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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-tulshi-oauth-transactional-access-tokens-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Transactional Access Tokens">Transactional Access Tokens</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-tulshi-oauth-transactional-access-tokens-01"/>
    <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale">
      <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
      <address>
        <email>atul.tulshibagwale@crowdstrike.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="18"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Web Authorization Protocol</workgroup>
    <keyword>OAuth</keyword>
    <keyword>access token</keyword>
    <keyword>transaction token</keyword>
    <keyword>rich authorization requests</keyword>
    <keyword>AI agents</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 69?>

<t>OAuth 2.0 access tokens are typically scoped to a session rather than
to a transaction. They carry no transaction identifier and no context
beyond scope. This document defines Transactional Access Tokens: a
profile of JSON Web Token (JWT) access tokens that carries a
transaction identifier and authorization server-granted transaction
context, has a very short lifetime, and is audienced to a single
resource server. Transaction context is requested and conveyed using
OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests. Transactional Access Tokens
align with the claims and semantics of OAuth Transaction Tokens, so
that transaction context can flow from the authorization server to a
resource server and onward into that resource server's trust domain.
A primary use case is task-scoped authorization of AI agents, where
the authorization server makes a fresh policy decision for each
transaction.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tulshi-oauth-transactional-access-tokens/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Web Authorization Protocol Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:oauth@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/"/>.
      </t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 86?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>OAuth 2.0 <xref target="RFC6749"/> access tokens represent an authorization grant
for a session. Access token lifetimes are often short, but the
authority behind them is durable: a client holding a refresh token or
client credential can obtain new access tokens without any
per-transaction decision by the authorization server (AS). Access
tokens convey what the client may do (typically via <tt>scope</tt>), but they
do not convey why, in what transaction, or under what context.</t>
      <t>OAuth Transaction Tokens <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/> (Txn-Tokens) address a related
problem inside a trust domain. A Txn-Token is short-lived, carries a
transaction identifier (<tt>txn</tt>) and transaction context, and is
audienced to the trust domain rather than to any single workload.
Txn-Tokens are not intended for use across trust domain boundaries,
and a resource server outside the trust domain that issued a Txn-Token
receives none of that context.</t>
      <t>Transaction context therefore needs to travel over several kinds of
hop, each addressed by a different specification:</t>
      <table>
        <name>Transaction Context Across Hops</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Hop</th>
            <th align="left">Specification</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Inside an application, between its workloads</td>
            <td align="left">Transaction Tokens <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Across enterprises</td>
            <td align="left">Transaction Token Chaining Profile <xref target="CHAINING-PROFILE"/> with Identity and Authorization Chaining <xref target="ID-CHAINING"/></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">From an AS or identity provider to an application (resource server)</td>
            <td align="left">Transactional Access Tokens (this document)</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t>This document defines Transactional Access Tokens (Txn-ATs). A Txn-AT is an
OAuth access token, based on the JWT access token profile <xref target="RFC9068"/>,
that also carries the transaction identifier and context semantics of
a Txn-Token. Unlike a Txn-Token, a Txn-AT is audienced to a single
resource server. Unlike the Chaining Profile, which starts from a
Txn-Token that already exists inside a trust domain, a Txn-AT starts
at the AS, for a client outside the application. The two compose: an
AS participating in a chained flow can itself issue a Txn-AT to the
resource server it serves (<xref target="chaining"/>).</t>
      <t>Clients request transaction context, and the AS conveys the context it
grants, using OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests (RAR) <xref target="RFC9396"/>.
This document defines an <tt>authorization_details</tt> type that carries the
transaction context (<xref target="txn-details"/>). An AS that already supports RAR
reuses its existing request handling and policy to issue Txn-ATs.</t>
      <t>Txn-ATs provide the following benefits:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Resource servers receive AS-granted transaction context, not only
scope.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A client, such as an AI agent authorized for a specific task, can
be issued a token bounded to that task, with no more durable
permission than the task requires. The AS evaluates policy for
every transaction and can deny any individual transaction, placing
the AS in control of each authorization decision.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The transaction identifier and context can be carried from the
resource server into its own trust domain via Txn-Tokens
(<xref target="txn-token-interop"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>In the model defined here, consent and client authority are durable,
while tokens are per-transaction.</t>
      <section anchor="examples">
        <name>Examples</name>
        <t>The following examples illustrate the flow. An AI agent holding a
token for a user obtains a Txn-AT for one resource server, then a
second Txn-AT for another resource server in the same transaction.
The elements shown are defined in the sections that follow. Line
breaks within values are for display purposes only.</t>
        <section anchor="ex-token-exchange-new">
          <name>Token Exchange Request (New Transaction)</name>
          <sourcecode type="http-message"><![CDATA[
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIs...

grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3A
  token-exchange
&requested_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3A
  token-type%3Atxn_access_token
&subject_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...
&subject_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3A
  token-type%3Aaccess_token
&actor_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...
&actor_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3A
  token-type%3Ajwt
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.example.net
&authorization_details=%5B%7B%22type%22%3A%22transaction%22%2C
  %22task%22%3A%22summarize_invoices%22%2C
  %22period%22%3A%222026-Q3%22%2C
  %22actions%22%3A%5B%22read%22%5D%7D%5D
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The <tt>authorization_details</tt> parameter, decoded:</t>
          <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
[
  {
    "type": "transaction",
    "task": "summarize_invoices",
    "period": "2026-Q3",
    "actions": ["read"]
  }
]
]]></sourcecode>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ex-token-response">
          <name>Token Response</name>
          <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "access_token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJ0eG5hdCtqd3QiLCJhbGci...",
  "issued_token_type":
    "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_access_token",
  "token_type": "DPoP",
  "expires_in": 60,
  "txn_handle": "th_9Qm2xVb7LkP0sR4tYw8eZa"
}
]]></sourcecode>
        </section>
        <section anchor="decoded-txn-at">
          <name>Decoded Txn-AT</name>
          <t>Header:</t>
          <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "typ": "txnat+jwt",
  "alg": "ES256",
  "kid": "as-2026-09"
}
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>Payload:</t>
          <sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[
{
  "iss": "https://as.example.com",
  "aud": "https://api.example.net",
  "sub": "pw-5c1e9f0a2b",
  "client_id": "agent-7f3a",
  "iat": 1790560000,
  "exp": 1790560060,
  "jti": "0f8b6a4e-2d1c-4b7e-9a3f-6c5d4e3b2a10",
  "txn": "k3JdQ9vX2mPz7LwR5tYb8A",
  "authorization_details": [
    {
      "type": "transaction",
      "task": "summarize_invoices",
      "period": "2026-Q3",
      "actions": ["read"],
      "requester": {
        "authn": "private_key_jwt",
        "req_ip": "198.51.100.7"
      }
    }
  ],
  "act": {
    "sub": "agent-7f3a"
  },
  "cnf": {
    "jkt": "0ZcOCORZNYy-DWpqq30jZyJGHTN0d2HglBV3uiguA4I"
  }
}
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The AS granted the <tt>task</tt>, <tt>period</tt>, and <tt>actions</tt> fields as requested
and enriched the object with a <tt>requester</tt> field describing how the
client authenticated and from where.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ex-additional-tat-refresh">
          <name>Additional Txn-AT for the Same Transaction (Refresh Token Grant)</name>
          <sourcecode type="http-message"><![CDATA[
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIs...

grant_type=refresh_token
&refresh_token=rt_Hq4mN8vK2pXz
&requested_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3A
  token-type%3Atxn_access_token
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fbilling.example.org
&txn_handle=th_9Qm2xVb7LkP0sR4tYw8eZa
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The request omits <tt>authorization_details</tt>, so the AS carries forward
the transaction context it established for the transaction. The
resulting Txn-AT has <tt>aud</tt> set to <tt>https://billing.example.org</tt>, a
<tt>txn</tt> value that cannot be correlated with <tt>k3JdQ9vX2mPz7LwR5tYb8A</tt>,
and a transaction authorization details object that the AS has
evaluated for, and may have tailored to, the new audience.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>This document uses the terms "access token", "authorization server",
"client", "refresh token", and "resource server" defined in
<xref target="RFC6749"/>, the terms "authorization details" and "authorization
details type" defined in <xref target="RFC9396"/>, and the terms "Transaction
Token", "Txn-Token", "Transaction Token Service", "trust domain", and
"workload" defined in <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/>.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Transactional Access Token (Txn-AT):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An access token conforming to this specification.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Transaction:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A unit of work, such as an AI agent task, for which the AS makes an
authorization decision and which may span requests to one or more
resource servers.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Internal Transaction Identifier (ITID):</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A value generated by the AS that uniquely identifies a transaction.
The ITID is known only to the AS and is never disclosed to clients
or resource servers.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Transaction Handle:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An opaque value issued by the AS to a client, which the client uses
to request additional Txn-ATs for the same transaction.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Transaction Context:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The content of the transaction authorization details object
(<xref target="txn-details"/>) that the AS grants in a Txn-AT, after evaluating
the request against policy.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Overview</name>
      <figure>
        <name>Transactional Access Token Flow</name>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
+--------+  (1) Token Request             +---------------+
|        |  (resource=RS1, grant,         |               |
|        |   authorization_details)       |               |
|        |------------------------------->|               |
|        |  (2) Txn-AT (aud=RS1, txn=T1)  | Authorization |
|        |      + txn_handle              |    Server     |
|        |<-------------------------------|  (policy on   |
| Client |  (3) Token Request             | every request)|
|        |  (resource=RS2, txn_handle)    |               |
|        |------------------------------->|               |
|        |  (4) Txn-AT (aud=RS2, txn=T2)  |               |
|        |<-------------------------------|               |
|        |                                +---------------+
|        |  (5) Txn-AT (aud=RS1) +-----+   (7) Txn-Token
|        |---------------------->| RS1 |---> (txn=T1) ---> internal
|        |  (6) Txn-AT (aud=RS2) +-----+                  workloads
|        |---------------------->| RS2 |
+--------+                       +-----+
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>The client requests a Txn-AT for resource server RS1 using a
supported grant (<xref target="grants"/>). The request describes the
transaction in an <tt>authorization_details</tt> parameter
(<xref target="txn-details"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The AS evaluates the request against policy and issues a Txn-AT
audienced to RS1. The Txn-AT carries the granted, and possibly
enriched, transaction context in its <tt>authorization_details</tt>
claim, and a <tt>txn</tt> value derived for RS1. The AS also returns a
transaction handle.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>For the same transaction, the client requests a Txn-AT for RS2 and
presents the transaction handle.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The AS evaluates policy again and issues a Txn-AT audienced to RS2,
with a different <tt>txn</tt> value that cannot be correlated with the
value for RS1.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>and 6. The client presents each Txn-AT to its resource server.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A resource server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> exchange the Txn-AT for a Txn-Token within its
own trust domain (<xref target="txn-token-interop"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section anchor="token-format">
      <name>Token Format</name>
      <t>A Txn-AT is a JWT <xref target="RFC7519"/> that conforms to <xref target="RFC9068"/>, except as
modified by this section.</t>
      <section anchor="jose-header">
        <name>JOSE Header</name>
        <t>Txn-ATs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the <tt>typ</tt> header parameter with the value
<tt>txnat+jwt</tt>. This deviates from <xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9068"/>, which
requires <tt>at+jwt</tt>. The distinct type is intentional: it causes
resource servers that do not implement this specification to reject
Txn-ATs, rather than accept them as ordinary access tokens and ignore
their transactional semantics. It also prevents confusion between
Txn-ATs, ordinary JWT access tokens, and Txn-Tokens
(<xref target="token-confusion"/>). Whether this benefit outweighs the ability to
reuse existing RAR deployments unchanged is an open question
(<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="claims">
        <name>Claims</name>
        <t>The following claims are used in Txn-ATs. Claims not listed here <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be
included as permitted by <xref target="RFC9068"/>, subject to
<xref target="privacy-considerations"/>.</t>
        <table>
          <name>Txn-AT Claims</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Claim</th>
              <th align="left">Requirement</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>iss</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">As defined in <xref target="RFC9068"/>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>aud</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">Identifier of exactly one resource server. <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a single string value.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>sub</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">As defined in <xref target="RFC9068"/>. See <xref target="privacy-considerations"/> regarding pairwise identifiers.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>client_id</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">As defined in <xref target="RFC9068"/>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>iat</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">As defined in <xref target="RFC9068"/>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>exp</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">See <xref target="lifetime"/>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>jti</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">Unique per token. <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be derived from the ITID.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>txn</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">Transaction identifier, as defined in <xref section="2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8417"/> and generated per <xref target="txn-generation"/>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>authorization_details</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">Granted authorization details, as defined in <xref section="9" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>. <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain exactly one transaction authorization details object (<xref target="txn-details"/>) and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain objects of other types. See <xref target="context"/>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>scope</tt></td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14></td>
              <td align="left">Scope granted for this transaction.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>act</tt></td>
              <td align="left">CONDITIONAL</td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> when the Txn-AT is issued via token exchange with an actor token, as defined in <xref target="RFC8693"/>.</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">
                <tt>cnf</tt></td>
              <td align="left">CONDITIONAL</td>
              <td align="left">
                <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> when the Txn-AT is sender-constrained.</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>Txn-ATs do not use the <tt>tctx</tt> and <tt>rctx</tt> claims defined in
<xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/>. The transaction context that those claims carry in a
Txn-Token is carried in a Txn-AT by the transaction authorization
details object. <xref target="txn-token-interop"/> describes how a Transaction
Token Service maps one to the other.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="txn-generation">
        <name>Transaction Identifier Generation</name>
        <t>When the AS begins a new transaction, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> generate an ITID with at
least 128 bits of entropy.</t>
        <t>The <tt>txn</tt> value in each Txn-AT <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> satisfy the following requirements:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the same for all Txn-ATs issued for the same transaction and
the same audience.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be different for different audiences in the same
transaction.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> allow any party other than the AS to determine whether
two <tt>txn</tt> values with different audiences belong to the same
transaction.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> disclose the ITID.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Any method satisfying the requirements above is acceptable, such as a
random value per audience with a mapping table stored at the AS. For
one possible construction using keyed derivation, see
<xref target="itid-generation"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="txn-details">
        <name>Transaction Authorization Details Type</name>
        <t>This document defines an authorization details type, as specified in
<xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>, that describes a transaction. The <tt>type</tt>
field of a transaction authorization details object has the value
<tt>transaction</tt>.</t>
        <ul empty="true">
          <li>
            <t>Note: the type identifier and the set of fields defined below are
provisional. See <xref target="open-issues"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>In addition to <tt>type</tt>, a transaction authorization details object <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
contain the following fields:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the common data fields <tt>locations</tt>, <tt>actions</tt>, <tt>datatypes</tt>,
<tt>identifier</tt>, and <tt>privileges</tt>, with the semantics defined in
<xref section="2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>. If <tt>locations</tt> is present in a Txn-AT,
every value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> identify the resource server named by <tt>aud</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>requester</tt>: a JSON object containing context about the requesting
client and the circumstances of the request, as observed by the
AS, for example the client authentication method used. Clients
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include this field in a request; the AS adds it by
enrichment (<xref target="context"/>). The AS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use the member names
defined for the <tt>rctx</tt> claim in <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/> where they apply;
and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>any other field defined by the deployment or by a profile of this
document, such as a task name, a purpose, a time period, or
evidence that a human approved the transaction.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The fields of a transaction authorization details object other than
<tt>type</tt> are determined by the AS. The resource server <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat
the presence of a field as evidence of anything other than that the
AS granted it.</t>
        <t>An AS that supports Txn-ATs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> list <tt>transaction</tt> in the
<tt>authorization_details_types_supported</tt> metadata parameter
(<xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="context">
        <name>Transaction Context</name>
        <t>Clients describe the transaction they intend to perform by including a
transaction authorization details object in the <tt>authorization_details</tt>
request parameter (<xref target="request-parameters"/>). The AS evaluates the
requested object against policy, as it would any authorization details
request, and conveys the result in the <tt>authorization_details</tt> claim of
the Txn-AT.</t>
        <t>The AS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> grant less than was requested, as described in
<xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>. The AS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also enrich the granted object
with information the client did not supply, as described in
<xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>. Enrichment is how the AS asserts context
that only it can know or has verified, such as:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the authenticated subject's properties, such as authentication
time, method, and assurance level;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the client's registration metadata and authentication method, and
any client or workload attestation, conveyed in the <tt>requester</tt>
field;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>claims in a subject token or actor token, in token exchange flows;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>properties of the request environment that the AS observes, such as
the source network address; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the results of policy evaluation, such as limits that policy placed
on the transaction.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The AS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include a client-supplied field in the granted object
without first evaluating it against policy. Fields the AS does not
understand or cannot evaluate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be omitted or the request rejected.</t>
        <t>A transaction authorization details object in a Txn-AT therefore
represents, in a single structure, both what the client was granted
and what the AS asserts about the transaction. The resource server
relies on it being granted by the AS (<xref target="context-integrity"/>).</t>
        <t>The AS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include in the granted object only the context that the
audience resource server needs (<xref target="privacy-considerations"/>). Where a
transaction spans several resource servers, the AS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> grant a
different transaction authorization details object to each.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="lifetime">
        <name>Token Lifetime</name>
        <t>Txn-ATs are intended to be valid for about as long as a single
transaction.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The difference between <tt>exp</tt> and <tt>iat</tt> <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> exceed 300
seconds.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The AS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> choose the shortest lifetime compatible with the
expected duration of the transaction.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The AS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> issue a Txn-AT whose <tt>exp</tt> is later than the expiry of
the associated transaction handle, if one exists.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="token-request">
      <name>Token Request</name>
      <section anchor="grants">
        <name>Supported Grants</name>
        <t>Txn-ATs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be issued only at the token endpoint, using one of the
following grants:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Token Exchange <xref target="RFC8693"/>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the refresh token grant (<xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>); or</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the client credentials grant (<xref section="4.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The AS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> issue Txn-ATs directly from the authorization code grant.
Requiring user interaction such as consent or credential entry for
every transaction is unrealistic and would disrupt the user experience.
Instead, the authorization code grant <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used once to obtain user
consent and a refresh token, which the client then uses to request
Txn-ATs without further user involvement. The consent obtained in that
step bounds the transactions the client can later request
(<xref target="durable-consent"/>).</t>
        <t>The token exchange grant is used when the client holds a source token,
for example a token representing the user as the subject and the
client (such as an AI agent) as the actor.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="requesting-a-txn-at">
        <name>Requesting a Txn-AT</name>
        <t>To request a Txn-AT, the client includes the <tt>requested_token_type</tt>
parameter with the value
<tt>urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_access_token</tt>.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>With the token exchange grant, this parameter is used as defined in
<xref target="RFC8693"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>This document also permits this parameter with the refresh token and
client credentials grants, where it has the same meaning.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>If the client's registration metadata includes
<tt>transactional_access_tokens_required</tt> with the value <tt>true</tt>
(<xref target="client-metadata"/>), the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> issue only Txn-ATs to that client,
whether or not <tt>requested_token_type</tt> is present.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="request-parameters">
        <name>Request Parameters</name>
        <t>The following parameters apply to Txn-AT requests:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>resource:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>. Exactly one resource indicator, as defined in <xref target="RFC8707"/>,
identifying the resource server the Txn-AT is for. If the request
contains zero or more than one <tt>resource</tt> value, the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject
it with the <tt>invalid_target</tt> error. In token exchange requests, the
client <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> use the <tt>audience</tt> parameter. If it does use it,
the resulting audience <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> resolve to a single resource server.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>authorization_details:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>As defined in <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>. <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> when the request
begins a new transaction, in which case it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain exactly one
transaction authorization details object (<xref target="txn-details"/>) and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
contain objects of other types. <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> when the request includes
a <tt>txn_handle</tt>; if absent, the AS uses the transaction context
established when the transaction began, adjusted for the new
audience (<xref target="context"/>). If present, the transaction object <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
consistent with the existing transaction, as determined by the AS.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>txn_handle:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. A transaction handle previously issued to this client
(<xref target="txn-handle"/>). If present, the request is for an additional Txn-AT
in the existing transaction. If absent, the AS begins a new
transaction.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>scope:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>. As defined in <xref target="RFC6749"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Extension parameters:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The AS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> accept additional parameters as inputs to policy. The AS
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> copy their values into the granted transaction object
without evaluation (<xref target="context"/>).</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Malformed or unsupported authorization details are rejected as
specified in <xref target="RFC9396"/>, with the <tt>invalid_authorization_details</tt>
error. A request that is well formed but denied by policy is rejected
with <tt>transaction_denied</tt> (<xref target="errors"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="policy-evaluation">
        <name>Policy Evaluation</name>
        <t>The AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> evaluate policy for every Txn-AT request. The AS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> deny a
request even when the presented grant, credential, refresh token, or
transaction handle is valid.</t>
        <t>When the request includes a transaction handle, the AS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> enforce
transaction-level policy, for example:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>limiting the set of resource servers the transaction may access;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>limiting the number of Txn-ATs issued for the transaction;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>limiting the transaction's total duration; or</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>rejecting a transaction object that is inconsistent with the
transaction as it began.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>If the AS denies a request on policy grounds, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return the
<tt>transaction_denied</tt> error (<xref target="errors"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="txn-handle">
        <name>Transaction Handle</name>
        <t>When the AS begins a new transaction, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include a transaction
handle in the token response (<xref target="token-response"/>). The transaction
handle:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be opaque to the client and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain at least 128 bits of
entropy;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be bound to the client to which it was issued. The AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
reject a handle presented by a different client;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be bound to the transaction's subject. In token exchange
requests, the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject a handle if the subject of the
presented subject token differs from the transaction's subject;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be bound to the same key as the Txn-ATs, when Txn-ATs are
sender-constrained;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have an expiry set by the AS; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be included in any Txn-AT or otherwise disclosed to resource
servers.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>If the handle is unknown, expired, or fails any of the binding checks
above, the AS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> return the <tt>invalid_txn_handle</tt> error.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-response">
        <name>Token Response</name>
        <t>A successful response follows <xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC6749"/> and, for
token exchange, <xref section="2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8693"/>, with these additions:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The <tt>issued_token_type</tt> parameter, if present, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
<tt>urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_access_token</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The <tt>txn_handle</tt> parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be present when a new transaction
was started. It <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be present in responses for an existing
transaction.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The AS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include the <tt>authorization_details</tt> response
parameter, as described in <xref section="7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>, whenever the
granted transaction object differs from the one requested.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>In token exchange responses, the AS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include a refresh
token.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>In refresh token grant responses, the AS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> rotate the refresh
token as described in <xref target="RFC9700"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="errors">
        <name>Errors</name>
        <t>In addition to the errors defined in <xref target="RFC6749"/>, <xref target="RFC8693"/>,
<xref target="RFC8707"/>, and <xref target="RFC9396"/>, this document defines the following
token endpoint errors:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>invalid_txn_handle:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The transaction handle is unknown, expired, or not bound to this
client or subject.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>transaction_denied:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The AS denied the transaction based on policy.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="rs-processing">
      <name>Resource Server Processing</name>
      <t>A resource server that accepts Txn-ATs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate them as specified in
<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9068"/>, with the following modifications:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>The resource server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that the <tt>typ</tt> header is
<tt>txnat+jwt</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The resource server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that <tt>aud</tt> is a single value that
identifies itself.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The resource server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that <tt>txn</tt> is present.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The resource server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify that <tt>authorization_details</tt> is
present and contains exactly one transaction authorization details
object (<xref target="txn-details"/>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If the Txn-AT contains a <tt>cnf</tt> claim, the resource server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify
proof of possession, for example as specified in <xref target="RFC9449"/> or
<xref target="RFC8705"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The resource server <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept a Txn-Token (<tt>typ</tt> value
<tt>txntoken+jwt</tt>) as a Txn-AT.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>A resource server <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use the transaction authorization details
object in its own authorization decisions, as it would any granted
authorization details (<xref section="9" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>), and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> record
<tt>txn</tt> in audit logs.</t>
      <t>A resource server that requires Txn-ATs for a resource <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject
ordinary access tokens (<tt>typ</tt> value <tt>at+jwt</tt>) for that resource.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="txn-token-interop">
      <name>Interoperability with Transaction Tokens</name>
      <t>A resource server may call workloads within its own trust domain. In
that case, it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> obtain a Txn-Token from its Transaction Token
Service (TTS), rather than forwarding the Txn-AT, as follows:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The resource server presents the Txn-AT as the <tt>subject_token</tt>, with a
<tt>subject_token_type</tt> of
<tt>urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_access_token</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The TTS <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate the Txn-AT as specified in <xref target="rs-processing"/>,
including verifying that <tt>aud</tt> identifies the resource server
presenting it.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The TTS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set the Txn-Token's <tt>txn</tt> to the <tt>txn</tt> value from the
Txn-AT. This preserves correlation within the resource server's trust
domain without enabling correlation with other resource servers.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The TTS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> derive the Txn-Token's <tt>tctx</tt> claim from the
transaction authorization details object in the Txn-AT, and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
derive members of the Txn-Token's <tt>rctx</tt> claim from that object's
<tt>requester</tt> field, in each case subject to the TTS's own policy.
The TTS <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also use the <tt>request_context</tt> and <tt>request_details</tt>
parameters of the Txn-Token request (<xref section="11.1" sectionFormat="of" target="TXN-TOKENS"/>) as it normally would.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Workloads <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept a Txn-AT in place of a Txn-Token.</t>
      <section anchor="rs-tts-pop">
        <name>Sender-Constrained Txn-ATs</name>
        <t>When the Txn-AT is sender-constrained (<xref target="replay"/>), the resource
server verified the client's proof of possession before accepting it.
That verification does not travel with the token. The resource server
authenticates itself to the TTS (<xref section="11.5" sectionFormat="of" target="TXN-TOKENS"/>), but
that authentication proves only who is presenting the Txn-AT, not that
the client proved possession of the key in <tt>cnf</tt>.</t>
        <t>To let the TTS verify the client's presentation itself, the resource
server includes evidence of the original presentation in the Txn-Token
request. For a DPoP-bound Txn-AT, the evidence is the DPoP proof JWT
the client sent. The TTS then:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>verifies the proof's signature using the public key bound in the
Txn-AT's <tt>cnf</tt> claim;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>verifies that the proof's <tt>ath</tt> claim matches the presented Txn-AT;
and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>verifies that the proof's <tt>htu</tt> and <tt>htm</tt> claims name an endpoint
of the resource server identified by the Txn-AT's <tt>aud</tt> claim.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The TTS <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> rely on the resource server's own report of having
verified the proof. For mutual-TLS-bound Txn-ATs (<xref target="RFC8705"/>), the
TLS handshake cannot be re-verified by a third party; the resource
server's assertion that the client certificate matched the <tt>cnf</tt> claim
<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be recorded in the TTS's audit record, but it is a reported
assertion, not verified evidence.</t>
        <t>This document does not yet define the Txn-Token request parameter that
carries the presentation evidence (<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The security considerations of <xref target="RFC6749"/>, <xref target="RFC8693"/>, <xref target="RFC9068"/>,
<xref target="RFC9396"/>, <xref target="RFC9700"/>, and <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/> apply.</t>
      <section anchor="token-confusion">
        <name>Token Confusion</name>
        <t>Txn-ATs share claims with both JWT access tokens and Txn-Tokens, which
creates a risk of token confusion. The distinct <tt>typ</tt> value and a
single-valued <tt>aud</tt> claim mitigate this risk:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>resource servers reject Txn-Tokens, whose <tt>aud</tt> identifies a trust
domain and whose <tt>typ</tt> is <tt>txntoken+jwt</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>workloads reject Txn-ATs, whose <tt>typ</tt> is <tt>txnat+jwt</tt>; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>resource servers that do not implement this specification reject
Txn-ATs because of their <tt>typ</tt> value.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> validate both <tt>typ</tt> and <tt>aud</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="replay">
        <name>Replay</name>
        <t>A bearer Txn-AT can be replayed within its lifetime. This document
accepts that risk in exchange for keeping resource servers stateless,
and bounds it with a short lifetime (<xref target="lifetime"/>).</t>
        <t>Txn-ATs <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be sender-constrained using DPoP <xref target="RFC9449"/> or mutual TLS
<xref target="RFC8705"/>. Sender-constraining is especially important for AI
agents, where tokens may be exfiltrated through prompt injection or
tool misuse. Resource servers that need single-use semantics can track
<tt>jti</tt> values, but this document does not require it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="durable-credentials">
        <name>Durable Credentials</name>
        <t>The refresh tokens and client credentials used to obtain Txn-ATs remain
durable. The security benefit of Txn-ATs depends on the AS evaluating
policy for every request and being able to deny individual
transactions. An attacker who obtains such a credential can request
Txn-ATs, but remains subject to per-transaction policy. Refresh tokens
used to obtain Txn-ATs <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be sender-constrained or rotated as
described in <xref target="RFC9700"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="durable-consent">
        <name>Durable Consent</name>
        <t>When a user consents once (<xref target="grants"/>) and a client then performs
long-running or recurring activity on the user's behalf, the consent
can outlive the user's awareness of what the client is doing. Txn-ATs
do not remove this risk; they make each transaction visible to the AS
and subject to its policy. An AS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use that visibility: for
example, by bounding the transactions a given consent authorizes in
scope, resource servers, rate, or elapsed time; by requiring the
transaction object to name a purpose that policy can compare with the
consent; and by giving users a view of the transactions performed
under their consent and a way to withdraw it.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="transaction-handle-theft">
        <name>Transaction Handle Theft</name>
        <t>A stolen transaction handle alone does not allow an attacker to obtain
Txn-ATs, because the handle is bound to the client, and to the subject
and sender-constraining key where applicable (<xref target="txn-handle"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="context-integrity">
        <name>Context Integrity</name>
        <t>Resource servers rely on the transaction authorization details object
having been granted by the AS. A client can propose transaction
context, but the AS decides what is granted and never includes
unevaluated client input (<xref target="context"/>). A client therefore cannot
inject context into a Txn-AT. An AS that fails to follow this rule
would turn Txn-ATs into signed but unverified assertions. Enriched
fields such as <tt>requester</tt> are especially sensitive, because resource
servers may treat them as facts observed by the AS.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="itid-generation">
        <name>Generating Transaction Identifiers</name>
        <t>One way to generate <tt>txn</tt> values satisfying the requirements in
<xref target="txn-generation"/> is keyed derivation:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
txn = BASE64URL(HMAC-SHA-256(K_txn, ITID || UTF8(aud)))
]]></artwork>
        <t>where:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>K_txn</tt> is a secret key of at least 256 bits, known only to the AS
and used only for this purpose;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>ITID</tt> is the internal transaction identifier, which <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be of
fixed length for a given <tt>K_txn</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>aud</tt> is the value of the Txn-AT's <tt>aud</tt> claim;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>||</tt> denotes concatenation;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>HMAC is as defined in <xref target="RFC2104"/>; and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>BASE64URL is base64url encoding without padding.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The output <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be truncated to no fewer than 128 bits.</t>
        <t>Keyed derivation lets the AS recompute the <tt>txn</tt> value for any
transaction and audience without storing a mapping. The AS can
therefore correlate a transaction across resource servers for audit,
while no other party can. An AS that rotates <tt>K_txn</tt> needs to retain
retired keys, or record which key each transaction used, for as long
as it requires this audit capability.</t>
        <section anchor="compromise-of-ktxn">
          <name>Compromise of K_txn</name>
          <t>Disclosure of <tt>K_txn</tt> allows the holder, together with knowledge of
ITIDs, to correlate <tt>txn</tt> values across resource servers. It does not
allow forging Txn-ATs. Because ITIDs are never disclosed outside the AS,
correlating <tt>txn</tt> values additionally requires access to AS internal
state. The AS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> protect <tt>K_txn</tt> with the same rigor as its token
signing keys.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="clock-skew">
        <name>Clock Skew</name>
        <t>Short lifetimes increase sensitivity to clock skew. Resource servers
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> allow no more than a small leeway, such as 30 seconds, when
validating <tt>exp</tt> and <tt>iat</tt>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="transaction-correlation">
        <name>Transaction Correlation</name>
        <t>Per-audience <tt>txn</tt> values (<xref target="txn-generation"/>) prevent resource
servers from using <tt>txn</tt> to correlate a transaction across resource
servers. Only the AS can link a transaction across resource servers.
Cross-resource-server forensic analysis therefore requires the AS's
cooperation. This is an intentional trade-off.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="other-correlating-claims">
        <name>Other Correlating Claims</name>
        <t>Other claims can still enable correlation, even when <tt>txn</tt> values
differ:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><tt>sub</tt>: The AS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use pairwise subject identifiers per resource
server, similar to the pairwise identifiers defined in <xref target="OIDC"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>client_id</tt>: This claim is the same across resource servers.
Correlation of the client's activity is therefore inherent.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>jti</tt>: This claim <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be derived from the ITID or from <tt>txn</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><tt>authorization_details</tt>: The AS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include only the context the
audience resource server needs, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> avoid stable identifiers
that would enable correlation. A task name or identifier that is
the same in every Txn-AT of a transaction is itself a correlator;
the AS <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> vary or omit such values when granting objects to
different resource servers.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Timing: Tokens for the same transaction are issued close together
in time. Resource servers that collude may be able to correlate
transactions by timing. This residual risk is not addressed by this
document.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="as-as-observer">
        <name>AS as Observer</name>
        <t>The AS observes every transaction. AS operators <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> apply
retention limits and access controls to transaction records.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="operational-considerations">
      <name>Operational Considerations</name>
      <t>Issuing a token for every transaction places the AS on the critical
path of each transaction:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Token issuance latency adds directly to transaction latency.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>AS availability becomes critical to the resource servers that
require Txn-ATs.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Issuance volume scales with the number of transactions rather than
the number of sessions.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Deployments should plan for:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>low-latency policy evaluation</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>low-latency signing</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>regional or distributed AS deployment</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>capacity planning based on transaction rates, and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>If applicable, management of <tt>K_txn</tt>, including rotation and retention of retired
keys.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="media-type-registration">
        <name>Media Type Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following media type
<xref target="RFC6838"/> in the "Media Types" registry:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Type name: application</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Subtype name: txnat+jwt</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Required parameters: N/A</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Optional parameters: N/A</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Encoding considerations: binary. A Txn-AT is a JWT; JWT values are
encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may
be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of RFC XXXX.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Interoperability considerations: N/A</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Published specification: RFC XXXX</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Applications that use this media type: Applications that issue or
consume Transactional Access Tokens.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Fragment identifier considerations: N/A</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Additional information: N/A</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information: IETF
OAuth WG, oauth@ietf.org</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Intended usage: COMMON</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Restrictions on usage: none</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Author: IETF OAuth WG</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oauth-uri-registration">
        <name>OAuth URI Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following value in the "OAuth URI"
registry established by <xref target="RFC6749"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:txn_access_token</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Common Name: Transactional Access Token</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification Document: RFC XXXX</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oauth-parameters-registration">
        <name>OAuth Parameters Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following parameter in the "OAuth
Parameters" registry established by <xref target="RFC6749"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Parameter name: txn_handle</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Parameter usage location: token request, token response</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification document(s): RFC XXXX</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oauth-extensions-error-registration">
        <name>OAuth Extensions Error Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following values in the "OAuth
Extensions Error Registry" established by <xref target="RFC6749"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Name: invalid_txn_handle</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Usage Location: token error response</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Protocol Extension: Transactional Access Tokens</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification document(s): RFC XXXX</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Name: transaction_denied</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Usage Location: token error response</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Protocol Extension: Transactional Access Tokens</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification document(s): RFC XXXX</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oauth-authorization-server-metadata-registration">
        <name>OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following value in the "OAuth
Authorization Server Metadata" registry established by <xref target="RFC8414"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Metadata Name: transactional_access_tokens_supported</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Metadata Description: Boolean value indicating whether the AS
supports issuing Transactional Access Tokens.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification Document(s): RFC XXXX</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="client-metadata">
        <name>OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following value in the "OAuth
Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry established by
<xref target="RFC7591"/>:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Client Metadata Name: transactional_access_tokens_required</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Client Metadata Description: Boolean value indicating that the AS
issues only Transactional Access Tokens to this client.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification Document(s): RFC XXXX</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="iana-txn-details">
        <name>Authorization Details Type</name>
        <t><xref target="RFC9396"/> does not establish a registry for authorization details
types, and <xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/> places type registration out of
scope. This document therefore defines the <tt>transaction</tt> type
(<xref target="txn-details"/>) without an IANA action. Whether the identifier
should instead be a collision-resistant name, as recommended by
<xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/>, for example a URN registered in the
"OAuth URI" registry, is an open issue (<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2104">
          <front>
            <title>HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication</title>
            <author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>
            <author fullname="M. Bellare" initials="M." surname="Bellare"/>
            <author fullname="R. Canetti" initials="R." surname="Canetti"/>
            <date month="February" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2104"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2104"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6749">
          <front>
            <title>The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework</title>
            <author fullname="D. Hardt" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Hardt"/>
            <date month="October" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6749"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6749"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7519">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <date month="May" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7519"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8414">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <date month="June" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a metadata format that an OAuth 2.0 client can use to obtain the information needed to interact with an OAuth 2.0 authorization server, including its endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8414"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8414"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8417">
          <front>
            <title>Security Event Token (SET)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." role="editor" surname="Hunt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="W. Denniss" initials="W." surname="Denniss"/>
            <author fullname="M. Ansari" initials="M." surname="Ansari"/>
            <date month="July" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data structure. A SET describes statements of fact from the perspective of an issuer about a subject. These statements of fact represent an event that occurred directly to or about a security subject, for example, a statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on behalf of a subject. This specification is intended to enable representing security- and identity-related events. A SET is a JSON Web Token (JWT), which can be optionally signed and/or encrypted. SETs can be distributed via protocols such as HTTP.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8417"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8417"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8693">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="A. Nadalin" initials="A." surname="Nadalin"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="C. Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a protocol for an HTTP- and JSON-based Security Token Service (STS) by defining how to request and obtain security tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including security tokens employing impersonation and delegation.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8693"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8693"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8707">
          <front>
            <title>Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0</title>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies an extension to the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework defining request parameters that enable a client to explicitly signal to an authorization server about the identity of the protected resource(s) to which it is requesting access.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8707"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8707"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9068">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="V. Bertocci" initials="V." surname="Bertocci"/>
            <date month="October" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth 2.0 access tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format. Authorization servers and resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to issue and consume access tokens in an interoperable manner.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9068"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9068"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9396">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests</title>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <date month="May" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies a new parameter authorization_details that is used to carry fine-grained authorization data in OAuth messages.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9396"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9396"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TXN-TOKENS">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="Atul Tulshibagwale" initials="A." surname="Tulshibagwale">
              <organization>CrowdStrike</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Transaction Tokens (Txn-Tokens) are designed to maintain and
   propagate user identity, workload identity and authorization context
   throughout the Call Chain within a trusted domain during the
   processing of external requests (e.g. such as API calls) or requests
   initiated internally within the Trust Domain.  Txn-Tokens ensure that
   this context is preserved throughout the Call Chain thereby enhancing
   security and consistency in complex, multi-service architectures.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6838">
          <front>
            <title>Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures</title>
            <author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed"/>
            <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/>
            <author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." surname="Hansen"/>
            <date month="January" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines procedures for the specification and registration of media types for use in HTTP, MIME, and other Internet protocols. This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="13"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6838"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6838"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7591">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="J. Richer" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Richer"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="M. Machulak" initials="M." surname="Machulak"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hunt" initials="P." surname="Hunt"/>
            <date month="July" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This specification defines mechanisms for dynamically registering OAuth 2.0 clients with authorization servers. Registration requests send a set of desired client metadata values to the authorization server. The resulting registration responses return a client identifier to use at the authorization server and the client metadata values registered for the client. The client can then use this registration information to communicate with the authorization server using the OAuth 2.0 protocol. This specification also defines a set of common client metadata fields and values for clients to use during registration.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7591"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7591"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8705">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens</title>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes OAuth client authentication and certificate-bound access and refresh tokens using mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication with X.509 certificates. OAuth clients are provided a mechanism for authentication to the authorization server using mutual TLS, based on either self-signed certificates or public key infrastructure (PKI). OAuth authorization servers are provided a mechanism for binding access tokens to a client's mutual-TLS certificate, and OAuth protected resources are provided a method for ensuring that such an access token presented to it was issued to the client presenting the token.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8705"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8705"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9449">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <author fullname="B. Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="D. Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access and refresh tokens.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9449"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9449"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9700">
          <front>
            <title>Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security</title>
            <author fullname="T. Lodderstedt" initials="T." surname="Lodderstedt"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley"/>
            <author fullname="A. Labunets" initials="A." surname="Labunets"/>
            <author fullname="D. Fett" initials="D." surname="Fett"/>
            <date month="January" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes best current security practice for OAuth 2.0. It updates and extends the threat model and security advice given in RFCs 6749, 6750, and 6819 to incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader application of OAuth 2.0. Further, it deprecates some modes of operation that are deemed less secure or even insecure.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="240"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9700"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9700"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ID-CHAINING">
          <front>
            <title>OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains</title>
            <author fullname="Arndt Schwenkschuster" initials="A." surname="Schwenkschuster">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kelley Burgin" initials="K." surname="Burgin">
              <organization>MITRE</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael J. Jenkins" initials="M. J." surname="Jenkins">
              <organization>NSA-CCSS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Brian Campbell" initials="B." surname="Campbell">
              <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Aaron Parecki" initials="A." surname="Parecki">
              <organization>Okta</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="19" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification describes a mechanism for preserving identity and
   authorization information across trust domains that use the OAuth 2.0
   Framework.  A JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization grant, obtained
   through an intra-domain OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, facilitates the
   cross-domain acquisition of an access token.  The relevant identity
   and authorization information is chained throughout the flow by being
   conveyed in the respective artifacts exchanged at each step of the
   process.  Chaining across multiple domains is achieved by using the
   same protocol every time a trust domain boundary is crossed.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CHAINING-PROFILE">
          <front>
            <title>Transaction Token Authorization Grant Profile for OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining</title>
            <author fullname="George Fletcher" initials="G." surname="Fletcher">
              <organization>Practical Identity LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Pieter Kasselman" initials="P." surname="Kasselman">
              <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sean O'Dell" initials="S." surname="O'Dell">
              <organization>CVS Health</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="6" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This specification defines a profile of the OAuth Identity and
   Authorization Chaining Across Domains
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-identity-chaining] mechanism that uses a Transaction
   Token (Txn-Token) [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens] as the subject
   token in a Token Exchange [RFC8693] request to obtain a JWT
   Authorization Grant for crossing a trust boundary.

   A Txn-Token is scoped to a single trust domain and represents the
   full authorization context of an in-progress transaction, regardless
   of whether that transaction was initiated by a human user calling an
   external API, by an internal system event, or by an automated
   workload.  This profile specifies how a service operating within that
   trust domain can present its Txn-Token to obtain a JWT Authorization
   Grant that carries the necessary context across a trust boundary,
   enabling an access token to be issued for a partner service, without
   exposing internal trust-domain credentials or token formats beyond
   the trust boundary.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-fletcher-transaction-token-chaining-profile-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OIDC" target="https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html">
          <front>
            <title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 2</title>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="N. Sakimura">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="J. Bradley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="M. Jones">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B. de" surname="Medeiros" fullname="B. de Medeiros">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Mortimore" fullname="C. Mortimore">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="December" day="15"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 1038?>

<section anchor="comparison-with-related-tokens">
      <name>Comparison with Related Tokens</name>
      <table>
        <name>Token Comparison</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left">Property</th>
            <th align="left">JWT Access Token </th>
            <th align="left">Txn-Token </th>
            <th align="left">Txn-AT</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>typ</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>at+jwt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>txntoken+jwt</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>txnat+jwt</tt></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Issuer</td>
            <td align="left">AS</td>
            <td align="left">TTS</td>
            <td align="left">AS</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Audience</td>
            <td align="left">Resource server</td>
            <td align="left">Trust domain</td>
            <td align="left">Single resource server</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Lifetime</td>
            <td align="left">Minutes to hours</td>
            <td align="left">Very short</td>
            <td align="left">Very short</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>txn</tt></td>
            <td align="left">No</td>
            <td align="left">Yes</td>
            <td align="left">Yes, per audience</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Context</td>
            <td align="left">Scope (and RAR)</td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>tctx</tt>, <tt>rctx</tt></td>
            <td align="left">
              <tt>authorization_details</tt> of type <tt>transaction</tt> (AS-granted, possibly enriched)</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left">Crosses trust domains</td>
            <td align="left">Yes</td>
            <td align="left">No</td>
            <td align="left">Yes, to one RS</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
    <section anchor="chaining">
      <name>Relationship to Identity Chaining and the Chaining Profile</name>
      <t>OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining Across Domains <xref target="ID-CHAINING"/>
lets a client in trust domain A obtain, from its own AS (AS-A), an
authorization grant that it then presents to the AS of trust domain B
(AS-B) to obtain an access token for a resource server in domain B.
The Transaction Token Chaining Profile <xref target="CHAINING-PROFILE"/> profiles
that flow for the case where the starting credential is a Txn-Token
that already exists inside domain A, so that the transaction context
established in domain A can cross into domain B.</t>
      <t>Txn-ATs address a different hop. A Txn-AT starts at an AS, for a
client that is outside the application it is calling, and establishes
the transaction context at that AS. Neither specification requires the
other, and they compose:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>In a chained flow, AS-B receives an authorization grant that carries
transaction context from domain A. AS-B can evaluate that context
against its own policy and issue a Txn-AT to the resource server in
domain B, with the granted transaction object in
<tt>authorization_details</tt> and a <tt>txn</tt> value for that resource server.
The resource server then proceeds as in <xref target="txn-token-interop"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Conversely, a resource server that received a Txn-AT, and whose
workloads need to call a partner enterprise, can use the Txn-Token
it obtained in <xref target="txn-token-interop"/> as the starting point for the
Chaining Profile.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Both specifications use RAR to carry authorization context between
authorization servers. Using RAR to carry the transaction context in
Txn-ATs (<xref target="txn-details"/>) lets an AS treat a transaction object the
same way whether it arrives directly from a client or inside a chained
authorization grant.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="open-issues">
      <name>Open Issues</name>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Definition of the transaction authorization details type
(<xref target="txn-details"/>): the type identifier (<tt>transaction</tt> is a
placeholder; <xref section="2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9396"/> recommends
collision-resistant names), the set of fields to standardize, and
whether a common vocabulary for AI agent tasks should be defined or
left to deployments.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Should Txn-ATs keep the distinct <tt>typ</tt> value <tt>txnat+jwt</tt>, or be
ordinary <tt>at+jwt</tt> tokens profiled by the presence of the
transaction authorization details type and the <tt>txn</tt> claim? The
distinct type fails closed at resource servers that do not
implement this specification; the plain type lets existing RAR
deployments issue and consume Txn-ATs with fewer changes.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>How should a resource server convey the client's proof of
possession to its TTS (<xref target="rs-tts-pop"/>)? A Txn-Token request
parameter carrying the DPoP proof is one option.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Should the AS return the transaction handle's expiry, for example
in a <tt>txn_handle_expires_in</tt> parameter?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Should a resource server error code be defined, for use in the
<tt>WWW-Authenticate</tt> response header, that signals a Txn-AT is required?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Should the AS be able to end a transaction explicitly before its
handle expires, for example through a revocation-style endpoint for
handles?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>How should this draft align with the WIMSE WG and with AI agent
authorization work?</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Name: "Transactional Access Tokens" is close to "Transaction
Tokens". Should an alternative, such as "Transaction-Scoped Access
Tokens", be considered?</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>The authors thank the authors of <xref target="TXN-TOKENS"/>, whose work this
document builds on, and Jeff Lombardo, Girish Konda, Wes Jackson, and
Ashay Raut for their feedback on earlier versions of this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="document-history">
      <name>Document History</name>
      <t>-01</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Aligned transaction context with Rich Authorization Requests
<xref target="RFC9396"/>. Clients now request transaction context with an
ordinary <tt>authorization_details</tt> parameter, using a new
<tt>transaction</tt> authorization details type, and the Txn-AT carries the
granted and possibly enriched object in its <tt>authorization_details</tt>
claim. Removed the <tt>tctx</tt> and <tt>rctx</tt> claims and the Txn-Token
request context parameters from the token request. This also
resolves the question of why both request context and
<tt>authorization_details</tt> were supported.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Rewrote the Transaction Context section to describe the AS's
evaluation and enrichment of the requested object, replacing the
earlier framing of RAR as copying the request into the token.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added a positioning table to the Introduction and an appendix on the
relationship to Identity Chaining and the Transaction Token Chaining
Profile.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added a section on exchanging sender-constrained Txn-ATs for
Txn-Tokens, in which the TTS verifies the client's presentation
itself.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Added a Durable Consent security consideration.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Updated the Txn-Token interoperability section so that the TTS maps
the transaction authorization details object into <tt>tctx</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Updated the comparison table, examples, and IANA Considerations.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Updated the open issues: replaced the <tt>tctx</tt> vocabulary question
with the definition of the transaction authorization details type,
and added the <tt>typ</tt> and presentation-evidence questions.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>-00</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Initial version.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="contributors" numbered="false" toc="include" removeInRFC="false">
      <name>Contributors</name>
      <contact fullname="Pieter Kasselman">
        <organization>Defakto Security</organization>
        <address>
          <email>pieter@defakto.security</email>
        </address>
      </contact>
    </section>
  </back>
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