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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Hybrid PQ-PAKE">Hybrid Post-Quantum Password Authenticated Key Exchange</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake-04"/>
    <author initials="J." surname="Vos" fullname="Jelle Vos">
      <organization>Apple, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>jelle_v_vos@apple.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Jarecki" fullname="Stanislaw Jarecki">
      <organization>University of California, Irvine</organization>
      <address>
        <email>sjarecki@ics.uci.edu</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
      <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
      <address>
        <email>caw@heapingbits.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>
    <abstract>
      <?line 246?>

<t>This document focuses on the problem of password authenticated key exchange
in a post-quantum setting, a gap for which there does not exist any protocol
suitable for deployment. Given PAKE uses in settings such as device pairing
and client-server authentication, this gap has real world security consequences.
This document addresses this gap with four post-quantum password
authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols: OQUAKE, OQUAKE+, CPaceOQUAKE, and
CPaceOQUAKE+. OQUAKE and OQUAKE+ are standalone PAKEs that both offer security against
a quantum-capable attacker. OQUAKE is a symmetric PAKE, suitable for use
cases where both parties share a view of the password. OQUAKE+ is an
augmented version of OQUAKE suitable for client-server settings where only
one party (the client) knows the password. CPaceOQUAKE is a hybrid PAKE
that runs a classical PAKE (CPace) and OQUAKE sequentially, and CPaceOQUAKE+
is its augmented version. This document also provides recommended configurations
for each protocol.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        CFRG Crypto Forum Research Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:cfrg@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/chris-wood/draft-pqpake"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 263?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) schemes are interactive
protocols that allow the participants to authenticate each other and
derive shared cryptographic keys using a (weaker) shared password.
PAKEs have a wide variety of use cases in practice, ranging from
device pairing to client-server authentication; see <xref target="use-cases"/>
for more details.</t>
      <t>PAKEs can be symmetric or asymmetric. In a symmetric setting, both
parties share a password and use it for authentication. SPAKE2
and CPace are examples of symmetric PAKEs.</t>
      <t>Asymmetric (or Augmented) Password Authenticated Key Exchange (aPAKE)
protocols are designed to provide password authentication and
mutually authenticated key exchange in a client-server setting
without relying on a public key infrastructure (PKI) and without
disclosing passwords to servers or other entities other than the client
machine. The only stage where PKI is required is during a client's registration.
OPAQUE-3DH <xref target="OPAQUE"/> and SPAKE2+ <xref target="SPAKE2PLUS"/>
are two examples of specified aPAKE protocols.</t>
      <t>Existing PAKEs such as SPAKE2, CPace, SPAKE2+, and OPAQUE-3DH, provide
security in classical threat models. However, in the presence
of a quantum-capable attacker, they fail to provide the desired level of
security. For example, SPAKE2+ and OPAQUE-3DH are vulnerable to a Harvest Now, Decrypt
Later (HNDL) attack executed by a quantum-capable attacker, in which the
attacker learns the shared secret and uses it to compromise application traffic.</t>
      <t>For a password-authenticated protocol, this HNDL threat is
more severe than for plain (unauthenticated) key exchange: breaking underlying classical
assumption of a PAKE that is not unconditionally password hiding does not merely
disclose the traffic of one harvested session, but can retroactively recover the password itself
from the harvested transcript. Since passwords are, or can be, long-lived credentials, this grants a
quantum-capable attacker indefinite impersonation capability rather than a one-time confidentiality
loss; see <xref target="retroactive-recovery"/> for a detailed treatment of this attack.
Upgrading existing protocols to provide post-quantum security is non-trivial, especially as
there are no known efficient constructions for certain building blocks used in these
protocols (such as the OPRF used in OPAQUE-3DH). As the threat of quantum-capable
attackers looms, the viability of existing aPAKE protocols in practice diminishes in time.</t>
      <t>Moreover, depending on the threat model, transitioning to a pure, post-quantum
PAKE may not be desirable. Post-quantum PAKEs are new, meaning that both their design and
implementations are new. In practice, hedging against failures in either is done
with hybrid designs, wherein a classical and post-quantum variant are combined such
that the overall protocol remains secure so long as either assumption underlying the
two variants, or their implementations, is secure. This protects against vulnerabilities
in either the classical or post-quantum components. However, unlike traditional
key exchange algorithms, combining PAKEs is not straightforward;
see <xref target="VJWYMS25"/> for more details.</t>
      <t>To summarize, there is a gap that the industry needs to fill: post-quantum
secure symmetric and asymmetric PAKEs. This document specifically addresses
that gap. It specifies four PAKE variants:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>A post-quantum symmetric PAKE, OQUAKE;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A hybrid symmetric PAKE, CPaceOQUAKE, which runs the classical PAKE CPace and OQUAKE sequentially; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Augmented versions of both, OQUAKE+ and CPaceOQUAKE+.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>CPaceOQUAKE+ is the protocol intended for the common client-server deployment,
and is the primary focus of this document. <xref target="use-cases"/> describes the
deployments that motivate each protocol, and
<xref target="configurations"/> provides recommended configurations for each.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="use-cases">
      <name>Post-Quantum PAKE Use Cases</name>
      <t>A PAKE provides three security properties:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>Confidentiality:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The parties establish a shared session key, and thereby a confidential channel, without
relying on a PKI.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Authentication:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A party only successfully completes the protocol with a peer that knows the password or, in an aPAKE,
with a server that holds a verifier for it. An active attacker can test at most one password
guess per session.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Password hiding:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An attacker that records a session, including any traffic protected with its session key, or even an attacker that obtains the session key directly,
cannot later mount an offline dictionary attack on the password.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>A quantum attacker can break all three properties of the classical PAKEs deployed today
(<xref target="retroactive-recovery"/>). Which of these properties must be protected against quantum attacks, and which must also be hedged against a failure of a new post-quantum alternative, may be decided based on how long the password remains valuable. The following sections
describe the two resulting classes of use cases, long-lived human passwords
(<xref target="use-cases-long-lived"/>) and temporary-use passwords for device pairing (<xref target="use-cases-ephemeral"/>),
and the protocol that this document recommends for each.</t>
      <section anchor="use-cases-long-lived">
        <name>Long-Lived Human Passwords</name>
        <t>The most common aPAKE deployment authenticates a user to a server with a human-memorable
password, e.g., to log in to an account. For example, the Brave browser logs users in to their
Brave Account using OPAQUE <xref target="BRAVE-ACCOUNTS"/>. Other similar use cases include WhatsApp and Messenger end-to-end
encrypted backups <xref target="WA-BACKUP"/> and Apple's iCloud Keychain escrow service <xref target="APPLE-ESCROW"/>, which
rely on an aPAKE to protect user data. Users keep such passwords for years and often reuse them
across services. Even if they do not reuse their password, passwords are often related, so their secrecy is crucial.</t>
        <t>All three properties matter in this setting, but password hiding matters most. Because the
password is long-lived, an attacker that recovers it from a harvested transcript can impersonate
the user in every future session until the password is changed, and on every other service where
it is reused (<xref target="retroactive-recovery"/>). Running a classical aPAKE inside a TLS connection with
post-quantum key exchange is not a substitute: deployments use an aPAKE precisely so that the
password stays hidden from any party that terminates or impersonates that TLS connection, such
as a load balancer or CDN <xref target="BRAVE-ACCOUNTS"/>, and a classical aPAKE loses this guarantee against
a quantum-capable attacker.</t>
        <t>Moreover, the transition to post-quantum PAKEs must not weaken the password hiding property. Classical aPAKEs
hide the password from classical attackers based on well-studied assumptions, whereas a purely
post-quantum aPAKE relies on newer assumptions, newer protocols, and newer implementations. If these turn out to
be weaker than expected, every transcript recorded in the meantime becomes subject to an offline
dictionary attack. These deployments therefore call for hybrid password hiding: the password stays
hidden as long as either the classical or the post-quantum assumptions hold. In this specification, CPaceOQUAKE+
provides hybrid password hiding along with hybrid confidentiality and authentication
(<xref target="hybrid-design"/>), while the server only stores a verifier.</t>
        <t>Some deployments with long-lived passwords require both parties to know the password. This is
the case, for example, in Wi-Fi networks that use the Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE)
handshake of IEEE 802.11. Such deployments can use CPaceOQUAKE, which provides the same hybrid
protection but, like any symmetric PAKE, does not protect the password if a party's stored state
is compromised.</t>
        <t>OQUAKE+ may serve client-server deployments whose policy requires the exclusive use of post-quantum
algorithms. It needs one round trip fewer than CPaceOQUAKE+, but does not provide hybrid password
hiding.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="use-cases-ephemeral">
        <name>Temporary-Use Passwords and Device Pairing</name>
        <t>A common use case is for two devices to set up a secure channel based on a short code or PIN, e.g., displayed on one
device and entered into the other. Such a code is typically valid for only a few minutes, so
password hiding matters little: an attacker that recovers the code after it has expired gains
nothing. For example, Magic Wormhole <xref target="MAGIC-WORMHOLE"/> transfers files between two computers
using SPAKE2 with a code that can be used only once. As another example, Matter <xref target="MATTER"/> commissions smart-home devices on IP networks using
SPAKE2+ with a short setup code that can only be used during a short commissioning window, and then uses the resulting channel to provision the device with
the credentials of the home network and an operational certificate.</t>
        <t>Confidentiality and authentication certainly need post-quantum protection today. The pairing
channel is typically used to provision long-term secrets, such as network credentials, so
harvesting a pairing session exposes those secrets even though the code itself has expired.
Moreover, many device pairing deployments involve lightweight devices that often remain in use for many years with few or no software updates. A
device that ships with a classical PAKE will still be paired, e.g., after a reset or a change of
owner, once quantum-capable attackers exist. Against SPAKE2 or SPAKE2+, such an attacker only
needs to compute a single discrete logarithm in advance to recover the code from one protocol
run, well within its lifetime, and use it to pair with the device (<xref target="retroactive-recovery"/>). The
quantum annoyance of CPace <xref target="ES21"/> only raises this cost to one discrete logarithm per guess, and a short PIN does not require many guesses.
Since the PAKE in such a device cannot be replaced later, it needs to be post-quantum from the
start.</t>
        <t>These deployments thus need a PAKE with post-quantum confidentiality and authentication, but not
necessarily password hiding. Use cases that involve low crypto agility (such as for lightweight smart-home devices) call for PAKEs that hedge against a failure of their new post-quantum components, which
makes CPaceOQUAKE the natural choice. Deployments in which the device stores only a verifier for
its code, such as Matter, can use CPaceOQUAKE+ instead.
If updating the PAKE at a later time is not considered challenging and no long-lived secrets are sent over the
channel, one can use OQUAKE or OQUAKE+ instead.</t>
        <t>Finally, some deployments must complete the PAKE in a single round trip. For example, the PAKE extension
for TLS 1.3 <xref target="TLS-PAKE"/> carries one PAKE message in the ClientHello and one
in the ServerHello. CPaceOQUAKE requires three messages and does not fit this flow, whereas
OQUAKE requires two. OQUAKE may therefore be a suitable post-quantum alternative where no more roundtrips can be permitted.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<section anchor="notation-and-terminology">
        <name>Notation and Terminology</name>
        <t>The following functions and operators are used throughout the document.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The function <tt>random(n)</tt> generates a cryptographically secure pseudorandom
byte string of length <tt>n</tt> bytes.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The associative binary operator <tt>||</tt> denotes concatenation of two byte strings.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The binary function <tt>XOR(a, b)</tt> denotes an element-wise XOR operation between
two byte strings <tt>a</tt> and <tt>b</tt> of the same length.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The functions <tt>bytes_to_int</tt> and <tt>int_to_bytes</tt> convert
byte strings to and from non-negative integers. bytes_to_int and int_to_bytes
are implemented as OS2IP and I2OSP as described in <xref target="RFC8017"/>, respectively.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The function <tt>lv_encode</tt> encodes a byte string with a two-byte, big-endian
length prefix. For example, lv_encode((0x00, 0x01, 0x02)) = (0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02).
The function <tt>lv_decode</tt> parses a byte string that is expected to be encoded
with a two-byte length preceding the remaining bytes, e.g.,
<tt>lv_decode((0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02)) = (0x00, 0x01, 0x02)</tt>. Note that <tt>lv_decode</tt>
can fail when the length of the actual bytes does not match that encoded in the
prefix. For example, <tt>lv_decode((0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00))</tt> will fail.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The notation <tt>bytes[l..h]</tt> refers to the slice of byte array <tt>bytes</tt> starting
at index <tt>l</tt> and ending at index <tt>h-1</tt>. For example, given <tt>bytes = (0x00, 0x01, 0x02)</tt>, then <tt>bytes[0..1] = 0x00</tt> and <tt>bytes[0..3] = (0x00, 0x01, 0x02)</tt>. Similarly, the notation <tt>bytes[l..]</tt> refers to the slice of the byte
array <tt>bytes</tt> starting at <tt>l</tt> until the end of <tt>bytes</tt>, i.e., <tt>bytes[l..] = bytes[l..len(bytes)]</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The value <tt>None</tt> denotes an optional input that is not provided. Wherever such an
input is used as a byte string, e.g., in a concatenation, it is equivalent to the
empty string <tt>b""</tt>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>All algorithms and procedures described in this document are laid out
in a Python-like pseudocode. Each function takes a set of inputs and parameters
and produces a set of output values. Parameters become constant values once
the protocol variant and the configuration are fixed.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="crypto-deps">
      <name>Cryptographic Dependencies</name>
      <t>The protocols in this document have four primary dependencies:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM); <xref target="deps-kem"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Splittable Binary Key Encapsulation Mechanism with specific uniformity properties (binary UPK-ANO-KEM, or BUA-sKEM); <xref target="deps-BUA-sKEM"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Key Derivation Function (KDF); <xref target="deps-symmetric"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Key Stretching Function (KSF); <xref target="deps-ksf"/></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t><xref target="configurations"/> specifies different combinations of each of these dependencies
that are suitable for implementation.</t>
      <section anchor="deps-kem">
        <name>Key Encapsulation Mechanism</name>
        <t>A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) is an algorithm that is used for exchanging
a secret from one party to another. We require an IND-CCA-secure KEM with key
derivation from a seed. It consists of the following syntax.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>DeriveKeyPair(seed): Deterministic algorithm to derive a key pair
<tt>(sk, pk)</tt> from the byte string <tt>seed</tt>, where <tt>seed</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have <tt>Nseed</tt> bytes.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Encaps(pk): Randomized algorithm to generate an ephemeral,
fixed-length symmetric key (the KEM shared secret) and
a fixed-length encapsulation of that key that can be decapsulated
by the holder of the secret key corresponding to <tt>pk</tt>. This function
can raise an <tt>EncapsError</tt> on encapsulation failure.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Decaps(ct, sk): Deterministic algorithm using the secret key <tt>sk</tt>
to recover the ephemeral symmetric key (the KEM shared secret) from
its encapsulated representation <tt>ct</tt>. This function can raise a
<tt>DecapsError</tt> on decapsulation failure.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Nseed: The length in bytes of the seed used to derive a key pair.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Nct: The length in bytes of an encapsulated key produced by this KEM.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Npk: The length in bytes of a public key for this KEM.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>This KEM is used for password confirmation in OQUAKE+ and CPaceOQUAKE+. The configurations
in this specification (<xref target="configurations"/>) use ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 <xref target="FIPS203"/> for
OQUAKE+, and the hybrid KEMs X-Wing <xref target="XWING"/> and MLKEM1024-P384
<xref target="CONCRETE-HYBRID-KEMS"/> for CPaceOQUAKE+.
For these KEMs, DeriveKeyPair uses the seed directly, as specified in <xref target="CONCRETE-HYBRID-KEMS"/>:
for ML-KEM, it is <tt>KeyGen_internal(seed[0:32], seed[32:64])</tt> <xref target="FIPS203"/>, and for X-Wing, it is
<tt>GenerateKeyPairDerand(seed)</tt> <xref target="XWING"/>. Implementations <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use the HPKE-style
<tt>DeriveKeyPair(ikm)</tt> of <xref target="XWING"/> instead, which first hashes its input and therefore derives a
different key pair.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="deps-BUA-sKEM">
        <name>Splittable binary KEM</name>
        <t>A KEM is binary if every byte string of length Npk is a valid public key, i.e.,
Encaps accepts any such string.</t>
        <t>A binary KEM with uniform public keys and anonymous ciphertexts, denoted
a binary UPK-ANO-KEM, supports the same functions as defined above for
a KEM, except that it generates key pairs with a randomized function
<tt>KeyGen() -&gt; (sk, pk)</tt> instead of DeriveKeyPair. Besides being IND-CCA
secure, it must also achieve two additional security properties.
A binary UPK-ANO-KEM is IND-CCA secure and it requires that:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Public keys are indistinguishable from random strings of bytes (of
the same length), i.e. uniform public keys (UPK); and</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Ciphertexts are anonymous in the presence of chosen ciphertext
attack (ANO-CCA), i.e. anonymous ciphertexts (ANO).</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>These additional properties are crucial for the security of OQUAKE. In
other words, one <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use a KEM that has no uniform public keys
and/or no anonymous ciphertexts in place of a UPK-ANO-KEM.</t>
        <t>In this specification, we also require a third property: the KEM must be splittable. A splittable KEM (sKEM) implements the <tt>Split(pk) -&gt; (ut, ⍴)</tt> function and its inverse, which takes a public key and splits it into a part <tt>⍴</tt> that is independent of the KEM's secret key and can therefore be made public, and a part <tt>ut</tt> that does depend on the secret key. This property allows parties to perform variable-time operations on <tt>⍴</tt> without revealing information about the secret key. We use N⍴ to denote the byte-length of ⍴ and Nt to denote the byte-length of ut. We use <tt>Combine(ut, ⍴) -&gt; pk</tt> to refer to the inverse operation of <tt>Split</tt>.</t>
        <t>In the remainder of this specification, we abbreviate 'splittable binary UPK-ANO-KEM' as BUA-sKEM.
This specification uses variants of ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 <xref target="FIPS203"/>, which we denote by
ML-BUA-sKEM-768 and ML-BUA-sKEM-1024. They are specified in <xref target="ML-BUA-sKEM"/>, using the Kemeleon
encoding of ML-KEM encapsulation keys <xref target="KEMELEON"/>. Note that, while
Kemeleon provides uniform encoding for KEM ciphertexts and public keys, we only
require uniform encoding for public keys. Future specifications can replace ML-BUA-sKEM
with another splittable binary UPK-ANO-KEM that is more efficient if one becomes available.</t>
        <section anchor="ML-BUA-sKEM">
          <name>ML-BUA-sKEM</name>
          <t>The design of ML-BUA-sKEM is such that it does not change the internals of ML-KEM.
To ensure that the public key generated by ML-BUA-sKEM.KeyGen is binary and
uniform, it uses Kemeleon <xref target="KEMELEON"/> to (re-)encode ML-KEM's
public keys via <tt>Kemeleon.EncodeEk</tt> and <tt>Kemeleon.DecodeEk</tt>.</t>
          <t>In the PAKEs described in this specification, it is crucial that this happens in
constant time. For this reason, ML-BUA-sKEM uses <tt>Kemeleon.EncodeEk</tt>, which performs
no rejection sampling and cannot fail, rather than the rejection-sampling variant
<tt>Kemeleon.EncodeEkR</tt>. <tt>Kemeleon.EncodeEk</tt> is randomized, and its randomness <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
kept secret <xref target="KEMELEON"/>. ML-BUA-sKEM sets Kemeleon's statistical distance parameter
Kemeleon.t to 132, which bounds the statistical distance between an encoded public key
and a uniform byte string as required in <xref target="params-oquake"/>.
Because <tt>Kemeleon.EncodeEk</tt> leaves the final 32 bytes (⍴) of the encoding untouched,
the resulting uniform public key remains splittable in the same way as the
underlying ML-KEM public key.</t>
          <t>This document uses the following parameter sets.</t>
          <table anchor="tab-ml-bua-skem">
            <name>ML-BUA-sKEM parameter sets</name>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">Parameter set</th>
                <th align="left">ML-KEM</th>
                <th align="left">Kemeleon.t</th>
                <th align="left">Npk</th>
                <th align="left">Nt</th>
                <th align="left">N⍴</th>
                <th align="left">Nct</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">ML-BUA-sKEM-768</td>
                <td align="left">ML-KEM-768</td>
                <td align="left">132</td>
                <td align="left">1205</td>
                <td align="left">1173</td>
                <td align="left">32</td>
                <td align="left">1088</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">ML-BUA-sKEM-1024</td>
                <td align="left">ML-KEM-1024</td>
                <td align="left">132</td>
                <td align="left">1596</td>
                <td align="left">1564</td>
                <td align="left">32</td>
                <td align="left">1568</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
          <t>ML-BUA-sKEM is defined as follows.
ML-KEM.KeyGen is specified in <xref target="FIPS203"/>, which generates encapsulation key ek and decapsulation key dk.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
ML-BUA-sKEM.KeyGen

Output:
- sk, a secret decapsulation key, a byte string
- upk, a uniform public key for encapsulation, a byte string of ML-BUA-sKEM.Npk bytes

Parameters:
- ML-KEM, the ML-KEM parameter set
- Kemeleon, A parameterized instance of Kemeleon with statistical distance parameter Kemeleon.t

def KeyGen():
  (ek, dk) = ML-KEM.KeyGen()
  upk = Kemeleon.EncodeEk(ek)
  return dk, upk
]]></artwork>
          <t>With Kemeleon.t = 132, Kemeleon encodes each polynomial of an ML-KEM encapsulation key in 391 bytes instead of 384, so the uniform public keys produced by ML-BUA-sKEM are longer than those produced by ML-KEM.
ML-BUA-sKEM encodes each integer output by Kemeleon's VectorEncode as a little-endian byte string of 391 bytes, and Kemeleon.DecodeEk decodes it in the same way.
The final 32 bytes of the public key still represent the part that does not depend on the secret key.
For this reason, N⍴ = 32 and Nt = ML-BUA-sKEM.Npk - 32.</t>
          <t>For ML-BUA-sKEM, the split operation is defined as follows.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
ML-BUA-sKEM.Split

Input:
- upk, an ML-BUA-sKEM public key, a byte string of ML-BUA-sKEM.Npk bytes

Output:
- ut, part of the uniform public key that depends on the secret key
- ⍴, part of the uniform public key that does NOT depend on the secret key

def Split(upk):
  ut = upk[0 : ML-BUA-sKEM.Nt]
  ⍴ = upk[ML-BUA-sKEM.Nt : ML-BUA-sKEM.Npk]
  return ut, ⍴
]]></artwork>
          <t>For ML-BUA-sKEM, the inverse of the split operation is concatenation.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
ML-BUA-sKEM.Combine

Input:
- ut, part of the uniform public key that depends on the secret key
- ⍴, part of the uniform public key that does NOT depend on the secret key

Output:
- upk, an ML-BUA-sKEM public key, a byte string of ML-BUA-sKEM.Npk bytes

def Combine(ut, ⍴):
  return ut || ⍴
]]></artwork>
          <t>ML-BUA-sKEM encapsulation undoes the uniform encoding performed during key generation before calling ML-KEM.Encaps on the non-uniform public key.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
ML-BUA-sKEM.Encaps

Input:
- upk, an ML-BUA-sKEM public key

Output:
- k, a symmetric shared secret, a byte string
- ct, an anonymous ciphertext encapsulating k, a byte string

Parameters:
- ML-KEM, the ML-KEM parameter set
- Kemeleon, A parameterized instance of Kemeleon with statistical distance parameter Kemeleon.t

def Encaps(upk):
  pk = Kemeleon.DecodeEk(upk)
  return ML-KEM.Encaps(pk)
]]></artwork>
          <t>The decapsulation procedure for ML-BUA-sKEM is exactly the same as for ML-KEM.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
ML-BUA-sKEM.Decaps

Input:
- ct, an anonymous ciphertext encapsulating k, a byte string
- sk, a secret decapsulation key, a byte string

Output:
- k, a symmetric shared secret, a byte string

def Decaps(ct, sk):
  return ML-KEM.Decaps(ct, sk)
]]></artwork>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="deps-symmetric">
        <name>Key Derivation Function</name>
        <t>A Key Derivation Function (KDF) is a function that takes some source of initial
keying material and uses it to derive one or more cryptographically strong keys.
This specification uses a KDF with the following API and parameters:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Extract(salt, ikm): Extract a pseudorandom key of fixed length <tt>Nx</tt> bytes from
input keying material <tt>ikm</tt> and an optional byte string <tt>salt</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Expand(prk, info, L): Expand a pseudorandom key <tt>prk</tt> using the optional string <tt>info</tt>
into <tt>L</tt> bytes of output keying material.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Nx: The output size of the <tt>Extract()</tt> function in bytes.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Where an input to a KDF or KSF concatenates several fields, each variable-length field is encoded with <tt>lv_encode</tt>, so that distinct field values always yield distinct inputs.</t>
        <t>The security analysis of the protocols in this document models the KDF as a random
oracle. The KDF <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> therefore be one that is reasonably modeled as a random oracle,
such as HKDF <xref target="RFC5869"/> instantiated with SHA-256.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="deps-ksf">
        <name>Key Stretching Function</name>
        <t>This specification makes use of a Key Stretching Function (KSF), which is a slow
and expensive cryptographic hash function with the following API:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Stretch(msg, salt, L): Apply a key stretching function to stretch the input <tt>msg</tt>
and salt <tt>salt</tt>, hardening it against offline dictionary attacks. This function also
needs to satisfy collision resistance. The output is a string of L bytes.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Overview</name>
      <t>This document specifies four PAKE protocols:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><strong>OQUAKE</strong>: A post-quantum symmetric PAKE built from a BUA-sKEM; see <xref target="oquake"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>CPaceOQUAKE</strong>: A hybrid symmetric PAKE combining CPace and OQUAKE; see <xref target="CPaceOQUAKE"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><strong>OQUAKE+</strong> and <strong>CPaceOQUAKE+</strong>: Augmented PAKEs obtained by applying a
PAKE-to-aPAKE transformation to OQUAKE and CPaceOQUAKE, respectively; see
<xref target="augmented-pakes"/>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>All PAKEs in this document share a common interface. Each takes as input a
password-related string PRS (or a password verifier derived from it), a public_context,
and a secret_context. The augmented PAKEs additionally take the registration
inputs described in <xref target="apake-transform"/>. The public_context binds public session information that
both parties agree on, such as an optional session identifier sid and optional
client and server identifiers U and S (e.g., a device identifier, an IP address,
or a URL). The secret_context binds confidential information shared by both
parties, such as the session key of a preceding protocol stage; it is never sent
on the wire. Both the public_context and the secret_context are optional; a party
that does not use one passes the empty string b"" (equivalently, None). Two parties
obtain matching session keys only if their PRS, public_context, and secret_context
match. See <xref target="identities"/> for more discussion about the identities and how they are
chosen in practice.</t>
      <t>The public_context is constructed from the optional sid, U, and S using the
<tt>EncodePublicContext</tt> utility function. Each of sid, U, and S is optional and
defaults to the empty string b"". Applications <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include additional public
information by prepending or appending it to the returned value. The byte-level
encoding produced by <tt>EncodePublicContext</tt>, along with the encodings of all
protocol messages, is specified in <xref target="encodings"/>; the main body of this document
describes protocol messages abstractly as tuples of named fields.</t>
      <t>Along with its session key, each PAKE outputs a transcript hash th, computed with the TH function below.
The th publicly binds to the public_context and to all protocol messages of
the session.
When a protocol in this document sequentially composes two sub-protocols, the later protocol uses the preceding's th as its public_context, binding them together.
Applications can also use th to bind a higher-level protocol to a PAKE session.
An implementation does not need to expose th to its callers.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
TH

Input:
- label, a byte string identifying the protocol
- f_1, ..., f_n, the fields to hash, byte strings

Output:
- th, a transcript hash of KDF.Nx bytes

Parameters:
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def TH(label, f_1, ..., f_n):
  return KDF.Extract(DST || "TH-" || label,
                     lv_encode(f_1) || ... || lv_encode(f_n))
]]></artwork>
    </section>
    <section anchor="oquake">
      <name>Post-Quantum PAKE: OQUAKE</name>
      <t>OQUAKE is a post-quantum symmetric PAKE built on a BUA-sKEM and KDF, using 2
rounds of a Feistel network to password-encrypt the BUA-sKEM public key. The
OQUAKE protocol is based on the Tempo protocol analyzed in <xref target="TEMPO"/>. If the
BUA-sKEM provides security against quantum-enabled attacks, then so does OQUAKE.
<xref target="quantum-attackers"/> discusses to what extent this has been proven.
OQUAKE implements the common interface described in <xref target="overview"/>: it consists of two
messages sent between initiator and responder, produced by
the functions Init, Respond, and Finish, described below. Both parties take as input a password-related
string PRS, a public_context, and a secret_context. Upon completion, both parties obtain matching session keys if
their PRS, public_context, secret_context, and key length (specified by Nkey) match. Otherwise,
they obtain random session keys. Either party can act as the initiator: in OQUAKE+
(<xref target="oquakeplus"/>) the client initiates, whereas in CPaceOQUAKE (<xref target="CPaceOQUAKE"/>) the
server does.</t>
      <t>When a secret_context is provided, OQUAKE derives an effective password from (PRS, secret_context) and uses it in place
of PRS throughout the protocol. This allows OQUAKE to be securely composed with a preceding protocol
stage whose output key is provided as the secret_context.</t>
      <t>The public_context typically encodes a session identifier sid and client and
server identifiers U and S. It has the following requirements. If a client and server identifier are provided:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The session identifier must match between the client and server</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>This session identifier has not been used before in a session between the client and server</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>If no client and server identifiers are provided:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The session identifier must match between the client and server</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>This session identifier has not been used before by the client or server in any session with any other party</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>These requirements originate from the security proof for OQUAKE. If these requirements are not met, the proof
does not apply, but this does not mean that the protocol becomes vulnerable.</t>
      <t>The specification follows the design as presented in <xref target="VJWYMS25"/>, adjusted to use the Tempo protocol <xref target="TEMPO"/>
and a splittable KEM rather than the NoIC protocol <xref target="ABJ25"/>. This prevents timing attacks caused by rejection
sampling in ML-KEM. See <xref target="timing-and-tempo"/> for more information on the timing attack and this fix.</t>
      <t>The byte-level encoding of the OQUAKE protocol messages is specified in <xref target="encodings"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="initiation">
        <name>Initiation</name>
        <t>Init takes as input the initiator's PRS, a public_context, and a secret_context.
It produces a state for the initiator to store, as well as a
protocol message that is sent to the responder. Its implementation is as follows.
In the comments, H denotes the random oracle of the protocol's security analysis,
which this document instantiates with the KDF (<xref target="deps-symmetric"/>).</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
OQUAKE.Init

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string

Output:
- state, opaque state for the initiator to store
- msg, a protocol message for the initiator to send to the responder

Parameters:
- BUA-sKEM, a BUA-sKEM instance
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def Init(PRS, public_context, secret_context):
  prk_ePRS = KDF.Extract(PRS, DST || "OQUAKE-context" ||
                         lv_encode(public_context) || lv_encode(secret_context))
  effective_PRS = KDF.Expand(prk_ePRS, DST || "effective_PRS", Nkey)

  (sk, pk) = BUA-sKEM.KeyGen()
  (ut, ⍴) = BUA-sKEM.Split(pk)

  r = random(Nr)

  // T = XOR(ut, H(effective_PRS, ⍴, r))
  prk_T_pad = KDF.Extract(effective_PRS, DST || "OQUAKE" || ⍴ || r)
  T_pad = KDF.Expand(prk_T_pad, DST || "T_pad", BUA-sKEM.Nt)
  T = XOR(ut, T_pad)

  // s = XOR(r, H(effective_PRS, ⍴, T))
  prk_s_pad = KDF.Extract(effective_PRS, DST || "OQUAKE" || ⍴ || T)
  s_pad = KDF.Expand(prk_s_pad, DST || "s_pad", Nr)
  s = XOR(r, s_pad)

  msg = (s, T, ⍴)

  return State(effective_PRS, sk, pk, ⍴, s, T, public_context), msg
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="response">
        <name>Response</name>
        <t>Respond takes as input the PRS, a public_context, a secret_context, and the initiator's protocol message.
It produces a protocol message intended to be sent to the initiator, an Nkey-byte symmetric key, and a transcript hash.
Its implementation is as follows.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
OQUAKE.Respond

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string
- init_msg, the initiator's protocol message

Output:
- resp_msg, a protocol message for the responder to send to the initiator
- key, output shared secret, a byte string of Nkey bytes
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Parameters:
- BUA-sKEM, a BUA-sKEM instance
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def Respond(PRS, public_context, secret_context, init_msg):
  (s, T, ⍴) = init_msg

  prk_ePRS = KDF.Extract(PRS, DST || "OQUAKE-context" ||
                         lv_encode(public_context) || lv_encode(secret_context))
  effective_PRS = KDF.Expand(prk_ePRS, DST || "effective_PRS", Nkey)

  prk_s_pad = KDF.Extract(effective_PRS, DST || "OQUAKE" || ⍴ || T)
  s_pad = KDF.Expand(prk_s_pad, DST || "s_pad", Nr)
  r = XOR(s, s_pad)

  prk_T_pad = KDF.Extract(effective_PRS, DST || "OQUAKE" || ⍴ || r)
  T_pad = KDF.Expand(prk_T_pad, DST || "T_pad", BUA-sKEM.Nt)
  ut = XOR(T, T_pad)

  pk = BUA-sKEM.Combine(ut, ⍴)
  (k, ct) = BUA-sKEM.Encaps(pk)

  prk_sk = KDF.Extract(effective_PRS, DST || "OQUAKE" ||
                       s || T || ⍴ || pk || ct || k)
  h = KDF.Expand(prk_sk, DST || "confirm", Nkc)
  key = KDF.Expand(prk_sk, DST || "key", Nkey)

  resp_msg = (ct, h)
  th = TH("OQUAKE", public_context, s, T, ⍴, ct, h)

  return resp_msg, key, th
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="quake-finish">
        <name>Finish</name>
        <t>Finish takes as input the initiator-created state that is output from Init
as well as the responder's reply message resp_msg. It produces a symmetric key
and a transcript hash that are output to the initiator.</t>
        <t>Finish does not raise an error when key confirmation or decapsulation fails.
Instead, it returns a freshly sampled random key, so that a party that does not
hold the correct PRS obtains an unrelated session key rather than a
distinguishable failure signal. Callers therefore <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat the output of
Finish as evidence that the peer knows the password; in the augmented PAKEs, that
evidence comes from password confirmation (<xref target="pwconf"/>).</t>
        <t>Its implementation is as follows.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
OQUAKE.Finish

Input:
- state, opaque state for the initiator to store
- resp_msg, the responder's protocol message

Output:
- key, output shared secret, a byte string of Nkey bytes
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Parameters:
- BUA-sKEM, a BUA-sKEM instance
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def Finish(state, resp_msg):
  (effective_PRS, sk, pk, ⍴, s, T, public_context) = state
  (ct, h) = resp_msg

  th = TH("OQUAKE", public_context, s, T, ⍴, ct, h)

  try:
    k = BUA-sKEM.Decaps(ct, sk)
  catch DecapsError:
    return random(Nkey), th

  prk_sk = KDF.Extract(effective_PRS, DST || "OQUAKE" ||
                       s || T || ⍴ || pk || ct || k)
  h_expected = KDF.Expand(prk_sk, DST || "confirm", Nkc)
  if h != h_expected:
    return random(Nkey), th

  key = KDF.Expand(prk_sk, DST || "key", Nkey)
  return key, th
]]></artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="CPaceOQUAKE">
      <name>Hybrid PAKE: CPaceOQUAKE</name>
      <t>This section specifies the hybrid PAKE called CPaceOQUAKE.
It is built on a sequential combiner that takes two PAKEs, denoted Stage 1 and Stage 2, that both implement the common interface defined in <xref target="overview"/>, and composes them into one hybrid PAKE.
This combiner is based on the `Sequential PAKE Combiner' protocol proposed by <xref target="HR24"/>.
A close variant was also analyzed in <xref target="LL24"/>.
CPaceOQUAKE is the instantiation of this combiner with CPace (<xref target="cpace"/>) as Stage 1 and OQUAKE (<xref target="oquake"/>) as Stage 2, which assumes that OQUAKE is instantiated with a quantum-resistant BUA-sKEM.
The augmented version, CPaceOQUAKE+, is specified in <xref target="CPaceOQUAKEplus"/>.</t>
      <t>Whereas running these two PAKEs in parallel realizes a worst-of-both worlds PAKE, this sequential composition realizes a combined PAKE that remains as secure as the strongest of its two component PAKEs.
In other words, it resists attacks that break either sub-PAKE.
For example, it remains secure either if a quantum-capable attacker breaks CPace or if there is a flaw in the implementation of OQUAKE.
The reason a parallel combination of CPace and OQUAKE does not achieve best-of-both-worlds security is that it requires both underlying PAKEs to hide the password unconditionally.
For more information, see <xref target="hybrid-design"/>.</t>
      <t>The sequential combiner overcomes this limitation: it only requires Stage 1's PAKE to unconditionally hide the password.
The combiner first runs Stage 1, establishing session key SK1 and transcript hash th1, and then runs Stage 2 with secret_context=SK1 and public_context=th1.
Stage 2 derives an effective password from (PRS, th1, SK1) and uses it throughout.
The final session key is derived from Stage 2's session key, SK1, and Stage 2's transcript hash, which covers both stages.
See the diagram below.</t>
      <artset>
        <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="304" width="392" viewBox="0 0 392 304" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
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            <polygon class="arrowhead" points="304,208 292,202.4 292,213.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,296,208)"/>
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            <g class="text">
              <text x="108" y="36">Client</text>
              <text x="292" y="36">Server</text>
              <text x="184" y="84">Stage</text>
              <text x="216" y="84">1</text>
              <text x="40" y="100">PRS</text>
              <text x="188" y="100">PAKE</text>
              <text x="352" y="100">PRS</text>
              <text x="192" y="132">|</text>
              <text x="176" y="148">SK1</text>
              <text x="216" y="148">th1</text>
              <text x="184" y="196">Stage</text>
              <text x="216" y="196">2</text>
              <text x="40" y="212">PRS</text>
              <text x="188" y="212">PAKE</text>
              <text x="352" y="212">PRS</text>
              <text x="48" y="276">client_key,</text>
              <text x="108" y="276">th</text>
              <text x="320" y="276">server_key,</text>
              <text x="380" y="276">th</text>
            </g>
          </svg>
        </artwork>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
            Client                 Server
              |                      |
              |     +---------+      |
              |     | Stage 1 |      |
     PRS ---->+---->|  PAKE   |<-----+<---- PRS
              |     +---------+      |
              |          |           |
              |       SK1, th1       |
              |          |           |
              |     +---------+      |
              |     | Stage 2 |      |
     PRS ---->+---->|  PAKE   |<-----+<---- PRS
                    +---------+
                      |      |
                      |      |
  client_key, th <----+      +----> server_key, th
]]></artwork>
      </artset>
      <t>We note that this document only specifies the composition above with CPace and OQUAKE.
It is not necessarily true that one can securely compose all PAKEs this way.</t>
      <t>At a high level, CPaceOQUAKE is a three-message protocol that runs between client and server wherein, upon completion, both parties share the same session key if they agree on the password-related string (PRS) and public and secret contexts.
Otherwise, they obtain random session keys.</t>
      <t>The client initiates CPace.
Upon receiving the client's first message, the server finishes CPace and uses its SK1 to initiate OQUAKE.
The server sends its CPace response along with its first OQUAKE message.
After that, the client finishes CPace and responds to OQUAKE.</t>
      <t>Unlike OQUAKE, CPaceOQUAKE does not require a shared session identifier sid, although this is strongly recommended.
The public_context of OQUAKE is CPace's transcript hash, which covers the public_context and the messages Ya and Yb.
Since each party contributes a fresh Ya or Yb, it is unique to the session even if the application provides no sid.</t>
      <t>See the diagram below for an overview of the protocol flow.
There are four functions: Init and InitiatorFinish are intended to be called by the client, and Respond and ResponderFinish are intended to be called by the server.
The byte-level encoding of the protocol messages is specified in <xref target="encodings"/>.</t>
      <artset>
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            <g class="text">
              <text x="32" y="36">Client:</text>
              <text x="144" y="36">PRS,pub_ctx,sec_ctx</text>
              <text x="312" y="36">Server:</text>
              <text x="424" y="36">PRS,pub_ctx,sec_ctx</text>
              <text x="60" y="68">ctx,</text>
              <text x="100" y="68">msg1</text>
              <text x="128" y="68">=</text>
              <text x="152" y="84">CPaceOQUAKE.Init(PRS,pub_ctx,sec_ctx)</text>
              <text x="220" y="116">msg1</text>
              <text x="276" y="164">ctx,</text>
              <text x="316" y="164">msg2</text>
              <text x="344" y="164">=</text>
              <text x="320" y="180">CPaceOQUAKE.Respond(PRS,pub_ctx,sec_ctx,msg1)</text>
              <text x="220" y="212">msg2</text>
              <text x="88" y="260">client_key,</text>
              <text x="160" y="260">msg3,</text>
              <text x="196" y="260">th</text>
              <text x="216" y="260">=</text>
              <text x="116" y="276">CPaceOQUAKE.InitiatorFinish(</text>
              <text x="64" y="292">PRS,pub_ctx</text>
              <text x="184" y="292">sec_ctx,ctx,msg2)</text>
              <text x="220" y="324">msg3</text>
              <text x="272" y="372">server_key,</text>
              <text x="332" y="372">th</text>
              <text x="352" y="372">=</text>
              <text x="304" y="388">CPaceOQUAKE.ResponderFinish(ctx,msg3)</text>
              <text x="352" y="404">|</text>
              <text x="68" y="436">output</text>
              <text x="144" y="436">client_key,</text>
              <text x="204" y="436">th</text>
              <text x="316" y="436">output</text>
              <text x="392" y="436">server_key,</text>
              <text x="452" y="436">th</text>
            </g>
          </svg>
        </artwork>
        <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
Client: PRS,pub_ctx,sec_ctx        Server: PRS,pub_ctx,sec_ctx
        -----------------------------------------
     ctx, msg1 =                           |
CPaceOQUAKE.Init(PRS,pub_ctx,sec_ctx)      |
             |                             |
             |           msg1              |
             |---------------------------->|
             |                             |
             |                  ctx, msg2 =
             |   CPaceOQUAKE.Respond(PRS,pub_ctx,sec_ctx,msg1)
             |                             |
             |           msg2              |
             |<----------------------------|
             |                             |
     client_key, msg3, th =                |
CPaceOQUAKE.InitiatorFinish(               |
  PRS,pub_ctx,sec_ctx,ctx,msg2)            |
             |                             |
             |           msg3              |
             |---------------------------->|
             |                             |
             |              server_key, th =
             |     CPaceOQUAKE.ResponderFinish(ctx,msg3)
             |                             |
        -----------------------------------------
     output client_key, th          output server_key, th
]]></artwork>
      </artset>
      <section anchor="client-initiation">
        <name>Client Initiation</name>
        <t>The client initiates CPace (Stage 1).</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE.Init

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string

Output:
- state, opaque state for the initiator to store
- msg, a protocol message for the initiator to send to the responder

Parameters:
- CPace, parameterized instance of CPace

def Init(PRS, public_context, secret_context):
  ctx1, Ya = CPace.Init(PRS, public_context, secret_context)
  return ctx1, Ya
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="server-response">
        <name>Server Response</name>
        <t>The server finishes CPace and initiates OQUAKE (Stage 2), using the CPace session key as OQUAKE's
secret_context and the CPace transcript hash as OQUAKE's public_context.
The server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort if its received message does not have the correct length.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE.Respond

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string
- init_msg, the message received from the client

Output:
- state, opaque state for the responder to store
- msg, a protocol message for the responder to send to the initiator

Parameters:
- CPace, parameterized instance of CPace
- OQUAKE, parameterized instance of OQUAKE

def Respond(PRS, public_context, secret_context, init_msg):
  Ya = init_msg

  key1, Yb, th1 = CPace.Respond(PRS, public_context, secret_context, Ya)
  ctx2, oquake_init = OQUAKE.Init(PRS, th1, key1)

  resp_msg = (Yb, oquake_init)

  return State(ctx2, key1), resp_msg
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="client-finish">
        <name>Client Finish</name>
        <t>The client finishes CPace and responds to OQUAKE.
It derives the session key from OQUAKE's session key, the CPace session key, and OQUAKE's transcript hash,
which is also the CPaceOQUAKE transcript hash.
The client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort if its received message does not have the correct length.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE.InitiatorFinish

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string
- state, the state generated by CPaceOQUAKE.Init
- resp_msg, the message received from the server

Output:
- key, a shared secret of Nkey bytes
- msg, a protocol message for the initiator to send to the responder
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Parameters:
- CPace, parameterized instance of CPace
- OQUAKE, parameterized instance of OQUAKE
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def InitiatorFinish(PRS, public_context, secret_context, state, resp_msg):
  ctx1 = state
  (Yb, oquake_init) = resp_msg

  key1, th1 = CPace.Finish(ctx1, public_context, Yb)
  msg, key2, th2 = OQUAKE.Respond(PRS, th1, key1, oquake_init)

  prk = KDF.Extract(key2, DST || "CPaceOQUAKE" || th2 || key1)
  client_key = KDF.Expand(prk, DST || "key", Nkey)

  return client_key, msg, th2
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="server-finish">
        <name>Server Finish</name>
        <t>The server finishes OQUAKE and derives the session key in the same way as the client.
The server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort if its received message does not have the correct length.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE.ResponderFinish

Input:
- state, the state generated by CPaceOQUAKE.Respond
- msg3, the message received from the client

Output:
- key, a shared secret of Nkey bytes
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Parameters:
- OQUAKE, parameterized instance of OQUAKE
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def ResponderFinish(state, msg3):
  (ctx2, key1) = state
  key2, th2 = OQUAKE.Finish(ctx2, msg3)

  prk = KDF.Extract(key2, DST || "CPaceOQUAKE" || th2 || key1)
  server_key = KDF.Expand(prk, DST || "key", Nkey)

  return server_key, th2
]]></artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="augmented-pakes">
      <name>Augmented PAKEs</name>
      <t>This section specifies the augmented PAKEs OQUAKE+ and CPaceOQUAKE+.
Both are obtained by applying the same PAKE-to-aPAKE transformation (<xref target="apake-transform"/>) to
a symmetric PAKE:
OQUAKE+ (<xref target="oquakeplus"/>) applies it to OQUAKE, and CPaceOQUAKE+ (<xref target="CPaceOQUAKEplus"/>) applies it to CPaceOQUAKE.</t>
      <section anchor="apake-transform">
        <name>PAKE-to-aPAKE Transformation</name>
        <t>The transformation transforms a symmetric PAKE into an asymmetric (augmented) PAKE, in which the
server stores a verifier for the client's password, instead of the password itself.
It is a close variant of the `augmented PAKE' constructions presented in <xref target="LLH24"/> and in <xref target="Gu24"/>.</t>
        <t>The verifier consists of three parts, derived from the output of a key stretching function on the client's password and a random secret.
The first Nv bytes of the KSF output are denoted v, which makes up the first part of the verifier.
The remaining KEM.Nseed bytes, which we call the seed, are combined with kem_blind, a secret random blinding value, to derive a KEM key pair.
The public key of this key pair and kem_blind are the second and third parts of the verifier.
This KEM does not have to be a BUA-sKEM.</t>
        <t>In each session, the client and server first run the symmetric PAKE with v instead of the PRS, yielding session key SK and transcript hash th.
The server then uses SK, th, the KEM public key pk, and kem_blind to challenge the client to prove knowledge of the seed (<xref target="pwconf"/>).
Password confirmation relies on SK for confidentiality, so it cannot be used as a standalone protocol and <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be used outside of this transformation.</t>
        <artset>
          <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="288" width="488" viewBox="0 0 488 288" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
              <path d="M 104,48 L 104,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 152,64 L 152,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
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              <g class="text">
                <text x="108" y="36">Client</text>
                <text x="332" y="36">Server</text>
                <text x="208" y="84">Symmetric</text>
                <text x="48" y="100">v</text>
                <text x="212" y="100">PAKE</text>
                <text x="384" y="100">v</text>
                <text x="208" y="132">|</text>
                <text x="196" y="148">SK</text>
                <text x="228" y="148">th</text>
                <text x="212" y="196">Password</text>
                <text x="36" y="212">seed</text>
                <text x="212" y="212">confirmation</text>
                <text x="392" y="212">pk,</text>
                <text x="448" y="212">kem_blind</text>
                <text x="48" y="260">client_key,</text>
                <text x="108" y="260">th</text>
                <text x="344" y="260">server_key,</text>
                <text x="404" y="260">th</text>
              </g>
            </svg>
          </artwork>
          <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
            Client                      Server
              |                           |
              |     +--------------+      |
              |     |  Symmetric   |      |
       v ---->+---->|     PAKE     |<-----+<---- v
              |     +--------------+      |
              |            |              |
              |          SK, th           |
              |            |              |
              |     +--------------+      |
              |     |   Password   |      |
    seed ---->+---->| confirmation |<-----+<---- pk, kem_blind
              |     +--------------+      |
                       |        |
  client_key, th <-----+        +----> server_key, th
]]></artwork>
        </artset>
        <section anchor="offline-registration">
          <name>Offline Registration</name>
          <t>This subsection specifies functions for generating a verifier and
a protocol for registering clients.</t>
          <section anchor="gen-verifiers">
            <name>Generating Verifiers</name>
            <t>Verifiers are random-looking values derived from password-related strings from which it is computationally impractical to derive the password-related string.
To make verifiers unique between different users with the same password or servers that they interact with, we employ a salt, a user account identifier, and an optional server identifier.
These identifiers identify the registration and do not have to be equal to any identifiers in the public_context; see <xref target="asymmetric-identities"/>.
The material required for the verifier is generated as follows:</t>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
GenVerifierMaterial

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- salt, client-specific salt, a byte string
- U and S, client and server identifiers

Output:
- v, the first part of the verifier, a byte string of Nv bytes
- seed, a KEM key-derivation seed, a byte string of KEM.Nseed bytes

Parameters:
- KEM, a KEM instance
- KSF, a parameterized KSF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def GenVerifierMaterial(PRS, salt, U, S):
  material = KSF.Stretch(DST || lv_encode(PRS) || lv_encode(U) || lv_encode(S),
                         salt, Nv + KEM.Nseed)
  v = material[0:Nv]
  seed = material[Nv:Nv + KEM.Nseed]
  return v, seed
]]></artwork>
            <t>The KEM key pair is derived from the seed and kem_blind as follows:</t>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
DeriveKEMSeed

Input:
- seed, a KEM key derivation seed, a byte string of KEM.Nseed bytes
- kem_blind, a secret blinding value of 32 bytes

Output:
- kem_seed, the seed for KEM.DeriveKeyPair, a byte string of KEM.Nseed bytes

Parameters:
- KEM, a KEM instance
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def DeriveKEMSeed(seed, kem_blind):
  prk = KDF.Extract(seed, DST || "KEMSeed" || kem_blind)
  return KDF.Expand(prk, DST || "kem_seed", KEM.Nseed)
]]></artwork>
            <t>To derive the verifier (v, pk, kem_blind), we use the following function:</t>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
GenVerifier

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- salt, client-specific salt, a byte string
- U and S, client and server identifiers

Output:
- v, the first part of the verifier, a byte string of Nv bytes
- pk, the second part of the verifier, a KEM public key
- kem_blind, the third part of the verifier, a secret blinding value of 32 bytes

Parameters:
- KEM, a KEM instance

def GenVerifier(PRS, salt, U, S):
  v, seed = GenVerifierMaterial(PRS, salt, U, S)
  kem_blind = random(32)
  (sk, pk) = KEM.DeriveKeyPair(DeriveKEMSeed(seed, kem_blind))
  return v, pk, kem_blind
]]></artwork>
            <t>The server <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> store pk and kem_blind; it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> store seed.
A fresh kem_blind <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be generated for each registration.
The server sends kem_blind to the client only in encrypted form during password confirmation (<xref target="pwconf"/>), so the client does not need to store it.</t>
            <t>Because the KSF is deliberately expensive, a client <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> compute (v, seed) once and store it in place of PRS, and use the stored values instead of calling GenVerifierMaterial when initiating the protocol.
The stored (v, seed) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be protected in the same way as PRS, since it allows authenticating as the client to that server.</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="client-registration">
            <name>Client Registration</name>
            <t>The registration phase consists of one message sent from the client to the server. This message
contains the verifier (v, pk, kem_blind) and a 32-byte salt.
The server stores this information corresponding to the client for future use in the verification flow.
This phase requires a secure channel from client to server in order to transfer the verifier.
The salt can be sent in plain text.
In some cases, there may not be a secure channel, but the server may already know the password.
In such cases, the server <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> instead choose the salt, compute the verifier on behalf of the client using GenVerifier, store it, and erase the password and the seed.</t>
            <t>We recommend that the salt is a random byte string: <tt>salt = random(32)</tt>.
The client needs the salt before it sends its first protocol message, since the symmetric PAKE already runs over v.
It can store the salt, or derive it from some client-specific value that it knows and can retain locally.
Otherwise, it obtains the salt from the server, which can send it in plain text, in an additional round trip before the protocol starts.
That round trip requires the client to first identify its registration to the server.</t>
            <t>A high level flow overview of the registration flow is below.</t>
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                    <text x="184" y="36">S</text>
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                    <text x="376" y="36">N/A</text>
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                    <text x="56" y="68">pk,</text>
                    <text x="116" y="68">kem_blind)</text>
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                    <text x="436" y="148">kem_blind,</text>
                    <text x="492" y="148">U,</text>
                    <text x="516" y="148">S)</text>
                  </g>
                </svg>
              </artwork>
              <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
Client: PRS, salt, U, S              Server: N/A
       ---------------------------------------
 (v, pk, kem_blind) = GenVerifier(PRS, salt, U, S)
            |                           |
            | salt,v,pk,kem_blind,U,S   |
            |-------------------------->|
            |                           |
            |                Store (salt, v, pk, kem_blind, U, S)
            |                           |
       ---------------------------------------
]]></artwork>
            </artset>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="pwconf">
          <name>Password Confirmation</name>
          <t>Password confirmation is a challenge-response exchange after the symmetric PAKE finishes.
Both parties input the key SK and the transcript hash th output by the symmetric PAKE.
The server must also input the client's registered public key pk and kem_blind, while the client inputs the corresponding seed.
The server creates a challenge in the form of a KEM ciphertext encapsulated for that pk, which it encrypts together with kem_blind using SK.
The client decrypts both using SK and proves that it can decapsulate the ciphertext.
It does so by deriving the KEM's secret decapsulation key from the seed and kem_blind.
Since kem_blind reaches the client in encrypted form, the time the client takes to derive the KEM key pair does not help an attacker that does not know the verifier to perform offline password guessing (<xref target="timing-and-tempo"/>).
The challenge also contains client_confirm, which depends on SK and on the encapsulated key.
It lets the client check that the server knows both, which requires the full verifier (v, pk, kem_blind) or the password.</t>
          <t>The state returned by Challenge holds the server's candidate session key.
This key <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be released to the calling application, used to protect traffic, or otherwise acted upon before Verify has confirmed the client's response.
Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> keep the state opaque so that server_key is reachable only as the return value of Verify.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
PC.Challenge

Input:
- SK, the key output by the symmetric PAKE, a byte string
- th, the transcript hash output by the symmetric PAKE, a byte string
- pk, part of the client's registered verifier, a KEM public key
- kem_blind, part of the client's registered verifier, a byte string of 32 bytes

Output:
- state, opaque state for the server to store
- challenge, a protocol message for the server to send to the client

Parameters:
- KEM, a KEM instance
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def Challenge(SK, th, pk, kem_blind):
  (k, c) = KEM.Encaps(pk)
  r = KDF.Expand(SK, DST || "OTP", Nct + 32)
  enc_c = XOR(c || kem_blind, r)

  prk_pc = KDF.Extract(SK, DST || "PC" || th || enc_c || k)
  client_confirm = KDF.Expand(prk_pc, DST || "client_confirm", Nkc)
  server_confirm = KDF.Expand(prk_pc, DST || "server_confirm", Nkc)
  server_key = KDF.Expand(prk_pc, DST || "key", Nkey)

  th_out = TH("PC", th, enc_c, client_confirm, server_confirm)
  challenge = (enc_c, client_confirm)

  return State(server_confirm, server_key, th_out), challenge
]]></artwork>
          <t>The client decrypts the KEM ciphertext and kem_blind using SK, re-derives the KEM key pair from the seed and kem_blind, and decapsulates the ciphertext to derive the password confirmation values and its session key.
It aborts if the server-provided confirmation value does not match its own.
Otherwise, it returns its session key, its own confirmation value, and the transcript hash.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
PC.Respond

Input:
- SK, the key output by the symmetric PAKE, a byte string
- th, the transcript hash output by the symmetric PAKE, a byte string
- seed, seed used to derive the KEM key pair during registration
- challenge, the server's password confirmation challenge

Output:
- client_key, a byte string of Nkey bytes
- server_confirm, a protocol message for the client to send to the server, a byte string of Nkc bytes
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Exceptions:
- AuthenticationError, raised when the password confirmation values do not match

Parameters:
- KEM, a KEM instance
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

def Respond(SK, th, seed, challenge):
  (enc_c, client_confirm_target) = challenge

  r = KDF.Expand(SK, DST || "OTP", Nct + 32)
  c_and_blind = XOR(enc_c, r)
  c = c_and_blind[0:Nct]
  kem_blind = c_and_blind[Nct:Nct + 32]

  (sk, pk) = KEM.DeriveKeyPair(DeriveKEMSeed(seed, kem_blind))

  try:
    k = KEM.Decaps(c, sk)
  catch DecapsError:
    raise AuthenticationError

  prk_pc = KDF.Extract(SK, DST || "PC" || th || enc_c || k)
  client_confirm = KDF.Expand(prk_pc, DST || "client_confirm", Nkc)
  if client_confirm != client_confirm_target:
    raise AuthenticationError

  server_confirm = KDF.Expand(prk_pc, DST || "server_confirm", Nkc)
  client_key = KDF.Expand(prk_pc, DST || "key", Nkey)
  th_out = TH("PC", th, enc_c, client_confirm, server_confirm)

  return client_key, server_confirm, th_out
]]></artwork>
          <t>Upon receipt of the response, the server validates that the password confirmation
value matches its own value. If the value does not match, the server aborts.
Otherwise, the server outputs its session key and the transcript hash.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
PC.Verify

Input:
- state, opaque state produced by Challenge
- server_confirm_target, the client's response, a byte string

Output:
- server_key, a byte string of Nkey bytes
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Exceptions:
- AuthenticationError, raised when the password confirmation values do not match

def Verify(state, server_confirm_target):
  (server_confirm, server_key, th_out) = state
  if server_confirm != server_confirm_target:
    raise AuthenticationError
  return server_key, th_out
]]></artwork>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oquakeplus">
        <name>OQUAKE+ Protocol</name>
        <t>OQUAKE+ is the augmented PAKE obtained by applying the transformation of <xref target="apake-transform"/> to OQUAKE (<xref target="oquake"/>).
The client initiates OQUAKE, and the server sends its password confirmation challenge together with its OQUAKE response, so the protocol consists of three messages.</t>
        <t>A high level overview of OQUAKE+ is below.</t>
        <artset>
          <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="416" width="552" viewBox="0 0 552 416" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
              <path d="M 104,96 L 104,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 104,288 L 104,376" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 136,256 L 136,264" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 384,72 L 384,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 384,192 L 384,336" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 88,64 L 400,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 112,128 L 376,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 112,224 L 376,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 112,320 L 376,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 88,384 L 400,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="384,320 372,314.4 372,325.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,376,320)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="384,128 372,122.4 372,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,376,128)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="120,224 108,218.4 108,229.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,112,224)"/>
              <g class="text">
                <text x="32" y="36">Client:</text>
                <text x="180" y="36">PRS,salt,U,S,pub_ctx,sec_ctx</text>
                <text x="344" y="36">Server:</text>
                <text x="440" y="36">v,pk,kem_blind,</text>
                <text x="440" y="52">pub_ctx,sec_ctx</text>
                <text x="20" y="84">ctx,</text>
                <text x="60" y="84">msg1</text>
                <text x="88" y="84">=</text>
                <text x="152" y="84">OQUAKE+.Init(</text>
                <text x="60" y="100">PRS,salt,U</text>
                <text x="180" y="100">S,pub_ctx,sec_ctx)</text>
                <text x="244" y="116">msg1</text>
                <text x="260" y="164">ctx,</text>
                <text x="300" y="164">msg2</text>
                <text x="328" y="164">=</text>
                <text x="404" y="164">OQUAKE+.Respond(</text>
                <text x="404" y="180">v,pub_ctx,sec_ctx,msg1,pk,kem_blind)</text>
                <text x="244" y="212">msg2</text>
                <text x="48" y="260">client_key,</text>
                <text x="116" y="260">msg3</text>
                <text x="156" y="260">th</text>
                <text x="176" y="260">=</text>
                <text x="116" y="276">OQUAKE+.Finish(ctx,msg2)</text>
                <text x="244" y="308">msg3</text>
                <text x="184" y="356">server_key,</text>
                <text x="244" y="356">th</text>
                <text x="264" y="356">=</text>
                <text x="372" y="356">OQUAKE+.Verify(ctx,msg3)</text>
                <text x="384" y="372">|</text>
                <text x="76" y="404">output</text>
                <text x="152" y="404">client_key,</text>
                <text x="212" y="404">th</text>
                <text x="348" y="404">output</text>
                <text x="424" y="404">server_key,</text>
                <text x="484" y="404">th</text>
              </g>
            </svg>
          </artwork>
          <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
Client: PRS,salt,U,S,pub_ctx,sec_ctx   Server: v,pk,kem_blind,
                                               pub_ctx,sec_ctx
          ----------------------------------------
ctx, msg1 = OQUAKE+.Init(                      |
  PRS,salt,U,S,pub_ctx,sec_ctx)                |
            |               msg1               |
            |--------------------------------->|
            |                                  |
            |                 ctx, msg2 = OQUAKE+.Respond(
            |                   v,pub_ctx,sec_ctx,msg1,pk,kem_blind)
            |                                  |
            |               msg2               |
            |<---------------------------------|
            |                                  |
client_key, msg3, th =                         |
  OQUAKE+.Finish(ctx,msg2)                     |
            |                                  |
            |               msg3               |
            |--------------------------------->|
            |                                  |
            |    server_key, th = OQUAKE+.Verify(ctx,msg3)
            |                                  |
          ----------------------------------------
      output client_key, th             output server_key, th
]]></artwork>
        </artset>
        <t>OQUAKE+ is parameterized by a BUA-sKEM, KEM, KDF, and KSF; see <xref target="config-oquakeplus"/> for the <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> configurations.
The byte-level encoding of the OQUAKE+ protocol messages is specified in <xref target="encodings"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="initiation-1">
          <name>Initiation</name>
          <t>Init derives the verifier material from the client's password (<xref target="gen-verifiers"/>) and initiates OQUAKE with v in place of PRS.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
OQUAKE+.Init

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- salt, client-specific salt, a byte string
- U and S, client and server identifiers used at registration
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string

Output:
- state, opaque state for the initiator to store
- msg, a protocol message for the initiator to send to the responder

Parameters:
- OQUAKE, parameterized instance of OQUAKE

def Init(PRS, salt, U, S, public_context, secret_context):
  (v, seed) = GenVerifierMaterial(PRS, salt, U, S)
  ctx, msg = OQUAKE.Init(v, public_context, secret_context)
  return State(ctx, seed), msg
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="response-1">
          <name>Response</name>
          <t>The server responds to OQUAKE and challenges the client to confirm its password.
As described in <xref target="pwconf"/>, the server_key held in the returned state <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used before Verify succeeds.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
OQUAKE+.Respond

Input:
- v, part of the client's registered verifier, a byte string of Nv bytes
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string
- init_msg, the initiator's protocol message
- pk, part of the client's registered verifier, a KEM public key
- kem_blind, part of the client's registered verifier, a byte string of 32 bytes

Output:
- state, opaque state for the server to store values to complete the protocol
- resp_msg, a protocol message for the responder to send to the initiator

Parameters:
- OQUAKE, parameterized instance of OQUAKE
- PC, password confirmation ({{pwconf}})

def Respond(v, public_context, secret_context, init_msg, pk, kem_blind):
  oquake_resp, SK, th = OQUAKE.Respond(v, public_context, secret_context, init_msg)
  state, challenge = PC.Challenge(SK, th, pk, kem_blind)
  resp_msg = (oquake_resp, challenge)
  return state, resp_msg
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="oquakeplus-finish">
          <name>Finish</name>
          <t>As part of Finish, the client finishes OQUAKE and responds to the password confirmation challenge.
It raises an AuthenticationError if password confirmation fails.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
OQUAKE+.Finish

Input:
- state, opaque state produced by Init
- resp_msg, the responder's protocol message

Output:
- client_key, a byte string of Nkey bytes
- response, a protocol message for the client to send to the server
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Exceptions:
- AuthenticationError, raised when the password confirmation values do not match

Parameters:
- OQUAKE, parameterized instance of OQUAKE
- PC, password confirmation ({{pwconf}})

def Finish(state, resp_msg):
  (ctx, seed) = state
  (oquake_resp, challenge) = resp_msg

  SK, th = OQUAKE.Finish(ctx, oquake_resp)

  return PC.Respond(SK, th, seed, challenge)
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="oquakeplus-verify">
          <name>Verify</name>
          <t>Verify checks the client's password confirmation value and outputs the server's session key and the transcript hash.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
OQUAKE+.Verify

Input:
- state, opaque state produced by Respond
- response, the client's response message, a byte string

Output:
- server_key, a byte string of Nkey bytes
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Exceptions:
- AuthenticationError, raised when the password confirmation values do not match

Parameters:
- PC, password confirmation ({{pwconf}})

def Verify(state, response):
  return PC.Verify(state, response)
]]></artwork>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="CPaceOQUAKEplus">
        <name>CPaceOQUAKE+ Protocol</name>
        <t>CPaceOQUAKE+ is the hybrid aPAKE obtained by applying the transformation of <xref target="apake-transform"/> to CPaceOQUAKE (<xref target="CPaceOQUAKE"/>).
It is a five-message aPAKE designed to provide security against both classical and quantum-capable attackers (<xref target="quantum-attackers"/>).
The first three messages are entirely CPaceOQUAKE, while the last two messages are the password confirmation protocol.
To ensure hybrid post-quantum security, the KEM used during password confirmation must be a hybrid KEM.</t>
        <t>Upon successful completion of the entire protocol, the client and server will share a
symmetric key that was authenticated by knowledge of the password. The protocol
aborts if the password did not match.</t>
        <t>A complete protocol flow is shown below. The client needs the salt before the
protocol starts; see <xref target="gen-verifiers"/>.</t>
        <artset>
          <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="576" width="568" viewBox="0 0 568 576" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
              <path d="M 104,96 L 104,240" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 104,288 L 104,424" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 104,464 L 104,536" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 352,336 L 352,344" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 384,72 L 384,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 384,192 L 384,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 384,368 L 384,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 384,448 L 384,496" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 88,64 L 400,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 112,128 L 376,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 112,224 L 376,224" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 112,304 L 376,304" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 112,400 L 376,400" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 112,480 L 376,480" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 88,544 L 400,544" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="384,480 372,474.4 372,485.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,376,480)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="384,304 372,298.4 372,309.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,376,304)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="384,128 372,122.4 372,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,376,128)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="120,400 108,394.4 108,405.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,112,400)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="120,224 108,218.4 108,229.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,112,224)"/>
              <g class="text">
                <text x="32" y="36">Client:</text>
                <text x="180" y="36">PRS,salt,U,S,pub_ctx,sec_ctx</text>
                <text x="344" y="36">Server:</text>
                <text x="440" y="36">v,pk,kem_blind,</text>
                <text x="440" y="52">pub_ctx,sec_ctx</text>
                <text x="20" y="84">ctx,</text>
                <text x="60" y="84">msg1</text>
                <text x="88" y="84">=</text>
                <text x="172" y="84">CPaceOQUAKE+.Init(</text>
                <text x="60" y="100">PRS,salt,U</text>
                <text x="180" y="100">S,pub_ctx,sec_ctx)</text>
                <text x="244" y="116">msg1</text>
                <text x="252" y="164">ctx,</text>
                <text x="292" y="164">msg2</text>
                <text x="320" y="164">=</text>
                <text x="416" y="164">CPaceOQUAKE+.Respond(</text>
                <text x="352" y="180">v,pub_ctx,sec_ctx,msg1)</text>
                <text x="244" y="212">msg2</text>
                <text x="36" y="260">ctx,</text>
                <text x="76" y="260">msg3</text>
                <text x="104" y="260">=</text>
                <text x="240" y="260">CPaceOQUAKE+.InitiatorContinue(</text>
                <text x="80" y="276">ctx,msg2)</text>
                <text x="244" y="292">msg3</text>
                <text x="180" y="340">ctx,</text>
                <text x="220" y="340">msg4</text>
                <text x="248" y="340">=</text>
                <text x="304" y="340">CPaceOQUAKE</text>
                <text x="432" y="340">.ResponderContinue(</text>
                <text x="268" y="356">ctx,msg3,pk,kem_blind)</text>
                <text x="244" y="388">msg4</text>
                <text x="64" y="436">client_key,</text>
                <text x="136" y="436">msg5,</text>
                <text x="172" y="436">th</text>
                <text x="192" y="436">=</text>
                <text x="320" y="436">CPaceOQUAKE+.InitiatorFinish(</text>
                <text x="80" y="452">ctx,msg4)</text>
                <text x="244" y="468">msg5</text>
                <text x="168" y="516">server_key,</text>
                <text x="228" y="516">th</text>
                <text x="248" y="516">=</text>
                <text x="412" y="516">CPaceOQUAKE+.ResponderFinish(ctx,msg5)</text>
                <text x="384" y="532">|</text>
                <text x="76" y="564">output</text>
                <text x="152" y="564">client_key,</text>
                <text x="212" y="564">th</text>
                <text x="348" y="564">output</text>
                <text x="424" y="564">server_key,</text>
                <text x="484" y="564">th</text>
              </g>
            </svg>
          </artwork>
          <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
Client: PRS,salt,U,S,pub_ctx,sec_ctx   Server: v,pk,kem_blind,
                                               pub_ctx,sec_ctx
          ----------------------------------------
ctx, msg1 = CPaceOQUAKE+.Init(                 |
  PRS,salt,U,S,pub_ctx,sec_ctx)                |
            |               msg1               |
            |--------------------------------->|
            |                                  |
            |                ctx, msg2 = CPaceOQUAKE+.Respond(
            |                   v,pub_ctx,sec_ctx,msg1)
            |                                  |
            |               msg2               |
            |<---------------------------------|
            |                                  |
  ctx, msg3 = CPaceOQUAKE+.InitiatorContinue(  |
     ctx,msg2)                                 |
            |               msg3               |
            |--------------------------------->|
            |                                  |
            |       ctx, msg4 = CPaceOQUAKE+.ResponderContinue(
            |         ctx,msg3,pk,kem_blind)
            |                                  |
            |               msg4               |
            |<---------------------------------|
            |                                  |
  client_key, msg5, th = CPaceOQUAKE+.InitiatorFinish(
     ctx,msg4)                                 |
            |               msg5               |
            |--------------------------------->|
            |                                  |
            |  server_key, th = CPaceOQUAKE+.ResponderFinish(ctx,msg5)
            |                                  |
          ----------------------------------------
      output client_key, th             output server_key, th
]]></artwork>
        </artset>
        <t>The protocol has six functions. Init, InitiatorContinue, and InitiatorFinish are
intended to be called by the client, and Respond, ResponderContinue, and
ResponderFinish are intended to be called by the server. The byte-level encoding
of the protocol messages is specified in <xref target="encodings"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="client-initiation-1">
          <name>Client Initiation</name>
          <t>Init derives the verifier material from the client's password (<xref target="gen-verifiers"/>)
and initiates CPaceOQUAKE with the verifier's v instead of PRS.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE+.Init

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- salt, client-specific salt, a byte string
- U and S, client and server identifiers used at registration
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string

Output:
- state, opaque state for the initiator to store
- msg, a protocol message for the initiator to send to the responder

Parameters:
- CPaceOQUAKE, parameterized instance of CPaceOQUAKE

def Init(PRS, salt, U, S, public_context, secret_context):
  (v, seed) = GenVerifierMaterial(PRS, salt, U, S)
  ctx, msg = CPaceOQUAKE.Init(v, public_context, secret_context)
  return State(ctx, v, seed, public_context, secret_context), msg
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="server-response-1">
          <name>Server Response</name>
          <t>Respond responds to CPaceOQUAKE using the verifier's v instead of PRS.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE+.Respond

Input:
- v, part of the client's registered verifier, a byte string of Nv bytes
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string
- init_msg, the message received from the client

Output:
- state, opaque state for the responder to store
- msg, a protocol message for the responder to send to the initiator

Parameters:
- CPaceOQUAKE, parameterized instance of CPaceOQUAKE

def Respond(v, public_context, secret_context, init_msg):
  ctx, msg = CPaceOQUAKE.Respond(v, public_context, secret_context, init_msg)
  return ctx, msg
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="client-continue">
          <name>Client Continue</name>
          <t>InitiatorContinue completes CPaceOQUAKE.
The client retains the resulting key SK and transcript hash th for password confirmation.
SK <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used as a session key.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE+.InitiatorContinue

Input:
- state, the state generated by CPaceOQUAKE+.Init
- msg2, the message received from the server

Output:
- state, opaque state for the initiator to store
- msg, a protocol message for the initiator to send to the responder

Parameters:
- CPaceOQUAKE, parameterized instance of CPaceOQUAKE

def InitiatorContinue(state, msg2):
  (ctx, v, seed, public_context, secret_context) = state
  SK, msg, th = CPaceOQUAKE.InitiatorFinish(v, public_context, secret_context,
                                            ctx, msg2)
  return State(SK, th, seed), msg
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="server-continue">
          <name>Server Continue</name>
          <t>ResponderContinue completes CPaceOQUAKE and challenges the client to confirm its password, using the password confirmation protocol as described in <xref target="pwconf"/>.
The server_key held in the returned state <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used before ResponderFinish succeeds.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE+.ResponderContinue

Input:
- state, the state generated by CPaceOQUAKE+.Respond
- msg3, the message received from the client
- pk, part of the client's registered verifier, a KEM public key
- kem_blind, part of the client's registered verifier, a byte string of 32 bytes

Output:
- state, opaque state for the responder to store
- msg, a protocol message for the responder to send to the initiator

Parameters:
- CPaceOQUAKE, parameterized instance of CPaceOQUAKE
- PC, password confirmation ({{pwconf}})

def ResponderContinue(state, msg3, pk, kem_blind):
  SK, th = CPaceOQUAKE.ResponderFinish(state, msg3)
  return PC.Challenge(SK, th, pk, kem_blind)
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="client-finish-1">
          <name>Client Finish</name>
          <t>The client responds to the password confirmation challenge, obtaining the CPaceOQUAKE+ session key, the confirmation value it sends to the server, and the transcript hash.
The client aborts if the server's password confirmation value does not verify.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE+.InitiatorFinish

Input:
- state, the state generated by CPaceOQUAKE+.InitiatorContinue
- msg4, the message received from the server

Output:
- client_key, a shared secret of Nkey bytes
- msg, a protocol message for the initiator to send to the responder
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Exceptions:
- AuthenticationError, raised when the password confirmation values do not match

Parameters:
- PC, password confirmation ({{pwconf}})

def InitiatorFinish(state, msg4):
  (SK, th, seed) = state
  return PC.Respond(SK, th, seed, msg4)
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="server-finish-1">
          <name>Server Finish</name>
          <t>The server finishes the protocol by verifying the client's password confirmation value, and outputs the session key and the transcript hash.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
CPaceOQUAKE+.ResponderFinish

Input:
- state, the state generated by CPaceOQUAKE+.ResponderContinue
- msg5, the message received from the client

Output:
- server_key, a shared secret of Nkey bytes
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Exceptions:
- AuthenticationError, raised when the password confirmation values do not match

Parameters:
- PC, password confirmation ({{pwconf}})

def ResponderFinish(state, msg5):
  return PC.Verify(state, msg5)
]]></artwork>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="configurations">
      <name>Configurations</name>
      <t>The PAKEs in this document are instantiated by selecting cryptographic components,
such as a KEM, BUA-sKEM, KDF, and KSF. Since the augmented PAKEs may have duplicate components
they are distinguished by "PC-" and "PAKE-" prefixes, e.g., PC-KDF and
PC-KSF belong to the PAKE-to-aPAKE transformation (<xref target="apake-transform"/>).</t>
      <t>This section gives <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> configurations for each of the four protocols specified in this document, in order of preference.
<xref target="test-vectors"/> contains test vectors for the first configuration of each protocol.
The preferred configuration of each protocol uses ML-KEM-1024 in OQUAKE, which provides a larger security margin (<xref target="params-oquake"/>).
Where CPace is used, it uses X25519, CPace's primary recommended suite, and CPaceOQUAKE+ uses X-Wing as the password confirmation KEM.
The configurations with ML-KEM-768 can be considered when the bandwidth cost would otherwise be too high.
Each configuration has an identifier containing the protocol name, CPace group (if any), BUA-sKEM, and password confirmation KEM (if any), each in lowercase and without punctuation.</t>
      <t>The configurations are nested in the same way as the protocols themselves.
Each names only the components the protocol uses, and a protocol that builds on another inherits that protocol's entries.
As a result, each CPaceOQUAKE+ configuration combines the entries of the corresponding CPaceOQUAKE and OQUAKE+ configurations, with a hybrid KEM in place of ML-KEM as the password confirmation KEM.</t>
      <t>The parameters in <xref target="config-params"/> are common to all configurations.</t>
      <t>Each DST below is a randomly generated 32-byte string, given in hexadecimal.
When one protocol builds on another, the DST of the outermost configuration applies
throughout, including within the inner protocols. The DST
values below are therefore alternatives, not values to be combined: an
implementation of CPaceOQUAKE+ uses the CPaceOQUAKE+ DST for CPace, OQUAKE, and
password confirmation alike.</t>
      <section anchor="config-params">
        <name>Common Parameters</name>
        <t>The <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> parameters, common to all configurations below, are (see
<xref target="params"/>):</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Nv = 32 (used only by the augmented protocols, OQUAKE+ and CPaceOQUAKE+)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Nkc = 32</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Nr = 64</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Nkey = 32</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="config-oquake">
        <name>OQUAKE</name>
        <t>OQUAKE (<xref target="oquake"/>) is a symmetric PAKE, so it requires neither a verifier-deriving
KSF nor the KEM used for password confirmation. Because only one KDF is present,
no prefix is needed.</t>
        <section anchor="config-oquake-mlbuaskem1024">
          <name>OQUAKE with ML-KEM-1024</name>
          <t>This is the preferred configuration (<xref target="params-oquake"/>).</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>oquake-mlbuaskem1024</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-1024 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: 601ed384c5775ddd3021f51a4660fff24bf4eaa7845a958b2cade75289d184cd</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="config-oquake-mlbuaskem768">
          <name>OQUAKE with ML-KEM-768</name>
          <t>This configuration can be considered when the bandwidth cost would otherwise be too high.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>oquake-mlbuaskem768</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-768 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: ca45261d9fe329b856389ebbf7f37ffa76c0034d8fc356454e1291d7d23e2045</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="config-oquakeplus">
        <name>OQUAKE+</name>
        <t>OQUAKE+ (<xref target="oquakeplus"/>) applies the PAKE-to-aPAKE transformation to OQUAKE, which
introduces the KEM used to carry the confirmation challenge and the KSF used to
derive v and the seed at registration. It therefore extends
<xref target="config-oquake"/> with the "PC-" entries, and the OQUAKE KDF takes the "PAKE-"
prefix to distinguish it from the password confirmation KDF. Both configurations use the
same ML-KEM parameter set in OQUAKE and for password confirmation.</t>
        <section anchor="config-oquakeplus-mlbuaskem1024-mlkem1024">
          <name>OQUAKE+ with ML-KEM-1024</name>
          <t>This is the preferred configuration (<xref target="params-oquake"/>).</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>oquakeplus-mlbuaskem1024-mlkem1024</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-1024 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PAKE-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>KEM: ML-KEM-1024 <xref target="FIPS203"/>, where Nseed = 64, Nct = 1568, and Npk = 1568.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KSF: scrypt(N = 32768, r = 8, p = 1)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: 284e89132c00ba4f49e66d0af9e63c4c8efa701ce4b66bb6fcf1ce9cc5c35be1</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="config-oquakeplus-mlbuaskem768-mlkem768">
          <name>OQUAKE+ with ML-KEM-768</name>
          <t>This configuration can be considered when the bandwidth cost would otherwise be too high.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>oquakeplus-mlbuaskem768-mlkem768</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-768 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PAKE-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>KEM: ML-KEM-768 <xref target="FIPS203"/>, where Nseed = 64, Nct = 1088, and Npk = 1184.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KSF: scrypt(N = 32768, r = 8, p = 1) <xref target="SCRYPT"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: 2a1a96e307871d45a9739c7193eeb04d6f52d17c67a52f762e5aae17df1ee5e6</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="config-cpaceoquake">
        <name>CPaceOQUAKE</name>
        <t>CPaceOQUAKE (<xref target="CPaceOQUAKE"/>) runs CPace as Stage 1 and OQUAKE as Stage 2, so it extends <xref target="config-oquake"/> with the CPace group and hash.
The first two configurations use CPace's primary recommended suite.
The third uses P-384, the curve of the hybrid KEM in the corresponding CPaceOQUAKE+ configuration.</t>
        <section anchor="config-cpaceoquake-x25519-mlbuaskem1024">
          <name>CPaceOQUAKE with X25519 and ML-KEM-1024</name>
          <t>This is the preferred configuration: it uses ML-KEM-1024 in OQUAKE (<xref target="params-oquake"/>) and CPace's primary recommended suite.
This corresponds to the <tt>oquake-mlbuaskem1024</tt> configuration.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>cpaceoquake-x25519-mlbuaskem1024</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Group: CPACE-X25519-SHA512 <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="CPACE"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Hash: SHA-512</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-1024 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PAKE-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: 443e3089985f0f8dddfb20cc5e8618f447bdcfe6dd39abb23911cd784c075120</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="config-cpaceoquake-x25519-mlbuaskem768">
          <name>CPaceOQUAKE with X25519 and ML-KEM-768</name>
          <t>This configuration can be considered when the bandwidth cost would otherwise be too high.
This corresponds to the <tt>oquake-mlbuaskem768</tt> configuration.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>cpaceoquake-x25519-mlbuaskem768</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Group: CPACE-X25519-SHA512 <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="CPACE"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Hash: SHA-512</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-768 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PAKE-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: c2ef9d7f73324735ec5614f331fa49c86c05be3430996c46816fca59d778380b</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="config-cpaceoquake-p384-mlbuaskem1024">
          <name>CPaceOQUAKE with P-384 and ML-KEM-1024</name>
          <t>This configuration uses P-384, the curve of the hybrid KEM in <tt>cpaceoquakeplus-p384-mlbuaskem1024-mlkem1024p384</tt>.
This corresponds to the <tt>oquake-mlbuaskem1024</tt> configuration.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>cpaceoquake-p384-mlbuaskem1024</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Group: CPACE-P384<em>XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_NU</em>-SHA384 <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="CPACE"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Hash: SHA-384</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-1024 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PAKE-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: 1c8604e01071bc2bee8e4132399ded88a9f83c23ed8ab7130d2d2e0b597c0fb5</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="config-cpaceoquakeplus">
        <name>CPaceOQUAKE+</name>
        <t>CPaceOQUAKE+ (<xref target="CPaceOQUAKEplus"/>) applies the PAKE-to-aPAKE transformation to CPaceOQUAKE.
Since it targets hybrid security, its password confirmation KEM is a hybrid KEM.</t>
        <section anchor="config-cpaceoquakeplus-x25519-mlbuaskem1024-xwing">
          <name>CPaceOQUAKE+ with X25519, ML-KEM-1024, and X-Wing</name>
          <t>This is the preferred configuration: it uses ML-KEM-1024 in OQUAKE (<xref target="params-oquake"/>) and CPace's primary recommended suite.
This corresponds to the <tt>cpaceoquake-x25519-mlbuaskem1024</tt> configuration.
Note that it requires both ML-KEM-1024 and ML-KEM-768.
The latter is used by X-Wing.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>cpaceoquakeplus-x25519-mlbuaskem1024-xwing</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Group: CPACE-X25519-SHA512 <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="CPACE"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Hash: SHA-512</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-1024 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PAKE-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>KEM: X-Wing <xref target="XWING"/>, where Nseed = 32, Nct = 1120, and Npk = 1216.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KSF: scrypt(N = 32768, r = 8, p = 1)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: 7de162c387ba1bad9c790e7e56bd245d6753d045185cbc3972eba34ddac1a9db</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="config-cpaceoquakeplus-p384-mlbuaskem1024-mlkem1024p384">
          <name>CPaceOQUAKE+ with P-384, ML-KEM-1024, and MLKEM1024-P384</name>
          <t>This configuration can be considered when a single ML-KEM parameter set and a single curve are preferred: it uses ML-KEM-1024 and P-384 throughout.
This corresponds to the <tt>cpaceoquake-p384-mlbuaskem1024</tt> configuration.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>cpaceoquakeplus-p384-mlbuaskem1024-mlkem1024p384</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Group: CPACE-P384<em>XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_NU</em>-SHA384 <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="CPACE"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Hash: SHA-384</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-1024 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PAKE-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>KEM: MLKEM1024-P384 <xref target="CONCRETE-HYBRID-KEMS"/>, where Nseed = 32, Nct = 1665, and Npk = 1665.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KSF: scrypt(N = 32768, r = 8, p = 1)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: d8fcdaf8c2c8c429a2ff93ff658d07050017487dc367d11cabb54f2a7dd2b5fd</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="config-cpaceoquakeplus-x25519-mlbuaskem768-xwing">
          <name>CPaceOQUAKE+ with X25519, ML-KEM-768, and X-Wing</name>
          <t>This configuration can be considered when the bandwidth cost would otherwise be too high.
This corresponds to the <tt>cpaceoquake-x25519-mlbuaskem768</tt> configuration.</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Identifier: <tt>cpaceoquakeplus-x25519-mlbuaskem768-xwing</tt></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Group: CPACE-X25519-SHA512 <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="CPACE"/></t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>CPace-Hash: SHA-512</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-768 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PAKE-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>KEM: X-Wing <xref target="XWING"/>, where Nseed = 32, Nct = 1120, and Npk = 1216.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>PC-KSF: scrypt(N = 32768, r = 8, p = 1)</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>DST: 07d746a69c979f51e46d0051f0878a05ac5ec457d93c72ec6b814f528aae46f2</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="defining-new-configurations">
        <name>Defining New Configurations</name>
        <t>Other documents can define configurations as needed for their use case, subject to the following requirements:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>When targeting hybrid security, KEM <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a hybrid KEM, i.e., one that achieves both classical and post-quantum security.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The parameters must be chosen so they correspond with this KEM. E.g., Nseed must have the correct length.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A configuration <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> specify every component used by the protocol it configures,
as listed in the corresponding subsection above.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>DST <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be a randomly generated 32-byte string, distinct from the DST of any
other configuration.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A configuration <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> meet the following minimums, which follow from the analysis in <xref target="params"/>:
            </t>
            <ul spacing="normal">
              <li>
                <t>The BUA-sKEM and the KEM achieve b &gt;= 128 against both classical and quantum
attackers (<xref target="params-oquake"/>), which excludes ML-KEM-512.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>Nr &gt;= 64, Nkc &gt;= 32, Nv &gt;= 32, and Nkey &gt;= 32.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>The CPace hash produces at least 32 bytes.</t>
              </li>
              <li>
                <t>For ML-BUA-sKEM, Kemeleon.t &gt;= 132, or another encoding whose statistical distance
from uniform is at most 2^-128 per public key (<xref target="params-oquake"/>).</t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>It is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that a configuration of CPaceOQUAKE+ use the same curve in CPace and in the hybrid password confirmation KEM.
Using the same ML-KEM parameter set in OQUAKE and in the password confirmation KEM further reduces code size.</t>
        <t>For instance, one possible additional configuration for CPaceOQUAKE+ uses P-256 throughout:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>CPace-Group: CPACE-P256<em>XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_NU</em>-SHA256 <xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="CPACE"/></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>CPace-Hash: SHA-256</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>BUA-sKEM: ML-BUA-sKEM-768 (<xref target="tab-ml-bua-skem"/>)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>PAKE-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>KEM: MLKEM768-P256 <xref target="CONCRETE-HYBRID-KEMS"/>, where Nseed = 32, Nct = 1153, and Npk = 1249.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>PC-KDF: HKDF-SHA-256</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>PC-KSF: scrypt(N = 32768, r = 8, p = 1)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>DST: 38a518ec4b20d388f06504e78d6307b000f11e82fa3e5ff575b526129cf70953</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-considerations">
      <name>Implementation Considerations</name>
      <t>Some functions included in this specification are fallible (as noted by their ability
to raise exceptions). The explicit errors generated
throughout this specification, along with conditions that lead to each error,
are as follows:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>AuthenticationError: Password confirmation fails at the client or server;
<xref target="pwconf"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>CPaceError: An invalid value, such as a point that yields the group identity,
was encountered in the CPace stage; <xref target="cpace"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>EncapsError: KEM encapsulation failed; <xref target="deps-kem"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>DecapsError: KEM decapsulation failed; <xref target="deps-kem"/></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Note that a decapsulation failure inside OQUAKE.Finish (<xref target="quake-finish"/>) is not
surfaced as a DecapsError. As described in <xref target="quake-finish"/>, OQUAKE.Finish returns
a random key in that case so that a failure is indistinguishable from a mismatched
password. Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> convert this into a distinguishable error, as
doing so would leak whether the peer holds the correct PRS.</t>
      <t>The KEMs in the configurations of this document use implicit rejection: decapsulating a
ciphertext of the correct length does not fail, but yields an unrelated key. A DecapsError
therefore only results from malformed input.</t>
      <t>Similarly, ML-BUA-sKEM.Encaps does not fail, because Kemeleon.DecodeEk outputs a valid ML-KEM
encapsulation key for every input of Npk bytes. In password confirmation, KEM.Encaps fails only
if the registered public key pk is not a valid public key, which the server can check when it
stores the verifier.</t>
      <t>Beyond these explicit errors, CPaceOQUAKE+ implementations can produce implicit errors.
For example, if protocol messages sent between client and server do not match
their expected size, an implementation should produce an error.</t>
      <t>The errors in this document are meant as a guide for implementors. They are not an
exhaustive list of all the errors an implementation might emit. For example, an
implementation might run out of memory.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This section discusses security considerations for the protocols specified in
this document.</t>
      <section anchor="hybrid-design">
        <name>Hybrid Design</name>
        <t>CPaceOQUAKE and CPaceOQUAKE+ are hybrid PAKE protocols, meaning that the overall
protocol remains secure so long as either the classical assumptions underlying
CPace, i.e., the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption, or the post-quantum assumptions,
i.e., D-MLWE used by OQUAKE, hold. This protects against vulnerabilities in
either the classical or post-quantum components.</t>
        <t>Moreover, OQUAKE does not unconditionally hide the password: an attacker that
can break the D-MLWE assumption can distinguish ML-KEM public keys and
ciphertexts from random bitstrings, and can therefore mount an offline
dictionary attack against the OQUAKE transcript. <xref target="retroactive-recovery"/> treats
this failure mode, and its consequences for both the password and the session
key, in general terms; the sequential composition described in
<xref target="CPaceOQUAKE"/> is what prevents it from applying to the original PRS here,
since OQUAKE receives an effective password derived from (PRS, SK1) rather than
PRS itself.</t>
        <t>The benefits of this hybrid protection come at the cost of protocol and round
complexity. From a protocol perspective, beyond two independent PAKEs treated
nearly as black boxes, additional protocol logic is needed to combine the PAKEs
together and produce a shared secret based on both PAKEs. From a round
perspective, the hybrid PAKE introduces additional round trips, complicating
integration into higher-level protocols like TLS. Finally, the hybrid protocol
is comparatively new and has not yet received significant peer review
(compared to the non-hybrid PAKEs). However, the core sequential-composition
design has been independently analyzed by at least three different groups,
improving overall confidence in the design.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="quantum-attackers">
        <name>Security Against Quantum Attackers</name>
        <t>The security proofs of the protocols in this document are in the universal composability (UC) framework under the classical random oracle model.
<xref target="BJ26"/> shows that OQUAKE-style protocols do not realize the standard UC PAKE functionality against attackers with quantum access to the random oracle, because a simulator cannot extract the password.
Note that this does not lead to an attack that recovers passwords or keys, and <xref target="BJ26"/> does prove stand-alone game-based security in the quantum random oracle model for a closely related protocol.
CPace is only quantum-annoying <xref target="ES21"/>: a quantum attacker must solve a discrete logarithm per password guess.
The security of CPaceOQUAKE and CPaceOQUAKE+ against quantum attackers therefore relies on that of OQUAKE.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="retroactive-recovery">
        <name>Retroactive Password and Session Key Recovery</name>
        <t>A PAKE is unconditionally password hiding if its protocol messages remain statistically
independent of the password even when every computational assumption underlying the PAKE fails.
Few efficient PAKEs achieve this: CPace does, but
OQUAKE does not, and this is true of PAKEs generally, not just the ones specified in this document.
This property is what makes CPace safe to use as the first stage of a sequential combiner: its
output key is never subjected to a verification check on its own, so an attacker who breaks the
Diffie-Hellman assumption learns nothing from the CPace messages alone. It does not, by itself,
mean that a session key derived by CPace stays safe once it <em>is</em> checked against something -- e.g.,
confirmed directly, or used to encrypt subsequent traffic, as happens in an ordinary standalone
deployment. This section generalizes that latter observation into a broader principle and uses it
to answer two concrete questions: which classical PAKEs allow a quantum-capable attacker to
retroactively recover a session when deployed this ordinary way, and does the same hold for
EKE-style PAKEs.</t>
        <t>The general principle is this: for any PAKE that is not unconditionally password hiding, breaking
its underlying computational assumption -- whether that happens contemporaneously or, as with a
future quantum computer, retroactively against a transcript recorded today -- allows an attacker
to mount an offline dictionary attack against that transcript, provided the attacker also has some
way to check a candidate password against it. In practice that check comes for free: an explicit
password-confirmation message, present in most aPAKEs, serves directly as the check, and even
without one, any subsequent application traffic encrypted under the resulting session key serves
the same purpose. Once the attacker recovers the password this way, two consequences follow. First,
the attacker can derive the session key of the harvested session and decrypt its traffic, exactly
as in ordinary Harvest Now, Decrypt Later against unauthenticated key exchange. Second, and unlike
that ordinary case, the attacker also now holds a long-lived credential: they can impersonate the
client in every future session until the password is changed. Retroactive password recovery is
therefore strictly worse for a PAKE than HNDL is for plain key exchange, which is why deploying a
post-quantum KEM only at the transport layer, as discussed in <xref target="related-work"/>, does not address
the risk that a classical PAKE poses on its own.</t>
        <t>This principle applies directly to classical Diffie-Hellman-based PAKEs, including CPace, SPAKE2,
and SPAKE2+, when deployed in the ordinary way, i.e., with the resulting session key confirmed or
used directly, rather than fed onward as an opaque input to a second PAKE stage as in
<xref target="CPaceOQUAKE"/>: their protocol messages are deterministic functions of a
password-derived generator and per-session exponents, so a quantum-capable attacker able to solve
the discrete logarithm or Diffie-Hellman problem can, for each candidate password, recompute the
generator, recompute the candidate shared secret from the recorded messages, and check it against
the verification signal described above. SPAKE2+ is a sharper case:
its password-derived offset is applied to fixed, standardized constant
points (commonly written M and N) shared by every server and session on a given group, rather than
to a fresh per-session generator as in CPace. Solving a single discrete logarithm instance for that
group -- e.g., the discrete log of M or N, using a quantum computer, even a slow one -- therefore
yields a capability reusable against any server using that group: a single live exchange with the
server, plus a confirmation or subsequent-traffic verification signal, is then enough to
brute-force the password offline with classical computation alone.</t>
        <t>This principle applies equally to EKE-style PAKEs, including one-encryption (OEKE)
variants such as the KEM-based compiler OQUAKE: the first protocol flow
is a password-encrypted public key, so an attacker who recovers the password by breaking
the KEM's hardness assumption (D-MLWE, for the ML-KEM-based instantiation in this document) can
decrypt that flow and derive the identical session key an honest party would. The password-hiding
failure of OQUAKE described in <xref target="hybrid-design"/> is the concrete
instance of this general EKE-style argument for the specific construction used in this document.</t>
        <t>This is precisely why the sequential hybrid composition specified in this document is valuable:
an attacker must break both a classical and a post-quantum hard problem simultaneously to
retroactively recover the password protected by CPaceOQUAKE(+), a strictly stronger guarantee than
any single-primitive PAKE, classical or post-quantum alone, can offer.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="identities">
        <name>Identities</name>
        <t>Client and server identities are essential to authenticated key exchange protocols,
and PAKEs are no exception. This section discusses the role and importance of
identities in the PAKE protocols specified in this document.</t>
        <section anchor="symmetric-identities">
          <name>Symmetric PAKE identities</name>
          <t>PAKEs are often analyzed in the universal composability (UC) framework,
which imposes several requirements on the protocols: (1) the existence
of a globally-unique session identifier associated with each protocol invocation,
and (2) unique party identifiers. Both are considered as inputs to PAKEs, along
with the password itself. In practice, however, computing or agreeing on session
and party identifiers is non-trivial and cumbersome. For example, agreeing on a
globally unique session identifier requires a protocol to run before the PAKE.
Moreover, assigning identifiers to parties -- especially in symmetric PAKE settings --
is problematic as there are rarely pragmatic choices to be made for each party's
identifier. IP addresses are not always unique, PKI or some other registry
mechanism for assigning names may not exist, and so on.</t>
          <t>Intuitively, in symmetric settings, passwords are the only secret input to the
PAKE protocol; party identities are assumed to be public. As such, an adversary
is assumed to know these identifiers. Fortunately, there exists a UC
model in which symmetric PAKEs such as CPace are proven secure
without requiring party or session identifiers -- the bare PAKE
model <xref target="BARE-PAKE"/>.
The UC bare PAKE model, and proof of security for CPace in this model,
demonstrate that PAKEs are universally composable without relying on
unique party or session identifiers. We believe that the current proof
of security of OQUAKE in <xref target="ABJ25"/> can be extended to show that NoIC,
the basis of OQUAKE, realizes the Bare PAKE model as well, although
we note that this proof has not been published yet.</t>
          <t>As such, for the PAKEs in <xref target="CPaceOQUAKE"/>, both the party and session identifier
are optional. Applications are free to choose values for these identifiers
if applicable, but they are not required for security.</t>
          <t>[[OPEN ISSUE: adjust the requirements for the identities in OQUAKE on the basis on the bare PAKE analysis]]</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="asymmetric-identities">
          <name>Asymmetric PAKE identities</name>
          <t>In contrast to the symmetric PAKE setting, party identities in the asymmetric
PAKE setting play a different role. The very nature of the asymmetric PAKE
is that one server, with many different registered passwords, can authenticate
many different clients. Consequently, when the protocol runs, the server
needs some way to determine which password registration to use in the protocol.
Beyond ensuring that the server is authenticating the correct client, the
client's identity is what helps the server make this selection.</t>
          <t>However, the server identifier carries a similar burden. Indeed,
the server identifier is used to distinguish distinct server instances
from each other so, for example, a client cannot mistakenly authenticate
with server A when communicating with server B. This is especially
important if the client re-uses their identifier across server instances,
since a password registration for server A would then be valid for server B
if the server identity were not incorporated into the protocol.</t>
          <t>Based on this, client and server identities are <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> for the asymmetric
PAKEs specified in this document (<xref target="augmented-pakes"/>). Both
client and server identities can be long-lived, e.g., a client identity
could be an email address and a server identity could be a domain name.</t>
          <t>The identifiers input to GenVerifierMaterial identify the registration. They do not have to be equal to any identifiers in the public_context, which bind an individual session, e.g., to network addresses.</t>
          <t>Practically, applications should be mindful of what happens when these
identities change. Since they are both included in the password verifier
(see <xref target="gen-verifiers"/>), changing either identifier will require the
verifier to be re-computed and the client to be re-registered. For a single
client, this change is minimal, but for a single server, which can have
many registered clients, this change can be expensive. Applications therefore
ought to consider the longevity and uniqueness of their party identifiers
when instantiating these protocols.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="verifier-compromise">
        <name>Verifier Compromise</name>
        <t>An attacker that obtains a client's verifier (v, pk, kem_blind) can perform an offline password guessing attack against it, and it can impersonate the server to that client.
This is inherent to augmented PAKEs.
Such an attacker, however, cannot impersonate the client without first recovering the password, which requires the seed (or a decapsulation key for this pk).
An attacker that knows v but not both pk and kem_blind can complete the symmetric PAKE, but it cannot pass password confirmation in either role:
computing client_confirm requires encapsulating to the key pair that the client derives, which requires pk and kem_blind, and computing server_confirm requires the seed.
Since an attacker that knows v can send the client ciphertexts of its choice, the KEM must be IND-CCA secure (<xref target="deps-kem"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="timing-and-tempo">
        <name>Timing Attacks and Tempo</name>
        <t>OQUAKE (without the fix from <xref target="TEMPO"/>) is subject to a timing attack
due to how the ML-KEM expands the key-generation seed (rho) to a matrix (A).
An internal function — SampleNTT — uses rejection sampling based on the seed
and therefore is variable time. In NoIC / OQUAKE, after a sender password-encrypts
a public key, an attacker can perform an offline dictionary attack based on
this key in the following way:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Password-decrypt the authenticated public key using a candidate password.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Time the seed-to-matrix expansion step using this candidate public key and
compare it against the known timing target.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The Tempo fix addresses this issue by ensuring that input to SampleNTT is not
secret-dependent.</t>
        <t>The PAKE-to-aPAKE transformation (<xref target="apake-transform"/>) faces a similar issue.
The client derives its KEM key pair from a seed that is derived from the password, and for the ML-KEM-based KEMs in this document, both key derivation and decapsulation expand a matrix derived from that seed using variable-time rejection sampling.
If the seed depended only on public information and the password, then an attacker that measures this time could perform an offline password guessing attack.
The PAKE-to-aPAKE transformation therefore derives the key pair from the seed and kem_blind, a secret random part of the verifier that the server sends to the client.
To ensure that the attacker does not observe kem_blind, it is encrypted with a key derived from the symmetric PAKE's session key (<xref target="pwconf"/>).
An attacker that does not hold the verifier does not know kem_blind and cannot relate the timing to a password guess.
Note that an attacker that knows v can make the client use a kem_blind of its choice, but such an attacker can already perform an offline password guessing attack against v.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="related-work">
        <name>Related Work</name>
        <t>This section relates the protocols in this document to existing standardized PAKEs and to the broader post-quantum
PAKE research literature, and addresses why this problem is not already solved, why it remains an
active research problem, and why the state of the art is nonetheless mature enough for CFRG to
engage with it.</t>
        <section anchor="existing-solutions-and-their-gaps">
          <name>Existing Solutions and Their Gaps</name>
          <t>OPAQUE-3DH and SPAKE2+ are standardized aPAKEs, and CPace <xref target="CPACE"/> is an
emerging symmetric PAKE, but all three are purely classical constructions: none provide
security against a quantum-capable attacker. NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization
effort has, to date, produced key encapsulation mechanisms <xref target="FIPS203"/> and signature schemes, but
no PAKE. A seemingly obvious fix is to run an existing classical PAKE inside, or alongside, a
post-quantum or hybrid KEM already deployed at the transport layer (e.g., hybrid key exchange in
TLS 1.3). This does not solve the PAKE-specific problem: it protects the resulting session key
against a future quantum-capable attacker, but does nothing for the classical PAKE's own handshake
transcript. If that classical PAKE's underlying hard problem is later broken, the <em>password</em>
itself becomes retroactively recoverable from the harvested transcript, as detailed in
<xref target="retroactive-recovery"/>, independent of whatever post-quantum protection was applied to the
surrounding transport. This is the concrete gap that simply layering a post-quantum KEM around an
existing classical PAKE does not close, and it is the gap this document addresses directly.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ongoing-research">
          <name>Ongoing Research</name>
          <t>[[EDITOR'S NOTE: remove in the final version of this document]]</t>
          <t>The compiler techniques underlying this document's design are recent and remain under active
development. The KEM-to-PAKE compiler underlying OQUAKE <xref target="ABJ25"/>, the timing side-channel fix
required to use it safely with ML-KEM <xref target="TEMPO"/>, the PAKE combiners used to hybridize it with
CPace <xref target="HR24"/><xref target="LL24"/>, and closely related asymmetric PAKE compilers <xref target="Gu24"/><xref target="LLH24"/> were all
published in 2024 and 2025. <xref target="GRSV25"/> takes a different approach, constructing a hybrid PAKE
from a combiner of obfuscated KEMs; this relies on a non-standard KEM with larger public keys and
ciphertexts. Kopis <xref target="Kopis26"/> is a recently proposed KEM based on Module Learning-with-Rounding and
nearly identical to Saber, whose public keys and ciphertexts are pseudorandom byte strings and whose
algorithms are efficient and constant time with respect to all inputs. A BUA-sKEM based on Kopis would not need
the Kemeleon encoding (<xref target="deps-BUA-sKEM"/>), but Kopis has not been standardized. The security analysis backing this document's specific composition
<xref target="VJWYMS25"/> is similarly new. Concretely, <xref target="TEMPO"/> identifies and fixes a timing side channel in
OQUAKE's ML-KEM key-generation step (see <xref target="timing-and-tempo"/>) that was only discovered in 2025,
after OQUAKE's core compiler had already been analyzed, illustrating that this design space is
still being hardened rather than settled. Likewise, this document currently carries an open issue
regarding whether OQUAKE's proof of security extends to the UC bare PAKE model without requiring
party or session identifiers (see <xref target="symmetric-identities"/>); this extension is believed to hold on
the basis of the existing NoIC/OQUAKE analysis in <xref target="ABJ25"/> but has not yet been published. Finally,
no single compiler approach
has yet converged as the preferred solution across the range of use cases in <xref target="use-cases"/>: designs
optimized for long-lived passwords (<xref target="use-cases-long-lived"/>), this document's primary target, make
different tradeoffs than designs optimized for, e.g., device pairing (<xref target="use-cases-ephemeral"/>).</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="readiness-for-cfrg-engagement">
      <name>Readiness for CFRG Engagement</name>
      <t>[[EDITOR'S NOTE: remove in the final version of this document]]</t>
      <t>Despite being new, the core sequential-composition design in this document has already been
independently analyzed by at least three different groups, as described in <xref target="hybrid-design"/>.
This document also includes test vectors for each protocol it specifies, generated by a
reference implementation, to support independent implementation and verification. The
remaining gaps identified above, most notably the unpublished bare-PAKE proof
extension and the open question of identity requirements, are well-scoped and do not call the core
design into question; they are the kind of item best resolved through the scrutiny that CFRG
engagement itself provides, rather than a prerequisite to starting that engagement.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="FIPS202" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FIPS203" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final">
          <front>
            <title>Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2024" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8017">
          <front>
            <title>PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2</title>
            <author fullname="K. Moriarty" initials="K." role="editor" surname="Moriarty"/>
            <author fullname="B. Kaliski" initials="B." surname="Kaliski"/>
            <author fullname="J. Jonsson" initials="J." surname="Jonsson"/>
            <author fullname="A. Rusch" initials="A." surname="Rusch"/>
            <date month="November" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document provides recommendations for the implementation of public-key cryptography based on the RSA algorithm, covering cryptographic primitives, encryption schemes, signature schemes with appendix, and ASN.1 syntax for representing keys and for identifying the schemes.</t>
              <t>This document represents a republication of PKCS #1 v2.2 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series. By publishing this RFC, change control is transferred to the IETF.</t>
              <t>This document also obsoletes RFC 3447.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8017"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8017"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="XWING">
          <front>
            <title>X-Wing: general-purpose hybrid post-quantum KEM</title>
            <author fullname="Deirdre Connolly" initials="D." surname="Connolly">
              <organization>Selkie Cryptography</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Peter Schwabe" initials="P." surname="Schwabe">
              <organization>MPI-SP &amp; Radboud University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Bas Westerbaan" initials="B." surname="Westerbaan">
              <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="23" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This memo defines X-Wing, a general-purpose post-quantum/traditional
   hybrid key encapsulation mechanism (PQ/T KEM) built on X25519 and ML-
   KEM-768.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing-kem-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CONCRETE-HYBRID-KEMS">
          <front>
            <title>Concrete Hybrid PQ/T Key Encapsulation Mechanisms</title>
            <author fullname="Deirdre Connolly" initials="D." surname="Connolly">
              <organization>SandboxAQ</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="6" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   PQ/T Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) combine "post-
   quantum" cryptographic algorithms, which are safe from attack by a
   quantum computer, with "traditional" algorithms, which are not.  CFRG
   has developed a general framework for creating hybrid KEMs.  In this
   document, we define concrete instantiations of this framework to
   illustrate certain properties of the framework and simplify
   implementors' choices.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-concrete-hybrid-kems-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="KEMELEON">
          <front>
            <title>Kemeleon Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="Felix Günther" initials="F." surname="Günther">
              <organization>IBM Research Europe - Zurich</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Douglas Stebila" initials="D." surname="Stebila">
              <organization>University of Waterloo</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Shannon Veitch" initials="S." surname="Veitch">
              <organization>ETH Zurich</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="3" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies Kemeleon encoding algorithms for encoding ML-
   KEM encapsulation keys and ciphertexts as random bytestrings.
   Kemeleon encodings provide obfuscation of encapsulation keys and
   ciphertexts, relying on module LWE assumptions.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-kemeleon-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5869">
          <front>
            <title>HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)</title>
            <author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>
            <author fullname="P. Eronen" initials="P." surname="Eronen"/>
            <date month="May" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies a simple Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF), which can be used as a building block in various protocols and applications. The key derivation function (KDF) is intended to support a wide range of applications and requirements, and is conservative in its use of cryptographic hash functions. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5869"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5869"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SCRYPT">
          <front>
            <title>The scrypt Password-Based Key Derivation Function</title>
            <author fullname="C. Percival" initials="C." surname="Percival"/>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="August" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the password-based key derivation function scrypt. The function derives one or more secret keys from a secret string. It is based on memory-hard functions, which offer added protection against attacks using custom hardware. The document also provides an ASN.1 schema.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7914"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7914"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CPACE">
          <front>
            <title>CPace, a balanced composable PAKE</title>
            <author fullname="Michel Abdalla" initials="M." surname="Abdalla">
              <organization>Alloc Init Labs - New York</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Björn Haase" initials="B." surname="Haase">
              <organization>Endress + Hauser Liquid Analysis - Gerlingen</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Julia Hesse" initials="J." surname="Hesse">
              <organization>IBM Research Europe - Zurich</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="22" month="April" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes CPace which is a protocol that allows two
   parties that share a low-entropy secret (password) to derive a strong
   shared key without disclosing the secret to offline dictionary
   attacks.  The CPace protocol was tailored for constrained devices and
   can be used on groups of prime- and non-prime order.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-cpace-21"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="Gu24" target="https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7qm0220s">
          <front>
            <title>New Paradigms For Efficient Password Authentication Protocols</title>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Gu" fullname="Yanqi Gu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LLH24" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1400">
          <front>
            <title>Efficient Asymmetric PAKE Compiler from KEM and AE</title>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Lyu" fullname="You Lyu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Liu" fullname="Shengli Liu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Han" fullname="Shuai Han">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LL24" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1630">
          <front>
            <title>Hybrid Password Authentication Key Exchange in the UC Framework</title>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Lyu" fullname="You Lyu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Liu" fullname="Shengli Liu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="HR24" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1621">
          <front>
            <title>PAKE Combiners and Efficient Post-Quantum Instantiations</title>
            <author initials="J." surname="Hesse" fullname="Julia Hesse">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Rosenberg" fullname="Michael Rosenberg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ABJ25" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/231">
          <front>
            <title>NoIC: PAKE from KEM without Ideal Ciphers</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Arriaga" fullname="Afonso Arriaga">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Barbosa" fullname="Manuel Barbosa">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Jarecki" fullname="Stanislaw Jarecki">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TEMPO" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1399">
          <front>
            <title>Tempo: ML-KEM to PAKE Compiler Resilient to Timing Attacks</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Arriaga" fullname="Afonso Arriaga">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Barbosa" fullname="Manuel Barbosa">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Jarecki" fullname="Stanislaw Jarecki">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="VJWYMS25" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1343">
          <front>
            <title>A Hybrid Asymmetric Password-Authenticated Key Exchange in the Random Oracle Model</title>
            <author initials="J." surname="Vos" fullname="Jelle Vos">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Jarecki" fullname="Stanislaw Jarecki">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Yun" fullname="Cathie Yun">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Myers" fullname="Steve Myers">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Sierra" fullname="Yannick Sierra">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BJ26" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2280">
          <front>
            <title>Natural Barriers to Quantum Extraction: On the Post-Quantum (In)security of (O)EKE and Masny-Rindal OT</title>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bartusek" fullname="James Bartusek">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Januzelli" fullname="Jake Januzelli">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ES21" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/696">
          <front>
            <title>The 'quantum annoying' property of password-authenticated key exchange protocols</title>
            <author initials="E." surname="Eaton" fullname="Edward Eaton">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="D." surname="Stebila" fullname="Douglas Stebila">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GRSV25" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/408">
          <front>
            <title>Hybrid Obfuscated Key Exchange and KEMs</title>
            <author initials="F." surname="Günther" fullname="Felix Günther">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Rosenberg" fullname="Michael Rosenberg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="D." surname="Stebila" fullname="Douglas Stebila">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Veitch" fullname="Shannon Veitch">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AHH21" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/114">
          <front>
            <title>Security Analysis of CPace</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Abdalla" fullname="Michel Abdalla">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Haase" fullname="Björn Haase">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Hesse" fullname="Julia Hesse">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="AS22" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/656">
          <front>
            <title>Quantum Augmented Dual Attack</title>
            <author initials="M. R." surname="Albrecht" fullname="Martin R. Albrecht">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Shen" fullname="Yixin Shen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CMST25" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1750">
          <front>
            <title>Assessing the Impact of a Variant of MATZOV's Dual Attack on Kyber</title>
            <author initials="K." surname="Carrier" fullname="Kevin Carrier">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="C." surname="Meyer-Hilfiger" fullname="Charles Meyer-Hilfiger">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Shen" fullname="Yixin Shen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J.-P." surname="Tillich" fullname="Jean-Pierre Tillich">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Kopis26" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2268">
          <front>
            <title>Kopis: A KEM for Obfuscation</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Basso" fullname="Andrea Basso">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Rosenberg" fullname="Michael Rosenberg">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Ogilvie26" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/279">
          <front>
            <title>On the Concrete Hardness Gap Between MLWE and LWE</title>
            <author initials="T." surname="Ogilvie" fullname="Tabitha Ogilvie">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ADPS16" target="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/alkim">
          <front>
            <title>Post-quantum key exchange - A new hope</title>
            <author initials="E." surname="Alkim" fullname="Erdem Alkim">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="L." surname="Ducas" fullname="Léo Ducas">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Pöppelmann" fullname="Thomas Pöppelmann">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Schwabe" fullname="Peter Schwabe">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Grover96" target="https://doi.org/10.1145/237814.237866">
          <front>
            <title>A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search</title>
            <author initials="L. K." surname="Grover" fullname="Lov K. Grover">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="Bernstein09" target="https://cr.yp.to/papers.html#collisioncost">
          <front>
            <title>Cost analysis of hash collisions: Will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?</title>
            <author initials="D. J." surname="Bernstein" fullname="Daniel J. Bernstein">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="WA-BACKUP" target="https://www.whatsapp.com/security/WhatsApp_Security_Encrypted_Backups_Whitepaper.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Security of End-To-End Encrypted Backups</title>
            <author>
              <organization>WhatsApp</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="APPLE-ESCROW" target="https://support.apple.com/guide/security/sec3e341e75d/web">
          <front>
            <title>Escrow security for iCloud Keychain</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BRAVE-ACCOUNTS" target="https://brave.com/blog/brave-accounts/">
          <front>
            <title>Brave Accounts: your password never leaves your device, ever.</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Brave</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="August" day="27"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MATTER" target="https://csa-iot.org/developer-resource/specifications-download-request/">
          <front>
            <title>Matter Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Connectivity Standards Alliance</organization>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MAGIC-WORMHOLE" target="https://magic-wormhole.readthedocs.io/">
          <front>
            <title>Magic Wormhole</title>
            <author initials="B." surname="Warner" fullname="Brian Warner">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date>n.d.</date>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OPAQUE">
          <front>
            <title>The OPAQUE Augmented PAKE Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="Daniel Bourdrez" initials="D." surname="Bourdrez">
         </author>
            <author fullname="Hugo Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk">
              <organization>AWS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kevin Lewi" initials="K." surname="Lewi">
              <organization>Meta</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Wood">
              <organization>Cloudflare, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="21" month="November" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes the OPAQUE protocol, an augmented (or
   asymmetric) password-authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) that supports
   mutual authentication in a client-server setting without reliance on
   PKI and with security against pre-computation attacks upon server
   compromise.  In addition, the protocol provides forward secrecy and
   the ability to hide the password from the server, even during
   password registration.  This document specifies the core OPAQUE
   protocol and one instantiation based on 3DH.  This document is a
   product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-18"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SPAKE2PLUS">
          <front>
            <title>SPAKE2+, an Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="T. Taubert" initials="T." surname="Taubert"/>
            <author fullname="C. A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Wood"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes SPAKE2+, a Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol run between two parties for deriving a strong shared key with no risk of disclosing the password. SPAKE2+ is an augmented PAKE protocol, as only one party has knowledge of the password. This method is simple to implement, compatible with any prime-order group, and computationally efficient.</t>
              <t>This document was produced outside of the IETF and IRTF and represents the opinions of the authors. Publication of this document as an RFC in the Independent Submissions Stream does not imply endorsement of SPAKE2+ by the IETF or IRTF.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9383"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9383"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLS-PAKE">
          <front>
            <title>A Password Authenticated Key Exchange Extension for TLS 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="Laura Bauman" initials="L." surname="Bauman">
              <organization>Apple, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="David Benjamin" initials="D." surname="Benjamin">
              <organization>Google LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Samir Menon" initials="S." surname="Menon">
              <organization>Apple, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Wood">
              <organization>Apple, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="6" month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The pre-shared key mechanism available in TLS 1.3 is not suitable for
   usage with low-entropy keys, such as passwords entered by users.
   This document describes an extension that enables the use of
   password-authenticated key exchange protocols with TLS 1.3.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-pake-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BARE-PAKE">
          <front>
            <title>Bare PAKE: Universally Composable Key Exchange from Just Passwords</title>
            <author fullname="Manuel Barbosa" initials="M." surname="Barbosa">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kai Gellert" initials="K." surname="Gellert">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Julia Hesse" initials="J." surname="Hesse">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Stanislaw Jarecki" initials="S." surname="Jarecki">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Lecture Notes in Computer Science" value="pp. 183-217"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1007/978-3-031-68379-4_6"/>
          <seriesInfo name="ISBN" value="[&quot;9783031683787&quot;, &quot;9783031683794&quot;]"/>
          <refcontent>Springer Nature Switzerland</refcontent>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 2367?>

<section anchor="params">
      <name>Deriving parameters</name>
      <t>CPaceOQUAKE+ composes several protocols, each with its own security analysis <xref target="AHH21"/> <xref target="ABJ25"/> <xref target="TEMPO"/> <xref target="HR24"/> <xref target="LLH24"/> <xref target="VJWYMS25"/>. These analyses include security proofs that, under a set of reasonable assumptions, upper-bound an attacker's advantage. The resulting bounds are typically loose and depend on many variables, such as the maximum number of queries that an attacker is allowed to make to each random oracle and the maximum number of PAKE sessions. For these reasons, these bounds are typically unsuitable for describing the concrete cost of an attack. However, with a few additional assumptions, we can obtain tight enough bounds that allow us to select concrete parameters.</t>
      <t>Most of the slack in these bounds is introduced in proof steps that require a computational hardness assumption to hold even when an attacker obtains many instances. For example, an attacker may break a certain protocol if it can solve even just one out of q instances of the Diffie-Hellman problem. The question is how much easier that makes the problem for the attacker. Proofs typically bound the advantage of the attacker as <tt>q * advantage_single</tt>, where <tt>advantage_single</tt> is the advantage an attacker obtains in breaking a single isolated instance in a given amount of time. However, this approach does not accurately describe all computational problems: breaking one of q instances may require almost as much effort as breaking an isolated instance. After all, it may be the case that there is a large fixed computational cost associated with breaking any instance, or the problem may be random self-reducible like the Diffie-Hellman problem.</t>
      <t>We measure an attacker's resources by its running time t, which models the number of operations it can perform, including queries to random oracles and engaging in protocol sessions. A protocol has security level λ if, for every t ≤ 2^λ, every attacker running in time at most t has an advantage of at most t/2^λ (in distinguishing the protocol from a simulation around the ideal functionality). Note that, for PAKEs, an attacker can always perform one online password guess per session, which does not count against λ. We target a security level λ = 128 against both classical and quantum attackers. For computational problems whose best known attack has an estimated cost of 2^b operations, we assume that an attacker running in time t has advantage at most t/2^b.</t>
      <t>For the parameter selection in this specification, we make some additional assumptions that tighten the bounds obtained by the security proofs. We keep all statistical terms unchanged, but we tighten computational terms like <tt>q * advantage</tt> to <tt>1 * advantage</tt> if they satisfy all of the following conditions:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The advantage describes an attack against a computational hardness assumption. This excludes, e.g., finding a collision in the output of a random oracle.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The number q only counts the positions in which a proof may place a challenge instance for the attacker, such as sessions or random oracle queries. This excludes, e.g., a square-root loss in the quantum random oracle model.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The computational hardness assumption is one for which we know that solving one of q instances is not significantly easier than solving an isolated instance. This holds for the Diffie-Hellman problem due to random self-reducibility, and for ML-KEM by the structure of the best known attacks.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Note that the resulting security levels are therefore estimates rather than proven bounds.</t>
      <t>It is currently hard to obtain concrete protocol security estimates against quantum attackers, so we choose to be conservative: we use the Q0 quantum core-SVP metric <xref target="AS22"/> to estimate the cost 2^b of the best known quantum attack on ML-KEM. For classical attackers, we use the classical equivalent, which is C0 core-SVP <xref target="Ogilvie26"/> <xref target="CMST25"/>; see <xref target="ADPS16"/> for the core-SVP methodology. Given that the security proofs are in the classical random oracle model, and that their UC security does not carry over to quantum attackers <xref target="BJ26"/>, we use a heuristic to estimate security against quantum attackers: we consider a quadratic speed-up <xref target="Grover96"/> for random oracle terms in which the attacker must find a value matching a target, but we do not consider a speed-up related to collision finding since quantum collision search is not known to be cheaper than classical collision search once the cost of quantum random access memory is taken into account <xref target="Bernstein09"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="params-conventions">
        <name>Conventions</name>
        <t>In the subsections below, <tt>q_ses</tt> denotes the number of sessions and <tt>q_X</tt> the number of queries to random oracle X.
The sum of all these <tt>q_*</tt> values is at most t.
A term meets the target if it is at most t/2^128 for every t up to 2^128.
In particular, a term t^k / 2^n meets the target if n &gt;= 128 * k.
Note that we ignore small constant factors.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="params-oquake">
        <name>Parameters for OQUAKE</name>
        <t>In the analysis below, we require estimates for the hardness of ML-KEM.
<xref target="tab-mlkem-costs"/> lists the costs 2^b of the best known attacks on ML-KEM that we use, from <xref target="Ogilvie26"/> (C0) and <xref target="AS22"/> (Q0).</t>
        <table anchor="tab-mlkem-costs">
          <name>Estimated log2 cost b of the best known attacks on ML-KEM</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Parameter set</th>
              <th align="left">b against classical attackers (C0)</th>
              <th align="left">b against quantum attackers (Q0)</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ML-KEM-512</td>
              <td align="left">120.3</td>
              <td align="left">99.7</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ML-KEM-768</td>
              <td align="left">172.3</td>
              <td align="left">150.0</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">ML-KEM-1024</td>
              <td align="left">236.7</td>
              <td align="left">208.4</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>The analysis of NoIC <xref target="ABJ25"/>, applied to the split public key of OQUAKE as in <xref target="TEMPO"/>, gives a bound with the following terms.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>BUA-sKEM security: the one-wayness, anonymity, and public key uniformity advantages of the BUA-sKEM are multiplied by <tt>q_ses * q_H1 * q_H2</tt>. These factors count positions for a challenge instance, so we tighten these terms as described in <xref target="params"/>. The underlying KEM then needs b &gt;= 128 against both classical and quantum attackers. Both ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 achieve this, but ML-KEM-512 does not.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Attacker-chosen seeds: in an active attack, the responder encapsulates to a public key whose seed ρ was chosen by the attacker. The reduction in <xref target="TEMPO"/> loses a factor equal to the number of seeds tried by the attacker because they may pick the most favorable of many matrices. We are not aware of any attacks that benefit from this choice, but we choose to be conservative in this regard. As a margin in case such an attack is found, this document prefers configurations that use ML-KEM-1024 (<xref target="configurations"/>): without tightening this term, ML-KEM-1024 still achieves approximately 118 bits of security against classical and 104 bits against quantum attackers, compared with 86 and 75 bits for ML-KEM-768, respectively.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Public key encoding (Kemeleon): the public key uniformity advantage also includes the statistical distance between encoded KEM public keys and uniform bytestrings. An attacker can test this once per password guess, so this distance must be at most 2^-128 per public key. This treats the encoding's statistical distance separately from the public key uniformity of ML-KEM itself. In the paper, this would require an additional game hop that replaces all encoded public keys by uniform byte strings at a cost of at most t times the per-key distance. Kemeleon.EncodeEk meets this when we set Kemeleon's statistical distance parameter (Kemeleon.t) to at least 132 (Kemeleon allows values that match 76 + 8x).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Decryption failure: the term <tt>q_ses * δ</tt> requires a failure probability δ of at most 2^-128. ML-KEM's failure probability is below 2^-138 for all parameter sets <xref target="FIPS203"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Randomness s: the proof requires that each message (s, T) sent by an attacker corresponds to at most one password guess. This fails when one of the attacker's hash outputs matches one of the roughly t^2 hash values it obtained earlier, which happens with probability approximately t^3 / 2^(8 * Nr), where s has Nr bytes. We treat this as a search for one of these roughly t^2 target values, which a quantum attacker succeeds in with probability approximately t^4 / 2^(8 * Nr). To achieve a security level of 128 against quantum attackers, we need Nr &gt;= 64.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Tag h: collisions between tags occur with probability <tt>t^2 / 2^(8 * Nkc)</tt>, which requires Nkc &gt;= 32 for a security level of 128. There is no quantum speed-up here.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The remaining terms are negligible.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>[[EDITOR'S NOTE: The bound in <xref target="ABJ25"/> includes the encoding's statistical distance in the public key uniformity advantage, which is multiplied by <tt>q_ses * q_H1 * q_H2</tt>. The requirement on the public key encoding above assumes a proof with a separate game hop for this distance, which still needs to be written down.]]</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="params-oquakeplus">
        <name>Parameters for OQUAKE+</name>
        <t>In addition to the terms of the symmetric PAKE (<xref target="params-oquake"/>), Theorem 3 of
<xref target="VJWYMS25"/> bounds the PAKE-to-aPAKE transformation with the following terms.
Here <tt>q_pb</tt> denotes the number of KSF evaluations.
Together, these terms require Nv &gt;= 32 and Nkc &gt;= 32.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>KEM security: the IND-CCA advantage of the KEM has a factor <tt>q_ses</tt>, which counts positions for a challenge instance, so we tighten this term. The KEM then needs b &gt;= 128. ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024, and the hybrid KEMs X-Wing and MLKEM768-P256 (which use ML-KEM-768) and MLKEM1024-P384 (which uses ML-KEM-1024) achieve this against both classical and quantum attackers. The IND-CCA advantage also covers decryption failures.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Verifier collisions: <tt>q_pb^2 / 2^(8 * Nv + 1)</tt> requires Nv &gt;= 32. Collision finding does not get a quantum speed-up.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Confirmation value collisions: collisions between confirmation values occur with probability <tt>t^2 / 2^(8 * Nkc)</tt>, which requires Nkc &gt;= 32. Theorem 3 of <xref target="VJWYMS25"/> does not have this term, but we include it as for the tag h in OQUAKE.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Guessing: guessing v or a confirmation value contributes <tt>q_ses / 2^(8 * Nv - 2)</tt> and <tt>q_ses / 2^(8 * Nkc - 2)</tt>, which require Nv &gt;= 16 and Nkc &gt;= 16 to achieve a security level of 128.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Secret kem_blind: an attacker that does not hold the verifier would have to guess kem_blind to relate the timing of the client's key derivation to a password guess (<xref target="timing-and-tempo"/>). This is a search for a target value, so a 32-byte kem_blind achieves a security level of 128 against all attackers.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>[[EDITOR'S NOTE: The proof of this bound needs to be updated for the password confirmation in this document, which derives client_confirm from the encapsulated key, and derives the KEM key pair from the seed and kem_blind.]]</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="params-cpace">
        <name>Parameters for CPace</name>
        <t><xref target="AHH21"/> bounds CPace by <tt>l^2 / p + 2 * l^2 * Adv_sSDH + Adv_sCDH</tt>, where l is the number of queries to the hash-to-curve function and p is the group order. Since the factor <tt>l^2</tt> counts positions for a challenge instance and the Diffie-Hellman problem is random self-reducible, we tighten this term. Generic Diffie-Hellman attacks have an advantage of approximately <tt>t^2 / p</tt>, so CPace reaches λ of approximately log2(p)/2, which is roughly 126 for X25519, 128 for P-256, and 192 for P-384.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="params-cpaceoquake">
        <name>Parameters for CPaceOQUAKE</name>
        <t><xref target="VJWYMS25"/> gives two bounds, following <xref target="HR24"/>: one if CPace is secure, and the other if OQUAKE is secure. Against classical attackers, CPaceOQUAKE reaches the higher of the levels of CPace and OQUAKE, and against quantum attackers it reaches the level of OQUAKE.</t>
        <t>Besides the advantage against CPace or OQUAKE, each bound has terms of order <tt>q_H / 2^(8 * n)</tt>, where n is the length of CPace's session key, of effective_PRS, or of the session key. These terms describe guessing a key, so against quantum attackers they become <tt>t^2 / 2^(8 * n)</tt>. To achieve a security level of 128, these keys must be at least 32 bytes, so Nkey &gt;= 32, and we require a CPace hash output of at least 32 bytes.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="params-cpaceoquakeplus">
        <name>Parameters for CPaceOQUAKE+</name>
        <t>CPaceOQUAKE+ applies the PAKE-to-aPAKE transformation to CPaceOQUAKE, so its requirements are those described both in <xref target="params-cpaceoquake"/> and <xref target="params-oquakeplus"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="cpace">
      <name>CPace Wrapper</name>
      <t>CPace is a classical elliptic curve-based PAKE <xref target="CPACE"/>. This appendix wraps the CPace specification in a consistent interface, following the common PAKE interface in <xref target="overview"/>. It is used as Stage 1 of CPaceOQUAKE (<xref target="CPaceOQUAKE"/>) and CPaceOQUAKE+ (<xref target="CPaceOQUAKEplus"/>).
We use an interactive version of CPace that takes two rounds, in which there is a designated initiator and responder.
In other words, the responder only starts executing the protocol after it received the first message from the initiator.</t>
      <t>The flow of the protocol consists of two messages sent between initiator and responder, produced by the functions
Init, Respond, and Finish, described below. Both parties take as input a password-related
string PRS, a public_context, and a secret_context (see <xref target="overview"/>). Upon completion, both parties
obtain matching session keys if their PRS, public_context, secret_context, and key length (specified by Nkey)
match. Otherwise, they obtain random keys. In exceptional cases, the protocol aborts.</t>
      <t>CPace derives its generator from PRS, a channel identifier (CI), and a session identifier (sid);
CI may carry confidential information and is never sent on the wire, whereas sid is public and is
additionally bound into the session key. Accordingly, CPace uses the secret_context as its CI and the
public_context as its sid. CPace's sid is therefore the entire public_context, e.g.,
<tt>EncodePublicContext(sid, U, S)</tt> (<xref target="public-context-encoding"/>), rather than the session identifier
sid itself.</t>
      <t>The functions below are parameterized by a group environment G and a hash function H, both as
specified in <xref target="CPACE"/>. From G, they use <tt>G.calculate_generator</tt>, <tt>G.sample_scalar</tt>,
<tt>G.scalar_mult</tt>, and <tt>G.scalar_mult_vfy</tt>, the neutral element <tt>G.I</tt>, and the domain-separation
identifier <tt>G.DSI</tt>. From H, they use <tt>H.hash</tt>.
The transcript hash TH (<xref target="overview"/>) uses the KDF and DST of the configuration.</t>
      <section anchor="initiation-2">
        <name>Initiation</name>
        <t>The initiator starts the protocol using its password-related string PRS, binding the session to the
public_context and secret_context.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
CPace.Init

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string

Output:
- state, opaque state for the initiator to store, comprising the discrete
  logarithm ya, which is kept secret until the protocol finishes, and the public
  point Ya
- Ya, public point, intended to be sent to the responder

Parameters:
- G, a group environment as specified in CPace
- H, a hash function as specified in CPace

def Init(PRS, public_context, secret_context):
  g = G.calculate_generator(H, PRS, secret_context, public_context)
  ya = G.sample_scalar()
  Ya = G.scalar_mult(ya, g)
  return State(ya, Ya), Ya
]]></artwork>
        <t>The initiator retains Ya in its state because the session key computed by
CPace.Finish binds the full protocol transcript, which includes both Ya and Yb.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="response-2">
        <name>Response</name>
        <t>The responder performs the same actions as the initiator.
Since it already received the initiator's message, it can immediately finish its execution of the protocol.
It outputs the shared secret, a message Yb intended to be sent to the initiator, and a transcript hash.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
CPace.Respond

Input:
- PRS, password-related string, a byte string
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- secret_context, optional secret context, a byte string
- Ya, public point, received from the initiator

Output:
- ISK, the established shared secret
- Yb, public point, intended to be sent to the initiator
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Parameters:
- G, a group environment as specified in CPace
- H, a hash function as specified in CPace
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

Exceptions:
- CPaceError, raised when an invalid value was encountered in CPace

def Respond(PRS, public_context, secret_context, Ya):
  g = G.calculate_generator(H, PRS, secret_context, public_context)
  yb = G.sample_scalar()
  Yb = G.scalar_mult(yb, g)

  K = G.scalar_mult_vfy(yb, Ya)
  If K = G.I, raise CPaceError

  ISK = H.hash(lv_cat(G.DSI || b"_ISK", public_context, K) || transcript_ir(Ya, b"", Yb, b""))
  th = TH("CPace", public_context, Ya, Yb)

  return ISK, Yb, th
]]></artwork>
        <t>The functions <tt>lv_cat</tt> and <tt>transcript_ir</tt> are defined in <xref target="CPACE"/>. This document does not use CPace's associated data, so ADa and ADb are empty.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="finish">
        <name>Finish</name>
        <t>The initiator finishes the protocol by combining the state generated by CPace.Init and the message Yb received from the responder.
It outputs the shared secret and a transcript hash.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
CPace.Finish

Input:
- state, opaque state produced by CPace.Init, comprising (ya, Ya)
- public_context, optional public context, a byte string
- Yb, public point, received from the responder

Output:
- ISK, the established shared secret
- th, transcript hash, a byte string of KDF.Nx bytes

Parameters:
- G, a group environment as specified in CPace
- H, a hash function as specified in CPace
- KDF, a KDF instance
- DST, domain separation tag, a byte string

Exceptions:
- CPaceError, raised when an invalid value was encountered in CPace

def Finish(state, public_context, Yb):
  (ya, Ya) = state

  K = G.scalar_mult_vfy(ya, Yb)
  If K = G.I, raise CPaceError

  ISK = H.hash(lv_cat(G.DSI || b"_ISK", public_context, K) || transcript_ir(Ya, b"", Yb, b""))
  th = TH("CPace", public_context, Ya, Yb)

  return ISK, th
]]></artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="encodings">
      <name>Message Encodings</name>
      <t>The main body of this document describes the protocols in terms of abstract
protocol messages, represented as tuples of named fields. This appendix specifies
the concrete byte-level encoding of these messages, and of the public context.
This encoding is the default, and is the encoding to which the test vectors in
this document correspond. An implementation that does not define its own mapping
<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> serialize and parse messages exactly as specified here.</t>
      <t>A specification that maps these protocols onto a particular transport <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> instead
define its own framing for protocol messages, subject to the requirements in
<xref target="transport-mappings"/>. The encoding of the public context is not subject to that
allowance: public_context is an input to key derivation, so it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be encoded
exactly as specified in <xref target="public-context-encoding"/> regardless of the transport.</t>
      <t>The functions <tt>lv_encode</tt> and <tt>lv_decode</tt> are defined in <xref target="notation-and-terminology"/>.
Parsing a message <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fail if the input does not have the expected length or
framing.</t>
      <section anchor="public-context-encoding">
        <name>Public Context Encoding</name>
        <t>The <tt>EncodePublicContext</tt> function (see <xref target="overview"/>) encodes the optional
session identifier sid and party identifiers U and S into a single byte string,
using four-byte, big-endian length prefixes. Each of sid, U, and S is optional and
defaults to the empty string b"".</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
EncodePublicContext

Input:
- sid, session identifier, a byte string
- U and S, client and server identifiers

Output:
- public_context, the encoded public context, a byte string

def EncodePublicContext(sid, U, S):
  public_context =
    int_to_bytes(len(sid), 4) || sid ||
    int_to_bytes(len(U), 4) || U ||
    int_to_bytes(len(S), 4) || S
  return public_context
]]></artwork>
        <t>Applications <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include additional public information by prepending or appending
it to the returned value.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oquake-message-encoding">
        <name>OQUAKE Message Encoding</name>
        <t>The OQUAKE initiator message <tt>(s, T, ⍴)</tt>, produced by OQUAKE.Init and consumed by
OQUAKE.Respond (<xref target="oquake"/>), is encoded as:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
init_msg = s || T || ⍴
]]></artwork>
        <t>where <tt>s</tt> has <tt>Nr</tt> bytes, <tt>T</tt> has <tt>BUA-sKEM.Nt</tt> bytes, and <tt>⍴</tt> has <tt>N⍴</tt>
bytes. On receipt, the fields are recovered as
<tt>s = init_msg[0 : Nr]</tt>,
<tt>T = init_msg[Nr : Nr + BUA-sKEM.Nt]</tt>, and
<tt>⍴ = init_msg[Nr + BUA-sKEM.Nt : Nr + BUA-sKEM.Nt + N⍴]</tt>.</t>
        <t>The OQUAKE responder message <tt>(ct, h)</tt>, produced by OQUAKE.Respond and consumed by
OQUAKE.Finish, is encoded as:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
resp_msg = ct || h
]]></artwork>
        <t>where <tt>ct</tt> has <tt>BUA-sKEM.Nct</tt> bytes and <tt>h</tt> has <tt>Nkc</tt> bytes. On receipt,
<tt>ct = resp_msg[0 : BUA-sKEM.Nct]</tt> and <tt>h = resp_msg[BUA-sKEM.Nct :]</tt>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="oquake-message-encoding-1">
        <name>OQUAKE+ Message Encoding</name>
        <t>The OQUAKE+ initiator message is an OQUAKE initiator message, encoded as above.</t>
        <t>The password confirmation challenge <tt>(enc_c, client_confirm)</tt>, produced by
PC.Challenge and consumed by PC.Respond (<xref target="pwconf"/>), is encoded as:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
challenge = enc_c || client_confirm
]]></artwork>
        <t>where <tt>enc_c</tt> has <tt>Nct + 32</tt> bytes (the KEM ciphertext length plus the length of kem_blind)
and <tt>client_confirm</tt> has <tt>Nkc</tt> bytes. On receipt, <tt>enc_c = challenge[0 : Nct + 32]</tt> and
<tt>client_confirm = challenge[Nct + 32 :]</tt>. The password confirmation response is the
<tt>server_confirm</tt> value, a byte string of <tt>Nkc</tt> bytes.</t>
        <t>The OQUAKE+ responder message <tt>(oquake_resp, challenge)</tt>, produced by
OQUAKE+.Respond and consumed by OQUAKE+.Finish (<xref target="oquakeplus"/>), is encoded
as:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
resp_msg = oquake_resp || challenge
]]></artwork>
        <t>where <tt>oquake_resp</tt> is an OQUAKE responder message of <tt>BUA-sKEM.Nct + Nkc</tt> bytes
and <tt>challenge</tt> is a password confirmation challenge. On receipt,
<tt>oquake_resp = resp_msg[0 : BUA-sKEM.Nct + Nkc]</tt> and
<tt>challenge = resp_msg[BUA-sKEM.Nct + Nkc :]</tt>.</t>
        <t>The OQUAKE+ response message is a password confirmation response.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cpaceoquake-message-encoding">
        <name>CPaceOQUAKE Message Encoding</name>
        <t>The CPaceOQUAKE initiator message <tt>Ya</tt>, produced by CPaceOQUAKE.Init (<xref target="CPaceOQUAKE"/>), is encoded as:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
init_msg = lv_encode(Ya)
]]></artwork>
        <t>where <tt>Ya</tt> is a CPace initiator message. On receipt, <tt>Ya = lv_decode(init_msg)</tt>.</t>
        <t>The CPaceOQUAKE responder message <tt>(Yb, oquake_init)</tt>, produced by CPaceOQUAKE.Respond, is encoded as:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
resp_msg = lv_encode(Yb) || oquake_init
]]></artwork>
        <t>where <tt>Yb</tt> is a CPace responder message and <tt>oquake_init</tt> is an OQUAKE initiator
message. On receipt, <tt>L = bytes_to_int(resp_msg[0..2])</tt>, <tt>Yb = resp_msg[2..2+L]</tt>,
and <tt>oquake_init = resp_msg[2+L..]</tt>.</t>
        <t>The CPaceOQUAKE message <tt>msg3</tt>, produced by CPaceOQUAKE.InitiatorFinish, is an
OQUAKE responder message, encoded as described in the OQUAKE message encoding
above.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cpaceoquake-message-encoding-1">
        <name>CPaceOQUAKE+ Message Encoding</name>
        <t>The CPaceOQUAKE+ messages <tt>msg1</tt>, <tt>msg2</tt>, and <tt>msg3</tt> are encoded exactly as the
corresponding CPaceOQUAKE messages described above.</t>
        <t>The CPaceOQUAKE+ message <tt>msg4</tt>, produced by CPaceOQUAKE+.ResponderContinue, is a
password confirmation challenge, and <tt>msg5</tt>, produced by
CPaceOQUAKE+.InitiatorFinish and consumed by CPaceOQUAKE+.ResponderFinish, is a
password confirmation response; both are encoded as described in the OQUAKE+
message encoding above.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="registration-message-encoding">
        <name>Registration Message Encoding</name>
        <t>The registration message described in <xref target="apake-transform"/>, carrying the client's salt,
verifier (v, pk, kem_blind), and identifiers, is encoded as:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
reg_msg = salt || v || pk || kem_blind || lv_encode(U) || lv_encode(S)
]]></artwork>
        <t>where <tt>salt</tt> has 32 bytes, <tt>v</tt> has <tt>Nv</tt> bytes, <tt>pk</tt> has <tt>KEM.Npk</tt> bytes, and <tt>kem_blind</tt>
has 32 bytes. On receipt, the fields are recovered as <tt>salt = reg_msg[0 : 32]</tt>,
<tt>v = reg_msg[32 : 32 + Nv]</tt>,
<tt>pk = reg_msg[32 + Nv : 32 + Nv + KEM.Npk]</tt>,
<tt>kem_blind = reg_msg[32 + Nv + KEM.Npk : 64 + Nv + KEM.Npk]</tt>, and the identifiers by
successive <tt>lv_decode</tt> calls over the remainder.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="transport-mappings">
      <name>Transport Mappings</name>
      <t>The encodings in <xref target="encodings"/> present each protocol message as a single
contiguous byte string. Some transports cannot carry a message of that size in one
protocol data unit. A specification that maps these protocols onto such a transport
can define its own framing, including carrying the fields of a single protocol message
in more than one transport message or PDU. This is possible because no value derived
by these protocols depends on how a message is framed: every key, confirmation value,
and transcript hash is computed from individual named fields -- <tt>Ya</tt>, <tt>Yb</tt>, <tt>s</tt>, <tt>T</tt>, <tt>⍴</tt>,
<tt>ct</tt>, <tt>h</tt>, <tt>enc_c</tt>, <tt>k</tt>, <tt>client_confirm</tt>, <tt>server_confirm</tt>, the public and secret contexts --
and never from the concatenated message as a whole.
Re-framing a message therefore cannot change any derived value, and does not
affect the security analysis of the protocol.</t>
      <t>Such a mapping <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> satisfy the following requirements.</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>The value of every field supplied to and recovered from the protocol functions
in the main body of this document <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be identical to the value that the
encoding in <xref target="encodings"/> would have produced or consumed. In particular, the
mapping <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> reorder, pad, truncate, or otherwise transform field values.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A party <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have received every field of a protocol message before invoking
the function that consumes that message. An implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> act on a
partially received message, and in particular <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> begin key confirmation,
derive an application key, or emit any protocol message in response to one.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The mapping <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> detect a message whose fields are missing, duplicated, or of
incorrect length, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> abort in that case, providing the same protection as
the length and framing checks required by <xref target="encodings"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The mapping <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> alter the number of protocol messages, the direction in
which each is sent, or the order in which they are processed. Only the framing
of a message is at the mapping's discretion.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The public context <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be encoded as specified in <xref target="public-context-encoding"/>,
since it is an input to key derivation.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Splitting a message across PDUs neither reduces the number of round trips nor
reduces the total number of octets sent; it redistributes octets across PDUs so
that each fits within the transport's limit. The number of round trips is a
property of the protocol itself and cannot be changed by a mapping. A mapping that
needs to avoid transport-layer fragmentation should therefore choose split points
that keep each PDU within the limit, rather than expecting a net saving.</t>
      <section anchor="message-sizes">
        <name>Message Sizes</name>
        <t>The following table gives the size in octets of each protocol message under the
<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> configurations of CPaceOQUAKE+ (<xref target="config-cpaceoquakeplus"/>), excluding any
framing added by the transport. The columns correspond to <tt>cpaceoquakeplus-x25519-mlbuaskem1024-xwing</tt>,
<tt>cpaceoquakeplus-p384-mlbuaskem1024-mlkem1024p384</tt>, and <tt>cpaceoquakeplus-x25519-mlbuaskem768-xwing</tt>, respectively.
Messages msg1 to msg3 are also the messages of the corresponding CPaceOQUAKE configurations. Sizes
for the other configurations follow from their respective field lengths.</t>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Message</th>
              <th align="left">Fields</th>
              <th align="left">X25519, 1024</th>
              <th align="left">P-384, 1024</th>
              <th align="left">X25519, 768</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">msg1</td>
              <td align="left">CPace Ya</td>
              <td align="left">34</td>
              <td align="left">99</td>
              <td align="left">34</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">msg2</td>
              <td align="left">CPace Yb, s, T, ⍴</td>
              <td align="left">1694</td>
              <td align="left">1759</td>
              <td align="left">1303</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">msg3</td>
              <td align="left">ct, h</td>
              <td align="left">1600</td>
              <td align="left">1600</td>
              <td align="left">1120</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">msg4</td>
              <td align="left">enc_c, client_confirm</td>
              <td align="left">1184</td>
              <td align="left">1729</td>
              <td align="left">1184</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">msg5</td>
              <td align="left">server_confirm</td>
              <td align="left">32</td>
              <td align="left">32</td>
              <td align="left">32</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>In each configuration, the largest message is msg2.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="test-vectors">
      <name>Test Vectors</name>
      <t>This section contains test vectors for ML-BUA-sKEM and for the first configuration of each protocol in <xref target="configurations"/>.
Each test vector lists the inputs, the randomness that each step consumes, intermediate values, the protocol messages, and the outputs.
Byte strings are encoded in hexadecimal.
The randomness used to generate these test vectors corresponds to the following labels:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>keygen_seed: the concatenation of the seeds d and z of ML-KEM.KeyGen in BUA-sKEM.KeyGen</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>kemeleon_m: the value m in Kemeleon.EncodeEk, added for each polynomial of the encapsulation key in BUA-sKEM.KeyGen (in decimal)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>encaps_m: the randomness m of ML-KEM.Encaps in BUA-sKEM.Encaps</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>oquake_r: the value r sampled in OQUAKE.Init</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>random_key: the key returned by OQUAKE.Finish when key confirmation fails</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>cpace_ya and cpace_yb: the scalars sampled in CPace.Init and CPace.Respond, respectively</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>kem_blind: the value sampled in GenVerifier</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>kem_encaps_m and kem_encaps_eseed: the randomness of KEM.Encaps in PC.Challenge; m for ML-KEM and eseed for X-Wing</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The intermediate values are listed by the following labels:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>v, seed, and pk: the values in GenVerifierMaterial and GenVerifier</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>cpace_ISK and cpace_th: the shared secret and transcript hash output by CPace</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>oquake_upk: the BUA-sKEM public key generated in OQUAKE.Init</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>oquake_k: the BUA-sKEM shared secret in OQUAKE</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>oquake_key and oquake_th: the key and transcript hash output by OQUAKE</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>cpaceoquake_key: the key output by CPaceOQUAKE, i.e., SK in CPaceOQUAKE+</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>pc_k: the KEM shared secret in password confirmation</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <section anchor="tv-ml-bua-skem">
        <name>ML-BUA-sKEM</name>
        <t>These test vectors list the randomness of ML-BUA-sKEM.KeyGen and ML-BUA-sKEM.Encaps, the public
key upk output by KeyGen, and the ciphertext ct and shared secret k output by Encaps.</t>
        <section anchor="ml-bua-skem-768">
          <name>ML-BUA-sKEM-768</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
# Randomness
keygen_seed:
f9977a57ce9d3a29bc4ea75165418069778d67ea4252d769c01e1c0432ae6afd
299bb671bad040d6566e536acf8281ff95ef912e9b529db896643341e7bb93e7
kemeleon_m:
1461349808863529180497329162631953944652
2018767594911507041497478964992230269995
1226531303044047062411806492047201745356
encaps_m:
5fb068064a06da2a3b5a4e036099aa2ab1ecae6abc50930fc7ba75db68a9820b

# Outputs
upk: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ct: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: 1aca95f4d35ccfa5df88ad047ce1aa654c524bd55d8fa2e7c1a041157b810883
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ml-bua-skem-1024">
          <name>ML-BUA-sKEM-1024</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
# Randomness
keygen_seed:
d7f4ac5351358f8c0cce054f550ef887d14453ee67eae9cfc848465f85beef78
186334d3185d6e77ef37897203ea589f8d9bff4b2ebca57d10e02d271536e7d6
kemeleon_m:
5272279800210349582568710348767618125641
6888731916715852000259939628383230864647
673819760188224090248748910699537810002
1137590557977869620235949346486406000588
encaps_m:
1096e1f2ecb7b3a6c15102c58ed7154e0ebbc876050cd2ebe20195260294bf9e

# Outputs
upk:
cae21f6d19d97c5a36e7477de94182eea3b4d3965d1c0a4d14ca0f7b9e580ef2
1dcc6c562fd7c1734541da98844370433608f441cd98169b94f19bef4baa59c0
4683d69286803ab36acc942b18e166b07a976e77538d8152098dbd4c3bb3e23a
c588dd86db5e2a556195de37931de368197493a86dddd9814bd52faa15f36279
b2964bc4a7fef51ebf73050c59cb67019af5bc7bc3c173ac04df1732fe7fde21
ab36208979b9cb03ae21b63dfb4b61a30468755b56fd039e5e6d2c965cbcc2d5
13268952fd2f85455c006b0fe468922414fc7cf0f0c66e768b8858eb84158e98
3a76011c79cb1d525b9ed23e7aca7d860acfd19c4bef1c3b38d9f6eb5c00817a
08d841e0a5c5bb2366ffd04fa668ab9c8bf691135a357826fba77bcce5019a46
a8d1ae37290485a3e8c0eb99f150f4d1973a6ffa4a265f5244451fb435b86e2a
29d235246f188508c56b72e95168e8eda1aa2ae1b35460f9505f5cadb57a9144
25425bc4286b3d716d81a62547a53615221ae0a3ee33287650ad41d47c487210
46ef068b393ea63007d699f9bb29e3d023d0529723fd91ab643435a46ad78e14
dbd15804ca3700556af69dde1e60070444f8f9b452d5610edcaec6dfc24f028a
2f0b690a4621199ff596a23bd11306a11254cb081e436762e7ec4d59a4a48168
1e189d73648b7b07c29f998e2168051b07a7ce353a1754aba177a98d02fac682
3313a090f7dade3f7f013d121b730d44abe40ddab2180050bd9fdaf9c3c41e43
b8be8d210ce468db164417d8a0c6fc07d104fe3b4ab5cdf18a4a02bf9a07c2a6
2841c855ea816367c8af37d1d11bba67e9759cf75ea253b13499a21961d7fa8b
5ee7c6abfa5b4ef7d2b746364516781bf198094113fce3514274688e3fa173d6
e2fb4f0489fff6c6e4c98f5e1d8cb19cb38606b562afb577ed399c9536012729
735df516dda55899b3a3decfff923e61281c3deec765fb69040fa0de9c2fe889
4f119f0cd7c8ef0e186464d1b6187cd215234ed8583d6f0eec70d9cc0ac7780d
d47ae1b78e098a4877a943ed6b8247b9f3345f5252f54dabb5976bde8bcbcf3b
035ae0a700fdee77f674ec5736d909ba0f9c0dffe8a0e8ad0badf78d6e6eb50e
17232574651c0beb040dc9ae82a6cd53dc7c14295e331d37615204702f2dd95c
b5b107804130dbc78494ef2d651d61bad8ef969ff0adb9b39d84acb92a2db8c2
ceeb9d50da688f23dc45452b6753ae8211c3456ab06432ba6006961587f36b86
92162f251757cd19c3740adfbd4eddffa142cbbfc1ff7f576946d36232483147
a18a3c90b388c80e58c6d104d4e1460e473577b004ff8ecc4b6596f73cd6faae
c1e4b91e7413fca0adefabc1b609fe5b4feb4c5e14991c17efd25d49050d7f84
00928e4dc68edecafbdd87d1775eb3a4caa9c9f705c97d3ca1ae44290f0af452
d41945c1598b424f7cf2472fd4691cfed2bb98e93f79ecf1d137c3471507106d
aac8fd5c146b060c61b4f6b4c36805acc52c418d39e089623a5117f299e96996
ede6544cfe86639db789df3ab97e650ca5b05c51577e5ef2a2a62fcee4025aeb
769cd2ac10d142712c8a1fb45e3a9368a3d5c73b44023bd42b12902882aee2d1
16f7855db92307aa3efa4f44294642b56f381f3f153b54ec82de3958a599cad6
02661b8343a9efce1aa9d6791d62fa9669a432ddc6fe68cef8b56f714d27a4c6
0ff1b1d0f0046b3126fbf0af817309c48a742657027fb906d8387df8f63dce31
a183ba99eace38a6c4f37142ca01741fa9b3cd7e60f96a6b0f4fa03eba3d363b
ad40ac65c1556065b84ff0d914fea57d662f50ce25d03b50d823e0bf71917246
476efd5f297cc30b1d88c3cb2718cb6ff44e9f4699bd8833746f18fe3850692e
44fe72ec3e285990103ceea47bad5cf28e599b8cbc27e507fa1bd4982e4471af
87ba8b35303ef93c89dd863bea0f7de0c0e90f4213dd976b9aba2ea87c661fec
e8a64ed90467af059dcb764f9399d6ff9dd12dac8ec610e54fa7ed5b2698f87a
e5f92cc942f94996ad79507d2f285b316ad8341b9a0368181bbf557575cd7027
02c2b78a33cc0c79db1fba5a125ca184f077049c2a6097ed036dab52bc38e093
8b709f7daeb8cf12086e0ebd83a947bfc5d93ffa3433852b7e37359977f9d2ef
8d1bebdbd53509017014324331261a000c41c2cda42efc20a5b6de233321fe3b
7387382735d72b4ec97d82be7c75e47693a6bd70100d46a27905f5ca
ct: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: c5af2f291a310a44fc1d3de6e031a4ac00cab841c01a678bffac70682ff40d01
]]></artwork>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="tv-oquake">
        <name>OQUAKE</name>
        <t>This test vector uses the configuration <tt>oquake-mlbuaskem1024</tt>.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
# Inputs
PRS: 70617373776f7264
sid: 491ebc580e99bdb207149851a41ade6e
U: 636c69656e74
S: 736572766572
public_context:
00000010491ebc580e99bdb207149851a41ade6e00000006636c69656e740000
0006736572766572
secret_context:

# Randomness
keygen_seed:
1b72ffacae1cea34e0b1b39c5ba3a48e510e96ae870d2852c48923451364b514
d09ef8c406ab29630af1cfae37d33f930309f92795f2b81d523067b309023664
kemeleon_m:
8058404972743800913033774606104527928166
1110385295860749891559900999499439305027
1286656160270843980114744582003922295292
7874892916391994581161732664824306710224
oquake_r:
24076dc36a2800779ad25b37b3160f036c85b2e78b174203c4dc1ec592eb982f
6390f50f537e8f220a25bbd5cdd320e5b295c8e46fa92b1f86ba33f2ac1af3d3
encaps_m:
0063df53afc95a34dc243ef15048268578ca06f51990c1491bcae15140bc7a02

# Intermediate values
oquake_upk: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oquake_k:
a2f6f231f2a39385f8bc7fcebd1325a9d8bc74304ba408515277464e3aba8b9e

# Messages
init_msg: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resp_msg: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# Outputs
key: 5dd4c8b1a0d75e7e1630909c3631a42581da38eef299a91f882a3daff51eda6f
th: 3561ba81783f339f83a687d470dcbc7cdd6912d13c463b349a6617b98a282add
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="tv-oquakeplus">
        <name>OQUAKE+</name>
        <t>This test vector uses the configuration <tt>oquakeplus-mlbuaskem1024-mlkem1024</tt>.
The message reg_msg is the registration message (<xref target="registration-message-encoding"/>).</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
# Inputs
PRS: 70617373776f7264
salt:
e795a40feaffe55c21b8406d81a58c6b93abc1c748e0f1d00288279ddfaf3e05
U: 636c69656e74
S: 736572766572
sid: 58ab9b8b68c5235ef34d55ed9360bef5
public_context:
0000001058ab9b8b68c5235ef34d55ed9360bef500000006636c69656e740000
0006736572766572
secret_context:

# Randomness
kem_blind:
8b48a9bdea8c06e6ec7a3a1a556c0986261c17c5b504593119fc572a395589b3
keygen_seed:
8f303d58861d5681fe2c425cee78427c20256c2d237598c0ceb138e69a8d0bb0
82672481ca851c51a1d0ab120cf41a7b2124c535f7da8b56060945ca628b760a
kemeleon_m:
3894838351867222182646994939770830104979
3434737787003320894514588210210527540422
3892794890143457944485005844715318524131
6849880024357140307951614887883724123854
oquake_r:
31e2e12b0d7d5899ae40424344eecd2e2f529081cd94745063102d8a475558bb
c10c478aa35240e82bbde6bd7091219e77967f1935d17f3799059fde95497617
encaps_m:
acdbaedc185b33aacb977863068a0cd004ed6b01c3ff85be5ae2ebeaf8869972
kem_encaps_m:
7ce9143437820b9bafd22810916aaac611a04c9e99886fccc07392bbae6cd15c

# Intermediate values
v: 34f9688e2af8846d2a5cf8bf6817339e18216363ad9db156e537d72428d2777e
seed:
e672f5bf8747b29e9d7cb029ef5d89014c75f2b38f94d628e1bcbc2eb608c4ef
e8619363763e488ed159ce6f9ec27566be8d4b6ce6e58b0c4452145c3859533f
pk: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_upk: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oquake_k:
5fed48cf64ca626f7fd0924b1114b7f688fc713843e0de5d93707eb5fe4e946b
oquake_key:
4f3921415c3969527a7b0fbf83c6efbba1bb95f3dae3c3fa0731611b7bd1b662
oquake_th:
917ff7bd48083b1909f3a5544e31d65e486390a640f2e0e0df4153a133563291
pc_k:
8d8e3be25ac114ca6d25bcd063de31be569e0d1b581152eee49000aa639a48ac

# Messages
reg_msg: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msg1:
6c3606a8141ed76fe371280ec20035dd2248ff4db35c9750e68a8560fb623edf
b88079e379ea6fe65ca07a374b2b658c70e00c63730042391b36a1b375213a08
a0e29b203bb309b63706eccd6e7489b7f8120c2b2e0d319c9077369c7716d5be
6192f90483dc91f4725aedcf64e8e24e372777d4f9829d8ee5bac6a95c45d156
7c1838d398edfcbf979a2123c3dc1712f240c6bf75e649dcb7577992e7559a18
6713a24ea00091e2e5c784113f76a68a25f27c2c8330c9bb8cbb69ac7a7be87b
f528d5b0760f16fd439285cff2029a4f7a6cba635e7a594b462e657d26847fb6
95f5159e247fcddca5d2a3fc71afd10ee8191f1f21f08c19539365ce5c4b6342
e385ac1db6cc8f180ec0b84a48ebc6ed0d0036a049180c6ed4899caf454f05ee
6d5ad5ed5b2f8c0486841ed426bba7449893aaabcc926dc8590dad1304a970ec
5ff5ace31ff043d774c5539984dfbe3a15c89655937ad5aadcd68e6f3960f856
6b14737557f00e1568a645162d4999fec658cff9029ffc3e8950d3200456db56
7528cad92e05a473e451c6080942ecd458900c780c44bc170c00d1efaf536d83
4e417efd19fdcd2ab4d0842b29a94040b16d309eb96922fdfff8db911133189f
1db3d43478a37c7c25881611e23d3d76803f4c00a20340d25dbd63209b72f24b
b16e0ed207916fa1e13138935f0b6e13e551c91fd740a78d230289b48aa3714d
c76eb9705d01d9ad9f543642723e5509fde1e2b692eee2c56bcdcc81fe89938a
75b6c6d67cbf384b13a56e334e2c90517ddc29918578bc0ea57ee5e50b8f7efe
d609f85dca77aa5282d7d5a15e737f52a519387010c5cf72919be008717aab04
41cbbb67d8de372f232ad5207716de911547a4ab2670931f58c7e06dcb7e718d
597826babca2aa52c6b261718b59bdd0920a2b96f902eeb668b4b053c1a78cfd
2453a8d3822f319e0d84d34970501a18157b437d263966be85a9b57c2b050ef2
71281ca4cb0d1d3ae02be94c71d148b87c88f8045af42e3c287e21c0a9c9cde4
024d454a9ccd364fa8e262d8fb651eeb88cbb2e652ba720f9f057b9f1920b48d
0d3f81b06e7cd0ad7a4a07bf2de092500fd613ebacdb9ca254fe4dd073c1d9bb
7d64d61f6d867f08ab7d3927ec1aeee7ba72a422a07f38784ee045b3421371e9
b261148af413f3abde153abbdc5eab01c73d2526426b8aadde683d8fbac5973f
168c114b11adaf6f84e1ad5834777c21d1528ffcf377c66f2501bfb5f23d558e
0072bc5a89c733de7b6a4e3d609f0a1751da586685c634752f708f23a6e1142a
bf7b36c4a6dfdc77a6f4066781aee977c791a98b066a0a3e08d84c6183e674eb
68cfcbf11c7804e8317a500ce3fba676254fcad4141fecfa5f7ab53765d90ba2
1a65f796b0811c02f5aec42d158abd4936e590a421aa9c90a14711906caa416d
04d79d47733b6cab82a56d013fb4154bb8df615b9898e7cd231221d8de812f24
f7e7d2a3867cb87f35c51f1587f408276f082665b01daeae72eb37e72d048035
491922309cda84884f77ff294f7df89be2af326844aad79efc98384274f6b00a
e0f9c5e5c11b7b6ad00bf7327814671d6eee990b03bd970cf2a7977d95922b40
35a1ae8016a50d48202188bce7333fa2c5b1d9e591c91864e6db28e2263d6cc6
8f9d3c16735ea1228e3d67d9380bcd3c7e914fb156c809dfce2bb3376e12a046
fc2f0766db08c560cb8fd65406202ffea2e138d6d52b8b40a42497f38265148a
b3b9b977c4b24c6cb52724a2e31e1df052c945724117d02acbcd61b7f4181659
09b5c1f6d7dcfa2c9e69eba54b04b6a8b6750ddfd4e657351dace716c09371dc
659b2f188ff91c07ec6d73c6f0b3ec4c83ad94cdef736811d069fa611068c72e
7f909c4094bfe16e2d960e2a1f9ea31b886501f17c7203b955df6c8406fdc718
ae2515691d1dfac384f09514185fbc473ae4601cc638f92b55b2c2dce258e1b3
99a58b7382fdd4891e98bd62fe2aa34fa2e65cae070554a1708373f621b13588
495c03a3ae0ae54eba53d864595740b6ac3b770e131ca5d1c57f9c96de489514
0e431ae462d56262123826b3e16243f9f8962270d89081ba774bc3b4e847e747
fe09969b737b81a98ba70658e83b271caa31304600fa27ec2fc6e66416206862
512c9769acb57008ad3ea0a12d679790a08f9804ca21ba17cd19f003b7971cae
d336ef7ea05a8a0de8955f2e152b2aa17a1c186f8ae6a3719ad9bf606313943a
7a3cbe84337cf5208fda181a17cda57d4c876ec96dfafa31fd3df9f0aef63e8b
44728db6e2a56eb66ccc93e855ddc975dff89613db6df8ae89fbc26c
msg2: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:
c8bbb2ff0bbffb0dc0fc11cca78ec2f53b5523f811bbc6d2eaeaf3be39c9a9af

# Outputs
key: fd317f41aa971761f29df797670baaea6b23b68fea78cd292559f6562917e859
th: c6ff82554b8a7917a144e96b951bd248d776bf85d31c0cfcab09c94797c19ccd
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="tv-cpaceoquake">
        <name>CPaceOQUAKE</name>
        <t>This test vector uses the configuration <tt>cpaceoquake-x25519-mlbuaskem1024</tt>.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
# Inputs
PRS: 70617373776f7264
sid: 5f02c05f74ddc40c6a72580fcca6c10e
U: 636c69656e74
S: 736572766572
public_context:
000000105f02c05f74ddc40c6a72580fcca6c10e00000006636c69656e740000
0006736572766572
secret_context:

# Randomness
cpace_ya:
1e2c3bbc8e3792c29232575e35cc4d80393fb8c42bd3987f4cb43c36b21021c0
cpace_yb:
1babee87af38b812ab8e4dd164b09624e38ee28b250755061e2d9d4d494d43a7
keygen_seed:
fcc8b186f5cb82e4b9f0c0511c8a24290e61cc62545a95c03f4fc35e6fe0d854
9ab6fc07bbea08621a01ed31607ab4be599629a1c9cda259d61a9f45d59480ed
kemeleon_m:
1359716769713181098622270848581034533426
4935050944789845558138946659851859036593
6242109080622844525534276880490673162202
1642571121857026614820940785026838197231
oquake_r:
1ce948cc6a8080496154c5e8b803ac91c15350dc1ecab4a878d5ac7a66cae9c3
a87efa9136a7667544e49f99faec179236ed2fe33efeffb1a94d8c5ecb96349c
encaps_m:
035b3b04c060e2a07b8292a59e37a9ed93a696e8f838c15fc6be18bd5975dc80

# Intermediate values
cpace_ISK:
76068b5b5bb45cd2ba4ebc558057af5d371c23a59d271de8c4ca8d589f5549e0
548e84c13d9c3c9dc7f33707edfcc6dfcba16113298b0282d0c531c800e04814
cpace_th:
56903ef8c04ffaba94a9f63b0573398ce519289408909da20580c10120dc40a3
oquake_upk: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oquake_k:
53b55996f289077c2f3816e37353ef1fb3a0e145706aa87ef54478c86bd42de9
oquake_key:
b2fd701473e79dcba51f65f2dc66f24feef1c7dc171afb69038ed569d0e71159

# Messages
msg1:
0020bcb5882fe0e6dd63cc591f6395c2bed43267ece198751e3a3cfb57af04f0
7137
msg2: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: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# Outputs
key: da7749513854187ccca337360cc9fe85bac2446fcd4560a186fadb14cdde6679
th: d87c1f03732425d5e04b0435a8397f03d894d5f4b4391132982940fab0fb31f9
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="tv-cpaceoquakeplus">
        <name>CPaceOQUAKE+</name>
        <t>These test vectors use the configuration <tt>cpaceoquakeplus-x25519-mlbuaskem1024-xwing</tt>.
The message reg_msg is the registration message (<xref target="registration-message-encoding"/>).</t>
        <section anchor="tv-cpaceoquakeplus-success">
          <name>Successful Run</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
# Inputs
PRS: 70617373776f7264
salt:
d06cadf597f5edbe49665a45e5fc64a4edd0548f8f5bf378af6c36716f3ad1b8
U: 636c69656e74
S: 736572766572
sid: 54f8c1bdf63ed6ba5003e76b5cfb83bb
public_context:
0000001054f8c1bdf63ed6ba5003e76b5cfb83bb00000006636c69656e740000
0006736572766572
secret_context:

# Randomness
kem_blind:
d8f4938d02f56defce1bc453ea277a9dc5721b9ca4824a9f4512e6a95c06497e
cpace_ya:
c241fe16e46eac30c95023d16c521b4c3ec4c1cc37644158d24774da2c7fbee6
cpace_yb:
54f1ed086a0e47a516a386063d5b00dc885f54a363d200fa4c476e571d70c3a6
keygen_seed:
2ed9ebe24644fc70c7ee4e6b433c7ba00598d72aa27dbe9cd3471eae3d386e81
ef008112e130e1c20b9eb06d7fcae99806c9e7b043a95a0f1b13ec7e5491b4cb
kemeleon_m:
1237154876545894753131008903038350498507
4441771810281243994208228782343105948742
7348407785231099440785815711724642103725
3365632252984598452680259611360129490452
oquake_r:
fadd3ce70d33a645d35b7637f4a85662271b997b37c559e9a6c919a20a7cdf38
b0833a3dbd2067f4fef035dda680da2cceaf88be9f754b5b543f6195205a7650
encaps_m:
9f3cfed05a4e87a6d9c14e3e2d0dcb596ac5211b7cbdd9a61eb9c5a7b56cdfad
kem_encaps_eseed:
43f54cc465ca9a277cfccb23f83bbcb6b53b9949b442850927728d96bc858a70
29d75bae549e77de7fe203fcece7c33aedd465d3c1b7e18a8d12e5a9f8c876b1

# Intermediate values
v: a37ca5142da5199502f083958b11c6a71bd46984c4a827ccc820409b6ecebb03
seed:
9448e7b1c350695493e7b6089a04e47611016c83f9a9ec8da8dce61af053e033
pk: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_ISK:
c9f3a5ad895cb596360b5517bf4934b2209ce18aea5542592b922949fabdfe93
73e0d408f83f5d3880dc3dfee50cdff74e6c5463c10e7065483c06a1e24ea007
cpace_th:
e96915b4e2deae693e1d521147a9c8dfa6bdda42b0c3b60af14230887901573a
oquake_upk: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oquake_k:
e905f105ba20d20cc9247c691a80d7bea9af2b70ee70eb985c15a4a6da4608ef
oquake_key:
935eb74b2b93e431e1585936335c99f8377ebc9bae61b1fe4330e0220b949c60
oquake_th:
385a8e60b1f6efdfe7316767158ac9a892377a7ef3ecd3a9f5b9b182088c40d7
cpaceoquake_key:
6aabdd9cabc86db4bb916546eefb35a3feb35411ae12c0524ffbae4af5ee1d55
pc_k:
99a52dac35b2d447e7061e035574aa94725d9e953c448c413d2a4c021ab9c7fc

# Messages
reg_msg: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msg1:
002063af203866b894ce2043caeac4bf6128a71597d94c4f656b48db5c0e8f51
1407
msg2: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: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: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:
12775f7ca2ca2ed02229f577c1da782917f5b2097ff38c76dfc2b2495a106b70

# Outputs
key: 449e3dbd30117643ed3bdc78289dbb07c158ec7085f439c508813fff856b8e62
th: 994569e229cfa9c6c1986b118d688e735bfa33fe013cce858a4a69bb597d81e1
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="incorrect-serverconfirm">
          <name>Incorrect server_confirm</name>
          <t>This test vector uses the inputs, randomness, and messages msg1 to msg4 of <xref target="tv-cpaceoquakeplus-success"/>.
A server that receives the following msg5 raises an AuthenticationError.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
msg5:
13775f7ca2ca2ed02229f577c1da782917f5b2097ff38c76dfc2b2495a106b70
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="wrong-password">
          <name>Wrong Password</name>
          <t>In this test vector, the client runs the protocol with client_PRS instead of the registered PRS.
OQUAKE.Finish at the server returns random_key, and the client raises an AuthenticationError on receipt of msg4.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
# Inputs
PRS: 70617373776f7264
salt:
8e88aecb7ad695567cb7c4b48fc41edcf1cb1adfe1a990a2d33e81aa5de02b59
U: 636c69656e74
S: 736572766572
sid: afa3f8d790ddb09b5ec5b137b3673628
public_context:
00000010afa3f8d790ddb09b5ec5b137b367362800000006636c69656e740000
0006736572766572
secret_context:
client_PRS: 77726f6e672070617373776f7264

# Randomness
kem_blind:
f327b5ccef0d7c249e8598e02036b8b34dd036da1f0eb79dfdce07bf61d3a5d5
cpace_ya:
e0b6d06d432560280a6f15fd21b372f5e572c76091586164f66f0b139b13d8b3
cpace_yb:
87e8d3a3f20cf59584954a5b88b0290fae13950e63e85ece1a43005127541af8
keygen_seed:
d30f9497783cdf7f835a0eb87ff72623f51b00292b9766cb0c089c68d354f99b
2b815271ae29e666ce4912477114cfffdcd6d4804fc8718d3031a98090e7d05b
kemeleon_m:
4567725574285524412479118180070268523173
3189614764122988195248002645185953521794
5346793645985749529627698781893394013311
7480348256781391904521126196694462393734
oquake_r:
85df3a5ae66b6c2f6a5ed95e178b7110d2f8e449d0fe5de7a67e42098fbe71f3
3394b56eb0d76a198d1bf4c2ad045d0650e4a83489f1f1ff7f043e8b93ae7a57
encaps_m:
e531946f170229dc57c11d876863dee09309f9049335654743e460a3d6293a62
random_key:
0b6a42ca7f7854b840a61a6750275eea5903b2aea9488c4bb6002086fa981311
kem_encaps_eseed:
0b7714fba342e4a36bdf0ed87030d98dfeb7a5ee4a35d8ce2792be6e277356ae
17253290da2dea3c70ccf1622ae5191d5f503655bc3327660120cfa4275d39d7

# Messages
reg_msg: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msg1:
002017569a58fccd75d6f21eddb82925456a059d457c85961437dce27a478a74
922a
msg2: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: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:
c8d895faccb6ef3998061b5806238a1579d75d761d6dd7e055dc44022d3fa210
d7ce73271f1631f9f31ec3d0c4f64bd99beab082b0bc6d13ffee76d06dfa66ea
f2ab412c4111413fbd54305f1bd52f214d4d081cb11e303cdfd80fb2e157c1a1
51dbff1ae9b7b46c274ff7d5a3b294216e53710341db703b3058daf841311c76
8105430496b252a96ce76dc9f76eb554e938ad31443363be3f7bcc9be4426b10
cc63a380dadd12769cd740b4590812efcd53347e7dfe6d7eee3a412cb4bec68a
7e572256cec39273d8cd5968997b688c83a0e9b59e8309c383b5781004f9aa6d
7d19b6cc326ead21727763ef6980666ab23d1987971a531ace62f497d285df5a
cf502eddccb5af6beb11067345bf32331febc9f0f7cddb8f983b701933436188
f784b2318d0fbdf04074a3e36e235571956ec304a74ede784fa16c33ccd265b2
ca1bbfaba57276be9dd483de39e48ee8f01977faeac41071ee2dd4bff5e00e4b
222a699bdc162a85e020f794da6f732874148975f9bcfd9d6561096df232c3f6
95c3f4736ef7c467f9009479f3b6be84a0421b44c34ab319e3d6ca54d026e46e
cd8b3ebd7e647db433b8aa0ba900916f611397a4055eccfd99c9b4bd1fc3263c
997a78115bf872b6a8f6e4c842d22c730668dfa584d8d2bedfbf35a640f34f94
d11cefe53fdd045bebc38baa173c6627ea70bfac4c26b5b2085505ad38f0b4e5
d6ddce0f20aa504eb8489c4e6ad1e8b9da1dcef8fd920255c406c9efd87354c4
f09279820559ed1e0b545dd0dd10e8548583dcd0dab9568a52789f4ef278120e
318a1d70bc55c03b5d33ca856dfb5efaf919237336530b2b2791cdba79d6f740
c4bc64b6489ef0d97a711da1e482dbb5d87ac96032a6feb6fec9d7e8aa4f4150
7be92e8d5b171268e938b70331e5877f9bfaedf8de227eb1f67171abf5167455
292c12e71bf21314ce1870ca8e62768143d359d1799a14876269085aa89a3139
756fa69a438346caaddeb5cbaf27cbf6967eea27d602dabb65a88aea0a65a3bb
dbba31b3aeedc3e89324ba7d60d44434c2e7e49b20fc6832fe7c4d782fb20966
7e52965467c47514e671a2c95b9548935bc2efe670e06bf4091db65772e81efb
364df9fd4bdc3283c859eff3c8b218dfea374487cf79e601d96f6bc3c7a10e12
32738297c33d6fd46b281f413e3261c6e8908ea58f3707a27b6ea4d900b06180
544af0cba33df6fe90ba3aa9a0052cd676c8acf6cc74251b23126a97c5753d32
ee17e182551ca0492d98877678ae6660f85ed78f614889910578f17a84ad0f51
5eb3fd13d8a9c1d0f00223df2ed9f24628c83188c5dcf99c7b84fb86d9020036
0c0603b3a614e80a3809d44ce8499e2e89500e8dedb3bb9950b300cf47b82773
3a067801fb0be79a94b6ccdfbbca2117e23ca7497e75b9253f096a4cc1066eb8
4bc0858dbb01013dc1d934fc2a4c0ce931bb8e092c93e6056462be5da285d096
f6f1f2683cb2a04c003935530897d789485fc3bc8a8a353746322317027a0cc9
f89ef189fbdf15e970d570b057f71b99e6347f5f8f991aa9e926d55447856959
745d7bbc5e76703616b982109788e257120774ca6aa997346cf05b57ca4bff05
4464e92b6f00f62c62818dc7f35f83d0b3bc0fad63380e1ae896c323c0cc9feb

# Error
AuthenticationError, raised by the client on receipt of msg4
]]></artwork>
        </section>
        <section anchor="neutral-element">
          <name>Neutral Element</name>
          <t>A server that receives the following msg1, in which Ya is the neutral element of G_X25519, raises a CPaceError, regardless of its other inputs.
<xref target="CPACE"/> lists further points for which CPace must abort.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
msg1:
0020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000
]]></artwork>
          <!--
# Acknowledgments
{:numbered="false"}

TODO acknowledge.
-->

</section>
      </section>
    </section>
  </back>
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