests are expressed as <em>treatments</em>, each a modality (prohibit, request, or require) applied to an action from a small enumeration (attack, open, detain, inspect, read, report, and so on).
Because actions are enumerated, software can ask "does anything here prohibit inspection?" across emblems of different profiles without understanding the law behind each.
Modalities and actions come from one common DIEM registry shared by all profiles; each profile states which treatments it may request (<xref target="profiles"/>).</t>
        <t>A treatment says what is asked, not why.
Its legal basis is carried separately, as one or more citations in an identified scheme (for example, a European Legislation Identifier, an Akoma Ntoso identifier, or a URI), with optional language-tagged text, and optionally a jurisdiction (an ISO 3166 code or an indication of international law).
Citations are open-ended, so profiles do not have to enumerate the laws they might invoke; validators compare citations within a scheme and display them to people, but do not need to interpret them.
A profile may still list the bases it expects, where that set is small (as for the instruments of IHL).</t>
        <t>A treatment is a request backed, if at all, by the cited framework.
The emblem does not enforce it, and does not confer the protection or privilege it signals: under IHL, for example, the distinctive emblem indicates protection that exists by law, whether or not the emblem is displayed.
Where a profile requires issuer authorization, the endorsement's scope covers the purposes and treatments the issuer may claim.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="marks">
        <name>Visual Marks</name>
        <t>People recognize emblems by sight, and many use cases have a physical sign that people already know: the red cross, red crescent, and red crystal, the Blue Shield, the ISPM 15 mark, a brand's logo.
An emblem may refer to a visual mark (an image of that sign), published as its own facet so that validators that display nothing never retrieve it.
The approach follows Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI) <xref target="I-D.brand-indicators-for-message-identification"/>, which lets mail clients display a sender's logo, with three differences.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The visual mark is published in the DNS as a facet, not fetched from a web server, so retrieving it reveals no more than retrieving the emblem, and it can be cached, stapled, and carried in an offline bundle.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Where BIMI relies on a certificate authority to verify that a logo belongs to a domain, here that role is played by the endorsement: the authorizing entity includes a digest of the visual mark in the endorsement's scope, attesting that this issuer may display it.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The authorizing entity is whoever the profile's framework names (a ministry for the distinctive emblems, an NPPO for the ISPM 15 mark), not only a trademark registry.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>A validator displays a visual mark only if its digest is covered by a validated endorsement, or if it matches a canonical rendering that the validator already holds for an enumerated value in the emblem (for example, the red cross for a protective red cross purpose).
Otherwise the validator does not display it, or labels it clearly as unverified.
A visual mark never overrides the emblem's data: if the two disagree, the data governs and the disagreement is itself a reason for suspicion.</t>
        <t>Marks use a restricted image format, such as the SVG Tiny Portable/Secure profile that BIMI defines <xref target="I-D.svg-tiny-ps-abrotman"/>, which excludes scripts, external references, and animation.
A simple symbol in this format is on the order of a hundred octets; detailed logos can run to several kilobytes.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="code-lists">
        <name>External Code Lists as Value Types</name>
        <t>Much of the data that emblems carry is already standardized elsewhere: country codes, currency codes, units of measure, location codes, commodity classifications, dangerous goods numbers.
DIEM should use these code lists rather than reinvent them, and should not mirror them into IANA registries.
On both points this document agrees with <xref target="I-D.woodcock-faltstrom-external-registry-rrtypes"/>, which argues them well.</t>
        <t>Where this document differs is in <em>where the code list attaches</em>.
In the external-registry RRTypes, a record names a code list (for example, "ISO 3166-1") and carries a code, an optional quantity, and an optional free-text descriptor.
The property that the code describes (whether "QA" is a flag state, a place of incorporation, or a country of origin) is carried only in the descriptor, which receivers must not interpret.
Two records about the same asset that use the same code list are therefore indistinguishable to software.</t>
        <t>In this architecture, the code list is the <em>type</em> of a map key:</t>
        <figure>
          <name>Where the meaning lives</name>
          <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
/ external-registry pattern (illustrative): meaning only in text /
ISO 3166-1 - QA "flag state"
ISO 3166-1 - US "state of incorporation"

/ typed map keys: the map key carries the meaning, the code list the type /
{ "flag-state": "QA", "incorporated-in": "US" }
]]></sourcecode>
        </figure>
        <t>A map key definition says "the value is an ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code", so a validator can reject "Q4" or "qa" (the codes are compared verbatim, as in the external-registry draft), and software can act on "flag-state" directly.
The alternative, recovering the property by parsing descriptor strings such as "flag state", is error-prone: descriptors are unconstrained text, so the same property can be written in many ways, in any language, abbreviated, or misspelled, and different parser implementors may interpret the strings differently.
Where a map key admits values from more than one code list, the value carries a small code-list identifier alongside the code.
The registry of code-list identifiers references external lists without copying their contents.</t>
        <t>This approach also reaches code lists that do not fit a one-RRType-per-maintainer pattern.
The OPCW use case in <xref target="DIEM-REQS"/> needs Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers, IUPAC names, GHS hazard pictograms, and UN dangerous goods numbers <xref target="UNMODELREGS"/>; the logistics example below needs Harmonized System codes <xref target="HS"/> and ISPM 15 treatment codes <xref target="ISPM15"/>.
Each of these becomes a value type that map keys can use, with no new RRType per maintainer.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="facets">
        <name>Facets: Signed Once, Signed Often</name>
        <t>Some emblem data never changes for the life of the emblem (a serial number, a hazard classification, a legal designation).
Some changes constantly (the location of a container in transit).
draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-00 described this as "signed" versus "informational" fields.
In a DNS-native design, the distinction maps onto RRsets:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Static facets are published in RRsets that can be signed offline and given long TTLs.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Dynamic facets are published in separate RRsets with short TTLs.
Because any key in a zone's DNSKEY RRset can sign any RRset in that zone, an online signing key in the same zone could also forge the static data.
Dynamic data that must be signed online is therefore placed in a separate, online-signed zone (for example, one shared zone for all of an issuer's dynamic facets), so the static data remains under offline keys.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Facets are also the unit of retrieval.
A recycler that only needs the battery chemistry does not need to fetch the declared customs value, and a customs officer does not need recycling instructions.
Each facet is either a distinct RRType at the emblem name (a LOC record for position, a URI record <xref target="RFC7553"/> for a link to documentation) or a distinct owner name below it.</t>
        <t>Just as a profile says which facets are static and which dynamic, it says which facets a validator needs for which purpose (<xref target="profiles"/>).
Optional facets add information but never change the outcome of validation.
A validator that cannot obtain a required facet (because the query times out, the facet is not in an offline bundle, or it is encrypted to someone else) reaches an indeterminate result for that purpose, not an invalid one (<xref target="validation"/>).
The distinction matters: a protected site must not appear unprotected because a query timed out.</t>
        <t>This replaces the application-layer hashing of the -00 draft.
DNSSEC already signs each RRset; a validator that retrieves a facet gets integrity for exactly that facet.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="hierarchy">
      <name>Hierarchy and Composition</name>
      <t>Assets nest and compose.
Physical assets nest: devices in cartons, cartons on pallets, pallets in containers, containers on ships.
Digital assets compose: an organization operates services, a service runs on hosts, a dataset is held on storage.
The two mix: a hard drive is a physical object (and may be dangerous goods in transit) that carries a dataset with protections of its own.
Different parties attest to different levels.
The architecture expresses all of these by explicit reference: an emblem names the emblems it relates to, and each referenced emblem is validated through its own zone's DNSSEC chain.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Within one issuer, a reference can be written relative to the issuer's emblem zone (for example, its <tt>_diem</tt> zone).
Relative references keep records small, and they cannot lead outside the issuer's zone.
A product class, for instance, is published once, with class-wide data (model, hazard classification), and each item's emblem refers to its class and adds only item-specific data (serial number).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Across issuers, references are absolute names.
A shipper's consignment emblem refers to the manufacturer's class emblems; a hard drive's emblem, describing the physical object, refers to the emblem of the dataset it holds, which carries the data's own protections.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Where the referencing party wants to fix exactly what it saw at the time (for example, a declaration to customs), the reference also carries a digest of the referenced RRset.
A profile states whether references carry digests, and whether they are required.
A digest pins the referenced data, so correcting that data means publishing a new version rather than editing it in place; a reference without a digest always resolves to the current data, which DNSSEC still authenticates.</t>
      <t>A validator walks as far as its task requires.
A customs officer may validate only the shipper's consignment emblem; a recycler may validate a single device's battery facet back to the manufacturer; an audit may walk everything.
Full walks of large consignments involve many queries, which caching, wildcards for homogeneous items, and offline bundles all mitigate.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="endorsement">
      <name>Authorization and Endorsement</name>
      <t>Some profiles require issuer authorization by a third party: a state authorizing use of a protective emblem under IHL, a national plant protection organization authorizing a pallet producer to apply the ISPM 15 mark, a treaty secretariat recognizing a designated site.
DNSSEC proves who published an emblem, not who authorized it.
Endorsement fills that gap.</t>
      <t>An endorsement is an RRset in the authorizing entity's own DNSSEC-signed zone.
It names the endorsed issuer and the scope of the endorsement: the profile, the permitted purposes or designations, and a validity period.
For example, <tt>hospital.example._endorse.health.gov.example</tt> might carry an ENDORSE record listing the protective purposes the ministry has authorized for <tt>hospital.example</tt>.
The endorsement can also carry a digest of the issuer's DNSKEY RRset or key-signing key, in the manner of a DS record, so that it binds the zone as it was when endorsed: if the issuer's domain lapses and is re-registered, or its keys are replaced without the authorizing entity's knowledge, the endorsement no longer matches.
(Binding to keys means the authorizing entity must re-endorse when the issuer rolls its key-signing key, so a profile chooses whether to bind to the zone name, the keys, or both.)</t>
      <t>Validators obtain an endorsement in one of two ways:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Queried:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The validator looks up the endorsement in the authorizing entity's zone and validates it with DNSSEC.
Revocation is removal, bounded by TTL and signature lifetime.
The cost is an extra query, which reveals to the authorizing entity's servers (through resolvers) that someone is interested in the issuer.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Stapled:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The issuer retrieves its own endorsement, with its RRSIGs and the DNSSEC chain from the root to the authorizing entity's zone, and publishes that serialization inside or alongside its emblem, much as a TLS server staples a certificate status response.
A validator validates the stapled RRset against the chain it carries, with no query to the authorizing entity.
A stapled endorsement cannot be recalled once copied, so its lifetime is that of its signatures.
The authorizing entity controls that lifetime through the signature validity period it chooses for endorsement RRsets, and the issuer must refresh the staple before it expires.
This suits profiles that require undetectable validation or offline operation.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>Either way the endorsement is one object, signed one way, in one place.
No second signature format is needed, and the authorizing entity's operational duty is the familiar one of maintaining a signed zone.
Authorization that passes through several levels (a state authorizing a ministry, which endorses hospitals) is a chain of endorsements, each in its endorser's zone, and a staple can carry the whole chain.</t>
      <t>Where the list of endorsed issuers is itself sensitive, the authorizing entity can name endorsements by a digest of the issuer's name and use a denial-of-existence method that resists enumeration (<xref target="confidentiality"/>): a validator that knows the issuer can find the endorsement, but nobody can list all of them.</t>
      <t>An authorizing entity that also wants its endorsements to be publicly auditable (so that issuing a secret endorsement is detectable) can log them in a transparency log as an addition; a profile can require this without the architecture depending on it.</t>
      <t>A profile states whether it requires endorsement, which authorizing entities it recognizes and how validators learn of them, and whether queried endorsements, stapled endorsements, or both are acceptable.
Because each authorizing entity's trust is anchored in a zone it controls, no global registry of authorities is needed.</t>
      <t>An issuer may hold endorsements from several authorizing entities, and an emblem may carry or refer to several.
Unless its profile is stricter, a validator accepts any one endorsement from an authorizing entity it recognizes whose scope covers the emblem, and ignores the others.
The authorizing entities need not recognize one another: where two states each regard themselves as competent for the same medical facility, each can endorse it, and a validator acting under either state's authority finds the endorsement it recognizes.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="confidentiality">
      <name>Confidentiality and Selective Disclosure</name>
      <t>Some emblem data is restricted: a consignment's declared value, the identity of a diplomatic courier, an issuer's internal forensic data.
<xref target="DIEM-REQS"/> anticipates selective disclosure.</t>
      <t>The architectural primitive is encryption of values inside signed records.
An encrypted value is a COSE <xref target="RFC9052"/> encryption structure (COSE_Encrypt0 for a single recipient, COSE_Encrypt with recipient structures where several parties, such as origin and destination customs, need access), with keys distributed as the profile specifies (for example, using HPKE <xref target="RFC9180"/> <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-hpke"/> to a public key that a customs authority publishes in its own zone).
DNSSEC signs the ciphertext, so integrity covers restricted fields even for validators that cannot read them.
This resolves an open question from the -00 draft (how encrypted subrecords participate in integrity protection): the signature covers what is published, which is the ciphertext.</t>
      <t>This is how the architecture provides validator authorization: a validator that holds a recipient's private key can read the value, and no other can, whichever server or cache it obtained the record from.
Recipients are therefore parties whose roles a profile names in advance (origin and destination customs, a receiving state, an operations center), each publishing its public key in its own zone, not arbitrary validators.
How to reach a recipient that was not foreseen when the emblem was issued (the customs authority of a country to which a shipment is diverted, for example) is an open issue (<xref target="open-issues"/>).
Each ciphertext is bound to its emblem and map key (for example, as COSE external additional authenticated data), so that it cannot be moved into another emblem or field.
A profile may also require that an encrypted value be accompanied by a salted digest of its plaintext, visible to all, so that a recipient can later prove to a third party what the issuer published; the salt, disclosed only with the plaintext, keeps values with few possibilities from being guessed.</t>
      <t>Authenticated DNS views, in which the server authenticates the client and returns different data to different audiences, are an alternative that this document does not recommend as the general mechanism:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>They identify validators to issuers' servers, which is unacceptable where inspection patterns are sensitive (and fatal to undetectable validation).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Answers that differ per client cannot be shared through resolver caches, so the restricted tier would become an application API with DNS framing.
Encryption keeps every answer identical and cacheable, whether or not emblem names are delegated to a separate server (<xref target="discovery"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Requiring client identification for emblem lookups in general would set a precedent for identified DNS lookups that could be misused well beyond DIEM.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Profiles may still use authenticated access where audit of who looked is itself a requirement, but should do so knowingly.</t>
      <t>Confidentiality also covers existence.
Where the mere existence of an emblem name is sensitive, issuers use unguessable labels and a denial-of-existence method that does not reveal them.
Plain NSEC allows zone walking and would expose such labels.
Compact denial of existence <xref target="RFC9824"/> reveals nothing but requires online signing, and its distinct signal for nonexistent names requires signer support that is not yet common in deployed authoritative servers; offline-signed zones can use NSEC3 <xref target="RFC9276"/>, whose hashed names resist enumeration when the labels themselves have high entropy.
NSEC3 still reveals, through its type bitmaps, how many names in the zone hold emblem records, though not which names they are; issuers for whom that count is sensitive should use compact denial or add decoy names.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="offline">
      <name>Offline and Constrained Validation</name>
      <t><xref target="DIEM-REQS"/> requires that the architecture not assume Internet access.
DNSSEC data is self-authenticating: an RRset, its RRSIG, and the chain of DNSKEY and DS records up to a trust anchor can be validated anywhere, by anyone holding the root trust anchor and a clock.</t>
      <t>An offline bundle serializes exactly that, following the pattern of the TLS DNSSEC chain extension <xref target="RFC9102"/> and the CHAIN query <xref target="RFC7901"/>.
A bundle carrying the full chain from the root runs from one to a few kilobytes, so it fits in a large QR code or an accompanying document, and can be validated at a disconnected port or in the field.
Smaller carriers, such as common NFC tags of under a kilobyte, generally need a validator that already holds a trust anchor closer to the issuer (for its sector, or for the issuer's own zone), so that the bundle can omit the upper part of the chain.
Signature algorithm choice matters here: newer algorithms, such as those based on elliptic curves, have much smaller keys and signatures than RSA (see <xref target="RFC8624"/> for current guidance), so issuers that expect their emblems to travel in bundles should prefer them.
Post-quantum algorithms, whose keys and signatures are much larger, would make chains many times larger as they come into use for DNSSEC, which makes placing trust anchors close to issuers matter even more.</t>
      <t>A bundle's validity is bounded by the shortest RRSIG validity period it contains, which also bounds how long a removed emblem can be replayed.
That includes the signatures of the root and TLD zones, which the issuer does not control and which typically last one to three weeks, so bundles have a limited shelf life and must be refreshed for long journeys.
A validator that already holds a current copy of the upper chain (refreshed whenever it is online) can prefer it to the copy in the bundle, so that only the part of the chain below its own trust anchor needs to be current.
How best to validate offline over periods longer than the upper zones' signature lifetimes is an open issue (<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
      <t>An offline validator needs a roughly correct clock.
Signature validity periods run from days to weeks, so a clock that is right to within a day or so suffices, but a validator whose clock can be set back will accept expired signatures.
A validator with no clock at all can still conclude that the data was validly signed at some time within the signatures' validity periods, which a profile may accept as evidence but not as proof that the emblem is current.</t>
      <t>Offline bundles take over the role that application-layer signed objects (such as signed CBOR) played in earlier thinking, without introducing a second signature system.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="lifecycle">
      <name>Lifecycle, Removal, and Forensics</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Removal:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Some profiles require that an emblem be removable (<xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>).
Removing the records stops new validators from finding them, but signed copies remain valid until their RRSIGs expire, and caches may hold them until their TTLs expire.
Profiles that need prompt removal should use short signature validity periods and TTLs, which in practice means online signing, and which limits the shelf life of offline bundles accordingly.
An emblem's own validity period is a different thing: it bounds the issuer's statement, while signature lifetimes bound how long a copy can be replayed, and only the latter governs removal.
Profiles should also be candid in their threat models that the DNS is not forgetful: passive DNS collectors may retain records indefinitely, which matters for the "learn after the fact" aspect of removability.
For an online validator, the query is itself the status check: authenticated denial of existence proves that an emblem has been removed, with no separate revocation mechanism.
Offline validators cannot make that check, and how they should learn of revocations is an open issue (<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Archival:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Removal from the DNS is not deletion.
Most use cases expect the issuer to archive emblems, with lifespan rules set by the profile.
Some archived data is public forensic record; some is internal (for example, the identity of the staff member who created a record) and may be published only in encrypted form or not at all.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Proof of presence:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A validated DNSSEC response is a portable, third-party-verifiable record that the zone's key signed a given emblem with a validity period covering a given time.
A validator that retains the response (with the DNSKEYs then in effect) holds evidence supporting Level 1 proof of presence in the terms of <xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>.
Level 2 (that a validator accessed the emblem) would need records of access, for example server-side logs where a profile accepts that access is observable, and Level 3 must come from the validator's own signed records; both are outside the DNS data itself.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="undetectable">
      <name>Undetectable Validation</name>
      <t>The IHL use case requires that validation be undetectable by the asset's operator (<xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>).
Several mechanisms contribute, and none is sufficient alone:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Resolver mediation: an issuer's authoritative server sees queries from resolvers, not from validators.
Large shared resolvers and Oblivious DoH <xref target="RFC9230"/> enlarge or obscure the population of query sources.
EDNS Client Subnet <xref target="RFC7871"/> works against this; validators should use resolvers that do not send it, or opt out with a source prefix length of zero.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Limiting other observers: encrypted transports protect the path to the resolver, and QNAME minimisation <xref target="RFC9156"/> keeps parent zones from learning the full name.
Neither hides the query from the issuer's own authoritative server.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Caching: a cached answer generates no query at all.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Self-contained answers: if everything needed for validation (including stapled endorsements, <xref target="endorsement"/>) arrives in one response, no follow-up query to the issuer or authorizing entity reveals interest.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Query indistinguishability: if the query that retrieves an emblem is one that ordinary clients make anyway, retrieving the emblem reveals nothing.
For a network service, the emblem can travel in a record that clients already request when connecting, such as the asset's HTTPS record <xref target="RFC9460"/>.
Techniques of this kind place emblem data in the asset's own zone, so they cannot be combined with delegating emblems to a separate server, and they should not require changes to recursive resolvers, which would delay deployment.
How best to hide the act of validation is an open issue (<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>This document recommends a baseline that works with today's DNS: validators query through large shared resolvers that do not send client subnet information, over encrypted transports, and issuers publish self-contained emblems with stapled endorsements and TTLs long enough for caching to be effective.
Against an issuer that watches its own authoritative server, this baseline hides <em>who</em> is validating but not <em>that</em> someone is, and only when the resolver's population is large enough to blend in.
Query indistinguishability is the only measure that hides the act of validation itself, so a profile whose threat model includes that adversary should require such a technique and accept its deployment constraints.</t>
      <t>A profile that requires undetectable validation must state its threat model (<xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>) in terms of which of these it relies on.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="profiles">
      <name>Defining a Profile</name>
      <t>Because the architecture leaves the use-case-specific choices to profiles, a profile specification has a predictable shape.
A profile specifies:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Data:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Its map keys, each with a type (preferably in CDDL), and which are required, which are critical, and which are confidential; for numeric values, whether each is an exact decimal or floating point; and which common map keys and code lists it reuses.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Layout:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>How its data divides into facets, which facets are static and which dynamic, which are required for which purposes, and the expected TTLs and signing arrangements for each (<xref target="facets"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Naming and discovery:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>How validators learn emblem names for its assets, whether names are derived from the asset's name, conveyed out of band, or deliberately unguessable, and how the <tt>asset</tt> map key relates to the emblem name (<xref target="discovery"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Hierarchy:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Whether its emblems refer to emblems of other issuers or profiles, and whether references carry digests, optionally or always (<xref target="hierarchy"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Issuer authorization:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Whether endorsement is required, which authorizing entities it recognizes and how validators learn of them, how endorsements are named, how an endorsement's scope is judged to cover an emblem, whether queried or stapled endorsements are acceptable, and any rule stricter than "any recognized endorsement suffices" (<xref target="endorsement"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Confidentiality and validator authorization:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Which values are encrypted, to which recipient roles, how recipients' keys are found, and whether salted plaintext digests are required (<xref target="confidentiality"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Lifecycle:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Removal expectations, the signature lifetimes and TTLs that follow from them, archival rules, and the level of proof of presence it supports (<xref target="lifecycle"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Threat model:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Its adversaries, including whether validation must be undetectable and by whom (<xref target="undetectable"/>), and whether unvalidated emblems may be used at all.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Interpretation:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The treatments it may request (<xref target="treatment"/>), the citation schemes it expects for their legal basis, what a validated emblem means for a validator acting under the profile's normative framework, and what a validator should do when an expected emblem is absent or fails validation.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>A profile specification therefore needs no protocol design of its own.
The worked examples in <xref target="examples"/> are informal sketches of four such profiles.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="validation">
      <name>Validation Outline</name>
      <t>Validation proceeds in the same way for every profile; only the final interpretation is profile-specific.
In outline, a validator:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>obtains the emblem name (or an offline bundle) for the asset;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>retrieves the emblem records it needs, or extracts them from the bundle;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>validates them with DNSSEC, treating bogus data as absent and, unless the profile permits unvalidated emblems, treating unsigned data as absent;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>selects the records whose profiles it understands, checks each value against its map key's type, and rejects a record if it contains a critical map key the validator does not understand;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>checks that the emblem identifies the asset in front of it, by FQDN and by whatever cross-check identifiers the profile defines;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>checks validity periods;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>where the profile requires issuer authorization, validates an endorsement (queried, stapled, or carried in an offline bundle, so this step works offline too) and checks that its scope covers the emblem;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>follows references to other emblems as far as its task requires, checking digests where present;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>decrypts any confidential values it is entitled to read; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>interprets the result under the profile, optionally retaining the validated responses as evidence (<xref target="lifecycle"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>The result is valid, invalid, or indeterminate.
Indeterminate means that something the profile requires for the validator's purpose could not be obtained or read: a required facet that timed out or is missing from a bundle, or a value the validator cannot decrypt (<xref target="facets"/>).
A validator must not present an indeterminate result as invalid.</t>
      <t>The steps are common to all profiles, but some of their inputs come from the profile: its map keys and types (step 4), how its emblems identify their assets (step 5), and, where it requires issuer authorization, which authorizing entities it recognizes, how their endorsements are named, and how an endorsement's scope is judged to cover an emblem (step 7).
These are data that a validator can load, listed in the profile template (<xref target="profiles"/>), rather than code.</t>
      <t>A validator that combines several records (following references, or decrypting one value and then checking another) should evaluate them all at one time.
Signatures can expire between queries, and a resolver's AD bit is a judgment made once that cannot be re-examined later.
A validator that needs consistency, or evidence it can show to others, therefore collects the RRsets with their RRSIGs and chains (in the bundle format of <xref target="offline"/>) and validates them itself at a single evaluation time.
This is ordinary DNSSEC validation in a validating stub or library, and needs no special resolver; the collected data is also the record that supports proof of presence (<xref target="lifecycle"/>).</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="reqs-map">
      <name>Meeting the Requirements</name>
      <t>The following table summarizes how the architecture addresses the requirements of <xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>.</t>
      <table>
        <name>Requirements coverage</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Requirement</th>
            <th align="left">How it is addressed</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Digital emblem format</td>
            <td align="left">A typed dictionary that identifies the marked asset by FQDN and names its profile, with a small set of common map keys; one record per profile where an asset falls under several (<xref target="data-model"/>, <xref target="strawman"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Emblem semantics</td>
            <td align="left">Defined by each profile (<xref target="profiles"/>); requested treatments are expressed uniformly, with an open legal basis (<xref target="treatment"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Discovery</td>
            <td align="left">A DNS query at the emblem name; authenticated denial of existence shows that no emblem exists (<xref target="discovery"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Query response</td>
            <td align="left">Authoritative servers answer every query (Assured Response) unless a profile permits Selective Response, at the cost of cacheability. Encrypted fields give every validator the same answer (Consistent Content) while restricting what each can read; audience-dependent answers (Selective Content) are possible but not recommended (<xref target="confidentiality"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Removable</td>
            <td align="left">Record removal, bounded by signature lifetimes and caching; for online validators, authenticated denial is the status check (<xref target="lifecycle"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Undetectable validation</td>
            <td align="left">Resolver mediation, caching, and self-contained answers; hiding the act of validation is open (<xref target="undetectable"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Validation</td>
            <td align="left">DNSSEC, in a common procedure (<xref target="validation"/>); facets let a profile validate all data or a subset, with dynamic data signed separately (<xref target="facets"/>). Profiles may permit unvalidated emblems</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Authorization</td>
            <td align="left">Issuer authorization by endorsements published in the authorizing entity's zone, queried or stapled, from one or several authorizing entities; key compromise is handled by DNSSEC key rollover, optional key binding in endorsements, and short signature lifetimes on stapled endorsements (<xref target="endorsement"/>). No Internet access is assumed (<xref target="offline"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Extensibility</td>
            <td align="left">New profiles and map keys without protocol changes; validators skip what they do not understand, and critical map keys protect them from misreading (<xref target="data-model"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Data formats</td>
            <td align="left">Value types, with external code lists as types (<xref target="code-lists"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Asset identifier discovery, implicit discovery</td>
            <td align="left">Out-of-band conveyance of emblem names (<xref target="discovery"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Confidentiality</td>
            <td align="left">Encrypted values in signed records, readable by recipients the profile names (validator authorization); enumeration-resistant names (<xref target="confidentiality"/>)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Proof of presence</td>
            <td align="left">Retained DNSSEC responses support Level 1 (<xref target="lifecycle"/>)</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section anchor="strawman">
      <name>Strawman Encoding</name>
      <t>This section is illustrative.
It sketches one way to realize the architecture so that the working group can evaluate it; it is not a specification.</t>
      <section anchor="the-emblem-rrtype">
        <name>The EMBLEM RRType</name>
        <t>The EMBLEM RRType carries one emblem dictionary (or one facet of one) as RDATA.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The RDATA is a single CBOR <xref target="RFC8949"/> map using core deterministic encoding (Section 4.2.1 of <xref target="RFC8949"/>).
Deterministic encoding fixes the serialization but not application-level equivalence, so the encoding must also fix canonical forms (for example, decimal mantissas without trailing zeros, integer epoch seconds) for equal emblems to have equal wire representations.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Map keys are small integers from a "DIEM Emblem Keys" registry (common map keys) or from the map key space of the profile named in the map.
Text names are used in this document for readability, for enumerated values as well as for map keys.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Map key 1, "profile", is required.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Enumerated values (profile identifiers, treatment actions, purposes, and the like) are small integers from registries; codes from external code lists are carried verbatim as text.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Exact decimal values use CBOR tag 4 (decimal fraction) and floating-point values use CBOR floats, as each map key's definition specifies; timestamps use tag 1; language-tagged text uses tag 38; URIs use tag 32; encrypted values are COSE_Encrypt0 (tag 16) or COSE_Encrypt (tag 96); a value that exists but is unknown to the issuer is the CBOR simple value undefined.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>RDATA contains no compressible domain names, so the type is compatible with unknown-type handling <xref target="RFC3597"/>.
Domain-name references are carried as text, normalized for comparison and digests (A-labels, lowercase, without a trailing dot); a reference within the same issuer may be relative to the issuer's emblem zone (<xref target="hierarchy"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The presentation format would be the generic <tt>\# length hex</tt> form of <xref target="RFC3597"/>, with CBOR diagnostic notation for human display; <xref target="encoded"/> shows one record both ways.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Why a CBOR map rather than SVCB-style key/value parameters <xref target="RFC9460"/>?
Both preserve the dictionary model.
CBOR brings typed values, nesting, decimal fractions, language tags, and COSE encryption without new definitions.
The cost is that zone-file tooling would need a CBOR-aware presentation format to be friendly.</t>
        <t>Why not one opaque blob per asset?
Because DNSSEC signs per RRset, packing everything into one record forfeits independent retrieval, independent TTLs, and the static/dynamic split of <xref target="facets"/>.
Profiles should split emblems into facets along the lines that validators actually query.</t>
        <t>Size needs attention at two levels.
Individual records vary: item-level emblems like those below are well under 100 octets and class-level ones around a hundred, while a consignment emblem with transport references and fields encrypted to two customs authorities, or an emblem with a stapled endorsement chain, exceeds the 1,232-octet limit commonly used for DNS over UDP and arrives over TCP or an encrypted transport.
Aggregates matter more: a consignment of 1,400 devices implies 1,400 item emblems, and validators should not have to fetch them all.
Class-level data is published once, consignments list classes with counts rather than items, and validators sample individual items or use an offline bundle prepared for the consignment.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="companion-rrtypes">
        <name>Companion RRTypes</name>
        <t>Existing RRTypes serve some facets directly: LOC <xref target="RFC1876"/> for point positions, URI <xref target="RFC7553"/> for references to documentation, TLSA <xref target="RFC6698"/> where an emblem is bound to a TLS service.
A separate RRType for typed quantities could serve profiles that query quantities independently.</t>
        <t>New types would be needed for endorsements (ENDORSE, whose RDATA could reuse the EMBLEM encoding with a map key space of its own: the endorsed issuer in place of the asset, the endorsed profile, scope, validity, and optional key and visual mark digests) and possibly for areas (polygons), which LOC does not express.
A stapled endorsement would be carried in an emblem as a byte string holding the serialized RRsets and chain, in the format of <xref target="RFC9102"/>.
All of these, like EMBLEM, need only Expert Review for allocation <xref target="RFC6895"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="examples">
      <name>Example Use Cases</name>
      <t>The following examples are sketches.
Names, map keys, and values are illustrative.
Emblem dictionaries are shown in CBOR diagnostic notation with text map keys and text enumerated values (both of which would be integers in an encoding, <xref target="strawman"/>), using the elision <tt>...</tt> of <xref target="I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals"/> for long values.
Country codes beginning with "X" are user-assigned placeholders.</t>
      <section anchor="ex-ihl">
        <name>IHL: A Hospital and Its Digital Services</name>
        <t>Example General Hospital operates a patient records system at <tt>records.hospital.example</tt>.
Under IHL, a medical unit entitled to protection may display the red cross, red crescent, or red crystal with the authorization of the competent authority, and Additional Protocol I already provides distinctive signals, including radio signals and electronic identification, chiefly for medical transports (Article 18 and Annex I, Chapter III of <xref target="API"/>).
A digital emblem extends this to the hospital's network services.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Issuer and authorization:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The hospital is the issuer.
The ministry of health of its state, as the competent authority, endorses the hospital for the protective use of the emblem.
The ministry publishes the endorsement in its own zone, under a label derived from a digest of the hospital's name so that its list of protected facilities cannot be enumerated.
Because validators must not reveal their interest, the hospital staples the endorsement, with its DNSSEC chain, inside its emblem, so validation requires no query to the ministry.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Placement:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The asset is a network service, so its name is already known to anyone who would interact with it.
The hospital may publish under its delegated <tt>_diem</tt> zone, at <tt>records._diem.hospital.example</tt> (served by a provider that serves emblems, with the profile deriving the emblem name from the service's name), or use one of the query-indistinguishability techniques of <xref target="undetectable"/> at the service's own name, as its profile's threat model dictates.
Either way, the <tt>asset</tt> map key names the service itself, <tt>records.hospital.example</tt>, not the emblem name.
The emblem's subject is the records service, not the host it runs on or the patient data it holds (<xref target="subject"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
/ EMBLEM at records._diem.hospital.example /
{
  "profile": "ihl-protective",
  "purpose": ["protective-red-cross"],
  "asset":   "records.hospital.example",
  "treatment": [{"prohibit": "attack"}],
  "basis":   [{"scheme": "uri",
               "id":   32("https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/..."),
               "text": 38(["en", "GC I, Art. 19"])}],
  "valid":   [1(1793491200), 1(1801440000)],
  "issuer-name": 38(["en", "Example General Hospital"]),
  "mark":    "_mark.records._diem.hospital.example",
  "endorsements": [               / stapled, from the ministry /
    {"by":     "health.gov.example",
     "staple": h'...'}  / ENDORSE RRset, RRSIGs, chain from root /
  ]
}

/ ENDORSE at 3q9v...._endorse.health.gov.example (stapled above) /
{
  "profile": "endorsement",
  "issuer":  "hospital.example",
  "endorsed-profile": "ihl-protective",
  "scope":   ["protective-red-cross", {"prohibit": "attack"}],
  "valid":   [1(1793491200), 1(1801440000)],
  "dnskey-digest": h'...',     / binds the hospital's current KSK /
  "mark-digest":   h'...'      / the mark the hospital may display /
}

/ EMBLEM at _mark.records._diem.hospital.example /
/ (visual mark facet: an image of the distinctive emblem) /
{
  "profile":    "mark",
  "asset":      "records.hospital.example",
  "media-type": "image/svg+xml",
  "image":      h'...'   / <SVG of Red Cross emblem> /
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <dl>
          <dt>Validator:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A cyber unit planning operations queries through a large shared resolver, receives the emblem with its stapled endorsement in one response, validates the emblem with DNSSEC and the endorsement against the stapled chain, and finds that the asset is marked with protective use authorized by the named ministry.
(With the chain stapled, the emblem is several kilobytes, so it arrives over TCP or an encrypted transport.)
Its display shows the red cross, both because the purpose calls for it and because the visual mark's digest matches the ministry's endorsement; a generic validator with no knowledge of IHL could display the endorsed image of the distinctive emblem on the second ground alone.
What the unit does with that is a matter for IHL, not for the protocol.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Removal:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>If the hospital judges that the emblem increases its risk, it removes the records.
Its profile specifies short signature lifetimes and TTLs (hours, not weeks), which bounds replay of the removed emblem and implies that the hospital's emblem zone is signed online.
The stapled endorsement does not extend that window, because the emblem that carries it is itself short-lived; the ministry's own signature lifetimes bound how long the endorsement could be reused after the ministry withdraws it.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ex-logistics">
        <name>Logistics and Customs: A Pallet of Smartphones</name>
        <t>A manufacturer ships 1,400 boxed smartphones of one model family, in three variants, on a wooden pallet.
A freight forwarder consolidates the pallet into a consignment.
Customs at the destination, and eventually a recycler, need different subsets of the data.</t>
        <t>The manufacturer's zone holds data for the model family, for each variant, and for each item:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
x1.models._diem.maker.example.       EMBLEM  (family: X1)
std.x1.models._diem.maker.example.   EMBLEM  (variant: X1)
pro.x1.models._diem.maker.example.   EMBLEM  (variant: X1 Pro)
max.x1.models._diem.maker.example.   EMBLEM  (variant: X1 Max)
sn-35791a7c._diem.maker.example.     EMBLEM  (one device)
]]></artwork>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
/ EMBLEM at x1.models._diem.maker.example (static, offline-signed) /
{
  "profile": "product-class",
  "asset":   "x1.models._diem.maker.example",
  "model":   "X1",
  "dangerous-goods": {
    "un-number": "3481",  / Li-ion batteries in equipment /
    "class":     "9"
  },
  "battery-chemistry": "li-ion",
  "recycling": 32("https://maker.example/recycle/x1"),
  "origin":    "VN",
  "mid-us":    "VNEXAMAK123HAN",     / US manufacturer ID /
  "radio-auth": {"fcc-id": "2AEXAX1"}
}

/ EMBLEM at pro.x1.models._diem.maker.example /
{
  "profile": "product-class",
  "asset":   "pro.x1.models._diem.maker.example",
  "class-ref": "x1.models",          / relative: same issuer /
  "gtin":    "00614141999989",
  "model":   "X1 Pro",
  "battery-energy": [4([-1, 193]), "WHR"]   / 19.3 watt-hours /
}

/ EMBLEM at sn-35791a7c._diem.maker.example /
{
  "profile": "product-item",
  "asset":   "sn-35791a7c._diem.maker.example",
  "class-ref": "pro.x1.models",
  "serial":  "35791A7C",
  "made":    1(1790812800)
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>The hazardous materials, origin, and regulatory data is published once for the model family, not 1,400 times.
Each variant adds only what differs from the family (here its GTIN and its battery's energy, which affects dangerous goods handling); the X1 and X1 Max variants are like the X1 Pro, with 18.5 and 24.1 watt-hours.
Variants are split only where validators act differently, so color, for example, does not warrant one.
Each item emblem names its class explicitly, relative to the manufacturer's emblem zone, so a validator follows that reference rather than deriving the class from the item's name, and the reference cannot lead outside the manufacturer's zone.
Supplier and component detail is commercially sensitive and invisible to consumers, so the manufacturer keeps it internal or, where a regulator needs it, publishes it encrypted to that regulator; a profile structures such data as its use case needs.</t>
        <t>The pallet carries the ISPM 15 mark <xref target="ISPM15"/>, authorized by the national plant protection organization (NPPO) of the country where the mark was applied.
The pallet producer publishes the mark's data, and the NPPO endorses the producer (a queried endorsement suffices here, since nobody needs to hide that they checked a pallet):</t>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
/ EMBLEM at p-20261031-0042._diem.pallets.example /
{
  "profile":   "ispm15",
  "asset":     "p-20261031-0042._diem.pallets.example",
  "country":   "VN",          / ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 /
  "producer":  "000123",      / registration number from the NPPO /
  "measure":   "HT"           / ISPM 15 treatment: heat /
}
/ ENDORSE at pallets.example._endorse.nppo.gov.example /
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>The consignment is an emblem subject in its own right, because it is what customs acts on: it is declared, examined, and released as a unit, whatever it contains.
The forwarder wraps everything in a consignment emblem at an unguessable name in its own zone (an NSEC3-signed zone, so the name cannot be enumerated), with live position in a shared online-signed zone:</t>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
/ EMBLEM at c-7f3k9q2m._diem.forwarder.example /
{
  "profile":    "consignment",
  "asset":      "c-7f3k9q2m._diem.forwarder.example",
  "hs-code":    "851713",          / smartphones /
  "hts-us":     "8517130000",
  "origin":     "VN",
  "container":  "EXMU1234569",     / ISO 6346 /
  "seal":       "EX4471029",
  "packages":   [1, "PX"],         / UNECE Rec. 21: pallet /
  "gross-mass": [4([0, 725]), "KGM"],
  "transport": {
    "bill-of-lading":   "EXSC260098812",
    "carrier":          "EXSC",
    "vessel":           "EXAMPLE STAR",
    "voyage":           "042E",
    "port-of-lading":   "VNSGN",   / UN LOCODE /
    "port-of-unlading": "USLAX"
  },
  "valuation":  96(...),           / encrypted to origin and   /
                                   / destination customs       /
  "parties":    96(...),           / likewise: seller, buyer,  /
                                   / importer of record, bond, /
                                   / ship-to, consolidator,    /
                                   / stuffing location         /
  "contents": [
    {"emblem": "p-20261031-0042._diem.pallets.example"},
    {"emblem": "std.x1.models._diem.maker.example", "count": 600},
    {"emblem": "pro.x1.models._diem.maker.example", "count": 500},
    {"emblem": "max.x1.models._diem.maker.example", "count": 300}
  ]
}

/ LOC at c-7f3k9q2m._live._diem.forwarder.example /
/ (shared online-signed zone, TTL 300)              /
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>The valuation is a dictionary of its own, encrypted so that only customs can read it.
Its plaintext uses monetary amounts (a decimal and an ISO 4217 code) and the commercial terms customs needs to determine the customs value:</t>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
/ plaintext of "valuation" /
{
  "method":     "transaction-value",   / customs valuation method /
  "related-party": false,
  "incoterm":   "FOB",                   / ICC Incoterms rule /
  "invoice":    "INV-2026-10-4471",
  "lines": [
    {"class-ref": "std.x1.models._diem.maker.example", "line-qty": 600,
     "unit-price": [4([1, 38]), "USD"]},    / 380 /
    {"class-ref": "pro.x1.models._diem.maker.example", "line-qty": 500,
     "unit-price": [4([1, 42]), "USD"]},    / 420 /
    {"class-ref": "max.x1.models._diem.maker.example", "line-qty": 300,
     "unit-price": [4([0, 465]), "USD"]}    / 465 /
  ],
  "total":      [4([2, 5775]), "USD"],   / 577,500 /
  "freight":    [4([2, 32]), "USD"],     / 3,200 /
  "insurance":  [4([0, 1155]), "USD"],   / 1,155 /
  "additions":  []                       / no assists or royalties /
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <dl>
          <dt>Customs:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The officer scans the consignment's code, validates the forwarder's emblem, and decrypts the valuation and parties with the customs authority's key.
The container and seal numbers, gross mass, and transport references tie the emblem to the carrier's manifest and to what is physically in front of the officer.
National requirements (here a US tariff number, manufacturer identification code, and radio equipment authorization) are map keys like any other.
Because amounts are typed decimals with currency codes, software can check that the lines' unit prices times quantities sum to the total and match the declared counts, compare each unit price with what is plausible for HS 8517.13 and that variant, and compute the customs value on the authority's own basis (adding freight and insurance where it values on a CIF basis).
The officer also checks the dangerous goods classification (following each variant's reference to the family's data), and optionally validates the pallet's ISPM 15 data and NPPO endorsement.
A retained copy of the validated response records exactly what the forwarder declared, which matters if the valuation is later disputed.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Authenticity:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Checking whether goods are genuine today means querying each brand through its own system.
Here, the officer checks that a device's item emblem exists in the brand's own zone and validates with DNSSEC, which confirms that the manufacturer issued that serial number for that model; a serial that does not resolve, or resolves to a different model, is a red flag.
The officer must still confirm that the zone really is the brand's (lookalike domains are the counterfeiter's obvious move), for example against a list of brand domains the customs authority maintains.
An emblem alone does not prove that a physical item is the one the serial was issued for, since a counterfeiter can copy a genuine serial.
Profiles can address cloning by binding a device-held key into the item emblem so that the device can prove possession when scanned, or by letting the manufacturer flag serials reported in implausible places (binding carriers to assets in general is an open issue, <xref target="open-issues"/>).
This replaces today's bespoke per-brand lookup arrangements with one validator that works for every brand and every shipment.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Recycler:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Years later, a recycler scans one device, validates its item emblem, follows its class references to the variant and family emblems, and reads the battery chemistry and energy.
It never sees the commercial data, and never needs to.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ex-pouch">
        <name>Diplomatic Pouches</name>
        <t>Under Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations <xref target="VCDR"/>, the diplomatic bag may not be opened or detained, and its packages must bear visible external marks of their character.
Those marks are easy to forge and impossible to verify at a distance, and the requirements document describes both the misuse of pouches for smuggling and the pressure to inspect them.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Issuer:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The sending state's ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) publishes an emblem for each pouch under an unguessable label in its own zone, using a denial-of-existence method that prevents enumeration (<xref target="confidentiality"/>).
The emblem's subject is the pouch itself; the seal number is a cross-check identifier that ties the emblem to the physical pouch (<xref target="subject"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
/ EMBLEM at k7q2-9xwm-4hd3._pouch._diem.mfa.gov.example /
{
  "profile":       "diplomatic-pouch",
  "asset":         "k7q2-9xwm-4hd3._pouch._diem.mfa.gov.example",
  "sending-state": "XA",                     / ISO 3166-1 /
  "consignee":     "embassy.xa.example",     / receiving mission /
  "seal":          "XA-2026-114357",   / matches physical seal /
  "pieces":        3,
  "gross-mass":    [4([-1, 184]), "KGM"],    / 18.4 kg /
  "courier":       16(...),       / to receiving state /
  "treatment":     [{"prohibit": "open"}, {"prohibit": "detain"}],
  "basis":         [{"scheme": "uri",
                     "id":   32("https://legal.un.org/..."),
                     "text": 38(["en", "VCDR, Art. 27(3)"])}],
  "valid":         [1(1793750400), 1(1794355200)]
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <dl>
          <dt>Validator:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The receiving state's customs scans the pouch mark, validates the emblem against the sending ministry's zone, compares the seal number, piece count, and mass with what is in front of them, and decrypts the courier details.
The pouch is never opened.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Proof of presence:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The validated response is evidence that the emblem was published and valid when checked.
A customs service that wants Level 3 proof of presence (<xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>) records its own signed validation event; that record is outside the DNS.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Removal:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>After delivery, the ministry removes the emblem and retains it in its archive.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ex-peacekeepers">
        <name>Peacekeepers: People, Vehicles, and Places</name>
        <t>A peacekeeping mission marks its facilities, vehicles, and personnel for the duration of a deployment (<xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>).
The mission is the issuer, and the organization that deploys it endorses the mission's zone.
This example differs from the others because some of its assets are people, and an emblem on a person is also a potential tracking identifier.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Facilities:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A camp is marked by area for the period of its use, with a point of contact.
Its location is public by design, so it is a static facet that can be signed offline.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Vehicles:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A convoy's position changes constantly and is sensitive.
It is a dynamic facet in the mission's online-signed zone, encrypted to the mission's operations center and to the host state's liaison, rather than a plaintext LOC record that anyone could follow.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Personnel:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Each person's emblem is published under an unguessable label that is replaced at every rotation, so that a name scanned once does not identify the person in future deployments.
The emblem carries the mission, the person's protected status, and a validity period.
Their identity is not in it, even in encrypted form.
The emblem therefore shows that a badge was issued by the mission, not that the person carrying it is the one it was issued to.
Binding a badge to its bearer, so that a copied or relayed badge does not pass, is an open issue (<xref target="open-issues"/>); a stolen badge is handled by removing its emblem and by the checkpoint's own checks.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
/ EMBLEM at r4nq-8w2k-c7tz._p._diem.mission.example /
{
  "profile":  "peacekeeping-personnel",
  "asset":    "r4nq-8w2k-c7tz._p._diem.mission.example",
  "mission":  "mission.example",
  "status":   "peacekeeper",
  "valid":    [1(1793491200), 1(1801267200)],
  "treatment": [{"prohibit": "attack"}, {"prohibit": "detain"}]
}

/ EMBLEM at _diem.mission.example (the mission itself) /
{
  "profile":  "peacekeeping-mission",
  "asset":    "mission.example",
  "contact":  32("https://mission.example/report"),
  "if-invalid": [{"request": "report"}, {"request": "hold"}]
}
]]></sourcecode>
        <dl>
          <dt>Validator:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>At a checkpoint, a soldier scans a badge, validates the emblem and the mission's endorsement, and learns that the badge is a current badge of the mission.
If a badge does not validate, nothing on it can be trusted, including any instructions it carries.
The mission therefore publishes its point of contact and what it asks in that case ("if-invalid") in its own emblem, which the validator validates separately and can cache or carry in an offline bundle.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Privacy:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The mission's authoritative servers see, through resolvers, when each personnel emblem is queried, and could build a map of where its people are being checked.
The profile may treat that as useful (stray reporting) or as a risk to manage, but it should say which (<xref target="privacy"/>).
If an individual's emblem raises their risk, the mission removes it, and short signature lifetimes bound how long it can be replayed.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="other-use-cases">
        <name>Other Use Cases</name>
        <t>The same pattern applies to the other use cases in <xref target="DIEM-REQS"/>.
A Ramsar-designated wetland would carry a location area and a designation endorsed by the Ramsar Secretariat; a CITES shipment would carry permit numbers and species codes; an OPCW Schedule 1 shipment would carry CAS numbers and GHS classifications with confidential quantities.
A law firm could mark a case file as privileged, requesting that it not be read without review and citing the applicable rule of its jurisdiction, with no authorizing entity at all.
Each is a profile, not a new architecture.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-issues">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <t>The following questions are open for working group discussion.
For each, this document describes a rational interim behavior or the options it sees, without settling the matter.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Binding a carrier to its asset:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>DNSSEC prevents an emblem from being moved to another name, and binding each facet and ciphertext to its emblem prevents mixing them between emblems.
Nothing in the DNS data, however, binds a physical label, tag, or badge to the asset it is attached to: a label can be copied onto another item, and a badge scanned at one checkpoint can be relayed to someone else.
Possible approaches include a key held in the tag or badge that answers a validator's challenge (which works offline), and a salted digest of a photograph or other attribute shown on the carrier, which a person compares without the emblem revealing whose it is.
Neither addresses a stolen carrier, which needs removal of the emblem and checks by the people at the scene.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Recipients not known at issuance:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Encryption to named recipients (<xref target="confidentiality"/>) works where a profile can name its recipients' roles in advance.
It does not by itself reach a party that was not foreseen, such as the customs authority of a country to which a flight is diverted.
Options include keys held for a role or region by an organization that recipients trust (a policy question more than a protocol one), re-encryption to new recipients in a dynamic facet when plans change, and disclosure by the issuer on request (which identifies the validator to the issuer).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Long offline periods:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Offline bundles expire with their shortest signature lifetime, including those of the root and TLD zones (<xref target="offline"/>).
Options for journeys longer than those lifetimes include validators preferring their own cached upper chain to the bundle's, trust anchors closer to issuers so that the issuer controls the relevant signature lifetimes, re-bundling at transshipment points, and profiles that accept validation as of a past time where that suffices.
Larger post-quantum signatures add to the pressure to anchor closer to issuers.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Revocation for offline validators:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Online validators learn of removal from authenticated denial of existence (<xref target="lifecycle"/>).
Offline validators cannot, so a removed emblem in a bundle remains acceptable until its signatures expire.
A signed status list of revoked emblems (as digests), carried with the validator's trust anchors, would help where revocation must be prompt (a stolen badge, for example), but publishing such a list defeats the purpose of removal where the aim is to stop being findable, as it may be under IHL.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Visual mark mismatch:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>When a visual mark's digest does not match the digest in the endorsement (<xref target="marks"/>), the interim behavior is that the mark is not authorized while the emblem and its data remain valid.
Validators must not present such a mark as authorized and should tell the person that it is not, rather than silently omitting it, and must keep "mark not authorized" visibly distinct from "emblem invalid", so that a protected site does not appear unprotected.
The digest is computed over the image octets as published in the mark facet, before any transfer compression and without canonicalization.
The alternative of treating a mismatch as invalidating the emblem is open, and profiles may be stricter.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Hiding the act of validation:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The baseline of <xref target="undetectable"/> (large shared resolvers without client subnet information, encrypted transports, caching, and self-contained emblems with stapled endorsements) hides who is validating, but not that someone is, from an issuer that watches its own authoritative server.
Hiding the act itself needs the query that retrieves an emblem to be one that ordinary clients make anyway; candidate techniques, such as carrying the emblem in a record clients already request, constrain where emblems can be published and are not yet worked out.
The interim behavior is the baseline, and a profile that needs more says so in its threat model.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>DNSSEC provides integrity and origin authentication for emblem data only if validators actually validate.
Validators must perform DNSSEC validation themselves, or use a resolver they trust over a secure channel, and must treat bogus emblem data as absent.
Unsigned emblem data must also be treated as absent unless the profile permits unvalidated emblems, in which case it carries no assurance of origin or integrity.</t>
      <t>An emblem is a statement by a zone holder.
Validators must not infer authorization from publication; where a profile requires authorization, the validator must validate the endorsement as well.
Lookalike and typosquatted domains are not addressed by DNSSEC; endorsements (or a validator's own list of known issuers) mitigate them, and cross-check identifiers on the asset add a further check.</t>
      <t>Removal is bounded by signature lifetimes and caching, and passive DNS collection means that removed emblems may remain known.
Profiles with removability requirements must account for both.</t>
      <t>Encrypted values protect confidentiality, but metadata remains visible: the emblem name, the profile, the size of the ciphertext, and the timing of queries.
Where a value's size is itself sensitive, the profile can fix its length or require padding before encryption.
Unguessable labels, with compact denial or NSEC3 rather than plain NSEC, reduce enumeration risk.</t>
      <t>Full audits of hierarchical emblems cause many queries; offline bundles and caching mitigate this, and profiles should state what depth of validation they expect.</t>
      <t>Citations of a treatment's legal basis (<xref target="treatment"/>) are compared and displayed, never dereferenced as part of validation, so an emblem cannot direct validators to fetch from a third party.</t>
      <t>Validity checks depend on time.
A validator whose clock is wrong, or can be set back by an attacker, will accept expired signatures and replayed emblems, which matters most for offline validators.</t>
      <t>Validators that display images supplied by issuers face two risks: the image may mislead a person (a lookalike mark, or a mark that contradicts the emblem's data), and the image format may attack the software that renders it.
Validators should display only visual marks that meet the conditions of <xref target="marks"/>, render them with a restricted renderer, and never let a visual mark override the emblem's data.</t>
      <t>As with physical emblems, displaying a digital emblem may increase an asset's risk in some contexts.
Profiles should consider this when specifying discovery and removal.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>Emblems are published so that they can be read, and the privacy questions concern who learns what beyond the emblem's intended content <xref target="RFC6973"/>.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Validators:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Each query reveals interest in an asset to the validator's resolver and, through the resolver, to the issuer's authoritative servers and to any authorizing entity whose endorsement is queried.
For some profiles this is harmless; for others the pattern of inspections is itself sensitive.
<xref target="undetectable"/> describes the available mitigations and their limits.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Issuers:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An issuer's emblem names can reveal its inventory, its customers, or its operations.
Enumeration of a zone (by NSEC walking) or of an authorizing entity's endorsements exposes them in bulk, which unguessable labels and enumeration-resistant denial address (<xref target="confidentiality"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Assets that are people:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t><xref target="DIEM-REQS"/> includes people among the assets an emblem can mark.
An emblem name that stays fixed is a persistent identifier: anyone who scans it once can recognize the person later, link sightings, and watch whether the emblem is still published.
Profiles that mark people should use unguessable names that change on a schedule suited to the use case, keep personal data out of emblems or encrypt it, avoid publishing location in plaintext, and avoid cross-references that link one person's emblems together.
The issuer can observe where and when a person's emblem is validated, and a profile should say whether that is intended.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Encrypted values:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Encryption hides content but not size, timing, or the set of recipients a profile defines.
A value encrypted to a recipient today may be read by anyone who obtains that recipient's key later, and emblems are retained by caches, passive DNS collectors, and validators long after removal (<xref target="lifecycle"/>).
Profiles should not encrypt data whose later disclosure would be harmful unless that risk is acceptable.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.
A specification realizing it would request the EMBLEM and ENDORSE RRTypes and create registries for common map keys, profile identifiers, and code-list identifiers.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
      <name>Informative References</name>
      <reference anchor="DIEM-REQS">
        <front>
          <title>Digital Emblems - Use Cases and Requirements</title>
          <author fullname="Rahel Fainchtein" initials="R. A." surname="Fainchtein">
            <organization>JHU/APL</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Felix Linker" initials="F." surname="Linker">
         </author>
          <author fullname="Alex Rosenberg" initials="A." surname="Rosenberg">
            <organization>Veridigo</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Casey Deccio" initials="C." surname="Deccio">
            <organization>Brigham Young University</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Allison Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin">
            <organization>Packet Clearing House</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   Digital emblems allow an issuer to signal that an asset should be
   protected or treated in a specific way, using some normative
   framework.  This document lists the requirements and use cases that
   an architecture for digital emblems must accommodate.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-diem-requirements-05"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.woodcock-faltstrom-external-registry-rrtypes">
        <front>
          <title>External-Registry DNS Resource Record Types: UNECE and ISO</title>
          <author fullname="Bill Woodcock" initials="B." surname="Woodcock">
            <organization>PCH</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Patrik Fältström" initials="P." surname="Fältström">
            <organization>Netnod</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="9" month="September" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   This document defines two DNS resource record types, UNECE and ISO,
   which convey numeric values paired with codes drawn from registries
   maintained by external standards organizations: the United Nations
   Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the International
   Organization for Standardization.  Neither proposed RRTYPE duplicates
   the external registries into IANA registries; each carries codes
   verbatim and uses the semantics defined by the external maintainer.
   The document specifies presentation and wire formats for both types,
   records the assignment of two decimal RRTYPE identifiers under the
   Expert Review process of BCP 42, and suggests a common design pattern
   that may serve as a model for future RRTYPEs seeking to make external
   registries usable from the DNS without duplication.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-woodcock-faltstrom-external-registry-rrtypes-01"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.brand-indicators-for-message-identification">
        <front>
          <title>Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI)</title>
          <author fullname="Seth Blank" initials="S." surname="Blank">
            <organization>Valimail</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Peter Goldstein" initials="P." surname="Goldstein">
            <organization>Valimail</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Thede Loder" initials="T." surname="Loder">
            <organization>Skye Logicworks LLC</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Terry Zink" initials="T." surname="Zink">
         </author>
          <author fullname="Jemma Bradshaw" initials="J." surname="Bradshaw">
            <organization>Fastmail</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Alex Brotman" initials="A." surname="Brotman">
            <organization>Comcast</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Wei Chuang" initials="W." surname="Chuang">
            <organization>Google</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="31" month="October" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI) permits Domain
   Owners to coordinate with Mail User Agents (MUAs) to display brand-
   specific Indicators next to properly authenticated messages.  There
   are two aspects of BIMI coordination: a scalable mechanism for Domain
   Owners to publish their desired Indicators, and a mechanism for Mail
   Transfer Agents (MTAs) to verify the authenticity of the Indicator.
   This document specifies how Domain Owners communicate their desired
   Indicators through the BIMI Assertion Record in DNS and how that
   record is to be interpreted by MTAs and MUAs.  MUAs and mail-
   receiving organizations are free to define their own policies for
   making use of BIMI data and for Indicator display as they see fit.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-brand-indicators-for-message-identification-15"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.svg-tiny-ps-abrotman">
        <front>
          <title>SVG Tiny Portable/Secure</title>
          <author fullname="Alex Brotman" initials="A." surname="Brotman">
            <organization>Comcast, Inc</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="J. Trent Adams" initials="J. T." surname="Adams">
            <organization>Proofpoint, Inc</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="31" month="October" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   This document specifies SVG Tiny Portable/Secure (SVG Tiny PS) -- A
   Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) profile to be used with documents that
   are intended for use with more secure requirements, and in some
   cases, in conjunction with a limited rendering engine.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-svg-tiny-ps-abrotman-13"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="CHARTER" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-diem/01/">
        <front>
          <title>Digital Emblems</title>
          <author>
            <organization/>
          </author>
          <date year="2025" month="May" day="27"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC1876">
        <front>
          <title>A Means for Expressing Location Information in the Domain Name System</title>
          <author fullname="C. Davis" initials="C." surname="Davis"/>
          <author fullname="P. Vixie" initials="P." surname="Vixie"/>
          <author fullname="T. Goodwin" initials="T." surname="Goodwin"/>
          <author fullname="I. Dickinson" initials="I." surname="Dickinson"/>
          <date month="January" year="1996"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This memo defines a new DNS RR type for experimental purposes. This RFC describes a mechanism to allow the DNS to carry location information about hosts, networks, and subnets. This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1876"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1876"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC3597">
        <front>
          <title>Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record (RR) Types</title>
          <author fullname="A. Gustafsson" initials="A." surname="Gustafsson"/>
          <date month="September" year="2003"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>Extending the Domain Name System (DNS) with new Resource Record (RR) types currently requires changes to name server software. This document specifies the changes necessary to allow future DNS implementations to handle new RR types transparently. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3597"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3597"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC4033">
        <front>
          <title>DNS Security Introduction and Requirements</title>
          <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
          <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
          <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
          <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
          <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
          <date month="March" year="2005"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System. This document introduces these extensions and describes their capabilities and limitations. This document also discusses the services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide. Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the documents that collectively describe DNSSEC. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4033"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4033"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC4034">
        <front>
          <title>Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions</title>
          <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
          <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
          <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
          <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
          <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
          <date month="March" year="2005"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of resource records and protocol modifications that provide source authentication for the DNS. This document defines the public key (DNSKEY), delegation signer (DS), resource record digital signature (RRSIG), and authenticated denial of existence (NSEC) resource records. The purpose and format of each resource record is described in detail, and an example of each resource record is given.</t>
            <t>This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4034"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4034"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC4035">
        <front>
          <title>Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions</title>
          <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
          <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
          <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
          <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
          <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
          <date month="March" year="2005"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of new resource records and protocol modifications that add data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS. This document describes the DNSSEC protocol modifications. This document defines the concept of a signed zone, along with the requirements for serving and resolving by using DNSSEC. These techniques allow a security-aware resolver to authenticate both DNS resource records and authoritative DNS error indications.</t>
            <t>This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4035"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4035"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC4501">
        <front>
          <title>Domain Name System Uniform Resource Identifiers</title>
          <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
          <date month="May" year="2006"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document defines Uniform Resource Identifiers for Domain Name System resources. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4501"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4501"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC4592">
        <front>
          <title>The Role of Wildcards in the Domain Name System</title>
          <author fullname="E. Lewis" initials="E." surname="Lewis"/>
          <date month="July" year="2006"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This is an update to the wildcard definition of RFC 1034. The interaction with wildcards and CNAME is changed, an error condition is removed, and the words defining some concepts central to wildcards are changed. The overall goal is not to change wildcards, but to refine the definition of RFC 1034. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4592"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4592"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC5890">
        <front>
          <title>Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework</title>
          <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/>
          <date month="August" year="2010"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document is one of a collection that, together, describe the protocol and usage context for a revision of Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA), superseding the earlier version. It describes the document collection and provides definitions and other material that are common to the set. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5890"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5890"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC5646">
        <front>
          <title>Tags for Identifying Languages</title>
          <author fullname="A. Phillips" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Phillips"/>
          <author fullname="M. Davis" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Davis"/>
          <date month="September" year="2009"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes the structure, content, construction, and semantics of language tags for use in cases where it is desirable to indicate the language used in an information object. It also describes how to register values for use in language tags and the creation of user-defined extensions for private interchange. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="47"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5646"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5646"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC6698">
        <front>
          <title>The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA</title>
          <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
          <author fullname="J. Schlyter" initials="J." surname="Schlyter"/>
          <date month="August" year="2012"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>Encrypted communication on the Internet often uses Transport Layer Security (TLS), which depends on third parties to certify the keys used. This document improves on that situation by enabling the administrators of domain names to specify the keys used in that domain's TLS servers. This requires matching improvements in TLS client software, but no change in TLS server software. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6698"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6698"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC6895">
        <front>
          <title>Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations</title>
          <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
          <date month="April" year="2013"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document specifies Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) parameter assignment considerations for the allocation of Domain Name System (DNS) resource record types, CLASSes, operation codes, error codes, DNS protocol message header bits, and AFSDB resource record subtypes. It obsoletes RFC 6195 and updates RFCs 1183, 2845, 2930, and 3597.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="42"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6895"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6895"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC6973">
        <front>
          <title>Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols</title>
          <author fullname="A. Cooper" initials="A." surname="Cooper"/>
          <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
          <author fullname="B. Aboba" initials="B." surname="Aboba"/>
          <author fullname="J. Peterson" initials="J." surname="Peterson"/>
          <author fullname="J. Morris" initials="J." surname="Morris"/>
          <author fullname="M. Hansen" initials="M." surname="Hansen"/>
          <author fullname="R. Smith" initials="R." surname="Smith"/>
          <date month="July" year="2013"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document offers guidance for developing privacy considerations for inclusion in protocol specifications. It aims to make designers, implementers, and users of Internet protocols aware of privacy-related design choices. It suggests that whether any individual RFC warrants a specific privacy considerations section will depend on the document's content.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6973"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6973"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7553">
        <front>
          <title>The Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) DNS Resource Record</title>
          <author fullname="P. Faltstrom" initials="P." surname="Faltstrom"/>
          <author fullname="O. Kolkman" initials="O." surname="Kolkman"/>
          <date month="June" year="2015"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes the already registered DNS resource record (RR) type, called the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) RR, that is used for publishing mappings from hostnames to URIs.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7553"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7553"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7858">
        <front>
          <title>Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title>
          <author fullname="Z. Hu" initials="Z." surname="Hu"/>
          <author fullname="L. Zhu" initials="L." surname="Zhu"/>
          <author fullname="J. Heidemann" initials="J." surname="Heidemann"/>
          <author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin"/>
          <author fullname="D. Wessels" initials="D." surname="Wessels"/>
          <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
          <date month="May" year="2016"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide privacy for DNS. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates opportunities for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries in the network, such as discussed in RFC 7626. In addition, this document specifies two usage profiles for DNS over TLS and provides advice on performance considerations to minimize overhead from using TCP and TLS with DNS.</t>
            <t>This document focuses on securing stub-to-recursive traffic, as per the charter of the DPRIVE Working Group. It does not prevent future applications of the protocol to recursive-to-authoritative traffic.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7858"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7858"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7901">
        <front>
          <title>CHAIN Query Requests in DNS</title>
          <author fullname="P. Wouters" initials="P." surname="Wouters"/>
          <date month="June" year="2016"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document defines an EDNS0 extension that can be used by a security-aware validating resolver configured to use a forwarding resolver to send a single query, requesting a complete validation path along with the regular query answer. The reduction in queries potentially lowers the latency and reduces the need to send multiple queries at once. This extension mandates the use of source-IP- verified transport such as TCP or UDP with EDNS-COOKIE, so it cannot be abused in amplification attacks.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7901"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7901"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8484">
        <front>
          <title>DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)</title>
          <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
          <author fullname="P. McManus" initials="P." surname="McManus"/>
          <date month="October" year="2018"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document defines a protocol for sending DNS queries and getting DNS responses over HTTPS. Each DNS query-response pair is mapped into an HTTP exchange.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8484"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8484"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8610">
        <front>
          <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title>
          <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
          <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/>
          <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
          <date month="June" year="2019"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8624">
        <front>
          <title>Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC</title>
          <author fullname="P. Wouters" initials="P." surname="Wouters"/>
          <author fullname="O. Sury" initials="O." surname="Sury"/>
          <date month="June" year="2019"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>The DNSSEC protocol makes use of various cryptographic algorithms in order to provide authentication of DNS data and proof of nonexistence. To ensure interoperability between DNS resolvers and DNS authoritative servers, it is necessary to specify a set of algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidelines to ensure that there is at least one algorithm that all implementations support. This document defines the current algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance for DNSSEC. This document obsoletes RFC 6944.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8624"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8624"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8949">
        <front>
          <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
          <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
          <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
          <date month="December" year="2020"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t>
            <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9052">
        <front>
          <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
          <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
          <date month="August" year="2022"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
            <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9102">
        <front>
          <title>TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension</title>
          <author fullname="V. Dukhovni" initials="V." surname="Dukhovni"/>
          <author fullname="S. Huque" initials="S." surname="Huque"/>
          <author fullname="W. Toorop" initials="W." surname="Toorop"/>
          <author fullname="P. Wouters" initials="P." surname="Wouters"/>
          <author fullname="M. Shore" initials="M." surname="Shore"/>
          <date month="August" year="2021"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes an experimental TLS extension for the in-band transport of the complete set of records that can be validated by DNSSEC and that are needed to perform DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) of a TLS server. This extension obviates the need to perform separate, out-of-band DNS lookups. When the requisite DNS records do not exist, the extension conveys a denial-of-existence proof that can be validated.</t>
            <t>This experimental extension is developed outside the IETF and is published here to guide implementation of the extension and to ensure interoperability among implementations.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9102"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9102"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9156">
        <front>
          <title>DNS Query Name Minimisation to Improve Privacy</title>
          <author fullname="S. Bortzmeyer" initials="S." surname="Bortzmeyer"/>
          <author fullname="R. Dolmans" initials="R." surname="Dolmans"/>
          <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
          <date month="November" year="2021"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes a technique called "QNAME minimisation" to improve DNS privacy, where the DNS resolver no longer always sends the full original QNAME and original QTYPE to the upstream name server. This document obsoletes RFC 7816.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9156"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9156"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9180">
        <front>
          <title>Hybrid Public Key Encryption</title>
          <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
          <author fullname="K. Bhargavan" initials="K." surname="Bhargavan"/>
          <author fullname="B. Lipp" initials="B." surname="Lipp"/>
          <author fullname="C. Wood" initials="C." surname="Wood"/>
          <date month="February" year="2022"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes a scheme for hybrid public key encryption (HPKE). This scheme provides a variant of public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key. It also includes three authenticated variants, including one that authenticates possession of a pre-shared key and two optional ones that authenticate possession of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) private key. HPKE works for any combination of an asymmetric KEM, key derivation function (KDF), and authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) encryption function. Some authenticated variants may not be supported by all KEMs. We provide instantiations of the scheme using widely used and efficient primitives, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF), and SHA2.</t>
            <t>This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9180"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9180"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9230">
        <front>
          <title>Oblivious DNS over HTTPS</title>
          <author fullname="E. Kinnear" initials="E." surname="Kinnear"/>
          <author fullname="P. McManus" initials="P." surname="McManus"/>
          <author fullname="T. Pauly" initials="T." surname="Pauly"/>
          <author fullname="T. Verma" initials="T." surname="Verma"/>
          <author fullname="C.A. Wood" initials="C.A." surname="Wood"/>
          <date month="June" year="2022"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes a protocol that allows clients to hide their IP addresses from DNS resolvers via proxying encrypted DNS over HTTPS (DoH) messages. This improves privacy of DNS operations by not allowing any one server entity to be aware of both the client IP address and the content of DNS queries and answers.</t>
            <t>This experimental protocol has been developed outside the IETF and is published here to guide implementation, ensure interoperability among implementations, and enable wide-scale experimentation.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9230"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9230"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9250">
        <front>
          <title>DNS over Dedicated QUIC Connections</title>
          <author fullname="C. Huitema" initials="C." surname="Huitema"/>
          <author fullname="S. Dickinson" initials="S." surname="Dickinson"/>
          <author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin"/>
          <date month="May" year="2022"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes the use of QUIC to provide transport confidentiality for DNS. The encryption provided by QUIC has similar properties to those provided by TLS, while QUIC transport eliminates the head-of-line blocking issues inherent with TCP and provides more efficient packet-loss recovery than UDP. DNS over QUIC (DoQ) has privacy properties similar to DNS over TLS (DoT) specified in RFC 7858, and latency characteristics similar to classic DNS over UDP. This specification describes the use of DoQ as a general-purpose transport for DNS and includes the use of DoQ for stub to recursive, recursive to authoritative, and zone transfer scenarios.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9250"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9250"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9364">
        <front>
          <title>DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)</title>
          <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
          <date month="February" year="2023"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes the DNS Security Extensions (commonly called "DNSSEC") that are specified in RFCs 4033, 4034, and 4035, as well as a handful of others. One purpose is to introduce all of the RFCs in one place so that the reader can understand the many aspects of DNSSEC. This document does not update any of those RFCs. A second purpose is to state that using DNSSEC for origin authentication of DNS data is the best current practice. A third purpose is to provide a single reference for other documents that want to refer to DNSSEC.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="237"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9364"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9364"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9460">
        <front>
          <title>Service Binding and Parameter Specification via the DNS (SVCB and HTTPS Resource Records)</title>
          <author fullname="B. Schwartz" initials="B." surname="Schwartz"/>
          <author fullname="M. Bishop" initials="M." surname="Bishop"/>
          <author fullname="E. Nygren" initials="E." surname="Nygren"/>
          <date month="November" year="2023"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document specifies the "SVCB" ("Service Binding") and "HTTPS" DNS resource record (RR) types to facilitate the lookup of information needed to make connections to network services, such as for HTTP origins. SVCB records allow a service to be provided from multiple alternative endpoints, each with associated parameters (such as transport protocol configuration), and are extensible to support future uses (such as keys for encrypting the TLS ClientHello). They also enable aliasing of apex domains, which is not possible with CNAME. The HTTPS RR is a variation of SVCB for use with HTTP (see RFC 9110, "HTTP Semantics"). By providing more information to the client before it attempts to establish a connection, these records offer potential benefits to both performance and privacy.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9460"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9460"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9499">
        <front>
          <title>DNS Terminology</title>
          <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
          <author fullname="K. Fujiwara" initials="K." surname="Fujiwara"/>
          <date month="March" year="2024"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>The Domain Name System (DNS) is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document.</t>
            <t>This document updates RFC 2308 by clarifying the definitions of "forwarder" and "QNAME". It obsoletes RFC 8499 by adding multiple terms and clarifications. Comprehensive lists of changed and new definitions can be found in Appendices A and B.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="219"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9499"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9499"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9824">
        <front>
          <title>Compact Denial of Existence in DNSSEC</title>
          <author fullname="S. Huque" initials="S." surname="Huque"/>
          <author fullname="C. Elmerot" initials="C." surname="Elmerot"/>
          <author fullname="O. Gudmundsson" initials="O." surname="Gudmundsson"/>
          <date month="September" year="2025"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes a technique to generate a signed DNS response on demand for a nonexistent name by claiming that the name exists but doesn't have any data for the queried record type. Such responses require only one minimally covering NSEC or NSEC3 record, allow online signing servers to minimize signing operations and response sizes, and prevent zone content disclosure.</t>
            <t>This document updates RFCs 4034 and 4035.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9824"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9824"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9276">
        <front>
          <title>Guidance for NSEC3 Parameter Settings</title>
          <author fullname="W. Hardaker" initials="W." surname="Hardaker"/>
          <author fullname="V. Dukhovni" initials="V." surname="Dukhovni"/>
          <date month="August" year="2022"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>NSEC3 is a DNSSEC mechanism providing proof of nonexistence by asserting that there are no names that exist between two domain names within a zone. Unlike its counterpart NSEC, NSEC3 avoids directly disclosing the bounding domain name pairs. This document provides guidance on setting NSEC3 parameters based on recent operational deployment experience. This document updates RFC 5155 with guidance about selecting NSEC3 iteration and salt parameters.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="236"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9276"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9276"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7871">
        <front>
          <title>Client Subnet in DNS Queries</title>
          <author fullname="C. Contavalli" initials="C." surname="Contavalli"/>
          <author fullname="W. van der Gaast" initials="W." surname="van der Gaast"/>
          <author fullname="D. Lawrence" initials="D." surname="Lawrence"/>
          <author fullname="W. Kumari" initials="W." surname="Kumari"/>
          <date month="May" year="2016"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>This document describes an Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0) option that is in active use to carry information about the network that originated a DNS query and the network for which the subsequent response can be cached. Since it has some known operational and privacy shortcomings, a revision will be worked through the IETF for improvement.</t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7871"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7871"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-cose-hpke">
        <front>
          <title>Use of Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)</title>
          <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
            <organization>University of the Bundeswehr Munich</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
            <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Orie Steele" initials="O." surname="Steele">
            <organization>Tradeverifyd</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Ajitomi, Daisuke" initials="A." surname="Daisuke">
            <organization>bibital LLC</organization>
          </author>
          <author fullname="Laurence Lundblade" initials="L." surname="Lundblade">
            <organization>Security Theory LLC</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="12" month="September" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   This specification defines hybrid public-key encryption (HPKE) for
   use with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE).  HPKE offers a
   variant of public-key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a
   recipient public key.

   HPKE is a general encryption framework utilizing an asymmetric key
   encapsulation mechanism (KEM), a key derivation function (KDF), and
   an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm.

   This document defines the use of HPKE with COSE.  Authentication for
   HPKE in COSE is provided by COSE-native security mechanisms or by the
   pre-shared key authenticated variant of HPKE.

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-cose-hpke-27"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals">
        <front>
          <title>Concise Diagnostic Notation (CDN)</title>
          <author fullname="Carsten Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann">
            <organization>Universität Bremen TZI</organization>
          </author>
          <date day="31" month="October" year="2026"/>
          <abstract>
            <t>   This document formalizes and consolidates the definition of the
   Concise Diagnostic Notation (CDN) of the Concise Binary Object
   Representation (CBOR), addressing implementer experience.

   Replacing CDN's previous informal descriptions, it updates RFC 8949,
   obsoleting its Section 8, and RFC 8610, obsoleting its Appendix G.

   It also specifies registry-based extension points and uses them to
   support text representations such as of epoch-based dates/times and
   of IP addresses and prefixes.


   // (This cref will be removed by the RFC editor:) This revision -29
   // attempts to implement various change requests not covered in -28
   // that have been discussed in the 2026-08-19 and 2026-09-30 WG
   // interim meetings, but does not attempt to reflect the outcome of
   // those discussions.  The text also does not have WG input yet on
   // any renaming decisions (CDN name, b1/t1 name).

            </t>
          </abstract>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-cbor-edn-literals-29"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="UNECE20" target="https://unece.org/trade/uncefact/cl-recommendations">
        <front>
          <title>Recommendation No. 20: Codes for Units of Measure Used in International Trade</title>
          <author>
            <organization>United Nations Economic Commission for Europe</organization>
          </author>
          <date>n.d.</date>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="ISO3166" target="https://www.iso.org/iso-3166-country-codes.html">
        <front>
          <title>ISO 3166 -- Country Codes</title>
          <author>
            <organization>International Organization for Standardization</organization>
          </author>
          <date>n.d.</date>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="ISO4217" target="https://www.iso.org/iso-4217-currency-codes.html">
        <front>
          <title>ISO 4217 -- Currency Codes</title>
          <author>
            <organization>International Organization for Standardization</organization>
          </author>
          <date>n.d.</date>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="ISPM15" target="https://www.ippc.int/en/publications/640/">
        <front>
          <title>ISPM 15: Regulation of wood packaging material in international trade</title>
          <author>
            <organization>International Plant Protection Convention</organization>
          </author>
          <date>n.d.</date>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="HS" target="https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview.aspx">
        <front>
          <title>Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System</title>
          <author>
            <organization>World Customs Organization</organization>
          </author>
          <date>n.d.</date>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="UNMODELREGS" target="https://unece.org/transport/dangerous-goods/un-model-regulations-rev-24">
        <front>
          <title>UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations</title>
          <author>
            <organization>United Nations</organization>
          </author>
          <date>n.d.</date>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="VCDR" target="https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf">
        <front>
          <title>Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations</title>
          <author>
            <organization/>
          </author>
          <date year="1961"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="API" target="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977">
        <front>
          <title>Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)</title>
          <author>
            <organization/>
          </author>
          <date year="1977"/>
        </front>
      </reference>
    </references>
    <?line 1189?>

<section anchor="encoded">
      <name>Encoded Example</name>
      <t>The ISPM 15 emblem of <xref target="ex-logistics"/>, encoded as the strawman describes (<xref target="strawman"/>), is 59 octets.
In CBOR diagnostic notation with the integer map keys and enumerated values that an encoding uses (the comments give the names used in this document, and the numbers are illustrative):</t>
      <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
{
  1 / profile /: 5 / ispm15 /,
  2 / asset /: "p-20261031-0042._diem.pallets.example",
  -1 / country /: "VN",
  -2 / producer /: "000123",
  -3 / measure /: "HT"
}
]]></sourcecode>
      <t>As a resource record in the generic presentation format of <xref target="RFC3597"/> (EMBLEM has no type code, so a private-use type number stands in):</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
p-20261031-0042._diem.pallets.example. 3600 IN TYPE65280 \# 59 (
    a50105027825702d3230323631303331
    2d303034322e5f6469656d2e70616c6c
    6574732e6578616d706c652062564e21
    6630303031323322624854 )
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" removeInRFC="true" anchor="changes-from-draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-02">
      <name>Changes from draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-02</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Defined the subject of an emblem: the asset named by the <tt>asset</tt> map key, which may be a person, place, or thing, physical or digital.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Allowed several profiles for one asset (one record per profile), with validators skipping profiles and map keys they do not understand.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Allowed issuer-defined map keys, named under a domain the issuer controls.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Distinguished issuer authorization from validator authorization, and allowed an emblem to carry several endorsements.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Generalized hierarchy to digital and mixed assets, using explicit references (relative within an issuer) instead of deriving names, and reworked the logistics example accordingly.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added required facets and an indeterminate validation result, and evaluation at a single time for validators that combine records.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Clarified recipients, ciphertext binding, and optional salted plaintext digests in confidentiality, and that the <tt>_diem</tt> delegation is operational.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Revised offline clock and shelf-life text, and noted that a live query is the status check for removal.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Let profiles choose exact decimals or floating point per map key.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added an Open Issues section and an encoded example.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Terminology: "map key", "external code", and "delegation".</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" removeInRFC="true" anchor="changes-from-draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-01">
      <name>Changes from draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-01</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Fixed some known errata and made minor touchups.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" removeInRFC="true" anchor="changes-from-draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-00">
      <name>Changes from draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture-00</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Adopted DNSSEC as the integrity layer, replacing application-layer hashing of emblem records.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Replaced "signed" and "informational" fields with static and dynamic facets in separate RRsets.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Replaced the Merkle-tree hierarchy with DNS naming plus cross-zone references with optional digests.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added typed keys and external code lists as value types.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added treatment (requested actions with an open legal basis) as a common key.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added visual marks, displayed only when endorsed or canonical.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added endorsement (as RRsets in the authorizing entity's zone, queried or stapled), confidentiality, offline bundles, lifecycle, and undetectable validation sections.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added what a profile specifies, and an outline of validation common to all profiles.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added Privacy Considerations.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added a strawman EMBLEM encoding using deterministic CBOR.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added worked examples for IHL, logistics and customs, diplomatic pouches, and peacekeeping.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The author thanks the participants of the DIEM working group for their drafts and comments, and Rohan Mahy for a detailed review of -01, including the suggestion of salted plaintext digests.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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