Independent Submission R. Sharif Internet-Draft CyberSecAI Ltd Intended status: Informational 18 November 2026 Expires: 22 May 2027 The MARS Rating: Machine-Adversary Resistance to Autonomous AI Attack draft-sharif-mars-rating-03 Abstract This document defines MARS (Machine-Adversary Resistance), an open rating, from 0 to 5, of how well a defended asset resists an autonomous artificial-intelligence adversary: an attacker that performs reconnaissance, exploitation, adaptation and propagation at machine speed and scale with no human in the loop. MARS is not a control catalogue and not a maturity model. It is a resistance rating, scored on five axes that describe adversary capabilities -- the ability to Learn a surface, Reuse a success, Scale by automation, Outpace a defence, and sPread from a foothold -- plus a requirement for tamper-evident, independently verifiable evidence at the highest levels. Because the axes are defined as adversary capabilities rather than specific technologies, MARS applies to any asset an AI can attack. This document specifies the threat model, the five axes, the rating scale, the assessment tiers, the assessment method, the evidence requirement, and a profile mechanism by which the invariant rubric is interpreted for any deployment substrate. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1.1. The Problem 1.2. What MARS Is and Is Not 1.3. Design Principle: Axes Are Adversary Capabilities 1.4. Relationship to Existing Work 2. Conventions and Definitions 3. The Autonomous AI Adversary 4. The Five Axes 4.1. L -- Learn 4.2. R -- Reuse 4.3. S -- Scale 4.4. O -- Outpace 4.5. P -- sPread 5. Evidence (E) 6. The Rating Scale 7. Assessment Tiers 8. Assessment Method (MRA) 9. Scoring and Expression 10. Profiles 11. Security Considerations 12. IANA Considerations 13. References Appendix A. Profile Library (initial) Appendix B. Worked Fleet Example Appendix C. Changes in This Revision Author's Address 1. Introduction 1.1. The Problem Attack tooling is becoming autonomous. Frameworks now chain reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploit synthesis, credential abuse and lateral movement into a single self-directed loop that runs at machine speed, retries without fatigue, and parallelises across many targets. A defence posture that was adequate against a human operator -- who is slow, tires, and attacks one thing at a time -- can fail completely against an adversary that does not. Existing security frameworks answer "which controls are present and how mature is the programme". None of them answer the question this document addresses: "how well does this asset RESIST an autonomous AI attacker, as a measured, comparable number". MARS is that number. 1.2. What MARS Is and Is Not MARS IS a 0-to-5 resistance rating of a single defended asset against a defined autonomous AI adversary, scored on five capability axes and gated by evidence. MARS IS NOT a control catalogue, a maturity model, a compliance checklist, a product certification, or a score of an organisation. It rates an ASSET (a service, an API, a device, an agent, a data store, a perimeter zone), not a company. 1.3. Design Principle: Axes Are Adversary Capabilities The durability of a rating depends entirely on what its axes measure. A rating whose axes are specific controls ("employs moving-target defence") dates as technology changes and fails on substrates where that control has no meaning. MARS axes are defined as ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES -- what the attacker can or cannot DO to the asset. Capabilities are substrate-independent, so a single rubric scores a web API, an industrial controller, an autonomous agent, a database and a smart contract without amendment. The per- substrate interpretation is supplied by a PROFILE (Appendix A); the axes themselves do not change. 1.4. Relationship to Existing Work MARS is complementary to control frameworks and risk methodologies: an operator uses those to decide WHAT to deploy, and MARS to measure how much RESISTANCE the result actually delivers against an autonomous adversary. MARS deliberately reuses mature, independently available technology categories (software-defined perimeters, runtime shielding, micro-segmentation, fleet detection and response, moving-target defence) so that a high rating is an achievable target rather than a single-vendor gate. 2. Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Asset: the single defended thing being rated. Autonomous AI adversary: see Section 3. Surface: the EXPLOITABLE interface of the asset -- the endpoints, parameters, state transitions and privileged actions an adversary must discover to act. Published content that the asset is designed to reveal is not part of the surface. Request: the unit of interaction an adversary captures and attempts to reuse (an HTTP request, a protocol command, a signed transaction, a tool call). Foothold: an initial position from which an adversary attempts to propagate. MRA (Machine-adversary Resistance Assessment): the procedure in Section 8. Ledger: an append-only, hash-chained, tamper-evident record of measurements and control actions. 3. The Autonomous AI Adversary MARS scores resistance against an adversary with the following assumed capabilities. An assessment MUST exercise the asset with an agent that approximates them. 1. Self-directed loop: reconnaissance -> enumeration -> exploitation -> propagation, adapting its next action on observed results, with no human in the loop. 2. Machine speed: issues, observes and adjusts far faster than a human operator. 3. Tireless retry: does not fatigue; repeats and varies attempts indefinitely. 4. Automation and parallelism: replicates its attack across many attempts, identities or targets at marginal cost. 5. Reuse: captures a successful artefact (a mapped endpoint, a valid request, a working exploit) and attempts to replay or generalise it. 6. Learning: accumulates observations over time and attempts to converge on the asset's patterns. 7. Assumed breach: MAY begin from a position INSIDE the perimeter -- malware delivered by email or a poisoned dependency, a phished credential, or a compromised build pipeline -- rather than only at the edge. 8. Targeting the defence: MAY attack the control that provides the resistance (disable it, patch it to do nothing, or replace it with a fake) rather than only the application it protects. 9. Riding a trusted client: MAY compromise or ride a legitimate client that already holds a valid identity, rather than defeating the control directly. 10. Interposing on the path: MAY attempt to BECOME the control, by manipulating name resolution, routing, or certificate issuance, so the client speaks to the adversary instead of the genuine control. This adversary is the fixed reference against which all five axes are scored. 4. The Five Axes Each axis is scored by how fully the asset DENIES the corresponding adversary capability. Each is summarised below and measured per Section 8. 4.1. L -- Learn (resist reconnaissance) L measures whether reconnaissance yields REUSABLE EXPLOIT ADVANTAGE against the asset. L is NOT a measure of whether the asset's address or published content is secret. Content the asset is designed to reveal (marketing pages, open documentation, a public contract interface, a well-known service name) is not counted against L. L is scored on the EXPLOITABLE surface: what an adversary must discover to act. An asset MAY be fully disclosed and still score high on L if knowing it confers no reusable path to exploitation. Disclosure-tolerant assets -- those that MUST reveal their interface -- are scored on L as "does knowing the full interface bring the adversary measurably closer to a win?", and carry their resistance on the remaining axes and on non-exploitability-when-fully-known (for example, formally verified logic or capability confinement). Assessor test: if the adversary is handed a complete map of the asset, how much closer to a win is it? None or little -> L is strong even though nothing is hidden. 4.2. R -- Reuse (resist replay and generalisation) R measures whether a captured success can be reused. A captured request, credential or exploit that works a second time, or generalises to other instances, is an R failure. Full R: every captured artefact is dead on reuse -- for example through non- replayable per-request authentication, surfaces that move between capture and replay, silent or backported patching that leaves nothing to weaponise, and implementation diversity. 4.3. S -- Scale (resist economy of scale) S measures whether the adversary gains ECONOMY OF SCALE by automating or parallelising the attack: whether attacker cost per additional attempt FALLS while defender cost per additional attempt holds or rises. S applies to a SINGLE target -- does a bot swarm overwhelm one asset, or do reflexive rate-limiting, challenge and auto-rotation make the thousandth attempt cost more than the first -- AND to a FLEET: does one detection on any node raise cost across the whole estate. Full S: automation confers no advantage; the adversary's marginal cost rises. 4.4. O -- Outpace (resist adaptation over time) O measures whether the asset can be outpaced: whether a learning adversary can converge on its patterns, or whether the defence responds in-interaction and keeps moving with real entropy so convergence never completes. Full O: enforcement occurs within the interaction (rotate, revoke, challenge mid-request) and the non- stationarity cannot be learned. 4.5. P -- sPread (resist propagation) P measures BLAST RADIUS from an initial foothold -- how far a compromise propagates before containment. Propagation includes lateral movement from node to node AND privilege or data propagation inside a single system (a foothold on a front end reaching a database; a leaked credential reaching beyond its intended scope). P applies to a single system -- is the foothold confined, or does it reach assets of value -- AND to a fleet -- are there zero lateral hops. Full P: a foothold is contained at its point of entry and reaches nothing of value, through per-identity segmentation and instant revocation. 5. Evidence (E) The five axes describe resistance. EVIDENCE describes whether that resistance is known to HOLD, continuously and verifiably, rather than asserted. Evidence is the difference between "we believe it resists" and "we can prove it resisted, today". An asset provides evidence when every relevant measurement and control action is written to a tamper-evident ledger; when an MRA- conforming adversary is run against the asset on a defined cadence; and when the ledger is exposed to an INDEPENDENT verifier who re- walks and co-signs it. Evidence is REQUIRED for the top of the scale (Section 6) and is the final gate between a self-attested and a certified rating. 6. The Rating Scale A MARS rating is an integer from 0 to 5, reflecting the WEAKEST applicable axis, with the top two levels additionally gated by evidence. MARS 0 -- None. The asset is enumerable, its requests replayable, and it is static. An autonomous adversary maps and exploits it with no resistance. MARS 1 -- Minimal. One axis offers partial resistance; the asset still falls to a straightforward autonomous attack. MARS 2 -- Partial. Some axes resist, but a clear exploitable path remains. MARS 3 -- Substantial (black-box ceiling). The asset resists Learn, Reuse and Outpace such that an EXTERNAL, unauthenticated adversary cannot map, replay or outpace it. Scale and sPread are not observable from outside; MARS 3 is the maximum achievable from a Tier 0 assessment (Section 7). MARS 4 -- Strong (cooperative). All five axes resist under a Tier 1 assessment: even an adversary holding a valid identity cannot learn or reuse the surface, automation gains no economy of scale, the asset cannot be outpaced, and a foothold does not spread. Requires Tier 1. MARS 5 -- Adaptive and Provable. MARS 4 PLUS continuous, independently verified evidence (Tier 2): the resistance is measured continuously against a current adversary baseline, recorded to a tamper-evident ledger, and co-signed by an independent verifier. A self-attested MARS 5 (operator-run Tier 1 with a ledger but no independent co-signature) MUST be expressed as "MARS 5 (self-attested)" and is not a certified 5. A rating applies to one asset at one time. For a zone composed of several assets, the zone rating is the MINIMUM over its externally reachable components: one unmoved, unproven component caps the zone. Defense integrity (gate on MARS 4 and 5). A control earns MARS 4 or 5 only if it is fail-closed, tamper-evident and authentic: disabling it makes the protected asset UNREACHABLE rather than exposed; a change to its code or configuration breaks a continuously attested self-measurement and quarantines the zone; and it runs under an attested identity so it cannot be impersonated by a substitute. A zone whose control can be silently switched off, patched to no-op, or replaced from inside CANNOT be MARS 4 or higher, whatever its axis scores. This closes the insider path: the resistance is only as real as the integrity of the thing providing it. Defense integrity extends beyond the sidecar. The same bar applies to the control plane that issues keys, seeds and revocations (it MUST fail-closed, be attested, and gate its own critical actions behind separation of duties and out-of-band approval), and to the keys themselves (held in a hardware root of trust, rotatable and revocable, never recoverable in software). A control MUST refuse an older validly-signed version (anti-rollback). Automated enforcement (rate-limiting, revocation, banning) MUST be keyed on an AUTHENTICATED signal: a control that penalises a principal by an unauthenticated, spoofable attribute can be turned into a denial-of-service weapon against legitimate users, and does not meet this gate. The evidence record MUST be live and complete, not merely internally consistent: a silenced or truncated ledger MUST be detectable through heartbeat liveness and an external append-only anchor, so that absence of evidence is never read as good news. A software signature over a release is necessary but not sufficient; build provenance is required, because a validly-signed artefact may still carry a poisoned dependency. 7. Assessment Tiers The tier states how deeply the asset was assessed and bounds the achievable rating. Tier 0 -- Black-box. Unauthenticated, external. Observes L, R and O only. Caps at MARS 3. Tier 1 -- Cooperative / fleet. The assessor holds valid identities and fleet visibility and can exercise all five axes. Required to certify MARS 4 and 5. Tier 2 -- Continuous evidence. A Tier 1 assessment run on a defined cadence, recorded to a tamper-evident ledger and co-signed by an independent verifier. Required for a certified MARS 5. 8. Assessment Method (MRA) A Machine-adversary Resistance Assessment (MRA) exercises the asset with an agent approximating the adversary of Section 3 and measures each applicable axis. The measurements below are the normative minimum; a profile (Appendix A) supplies the substrate-specific interpretation of "surface", "request", "moving", "scale" and "spread". 1. L: drive reconnaissance against the asset using a vocabulary that includes the real surface verbatim where known. Measure the count of REAL exploitable elements the adversary recovers. Responses that are shared-shape across many distinct probes, or whose values are non-stationary noise, are decoys and MUST NOT be counted as real. Zero real elements recovered is full L. 2. R: capture a successful artefact (a request or credential), then attempt to reuse it after any rotation window. Reuse that reproduces the original effect is an R failure. 3. O: capture the asset's state, wait a defined interval or trigger the defence, and re-measure. The SURFACE must have moved (element gone, or shape changed) -- a changed dynamic value such as a timestamp does NOT count as movement. 4. S: issue automated, parallel attempts and measure whether marginal attacker cost falls or rises. At fleet scope, trigger one detection and measure whether cost rises across the estate (for example, a fleet-wide re-key and identity quarantine). 5. P: establish a foothold and attempt to propagate -- laterally and by privilege or data reach. Measure the number of hops and whether any asset of value is reached. Zero reach is full P. 6. E: record every measurement and control action to the ledger; verify the chain; for Tier 2, submit it to an independent verifier. Every MRA MUST record its target, tier, date, adversary profile, per-axis measurements and resulting rating to the ledger. 9. Scoring and Expression A rating is expressed as a single string carrying the number, tier, scope and date, for example: MARS 3, MRA-1, Tier 0, as of 2026-11-18 (black-box; S,P not assessed) MARS 5, Tier 1 (cooperative/fleet), as of 2026-11-18 (self- attested) MARS 5, Tier 2, as of 2026-11-18 (independently verified) The expression MUST state the tier and whether the top level is self-attested or independently verified, so that a reader cannot mistake one for the other. 10. Profiles Coverage of any substrate is delivered by a PROFILE: a short mapping of what surface, request, moving, scale and spread mean for that substrate, with a worked example. The axes, scale, tiers and method are invariant; the profile only interprets them. A new use case is a new profile, never a new axis. Appendix A provides an initial library. 11. Security Considerations MARS is a security rating; its production and publication have security implications. An MRA exercises real attack behaviour and MUST only be run against assets the assessor is authorised to test. A published rating reveals information about an asset's defensive posture; operators SHOULD treat low ratings as sensitive. A rating is a point-in-time measurement against a stated adversary baseline; because adversary capability advances, ratings MUST carry a date and SHOULD be re-validated when the baseline materially advances. A self-attested rating depends on the honesty of the operator-run MRA; independent verification (Tier 2) exists precisely to remove that dependence, and a certified MARS 5 MUST NOT be claimed without it. Assessment integrity. A rating is only as strong as the adversary it was tested against. An MRA MUST state the adversary baseline version it used, and a baseline MUST define a minimum capability (Section 3) so that a rating cannot be inflated by testing against a weak attacker. A system that behaves differently under assessment than in production, or that detects an assessor and changes behaviour, is non-conformant; continuous and unpredictable assessment (Tier 2) exists to catch this. A rating MUST declare the boundary of the asset it covers, so that a hardened component cannot be presented as a rating of the whole system. A rating is point-in-time: configuration drift after assessment can silently lower real resistance, so a date is REQUIRED and continuous evidence (Tier 2) is the only form that tracks drift. Side channels. Identical response bodies are not sufficient to deny Learn. Timing, response size, error differentials and transport fingerprints can distinguish a real surface from a decoy; an assessment of L and O SHOULD include these channels. 12. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. A future revision MAY request a registry for MARS profiles and for adversary baseline versions. 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . 13.2. Informative References [MARS] Sharif, R., "MARS: Machine-Adversary Resistance Rating", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24341963, 2026, . Appendix A. Profile Library (initial) Each profile interprets the five axes for one substrate. Format: surface / request / moving / scale / spread / what caps it / worked example. A.1. Public Web and API Surface: the API endpoints, parameters, admin and state-changing actions behind the public pages. The published pages themselves are not surface. Request: an HTTP request, including any session token. Moving: per-identity, per-cycle route and parameter aliasing on the API; anonymous visitors receive an ephemeral, signed, short-lived per-session token at the edge so a captured request cannot be replayed. Scale: edge bot-management and reflexive rate-limiting so a swarm's marginal cost rises; CDN/edge fleet re-key on detection. Spread: the web tier is segmented from data; a front-end foothold reaches no raw data store directly. What caps it: a guessable admin or data endpoint (L); a replayable API request (R). Worked example: a homepage served to everyone while an MRA with the real route names verbatim recovers zero real API endpoints and every captured call is dead next cycle. A.2. AI Agent as the Asset Surface: the agent's tools, memory, system prompt and guardrails -- what an adversary must learn to misuse it. Request: a prompt, tool invocation or injected instruction. Moving: rotating and constraining tool scopes and prompts; per- session capability tokens so a working injection does not generalise. Scale: resistance to automated prompt-variation swarms; one detection constrains the fleet of agent instances. Spread: a compromised agent cannot pivot to its tools, data, or other agents beyond a confined scope (delegation attenuation, per-tool identity). What caps it: a reusable jailbreak (R); an agent that, once subverted, reaches every tool (P). Worked example: an injected instruction succeeds once, is logged, the capability is revoked fleet-wide, and the same injection fails on every other instance. A.3. OT / ICS / SCADA Surface: reachable commands, registers and set-points on controllers and gateways. Request: a protocol command (for example a write to a coil or register). Moving: identity-gated, non-replayable command authorisation at a protocol-aware sidecar or gateway; the command surface is not enumerable from the network. Scale: one detection quarantines the offending identity across the cell; automated scanning gains nothing. Spread: per-device identity and cell segmentation; a compromised engineering station reaches zero actuators outside its authorised scope. What caps it: an enumerable, replayable command interface (L, R); flat networks (P). Worked example: a captured valid command does not re-apply after rotation, and a foothold on one gateway reaches no second cell. A.4. Cloud IAM / Control Plane Surface: the permissions, roles and API actions an identity can discover and assume. Request: an API call under a credential or assumed role. Moving: short-lived, non-replayable credentials; just-in-time, scoped role issuance so standing privilege is minimal and moves. Scale: anomalous automation across the account raises cost and triggers containment; one detection re-keys and quarantines fleet-wide. Spread: least-privilege and boundary segmentation so an assumed role reaches no further role or data than intended; instant revocation. What caps it: long-lived reusable keys (R); over-broad roles enabling privilege escalation (P). Worked example: a leaked credential expires before reuse and can assume no role beyond its scope; the access is revoked across the account on first anomaly. Appendix B. Worked Fleet Example A mesh of six services, each behind a moving-target sidecar, with a fleet control plane and a tamper-evident ledger, assessed at Tier 1: o L: an MRA firing every real route name verbatim recovers 0 real endpoints across the mesh (only decoys). o R: a captured morphed URL returns not-found after one rotation. o O: the surface auto-rotates under the attacker. o S: one honeypot detection on one service re-keys all six services and quarantines the attacking identity across the mesh. o P: a stolen, still-signed identity achieves zero footholds on any of the other services. o E: every control action and measurement is hash-chained; the chain verifies. Result: MARS 5, Tier 1, self-attested. A certified MARS 5 requires an independent verifier to co-sign the ledger (Tier 2). Appendix C. Changes in This Revision o Learn (L) redefined as exploit advantage rather than secrecy of the name, covering disclosure-tolerant and public-by-design assets. o Scale (S) and sPread (P) redefined at the capability level so they apply to single-instance assets, not only fleets. o Tiers 0/1/2 and the self-attested vs independently verified distinction made explicit. o Profile mechanism and an initial profile library added (Appendix A). o Threat model extended to an assumed-breach insider (Section 3, items 7 and 8) and to an adversary that targets the defence itself, not only the application. o Defense Integrity added as a gate on MARS 4 and 5 (fail-closed, tamper-evident, authentic) in Section 6. o Threat model further extended with client-riding and path- interposition adversary capabilities (Section 3, items 9 and 10). o Defense Integrity extended to the control plane and keys, anti- rollback, authenticated enforcement signals (so the defence cannot be used as a denial-of-service weapon against legitimate users), evidence liveness and external anchoring (so a silenced or truncated ledger is detected), and build provenance. o Assessment Integrity and side-channel considerations added (Security Considerations): adversary baseline versioning, anti- gaming, scope declaration, and rating drift. Author's Address Raza Sharif CyberSecAI Ltd London United Kingdom Email: contact@agentsign.dev